tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32953285759539923722024-03-18T05:16:32.383-04:00UnapologeticaHave you been thinking all along that we have been defending ourselves to you? We have been speaking in the sight of God as those in Christ; and everything we do, dear friends, is for your strengthening.
(2 Corinthians 12:19)Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.comBlogger664125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-10760512055156393192024-03-01T11:49:00.005-05:002024-03-02T01:50:26.164-05:00Sola Scriptura and "The Primacy of Revelation"<p>I was pleasantly surprised to hear James White use the word "Scripturalism" in his opening statement in a recent debate on <i>sola scriptura</i> with Trent Horn (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CV01DNwNmig">link</a>). He even seems to mean something pretty near to Clark's position: that Scripture is our ultimate epistemic authority - see minute mark 17:30-21:00. If more mainstream, Reformed apologists are willing to go this route, it would make more clear "the dividing line" (pardon the James White pun). [Side note: less pleasant was listening to White's final cross-examination answers from minute mark 1:42:00-1:46:20.]</p><p>A comment on <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/02/east-of-eden.html">my recent post on Eastern Orthodoxy</a> noted a few, anecdotal examples of nominally Reformed Christian moving to Eastern Orthodoxy due to issues they took with the doctrine <i>sola scriptura</i>. That Protestants would be more aware of the centrality of <i>sola scriptura</i> (if not the nuances) does not surprise me. Most - if not all - heresies are traceable to a faulty understanding or doctrine of Scripture. After all, it is a rare person who would claim to understand a biblical doctrine as true, claim to accept it as true, and later reject said doctrine <i>despite still regarding it as true.</i> </p><p>I noted in the above link and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html">elsewhere</a> that Eastern Orthodox apologists appear quite willing to borrow concepts or appropriate arguments made by Reformed theologians - far more so than Roman Catholics (at least in my experience). Even in the case of <i>sola scriptura</i>, you are unlikely to hear a Roman Catholic make a statement such as <a href="https://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2007/01/11/that-good-ol-confusion-between-person-and-nature/">this</a>, for example: </p><p></p><blockquote>Though I think much of Dr. Svendsen’s critique of Roman theology can often be polemical and bitter because he sees as a corrupt institution, he is undoubtedly right about his insistence on the primacy of revelation as this is probably the main point that also divides Orthodoxy from Rome... Svendsen’s approach to the question at hand and insistence that divine revelation be the paradigm is far more acceptable of how an Orthodox approach these questions.</blockquote><p></p><p>This is not an isolated observation. I'm aware of other proponents of Eastern Orthodoxy who would likewise state acceptance of something along the lines of "a primacy of revelation." Similarly, Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to disapprove of "natural theology" (<a href="https://www.catholic.com/audio/cot/debate-should-christians-reject-natural-theology-with-jay-dyer">example</a>). Is it any wonder that upon hearing these sorts of things, nominally Reformed or Protestant individuals - particularly, certain presuppositionalists who deny any and all epistemic or apologetic utility in natural theology - might find themselves more receptive to apologists whose positions are seemingly similar to their own? </p><p>Again, what is often missing is nuance. For one thing, Michael Sudduth has argued fairly persuasively in <i>The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology </i>that some kind of natural theology was accepted among virtually all Reformed theologians until the 19th century (see most of chapter 1, <a href="https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781317018070_A26610132/preview-9781317018070_A26610132.pdf">here</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3hegCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">here</a>) . I hope to do a further post on this book in particular, as its distinctions and explanation of the functions of natural theology are helpful. In brief, though, I agree with finding a proper place for natural theology within one's worldview, as Gordon Clark also accepted (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/01/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>). This may come as a surprise to some.