Every so often, I come across a book that confirms an idea I arrived at independently, which is probably why I enjoyed Helm’s chapter on Divine Freedom in his Eternal God as much as I did. When I wrote this post several months ago, I wasn’t aware that Helm had written such strikingly similar arguments. Since he answers a few objections to the idea God’s choice to instantiate this world was necessary which, at the time, I had not considered, I thought I would post them. But firstly, here is how he frames the discussion:
Granted that no one or nothing could coerce such a choice, and that all such choices would be the product of God’s supremely excellent nature, is an eternal God free to choose between or among alternative possible outcomes? And if he is not free to choose between such outcomes does this matter? …does it make sense to suppose that there are alternative equally optimific (or equally reasonable in some other way) outcomes between which God may choose? If not, does this matter? (pg. 172)
Why are these questions important? Well, how one answers them will indicate what position he would hold on divine timelessness, determinism, omniscience, and, by extension, broader topics like epistemology and soteriology. Throughout his chapter, Helm chiefly relies on the first reason I provided in my post for believing that God’s instantiation of this world was necessary (or as Helm will put it, that God “had to” choose what He did); viz. that any reason for God’s choosing to instantiate a possible world implies it:
If God is supremely good then he could only choose those possible outcomes, instantiate those possible worlds, which are consistent with his having this character, since to act inconsistently is a defect which God could not have. And since God is supremely good it must be supposed that God chooses from all possible worlds that world which is the best, the best of all possible worlds, since to suppose that he might choose a world which was less than the best is to suppose that he might do something which was inconsistent with his supremely good nature. (pg. 172)
So God’s choice of the universe may be contingent in the sense that there are coherent alternative universes which God is powerful enough to have instantiated had he possessed an adequate reason to do so. This argument does not depend on the idea of God choosing between equally optimific outcomes, which would appear to make God’s instantiation of any universe an act of pure reasonless will. Rather the argument is that God’s freedom consists in the rationality of his choice, in his having a good reason for what he instantiates, not in his having no reason. (pg. 178)
Elsewhere, Helm states God can also be said to be free “because he acts in accordance with his supremely excellent nature without coercion or hindrance” (pg. 174). On the same page, he knocks down the following argument:
…the further objection that in choosing God is somehow constricted or constrained in his freedom is a curious one. There seems to be a species of metaphysical delusion at work in the advancing of such an objection. For the objection supposes that it would be some sort of disability to have a supremely wise and good nature and to ‘have to’ act in accordance with it. How much finer and freer, the objection implies, to have a nature which would allow the choosing of what is vile and wretched!
With all this said, I would like to make one clarification to something Helm says about the implications of multiple “optimific” worlds:
If we suppose that [God’s actualizing one of a number of co-optimific goals] makes sense, on what grounds could God decide in favour of one rather than another? Clearly, not by reference to their character. There seem to be two alternatives; either he chooses on the basis of some accidental feature of one alternative lacked by all the others, a feature not related to optimificity, or he chooses as a result of pure whimsy. Neither of these alternatives is very appealing. (pg. 180)
While it is to Helm’s credit that he finds neither appealing, I would and have argued they are not really alternatives at all; in both cases God would choose “as a result of pure whimsy.” What I mean is that if the “accidental feature” according to which God chose to instantiate this world is appealed to as a reason for God’s choice, then the feature turns out to be not so accidental after all. It’s essential, as, in fact, it would set this world apart as that so-called possible world which is most optimific. But in this case, we are back to the supposition that there is only one optimific world, a world which God “had to” instantiate. On the other hand, if the “accidental feature” does not function as a reason for God’s choice – that is, if it wasn’t necessary for God to have chosen this world for the reason that said feature was exclusive to it – then actually, this is no different than the position that God’s choice was arbitrary.
Helm summarizes the chapter thus far very well when he writes:
So far I have defended the contingency of the universe on the grounds that it is the outcome of God’s reasonable choice, against the view of Aquinas, recently endorsed by Stump and Kretzmann, that contingency results from choice among equally optimific outcomes.
But did not God have to choose reasonably? And if he did does this not put paid to his freedom and to the universe’s contingency? In a sense, yes. But the language ofhaving to does not imply constraint in this case. God had to because of who he is and that he did choose is the ultimate explanation of what takes place. Thus to say that God had to is to say that no further explanation of what takes place is possible than that it seemed good to the eternal God that these things should be so. (pg. 181)
Helm notes that this position is not Spinozan, because Spinoza would have said that what exists is “not as the outcome of a divine choice…” (pg. 183), essentially because “Spinoza denies both intelligence and will to God…” (pg. 182). Helm also denies Spinoza’s “metaphysical monism” (cf. pgs. 180, 185-186) and then provides another quick summary of where we stand at this point in the chapter:
The power that creatures have is derived from God, but it is not immediately from God. According to theism I write these words as a result of physical and mental powers given and maintained by God. But this does not imply that it is God who is writing these words…
So far we have maintained that the actual universe is contingent; that God chooses it in accordance with his own nature, and not because it is one of a number of equally optimific alternatives; and that this is a markedly different position from that of Spinoza. (pg. 186)
Now, in the comment section of my post on the necessity of this world, it was argued that such would make creation consubstantial with God. Helm replies:
Certainly the idea of the universe is in the mind of God. But to suppose that the creation is a whole or a part of God would be to suppose that to talk about creation is to talk about God. But this is manifestly unsatisfactory. If Jones disobeys God there are two individuals related. To suppose that in such a situation God really disobeys himself, or that the disobedience is only apparent, would be to maintain something altogether different.
