A Special Kind of Scripturalist

It takes is a special kind of Scripturalist to use historical development of a doctrine as the basis upon which to say, “No, you’ve got it all wrong.” Yet, that is exactly what Sean Gerety has done (link)... or rather, is trying to do, as he as yet has not even correctly handled the history of the Trinity. I keep waiting for him to address the following arguments, any one of which is sufficient to devastate his view of the Trinity:

1. Scripture always refers to the Father alone is always the referent of “one God” (Romans 3:30, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Ephesians 4:6, 1 Timothy 2:5) or “[only] true God” (John 17:3, 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 John 5:20). (link)

2. Jesus is the Son of God. Jesus is not the Son of a set of divine attributes, He’s the Son of a person. (link)

3. Divine [or human] attributes are predicated of persons. Persons are not predicated of divine [or human] attributes. (link)

4. Scripture always refers to the Father as Παντοκράτωρ or παντοκράτορος (“Almighty”). (link)

5. Not once does Sean himself examine what the Nicene Creed says. Allow me: The Creed says “We believe in one God, the Father Almighty.” The Creed says the Son is “God of God.” When the creed says that the Son is “God of God,” it is saying the Son is God out from (ek) the Father, or the Father is the source of the Son. Thus, the Creed does not say the Son is “God of Himself” (autotheos), it says He is “God of God.” This is problematic for Sean, as he denied any kind of intra-Trinitarian“from/to relationship.” (link)

6. Sean cannot even seem to define “eternal generation” or “eternal procession,” not surprising since Sean affirms the aseity of the Son. At most, then, he must think the second person derives His personal property from the Father, not His person from the Father. But then it would be more appropriate to refer to the Son as eternally adopted. Further, this neo-Adoptionism appears to make the relationships among the persons arbitrary, since there is no reason to suppose that the personal properties could not have been reversed. (link)

7. Three Trinitarians minds and three Trinitarian wills are necessary to preserve the distinct thoughts each possesses and roles each has in the covenant of redemption and economy of salvation. In this case, the idea the persons are united numerically can’t be true (link). But if Sean rejects numeric unity and the subordination of the Son and Spirit, then just as there is one definition of human but multiple humans, so there must, on Sean's view, be one definition of God but multiple Gods. (link)

These are just several of the relevant points of Scripture and logic I have mentioned in the course of our blog discussion, all of which he has had ample time to address. I have also received no reply to my post showing a difference between myself and Samuel Clarke – I believe the Son and Spirit to exist necessarily – which has, thus far, been critical to Sean’s accusation that I am a Unitarian. Nor has he responded to my post showing that Alexander of Alexandria who, of all things, was the primary opponent of Arius, thought that the Son is subordinate to the Father. He has, however, admitted on facebook that Novatian constitutes precedent for our view. But I suppose these early church fathers were just a bunch of Arians and Unitarians? Right.

Speaking of curious views of history, Sean apparently thinks I should acknowledge my conscience to be bound to the Athanasian Creed. So much for Scripturalism and sola scriptura. If he doesn’t think it to be infallible, then why should I really care what Sproul thinks about it? On that subject, though, I would note that Sproul doesn’t make a normative or universal statement. Rather, Sean leaves it to the reader to connect the dots: Ryan rejects the Athanasian Creed, so Ryan is obviously arrogant and obviously wrong.

But even assuming Sean’s tacit denial of the formal principle of the Reformation, it’s preposterous that Sean would presume to moralize on Trinitarianism in church history when he can’t even consistently affirm the Nicene Creed. If I’m culpable for denying a non-ecumenical creed not even written by the person after whom it was named, how much more is Sean culpable for denying the Nicene Creed? He objects that I misunderstand the Nicene Creed. But he has yet to make good on that objection.

Meanwhile, I have consistently explained why it is that I am able to affirm the co-equality or co-essentiality of the Son and Spirit with the Father in terms of their unity in distinctly yet univocally possessing the same attributes, a fact which renders Sean’s insinuations to the contrary a lie and his citations of Athanasius irrelevant. It is his burden of proof to show that being self-existent and autotheos are divine attributes. It is his burden of proof to harmonize his idea with the questions and arguments he has so far been unable to answer.

Furthermore, I would point out that Sean has admitted his view of the Incarnation is not compatible with Chalcedonian Christology (link). This isn’t even a question of logical inference: Sean openly denies that Chalcedon is true. But then I too can cite modern theologians who think this council is, as Sean puts it, “affirmed by virtually every historic Protestant church,” leaving it to the reader to follow my own trail of bread crumbs. In fact, I don’t need to look any further than Nick Needham, a cohort of R.C. Sproul (link):

It’s hard enough to pronounce “Chalcedon.” Getting to grips with its theology can be even more daunting. But the effort will be very richly rewarded. For the past 1,500 years, right up to the present day, virtually all orthodox Christian theologians have defined their “orthodoxy” with reference to the Council of Chalcedon. That certainly includes the Reformed tradition. We may not think that the early ecumenical councils were infallible. But we have generally held that they were gloriously right in what they affirmed, and that Christians who take the church and its history seriously must reckon with these great councils as providential landmarks in the unfolding life story of God’s people.

For good measure, here is what R.C. Sproul says (link):

The fifth century saw the convening of perhaps the most important christological council in all of church history at Chalcedon in 451. Here orthodox Christianity had to fight a battle on two fronts. On the one hand was the opposition to the orthodox view of the nature of Christ in His incarnation by Eutyches. Eutyches was a monophysite — he declared that Jesus had only one nature. This nature was called a single “theanthropic nature,” meaning a divinely human nature or a humanly divine nature. This position, saying that Christ had one nature (Greek: monophysis), obscured both the real deity and the real humanity that were united in the incarnation of Christ. 

On the other side of the debate, the Nestorians argued that if Jesus had two natures, He had to have had two persons as well, so they separated the two natures of Christ into two persons. Over against both heresies, Chalcedon gave its famous formula by which it declared that Christ is truly God and truly man, with the natures perfectly united in such a way that they are not confused — the natures are without mixture, confusion, division, or separation; each nature retains its own attributes. This was a watershed council because it set the boundaries or parameters of christological speculation. The two natures were not to be merged or confused; the human nature, for example, would not be absorbed or swallowed up in the divine nature and vice versa. At the same time, the two natures were not to be separated so as to lose their unity in the one person. 

Throughout history since Chalcedon, the church in virtually every generation has had to face the tendencies of either confusing the two natures or dividing or separating the two natures. Orthodoxy in the fifth century declared that the natures must be distinguished yet never separated. They must be distinguished and never be co-mingled.

Now, does any of this bother Sean? Clearly not. And why should it? He has elsewhere lamented that “It’s a shame more Protestants don’t think like Calvin when it comes to the so-called “ecumenical” Councils” (link). Little did Sean know that he would become one of those Protestants. Clearly there is a double standard at play, and the reason is that Sean is not able to address the above arguments.

Really, this whole discussion of historical theology is a distraction. I don’t mind exposing Sean’s farcical view of church history, and I am in the process of doing just that, but the idea that two Scripturalists should be arguing about anything other than Scripture or that which can necessarily be inferred from it in a conversation about so serious a topic as the Trinity is ludicrous. Or maybe Sean wants to take a crack at naming all of the Scripturalists in the last millennium too. Anyway, moving on...

Instead the Son and Spirit derive their existence from the Father who then delegates his authority to them.  Neither the Son nor the Spirit are “autotheos” or God in themselves.  Their divinity is derived and contingent on the Father’s essential and supreme divinity.  According to Hedrich and Shelton only the Father can be called God in the fullest sense and the Son and Spirit are merely his messengers or servants both of whom act as pointers or emissaries leading people to the “one true God the Father.”  Ryan calls Jesus Christ a “vicegerent,” which means that he is God’s deputy who exercises power delegated to him by the Father and something He lacks intrinsically and in himself.  Shelton refers to Jesus as an “icon” who is not strictly speaking God incarnate (which in his warped mind would mean the Father is incarnate), but rather is  “the representative of God on earth who has de jure authority over all men.”   The important thing to keep in mind is that when these men say “God” they mean “the Father.”

Autotheos means God-of-Himself, not God-in-Himself. Sean would like it if I let this slip by without notice, because then he would indeed have good reason to say I think the Son lacks intrinsic power. But that isn’t the case, and he knows it. The Son is divine in Himself – and thus He is God in one sense – but not of Himself – and thus He is not God in a separate sense. Similarly, I am a man in myself, but I am not a man of myself. Sean conflated “in” with “of” in our facebook discussion and, when corrected, withdrew it. It appears he has forgotten this miscue.

