Sola Scriptura and "The Primacy of Revelation"

I was pleasantly surprised to hear James White use the word "Scripturalism" in his opening statement in a recent debate on sola scriptura with Trent Horn (link). He even seems to mean something pretty near to Clark's position: that Scripture is our ultimate epistemic authority - see minute mark 17:30-21:00. If more mainstream, Reformed apologists are willing to go this route, it would make more clear "the dividing line" (pardon the James White pun). [Side note: less pleasant was listening to White's final cross-examination answers from minute mark 1:42:00-1:46:20.]

A comment on my recent post on Eastern Orthodoxy noted a few, anecdotal examples of nominally Reformed Christian moving to Eastern Orthodoxy due to issues they took with the doctrine sola scriptura. That Protestants would be more aware of the centrality of sola scriptura (if not the nuances) does not surprise me. Most - if not all - heresies are traceable to a faulty understanding or doctrine of Scripture. After all, it is a rare person who would claim to understand a biblical doctrine as true, claim to accept it as true, and later reject said doctrine despite still regarding it as true. 

I noted in the above link and elsewhere that Eastern Orthodox apologists appear quite willing to borrow concepts or appropriate arguments made by Reformed theologians - far more so than Roman Catholics (at least in my experience). Even in the case of sola scriptura, you are unlikely to hear a Roman Catholic make a statement such as this, for example: 

Though I think much of Dr. Svendsen’s critique of Roman theology can often be polemical and bitter because he sees as a corrupt institution, he is undoubtedly right about his insistence on the primacy of revelation as this is probably the main point that also divides Orthodoxy from Rome... Svendsen’s approach to the question at hand and insistence that divine revelation be the paradigm is far more acceptable of how an Orthodox approach these questions.

This is not an isolated observation. I'm aware of other proponents of Eastern Orthodoxy who would likewise state acceptance of something along the lines of "a primacy of revelation." Similarly, Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to disapprove of "natural theology" (example). Is it any wonder that upon hearing these sorts of things, nominally Reformed or Protestant individuals - particularly, certain presuppositionalists who deny any and all epistemic or apologetic utility in natural theology - might find themselves more receptive to apologists whose positions are seemingly similar to their own? 

Again, what is often missing is nuance. For one thing, Michael Sudduth has argued fairly persuasively in The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology that some kind of natural theology was accepted among virtually all Reformed theologians until the 19th century (see most of chapter 1, here and here) . I hope to do a further post on this book in particular, as its distinctions and explanation of the functions of natural theology are helpful. In brief, though, I agree with finding a proper place for natural theology within one's worldview, as Gordon Clark also accepted (link). This may come as a surprise to some.

Another missing nuance in deconversion stories related to sola scriptura is that to state agreement on "the primacy of revelation" does not outline what the content of divine revelation is. For those who are mistakenly dissuaded of sola scriptura, it makes sense that Eastern Orthodoxy is viewed as a leading alternative (despite problems I've mentioned elsewhere) in light of the mess that is contemporary Roman Catholic apologetics. Just have a look at the comments here or the numerous examples of Roman Catholic cognitive dissonance here (particularly on the question of private judgment; cf. link). Talk about buyer's remorse!

But in turn, does Eastern Orthodoxy stand in any better position relative to Protestantism? Take the Synod of Jerusalem. Most Eastern Orthodox apologists would say the synod was not ecumenical. In this case, then, one would think that an Eastern Orthodox believer should agree that it may err and therefore is not to be made the rule of faith, or practice (cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 31.4). 

Nevertheless, some Eastern Orthodox apologists would appeal to it as an external confirmation of the canon of Scripture (link), whereas others would disagree and hold to a different canon of Scripture (link). How is this to be explained? What would motivate an Eastern Orthodox apologist to appeal to a fallible synod? 

1) Is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is infallible after all? If so, then there is disagreement among Eastern Orthodox believers regarding the canon of "divine revelation" vis-a-vis what counts as an ecumenical council. Many apologetic arguments one finds against Protestantism would thereby cut against Eastern Orthodoxy. [Side note: that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy disagree on which councils were ecumenical already begs this question.] 

2) Or is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is fallible but supports a particular understanding of the canon of Scripture? If so, one can understand why Eastern Orthodox believers who take seriously "the primacy of revelation" and have a different canon of Scripture than this synod would not gainsay the epistemic weight of what they regard as infallible in favor of the determinations of a fallible synod. 

3) If an Eastern Orthodox believer doesn't wish to appeal to the Synod of Jerusalem at all, how then does he know the canon of Scripture? So-called ecumenical councils never listed the books of Scripture. In fact, who is to say that one's opinion of the canon of Scripture won't differ from a future, allegedly infallible ecumenical council?

In each case, how is disagreement about the content of divine revelation supposed to be resolved? There is no infallible table of contents for the Eastern Orthodox believer any more than there is for the Protestant. The Protestant is simply more honest about this and, if nuanced, able to argue that such a fact is really irrelevant (link). 

Sola scriptura is a species of sola revelation. If the Eastern Orthodox apologists I've referenced are representative of the whole, then the principle difference between Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy is not so much "the primacy of revelation" but the content of it. In that case, though, one who deconverts from Protestantism due to perceived issues with sola scriptura but then goes ahead to accept another form of sola revelation has simply exchanged one set of presuppositions for another without meaningfully considering 1) whether what he thought were issues actually are, and 2) whether said issues would also apply to his newfound beliefs. The issue of "private judgment" never disappears, nor the need for self-authenticity. Protestantism just turns out to be more defensible because Protestants self-consistently accept as God-breathed only the sort of content that is described as God-breathed: holy writ (2 Timothy 3:16-17).

WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.

Self-Attestation vs. Self-Authenticity

As I read more and more examples in which I find a conflation between epistemology and apologetics (link, link, link, link), I am reminded of Anthony Bryson's thoughtful chapter in Calvinism and the Problem of Evil called, Calvinism, Self-Attestation, and Apathy toward Arguments From Evil. Unlike many authors, Bryson is aware of the distinction between the two:

...my aim is not to look at what role self-attestation should play in apologetics. I'm interested in how the Christian can know that the Bible is the word of God. In the SA literature, these sometimes get confused.

In his chapter, Bryson detects apathy from presuppositionalists towards the problem of evil and thinks such is due to their reliance on the principle of "self-attestation." He writes that some presuppositionalists think as follows: 

We clearly know that God exists because of what the Bible says. Since God is its author, it is infallible. And we know its author is God because of its own self-testimony. In short, the Bible is self-attesting... 

...how can we know that the Bible is inspired? The most common answer from self-attestation theorists is that Jesus and the rest of the Scriptures teach that it is… we know that it was written by God because God, in the Bible, has written that it was written by him. (pgs. 275, 280-281)

Now, some authors of books in the Bible do claim their own or other biblical writings have been divinely revealed. But any reliance on self-attestation to function as a positive evidence, proof, or defense of one's belief in the Bible already presupposes that the Bible is trustworthy. Circular argumentation (apologetics) may be permissible (see below). But argumentation presupposes epistemic justification, and circular justification (epistemology) is not permissible (link). Bryson is interested in the latter, not the former.

Here's another problem with "apathetic" presuppositionalists Bryson mentions: does every proposition the Bible communicates begin with a self-attestation (e.g. "I am the Lord...")? Obviously not. How, then, are we able to know those propositions? Not by an appeal to self-attestation! There must be some other way in which we know each biblical proposition, in which case Bryson has a point that the motivation for a lazy self-attestation epistemology is undercut. 

Further, suggesting that self-attestation is an epistemic necessity would seem to lead to a vicious regress: with respect to any purported revelation from God, God Himself would have to attest that He is attesting that He is attesting ad infinitum. Divine revelation could not be known if it requires infinite content.

Now, none of this suggests that self-attestation arguments are irrelevant to apologetics. Self-consistency is a virtue, after all. The Bible may even allow for [apologetic] tests according to which one may disconfirm knowledge claims, which is not the same as suggesting the Bible requires tests for knowledge-claims to be epistemically justified (link). 

Even so, should one solely rely on self-attestation arguments in one's apologetic (let alone in one's epistemology)? No. For example, other religious apologists might make self-attestation arguments. It would be useful to show in what ways Christianity has comparatively unique evidence or in what ways those religions are internally inconsistent. In other words, if he had cared to make an argument against a purely self-attestation apologetic, Bryson would also have had a point. To this extent, I have no issue with him. 