</p><p>Another missing nuance in deconversion stories related to <i>sola scriptura</i> is that to state agreement on "the primacy of revelation" does not outline what the <i>content</i> of divine revelation is. For those who are mistakenly dissuaded of sola scriptura, it makes sense that Eastern Orthodoxy is viewed as a leading alternative (despite problems I've mentioned <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/a-critical-evaluation-of-eastern.html">elsewhere</a>) in light of the mess that is contemporary Roman Catholic apologetics. Just have a look at the comments <a href="https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2024/02/what-counts-as-magisterial-teaching.html?m=1">here</a> or the numerous examples of Roman Catholic cognitive dissonance <a href="https://beggarsallreformation.blogspot.com/search/label/Blueprint%20For%20Anarchy">here</a> (particularly on the question of private judgment; cf. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2011/11/private-judgment.html">link</a>). Talk about buyer's remorse!</p><p>But in turn, does Eastern Orthodoxy stand in any better position relative to Protestantism? Take the Synod of Jerusalem. Most Eastern Orthodox apologists would say the synod was not ecumenical. In this case, then, one would think that an Eastern Orthodox believer should agree that it <b><u><i>may err</i></u></b> and therefore is <i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">not to be made the rule of faith, or practice</i> (cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 31.4). </p><p>Nevertheless, some Eastern Orthodox apologists would appeal to it as an external confirmation of the canon of Scripture (<a href="https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/05/eastern-orthodox-acceptance-of-hebrew.html">link</a>), whereas others would disagree and hold to a different canon of Scripture (<a href="https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/05/multiple-canons-of-eastern-orthodox.html">link</a>). How is this to be explained? What would motivate an Eastern Orthodox apologist to appeal to a fallible synod? </p><p>1) Is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is infallible after all? If so, then there is disagreement among Eastern Orthodox believers regarding the canon of "divine revelation" <i>vis-a-vis</i> what counts as an ecumenical council. Many apologetic arguments one finds against Protestantism would thereby cut against Eastern Orthodoxy. [Side note: that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy disagree on which councils were ecumenical already begs this question.] </p><p>2) Or is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is fallible but supports a particular understanding of the canon of Scripture? If so, one can understand why Eastern Orthodox believers who take seriously "the primacy of revelation" and have a different canon of Scripture than this synod would not gainsay the epistemic weight of what they regard as infallible in favor of the determinations of a fallible synod. </p><p>3) If an Eastern Orthodox believer doesn't wish to appeal to the Synod of Jerusalem at all, how then does he know the canon of Scripture? So-called ecumenical councils never listed the books of Scripture. In fact, who is to say that one's opinion of the canon of Scripture won't differ from a future, allegedly infallible ecumenical council?</p><p>In each case, how is disagreement about the content of divine revelation supposed to be resolved? There is no infallible table of contents for the Eastern Orthodox believer any more than there is for the Protestant. The Protestant is simply more honest about this and, if nuanced, able to argue that such a fact is really irrelevant (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2016/08/on-meaning-of-sola-scriptura.html">link</a>). </p><p><i>Sola scriptura</i> is a species of <i>sola revelation</i>. If the Eastern Orthodox apologists I've referenced are representative of the whole, then the principle difference between Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy is not so much "the primacy of revelation" but the content of it. In that case, though, one who deconverts from Protestantism due to perceived issues with <i>sola scriptura</i> but then goes ahead to accept another form of <i>sola revelation</i> has simply exchanged one set of presuppositions for another without meaningfully considering 1) whether what he <i>thought</i> were issues <i>actually are, </i>and 2) whether said issues would <i>also</i> apply to his newfound beliefs. The issue of "private judgment" never disappears, nor the need for self-authenticity. Protestantism just turns out to be more defensible because Protestants self-consistently accept as God-breathed only the sort of content that is described as God-breathed: holy writ (2 Timothy 3:16-17).