In that post, I was trying to provide a Reformed reply to the following question put forward by Carl Henry: "Does the very notion of "events which could have been otherwise" violate divine omnipotence and omniscience?" Notwithstanding my attempt to answer in the negative, even a few weeks after writing the post, I frustratingly wrote to a friend:
I cannot say that I am quite satisfied with it. For instance: why did God choose to effect this possible world? Presumably because it pleased Him. Why did it please Him? Presumably the answer has something to do with His nature. But it seems to me such an answer implies that God must have effected this possible world, since God's nature is not itself effected but rather that by which all other things are effected. God's nature is determinative. That in turn implies this is the only possible world, in which case the problem reasserts itself: how does God know counter-factuals if this is the only possible world? Vexing...
It wasn't until recently I discovered that there is precedent in the history of Reformed theology for rejecting the concept of counter-factual knowledge (cf. Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics pgs. 428-432). I may write a separate post on this. Here, however, I will only be concerned with explaining why I have come to think - in contrast to an assumption of the aforementioned blog post - that this is the only possible world. In so doing, I will be providing an alternative Reformed defense of the biblical doctrine of divine omniscience.
At the same time, I do not wish to imply that I think everything I wrote in my post from a year ago is wrong. I still believe God's righteousness and the manifestation of His glory are correlated in that God's righteousness is demonstrated in what John Piper would call His unswerving commitment always to preserve the honor of his name and display his glory. I still believe God's decree must be non-arbitrary. I still believe that:
God's decree to effect this possible world implies that this possible world is entailed in God's decree to maximally manifest His glory; that is, given God's purpose to maximally manifest His glory, God necessarily must have decreed to effect this possible world.
What I have reconsidered is whether or not there could be "possible worlds" - worlds God could have instantiated - other than this actual world. There are several reasons for this:
1. As my remarks to a friend indicated, I believe there is reason for everything God has decreed. That would include the teleological end of all things, God's glory. Ironically, I wrote a post 3 years ago (republished here) in which I made a statement very much in line with what I think now:
For God to act in a manner which would not bring Himself maximal glory… would constitute a contravention of the divine nature, and since God cannot deny Himself, God’s actions too are determined [by His own, immutable nature].
Why did God decree to maximally manifest His glory? I don't see any other possible conclusion than something similar to this or what I said to my friend. In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one?
2. Let us suppose God had actualized a different possible world; after all, if God's actualization of this world wasn't absolutely necessary, He could have chosen to actualize a different possible world. But this means God's knowledge is not eternal, since His knowledge [of what is the actual world] would not be necessary.
God knows that this is the actual world. But if God has a libertarian free will, it cannot be denied He could have chosen to instantiate (and therefore could have known as actual) a completely different possible world. Making God's knowledge contingent on a "free" choice - even His own - requires a succession of ideas in His mind (knowledge of possible worlds -> choice -> knowledge of the actual world), and that destroys His eternal omniscience. Not only is God's instantiation of this world non-arbitrary, but God also didn't compare multiple possible worlds in order to come to a decision as to which to put into effect.
This is a most important objection because it cuts across all [Christian] systems which believe in an eternally omniscient God.
3. Suggesting God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability.
Conclusion: God knows who He is because of who He is. He knows this world is possible both because He has the power to effect it and because effecting it would not contradict who He is. He necessarily effected this possible world because no other world fits this criteria. This is not to say God's will is under any external compulsion; rather, His works are intrinsically determined by His nature.
30 comments:
Ryan,
“In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one?”
I don’t believe that there are other possible worlds. God’s will to create is eternal extending from the immutability of his will. The questions is not whether God has rational deliberation behind his will. That’s too obvious to even debate. The issue is, is the universe something necessary to God so without which God is not God or is the universe something agreeable to his nature? Do God’s attributes depend upon the existence of this universe? No way. That’s looney tunes. So I see a distinction between an absolute necessity of nature and a decision of the will agreeable to the divine nature. Of course the nature directs the will but does it always necessitate actions? I don’t believe that there are any temporal sequences in God thinking or contingencies to God’s knowledge. IMO those are not the issues. The issue is, is God an absolute monad with no distinctions in him at all? IMO NO.
“God knows that this is the actual world. But if God has a libertarian free will, it cannot be denied He could have chosen to instantiate (and therefore could have known as actual) a completely different possible world.”