On pg. 282, however, Bryson seems to equates self-attestation with self-authenticity:

SA arguments fence off inerrancy claims so that we cannot possibly acquire good reasons for thinking that the Bible, or just a part, is uninspired. God's self-authentication is the most fundamental and important piece of evidence for the inspiration/inerrancy of Scripture. All other evidence depends on it and must be interpreted in light of this epistemic base. The self-attestation of Scripture is not one piece of evidence among others that happens to weigh more. It determines what else can count as evidence, including how or whether we even ought to search for evidence. Put another way, for the SA theorist belief in biblical inerrancy resembles the sort of belief lodged in the middle of a Quinean doxastic web. The belief will (and ought to) be held, come what may.

Perhaps Bryson only means to summarize certain presuppositionalists. In footnotes for this paragraph and elsewhere in his chapter, he mentions Frame and Kruger. Indeed, his critiques of these and other presuppositionalist may land. For example, Kruger, whose work I do respect, has said (link):

Christian theologians—especially in the Reformed world—have long argued that there is a more foundational way we can know books are from God: the internal qualities of the books themselves.

In this case, Bryson's response appears devastating:

Kruger believes that SA sanctions the use of other kinds of evidence, like the internal virtues of a book, to pick out the divinely inspired books. Yet, despite this broadening of potential evidence, his view collapses into the strict self-attestation view. He requires that we beg the question and assume which books belong in the cannon [sic] to figure out which books should be included in the canon. Unless God, via some other form of communication, enlightens us as to the list of canon making attributes, we must rely on God's word. Consequently, we must have already isolated the right books so that we can extract from them the criteria for canon inclusion.

For instance, Kruger believes that the beauty of the Bible, along with its efficacy and harmony, is evidence of inspiration. But how does he know to search for these attributes? Primarily because of what he knows about God and his character. And he acquired this knowledge, I believe he would say, from Scripture.

At this point, we've hit upon the second horn of our dilemma: We must already know some of the books that belong in the New Testament canon apart from this method. For if we know that book X belongs in the canon and then learn that according to that book, properties a, b, and c are indicative of divine inspiration, those properties must not initially explain how we first learned that book X is inspired. (pg. 293)

Touché. Is there an alternative, or is the presuppositionalist out of luck? Perhaps Bryson would agree that "self-authentication" can refer to some meaning that is distinct from "self-attestation" if an author defines his terms. That is the route I would wish to take.

Self-attestation would be something along the lines of a speaker identifying himself as such while speaking. Bryson's definition of self-attestation (provided above) is just fine. On the other hand, I have mentioned elsewhere that I think self-authenticity means that the truth content of one's belief is the very justification one has for believing it. Self-authentication would be synonymous with self-justification.

As such, these are distinct ideas. In my mind, then, equating self-authenticity with self-attestation would be to commit the same sort of conflation between knowledge (epistemology) and defense of knowledge (apologetics) I've seen elsewhere. Consider an analogy I've mentioned before:

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness). (link)

To expand on this, a child is playing outside of his house. His mom calls him home for dinner. How does the child "know" to come home for dinner? Well, the epistemic starting point must be the mother's voice. 

Of course, the voice doesn't exist without the mother first existing, but that's a point of ontology. An ontological precondition for a situation in which a child is able to "know" to come home for dinner is distinct from what the child himself must take as his epistemic foundation for knowing to come home for dinner. Again, when a child hears his mother's voice, she doesn't need to say, "This is your mom speaking!" for the child to "know" and obey his need to come home.

A fortiori, as sinners, we are playing outside of the safety and nourishment of God's house. When He calls his children home by His word - Scripture; the Bible - the recipients of His effectual call may - with full assurance - know, hear, follow His voice. They will do this even if the word they hear does not contain a reference to self-attestation ("Thus saith the Lord")! That being said, our God is gracious, and if we listen long enough, we find that He does give us behavior reinforcement and so forth by self-attesting as to the fact that it is He who is calling.

The epistemic justification we have for believing God's speech is true - the content of which are biblical propositions - is the very fact that His word is truth. There is no prior premise. There is no circular reasoning in which a proposition[al belief] somehow becomes justified only after one makes a circular argument. As I said before, we don't know Scripture because it is "self-attesting" - i.e. because Scripture says it was written by God. We know it because it is "self-authenticating" - i.e. the truth of God's word and nothing else is our epistemic justification for foundational belief in it. 

In short, I think self-authenticity is to epistemology as self-attestation is to apologetics. Neither "prove" the Bible is God's word. But self-authenticity (John 10) is the principle by which Christians are able to know what is indemonstrable, whereas self-attestation is one reason (among many) Christians can cite in defense of what they already know.

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 9)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's eighth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

Is Scripturalism Fundamentally Tied to Internalism?

Because both this chapter and Mr. Lazar's last chapter are so integrally tied to understanding the difference between internalism and externalism, I thought I'd begin this review with some prefatory comments. 

One of the only objections I've seen from fellow Scripturalists to the idea that Scripturalism is tied to internalism is the thought that divine revelation is something "external" to us. If divine revelation is something distinct from us, does that not mean that it is "external" to us? Such objections betray a complete unfamiliarity with what internalism and externalism actually mean. I cited contemporary epistemologist Michael Williams in a post long ago that succinctly explains the difference:

Internalism is the view that, to be justified in holding a belief, we must have “cognitive access” to its “justification-makers.” So-called “externalist” theories of knowledge and justification, by contrast, allow epistemically appropriate believing to result from factors of which we are not aware.

Now, at the end of my last review, I linked to posts I've written (including the above) in which I further explain why I think Scripturalism is tied to internalism, a particular view of epistemic justification. While Scripturalism may also be compatible with externalism in some contexts, one's "basic epistemology," as Clark put it, ought to involve a first principle that is self-authenticating or self-justifying. This means that one can be aware of or have cognitive access to the epistemic justification for one's first principle, for the epistemic justification does not come from any external factors. 

Is divine revelation something that is distinct from us? Of course. But is divine revelation cognitively accessible? Yes, it is. We can reflect upon, meditate upon, and be aware of divine revelation, the extant extent of which is codified in Scripture. In fact, this is one of the reasons that I mentioned in an earlier review that Scripturalists ought to regard our epistemic foundation, not as a physical and non-propositional texts, but rather as the [propositional] contents which the texts codify. Hence, Scripturalism is fundamentally tied to internalism even if it is compatible with [other] beliefs being epistemically justified or "known" on externalist grounds.

I really am not trying to suggest that I know it all. I don't. But it is admittedly frustrating to hear these kinds of objections when I have already anticipated such objections in and by providing definitions of the very terms in question, definitions I honestly doubt objectors have even thought to consider. I can only hope that, at some point, contemporary Scripturalists get with the times if they really want to start identifying with contemporary labels. I am aware of several Scripturalists who seem to think Scripturalism is fundamentally tied to externalism, not internalism. I hope these reviews cause them to rethink their position.

Anyways, if I can give Mr. Lazar credit for one thing, it is that he does not seem unwilling to read contemporary philosophers in general or epistemologists in particular, something I've recommended Scripturalists need to do for a long time now (link). He has not made the mistakes I am addressing above. I only thought it would be worthwhile to deal with them here and remind readers of the definitions for internalism and externalism as I proceed to review Mr. Lazar's eighth chapter.

Sense Knowledge, Internalism, and Externalism

I mentioned that Mr. Lazar provided what were, in my mind, several good biblical cases of extra-biblical knowledge. In this chapter, Mr. Lazar seems to want to pursue his point a bit farther, citing several biblical stories to strengthen his case. Unfortunately, I didn't think the examples he picked were well chosen. 

For example, Clark might have chuckled at Mr. Lazar's choice to argue for sense knowledge based a story from the Bible in which sense deception occurred. Now, as a quote early on in Mr. Lazar's chapter shows, Clark didn't deny sense experiences, even if he overemphasized metaphorical cases involving them. So yes, in the story of Isaac and Jacob, Isaac's ears heard, eyes saw, and hands felt, just as God created them to do. Isaac is nevertheless tricked into a false belief that was [seemingly] caused by his senses. There is a book called Clark Speaks from the Grave, and I fancy that I can almost myself "hearing" Clark ask from beyond the grave, "how then can one trust whether his senses have caused a true belief?" This is a fair question, and I will return to it below.