</p>WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-23136999131392426052024-02-29T23:33:00.001-05:002024-03-01T00:03:27.698-05:00Trinitarian and Anthropological Metaphysics<p>In the comments of <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/02/clark-and-nestorius.html">a recent post</a>, I was recently asked some challenging questions regarding Trinitarianism, Christology, and anthopology. In the past few years, I've mentioned several times the need for humility and balance when positing a doctrine of God (see <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/trinitarianism-and-philosophy.html">here</a> and pursuant links). On the one hand, I aim to do a better job of avoiding dogmatism on points of speculation. On the other hand, even in the case that answers to certain questions are underdetermined by biblical data, apologetic concerns warrant consideration of possibilities to prevent one's faith from being undercut. </p><p>In what follows, my goal is to provide answers that are faithful to Scripture insofar as they are deducible from or coherent with it. Keeping in mind that this latter qualification - coherence - is a necessary but insufficient condition for truth, the questions I was asked will be indented:</p><p></p><blockquote>I'm trying to also keep in my the Trinity, with the three persons united in one being. Being would be identical to nature (divine nature), would it not?</blockquote><p></p><p>On the concept of "unity," <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2012/12/clark-realism-and-trinitarian.html">this post</a> would provide a helpful background for my own thoughts (excepting a few uncareful remarks in the final paragraph).</p><p>I don't think the Trinity are united "in one being" if that means persons are subsumed under nature. Don't get me wrong: natures don't exist without persons, and persons do not exist without natures. Yet insofar as "nature" or "being" discusses what is common to individuals, natures belong to and are predicated of persons, not persons to natures. "Enhypostasis" - nature is in the hypostasis. If persons were "in" natures, then Christ's having two natures would seem to imply Nestorianism.</p><p>Now, the members of the Trinity are consubstantial. In fact, I think the meaning of their being consubstantial is just the same as the meaning of you and I being consubstantial, although the manner of consubstantiality differs between Trinitarian members (eternal, necessary) and us as men (temporal, contingent). Regardless, they indeed are of the same nature. </p><p>But I would balk at certain theories of divine simplicity that may be implicit in the phrasing of your question. That is, Trinitarian consubstantiality does not imply only one concrete nature. Recall that you mentioned mind is "indexed" to nature: if we subsumed the divine persons under or in a single, concrete divine nature, then, that would entail that there is just one divine mind. The problem with that - as you seem to recognize - is that it runs against biblical data suggesting the members have distinct, self-reflective thoughts (e.g. John 17). On that note:</p><p></p><blockquote>So the mind of the Son would have self-referential propositions that the Father would not (e.g. "I am the eternally begotten one"), but that mind would not be coextensive with the person of the Son? What would be the remainder? Would it be something like the shared divine nature that extends beyond the self-referential thoughts of the mind?</blockquote><p></p><p>While the mode of the Son's existence is eternal, He is also eternally begotten. Here is precisely where I think Clark, for example, went wrong: it is not <i>merely</i> that the Son thinks something of Himself that is different than His thought of the Father or Spirit; rather, <i>this thought corresponds to something about the Son Himself</i>. I argue Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth in the 1940s led him to collapse persons into propositions/thoughts (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/02/clarks-gradual-metaphysical-synthesis.html">link</a>). I further argue I think Clark's reasons for rejecting it only pertain to a certain kind of correspondence theory of truth (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">link</a>). </p><p>What I am saying, then, is that the persons of the Trinity are not simply minds - and again, since you agree minds are "indexed" to nature, that would not constitute a differentiating principle between the individual Trinitarian persons anyway. Nor are the persons the thoughts of the mind (as if it is intelligible to suggest the divine persons are products of three minds?). On the contrary, the thoughts of the persons of the Trinity about themselves reflect or correspond to something unique about the way that they themselves are: unbegotton/originate, eternally begotten/generation, eternally spirated/process. Epistemological and ontological categories should not be collapsed. </p><p>Also remember that in the original post on Clark and Nestorius, I was only attempting to provide a connotative definition