Only on the assumption that the divine will is jointly exhaustive with the divine nature. I reject divine simplicity as Clark did and therefore see a distinction between divine will and divine nature. Your assumption which is laced with hyper calvinist and Origienist undertones assumes that there is only one kind of eternity in God.
In Florovsky’s Works, Vol. 3 he says,
“The idea of the world, God’s design and will concerning the world, is obviously eternal, but in some sense not co-eternal, and not conjointly everlasting with Him, because ‘distinct and separated,’ as it were, from His ‘essence’ by His volition.One should say rather that the Divine idea of the world is eternal by another kind of eternity than the Divine essence…The idea of the world has its basis not in the essence but in the will of God. God does not so much have as ‘think up’ the idea of creation…in perfect freedom; and it is only by virtue of this…that He as it were ‘becomes’ Creator, even though from Everlasting…any such ‘refraining’ from creation would in no way alter or impoverish the Divine nature”. pg. 56”
I have tons of stuff on my website about this. The best article though is Time and Eternity in Gordon Clark and Georges Florovsky; Hyper Determinism Refuted; More Problems for Sean Gerety’s “God’s Hammer” by Drake on this subject.
http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/06/09/time-and-eternity-in-gordon-clark-and-georges-florovsky-hyper-determinism-refuted-by-drake/
"The issue is, is the universe something necessary to God so without which God is not God or is the universe something agreeable to his nature? Do God’s attributes depend upon the existence of this universe? No way. That’s looney tunes."
I agree. However, what is agreeable to God's nature? You say:
"I don’t believe that there are other possible worlds."
But also cite Florovsky who says:
"...any such ‘refraining’ from creation would in no way alter or impoverish the Divine nature."
Does not this latter quote imply refraining from creation would be agreeable to the divine nature? Does such not imply more than one possible world?
"Does not this latter quote imply refraining from creation would be agreeable to the divine nature?"
How could refraining from making a world imply another possible world? In this case there would be no world.
That's a rather narrow view of what a possible world is. I would say a possible world is a possible reality.
If God did not create a world, it would be true that "God did not create." But God did create, so that "God did create" is true. These mutually exclusive propositions demonstrate that a "world" or "reality" in which God did not create, if possible, is as susceptible to the argumentation in the original post as is multiple possible "worlds" according to your definition. In both cases, what God chose to do (or not to do, as the case may be) was not determined. He could legitimately have chosen to create or not to create, since both are, as you say, "agreeable" with His nature. At this point, the numbered arguments I made follow.
Ryan,
“That's a rather narrow view of what a possible world is. I would say a possible world is a possible reality. ”
That denies creation ex nihilo. There is no other reality outside of creation than God. God did not create into another reality. He created ex nihilo, implying into nothing and out of nothing. What you need to prove is that another reality other than God can exist without a creation. If you proved it you would deny creation ex nihilo and the Christian religion. I don’t believe it’s possible but I’ll hear you out if you have a position to defend. I made a video on this subject here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEYThb2Fp3M
"These mutually exclusive propositions demonstrate that a "world" or "reality" in which God did not create, if possible, is as susceptible to the argumentation in the original post as is multiple possible "worlds" according to your definition."
I deny the possibility of another reality outside of God and creation. What it would prove is that another reality can exist without a creation, say goodbye to creation ex nihilo.
"He could legitimately have chosen to create or not to create, since both are, as you say, "agreeable" with His nature. At this point, the numbered arguments I made follow."
Since I have already refuted the possibility of a reality outside of God and creation there is nothing to follow. Also, God is never in time and so distinguishing between action and inaction is meaningless.
What you are going to have to end up saying in this line of thought is that God's mercy depends upon him showing mercy to creatures. God's justice depends on him damning the wicked and so on, where God's goodness is dependent on our evil. Now you are into Gnostic Dualism and Origenism. See Origen’s Mistake and One of Dr. Clark’s Mistakes
http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/04/29/origens-mistake/
"There is no other reality outside of creation than God."
Right. Where did I say otherwise? My point was that if God had chosen to not create, such would still constitute a possible reality, for God would still [allegedly] be God. You agree God is real, so what we have is one possible reality in which God alone is real and another in which God and creation are real. That's two possible realities, not one. Given such, my arguments in the OP follow.
So I'm not imputing to your position an eternal, physical plenum when I speak of an alternative possible reality.
"What you need to prove is that another reality other than God can exist without a creation."
No, because that you say God could have chosen to alone be "existent" is sufficient for my case.