The Son indeed has power and authority, but it is power and authority received from the Father (Matthew 28:18, John 17:2). Sean may reply that these are references to economic activity, as if it could ever have been said that the Father received power from the Son. Let’s take a look at these Scriptures:

John 10:17-18 For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life that I may take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again. This charge I have received from my Father.

John 12:49-50 For I have not spoken on my own authority, but the Father who sent me has himself given me a commandment—what to say and what to speak. And I know that his commandment is eternal life. What I say, therefore, I say as the Father has told me.

John 14:30-31 I will no longer talk much with you, for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no claim on me, but I do as the Father has commanded me, so that the world may know that I love the Father. Rise, let us go from here.

John 15:10 If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father's commandments and abide in his love.

Now, can we really say the Son could have refused the commandments of the Father, or is it the case the Father “has a claim,” so to speak, on Him? If obliged to obey, does not the Father have authority over the Son just as the Son has authority over us (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:3)? Or is the capacity of the Father to charge and command the Son just an arbitrary happenstance which could have been reversed? Could the Son have commanded the Father? What does Sean think? Well, maybe he’ll get around to answering these things in one of his posts.

Given this, we have reason to say that the Father is the ultimate object of worship. Sean notes a host of passages which state we ought to worship Christ. Well, no one denied that. But ironically, the context of one of the two other passages Sean cited clearly connects our worship and honor of the Son to the fact it was the Father – the head of the Son, a head without head – who placed Him at the head of creation:

John 5:22-23 The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son, that all may honor the Son, just as they honor the Father. Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him. 

Next, Sean writes:

Sadly, Hedrich’s failure to honor the Son while thinking he is honoring the Father stems from a complete misreading of the Nicene fathers and Athanasius in particular. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is the fact that all of church history, including the entirety of the Reformed tradition, stand in direct opposition to Hedrich.  Yet, this observation hardly gives this proud young man even the slightest pause.  But unlike “Athanasius contra mundum,” Hendich remains “contra Athanasius.” At the heart of Henrich’s departure from the faith lies the misplaced belief that the eternal generation of the Son necessitates the ontological and authoritative subordination of the Son to the Father, but that is precisely the  opposite of what Athanasius taught and what the Nicene creed affirmed.  For Hedrich, just as we derive out existence from our human parents, the Son as the only begotten of the Father derives his existence and divinity in a similar fashion, but that kind of one to one comparison is what the Nicene fathers wanted to avoid.  The irony is if Hedrich is correct then Athanasius would be advocating the very subordinationism he was opposing in his fight against the Arians and semi-Arians.   

Firstly, subordinationism refers to the heresy of stating the nature of the Son is unequal to that of the Father. I have not made that mistake. But his citation of Athanasius only proves that the nature of the relationship between the Father and Son is not corporeal. Who said it was? How does this prove that the generation of the Son can in no way be understood “after the manner of men”? For Athanasius also says “such as he that begets, such of necessity is the offspring” and asks, “for who hears of a son but conceives of that which is proper to the father’s essence?” (link) Likewise, in his chapter on Athanasius in The Trinity, Gordon Clark held that “Christ is the Son of God as Isaac was the son of Abraham: not a moral but a natural sonship.” I would admittedly be somewhat astonished that Sean could actually disagree with Clark. Interestingly, from that same work Sean quoted, we read Athanasius affirms the subordination of the Son (link):

(4.) Nor again, in saying that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is one only God, the only Ingenerate, do we therefore deny that Christ also is God before ages: as the disciples of Paul of Samosata, who say that after the incarnation He was by advance made God, from being made by nature a mere man. For we acknowledge, that though He be subordinate to His Father and God, yet, being before ages begotten of God, He is God perfect according to nature and true, and not first man and then God, but first God and then becoming man for us, and never having been deprived of being.

One can search high and low, but the context does not reference any economic activity. It is clear Athanasius is talking about the ontological Trinity. So will Sean say Athanasius a subordinationist? No. How do I know this? Because I’ve already pointed Sean to this passage in Athanasius, all he had to say in reply was: “You do have a problem as you no understanding of Athanasius and you read the economic Trinity back into the immanent Trinity. You're embarrassing yourself.” He almost convinced me with that one...

In fact, I see that he is recycling several Athanasian quotes from our facebook discussion, each of which only serves to show either he has forgotten the refutation or has hoped that I would. He says:

According to Athanasius, while the eternal generation of the Son is intended to individuate the Persons of the Godhead, it is the Godhead considered as “the eternal triad” that is the “monarche” or source of the essential divinity of the Persons and not the Father exclusively. Athanasius argues there is “a Holy Trinity but one Godhead and one beginning [arche], and that the Son is co-essential with the Father … while the Holy Spirit [is] proper to and inseparable from the essence of the Father and the Son.”

But that there is one genus “Godhead” and one “beginning” does not mean the Godhead is the arche. Again, I will cite for Sean now what I cited then (link):

Believing then in the All-perfect Triad, the most Holy, that is, in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and calling the Father God, and the Son God, yet we confess in them, not two Gods, but one dignity of Godhead, and one exact harmony of dominion, the Father alone being Head over the whole universe wholly, and over the Son Himself, and the Son subordinated to the Father; but, excepting Him, ruling over all things after Him which through Himself have come to be, and granting the grace of the Holy Ghost unsparingly to the saints at the Father’s will. For that such is the account of the Divine Monarchy towards Christ, the sacred oracles have delivered to us.

The Divine Monarch is the Father, not the Godhead. Sean didn’t even bother to reply to this quote in our facebook discussion. His cherry-picking of Athanasius doesn’t imply his inferences, and any careful reader will see this.

Next, Sean highlights Giles as saying all subordinationists describe the relationship between the Son and Father is asymmetrical. Okay. So? Sean’s arguments leave much to be desired. If his conclusion is that all those who describe the relationship between the Son and Father as asymmetrical are subordinationists, that’s an obvious fallacy, but what else could have been the point of the quote?

Sean then cites my interpretation of Genesis 1:26 in which I state that I believed the Father to be referring to the heavenly court. This reason is given by Bruce Waltke: “the other four uses of the plural pronoun with reference to God ([Gen.] 3:22; 11:7; Isa. 6:8) do not seem to refer to the Trinity” (Genesis: A Commentary, pg. 64). Isaiah 6:2-7, for instance, pertain to the actions of seraphim. Are seraphim divine? No. Wallace writes (link):

In 2 Sam 24:14 David uses the plural as representative of all Israel, and in Isa 6:8 the Lord speaks on behalf of his heavenly court. In its ancient Israelite context the plural is most naturally understood as referring to God and his heavenly court (see 1 Kgs 22:19-22; Job 1:6-12; 2:1-6; Isa 6:1-8). (The most well-known members of this court are God’s messengers, or angels. In Gen 3:5 the serpent may refer to this group as “gods/divine beings.” See the note on the word “evil” in 3:5.) If this is the case, God invites the heavenly court to participate in the creation of humankind (perhaps in the role of offering praise, see Job 38:7), but he himself is the one who does the actual creative work (v. 27). Of course, this view does assume that the members of the heavenly court possess the divine “image” in some way. Since the image is closely associated with rulership, perhaps they share the divine image in that they, together with God and under his royal authority, are the executive authority over the world.

Does Sean’s view of the Trinity really hang on one Old Testament passage? What would it prove if his interpretation were correct? I think focusing on minutiae is Sean’s way of avoiding the more important questions while appearing to save face. He does, however, take this opportunity to conflate existing “in” oneself to existing “of” oneself, a notion Athanasius himself puts to rest here:

Christ is the Word of God. Did He then subsist by Himself, and subsisting, has He become joined to the Father, or did God make Him or call Him His Word? If the former, I mean if He subsisted by Himself and is God, then there are two Beginnings; and moreover, as is plain, He is not the Father’s own, as being not of the Father, but of Himself. But if on the contrary He be made externally, then is He a creature. It remains then to say that He is from God Himself; but if so, that which is from another is one thing, and that from which it is, is a second; according to this then there are two. But if they be not two, but the names belong to the same, cause and effect will be the same, and begotten and begetting, which has been shewn absurd in the instance of Sabellius. But if He be from Him, yet not another, He will be both begetting and not begetting; begetting because He produces from Himself, and not begetting, because it is nothing other than Himself. But if so, the same is called Father and Son notionally. But if it be unseemly so to say, Father and Son must be two; and they are one, because the Son is not from without, but begotten of God. But if any one shrinks from saying ‘Offspring,’ and only says that the Word exists with God, let such a one fear lest, shrinking from what is said in Scripture, he fall into absurdity, making God a being of double nature. For not granting that the Word is from the Monad, but simply as if He were joined to the Father, he introduces a twofold essence, and neither of them Father of the other. And the same of Power. And we may see this more clearly, if we consider it with reference to the Father; for there is One Father, and not two, but from that One the Son. As then there are not two Fathers, but One, so not two Beginnings, but One, and from that One the Son essential.