Returning to the story and Mr. Lazar's arguments, it does appear Jacob makes an assumption that "if I do not dress up, Isaac will not be deceived." However, that assumption wouldn't itself imply Isaac would have otherwise known Jacob was appearing before him. That is, what Jacob may assume in this story isn’t explicitly validated, much less is it implied that any of the individuals in the story would have had or did have knowledge due to sensation. In other words, this story doesn't help Mr. Lazar's case.

Likewise, when Mr. Lazar brings up "doubting Thomas," we follow the story and read that Thomas would not believe that Jesus rose again unless he saw and touched Him. Jesus later rebuked Thomas for wanting to believe on the basis of sight. Mr. Lazar's conclusion that "the Bible assume the validity of the senses and their ability to furnish us with knowledge" (emphasis mine) does not follow from this story. Neither in this story nor in the story of Jacob and Isaac do we read anything about individuals acquiring or acting based on knowledge. Such responses would have sufficed for Clark to defend his epistemology without having to appeal to the sorts of metaphors Mr. Lazar notes he usually did. I think this recommends apologetic conservativism to us, another point I will return to below.

But that's boring! So while the following is entirely hypothetical, let's instead imagine that Clark read Mr. Lazar's chapter and felt especially responsive. Let's say that he not only was satisfied with replying along the above lines but also replied that these stories have more to do with metaphysics (causation of beliefs) rather than epistemology (beliefs that can be viewed as known).

Mr. Lazar might respond that, in such a scenario, Clark would be assuming that the two have nothing to do with one another. That is, perhaps the manner in which true beliefs are caused, for example, itself can function as epistemic justification. This would be to suggest externalism: we can refer to true beliefs as being known if they have been caused in a particular, divinely designed manner. We may not be aware of the causal process that was divinely ordained (hence, at least one justificatory factor is external), but we can hypothesize that the causal process occurred.

As was already noted above, Clark could just reply that these biblical stories are not evidence for an externalist theory of epistemic justification. In fact, since the passages say nothing about knowledge, it is actually Mr. Lazar who would be making the assumption. Even though this is a hypothetical, since Mr. Lazar did bring these passages up in a chapter on sense knowledge, the charge does seem to be applicable. It also foretells why Mr. Lazar would have been better off sticking to explicit Scriptural cases of extra-biblical knowledge rather than unnecessarily attempting to multiply examples. 

But rather than pursuing that consideration at this point, let's consider what else Clark might have said. Since Clark was interested in distinguishing between cases of knowledge and opinion, suppose he asked Mr. Lazar the following question: can one who has "knowledge" in an externalist sense distinguish such "knowledge" from an opinion, or is it only third-parties (like God) who can be consciously aware of what externalist "knowledge" we possess? 

Say one had two beliefs - one which was an untrue opinion and another which was a true belief that was epistemically justified in an externalist sense such that this latter belief could legitimately be regarded, in an externalist sense, as "knowledge" - could the person be aware of which belief of his is the one that is epistemically justified ("known")? Well, I think Mr. Lazar implicitly admits that he can't:

Clark claimed that you can't affirm the possibility of sense knowledge without first explaining how it works... What's the Neo-Scripturalist response to this objection? To reiterate that we take sense knowledge axiomatically, not on the basis of empirical theories. We know that sense knowledge happens because the Bible says so, not because we can explain how it happens philosophically.

Reading Mr. Lazar carefully, he may be correct that that Bible says we can know that sense knowledge happens in general. But if we cannot tell when sense knowledge actually happens - for what if we are all potential Isaac's with deceitful Jacobs [or the demon of Descartes] plotting to trick us! - then it seems we cannot consciously distinguish our true beliefs that have epistemic justification in an externalist sense from other beliefs of ours which are [potentially false] opinions.

Consider why not: take a belief that is known in an externalist sense. In part, the reason such a belief could be generally regarded as "known" is because at least one element of one's epistemic justification is not reflectively or cognitively accessible. There is at least one contributing factor to one's epistemic justification of which one cannot be aware (precisely because it is "external"). Whatever the external element or contributing factor is, it prevents one's being aware of it and, I conclude, therefore prevents one's being aware that his belief is known in an externalist sense. That is, in the scenario we are considering, one cannot be aware of one's own true belief as anything more than an opinion even if a third party could. For only a third party (like an omniscient God) could be aware of the justificatory factor that is present such that our belief is "known" by us in an externalist sense.

I think that for Mr. Lazar to object to any of this would really mean that he would be positing an empirical theory of knowledge after all, despite his protestations to the contrary. If he were to try to defend the presence of the "external," justificatory factor in a particular sense experience so as to identify when one has sense knowledge, that would suggest Mr. Lazar could be aware of the presence of it after all. It would no longer be "external" to Mr. Lazar but something about which he could be aware. How he could be aware is anyone's guess, but I think it would conform to some empiricist theory of knowledge even if not a pure empiricism.

With the above arguments in mind, what good does it do for, say, God to be aware of what we "know" in an externalist sense if we ourselves cannot be aware of this "knowledge"? Well, we should not too hastily conclude that beliefs which are epistemically justified in an externalist sense are useless (link). Hypothetical reasoning is important, although it's importance is not to be overstated. But the fact that we cannot be aware of externalist "knowledge" we may posses should give us apologetic pause. Which of our beliefs should we fundamentally be attempting to defend: ones that have epistemic justification of which we can be aware, or one's that have at least one justificatory element of which we cannot be aware?

I expanded on this question in my last review, explaining why knowledge that is epistemically justified in a [purely] internalist sense is more fundamental than that which is justified in an externalist sense. Note that Mr. Lazar implicitly agrees in the way in which he defends sense knowledge. Mr. Lazar may say that we should take sense knowledge as axiomatic. But does he really mean that?

I cannot think that he does. Suppose Isaac took it as axiomatic that he was talking to Esau when he was actually deceived! Just because one says he takes something as axiomatic does not mean his belief is true. Sense knowledge is not self-authenticating like God's word is. In fact, Mr. Lazar readily admits that he inferred that (again, not when) sense knowledge is legitimate from God's word: "Neo-Scripturalism accepts sense knowledge on the basis of our master axiom, i.e. the Bible" (emphasis mine). Okay, but if one's belief is inferred or deduced from a prior premise - even the Bible - that belief cannot be regarded as axiomatic by definition. 

Therefore, Mr. Lazar himself seems to implicitly recognize that we defend that we can have beliefs that are epistemically justified in an externalist sense by first appealing to a foundational or axiomatic belief that is epistemically justified in an internalist sense. The truth of divine revelation (in our case, the extant extent of which is Scripture) is self-justifying or self-authenticating; hence, we can clearly reflect on or be aware of this justification. This is a belief which is justified in a [purely] internalist sense. 

What this chapter turns out to be, then, is a further example of how internalism is apologetically more fundamental than externalism. Even if we have beliefs that are epistemically justified in an externalist sense long before we have beliefs that are epistemically justified in a [purely] internalist sense, we cannot be fully assured in a defense of the former until we have the latter. A child can "know" who his parents are in an externalist sense. But a mature ability to defend this kind of knowledge will not be possible until the child grows in grace and knowledge such that his conscious epistemic foundation is God's word, and this is why Scripturalism is intimately tied to internalism. Scripturalists have a conscious epistemology, not an unconscious one.

To return to my opening remarks, Mr. Lazar was better off, in his critique of Clark, bringing up passages like Mark 6:38, 13:28, and 15:44-45. These indeed appear to be instances of "sense knowledge," properly construed in an externalist sense of epistemic justification. That doesn’t mean Clark’s specific focus on the kind of knowledge in which he was interested (link) was wrong, only that it should not be regarded as the exclusive meaning of "knowledge" in all contexts. Clark's implicitly internalist understanding of "knowledge" just sets the context for our being able to defend an externalist understanding of "knowledge."

There are many more reasons for not regarding Scripturalism as fundamentally tied to an externalist theory of knowledge. I've mentioned most of them in other posts. One more reason is that subscription a fundamentally internalist theory of knowledge can allow for cases of externalist knowledge. If we regard divine revelation as our epistemic foundation - one whose justification we can be aware of (precisely because the foundation, of which we are aware, is self-authenticating or self-justifying; link) - then one can, just as Mr. Lazar has, deduce from it examples within that revelation why an externalist theory of knowledge is defensible. If one begins with an externalist theory of knowledge, however, one can never from such "knowledge" deduce that internalist knowledge is possible, for one can never be aware of what he himself actually "knows" in an externalist sense, if anything. 