So there is a sense in which a theist (as opposed to a Spinozist) holds that the universe is necessary in only a qualified sense. For according to theism the universe comes about as a result of God’s will, the will of an agent, though an agent who is not, and necessarily not, ever undecided what to do. God is necessarily good, but he is not necessarily good as a result of a decision or an act. The necessary goodness of God is not the result of God’s agency. (pg. 187)
The reply to this objection also affords Helm to finish his chapter with a fine answer to the objection that God is not self-sufficient if he “had to” create as He did:
If God is self-sufficient does he need to create? In one sense, obviously not. If a country is self-sufficient it does not need to import goods. But an individual may be self-sufficient in the sense that nothing else is necessary for that individual’s existence and yet he may wish to act or communicate himself, though not because he has a psychological need or deficiency, or some other defect of existence or character such that he has to communicate or create. To want to do something may be a sign not of weakness by of strength, not of deficiency but of fullness. So that it seems perfectly consistent with the fact that God does not need anything that he nevertheless wishes to have other beings and creates in accordance with these wishes. And it would be a perverse piece of argumentation which attempted to qualify this by saying, ‘Ah, yes, but this means that God needs to wish to create.’ This is rather like the claim that all human actions are selfish. There is a sense, a perfectly trivial sense, in which all human actions are selfish, in the sense that all such action is the action of the self who performs it. But there is a non-trivial sense in which what a person does is selfish because it is at the expense of the legitimate interests of others. In the same way there is a trivial sense in which it might be said, from the very fact that God has created the universe and you and me in it, that God needs you and me. Otherwise why would he have created us? But there is another sense in which he clearly did not need you and me, in the sense in which neither you nor I are necessary for God’s being God. We may be pretty important people but it would be taking things a bit too far to suppose that our non-existence would result in God’s non-existence as well. Although the language may seem rather extravagant to our ears, Jonathan Edwards is expressing a perfectly consistent and intelligible position when he writes that ‘a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world’. (pgs. 193-194)
Creation is metaphysically contingent on God, not the other way around. Who God is is not derived from but is rather the precondition for creation. That God had to create or that God created necessarily is not to be explained in terms external to God but rather in terms of who God is or, equivalently, that it was according to His good pleasure to create. And that is just natural: Jonathan Edwards also correctly noted that individuals choose what which they most strongly desire or please. That such would apply to God as well as men does not suggest God is not meaningfully free, nor is it not a blurring of the Creator-creature distinction: “It is perfectly consistent with the basic theistic distinction between the creator and the creature to suppose that the actual universe should be the only possible universe” (pg. 188). Just the opposite: it is a stamp of reassurance that while rationally independent, God is personal rather than some Spinozan, abstract principle: “What God actualizes in timeless eternal fashion is not by logic but by his own nature” (pg. 187). In our creaturely capacity, we only know what God reveals to us. Hence, it may be that we cannot understand why no other world was possible. But that doesn’t imply there is no answer or that we cannot learn the answer:
About many of such possibilities regarding the future we are now able to say that for all we know they may come to pass. They represent present epistemic possibilities and logical possibilities. But if we were to know everything, or more than we do, then we would see that these possibilities are only abstract. They do not represent real possibilities and never did. The thought that they did was the product of our ignorance. (pgs. 188-189)
I appreciate Helm’s book as a whole, but this chapter was genius. He makes many other observations in it, in particular by relating each of these points to time[lessness]. But that would go beyond the scope of this post.
29 comments:
“If God is supremely good then he could only choose those possible outcomes, instantiate those possible worlds, which are consistent with his having this character, since to act inconsistently is a defect which God could not have.”
So then God’s goodness is dependant on a creation.
“Rather the argument is that God’s freedom consists in the rationality of his choice, in his having a good reason for what he instantiates, not in his having no reason. (pg. 178)”
Having a good rational reason for creating is not the issue. I admitted that the creation was agreeable to God’s nature.
“For the objection supposes that it would be some sort of disability to have a supremely wise and good nature and to ‘have to’ act in accordance with it.”
Again having to act in accordance with nature is not the issue. I already admitted of such.
““Spinoza denies both intelligence and will to God…” (pg. 182)”
As Plotinus did of his One/Monad
“Helm replies:
Certainly the idea of the universe is in the mind of God.”
God has a mind? What happened to ADS?
“For according to theism the universe comes about as a result of God’s will”
See he is using the term will and nature as the exact same thing. This is ADS.
“But there is another sense in which he clearly did not need you and me, in the sense in which neither you nor I are necessary for God’s being God. ”
Isn’t that exactly what he is saying though? God’s goodness is his nature. The creation is necessary to God’s nature, ergo God’s goodness is dependant on creation. You and I are necessary to God’s Goodness; UNLESS he takes the Essence and Energy distinction where Goodness is NOT God’s nature but an energy of nature. Then he needs to covert to eastern orthodoxy.
So I didn’t see much here that added to our original discussion.
"So then God’s goodness is dependant on a creation."
I don't know why you keep reversing the logical and metaphysical dependency when Helm's if-then statement clearly has them the other way around. Your interpretation of Helm's statement is like my saying the conditional "if I am hungry, then I eat a sandwich" implies my hunger is dependent on my eating a sandwich. It's the other way around. You've made this mistake before.
"Having a good rational reason for creating is not the issue."
Last time we discussed this, you could not explain why God decided to create as opposed to not create. You appealed to the inscrutability of God. Now, while I (and Helm) agree that so far as no contradiction is implied, appealing to our ignorance is fine (see the last quote in the post), this appeal doesn't work in this case because you fall prey to the horns of the following disjunction:
1) God had a reason to create.