Athanasius rejects that the Word “subsisted by Himself” or “of Himself” – so much for autotheos or aseity – as such implies “two Beginnings” rather than one [God]. Yes, Athanasius did say, and correctly so, that “what is said of the Father, is said in Scripture of the Son also, all but His being called Father,” but what does it mean to be the Father? Until Sean can explain the doctrine of eternal generation, he has no answer. And even if he were to to do so, it appears he would disagree with Athanasius, the Nicene Creed, etc.

Sean wraps up his post by evading yet another question – does he hold to generic unity? – begging another – how is my explanation of generic and numeric unity faulty? – and relying on well-poisoning to prejudice his readers. I expect better in the future.

The Early Church, Trinitarianism, and the Subordination of the Son I

[This will be the first of a series of posts on the Trinitarian views of the early church fathers, particularly focused on the way in which they view the relationship between the Father and Son. I don’t know how long this series will be, but as a general outline of what each post will look like, I plan to include 1) a brief biography of the author, 2) the author’s own statements on the Father and Son in their full context, and 3) a concluding summary of these statements in my own words. Let others consider these fathers of Trinitarianism heretical anti-Trinitarians if they dare, but if so, may they also show such from Scripture.]

Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria at the time of the construction of the Nicene Creed, was the primary opponent of Arius up to that point in time. He was principally concerned with communicating  “knowledge of the Trinity” which had been received as “the apostolic doctrines of the Church” (link). It was of him that Athanasius, his deacon, wrote (link):

…when Alexander of blessed memory had cast out Arius, those who remained with Alexander, remained Christians; but those who went out with Arius, left the Saviour's Name to us who were with Alexander, and as to them they were hence-forward denominated Arians. Behold then, after Alexander's death too, those who communicate with his successor Athanasius, and those with whom the said Athanasius communicates, are instances of the same rule; none of them bear his name, nor is he named from them, but all in like manner, and as is usual, are called Christians.

In agreeing with Alexander’s statements regarding the subordination of the Son to the Father, then, I show that I am not presenting a historical novelty but rather upholding a mainstream view of the fathers of the Nicene Creed. More importantly, in holding this view I no more count myself as among those who diminish the deity of the Son as would these authors; rather, this view allows me to be able to pay proper respect to the words of the Son Himself who said, “My Father is greater than I.”

11. And let these things be now urged according to our power against those who, with respect to matter which they know nothing of, have, as it were, rolled in the dust against Christ, and have taken in hand to calumniate our piety towards Him. For those inventors of stupid fables say, that we who turn away with aversion from the impious and unscriptural blasphemy against Christ, of those who speak of His coming from the things which are not assert, that there are two unbegottens. For they ignorantly affirm that one of two things must necessarily be said, either that He is from things which are not, or that there are two unbegottens; nor do those ignorant men know how great is the difference between the unbegotten Father, and the things which were by Him created from things which are not, as well the rational as the irrational. Between which two, as holding the middle place, the only begotten nature of God, the Word by which the Father formed all things out of nothing, was begotten of the true Father Himself. As in a certain place the Lord Himself testified, saying, “Every one that loves Him that begot, loves Him also that is begotten of Him.”  

12. Concerning whom we thus believe, even as the Apostolic Church believes. In one Father unbegotten, who has from no one the cause of His being, who is unchangeable and immutable, who is always the same, and admits of no increase or diminution; who gave to us the Law, the prophets, and the Gospels; who is Lord of the patriarchs and apostles, and all the saints. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God; not begotten of things which are not, but of Him who is the Father; not in a corporeal manner, by excision or division as Sabellius and Valentinus thought, but in a certain inexplicable and unspeakable manner, according to the words of the prophet cited above: “Who shall declare His generation?” Since that His subsistence no nature which is begotten can investigate, even as the Father can be investigated by none; because that the nature of rational beings cannot receive the knowledge of His divine generation by the Father. But men who are moved by the Spirit of truth , have no need to learn these things from me, for in our ears are sounding the words before uttered by Christ on this very thing, No man knows the Father, save the Son; and no man knows who the Son is, save the Father. That He is equally with the Father unchangeable and immutable, wanting in nothing, and the perfect Son, and like to the Father, we have learned; in this alone is He inferior to the Father, that He is not unbegotten. For He is the very exact image of the Father, and in nothing differing from Him. For it is clear that He is the image fully containing all things by which the greatest similitude is declared, as the Lord Himself has taught us, when He says, “My Father is greater than I.” And according to this we believe that the Son is of the Father, always existing. “For He is the brightness of His glory, the express image of His Father's person.” But let no one take that word always so as to raise suspicion that He is unbegotten, as they imagine who have their senses blinded. For neither are the words, “He was,” or “always,” or “before all worlds,” equivalent to unbegotten. But neither can the human mind employ any other word to signify unbegotten. And thus I think that you understand it, and I trust to your right purpose in all things, since these words do not at all signify unbegotten. For these words seem to denote simply a lengthening out of time, but the Godhead, and as it were the antiquity of the only-begotten, they cannot worthily signify; but they have been employed by holy men, while each, according to his capacity, seeks to express this mystery, asking indulgence from the hearers, and pleading a reasonable excuse, in saying, Thus far have we attained. But if there be any who are expecting from mortal lips some word which exceeds human capacity, saying that those things have been done away which are known in part, it is manifest that the words, He was, and always, and before all ages, come far short of what they hoped. And whatever word shall be employed is not equivalent to unbegotten. Therefore to the unbegotten Father, indeed, we ought to preserve His proper dignity, in confessing that no one is the cause of His being; but to the Son must be allotted His fitting honour, in assigning to Him, as we have said, a generation from the Father without beginning, and allotting adoration to Him, so as only piously and properly to use the words, “He was,” and “always,” and “before all worlds,” with respect to Him; by no means rejecting His Godhead, but ascribing to Him a similitude which exactly answers in every respect to the Image and Exemplar of the Father. But we must say that to the Father alone belongs the property of being unbegotten, for the Saviour Himself said, My Father is greater than I. 

While he is everywhere cautious not to speculate as to the nature of eternal generation, in the first paragraph, Alexander abuses the stupidity of those who argue that a denial that the Son is a creation ex nihilo from the Father implies “two unbegottens.” This is a false dichotomy. The nature of the Son is said to hold a “middle place” between creation and the “true Father Himself” from whom He was begotten – here, interestingly, Theodoret, a 5^th century early church historian, records Alexander as having said “the self-existent Father” instead of “true Father Himself” (link). 

Either way, this middle place preserves the Father’s “proper dignity” as alone unbegotten or without cause, the implication of which is that the Son, because of His generation from the Father, is caused [yet not thereby created]. This is a peculiar property of the Father, and as such, it does not imply a rejection of the Godhead or deity of the Son. For like the Father, the Son is eternal and immutable, having always existed. In fact, as being the perfect image of His Father, He is no different except insofar as He is not unbegotten: “in this alone is He inferior to the Father.” This is the position of “the Apostolic Church.”