Clark may well have agreed with all of this had he been given the chance to reflect on it. Personally, I do wish he spoke to these sorts of texts more than mentioning metaphorical cases of sense organs. Nevertheless, I would argue that the context for the kind of "knowledge" Clark is interested in is fundamental to epistemic discussions.

Tactical Apologetics: Recommending a Conservative Approach

I think this chapter is an example of apologetic overreach. I think Mr. Lazar really desires to such forth as much evidence as possible for a position I would even broadly agree is correct: there are biblical examples of extra-biblical knowledge. But if Clark were alive and had the inclination to respond to Mr. Lazar's book, I think it would have been easy for him to respond to this chapter. 

Perhaps Clark would still have dealt with the stronger examples for Mr. Lazar's position. But one can be sure that many others would not. Instead, they would simply respond to Mr. Lazar's weaker arguments, ignore the stronger ones, and act as if they had thoroughly refuted Mr. Lazar. While this would not be done in good faith, Christians should know all too well why acting in bad faith is commonplace and should be our expectation in a world of sin.

This leads me to think that when we are defending our beliefs, we ought to set forth our best critiques of positions with which we disagree. If such critiques are defeated, so be it. We must think again upon 1) whether there are stronger critiques against the position that we hadn't considered, and 2) whether our beliefs on the matter in question are correct. But, if possible, we should be careful not to give those with whom we disagree any room for relief in being able to respond to weak arguments such that they can then posture while ignoring our strongest critiques. 

Apologetics can be a way of dialoguing with friends. I hope Mr. Lazar reads these posts with the understanding that I do not view him as someone who refuses to believe the truth. I myself may stand in need of correction on some points. I am only saying here that I think Mr. Lazar could have effectively said "more" against Clark's view (figuratively) by saying less (literally), focusing only on his strongest arguments and biblical cases that function as evidence for his views. 

With that in mind, I do think another intention of apologetics can be to shut mouths of those who refuse to believe the truth. If we only present our strongest critiques against a position (at least initially), we give stubborn adherents less reason to open their mouths against us. We don't need to say more in order for the Spirit to work in the minds of those with whom we are conversing. His power does not depend on how much we say. If anything, we need to keep our speech focused. As much of this is more so my own strategic opinion rather than a dogmatic assertion, though, I'll leave it at that.

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 9, which Mr. Lazar calls The Bible and Other Sources of Knowledge.

Meta-epistemology and Gordon Clark

Recently, I've been reviewing a book on Scripturalism (link). Before proceeding any further in that review, I wanted to clarify that I am speaking about "knowledge" in the same sense in which Clark usually does: "knowledge with a capital K" by which "certainty" is possible (Clark and His Critics, pgs. 75-76). I will return to what this means in a moment. 

As I was organizing my thoughts on the next chapter, I found that what I was writing (i.e. what follows) was less of a review of that book and more of an important background for an historical understanding of the epistemological thought of Gordon Clark. While I have maintained and continue to maintain that Scripturalism is not synonymous with the thought of Clark, Clark popularized Scripturalism. 

Since a discussion of Scripturalism usually involves evaluating or mentioning the thought of Clark, it is helpful to exposit that thought for a few reasons: 1) most importantly, to distill what ideas are or are not Scriptural; 2) to be historically accurate (so far as is possible) in representations of Clark; 3) to determine whether an author correctly understands Clark, which may or may not be relevant to how he understands Scripturalism. With these reasons for this post in mind, I want to wade into the waters of "meta-epistemology."

If an epistemology is a theory of knowledge, a meta-epistemology questions what epistemology itself aims to answer: what is the nature of knowledge? What is the structure of epistemic justification? What is truth? These sorts of definitional questions are important in establishing a context for and focus of an epistemology, and they are questions I have been thinking about in the context of Scripturalism for almost 10 years (link). 

One point I would immediately make about definitions is that in order to "know" one's own answers to these questions and be consistent with one's own epistemology, one's own source[s] of knowledge must be able to furnish the answers:

One’s first principle is his first principle... when one is evaluating opposing first principles, definitions of truth, or methods of epistemic justification, he cannot pretend that he is evaluating them abstract from his background as a skeptic, agnostic, coherentist, pragmatist, empiricist, rationalist, Scripturalist, etc. Even the meta-epistemological statements I have made throughout this post have been informed by my own epistemological background. (link)

In other words, what a word means is context-laden. Especially in epistemic discussions, establishing a meta-epistemic context for what it is that under discussion is helpful, for it frames what the "knowledge" is that is in view, why such knowledge is important, etc. This takes some time (as this blog demonstrates!), yet it should not distract us from the point that our source of knowledge should itself inform any meta-epistemic context we wish to set and claim to know; otherwise, we would either have another source of knowledge. 

For example, to return to Clark, from what he wrote, it is clear he understood that his own source of "knowledge" allowed for various meanings of the word:

The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. (The Pastoral Epistles, pg. 166).

While "knowledge" can refer to different things, it is not surprising that Clark's primary interest related to forming a "basic epistemology." That is, Clark's interest in a basic theory of knowledge had little to do with a theory of sex! He was not interested in "opinion" or "conjecture," "accident or good luck" (Lord God of Truth, pg. 40). Such things are not formative in a basic epistemology. 

He was rather, as was quoted initially, interested in "certainty" and "infallibility." In contemporary epistemological terms – and distinct from whether or not he was entirely consistent, logically or personally (i.e. did he change his mind on some issues) – Clark [implicitly] sought to defend an internalist and infalliblist epistemology (link). That is, he was interested in beliefs in true propositions sourced in a self-authenticating, axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect. 

[Parenthetically, to many, this may not seem to be not so "basic" upon close inspection! However, let the reader understand that I am only attempting to describe Clark's epistemology. I will, below, quote reasons why I believe the above is an accurate summary of Clark's meta-epistemic views, and in these quotes, Clark will defend, successfully or not, why his views are what they are. While reading this entire section, let the reader keep in mind the distinction between epistemology and apologetics that is critical to a right understanding of Scripturalism (link). 

That is, it is one thing to know "the truth of the Bible" - the truth of the Bible "is the basic axiom of Christian theism," according to Clark (A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 43). It is another thing for Clark [or I] to expound on the meanings of terms Clark used in order to describe his axiom - and its theorems - as "knowable" (including spelling out some context as to what that entails). This is meta-epistemic and can be known only in virtue of Clark's [or my] epistemic axiom. It is yet another thing for Clark [or I] to defend his epistemic axiom or implicit meta-epistemic views. Only if we constantly keep in mind that Clark's apologetic is subsumed under his epistemology and not the basis for it will we realize that his epistemology is simpler than we think. To summarize:

...a man may learn several propositions about God without reflecting on the method by which he learned them. Musicians and painters usually produce good works of art before they understand the theory. Hence in temporal psychology a knowledge of God precedes a knowledge of method. But to explain this process an apologist ought to start with the methodology. For while the unreflective reader may be unaware of the methodology – he may not realize how he does what he does – he nonetheless uses the method. And for Clark and Henry the method is Scriptural. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 184-186)

Thus, "skepticism ends where divine revelation begins" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 258-259)... just as our salvation really begins when we are regenerated unto faith in the gospel. Yes, we could define and elaborate upon meaning of faith, the content of the gospel, and more. We could even defend our views in these areas. Nevertheless, a child can be saved by grace through faith, because actually having faith in the gospel is itself simple, albeit only possible by grace.]

Returning to Clark, I said he was interested in a certain kind of knowledge: "beliefs in true propositions sourced in an axiomatic foundation of which one could be infallibly aware or upon one could reflect." While I have argued these points in scattered posts across this blog, I do not suppose anyone has read all of my published thoughts on this matter, let alone retained them (I haven't!). So, here are some definitions and reasonings from Clark about various components of epistemology: propositions, beliefs, truth, sources, axioms, foundations, infallibility, awareness, and reflection.