"I deny the possibility of another reality outside of God and creation."
Yes, I understand. That has nothing to do with my point, i.e.:
//He could legitimately have chosen to create or not to create, since both are, as you say, "agreeable" with His nature. At this point, the numbered arguments I made follow.//
"Also, God is never in time and so distinguishing between action and inaction is meaningless."
What I'm saying is that according to your position you must acknowledge multiple possible realities (perhaps residing in the "scientia necessaria"). If you do acknowledge that then I would point out that the numbered arguments follow.
"What you are going to have to end up saying in this line of thought is that God's mercy depends upon him showing mercy to creatures. God's justice depends on him damning the wicked and so on, where God's goodness is dependent on our evil."
It's the other way around. God's showing mercy and justice would depend on who He is: merciful and just. I don't see what simplicity has to do with this.
Ryan,
" You agree God is real, so what we have is one possible reality in which God alone is real and another in which God and creation are real. That's two possible realities, not one. Given such, my arguments in the OP follow."
How? The two would not be mutually exclusive. If God doesn’t create, you have nothing mutually exclusive from the first, you just have less than the first.
“So I'm not imputing to your position an eternal, physical plenum when I speak of an alternative possible reality.”
My objection does not require a physical plenum as an alternative. As my video showed some posit an endless succession of empty ages before God created as their definition of eternity, which would deny creation ex nihilo and then an empty time INTO which God creates. Both deny creation ex nihilo and both are not a physical plenum.
“No, because that you say God could have chosen to alone be "existent" is sufficient for my case.”
Again, you are equivocating on the word world here. Your article’s title is Impossible Worlds, Absolute Necessity. If you want to make God a world, I suggest you find a different religion other than Christianity.
“"I deny the possibility of another reality outside of God and creation."
Yes, I understand. That has nothing to do with my point, i.e.:”
Sure it does. You want to put God into the category of the “other possible world” and the entire endeavor is getting quite goofy.
“What I'm saying is that according to your position you must acknowledge multiple possible realities”
No I don’t because I see the universe as extending from the will not the nature. The will is eternal and immutable therefore eliminating any other possibility.
I am simply denying is that the divine nature depends upon a creation. Which you must assert.
“"What you are going to have to end up saying in this line of thought is that God's mercy depends upon him showing mercy to creatures. God's justice depends on him damning the wicked and so on, where God's goodness is dependent on our evil."
It's the other way around. God's showing mercy and justice would depend on who He is: merciful and just.”
EXACTLY. God is still God without a creation. You just said it all brother. What you are admitting to is that God was merciful and just “before” a creation. Meaning that the divine nature does not absolutely require a creation for it to be the divine nature. Welcome to Orthodox Calvinistic Libertarianism.
"How? The two would not be mutually exclusive. If God doesn’t create, you have nothing mutually exclusive from the first, you just have less than the first."
I already provided an example of the way in which they would be mutually exclusive:
//If God did not create a world, it would be true that "God did not create." But God did create, so that "God did create" is true. These **mutually exclusive propositions** demonstrate that a "world" or "reality" in which God did not create, if possible, is as susceptible to the argumentation in the original post as is multiple possible "worlds" according to your definition.//
God's very thoughts would have been different if He had refrained from creating as you believe was possible.
"My objection does not require a physical plenum as an alternative. As my video showed some posit an endless succession of empty ages before God created as their definition of eternity..."
Which I would reject. I have no problem with Clark's understanding of eternity and time. In fact, argument #2 specifically draws on Clark's language from Time and Eternity. If God's thoughts are "successive," He is not eternal[ly omniscient]. But this is precisely what must be the case if there are [mutually exclusive] possible realities which God could have chosen, e.g. "God alone is real" vs. "God and creation are real." Only one of those statements can be true, and yet if you are correct when you say God could have chosen to not-create, then either of those propositions could have been true. That's the whole reason I wrote what I did:
//Making God's knowledge contingent on a "free" choice - even His own - requires a succession of ideas in His mind (knowledge of possible worlds -> choice -> knowledge of the actual world), and that destroys His eternal omniscience.//
"Again, you are equivocating on the word world here. Your article’s title is Impossible Worlds, Absolute Necessity. If you want to make God a world, I suggest you find a different religion other than Christianity."
A possible world: a possible reality or state of affairs. I don't see how I'm equivocating, especially given the mutually exclusive propositions - either of which could have been true, since both are agreeable to God's nature and, hence, depend on His "free" will - I had already provided as an example of the way in which there must on your view be another "possible world."