Unitarianism, Samuel Clarke, and Assorted Details

One of Sean's stated reasons I am a hell-bound Unitarian is that historically, my view "most accurately mirrors" that of Samuel Clarke (link). Clarke was a Unitarian, so I must be too - or so, it seems, the argument goes. Now, I assume that Clarke is considered a Unitarian because his views in turn are aligned with those of Unitarianism, as Clarke predated the actual Unitarian movement by a half a century. If this assumption is correct, I would reply that even if it were the case that, historically speaking, Clarke's views were the most closely aligned with my own, that would not prove I am a Unitarian, for it may be and in fact is that I disagree with Clarke on a significant issue: the issue of whether eternal generation and procession are necessary. Clarke states in The Modest Plea (pgs. 15-18):

(1) Length of duration, how unlimited forever, either a parte post or a parte ante, in a person begotten by the Power and Will of Him that begat, does not imply Necessary Existence. And 'tis a great Presumption to affirm that, what the Scripture always expresses by a word denoting an Act, may as well be expressed by a word denoting not an Act. As to Antiquity; The Doctrine of Necessary Emanations, sprung from the Notions of Valentinus, Cerinthus, Manes, Montanus, &c. But in opposition to the numerous Passages cited by Dr. Clarke, wherein the Fathers expressly affirm the Son to be begotten by the Power and Will of the Father; 'tis observable, Dr. Waterland has not been able to produce so much as ONE single Passage out of any One Ante-Nicene Father, wherein the Son is affirmed to have emaned or been emitted by Necessity of Nature. Even They who supposed him, in an unintelligible manner, to have been the internal Reason or Wisdom of the Father, before his Generation; still suppose him to have been Generated into a real person by the Power and Will of the Father. And They who compared his Generation, to the Sun's sending forth his Rays of Light, or to One Fire lighting Another; yet All of them suppose, and Some of them expressly distinguish in this Similtude, that whereas the Sun emits his Light, and one Fire lights another, by Necessity of Nature; the Father begat the Son by his Power and Will. See Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, Part II, 17.  

(2) "A Necessary Emanation from the Father, by the Will and Power of the Father;" is an express contradiction. Because Necessity, in its very Notion, excludes all operation of Will and Power, though it may be consistent with Approbation. Whatever is by Necessity of Nature, cannot, without the highest Absurdity, be said to be By any one's Will and Power; though it may well be Agreeable and Pleasing to him. A Necessary Emanation from the Father, can no more be said to be Begotten of the Father, to be Begotten by his Power and Will; than the Father can be said to have begotten, or given Being to himself, or to his own Reason or Understanding. On the contrary, Such an Emanation, and the Essence from which it emanes, would Both be as equally self-existent, as 'tis equally necessary for God to be an Intelligent Being, and to Be at all. Whatever necessarily and essentially belongs to That which is self-existent, is itself Self existent, as being indeed only the very same thing apprehended under a partial consideration. "God" (as this matter has been expressed in the Letter to the Author of the True Scripture-Doctrine, &c. pag. 267,) "is necessarily Omnipresent and Eternal; doubtless, not without [much less against] his own Liking and Approbation: But was ever any Man therefore so absurd, as to say that he was Omnipresent and Eternal BY his will? He is likewise by Necessity of Nature, Wise and Good; that is, he always necessarily sees and knows what is right, and approves what is good; And in all this, his will is no way concerned: But whenever he Acts, whenever he Does any thing, then 'tis not by Necessity of Nature, but by the Choice of his Will." The contrary Supposition, is, in the truth of things, making him No Agent at all; 'Tis devesting him (as Mr. Hobbs has done) of the Prime Glory of all his Attributes.  

(3) But (says Dr. Waterland), "Will is One thing, and Arbitrary Will another." I answer. This is one of the greatest and most unreasonable Abuse of words, that I have ever met with in Any Writer. For the only true difference between Will and Arbitrary Will, is, that Arbitrary Will signifies Willing a thing unreasonably, and without any just Cause. But to make Arbitrary Will signify barely the Choice or Free Act of the Will, and to make Will signify mere Approbation without Any Choice or Act of the Will at all; is taking away all Sense from words. For, at This rate, a Man's Heart may be said to beat by the Will and Power of the Man, though his Will and Power have no influence at all upon it. And the Sun may be said, in the same sense, to rise and set by the Will of Man, that is, with his good Liking and Approbation. And a Balance, if it could feel itself Necessarily turned by a Superior Weight in One Scale, might justly be said to Turn itself by its Will and Power. If this be not indeed in the highest degree (to use Dr. Waterland's phrase) "elusive and equivocating," 'tis hard to say What is.

This is similar to the position of American Unitarians, a group to which Sean at one time thought and perhaps still thinks I should belong (link):

But in regard to all such accounts of the doctrine, it is an obvious remark that the existence of the Son, and of the Spirit, is either necessary, or it is not. If their existence be necessary, we have then three beings necessarily existing, each possessing divine attributes, and consequently we have three Gods. If it be not necessary, but dependent on the will of the Father, then we say that the distance is infinite between underived and independent existence, and derived and dependent, between the supremacy of God, the Father, and the subordination of beings who exist only through his will. In the latter view of the doctrine, therefore, we clearly have but one God, but at the same time the modern doctrine of the Trinity disappears. The form of statement too, just mentioned, must be abandoned, for it can hardly be pretended that these derived and dependent beings possess an equality in divine attributes, or are equal in nature to the Father. Beings whose existence is dependent on the will of another cannot be equal in power to the being on whom they depend. The doctrine, therefore, however disguised by the mode of statement which we are considering, must, in fact, resolve itself into an assertion of three Gods, or must, on the other hand, amount to nothing more than a form of Unitarianism. In the latter case, however objectionable and unfounded I may think it, it is not my present purpose to argue directly against it, and in the former case, it is pressed with all the difficulties which bear upon the doctrine as commonly stated, and at the same time with new difficulties, which affect this particular form of statement. That the Son and the Spirit should exist necessarily, as well as the Father, and possess equally with the Father all divine attributes, and yet be subordinate and inferior to the Father—or, in other words, that there should be two beings or persons, each of whom is properly and in the highest sense God, and yet that these two beings or persons should be subordinate and inferior to another being or person, who is God—is as incredible a proposition as the doctrine can involve.

The arguments are easy enough to reproduce, so I will do so in turn, explaining why each fails. In this last paragraph, we find a few arguments: 1) if the Father, Son, and Spirit each necessarily exist, then there are three Gods; 2) if the Son and Spirit are derived, then the Son and Spirit cannot be consubstantial or of the same essence or nature as the Father, as, for example, the Father’s power is supreme; 3) the Son and Spirit cannot exist necessarily yet be subordinate to the Father.

In reply, we may note that 1) and 3) both beg the question: why? No supporting arguments are provided, and I can think of none. Clarke provided a more nuanced argument which I will turn to in a moment, but no immediate objection sprang to mind when considering the possibility that the Son and Spirit necessarily exist because the Father necessarily eternally generates the Son and spirates the Spirit; in that case, then, we may say the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father is precisely found in the fact that they are [necessarily] derived from Him. In reply to 2), the presumption is that “power” is a divine attribute. What sort of power is the author referring to? Obviously, the Son and Spirit have power or authority, but that is because such has been given to them by the Father. The Father alone is called “Almighty” (2 Corinthians 6:18, Revelation 1:8, 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 16:7, 14, 19:6, 15, 21:22) and ultimate “Sovereign” (1 Timothy 6:15). This, I think, is a sufficient reply to American Unitarianism.

Turning to Clarke, one of his first objections is that his opponent produced neither Scripture nor an early church father which taught that the Son or Spirit existed necessarily. Now, if this is one area of disagreement I have with the majority of the early church as Clarke thought, is it not ironic that it is on a point which would imply I am against rather than for American Unitarianism? And yet Clarke has exaggerated, for a Nicene father no less than Athanasius thought that eternal generation was according to a “necessity of nature” (link): 

If then there is another Word of God, then be the Son originated by a word; but if there be not, as is the case, but all things by Him have come to be, which the Father has willed, does not this expose the many-headed craftiness of these men? That feeling shame at saying 'work,' and 'creature,' and 'God's Word was not before His generation,' yet in another way they assert that He is a creature, putting forward 'will,' and saying, 'Unless He has by will come to be, therefore God had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure.' And who is it then who imposes necessity on Him, O men most wicked, who draw everything to the purpose of your heresy? For what is contrary to will they see; but what is greater and transcends it has escaped their perception. For as what is beside purpose is contrary to will, so what is according to nature transcends and precedes counselling. A man by counsel builds a house, but by nature he begets a son; and what is in building began to come into being at will, and is external to the maker; but the son is proper offspring of the father's essence, and is not external to him; wherefore neither does he counsel concerning him, lest he appear to counsel about himself. As far then as the Son transcends the creature, by so much does what is by nature transcend the will. And they, on hearing of Him, ought not to measure by will what is by nature; forgetting however that they are hearing about God's Son, they dare to apply human contrarieties in the instance of God, 'necessity' and 'beside purpose,' to be able thereby to deny that there is a true Son of God. For let them tell us themselves—that God is good and merciful, does this attach to Him by will or not? If by will, we must consider that He began to be good, and that His not being good is possible; for to counsel and choose implies an inclination two ways, and is incidental to a rational nature. But if it be too unseemly that He should be called good and merciful upon will, then what they have said themselves must be retorted on them—'therefore by necessity and not at His pleasure He is good;' and, 'who is it that imposes this necessity on Him?' But if it be unseemly to speak of necessity in the case of God, and therefore it is by nature that He is good, much more is He, and more truly, Father of the Son by nature and not by will.