Propositions defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

…all propositions require a distinction between subject and predicate. Knowledge also requires the distinction, logical if not actual, between the person knowing and the object known. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 146-147)  

Knowledge consists of propositions, of predicates related to subjects, i.e., of truths. The meaning which the words designate is the object of knowledge. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 149-150)  

In Thales to Dewey (455) Clark, after some pages of technical detail, arrives at the subhead “Propositions and Concepts.” But the simplest reason why truth must be propositional is that a noun all by itself can be neither true nor false. Suppose someone says, without any implicit context, “Two,” or “Cat,” or “Star.” No one could understand; neither truth nor falsity has been spoken. Only when a predicate is attached to a subject by a copula can the expression be true or false. “Two is an even number” is true; “Two is an odd number” is false; but just plain “Two” is unintelligible. Therefore, Clark insists that when a botanist says, “A cactus has no true leaves,” he uses the word true in a metaphorical sense, contrasting the spines of a cactus with the ordinary leaves of an ocotilla or rose bush. What the metaphor means, a good botanist can explain in literally intended propositions. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 180-182)

Truths defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

...every item of God’s knowledge must surely fit in with every other item. This also seems to me to solve the philosophic problem of truth. The three chief contenders in this field are the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. For reasons too numerous to include here, I believe pragmatism leads to complete skepticism. The correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object. This is impossible. The coherence theory remains. (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948)

This gentleman distinguishes between logical consistency and a coherence view of truth. Since he stresses the latter rather than the former, he might think that Nash rates me too highly by asserting that I hold to coherence. However, neither Professor Nash nor I acknowledge this distinction, and while I now prefer the word consistency for clarity’s sake, I have no objection to Nash’s statement at this point. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 142)

Beliefs defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Belief is the voluntary assent to an understood proposition. (First John, 1980, pg. 119) 

Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will... Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pgs. 83, 85) 

Faith is the belief in or assent to an understood proposition. Saving faith is assent to certain Scriptural propositions – the good news of the Gospel, the information the Scriptures put before us. The power and strength we derive in answer to Paul’s prayers come through and are proportionate to our grasp of Scripture... Scripture tells us, if I may condense it, “Believe and be saved.” Believing is an intellectual process... we may add, believe presupposes understanding. A true Christian, by definition, loves the truth. He must oppose both the existential emotionalism of the so-called Neo-orthodox and also those scientists who have a zeal for truth but do not have the truth. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pgs. 87-88) 

How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology. (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169) 

Assurance and conviction are belief, strong belief, voluntary belief, and as intellectual as you please. They are intellectual because their objects are meaningful propositions. Their objects are truths. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 79, 175)

Self-Authenticating Sources, Axioms, or Foundations for knowledge defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

To the same effect, it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore, the same conclusion follows: Either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 53-54)

The argument is that every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically... Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures... The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation of the notion that theology has several sources such as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion, or psychology. There is but one source, the Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. God is truth. Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life. (Against the Churches, 2002, pg. 34)

Mavrodes notes, “It is a common tactic of Christianity’s opponents to direct some of their first and most effective attacks against the Axiom.” In this tactic, so it seems to me, there is a satanic wisdom that passes by derivative propositions and fixes on the very basis of Christianity. These opponents know or perhaps dimly but rightly surmise that if they can destroy the foundation, nothing remains. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 235)

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47)

Infallibility defined, explained, and its importance to epistemology:

How then may we know that the Bible is true? The Confession answers, “Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority [of the Scripture] is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit.”

Faith is a gift or work of God. It is God who causes us to believe: “Blessed is the man whom thou choosest and causest to approach unto thee” (Psa. 65:4).

Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe, 1985, pg. 18) 

With infallibility gone, the other doctrines of Scripture automatically drop by the wayside. If the writers of the Bible were not infallible, could any of us be infallible percipients of our needs? Dare we claim to have made no error in our self-analysis? The Bible furnishes us with an analysis of human nature and need. It tells us that the guilt of Adam’s first transgression was immediately imputed to us with the result that we were born in iniquity and that our heart is deceitful above measure. If this Biblical statement is true, any merely human analysis of human nature is bound to be unreliable. And if the Bible is not true, what reason is there for thinking that we have a more accurate understanding than the prophets, who even on Neo-orthodox principles stood so close to the fountains of the faith? May I suggest therefore that anyone who says he does not need the doctrine of infallibility has misunderstood his own needs? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 55, 61-62)

Awareness or reflection defined, explained, and their importance to epistemology:

Communication is of course possible only by means of words or some other signs; but the words, instead of teaching anything new, rather stir up our memories of things we had previously understood. Thus, when a speaker says something, unless he is referring to sensory objects present at the moment, we consult the Truth within our minds to see whether or not he is telling the truth. In the Platonic dialogues a series of questions stimulates reflection, and the learning or assent comes from within... communication and teaching, although making use of words or signs, is possible only because the mind possesses Truth. Socrates or Augustine is not really the teacher or master: The true master is Christ, who is the Truth and who enlightens every man. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 184-186) 

Now since it is the conclusion of a demonstration that we are trying to prove, and since it is proved by giving the premises, it follows that the premises of demonstrated knowledge are better known than the conclusion. If we did not know the premises, obviously we could not know the conclusion. The conclusion cannot be more certain than the premises on which it is based. The premises are the cause of the conclusion, and therefore they must be prior to it. And also, in demonstration, although not in every formally valid syllogism, the premises must be true. For demonstration is knowledge, and there can be no known of the non-existent. The premises, therefore, must be statements of what exists or what is so, i.e., they must be true... It has been shown above that scientific knowledge or demonstration is impossible without immediate premises. However, since these principles are indemonstrable, a knowledge of them cannot be “scientific” knowledge. There must therefore be another kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is actually superior to scientific knowledge because conclusions cannot be more certain than the premises on which they depend. (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pgs. 101-103) 

...the mind can rest in this knowledge with greater security than in any reasons. This is obvious because the security of a conclusion can be no greater than that of the premise on which it is based. That the sum of the squares on the other two sides is equal to the square of the hypotenuse cannot be any more certain than the axioms from which it is deduced. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21) 

This criticism, so it seems to me, proceeds on the assumption that the “Bible” is just a word – a sound in the air, to use a nominalistic phrase. Apparently Mavrodes thinks that I would be better off technically if I made every verse a separate axiom. To me this seems like more machinery, which can be obviated by referring to them all under one name, the Bible. Similarly, the proposition “Everything God says is true,” need be a separate axiom, only if “God” too is just a word. But if the word has a meaning, the Biblical meaning, then it is analytically certain that everything God says is true. Indeed Mavrodes acknowledges this in his immediate discussion; and that is why these initial criticisms cannot be taken seriously. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 232-233)

Quotations could have been multiplied, and if I were writing a book, I might organize and explain this a bit more precisely and thoroughly. To summarize, to "knowledge" is about truth. Truth is the set of coherent or consistent propositions. When one reflects upon a true proposition, believes it, has either deduced it from an axiom or believes it axiomatically, and the axiom [and/or deduction] is infallibly justified, he can be certain (in an epistemic, not merely a psychological, sense) that what he believes is truth. He possesses knowledge of the proposition[s] in question.

[Another, longer parenthetical: It is not the case, as Clark says, that "the correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object" (The Bible Today 42.6, March 1948, pgs. 173-177). Clark has confused a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification. Note Clark's conflation of a "test of truth" with a "theory of truth." Just as his acceptance of a coherence theory of truth doesn't require him to accept coherentism, acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth doesn't require one to accept a theory of epistemic justification on which we must look to the correspondent to justify, by comparison, the corresponding truth. 

For example, I can and do still hold that truth is propositional and denotatively defined as the meaning of the thought[s] of the Trinity. Their revelation of these propositions to us may indeed be mediated to us by non-propositions. However, just as Clark should have replied to his objectors ("Don't you have to read your Bible?") that his source of knowledge does not require a certain, causative means by which we are justified – an internalist variety of epistemic justification is not etiological, except perhaps in relation to the structure of epistemic justification (which needn't be empirical even if non-propositions are secondary causes of our propositional thoughts) – he should have recognized that a theory of truth likewise does not necessarily entail a certain method of reasoning by which we know.

The correspondence theory of truth also needn't mean that we only have an analogy or representation of the truth; it only means that truths (propositions) correspond to other realities (some of which would be non-propositional). We may not immediately interface with non-propositional realities intellectually... but that is to be expected, because these realities are not reducible to propositions. Thus, I suspect Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and hasty reasoning – if one "knows reality, there is no need for an extra something which corresponds to it" (God's Hammer, pgs. 34-37) – led him to accept unorthodox views.

For instance, the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in favor of coherence or consistency (as if one can't hold to both) means that unless one accepts necessitarianism, there could be multiple coherent yet mutually contradictory systems. In this case, not only would knowledge of which system is "true" be impossible, it would be unintelligible, for intelligibility presupposes truth. Mutually contradictory yet internally coherent propositional systems would mean the supra-system[s] that would constitute truth unfortunately can't, for coherence or consistency would break down. Hence, necessitarianism seems unavoidable, and this is a view Clark held only late in his life.