2) God had no reason to create.
Obviously, 2) is what we must avoid in a defense of divine rationality against arbitrariness. So 1) must be true.
Now, at this point, you can and have appealed to the inscrutability of God with respect to what His reason for creating was. but you must first admit that He actually had a reason. And this is where you run into trouble, because you say whatever reason God had for creating was unnecessary, i.e. that according to His nature He could have chosen to not create. But then it's not a reason at all, it's "pure whimsy."
The fact that you think God's will is eternal is irrelevant to this point, because you still agree God's will must accord with His nature.
"God has a mind? What happened to ADS?"
Why do you assume Helm holds to ADS? Helm's view of simplicity strikes me as similar to your own (link) when he says, for instance, that "though God is simple, without parts, without division, there is nevertheless a complexity in the mind of God, but this complexity does not depend on something other than himself."
"See he is using the term will and nature as the exact same thing."
I never understood this. God's nature determines His will, but how does that reduce to God's nature is His will? Helm's quote merely shows God's will to be a necessary precondition for creation contra Spinoza.
“Last time we discussed this, you could not explain why God decided to create as opposed to not create”
Yes I did explin it. You asked: “2. Do you believe that God could have chosen to not create?”
I answered: “At the level of nature yes, at the level of will no.”
“Last time we discussed this, you could not explain why God decided to create as opposed to not create.”
>>>I said very clearly, “For his glory.”
“Why do you assume Helm holds to ADS? ”
>>>Because as I have shown numerous times now your view and his collapse nature and will as the same thing.
“Helm's view of simplicity strikes me as similar to your own (link) when he says, for instance, that "though God is simple, without parts, without division, there is nevertheless a complexity in the mind of God, but this complexity does not depend on something other than himself."”
>>>First off, I believe in three minds in the Trinity. Does he? I highly doubt it.
“God's nature determines His will, but how does that reduce to God's nature is His will?”
>>>Actually that is my question to you.
"Yes I did explin it."
Here's what I was referring to:
Ryan: "I do not see that you have or even can explain why God chose Scenario B."
Drake: "Even Clark realized that we don’t have answers to everything. My lack of omniscience does not imply a contradiction. God has not revealed that to us completely. This particular complaint is embarrassing for you as a Calvinist. Why does God choose one man over another to be his elect? Is his decision arbitrary? ; Or did He have a [non-arbitrary] reason? If the latter, does not such a reason imply that His will is naturally necessitated? So now, God is necessitated to redeem. So then his mercy is dependent on him showing that mercy to a creature. The exact complaint that I showed is pagan dualism. http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/10/01/darkness-a-consistent-hyper-calvinist/"
Instead of answering my question, you asked one of your own about God's nature. Speaking of which I still don't understand the objection that I'm collapsing will into nature. I asked:
Ryan: "God's nature determines His will, but how does that reduce to God's nature is His will?"
Drake: "Actually that is my question to you."
My answer is that I don't know. It's your objection, not mine. I don't see a problem with saying God's nature determines His will but that God's nature and will are distinct. So when you say:
"Because as I have shown numerous times now your view and his collapse nature and will as the same thing."
Then I don't understand why you think I need to answer my own question. It is you who needs to answer it, for it is your objection.
In any case, you cite this part of our previous conversation as your answer to what I said you couldn't answer:
Ryan: "2. Do you believe that God could have chosen to not create?"
Drake: "At the level of nature yes, at the level of will no."
I said "you could not explain ***why*** God decided to create as opposed to not create," not that you did not provide an answer as to ***whether*** God could have chosen not to create.
"I said very clearly, "For his glory.""
Are you saying that because God's glory would be maximally manifested by His creation of this world, this world is what He chose to create? If so, I would agree, but then this means God's choice was rational and necessary. If not, then this "reason" is arbitrary at best (if this world is co-optimific with another possible world) and at worst possibly suggests that God is not supremely good (if another possible world would have been more optimific).
"First off, I believe in three minds in the Trinity. Does he? I highly doubt it."
I cannot find that he takes a position one way or another, but were he or I to say that the persons of the Trinity each have his own mind, then how could your objection of ADS stand?
Notice I said, "God has not revealed that to us completely." I did not say he said nothing about it. He clearly asserts that he made man for his glory. Why he wanted to seek after a created glory? I don't know.
“My answer is that I don't know. It's your objection, not mine. I don't see a problem with saying God's nature determines His will but that God's nature and will are distinct. So when you say:”
I have explained this before. If you say the creation is a necessity of nature you are saying the same thing as Origen said and what the Arians said though both had different emphases. Origen said that creation extended from nature to preserve the idea of an eternal economia and the pre-existence of souls. The Arians wanted to make the logos and Creation consusbstantial thus denying Christ’s divinity by asserting that both extended from the same PLACE in God. That is what you are doing. You are saying that both the eternal generation of the son (EG) and the creation are necessities of nature and extending from the same place (nature) in God. The Athanasian solution is to say that there is an ontological distinction between nature and will. EG extends from nature and is consubstantial, creation extends from will and therefore not consusbstantial and THEREFORE NOT A NECESSITY OF NATURE.
“Are you saying that because God's glory would be maximally manifested by His creation of this world, this world is what He chose to create?”
>>>Maybe, maybe not. The MODE AND CIRCUMSTANCE is not revealed only the essential purpose.
“I would agree, but then this means God's choice was rational and necessary”
>>> We have been through this so many times Ryan and I have to keep saying the same things to you. Rational does not mean a necessity of nature. I t could mean a volition agreeable to nature.