Finding Scriptures which deal with this issue will require consideration of logical implications, for to my knowledge there is no explicit passage which addresses it. My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. There are, however, several objections to my own position – some made by Clarke and others I have received from those who are in most other respects in agreement with my Trinitarian views – so I will try to address them in a short amount of space.

Clarke thinks the idea that something can be willed necessarily is a contradiction in terms. Thus, he, Athanasius, and others dichotomize that which is willed from that which is a “necessity of nature.” But I do not find his reasons for saying so persuasive: he mentions that I might as well say that a man’s heart beats by his will, the sun rises by man’s will, and a balance which turns necessarily turns by its will. These are just examples of what a proof by example fallacy looks like. What Clarke rather ought to have done is define what it means “to will” or “to choose” or “to act.” As a Calvinist, I don’t have any problem with a definition of these terms which excludes the notion of freedom of contrariety – the ability to have willed, chosen, or acted differently than one did. In fact, freedom of contrariety itself presupposes a definition of willing, choosing, and acting. I would define these words in terms of the mind’s volitional selection, determination, or performance.

Where the line is between providing mere synonyms and providing a clear metaphysical definition can be challenging, but in any case, I am in no worse a position than Clarke, who must also define these terms. Until he does, the burden of proof is on him to explain why necessity is mutually exclusive with will. Anyway, I don’t suppose Sean will have any issue with my explanation, as this is entirely consistent with Gordon Clark’s view 1) that God’s existence is necessary yet by His eternal will and choice, and 2) that the generation of the Son is voluntary and necessary like creation (see his chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity).

This last remark brings me to the objection from the other side to my position, viz. my thinking creation is necessary as well as the Son and Spirit. Whereas Sean thinks I bring the Son and Spirit down to the level of creation by making the them contingent – a counter which backfires, as [I would hope] Sean would not say the person[al property] of the Son is created even though he holds that the person[al property] of the Son is contingent – the objection here is that I raise the creation to the level of divinity (see here and here for examples).

Now, I admit I have perhaps missed some solution which would resolve the tension between an unnecessary creation and a seemingly arbitrary God, but if so, I have not encountered it. It seems easier for me to explain why a necessary creation is not divine than it is to explain why an unnecessary creation is not arbitrary. As I understand it, the reason there is an objection to the idea that who the Father is determines everything He wills is that such means the Son, Spirit and creation all originate from the Father in the same way. I suspect the argument is that since “like causes like,” one whose nature is divine must, if He acts according to a “necessity of nature,” cause another with a divine nature.

But I do not see why this needs to be the case. The nature or person of the Father may determine His causation of this possible world as well as the Son and Spirit, but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not on my view have willed to] communicate His nature to creation. Thinking about this question recently, I found myself asking: is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them? If the latter is possible, then is this not a reasonable answer as to why the necessity of creation would not imply consubstantiality with its Creator?

Putting these questions to the side as I wait for an answer to them, I return to some last statements by Clarke concerning whether the necessary existence of the Son and Spirit would somehow imply their self-existence. The first argument is that it is equally necessary for God to be an Intelligent Being, and to Be at all; the second seems to suggest that if eternal generation is necessary, that which is eternally generated would be a predicate of that which is self-existent and thus itself be self-existent.

To be honest, I didn't follow either of these arguments. They were too short for me to tease out the intended implications. If the first argument relies on divine simplicity, I would have to know what sort of simplicity Clarke held to. Obviously, “intelligent being” and “being qua being” are distinct. If the point is that for God to be He must also be intelligent, I have no idea how I am supposed to connect that to the conclusion that the Son is self-existent if necessarily existent. Perhaps Clarke is conflating divine attributes with divine properties. I just don’t know.

As to the second argument, I don’t understand why Clarke thinks that something which is necessarily generated belongs to that which is self-existent as the very same thing apprehended under a partial consideration. What “very same thing” is Clarke referring to? The Father? Is he saying the Son “belongs to,” is “partially apprehended under,” and is a mere predicate of the Father? Why? And even so, is it not the case that to assert that a particular predicate is self-existent because the sum of a (i.e. the Father’s) set of predicates is self-existent an instance of the fallacy of division (see the comment section here)?

Perhaps Clarke has elsewhere dealt with these issues more in depth, but he breezed by them too quickly here. Regardless, I hope this post puts into perspective why this particular argument that I am a Unitarian is groundless.

Failure to "Communicate"

Opting to pass over a previous reply to him in which I mention quite a few Scriptures to support my Trinitarian beliefs, Sean Gerety has decided to reply to this post in which I ask a few questions to those who would say both 1) that the persons of the Trinity are each self-existent and autotheos and 2) that eternal generation and procession are biblical doctrines. Of course, I don’t mind discussing the logical implications of Sean’s position and those who think similarly, but in a post labeled “Going Beyond What is Written,” I would have expected to see some interaction with what I've actually said about “what is written.”

Instead, I see much ado about historical theology – or rather, what contemporary theologians who agree with Sean opine about historical theology – and a general begging off from answering the questions asked in my post by way of appealing to a general lack of clarity in the usages of particular terms. In the latter case, I fail to see why Sean, a strong advocate of a two-person theory of the Incarnation, would retain terms such as “eternal generation” or “eternal procession” when it seems he cannot even define them. More on that in a bit.

Before further reply, however, I wish to make a point of clarification Sean did not see fit to mention: in the post to which he is replying I only argued that Clarkians should, if they agree with Clark that a person is an essence or definition, admit that if the person of the Son is generated, then the essence of the Son is generated by definition. My “opponents” are not Clarkians per se and much less in toto, for quite a few Clarkians agree with me. I myself am a Clarkian in several respects, principally epistemologically and soteriologically. But my conscience is not bound to Clark’s writings.

Sean’s first response to the substance of my post is to note that in “Nicene orthodoxy,” koinonia, a Greek word for “communication,” “is not a transfer of something from one person to another, much less from a superior to an inferior, rather it carries the idea of sharing something in common.” The point is that Sean thinks if and when the Nicene fathers speak of the communication of the Godhead or divine nature from the Father to the Son, they only mean that the Father and Son and Spirit have the Godhead in common.

If Sean could point us to an example of such usage, I would appreciate it, for I would like to see that the Nicene fathers did, in fact, use it in this way. However, even if they did, what is that supposed to prove? After all, I wouldn't disagree that the Father, Son, and Spirit have in common the univocally distinct possession of the divine nature or set of divine attributes; that is, though our understanding of what predicates may be considered divine attributes may differ, Sean and I both agree that the persons of the Trinity are generically united by them.

But none of this would prove that the Nicene fathers did not further believe that the reason they are so united is because the Son and Spirit are logically derived from, caused by, or metaphysically dependent on the Father. So what’s Sean’s point? That the colloquial meaning of “communicate” is not the ancient meaning? Okay. I never said it was. Perhaps if Sean spent less time thinking of imaginative pejoratives and more time reading the actual content of my post, he would have noticed that. Or, if there was some other point to this section, Sean needs to work on his communication.

Next, Sean cites a Kevin Giles several times in an effort to show that I am mistakenly rejecting Nicene Orthodoxy. Now, I am at a slight disadvantage because I do not yet have access to his book – I hope to have it later this month – but I have by this point read enough early church fathers to know that either Sean is not being forthright about the conclusions of Giles, or Giles is not being forthright about his conclusion of what the early church believed regarding eternal generation.

This is evident in Giles’ own citation of the Nicene Creed in which the Son is said to be “God of [ek] God, Light of Light, true God of true God.” Since he so helpfully produced a Clark quote on the meaning of one Greek term already, perhaps Sean can also find what Clark has to say about the meaning of ek. Until then, I will try to fill in the gap: it means “out from” and connotes “to.” When the creed says that the Son is “God of God,” it is saying the Son is God out from the Father, or the Father is the source of the Son. Thus, the Creed does not say the Son is “God of Himself” (autotheos), it says He is “God of God.” This is problematic for Sean, as he denied any kind of "from/to relationship."