"Sure it does. You want to put God into the category of the “other possible world” and the entire endeavor is getting quite goofy."
1. Do you agree that "God chose to not create" and "God chose to create" are mutually exclusive? If so,
2. Do you believe that God could have chosen to not create? If so,
3. Do you not see that if God had chosen to not create, His thoughts would be other than what they are? If so,
4. Do you not see that admitting this would require a succession of thoughts in God's mind from His knowledge of what is possible to His knowledge what is actual bridged by His will?
"The will is eternal and immutable therefore eliminating any other possibility."
Then it was not possible for God to have not created. If you reject that, then you do not really believe "any other possibility [is eliminated]."
"EXACTLY. God is still God without a creation. You just said it all brother. What you are admitting to is that God was merciful and just “before” a creation. Meaning that the divine nature does not absolutely require a creation for it to be the divine nature. Welcome to Orthodox Calvinistic Libertarianism."
I don't see how what I said implies that. Yes, God is who He is antecedent to creation, but that He creates nevertheless follows from who He is. There is a distinct difference between saying that God must become who He is by creating (which is really what it would mean for God's nature to depend on creation) and saying that because God is who He is, He will act as He has acted (creation et. al.).
Ryan,
“//If God did not create a world, it would be true that "God did not create." But God did create, so that "God did create" is true. These **mutually exclusive propositions** demonstrate that a "world" or "reality" in which God did not create, if possible, is as susceptible to the argumentation in the original post as is multiple possible "worlds" according to your definition.//”
>>Ok so assuming your definition of “world” as a set of realities, some created some uncreated (Which is again really goofy), proposition A: God did not create is to mutually exclusive to proposition B: “God did create” because the reality “God” is in both. There is a difference between contradictory propositions and mutually exclusive concepts.
“God's very thoughts would have been different if He had refrained from creating as you believe was possible.”
>>>Here you are not distinguishing between necessities of nature and eternal accidents extending from the will . What you are going to have to say is that the set of propositions for Ryan is something necessary to God at the level of nature which means you are God. You are an emanation from the nature of God instead of a creation extending from the will.
“ If God's thoughts are "successive," He is not eternal[ly omniscient].”
>>> Agreed
“But this is precisely what must be the case if there are [mutually exclusive] possible realities which God could have chosen, e.g. "God alone is real" vs.
"God and creation are real."
>> Again you are not distinguishing between necessities of nature and eternal accidents extending from the will.
Ryan,
“Only one of those statements can be true, and yet if you are correct when you say God could have chosen to not-create”
>>>It looks like I am going to have to say this stuff about 20 times before it sinks in. It took me about a year and a half to understand this so hopefully I can make that journey much shorter for you. You need to understand the difference between nature and will. This is the biggest point of error in Western Christian thinking coming from Plotinus’ Divine Simplicity in his One. In Plotinus’ Monad there are no distinctions between nature , will and activity. Augustine picked right off of this and Clark even catalogues it for you in Thales to Dewey. Reading Clark’s early writings and the Eastern Theologians opened my eyes to the primary individuating factor of Christianity: The universe does no emanate from God, it is a creation at the level of will.
I suggest you read A Theological Introduction to the Mystagogy of Saint Photios by Joseph P. Farrell, D.Phil. This is the best critique of Western Theology proper available in ink right now. He’s hitting on the same problems in Theology proper and Triadology that Dr. Clark pointed out in epistemology. Unfortunately Clark did not understand the former (Or he forgot it later in life because ehe says some stuff in Thales to Dewey that showed he did) but only the latter.
Also, Florovsky’s Works, Vol. 3. Creation and Redemption is awesome. I’m not into their Pelagianism at all but their critiques of western simplicity in distinguishing the nature from the will and Triadology are spot on.
The point I don’t think you are letting sink in is from the statement of
Florovsky above:
Florovsky’s Works, Vol.3,
“The idea of the world, God’s design and will concerning the world, is obviously eternal, but in some sense not co-eternal, and not conjointly everlasting with Him, because ‘distinct and separated,’ as it were, from His ‘essence’ by His volition. One should say rather that the Divine idea of the world is eternal by another kind of eternity than the Divine essence…The idea of the world has its basis not in the essence but in the will of God. God does not so much have as ‘think up’ the idea of creation…in perfect freedom; and it is only by virtue of this…that He as it were ‘becomes’ Creator, even though from Everlasting…any such ‘refraining’ from creation would in no way alter or impoverish the Divine nature”. pg. 56”
You want there to be only one kind of eternity meaning, no distinction between divine nature and divine will; thus Plotinus.