“I cannot find that he takes a position one way or another”
>>That is why I buy no books from Paul Helm and why I will never attend a Reformed seminary. They are not scripturalists Ryan. They may believe a different doctrine of God than you do. How can you remain a member of a church that may have a different God than you?
“but were he or I to say that the persons of the Trinity each have his own mind, then how could your objection of ADS stand?”
>>>> It couldn’t. Three minds is what Clark taught BECAUSE HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN ADS.
“Why he wanted to seek after a created glory? I don't know… We have been through this so many times Ryan and I have to keep saying the same things to you. Rational does not mean a necessity of nature. I t could mean a volition agreeable to nature.”
I know we’ve been through it so many times, and I’m as baffled as you seem to be. If there is some other choice which would have been agreeable to God’s nature – a so-called “co-optimific” choice – such that there is no possible reason which can be given as to why God would choose this rather than the other, then the choice God actually made was arbitrary, not rational. Sure, a reason can be given as to why God chose this world rather than a less than optimific world – i.e. such a world isn’t agreeable to His nature whereas this one is – but I’m specifically talking about God’s actual choice relative to the co-optimific yet unrealized choice.
Again, I’m not faulting you for saying you don’t know why God “wanted to seek after a created glory.” I’m trying to point out that you can’t know, because any such knowledge would imply the necessity of God’s choice, which for you is off bounds.
“If you say the creation is a necessity of nature you are saying the same thing as Origen said and what the Arians said though both had different emphases. Origen said that creation extended from nature to preserve the idea of an eternal economia and the pre-existence of souls. The Arians wanted to make the logos and Creation consusbstantial thus denying Christ’s divinity by asserting that both extended from the same PLACE in God. That is what you are doing.”
That these two groups attempted to apply the necessity of creation to their respective heresies doesn’t mean they established a logical connection, does it?
For instance, since there is no earlier event, the creation of the temporal order (the entire B-series set of events) is eternal; God does not create “in[to]” time. But the created events may themselves be temporally distinguished relative to each other. So with respect to what would one pre-exist? His conception? But that does not follow from the necessity of creation.
Nor do I see how the Arian’s argument follows. For while both may be necessary, why does it have to be that God communicates His essence to creation? Does it follow that creation is divine simply because it is necessary? I don’t see how, especially given a qualified understanding of divine simplicity.
“Maybe, maybe not. The MODE AND CIRCUMSTANCE is not revealed only the essential purpose.”
What mode and circumstance are you referring to, and how is it revealed (or is it)?
“That is why I buy no books from Paul Helm and why I will never attend a Reformed seminary. They are not scripturalists Ryan. They may believe a different doctrine of God than you do. How can you remain a member of a church that may have a different God than you?”
I am currently not a member of any church. But just because he hasn’t stated a position doesn’t mean he doesn’t have one.
“It couldn’t. Three minds is what Clark taught BECAUSE HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN ADS.”
Well, ok then. As I too (and, potentially, Helm) believe each person of the Trinity possesses an individual mind, why do you think that the assertion that creation was necessary implies ADS?
“If there is some other choice which would have been agreeable to God’s nature – a so-called “co-optimific” choice”
>>I reject the possibility of even discussing other potential or possible worlds. God’s decision to create is an eternal one extending from the will. Just because we do not have a revealed or inferred rational deliberation behind his choice of THIS WORLD does not mean his decision is arbitrary. We do not have revealed or inferred rational deliberation behind why God chooses one man over another to be his adopted children. It does not mean the choice is arbitrary.
“That these two groups attempted to apply the necessity of creation to their respective heresies doesn’t mean they established a logical connection, does it?”
>>I thought I just spelled out the logical connections for you in how the necessity of nature in creation was logically connected to their respected systems.
“For instance, since there is no earlier event, the creation of the temporal order (the entire B-series set of events) is eternal; God does not create “in[to]” time. But the created events may themselves be temporally distinguished relative to each other. So with respect to what would one pre-exist?”
>>>I am assuming you are jumping into origen’s worldview and showing logical fallacies. The problem with your criticism from what I can see is that you are using a different definition of eternal and temporal that origen would.
“Nor do I see how the Arian’s argument follows. For while both may be necessary, why does it have to be that God communicates His essence to creation?”
>>>It doesn’t. That is not the argument. The argument is that creation and the logos both extend from the same place in God. Creation is not consubstantial with God therefore neither is the Logos. Ergo Christ is not a divine person homoousios with the Father: thus Arianism.
“What mode and circumstance are you referring to, and how is it revealed (or is it)?”
>>>Your assertion is that THIS PARTICULAR creation (mode and circumstance of a creation) is a necessity of divine nature for the maximizing of God’s glory. I say that this particular creation is not a necessity of nature but a necessity deriving from the eternality of divine will for God’s glory. I am not going to commit myself to the idea that THIS PARTICULAR creation is the only possible way God could have maximized his glory. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t I don’t know.
“I am currently not a member of any church”
>>>Excellent. Then you can come up here to Louisville and help me start the Scripturalist church here. You would be of immense help to me.
“I reject the possibility of even discussing other potential or possible worlds. God’s decision to create is an eternal one extending from the will.”
But this reply is irrelevant, as I pointed out earlier:
//The fact that you think God's will is eternal is irrelevant to this point, because you still agree God's will must accord with His nature.//
“Just because we do not have a revealed or inferred rational deliberation behind his choice of THIS WORLD does not mean his decision is arbitrary.”