Another example of an unfortunate conclusion was Clark's view that persons are propositions. Truth is real and propositional, but if there is no correspondent to it, then to speak of persons as real leads to the idea persons just are propositions. If he had pushed this another (again, seemingly inevitable) step further and applied this line of reasoning to all of creation, then all of creation would just be propositional, in God's mind, and Clark would have landed in panentheism, not to mention propositional monism.

Frankly, Clark's discussion of the correspondence theory of truth on pg. 181 of Modern Philosophy (2008) leads me to wonder whether he even understood the theory, because he says "this theory provides us only with pictures of [reality]." In this quote, it sounds to me as if he didn't understand the correspondence theory of truth still held propositions to be truth-bearers, especially since he continues to talk about "similarity" between the "picture" we have and corresponding "object." Perhaps he is just arguing that even if truths would be propositions in such a scenario, we can't tell whether they correspond to objects by comparing them. I don't know if it would be better to say that Clark just didn't understand the theory or worse to say he thought he understood it and rejected it. If it is the latter, then to repeat the above, no correspondence theorist needs to suggest that we compare a proposition to a non-proposition to see if they correspond. That confuses a theory of truth with a theory of epistemic justification.

Better would be to follow Clark's own conclusion, when discussing his own theory of language, that correspondence is not objectionable:

In one sense of the term, a photo corresponds to or looks like its object, but no one supposes that a word corresponds to a thing in this way. Language is not a picture of reality. The letters c-a-t do not look like the purring animal. It is all the more true that words cannot possibly look like spiritual realities, if such there be, for these are not visible entities. But in a non-photographic sense a mathematical formula may be said to correspond to the motion of a freely falling body. Could not this be an absolute correspondence? Or, if the term absolute causes hesitation, could not such a formula be or be understood as a literal assertion? Further, if the sound cat is essentially an arbitrary sign of the animal, what more correspondence could be desired? (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 194-195)

Indeed, one needn't compare cat to the animal to epistemically justify the legitimacy of the word referring to the animal. So, too, a Christian needn't epistemically justify the legitimacy of a proposition about a cat corresponding to the animal. One may even hold that correspondence between propositions and non-propositions is not even arbitrary but rather established by the will or persons of the Trinity (depending on the realities involved, such as God Himself). But the main point is that Clark never repudiated words as symbols of concepts, so it appears that, to the extent words are not propositional, he never fully embraced propositional monism.

One last thought. If Clark's line of reasoning leads to even "belief" itself just being a proposition, then insofar as he held that belief is an act of will, it would again seem to follow that the will is reducible a mere proposition. In that case, insofar as propositions are eternal - because God knows them eternally - it would appear that we ourselves are eternal, for our persons as well as our actions would be eternal.

For more of my thoughts on why the correspondence theory of truth is compatible with Scripturalism, see here and here.]

Why is it important to establish a meta-epistemic context? One reason is that since, as we have seen, apologetics is subordinate to epistemology, one's apologetic will be better to the extent one is better able to explain one's epistemology. Further, the better we can both explain and defend our epistemology, the more grounded or full our assurance (link) of our salvation will be, as Clark says:

With some diffidence and reserve because of the complex difficulties, I suggest the following: By loving in deed and truth we shall know that we are of the truth... Assurance of eternal life can be deduced from a knowledge that one is a believer. Of course, as the negro spiritual says, “Everybody talking about heaven ain’t going there.” With constant frequency people are assured of many things untrue. Indeed certainty increases in direct proportion to ignorance. The less educated a man is, the more things of which he is certain. If this obvious truth disturbs anyone, he should also realize that assurance is not essential to salvation. Different people have different mentalities. John Bunyan was so morbid he could hardly have had much assurance. With others more careless, doubts never arise. But if one knows, if one has a clear intellectual understanding that he believes, he should have legitimate assurance. (First John, 1980, pg. 113, 161)

This confidence, in turn, should lead us to boldly work out our salvation. The more brightly our light shines, the more glory is given to God. Whether our labor bears fruit on earth - such as God shining light into the darkness of the hearts of others - or in heavenly rewards, there is every reason to develop our understanding of our faith-knowledge in God's word.

Clark believed this too, and while he was inconsistent (both in that he changed his mind over time and that he accepted some positions which were inconsistent with other beliefs of his), what this amounts to is that Clark's attempt to explain his epistemology (i.e. his meta-epistemology) falls short of perfection. It does not, however, imply that his epistemology itself is false. 

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 2)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's first chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

Before proceeding, however, I want to reiterate what I mentioned in my first post: I believe "Scripturalism" is not Gordon Clark's brainchild. In fact, I cannot find a published instance in which Clark applied the term to his own views. Obviously, the shoe does fit, for I think anyone may be legitimately referred to as a "Scripturalist" whose "theory of knowledge ought to be founded upon the Bible as [the extant extent of] divine revelation." It is understandable that Clark, a prominent popularizer of Scripturalism as such, would be the lens through which Scripturalism is evaluated, so I will say little more about this matter as I proceed in reviewing Mr. Lazar's book. But I hope the reader understands that I do not consider a sound criticism of Clark to necessarily entail a sound criticism of Scripturalism.

Chapter 1: How to Evaluate a Worldview

In his Introduction, Mr. Lazar refers to “Clark’s distinct philosophy of Scripturalism.” Elsewhere, he lets the reader know of his intention to explore “why Scripturalism failed as a worldview.” As he is describing his own background, Mr. Lazar states that he “began to notice… problems with Clark’s apologetic,” so he “turned away from Scripturalism” until he rethought whether he could “improve Scripturalism” while being “faithful to the core of Clark’s apologetic.” The very subheading of the book itself is "Reviving Gordon Clark's Apologetic. Finally, Mr. Lazar will, in the chapters 2 and 3, refer to “Scripturalist epistemology” and Scripturalism as “Clark’s… theory of knowledge.” All emphases are mine.

In various parts of the book, Mr. Lazar refers to Scripturalism either as being or containing a philosophy, apologetic, worldview, and an epistemology. The reader should be careful when reading such statements, for while one might consider a “philosophy” or “worldview” to mean the same thing, an “epistemology” and an “apologetic” are narrower in focus and, at the same time, distinct from one another.

For example, Scripturalism considered as being a “philosophy” or “worldview” would contain an epistemology and apologetic, but it would also encompass a metaphysic and ethic. Mr. Lazar is mainly interested, it seems, in the epistemology and apologetic of Scripturalism – of course, there is nothing wrong with this interest.

It should be kept in mind, though, that when Mr. Lazar states in the introduction to this chapter that “Clark’s students pointed out some crucial flaws in his apologetic that Clark failed to answer to their satisfaction,” all this would mean is that Clark’s students weren’t satisfied with Clark’s defense (apologetic) to flaws in his defense (apologetic) [of Christianity]. When read in those terms, the indictment against Clark does not appear so bad.

Firstly, who can ensure that his critics will ever be satisfied? Is it not by the grace of God – divine action over which we have no control except in providing opportunity for it – that anyone accepts the truth? Secondly, if the flaws in Clark’s apologetic really are “crucial,” then his students were right to remain unsatisfied, and Mr. Lazar is right to mention them. But an apologetic failure is not necessarily an epistemic one. 

The Distinction Between Epistemology and Apologetics

It will be extremely important for the purposes of my review(s) to distinguish a Scripturalist epistemology (a Scripturalist’s theory of knowledge) will be distinct from his apologetic methodology (how one defends Scripturalism as a worldview, not just as an epistemology, and how one attacks other worldviews), Mr. Lazar’s book intends to criticize Clark on both accounts.

At the risk of anticipating too much discussion, to illustrate the difference between epistemology and apologetics, we might ask a Scripturalist how he knows how to defend his faith. If he wants to answer this question, the Scripturalist would presumably respond by offering an apologetic (he will make a defense). Particularly, he would endeavor to communicate how his apologetic method is deducible from his epistemic axiom. The Scripturalist’s apologetic method is – if it is something he wants to defend as knowable – derived from and subordinate to his epistemology.

Perhaps Clark’s students or others have criticized Clark’s apologetic because they regard it as unbiblical. If so, then while that would be a criticism against Clark’s apologetic, it would not necessarily entail a criticism against Clark’s epistemology. Rather, it would just mean that if the charge sticks, Clark would need to revise his apologetic to be internally consistent and in accordance with his theory of knowledge.