Ryan,
“- I had already provided as an example of the way in which there must on your view be another "possible world."”
>>This looks like the place to set up shop to show how you are not getting the nature-will distinction. I am not asserting that there could be another possible world. I am asserting that there is another kind of eternity in God other than the nature.
“1. Do you agree that "God chose to not create" and "God chose to create" are mutually exclusive?”
>>>No. they are contradictory.
“2. Do you believe that God could have chosen to not create?”
At the level of nature yes, at the level of will no.
“3. Do you not see that if God had chosen to not create, His thoughts would be other than what they are?”
>>> Do you not see that if you make all of God’s thought necessities of nature, then his thought of you makes you consubstantial with God?
“4. Do you not see that admitting this would require a succession of thoughts in God's mind from His knowledge of what is possible to His knowledge what is actual bridged by His will?”
>>>This assumes that I am asserting that the distinction between nature and will is one in time which I have avoided numerous times now.
“"The will is eternal and immutable therefore eliminating any other possibility."
>>>That’s the bull’s-eye. Consider yourself locked on, I’m preparing to fire: FOX 3!
Therefore, there is only one kind of eternity and immutability in God. Ergo, God is an absolute Monad with no real internal distinctions , making the persons modes not subjects and the only way out is to fall back into Aristotelian Christianity where God is one substance/subject with three sets of modal predications = Van Tilism.
You are not distinguishing nature from will and being sucked down into Plotinus’ Monad: “But I don’t want to be dissolved into the void!”
“I don't see how what I said implies that. Yes, God is who He is antecedent to creation, but that He creates nevertheless follows from who He is.”
>>>Who he is, with reference to nature or will?
“There is a distinct difference between saying that God must become who He is by creating (which is really what it would mean for God's nature to depend on creation)”
>>>No, actually Plotinus was pretty clear that the universe was not something that the One became by creating. It was an emanation extending from the very nature of the One from all eternity. Ergo no doctrine of creation, Clark makes that very clear in Thales to Dewey in a number of pagan contexts not just Plotinus.
You say that I am not distinguishing nature from will, so I will do so at the outset:
One’s will is his volition.
One’s nature is his characteristics or attributes.
Applying this to your arguments:
1. I do not find the language of “emanation” objectionable, but I maintain that God willed to create. The two do not appear to be any more mutually exclusive than the idea that sin follows from a sin nature and yet is chosen by the sinner. Do you not agree, for example, that our unregenerate nature determined our will and that our glorified nature will determine our will? I am having a hard time understanding your criticism, because one need not possess freedom of contrariety in order for the above distinction between will and nature to hold. In any case, I am aware of what Clark wrote about Plotinus in Thales to Dewey as I just reread it over the weekend due to our conversation; I simply disagree with Clark’s there. I do not, as did Plotinus, “explicitly den[y] will to [God].”
2. On that note, I also do not see how what I have said requires me to regard God as “undifferentiated.” Regarding absolute simplicity, even if the idea that the will is determined by the nature means the two cannot be distinguished, a point of which I am by no means convinced, could I not nevertheless maintain God is not absolutely simple since His characteristics or attributes are not identical with one another?
3. Furthermore, while God’s idea of me may be eternal – and that your blog is called “eternal propositions” leads me to think you would not find this objectionable – and necessary, I can hardly understand why you think that means I am [consubstantial with] God. My characteristics are not His, nor are His mine.
So much for my replies to your arguments. Addressing your replies (or lack thereof) to mine:
1. I still have not seen a reply to argument #1 in the OP. You agree with me that God can only will that which agrees with His nature, but according to you, more than one possible state of affairs is agreeable with His nature, viz.
Scenario A: God chooses to never create.
Scenario B: God chooses to create [what He has indeed created].
So, why did God choose Scenario B? Is His will arbitrary, or did He have a [non-arbitrary] reason? If the latter, does not such a reason imply that His will is naturally necessitated? To speak plainly, I do not see that you have or even can explain why God chose Scenario B.
2. Also, you evaded this question: “Do you not see that if God had chosen to not create, His thoughts would be other than what they are?” I have answered your counter-question, or I have at least attempted to do so. I would in turn like an attempt at a straight answer to mine.