Giles himself says that “the Son on the basis of his begetting is “one in being [homoousios] with the Father.”” Although I would avoid using ambiguous phrases like “one in being,” as long as Giles thinks homoousios refers to the generic rather than an alleged numeric unity among the persons of the Trinity, I fully agree with him; it is indeed “on the basis” of eternal generation that the Son is homoousios with the Father. This is exactly what Sean denies by asserting the Son is aseity and autotheos.

[Somewhat off topic, I do disagree with Giles that “almighty” is a divine attribute, though. Scripture always refers to the Father as Παντοκράτωρ or παντοκράτορος (“Almighty”).]

Sean then turns his attention to addressing why I think the idea each person of the Trinity is aseity and autotheos is incompatible with eternal generation. Here was my argument:

Generation is a word which implies logical, if not temporal, derivation. But if the "second person" of the Trinity is self-existent and autotheos, He cannot be said to be eternally generated; that is, the second person wasn't "generated" per se, since the second person qua second person is allegedly underived, self-existent, and God-of-Himself.  

Rather, it would appear that in this case, "eternal generation" actually means the second person merely eternally assumed the personal property of Sonship. If the second person of the Trinity only derives His property of Sonship from the Father, it's misleading to say the second person qua second person is eternally generated. For the person of the Son isn't generated at all. 

At most, the second person derives His personal property from the Father, not His person from the Father. But then it would be more appropriate to refer to the Son as eternally adopted. Furthermore, this neo-Adoptionism appears to make the relationships among the persons arbitrary, for I see no reason to think that the personal properties could not be reversed. To us, the first person may be the Father and the second may be the Son, but why may it not have been the case that the first person be the Son and the second the Father? Or, why must the second person have "derived" His property from the first if each of the persons of the Trinity are autotheos, ontologically co-equal in every respect?

What is Sean’s reply?

According to Clark the idea of generation was used “as a contrast with the term creation, as well as a contrast with eminationism, to preserve the New Testament teaching on the doctrine of the Second Person.”  The word “eternal” was to address the heresy of Arius.  He is also notes that “Terminological difficulties abound in every line.  Modern theologians could have avoided some, if they had a greater knowledge of pagan Greek philosophy.”  I think that is an understatement given the many ancient and modern controversies surrounding the doctrine of Eternal Generation of the Son.  After all, if John Calvin can be accused of being a heretic over this issue (and he was), and more recently Robert Reymond has taken some heat too even to the point of having to revise the second edition of his systematic theology, I think Clark’s warning suggests that we need to tread very lightly before trying to draw rigid implications from the ancient creeds especially while reading our own definitions of key terms back into them. 

As anyone can see, this is no reply at all. Sean never tells his reader what “generation” actually means. He doesn't even offer a possible alternative. And because he has no answer, he is in no position to answer my questions. In that case, I don’t need to demonstrate incoherence, for it is admitted at the forefront. I don’t see why Sean says he believed the Son is eternally generated if he can’t explain what that means other than that he would like for his position to be considered orthodox. Anyway, he follows his mystification by saying:

Interestingly, just as Ryan can’t “see how eternal generation is compatible with the view that the persons of the Trinity are each autotheos and self-existent,” some modern Evangelicals agree with Ryan and want to modify or even abandon the creed on that account. 

This implies that “modern Evangelicals” think the Nicene Creed teaches that the persons of the Trinity are autotheos and self-existent. But even though they would be wrong, which “modern Evangelicals” is Sean talking about? Can he give an example? It seems to me that the precise opposite is the case: because the Nicene Creed rejects that the Son is aseity or autotheos, some Reformed individuals are proposing that the Nicene Creed be abandoned (example). I pointed this out to Sean when he cited this same link in the course of our conversation on facebook. It is too bad that he has forgotten it already.

Finally, Sean concludes with several authors who supposedly state that the Nicene Creed was “designed specifically to guard against the type of ontological subordinationism, along with the subordination of authority, Ryan and Drake believe.” I explain what I mean by "ontological subordination" here. Now, it may be these sources do, in fact, disagree with me. But does that make them true? How does Sean know? Not once does Sean himself examine what the Nicene Creed says. Allow me: The Creed says “We believe in one God, the Father Almighty.” The Creed says the Son is “God of God.” 

These facts are untouched by Sean’s authors and, therefore, by Sean himself. Clark is correct that “we must apply to the Son some sense of the term “generation,”” but the sense applied is the very reason that the Son is subordinate to the Father. There is certainly no subordination in regards to the divine nature predicable of each – the Son and Spirit are of the same essence as the Father – but if that’s Sean’s argument against my position, then in his hopes to show that I've gone beyond what is written, Sean has had to resort to going beyond what I've written.

What's in a name?

Sean Gerety has labelled me a Unitarian on several occasions now (example). I am not sure whether he intends to address my response to that particular post beyond his reply to a single verse I only mentioned in passing and which, since several others who hold to a similar position as myself disagree with my interpretation, is not likely indicative of whether my more broad views are false. What I am fairly sure of is that Sean knows I believe in the deity or divinity of Christ and the Spirit. He simply believes that because I refer to the Father alone as aseity and autotheos, my definition of deity or divinity fails to take into account that these predicates are actually attributes rather than personal properties. The charge of Unitarianism seems to based on what he thinks are the logical implications of my views rather than what my actual views are.

In that case, I may as well call him a Tritheist, for he holds to both generic unity and rejects that the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father in any ontological sense. To defend against this charge, he may appeal to the idea there is one definition of "God," but this no more precludes the fact this definition would be predicable of multiple persons than the idea that there is one definition of "human" precludes the fact this definition would be predicable of multiple persons. As there are multiple humans, so there must, on Sean's view, be multiple Gods. As an alternative defense, Sean may say that the Son and Spirit are in some sense subordinate to the Father, just not in respect of their natures. I would completely agree with that, but because Sean has said "aseity" and "autotheos" are attributes common to each person, it seems to me that he has eliminated the very means by which the "second" and "third" persons of the Trinity can in some ontological or non-economic sense be subordinate to the "first" (cf. link).

Now, ascribing unwanted labels to each other - however accurate they may be - is not really what I'm interested in. I'm much more interested in hearing Scriptural or philosophical counter-arguments and rebuttals to my views. Nevertheless, as in the absence of such it appears that Sean's charge of Unitarianism is the most likely to present prejudicial challenges to third party readers, I think it will be useful to examine just why it is he thinks I'm a Unitarian and whether it's true. 

However, to do that in one post would require me to cover more material than I am prepared to cover, and I suspect it would also be more than anyone would be prepared to read in one sitting. So I will explain in future posts why I do not consider myself a Unitarian. In short, while I believe the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father only insofar as they are eternally begotten of and spirated by (i.e. derived from) the Father, I assert they are both [eternal and necessary] divine persons, which is, in fact, one possible meaning of the word "God" (simply not the monotheistic meaning). I agree with the Trinitarian formula of the Nicene Creed and many of the early church fathers's views who formed or benefitted from it. I do not see how, if I show these things to be the case an contrast them to Unitarianism, this charge will be able to stand, and I expect Sean to retract it if I do. If I am wrong, I will accept the label and hope to reign discussion back towards Scripture and the logical implications of it. That's where it should be in the first place, but I can only take what I'm given.

I hope Sean comes to agree with me, but this will only be possible if, as I did, he opens himself to the possibility that what he and many mainstream Reformed Christians currently think are wrong. If it's possible in epistemology, it's possible in theology proper.

Eternal Adoption[ism?]

Several Reformed theologians hold to the position that the "person" of the Son is generated whereas the Son's participation in the "divine essence" is not.

For the strictest of Clarkians this would be rather bizarre, since for them the person of the Son is the sum of His predicates. Tautologically speaking, the person of the Son is the definition of the Son, and "definition" is precisely what Clark equated with "essence." In other words, if the person of the Son is generated, that would seem to imply, given Clark's terminology, that the essence (definition) of the Son is generated.

This would be a problem if they wish to hold, as did Clark, that the Son is autotheos. But I suspect this is, in fact, probably not a case of inconsistency so much as an inconsistent reliance on Clark's definitions. I imagine that these Clarkians who argue that the Son's essence is not generated mean that the divine nature or set of attributes of the Son is not generated. In other words, the Father doesn't "communicate" the [or a] divine nature to the Son if such implies the divinity of the Son is in some sense derived from the Father; rather, Clark (and probably these Clarkians) thinks "communicate" merely suggests that the Son has the [or a] divine nature "in common" with the Father. This would suggest that the Son may well communicate the [or a] the divine nature to the Father, but the strange sound of this suggestion is not the focus of this post.