An apologetic failure does not necessarily indicate a failure in one’s epistemology, metaphysic, or ethic. We might say that many people aren’t well-equipped to defend their faith; we would not suggest that their faith be revised. Likewise, one might argue that if Scripturalism, as a philosophy or worldview encompassing these topics, only needs revision to its apologetic, this would be relatively less troubling than a needed revision to its epistemology. A revision to one’s epistemology could entail change to one’s apologetic. 

For example, if Clark’s theory of knowledge required revision in regards to source[s] of knowledge, scope of knowledge, means of knowledge-acquisition, etc., then the content of what Clark could know would change; thus, what he could defend as knowable would change. His apologetic methodology itself could require revision. This completes a second reason why Mr. Lazar's introductory indictment against Clark does not initially appear so bad.

Regardless, the primary point I wish to make is that a Scripturalist’s epistemology and a Scripturalist’s apologetic are distinct and must not be conflated. If one is to be consistent, his apologetic must conform to his theory of knowledge. The former depends on the latter, not vice versa. 

Defending this Distinction in Clark's Thought

Keeping this distinction in mind, Mr. Lazar raises two questions following the initial indictment against Clark: "what kind of flaws should you look for in an apologetic? And what methods can you use to discover those flaws?" My thought process was to immediately wonder whether Mr. Lazar would conflate flaws in an epistemology with flaws in an apologetic methodology, both of which are found in a worldview. This question was in my mind as I read the first sub-heading in Mr. Lazar's chapter, called "How to Choose a Worldview," where he attempts to begin to answer to the above questions by expositing Clark's thinking. 

The first paragraph is a fair summary. In particular, Mr. Lazar's first summary of Clark is correct: "he argued that you must choose your first principles, because if you could prove them to be true, the proof would rely on premises that were more basic that your first principles, indicating they were not first principles after all."  

As indicated in the above summary, however, in the middle of the paragraph, Mr. Lazar seems to switch from choosing worldviews (per the title of the section) to choosing first principles, since "all worldviews have first principles." The language of "first principles" is epistemic. There is a subtle shift from discussing worldviews, which are broad, to first principles, which are narrow. While the initial discussion surrounding this shift is fine, it is important to note, for starting in the second paragraph, Mr. Lazar cites the following statements by Clark:

1) "...our belief is a voluntary choice; but if one must choose without a strict proof, none the less it is possible to have sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice. Certainly there are sane reasons for rejecting some choices." (Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pg. 41)

2) ...no philosopher is perfect, and no system can given man omniscience. But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent while others are self-contradictory, who can deny, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 1998, pg. 16)

3) We can judge the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system. (An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, 1993, pgs. 59-60)

From these statements, Mr. Lazar concludes that Clark/Scripturalism suggests we first "identify a worldview to be tested," then "take the worldview as a conjecture of a hypothesis," and finally "evaluate the worldview" in order to "make a sane choice between worldviews." 

Without having read any further in the book, I suspected the direction in which Mr. Lazar's criticism of Clark might lead: that of Gordon R. Lewis in his book, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, which I reviewed many years ago. In that review, I argued Lewis makes the very conflation between apologetics and epistemology that I think that Mr. Lazar has made in forming the above conclusion. It was no surprise to me that Lewis' criticisms later made an appearance in chapter 3.

Here is the question we must ask of Mr. Lazar: in the above contexts in which Clark cites persons having "sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice [of a first principle]," "judg[ing] the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system," and a "right to choose the more promising first principle," does he think Clark is speaking about epistemic justification or apologetic justification? 

If the former, does that mean he thinks Clark wants his readers, in these contexts, to reason towards a first principle from premises which are more basic (e.g. the four "tests" which are the subject matter of Mr. Lazar's next four chapters)? That would indeed undermine whatever so-called first principle or axiom Clark chose, for the first principle(s) would really be the tests. 

This understanding would also seem to agree with Mr. Lazar's citation of Ronald Nash in one of the footnotes, where Nash argues that a presuppositionalist is like a scientist who tries to test hypotheses to see whether or not his "world view can measure up to the standards and tests for trust" and "reflect reliability back upon its first principles." As Clark argued against the possibility of knowing scientific hypotheses by means of testing and inductive reasoning, it would be quite ironic (and damning) if Clark advocated epistemically justifying a first principle or worldview by the same reasoning.

If any of this is what Mr. Lazar would argue Clark believed, I would disagree. In addition to my above review of Lewis, see point 5 here, in which I defend Clark against a similar argument by Michael Butler. I think Clark need not be interpreted as being inconsistent.

Rather, I think Clark means that there are "sane reasons" by which one can defend the choice of his first principle, that no one with an inferior first principle may deny Christians the right to choose a superior one, and that one can therefore defend it to be a "success." In other words, I think the above contexts in which Clark speaks are meant to be apologetic.

Consider these paragraphs by Clark which immediately follow quote 1) cited above by Mr. Lazar:

Consistency extends further than a first principle narrowly considered, so that it can be shown to be self-contradictory in itself; it extends into the system deduced from the first principle or principles. The basic axiom or axioms must make possible a harmony or system in all our thoughts, words, and actions. Should someone say (misquoting by the omission of an adjective) that consistency is the mark of small minds, that he does not like systems, that he will act on one principle at one time and another at another, that he does not choose to be consistent, there would be no use arguing with him, for he repudiates the rules, the necessary rules of argumentation. Such a person cannot argue against theism, for he cannot argue at all... 

When now the theist speaks of theism as a practical postulate, he is not indulging in any "as-if" philosophy. He means that God exists and that one should conduct his daily life by that belief. It is called a postulate because it is an indemonstrable first principle and not a theorem derived from more ultimate premises (Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988, pgs. 41-43)

The "sane reasons" for choosing our first principle are not "more ultimate premises." Rather, a worldview is apologetically tested or evaluated by methods which [ought or are purported to] come from the worldview itself which is in question. One can, for example, apply a test of reason to the axiom of Scripturalism because Scripture itself is and claims to be, as God's word, reasonable. On the other hand, there would be no reason in arguing with a person who chooses insanity or inconsistency. Of what use would it be to apply apologetic tests of sanity or consistency to a person self-admittedly doesn't want to defend his worldview as being so (and thus, logically, is prevented from attacking or "arguing against" other views such as theism)? One could, of course, do so for the benefit of third-parties; this would, I think, be more like an external critique rather than an internal one.

Side-note: Bahnsen, who makes a later appearance in Mr. Lazar's book, misinterpreted Clark in similar respects in his book, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, when the latter used language like the "hypothesis of divine omniscience." Clark does not mean divine omniscience is to be taken only "as if" it is true. He means it is an undemonstrated assumption, presupposition, axiom, or first principle:

When unbelievers object to Christianity on the basis that it views the world on the basis of undemonstrated hypotheses, the reply should plainly be made that everyone more or less consciously bases his conclusions on undemonstrated assumptions. There are no facts, no meaningful facts, apart from presuppositions. (The Bible Today, 42.4, 1948)

Likewise, in quote 2) above in which Clark asks, "who can deny, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle?" Clark is speaking rhetorically and against those with an inferior apologetic whom we will try to persuade, an idea he alludes to in a preceding paragraph:

...after the humanist or theist has worked out a consistent system by arranging all his propositions as theorems in a series of valid demonstrations, how is either of them to persuade the other to accept his unproved axioms? (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pg. 26).