Perhaps your answer will involve your citation of Florovsky and attempt to distinguish between “kinds” of eternity in God. If this means that God’s will is predicated on what is agreeable to His nature, that’s fine with me (otherwise, you’ll have to clarify).
Regardless, given the two possible Scenarios (provided above) that you think are agreeable with God’s nature, to say that God’s will is immutable or eternal without further explaining the relation between God’s nature and will is confusing (to me, anyways). Here’s what I mean:
I asked you if God could have chosen not to create (i.e. Scenario A). You said: “At the level of nature yes, at the level of will no.” Well, why not at the level of will? Does God not possess freedom of contrariety on your view? If so, and if Scenario A is agreeable with His nature, then I fail to understand why you don’t think God could not have chosen Scenario A “at the level of will.”
The only reason I can imagine that you would say that He could not have chosen Scenario A “at the level of will” is because you recognize that to concede such would mean there are a succession of thoughts in God’s mind, as I argued in the OP. But a wish to avoid this, while wise, doesn’t explain how you can harmonize 1) freedom of contrariety and/or the agreeableness of Scenario A to God’s nature with 2) an inability of God to choose Scenario A “at the level of will.”
To further confuse matters, I wrote:
//God's very thoughts would have been different if He had refrained from creating as you believe was possible.//
You responded that I am not “distinguishing between necessities of nature and eternal accidents extending from the will.” But for God’s knowledge of Scenario B to be an “accident extending from the will” surely implies that it was not necessary for God to have willed Scenario B or, by extension, known Scenario B as more than a mere possible state of affairs. Rather, since Scenario B is an accident of the divine will, God could have willed Scenario A. This is indeed compatible with freedom of contrariety, but it would both contradict your denial of the idea God could have chosen to not-create at the level of will.
Ryan,
“One’s will is his volition.
One’s nature is his characteristics or attributes. ”
No, no; I am not asking for a logical distinction but a metaphysical one.
“1. I do not find the language of “emanation” objectionable, but I maintain that God willed to create”
I figured as much which is why I reject that Hyper-Calvinists are Christians. You are fundamentally denying the exact distinction that Athanasius made in his debates with the Arians. I catalogued this in detail here: http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/08/19/athanasian-christianity-vs-western-scholasticism-both-roman-and-protestant/
You have essentially made the universe to be metaphysically equal to the eternal generation of the Son, which is nothing else than a denial of the eternal generation of the Son.
“ but I maintain that God willed to create”
Just as he willed to generate the Son, making the Son no better than a creature. Your Theology is ipso facto Arian.
“ The two do not appear to be any more mutually exclusive than the idea that sin follows from a sin nature and yet is chosen by the sinner. ”
Sinners are people and are therefore mutable and therefore making absolute necessities of man’s nature is pointless. You fall prey to the objection that your logic implies only righteousness must flow from a righteous nature yet Adam in original righteousness sinned.
“Do you not agree, for example, that our unregenerate nature determined our will and that our glorified nature will determine our will?”
>>>Again, mutable creatures do not have natures that contain absolute necessities but the word that Robert Shaw uses in his commentary on the confession is that nature gives a tendency to something not an absolute necessity.
“ I simply disagree with Clark’s there”
You mean this statement: “The Christian view of things also seems to resemble a dualism: At least the world and God may be called two ‘substances’ ; neither one is the substance of the other. But actually Christianity is more successfully monistic than Neoplatonism was. God alone is the eternal substance, the independent principle’ apart from creation of the world nothing exists besides him. This underlines the essential and controversial elements of the Hebrew-Christian doctrine. First, as Creator, God is viewed, not as an undifferentiated One that produces a world by necessity, but as a living mind who with foreknowledge created voluntarily. Plotinus explicitly denied will to his One; but will is one of the most prominent aspects of the Biblical Deity.” Thales to Dewey, pg. 189
? If so would you please tell Pat T McWilliams that Clark held my view early in life. I have tried to tell him but he won’t hear it from me. Maybe getting it from someone he agrees with on this issue will get it to sink in.
Ryan,
“ I do not, as did Plotinus, “explicitly den[y] will to [God].” ”
>>>But that is what emanationism is.