Again, this reply too is irrelevant:
//…you can and have appealed to the inscrutability of God with respect to what His reason for creating was. but you must first admit that He actually had a reason. And this is where you run into trouble, because you say whatever reason God had for creating [this particular world] was unnecessary, i.e. that according to His nature He could have chosen to not create [this particular world]. But then it's not a reason at all, it's "pure whimsy."//
“We do not have revealed or inferred rational deliberation behind why God chooses one man over another to be his adopted children. It does not mean the choice is arbitrary.”
In a manner of speaking, this is true. I think it would be more technically correct to say that while we have the reason – it is according to His good pleasure because it maximally manifests His glory – we are at present unable to understand how the election of one man over against another (abstractly considered) functions toward this end. It’s a question of how, not why. And in any case, I admit that there is a necessary reason for electing one man over against another.
Our disagreement on this point seems to hinge on whether or not the outcomes of a rational deliberation can be unnecessary. You say it can. I say it can’t – that it’s arbitrary. Is this a fair summary?
“I am assuming you are jumping into origen’s worldview and showing logical fallacies. The problem with your criticism from what I can see is that you are using a different definition of eternal and temporal that origen would.”
Well, I thought Origen believed in divine atemporality. Did Origen hold to an A-series view of time? If Origen wouldn’t have accepted the definitions I provide, he would at least, if he believed in divine atemporality, had to have held that the doctrines they represent are true or his philosophy of time would have been inconsistent. So the argument is either an external critique if he wouldn’t have accepted what those definitions represent or an internal critique if he would have.
“The argument is that creation and the logos both extend from the same place in God. Creation is not consubstantial with God therefore neither is the Logos. Ergo Christ is not a divine person homoousios with the Father: thus Arianism.”
I will rephrase my question: while it may be necessary to create and it may be necessary to eternally generate, why does it have to be that God must either communicate His essence both to the Son and creation or neither? Why can’t it be necessary according to God’s nature to communicate His essence to the eternally generated Son alone although necessary according to God’s nature to create? That was my question.
“Excellent. Then you can come up here to Louisville and help me start the Scripturalist church here. You would be of immense help to me.”
I’m flattered if you’re serious, but my school is down here, and in any case, I haven’t given up hope that I can find a church. I’ve heard good things about Chalcedon Presbyterian from a Reformed Baptist church I attended with a friend. Of course, I am more than willing to help you in any way I can, such as proofreading docs.
"why does it have to be that God must either communicate His essence both to the Son and creation or neither?"
>>This is the issue that I spent years scaling mountains of books to attain: the hypostatic union. When something connects to or extends from a divine person at the level of nature, it is necessarily consubstantial. The distinction that was made in the ecumenical councils (but applied inconsistently) is that the humanity of Christ did not attach to the Logos at the level of nature but at the level of hypostasis. There were some still clinging to the idea that there was only one nature of christ specifically because the humanity of christ was ontologically connected to it at the level of nature (thus not distinguishing nature-hypostasis distcintion)and therefore there really was no hypostatic union but a metamorphosis (Consubstantiality-deification [in a bad sense]).
BTW, Chalcedon Pres Church is hard core theonomist.
"There were some still clinging to the idea that there was only one nature of christ specifically because the humanity of christ was ontologically connected to it at the level of nature..."
See, but I think that that argument of theirs would beg my question. Here's what I mean:
Obviously, if it is true that "When something connects to or extends from a divine person at the level of nature, it is necessarily consubstantial," then that argument would follow. For that Christ's humanity follows necessarily from the divine nature - which I assume is what you mean by "connect to or extends from" - would mean that Christ's humanity is consubstantial with Christ's divinity (ad arguendo). But then Christ's humanity isn't really a distinct nature. So if it is true that "When something connects to or extends from a divine person at the level of nature, it is necessarily consubstantial," I can see why they would argue that since Christ's "humanity" is "ontologically connected" to the Logos' nature, Christ only possessed one nature. This is not to say that position is true, but that conclusion indeed follows from that premise.
But supposing it is not true that "When something connects to or extends from a divine person at the level of nature, it is necessarily consubstantial," then to argue that the humanity of Christ follows necessarily from the divine nature doesn't mean it is consubstantial with it. Right? But that is the point in question: whether or not something's necessarily following from the divine nature makes it consubstantial with the divine nature. In essence, just as I want an answer to this question from you, I would want an answer to this question from those you mentioned who believed Christ only possessed on nature.
“Right? But that is the point in question: whether or not something's necessarily following from the divine nature makes it consubstantial with the divine nature. ”
>>>Because God’s nature is immutable. To say that creation extends or ontologically identities with immutability affirms an eternal immutable universe, not a creation.
Christ’s humanity cannot extend from omnipresence and be consubstantial with created human nature because created human nature is not omnipresent but particular and localized, ergo no bowing to the wafer.
Now I'm not so sure that what you mean by "extends from" or "connects to" the divine nature is the same as saying that some act follow necessarily from the divine nature. Similarly, saying that something which necessarily follows from the divine nature ontologically identifies with that nature seems to suggest on your part that their is some sort of metaphysical identity (consubstantiality).
So I guess that, given a better understanding of what you mean, I would disagree that because the divine nature necessitates some sort of divine action or willing, the effect of said action or will ontologically identifies with the nature from which it was necessitated. Or I would at least need clarification as to why you think that.