Persuasiveness is apologetic, not epistemic. And because the Christian is able to produce a better apologetic due to a better epistemology, it is true that non-Christians cannot deny our right to choose a more promising first principle – note that this does not mean Clark believes our first principle is premised on any apologetic test he mentions. On the contrary, as Clark says later in the same book: 

How then could God show to a man that it was God speaking? Suppose God should say, “I will make of you a great nation...and I will bless them that bless you and curse him that curses you.” Would God call the devil and ask Abraham to believe the devil’s corroborative statements? Is the devil’s word good evidence of God’s veracity? It would not seem so. Nor is the solution to be found in God’s appealing to another man in order to convince the doubter. Aside from the fact that this other man is no more of an authority than the devil, the main question reappears unanswered in this case also. What reasons can this man have to conclude that God is making a revelation to him? It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. God may, to be sure, furnish “evidence” to man. He may send an earthquake, a fire, or still small voice; he may work spectacular miracles, or, as in the cases of Isaiah and Peter, he may produce inwardly an awful consciousness of sin, so that the recipient of the revelation is compelled to cry out, “Woe is me! For I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips.” But whether it be an external spectacle or an inward “horror or great darkness,” all of this is God’s witnessing to himself. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183)

Finally, the above quote 3) refers to Clark's statement that "We can judge the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system." In the very next sentence, Clark reiterates: "Axioms, because they are axioms, cannot be deduced from or proved by previous theorems." The same thing is said in the previous paragraph, and note the conclusion:

...that revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axioms, whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way... by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 53)

Axioms are tested by evaluation of their resulting systems, but they are not known by those means. Some might say Clark would have agreed with John Robbins' implicit positism in defining knowledge as "giving reasons" (in which case, an axiom cannot be known because no reasons for it can be given). Others have thought Clark was a coherentist, thinking he could know his first principle by evaluation of the resultant system. I would disagree: Clark was a foundationalist (link; cf. point 5 again in the Butler link above), which buttresses my argument that he viewed a distinction between epistemology and apologetics.

Another aside: unless people are prepared to argue that Clark was a traditional coherentist, other forms of coherentism collapse into foundationalism. Among others, Ernest Sosa and Peter Klein have each noted that “emergent” coherentism, on which the justification for a proposition or belief emerges in virtue of its being a member of a coherent set, is a form of meta-justificatory foundationalism.

To return to Mr. Lazar conclusion, he believes that Clark/Scripturalism suggests we:

1) "identify a worldview to be tested," then 

2) "take the worldview as a conjecture of a hypothesis,"  

3) "evaluate the worldview" and finally, 

4) "make a sane choice between worldviews."

Is the outlined procedure here a reference to the epistemology of Scripturalism, to its apologetic, or both? And if it is a reference to the apologetic, does Mr. Lazar think Clark's epistemology is grounded on his apologetic or vice versa? It preliminarily appears as though Mr. Lazar makes Clark's apologetic the ground of his epistemology, since it looks like he is arguing that the choice of a worldview['s first principle] comes at then end of a process. Further evidence for this is found when he expounds on the second step:

Second, you take the worldview as a conjecture or a hypothesis. At this point, it's not important whether you already believe the worldview to be true or false. For the sake of the evaluations, you consider it on its own terms to test it for consistency. (emphasis mine)

One already believes a worldview to be true before he attempts to apply apologetic tests. This is inescapable: by the time a reader realizes that we all choose first principles, he has already implicitly chosen one. No one begins in an epistemically neutral position (link): 

...if one were ever truly thoroughly epistemically neutral, there would be by definition no criterial basis on which he could ever move to non-neutrality. The first step toward knowledge is not neutrality, it's committing to some criteria by which one can allegedly distinguish what is and isn't knowable.

On Clark's system, for example, I need to know another's first principle in order to show it to be self-defeating on its own grounds. But apagogic argumentation itself presupposes I hold to a worldview from which I am able to operate. To know how to undermine skepticism, for instance, I must first be able to know what skepticism is. But how? Certainly not on skeptical grounds, for skepticism is self-defeating. You can't really criticize another's worldview until you have - or, at least, think you have - one of your own. But then is it is clear that one can't criticize from a self-pronounced position of epistemic neutrality, for one cannot operate from a position whose sole requirement just is to abstain from all positions, including criteria for knowledge. That itself is self-defeating.

What, then, does Mr. Lazar believe was the criterial basis on which Clark believed by which he claimed to know anything? The three or four tests he mentions, or Scripture? It is one thing to say that the epistemic axiom ought to be self-consistent. It is another to suggest that we have no idea whether the worldview (and, thus, the epistemic axiom of that worldview) is true until we test it, or that the truth of the worldview is irrelevant. That line of thinking would lead to considering Clark's apologetic being the root of his epistemology and result viewing Clark as being a traditional coherentist who, for some reason, likes to talk about first principles.

I have mostly been offering a counter-exposition as to what I think Clark believed. If I were writing a book about Scripturalism, I would probably mention many other instances in Clark's writings from which I gather he is a foundationalist, why I think several writers are mistaken about whether or not he views Scripturalism as just one axiom among many others (any of which may be, antecedent to testing, possibly true), etc. 

I might also put forward for consideration that because, for Clark, it is by grace that we believe in the Scriptures, there is a further distinction at play which could be discussed: the distinction between a metaphysical, etiological explanation for a belief (e.g. the causation of the Holy Spirit) and epistemic justification (which itself can be categorized, broken down into further distinctions: inferential reasoning vs. self-authentication). 

But I hope it is clear that in my view, the apologetic of Clark proceeds from the epistemology of Clark, an order with which I agree (and perhaps Mr. Lazar does as well, in which case much of this is just discussion about what Clark actually believed). I think Clark is able to attack other worldviews and defend his own, not because he began with certain tests in mind, struck upon the idea of an epistemic axiom of revelation and, since it passed those tests, chose to accept it. Rather, he was able to test anything only because he first believed the axiom of revelation. The knowledge of the tests doesn't precede the axiom, they come from it (or, depending on the worldview in question, purport to). Epistemology grounds apologetics, not vice versa. I will mention this again at various points in the rest of the review at pertinent points.

Scripturalism's Two Tasks

Before Mr. Lazar turns to examine whether Scripturalism passes four tests, he describes Clark's apologetic as having "two tasks: negative and positive." I think Scripturalism itself has more tasks than that if one considers to to be a worldview, not just an apologetic. But Mr. Lazar is correct that the apologetic Scripturalism has these two tasks. 

Something that I think is missed in ensuing discussion, though, is that Clark did not think that the negative test of consistency was a sufficient one. Mr. Lazar concludes this section of exposition of Clark's thought by writing, "In sum, demonstrating the consistency of Christianity and the inconsistency of non-Christian worldviews is how you can make a sane choice between first principles." Yes, it is extremely useful to, where possible, show that a person contradicts himself and examine why. It is also useful to show, to as great an extent as possible, that Christians can be consistent. And indeed, apologetics is concerned with being useful, persuasive, and practical. With all of this, Clark would agree. But besides logical consistency, Clark was also clear that Scripture itself is also a test of truth (which would, of course, be in line with his epistemology):

The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth. 

Ideally or for God this seems to be the case. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.
Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other... 

Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions. Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest. Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth. 

Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 287, 290)

In addition to the tests of truth Mr. Lazar mentions, a further chapter on Scripture as a test of truth may have solved some of the problems he finds with Scripturalism. But I don't blame him for missing this, because despite earning the moniker of Scripturalism and advocating for Scripture as his epistemic axiom, it is remarkable how many people fail to mention that Clark thought Scripture itself is useful in apologetics. If we can know Scripture is true (and we can, axiomatically), then we can appeal to it when defending our faith. Now, it is a standard that some people reject. But just as there is use in mentioning to third parties that a person who chooses insanity or inconsistency fails the test of reason (an external critique), there is use in mentioning to third parties (e.g. Christians) that a person who chooses to reject the inerrancy of God's word has failed the test of Scripture.

My final comment on this chapter is about the following statement by Mr. Lazar: "As with all other worldview conjectures, Scripturalism can be falsified, but not verified." I would argue that Scripturalism cannot be falsified. It can be tested, but there is no possibility that a correct examination could lead to a conclusion that it fails. For something to be falsifiable means that it could be proven false. 

Suppose one regarded every worldview as falsifiable. Then everything is capable of being proved false... but how? If no test is exempted from being proved false, then how would you test whether something is false at all? And is the very meaning of true and false subject to falsifiability? Is a principle of falsifiability itself falsifiable? All of this is an indirect argument for infallibilist knowledge (link). Clark certainly didn't believe that his first principle was falsifiable. He thought, as a good foundationalist, it was self-authenticating and infallible:

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47) 

Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems. Every religion and every philosophy must be based on some first principle. And since a first principle is first, it cannot be “proved” or “demonstrated” on the basis of anything prior. As the catechism question, quoted above, says, “The Word of God is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify Him.” (What Do Presbyterians Believe?, 1985, pg. 18) 

The only reason I can think of as to why one would think Clark believed or held beliefs which imply that Scripturalism is falsifiable is if he thought Clark appealed to various tests (reason, skepticism, explanatory power, etc.) in order to epistemically (rather than apologetically) justify his axiom. As I hope I have shown, this is not what Clark believed, nor should the reader.

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 2, which concerns what Mr. Lazar calls the test of reason.