“2. On that note, I also do not see how what I have said requires me to regard God as “undifferentiated.” Regarding absolute simplicity, even if the idea that the will is determined by the nature means the two cannot be distinguished, a point of which I am by no means convinced, could I not nevertheless maintain God is not absolutely simple since His characteristics or attributes are not identical with one another? ”
>>>>The remarks I made about eternal generation and the quotation I supplied from Athanasius should have driven you to absolute despair but reread that section in Athanasius and you will have two options to choose from: 1. Take my/Athanasius’. Nicene Creeed’s view 2. Deny that nature and will can be distinguished so you can have a necessary creation on the same level as eternal generation.
You seem to have more of a desire for truth than my usual scriptiuralist fare, so after you have had a mental breakdown I’ll be waiting for your resignation from Plotinianism.
No. Because for you, to be, is the same thing as “to be creator”. You fall right back into Plotinus’s dialectic of opposition. Read Farrell.
“Furthermore, while God’s idea of me may be eternal – and that your blog is called “eternal propositions” leads me to think you would not find this objectionable”
>>>Of course it is not objectionable because I extend from the will of God as a free creation. You extend from the nature, ergo emanationism.
“My characteristics are not His, nor are His mine”
>>>Then you admit that you do not extend from the nature. Meaning you are not an absolute necessity of nature. Or do you admit it? Athanasius speaks to this in detail. The eternal generation is an absolute necessity of nature. The creation extends from will not nature. It was the Arians that tried to put the two in the same category, JUST LIKE YOU.
“You agree with me that God can only will that which agrees with His nature, but according to you, more than one possible state of affairs is agreeable with His nature, viz.”
>>>>Yes because otherwise I have to put the creation as metaphysically equal with eternal generation, making Christ a creature. No thanks.
Ryan,
“So, why did God choose Scenario B?”
>>>For his glory. Not that his glory depends on the creation as your view must assert in contradiction to scripture as I have shown here: http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/06/09/time-and-eternity-in-gordon-clark-and-georges-florovsky-hyper-determinism-refuted-by-drake/
Psalm 16:2 O my soul, thou hast said unto the LORD, Thou art my Lord: my goodness extendeth not to thee;
Job 35:6 If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him? or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto him? 7 If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? or what receiveth he of thine hand? kjv
I do not deny a rational deliberation but that does not mean that creation is absolutely necessary.
“ I do not see that you have or even can explain why God chose Scenario B.”
Even Clark realized that we don’t have answers to everything. My lack of omniscience does not imply a contradiction. God has not revealed that to us completely. This particular complaint is embarrassing for you as a Calvinist. Why does God choose one man over another to be his elect? Is his decision arbitrary? ; Or did He have a [non-arbitrary] reason? If the latter, does not such a reason imply that His will is naturally necessitated? So now, God is necessitated to redeem. So then his mercy is dependent on him showing that mercy to a creature. The exact complaint that I showed is pagan dualism. http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/10/01/darkness-a-consistent-hyper-calvinist/
“2. Also, you evaded this question: “Do you not see that if God had chosen to not create, His thoughts would be other than what they are?””
>>No I did not. I distinguished between essential thoughts arising from nature and thoughts arising from will.
“ Well, why not at the level of will?”
>>Because the will is immutable and eternal.
Ryan,
“Does God not possess freedom of contrariety on your view? “
>>>I’m happy with Owen and Trueman’s distinction:
“[Quoting Owen-DS] [T]hat God punishes sins with a concomitant liberty, because he is of all agents the most free, we have not a doubt. Thus his intellectual will is carried towards happiness by an essential inclination antecedent to liberty: for to act freely is the very nature of the will; yea it must necessarily act freely.
Therefore, God’s freedom is not his ability to choose between alternative courses of action but his ability to will happiness without hindrance.”
Carl Trueman’s journal article John Owen’s Dissertation on Divine Justice
“You responded that I am not “distinguishing between necessities of nature and eternal accidents extending from the will.” But for God’s knowledge of Scenario B to be an “accident extending from the will” surely implies that it was not necessary for God to have willed Scenario B or, by extension, known Scenario B as more than a mere possible state of affairs. Rather, since Scenario B is an accident of the divine will, God could have willed Scenario A. This is indeed compatible with freedom of contrariety, but it would both contradict your denial of the idea God could have chosen to not-create at the level of will.”
>>>I have to say the same things over and over to you. By necessary you should know that I mean a necessity extending from the eternality and immutability of the will not the nature. Or saying “God could have willed Scenario A”, by “could” you already know the distinction I make here.