Athanasius,
"The Son of God then, He is the ‘Word’ and the ‘Wisdom;’ He the ‘Understanding’ and the Living ‘Counsel;’ and in Him is the ‘Good Pleasure of the Father;’ He is ‘Truth’ and ‘Light’ and ‘Power’ of the Father. But if the Will of God is Wisdom and Understanding, and the Son is Wisdom, he who says that the Son is ‘by will,’ says virtually that Wisdom has come into being in wisdom, and the Son is made in a son, and the Word created through the Word; which is incompatible with God and is opposed to His Scriptures. For the Apostle proclaims the Son to be the own Radiance and Expression, not of the Father’s will, *******but of His Essence Itself, saying, ‘Who being the Radiance of His glory and the Expression of His
Subsistence.’ But if, as we have said before, the Father’s Essence and Subsistence be not from will, neither, as is very plain, is what is proper to the Father’s Subsistence from will; for such as, and so as, *****that Blessed Subsistence, must also be the proper Offspring from It****** [THAT WHICH NECESSARILY FOLLOWS FROM THE DIVINE NATURE-DS]. And accordingly the Father Himself said not, ‘This is the Son originated at My will,’ nor ‘the Son whom I have by My favour,’ but simply ‘My Son,’ and more than that, ‘in whom I am well pleased;’ meaning by this, This is the Son by nature; and ‘in Him is lodged My will about what pleases Me.’"
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf204.xxi.ii.iv.viii.html
So to your statement: "Similarly, saying that something which necessarily follows from the divine nature ontologically identifies with that nature seems to suggest on your part that their is some sort of metaphysical identity (consubstantiality). "
Yes it does because it necessarily implies generation and offspring. See section 66 as well.
In summary you are making creation as pleasing to God as his Son. I cannot go there.
I'm sorry man, I just don't see why I can't affirm something like that the Son is consubstantial with the Father because He necessarily follows from the Father's nature apart from His will whereas creation follows necessarily from the divine nature but is not consubstantial because it must be willed. This would also leave room for distinction between the Son (and Spirit) and creation in the eyes of the Father.
It comes back to why you think I "collapse nature and will as the same thing" just because I think that what is necessarily follows from the divine nature. God doesn't choose to generate the Son or emanate the Spirit (for such would be a contradiction in terms) whereas He chooses to create, right? And we agree that what God chooses must at least accord with His nature, right?
So essentially, you're denying that I can argue that God's choice to create is that alone which accords with His nature. You say this collapses will into nature. But on this view, I see a clear difference between the choice God makes and the nature which determines the choice. I see a clear difference between nature and will such that they are not "the same thing" despite the idea the latter is determined by the former.
" creation follows necessarily from the divine nature but is not consubstantial because it must be willed. "
Even if it is not consusbstantial on your view, the attributes are still dependent on creation. You are saying that his attributes are dependant on creation. The creation is necessary to the divine nature. The divine nature is not the divine nature without creation. As i said in the previously linked post:
"What you are going to have to end up saying in this line of thought is that God's mercy depends upon him showing mercy to creatures. God's justice depends on him damning the wicked and so on, where God's goodness is dependent on our evil. Now you are into Gnostic Dualism and Origenism. See Origen’s Mistake and One of Dr. Clark’s Mistakes "
And you never responded to this in that dialogue.
I think I answered it in my first response in this comment section:
//I don't know why you keep reversing the logical and metaphysical dependency when Helm's if-then statement clearly has them the other way around. Your interpretation of Helm's statement is like my saying the conditional "if I am hungry, then I eat a sandwich" implies my hunger is dependent on my eating a sandwich. It's the other way around. You've made this mistake before.//
You never responded to this in this dialogue.
You still did not reply to the statement.
First you never quoted what "if-then statement" you were referring to.
Second, your analogy infers a deficiency (hunger) in God which does not exist and again vindicates my complaint. The sufficiency of God is dependent on creation.
Moreover, in that dialogue this exchange developed:
""[ds]EXACTLY. God is still God without a creation. You just said it all brother. What you are admitting to is that God was merciful and just “before” a creation. Meaning that the divine nature does not absolutely require a creation for it to be the divine nature. Welcome to Orthodox Calvinistic Libertarianism."
[rh]There is a distinct difference between saying that God must become who He is by creating (which is really what it would mean for God's nature to depend on creation) and saying that because God is who He is, He will act as He has acted (creation et. al.)."
“There is a distinct difference between saying that God must become who He is by creating (which is really what it would mean for God's nature to depend on creation)”
>>>[ds] No, actually Plotinus was pretty clear that the universe was not something that the One became by creating. It was an emanation extending from the very nature of the One from all eternity. Ergo no doctrine of creation, Clark makes that very clear in Thales to Dewey in a number of pagan contexts not just Plotinus."
>>>I am not asserting that you posit a becoming in God, just like Plotinus avoided such a sequence in his emanationism. I am not saying you are asserting becoming in god. I am saying you are asserting a plotinian emanationism. To fill in the gaps, let us go to your recent statement:
"It comes back to why you think I "collapse nature and will as the same thing" just because I think that what is necessarily follows from the divine nature."
As I said before exposing your view, "there is only one kind of eternity and immutability in God."
In your recent article you operate off the same fundamental point you keep ignoring. You say,
"But in this case, we are back to the supposition that there is only one optimific world, a world which God “had to” instantiate. On the other hand, if the “accidental feature” does not function as a reason for God’s choice – that is, if it wasn’t necessary for God to have chosen this world for the reason that said feature was exclusive to it – then actually, this is no different than the position that God’s choice was arbitrary."
>>You keep making the alternative to a necessity of nature a different external world and then superimposing that straw man onto me. I am not asserting that the only other alternative to a necessity of nature is another external world but ANOTHER KIND OF ETERNITY WITHIN GOD DISTINCT FROM DIVINE NATURE, NAMELY DIVINE WILL.