of "person" in general. I was not talking <i>individual</i> persons/hypostases/subjects. For example, I think the Father, Son, Spirit, the angels, and humans are all "persons" because they have something in common: they each have a mind or minds. But this definition does not individuate any one <i>individual</i> "person" from any other. Well, that makes sense, for we agree that the having of a mind (or minds) is something properly belonging to the category of nature - not that we have the same nature as God, of course, but the overlap explains (at least partially) in what sense creaturely persons might be images of divine persons. </p><p>So what individuates <i>individual</i> persons/hypostases/subjects? We might posit (as Clark did) that they can be individuated by their thoughts (of themselves). In a cursory analysis, this might be sufficient. But foundationally, note again that thoughts are products of thinkers. To the extent that an individual's thoughts of himself is relevant to this question, that to which the thoughts correspond - the individual himself - is all the more so. </p><p>Let me suggest that an individual person is the correspondent of whatever may truly be predicated of him either timelessly (if His mode of existence is timeless, e.g. the Father) or at time t (if his given his mode of existence is temporal, e.g. an angel or human). What I "think" of myself is irrelevant, because my thoughts of myself are potentially false. Rather, true propositions about me (corresponding to my existence at time t) are those thoughts <i>God</i> thinks about me (corresponding to my existence at time t).</p><p>The above is perfectly intelligible to me. Even the case of Christ incarnate can be nuanced (<a href="https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/you-asked-did-god-change-at-the-incarnation/">example</a>). Here is one catch, however: it suggests that the divine nature is concretized in the three persons. This should be obvious anyways if we accept a model of the Trinity on which each member of the Trinity has a distinct mind, but it should be noted. Not all (or even most) Trinitarian models would accept this. If we take Clark's definitions of thoughts/beliefs as involving volition, three concrete minds also entails three concrete wills.</p><p>Clark's own reasoning supports this, for he reject faculty psychology in the context of anthropology and Trinitarianism:</p><blockquote>In the case of God, the simplicity of his reality should favor still more such a identification, rather than a development of divine faculty psychology. (April 3, 1937, Letter to J. Oliver Buswell)</blockquote><p></p><blockquote>A man is not a compound of three things, an intellect, a will, and an emotion. Each man is a single personality. (1943. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/04/gordon-clark-on-primacy-of-intellect.html">On the Primacy of the Intellect</a>. Westminster Theological Journal Vol. 5 No. 2, May. 182-195)<br /><br />The question has to do with Ephesian 4 where it speaks of man’s mind being darkened. Well, I would include in the functions of mind the assent as well as the notitia, but I distinguish between the two functions. This is not faculty psychology, but it is two functions of the same spirit. (1977. <a href="https://gordonhclark.com/a-defense-of-christian-presuppositions-in-the-light-of-nonchristian-presuppositions-by-gordon-h-clark/">A Defense of Christian Presuppositions in the Light of Non-Christian Presuppositions</a>)</blockquote><p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin: 0in; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p>Just as in the post on "unity" I linked to above, these statements exhibit an internal inconsistency in Clark's thought. If the same spirit has two functions - assent and notitia or knowledge - then on what grounds could Clark affirm three distinct functions in one respect (self-knowledge) but not the other (assent)? If only the Son <i>thinks</i> "I am the Son," what does it mean to "think" if assent is not involved?</p><p>We can certainly differentiate the relationship between our persons to propositions we "know" (acquisitional, receptive) to the relationship between the Trinitarian persons and propositions they "know" (active, generative). In both cases, the objects of knowledge - truth-bearing propositions - are the same, although the psychological activity of "knowing" differs.</p><p>To reiterate, on the model I gravitate towards, the Trinitarian persons are consubstantial just as you and I are consubstantial. What it means for the divine nature to be "in" each person is the same, is true, and therefore corresponds to the existence of each person. There is just one "divine nature" that we conceptualize: all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, etc. Each member of the Trinity is all-wise, all-good, etc.