The main point of this post is what I now turn to: even if one holds to this now qualified Reformed view that 1) the Son is autotheos, and 2) the person of the Son is generated but not His essence, terminological difficulties remain in respect to the meaning of "generation." If the Son is autotheos, how is it that His "person" can be generated? What does that mean? Generation is a word which implies logical, if not temporal, derivation. But if the "second person" of the Trinity is self-existent and autotheos, He cannot be said to be eternally generated; that is, the second person wasn't "generated" per se, since the second person qua second person is allegedly underived, self-existent, and God-of-Himself. 

Rather, it would appear that in this case, "eternal generation" actually means the second person merely eternally assumed the personal property of Sonship. If the second person of the Trinity only derives His property of Sonship from the Father, it's misleading to say the second person qua second person is eternally generated. For the person of the Son isn't generated at all.

At most, the second person derives His personal property from the Father, not His person from the Father. But then it would be more appropriate to refer to the Son as eternally adopted. Furthermore, this neo-Adoptionism appears to make the relationships among the persons arbitrary, for I see no reason to think that the personal properties could not be reversed. To us, the first person may be the Father and the second may be the Son, but why may it not have been the case that the first person be the Son and the second the Father? Or, why must the second person have "derived" His property from the first if each of the persons of the Trinity are autotheos, ontologically co-equal in every respect?

I cannot see how eternal generation is compatible with the view that the persons of the Trinity are each autotheos and self-existent.

Whose Hammer?

Over at God's Hammer, Sean Gerety seems concerned that I am "departing from the faith" following an extended conversation between ourselves and other Scripturalists in a rather long comment thread on facebook (link). Much of the ground Sean covers in his post was trodden in our discussion, so I am not sure whether it was meant for me to address or if Sean simply wanted to warn others about me. At any rate, I am provoked to respond. Sean writes:

However, I would have thought that for Christians everywhere the essential deity of Christ was an issue that was beyond dispute. Silly me. God is, after all, three Persons of one essence or substance; not three Persons of three essences or substances. 

As Sean later notes, I claim that the Father, Son, and Spirit are each deities or divine persons. The real question is what it means to be a deity or divine person, a question I will get to in a moment. Regardless, while I don't have a problem saying the persons of the Trinity are "of one essence or substance" if by that Sean means they are generically united according to the set of divine attributes each univocally but distinctly possesses (link), Sean's statement that "God... is three persons" is problematic, for Sean - as thoroughgoingly Clarkian as one can be - agrees with Clark that "The [divine] attributes constitute the definition of God." But substituting this definition for "God" in Sean's statement, we get the idea that "the divine attributes are three persons." This does not make sense; rather, the divine attributes are exemplified in three persons. Attributes are predicated of persons. Persons are not predicated of attributes.

There seems very little to recommend this definition of God, Clark's approval notwithstanding. Sean's blog is called "God's Hammer." But to whom or what does the hammer of Jeremiah 23:29 belong? A set of attributes? Does a set of attributes "declare"? Is Scripture the "word" of a set of attributes? Of course not. It is the word of the Father (cf. 23:1-6). I am not aware of any Scripture in which "set of divine attributes" can intelligibly be substituted for "God." In fact, the WCF's use of singular personal pronouns for "God" was what first led me to question the idea "God and His attributes are one." Rather, it seems to me there are two primary Scriptural meanings of "God" - 1) the Father in a peculiar, preeminent sense; 2) a divine person in general. In either case, it seems to me it always refers to a single person. 

That there are multiple possible meanings of the word is fairly obvious. For instance, Jesus is referred to both as God (e.g. Romans 9:5) and the Son of God (e.g. Mark 1:1). Obviously, Jesus is not the Son of Himself. Equally obvious is that Jesus is not the Son of a set of attributes. Or consider John 1:1-2. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God. He was in the beginning with God." Sean is correct; the Word, Jesus, was God and dwelt among us. Who could deny it? And yet, the Word was not "with" Himself, He was "with" the Father (cf. 1:14, 18). Jesus was with God - a distinct person - and yet Jesus Himself was God. This seems to me to be a pretty clear case that "God" can have multiple meanings. The trick is to determine which meaning applies when. Sean argues, for instance:

Certainly, Jesus Christ is autotheos, divine of Himself. From Jesus’ confession that he is the self-existent I AM and the Almighty Jehovah of the Old Testament, to John’s insistence that the Word was God and dwelt among us, to doubting Thomas’ confession that Jesus is his Lord and His God, even to Jesus’ own testimony that he is the Alpha and the Omega of Revelation, the biblical and exegetical evidence is overwhelming that Jesus Christ is very God of very God.  Yet, it seems that some men, even those calling themselves Christian Scripturalists, think all this is doubtful and Jesus’ confessions concerning his own essential equality with the Father are really confessions of the Father’s unique divine nature and who alone can properly be called God.

John 8, 20:28, and Revelation 1:8 were primary texts Sean used to support the view the Son is self-existent and autotheos in our previous discussion. I think I responded sufficiently to each of these in the course of the facebook conversation: 1) Granville Sharp's sixth rule would imply that the "God" to whom Thomas referred was someone other than the "Lord" [Jesus]; 2) the Greek word for "Almighty" in Revelation 1:8 everywhere else refers to the Father, and as the Father is clearly the referent of "God" in 1:1 and 1:6, it is most natural to regard "the Lord God... Almighty" in 1:8 as referring to the Father; 3) I am not necessarily opposed the idea that Jesus can bear names usually designated of the Father (e.g. YHWH) insofar as He is the perfect image of His Father whom He represents to us - just as a messenger can come in the name of his king - but in these cases we would do well to distinguish between the proper and improper or derivative attribution of them; 4) in the same breath that Jesus refers to Himself as the "I AM," he says that He was taught by the Father (John 8:28). But given Sean's two-person theory of Jesus and that He was speaking as the divine Son sent by the Father (cf. 8:29), how is this possible if the Son is autotheos? Might "I AM" imply eternality rather than self-existence?

On the other hand, the point that the Father alone is always the referent of "one God" (Romans 3:30, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Ephesians 4:6, 1 Timothy 2:5) or "[only] true God" (John 17:3, 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 John 5:20) in Scripture did not seem to make much of an impression. I am not sure why. The idea that monotheism is true because there is one "God and Father" (Romans 15:6, 2 Corinthians 1:3, 11:31, Galatians 1:4, Ephesians 1:3, 4:6, Philippians 4:20, 1 Thessalonians 1:3, 3:11, 3:13, 1 Peter 1:3, Revelation 1:6), one "God our Father" (Romans 1:7, 1 Corinthians 1:3, 2 Corinthians 1:2, Galatians 1:3, Ephesians 1:2, Philippians 1:2, Colossians 1:2, 2 Thessalonians 1:1-2, 2:16, Philemon 1:3), etc. seems like a neat solution to any tension between monotheism and the Trinity - much more neat, anyway, than the little to no support for a view of God as a set of attributes.

Further, on Clark's view, the reason monotheism is true is because there is one definition of "God." Clark equated "essence" with "definition." Because there is one definition of God constituted by the divine attributes, there is, in essence, one God. But while I admire Clark in general, I don't see how he could have thought this was a legitimate response to the charge of tritheism. There may be one definition of "human," but because there are multiple subjects to whom this definition can apply - Sean, Clark, and myself, for instance - there are multiple humans. Similarly, because there are multiple subjects of whom the set of divine attributes may be predicated - the Father, Son, and Spirit - it logically follows that there are, on Clark's view, multiple Gods. And as Clark goes, so does Sean. The difference is that Clark admitted he may have been wrong:

The discussion of the main problem in the doctrine of the Trinity may now be called completed, even if it is not complete. Other students and scholars may add to, subtract from, modify, contradict, or otherwise alter the foregoing. Such responses would be a great improvement over the present almost universal neglect of the doctrine. It would turn the attention of the somewhat faithful churches from their sociological sentimentalism to the basic doctrine of the Bible. (The Trinity, Individuation)

Returning to the question of what it means to be divine, though, Sean is adamant that it includes the predicates of "aseity" (self-existence) and being "autotheos" (God-of-Himself):

The way Hedrich and Shelton get around this juxtaposition of orthodoxy and glaring heterodoxy is through a clever use of redefinition. When it’s argued that self-existence is a distinguishing attribute of the divine nature and is central to God’s essence, self-existence is magically redefined as a “personal property”;  a “personal property” unique to the Father and to the exclusion of the other two Persons (or should that be lower case ‘persons”). But, what can the “personal property” of self-existence be besides a divine attribute?   On the one hand there is a subordination of persons not of nature, on the other there is a subordination of both persons and nature.  In Shelton’s anti-trinitarianism, and despite claims to the contrary, the Father is an ontologically superior being who the other two Persons are united to in a limited and derivative way. 