YOU FUNDAMENTALLY DENY THAT THERE IS ANOTHER SUCH ETERNITY WHICH IS WHY I keep coming back to the idea that you "collapse nature and will as the same thing". It is the same eternity and no other ETERNITY IS POSSIBLE. That is ADS.
PS
I am also thrown by this statement:
"//I don't know why you keep reversing the logical and metaphysical dependency...You've made this mistake before.//"
What are you referring to? When have I done this before?
“What are you referring to? When have I done this before?”
In the very statement you are asking me to respond to. In both cases you switch the metaphysical or ontological dependency from God to creation. God cannot be metaphysically dependent on creation if creation is metaphysically dependent on God, which is the case.
“First you never quoted what "if-then statement" you were referring to.”
That’s because you did it for me in your first paragraph before your first comment, to which that if-then reference applied.
“Second, your analogy infers a deficiency (hunger) in God which does not exist and again vindicates my complaint. The sufficiency of God is dependent on creation.”
It does no such thing. Reread Helm’s long defense of the sufficiency of God (pgs. 193-194) and my thoughts thereafter.
“Moreover, in that dialogue this exchange developed…”
Yes. And I stand by what I said that you quoted: there is a distinct difference between saying that God must become who He is by creating (which is really what it would mean for God's nature to depend on creation).
“I am not asserting that you posit a becoming in God, just like Plotinus avoided such a sequence in his emanationism. I am not saying you are asserting becoming in god. I am saying you are asserting a plotinian emanationism.”
Plotinus believed ADS. I don’t, as you yourself admit must be the case, because I think the persons of the Trinity each has His own mind. I have also qualified the way in which eternal generation and creation could be distinguished: the first is not willed and the second is. Further, did not Plotinus think to emanate was something other than to will (i.e. the nature/will “collapse” which I don’t think applies to me)?
“As I said before exposing your view, "there is only one kind of eternity and immutability in God."”
I think you mean to say this is my view. I haven’t subscribed to it, because the phrasing seems loaded. If it means to imply that there no distinction between nature and will, I would reject it. If it means to imply what God wills is predicated on His nature and that only the actual world God has created could accord with His nature then I have no problem with it; at the same time, I would assert this does not imply that there is no distinction between nature and will.
“You keep making the alternative to a necessity of nature a different external world and then superimposing that straw man onto me. I am not asserting that the only other alternative to a necessity of nature is another external world but ANOTHER KIND OF ETERNITY WITHIN GOD DISTINCT FROM DIVINE NATURE, NAMELY DIVINE WILL.
YOU FUNDAMENTALLY DENY THAT THERE IS ANOTHER SUCH ETERNITY WHICH IS WHY I keep coming back to the idea that you "collapse nature and will as the same thing". It is the same eternity and no other ETERNITY IS POSSIBLE. That is ADS.
Given what I said above about my reservations as to agreeing one way or another with your accusation until its nature is clearer to me, I already noted that the possibility of a will which is not necessitated by the nature but nevertheless must accord with it is arbitrary. You do think that what God wills must be agreeable to His nature, correct? But you don’t think that God’s nature determines what He wills, correct? Then whether or not God’s will is eternal is irrelevant to my argument of arbitrarity, a point I made in my very first reply in this combox.
“God cannot be metaphysically dependent on creation if creation is metaphysically dependent on God, which is the case.”
>>>I am not saying, on my view, that the attributes of God are dependent on creation. I am saying that your view implies that. I am also not saying that God’s nature is the same thing as God’s existence (ADS). I am also not saying that your view affirms that God’s existence depends on creation (Thus your “if creation is metaphysically dependent on God” is irrelevant to my argument). I am saying that *****your view****** affirms that God’s ESSENCE/NATURE depends on creation You are fundamentally confusing God’s essence/nature with his existence, and guess what, that is exactly what ADS teaches; no distinction between divine essence and existence! What a surprise!
“It does no such thing. Reread Helm’s long defense of the sufficiency of God (pgs. 193-194) and my thoughts thereafter.”
>>Whether Helm’s statement avoids the argument your analogy does not and that is the point of my statement.
You quote Helm:
“If God is self-sufficient does he need to create? In one sense, obviously not. If a country is self-sufficient it does not need to import goods. But an individual may be self-sufficient in the sense that nothing else is necessary for that individual’s *******existence********* ”
Notice here again we have the collapsing of the meaning of nature onto existence. Three Types of Religious Philosophy by Gordon Clark (The Trinity Foundation: Jefferson, Maryland, 1989), pg. 63
"Thomas [Aquinas-ds] developed the theory of analogy far beyond the simple observation of Aristotle, and it took on major proportions when the subject was God. Thomas held that *******the simplicity of the divine being required God’s existence to be identical with his essence*********. This is not the case with a book or pencil. That a book is and what a book is are two different matters. But with God existence and essence are identical. For this reason an adjective predicated of God and the same adjective predicated of man are not univocal in meaning. One may say, God is good, and one may say, This man is good; but the predicate has two different meanings. There is no term, not a single one, that can be predicated univocally of God and of anything else.”
Helm is teaching you Plotinian Monadism (ADS) Ryan. Flee from it my brother. Graduate from college with flying colors as I know you will and then come and help me start this church here. I hopefully will be prepared to enter into the grad school at U of L in their Philosophy degree. WE can party all night long with thick books, pocket protectors and capri sun.