I have said so many things here that you have not even touched and I doubt you ever will. IN any case you need to be honest and admit you do not believe the Nicene Creed at this point and have the balls to acknowledge your denial of the Christian revelation. There is something that generates from God eternally that extends from something in God eternally that creation does not extend from. You can’t believe this and so you can’t believe the eternal generation of the Son. It’s time to change your beliefs or tap out on Christianity. Save yourself the heart ache man. I know a guy just in the last couple months who knows Christian Theology better than any seminary professor I have ever had and he left Christianity because of these and related issues.
I confess that at this point I am not well-read enough to answer several of your arguments here, and though I think you would do better to try to help people think through the issues rather than bash them over the head with what you believe is true, since I too can be guilty of this at times I will attempt to think about the substance of what you have said and get back to you with some questions.
I just read Clark's chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity and was wondering for what reasons you think his defense of absolute necessity there does not successfully walk the line between Arianism and Plotinic emanation (I wasn't aware of the Neoplatonic background of that term when you asked me about emanation; I thought it meant that creation follows necessarily from God's nature) and why you don't think his distinction between creation and eternal generation holds (given absolute necessity).
Clark says,
“A more reasonable and philosophical theory of emanation was that of Plotinus…whose deleterious effects, variously evaluated by different writers, were not so immediate. The theory is a form of pantheism. The Supreme One, transcending even the duality of propositional truth, transcending Mind, beyond all knowledge, shines by its own nature,[Generates by a necessity of nature] and its expanding rays are the ranks of being in the world, each less brilliant than the prior one,[Hierarchies] until the light is lost in darkness and nothingness. Since the Christian idea of generation ends with a single only-begotten Son, Neoplatonism is ruled out…Therefore the doctrine of the Trinity used the term generation as a contrast with the term creation, as well as a contrast with emanationism, to preserve the New testament teaching on the doctrine of the Second person. ”
The Trinity, pg. 115
His problem is that it does not end with the generation of the Son in his later Hyper-Calvinist system. The creation also extends from the same "place" in God.
Could you explain some of the damaging implications of such a position? Though I'm sure you are aware of it, Clark goes on to distinguish that "Created objects are not homoousionta with the Father," nor is creation eternal.
Another quick question:
I wrote: “God's very thoughts would have been different if He had refrained from creating as you believe was possible.”
You wrote: >>>Here you are not distinguishing between necessities of nature and eternal accidents extending from the will.
Does this mean that you think knowledge pertaining to the "eternal accidents extending from the will" is not a participation in the divine nature?
Ryan,
"Does this mean that you think knowledge pertaining to the "eternal accidents extending from the will" is not a participation in the divine nature?"
No, I would just gloss nature a bit broader than essence. It would still affirm a participation in God mind; A participation in things that are uncreated in God. Even the Greek Fathers understood that a participation in God's essence qua essence was not possible but the energies of that essence.
In The Answer, we are told that the Scripturalist view asserts a participation in the objects of God's knowledge not the manner of God knowledge. So we participate in uncreated propositions and in so doing participate in God's nature, but not the manner of God's knowing (essence).
Ryan,
"Could you explain some of the damaging implications of such a position? Though I'm sure you are aware of it, Clark goes on to distinguish that "Created objects are not homoousionta with the Father," nor is creation eternal."
It's just an inconsistency.
As far as implications I have written over 50 articles on the issue for you to peruse if you so desire. I suggest you start with origen.
"No, I would just gloss nature a bit broader than essence."
That is, "nature" in Peter's epistle refers to something more broad than "nature" in our discussion to this point?
I agree with you regarding our knowledge being univocal with God's and yet discursive rather than intuitive, but would you mind explaining what are "the energies of [God's] essence"?
Ryan,
"I agree with you regarding our knowledge being univocal with God's and yet discursive rather than intuitive, but would you mind explaining what are "the energies of [God's] essence"?"
First, I don't agree with the Eastern Essence-Energy thing. If you want a full explanation see David Bradhaw's "The Concept of the Divine Energies."
http://www.uky.edu/~dbradsh/
I rejected it here: http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/08/24/the-essence-and-energies-distinction-in-david-bradshaw-refuted/
"That is, "nature" in Peter's epistle refers to something more broad than "nature" in our discussion to this point?"
Strictly speaking yes. There is overlap but creation and participation; It's a different subject and context.
Do you mind if I use this dialogue in my book that I am writing? I think we turned over just about every stone that can be turned over in this conversation. I think it would be helpful to some people.
Not at all. I am still undecided on the issue, but feel free to include it.
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