Firstly, I want to make clear that if and when I have stated the Son is ontologically subordinate to the Father, I do not mean that the Son's divine nature is lesser than that of the Father's. What I mean is that the Father and Son [and Spirit] have their own, unique definitions, and these definitions include more than the fact each are divine; that is, they include the individuating principles or predicates unique to the persons. Given that Sean believes in eternal generation, he should recognize a personal property of the Father is the fact He is unoriginate. A personal property of the Son is that He is eternally begotten. A personal property of the Spirit is that He is eternally spirated. Etc. With this clarification, there should be no confusion as to what it means when I assert that self-existence and being autotheos are personal properties or unique predicates of the Father.

Now, if this view is true, it should be obvious that the definition of the Father has one or more preeminent properties as compared to the definitions Son and Spirit such that although the latter would not have lesser divine natures, their persons would be subordinate to the Father's person. But to say that the persons of the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the person of the Father - a statement which Sean wrote "sounds perfectly fine" - is no different than saying the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father. That is all I meant by ontological subordination, although it may be better to simply cut out that middleman altogether and simply say the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father.

Secondly, I am curious as to what Sean means when he says I have magically redefined self-existence as a personal property. What is the source of the original definition? The Reformers? Scripture? If the latter, I do not think he has convincingly argued for the Son's or Spirit's self-existence or being autotheos. As I mentioned earlier, I think this leads to tritheism unless the persons are collapsed and/or a faulty definition of "God" is assumed. I'm also not sure what eternal generation and procession entails if not a communication of divine nature from the Father to the Son and Spirit; analogously, what does a human father's generation of a son entail if not a communication of human nature from the father to the son? I don't know why the Father assumed the role of the head of the economic activity of the Trinity or why He is referred to as "God" in special senses - one, only true, Almighty, etc. - if the Son and Spirit are in every way equal to Him.

If I am becoming more entrenched in my position, it is only because I am being underwhelmed by the alternatives.

Late Night Thoughts

Interesting late night thoughts are double-edged. On the one hand, I hate boredom, so the fact I can entertain myself is a blessing. But usually, I'm too lazy to get out of bed to write any of these thoughts down, and thinking about them usually deprives me of much needed sleep.

To give an example, I was thinking about the relation between time and the Trinity, topics I have been concentrating on for the past few months. Specifically, I was trying to think of a consistent set of theories from among what alternatives I am aware of. I don't really mean for the following to be a strict argument - more like a rare, real life anecdote. I'm in a funny mood, I guess.

"Subordination of the Son to the Father insofar as a divine nature is communicated to the former by the latter in eternal generation seems to be the best explanation for the Trinitarian issue of generic unity which avoids both tritheism and the collapsing of the persons... but if eternal generation is true, the Son is in some sense caused by the Father, so to distinguish Him from creatures it will be necessary to contrast creatures to divine persons... the most obvious way to do that would be by emphasizing the eternality of the latter... but then, since eternal generation would imply some sort of causation, the B-theory of time in which events are ordered in the direction of causation would seem to be precluded or at least in need of modification, as that would suggest the Son is not eternal... but if, on the contrary, something like William Lane Craig's time is true, while that may account for the eternality of the Son, it would mean that the thoughts of the omniscient divine persons change in accordance with irreducible tensed propositions to reflect the temporal "flow" of reality... but if the thoughts of the divine persons change, not only can't a strong view of immutability be maintained like Paul Helm would want, it would suggest a person cannot, as Gordon Clark thought, "be" what he thinks, for then the divine persons themselves would be continually changing due to their change in thoughts... so maybe Clark's metaphysic needs adjusting... or maybe immutability refers to the moral character or rational nature of the persons... ah, screw it, I'll forget all of this by morning."

Enough to keep anyone awake, huh? Good night folks.

Connect the Dots

Before you, there is a paper extending up and down, left and right as far as the eye can see. On this paper, there are trillions and trillions of dots, much too many to count. Each of these dots represents a distinct proposition. If you connect the dots which represent true propositions, you will see a most beautiful picture, beautiful beyond imagination.

But how do you know which propositions are true? Where do you begin? You guess. You start connecting dots you would like to be true, but pretty soon you've crossed and re-crossed over so many lines that the tangled mess you see makes it evident that at some point, you've connected to at least one dot representing a false proposition.

You erase the picture and start again. But you think more carefully about how to begin this time. You remember as a child drawing rudimentary connect-the-dots images by following a series of numbers. You think that if you begin with dots representing propositions which claim to be the root of knowledge of other propositions, you might achieve similar results.

So you begin with one such dot with which you are familiar. You think a great many people would have pictures starting with this dot. You see no harm in trying it. Even when this leads to another distorted picture, you shrug and start again. You didn't expect to get it right the first or second time anyway. Who could expect you to?

But then you falter again. And then again. And again. And each time you think you can make a slight adjustment which will hold the core together, you come across a dot representing a proposition which collapses the entire system.

Soon, you encounter dots which not only overthrow particular attempted drawings but question the entire enterprise. They tease you, reading, "you did not draw connect-the-dot images as a child," and "no one else would start with that dot," and "you are indeed expected to get the picture right the first time," and "there is no beautiful picture to be found after all." Each dot brings a new frustration.

It's not long after that you begin to despair: How much time have I spent on this stupid dream! Demonic dots seem to leap off the paper, each prompting, demanding you answer overwhelming questions: What is time? Who am I? Where am I? Depression and fatigue set in, and you wonder if there's a time limit for the completion of the picture... if there is even paper on which to draw. What are these words I am thinking? Do words represent thoughts, or are they the thoughts, or do they represent something else about which I am thinking, or...? You fancy yourself going mad. Am I in control of my thoughts? Was I ever? What's the point?

..............

My reader, the prospect is too big. You can't do it by yourself. Contrary to what some will tell you, as if they could even know, it is not in your trying to construct a masterpiece that you will find happiness - this doomed effort will not yield a happiness worth knowing, at any rate - but rather in the recognition of one already drawn by another.

If one tried, on his own, to connect the dots from scratch, he could, at best, only discover a few necessary conditions for knowledge. Even then, he would never know if he had a sufficient condition - and this fact would undermine any possibility of justifying knowledge-claims of these necessary conditions - because that presupposes eternal omniscience. To claim to know one proposition presupposes knowledge that its truth value isn't contingent on the truth value of an unknown proposition. This is only possible if one is eternally omniscient or has received self-authenticating revelation from one who is eternally omniscient.

The fact is, dots have already been connected for us if we are but willing to trace the lines of God's word. That is the self-attesting source from which we must begin, to which we return, and by which we will be able to see a picture of true worth.

Ecclesiastes 12:11 The words of the wise men are like goads, and masters of these collections are like well-driven nails; they are given by one Shepherd.
12 But beyond this, my son, be warned: the writing of many books is endless, and excessive devotion to books is wearying to the body.
13 The conclusion, when all has been heard, is: fear God and keep His commandments, because this applies to every person.
14 For God will bring every act to judgment, everything which is hidden, whether it is good or evil.

2012 TrinityFoundation Contest

Well, October has been as busy a blog month as I've had in a while. As its close brings another Reformation Day, that means another Trinity Foundation essay contest has been completed. This year, the book for review was John Robbins' Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System. As it was my last year for eligibility, I worked extra hard, rereading Robbins' book (some of you may recall I had done a series of posts on Robbins' earlier book Answer to Ayn Rand) as well as reading all of Rand's major philosophical publications, usually articles which were compiled into books. I can't deny that I am surprised and disappointed that my essay did not place, especially since it seems no essay was considered good enough for third, but I will try to swallow my bitterness. It may be a needed lesson in humility. Anyway, I've taken a lot away from these contests other than prize money and books. Apologetics is a responsibility, but it can be fun.

I wish congratulations to the winners and a thank you to The Trinity Foundation for providing incentives for young people to learn material which is honestly interesting in itself. You may read excerpts from the essays of the two winners here, and you may find my essay here.