“Plotinus believed ADS. I don’t, as you yourself admit must be the case”
>>>But you are still under the influences of Plotinus. You are confused. I am doing my best to unravel the PLotinian web from your limbs.
“ Further, did not Plotinus think to emanate was something other than to will (i.e. the nature/will “collapse” which I don’t think applies to me)?”
>>>That’s right.
“Given what I said above about my reservations as to agreeing one way or another with your accusation until its nature is clearer to me,”
>>>I think my essence-existence exposure in this comment suffices.
“ You do think that what God wills must be agreeable to His nature, correct?”
>>>Yes of course.
“But you don’t think that God’s nature determines what He wills, correct?”
>>> Incorrect ; Somethings, yes, somethings no. From my systematic theology:
The divine nature did not demand the creation as if it was necessary to it, but in willing the creation God’s nature was agreeable to it . (Psa 16:2, Job35:6) In all things the divine nature directs and regulates the divine will because God is not an irrational pure nature with arbitrary whims. In some things there is an absolute necessity as in the Generation of the Son and the Spiration of the Spirit; also having presumed a decree to create a just law was absolutely necessary to the divine nature.
I think I finally understand your argument. I haven’t really grasped it until now. It’s this:
God’s nature is His attributes. You think that I am asserting God’s nature depends on creation in the sense that God’s mercy, wrath, justice, compassion, goodness, etc. (or at least one of those attributes) requires a creation. If mercy et. al. could be predicated of God apart from creation, then it could not be the case that creation necessarily follows from the divine nature. If mercy et. al. cannot be predicated of God apart from creation, these divine attributes would “depend” on creation, and so divine nature wouldn’t be self-sufficient in that sense. Is that right?
This seems true and that you have a point here. I need to think about it, as well as the implications of each position. Could you expand a bit more on what would follow if God’s self-sufficiency were denied? You’ve referenced a few concepts, but I would need more than just “that’s Plotinian” or pagan. Not to say that I would want to be associated with either, obviously, but I still have one problem with your position:
“Somethings, yes, somethings no.”
Ok, but this qualification doesn’t address my issue with your position:
The divine will is atemporal. We agree. It’s logically contingent on the divine nature. We agree. The only problem, as I see it, is that on your position, no answer can be given as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another “world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. There must be some other “world” agreeable to the divine nature on your view, or else this world would have been necessary, a point to which you strenuously object. I believe last time we established that another such “world” would have been one in which God didn’t create. That would be, you said, consistent with the divine nature. Then again, I pointed out it would be mutually exclusive with this “world” because only in the latter is it true that “God created.”
Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that isn’t relevant because you’ve already agreed that it’s nevertheless logically contingent on the divine nature, a divine nature which, since it doesn’t “direct and regulate” which of the two (or more) “worlds” which are agreeable to it are to be instantiated by the logically contingent divine will, there can never be any answer as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” over against the other which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.
I know it must seem I've asked you to refute this a 1000 times now, and maybe it's just one more thing I haven't grasped, but I really don't understand your answer is or how you could answer.
I meant to write:
//Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that *IS* relevant...//
“God’s nature is His attributes. You think that I am asserting God’s nature depends on creation in the sense that God’s mercy, wrath, justice, compassion, goodness, etc. (or at least one of those attributes) requires a creation. If mercy et. al. could be predicated of God apart from creation, then it could not be the case that creation necessarily follows from the divine nature. If mercy et. al. cannot be predicated of God apart from creation, these divine attributes would “depend” on creation, and so divine nature wouldn’t be self-sufficient in that sense. Is that right?”
>>That’s right
“This seems true and that you have a point here. I need to think about it, as well as the implications of each position. ”
>>Fair enough
“Could you expand a bit more on what would follow if God’s self-sufficiency were denied?”
>>My complaints terminate on the Pantheistic Neoplatonic Monadism stuff.
“no answer can be given as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another “world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature…I know it must seem I've asked you to refute this a 1000 times now, and maybe it's just one more thing I haven't grasped, but I really don't understand your answer is or how you could answer.”
>>> I’ll repeat. The will is eternal which makes the question meaningless.
Both you and Stephen Macasil get all this stuff when given just a couple passer bys which is why i'm bent on getting you guys out here with me. Forgive my tenacity, but you are young and I don't want you to have to waste your life going through one horrible church experience after another because the people around you are not truth seekers and one day you are going to be old enough and seasoned enough in the atrocities of this life and the multiplied atrocities that accompany a true religious person, that you are going to want to be around people of like mind and ryan, I'm sorry, the Reformed Churches do not understand what they believe about this stuff and they certainly don't believe in Scripturalism. If you question them on it they will give you a swift boot to the gut and however spiritual a person you are it WILL TEAR YOU APART.
Since you seem so interested, it's only fair for me to tell you about where I'm at and what I'm planning for the future. I probably have two more years before I graduate, and I'll have student loans which I plan to pay off by military service. After that, I've thought about getting a masters/PhD in philosophy and teaching or just looking for what would be available. I'm not sure.
I also have family and friends here that I hope to convict and help succeed. A few of my friends are on board with most (if not all) significant doctrinal issues we talk about. They're relatively new to Clark, Scripturalism et. al., but they catch on as quickly to this stuff as I did, some of which I will attribute to my ability to get at the heart of matters by relating my own experiences and intellectual struggles. One of them is in the army right now but plans to become a pastor.
The point is, I really appreciate what you're offering and would like to help you however I can, but I have to tell you that it's going to be a while before I would even be in a position to commit to what you're proposing or to know if I would even want to.
Thanks for the discussion, btw. Since I've known you, you've really improved in your patience with others. Keep it up!
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