</p><p>It's just that how consubstantiality cashes out is not in persons being found "in[side]" of a common nature but rather along the lines that a person who is a principle or "fount" (e.g. the Father; Adam) communicates his same nature to others who find their "origin" in him (e.g. the Son/Spirit; the rest of humanity). This bears on the unity of persons and explains the connection to traducianism, by the way, which I'll return to momentarily.</p><p>In the context of the Trinity, there is a necessary connection between the members. The property of the Father, the attributes of the divine nature He enhypostatizes, and mode of the communication of His divine nature to His Son and Spirit is such that the three persons 1) mutually depend on each other - for example, the Father is not who He is without His Son and Spirit - and 2) always act conjointly and agreeably. </p><p>A comparison could reasonably be made between 1) three distinct knowers who distinctly and reflexively index the same, objective body of propositional meaning, and 2) three distinct operators or actors who necessarily produce one and the same conjoint operation or act (which, incidentally, includes the body of propositional meaning comprised of necessary and contingent truths).</p><p>A traducian friend of mine (Ken Hamrick) uses the language of "shared agency" to describe our participation in Adam's sin while the mode of "our" being was not yet (i.e. at the time of the Fall) as individuals but as the singular nature of Adam through which he sinned and out of whom we were not yet propagated as individuals (<a href="https://theforgottenrealist.blog/2023/04/13/a-realists-response-to-robert-strimple/">link</a>). I agree with him, although how we think this analogizes to the Trinity differs. </p><p>Ken would emphasize the numerical sameness of the spirit traduced to us and thereby argue for the numerical sameness of essence shared among the Trinity (<a href="https://theforgottenrealist.blog/2014/10/11/origin-of-the-soul-a-defense-of-paternal-traducianism/">link</a>). I would emphasize that once we are propagated out of Adam, our possession of the same spirit is nevertheless concretely distinct and thereby argue that the Trinitarian persons exhibit an analogy to "shared agency" in the eternal communication of the divine nature through which the persons operate even as they are eternally individuated and individuals. As I mentioned at the outset, these are rather deep waters to stake out a dogmatic claim that one can confidently swim them. </p><p>In either model - Ken's or mine - there is an analogy one could make between Trinitarianism and traducianism. There are also disanalogies in either case, of course. For Ken, whereas <i>we</i> have distinct, concrete natures (albeit inherited through our fathers once we are propogated out of them into a different mode of being, i.e. as individuals), the members of the Trinity would not. On my end, the manner of consubstantiality between the Father, Son, and Spirit would be eternal and grounded in their intrapersonal relations rather than temporal (such as my relation to my father). This interesting impasse at once suggests an argumentative parallel between Trinitarianism and traducianism regardless of which one of us is correct as well as that other reasons must be given for independent support for either of our positions.</p><p>I think my model goes some way in explaining biblical texts like John 17, the covenant of redemption, and the resonance between theology proper and anthropology. </p><p>Further, on the subject of anthropology in general and traducianism in particular, I think this model (and Ken's) also avoids nominalism while affirming a realism in the contexts of original sin and justification which does not devolve into erroneous positions. For example, erroneous positions such as: </p><p>1) one wherein Christ assumes a sinful nature (cf. uncareful statements of the doctrine of original sin), </p><p>2) one wherein I am unjustly punished for sins which are really and completely alien to me (cf. representationalist theories of original sin), </p><p>3) one wherein Christ assumes and glorifies a human nature under which all persons are said to be subsumed (cf. Eastern Orthodoxy and deification, despite the protestations of its apologists to believe that natures are in hypostases rather than the reverse), </p><p>4) one wherein infused righteousness is argued as necessary for justification to be justly possible in this lifetime (cf. Roman Catholic apologists, although those who argue this are themselves inconsistent).</p><p>On several of these points, see <a href="https://theforgottenrealist.blog/2023/05/31/the-importance-of-biblical-realism/">here</a> for more. Further potential advantages of this model are that it seems to cohere with other metaphysical ideas which have separate appeal: theistic propositional realism (i.e. divine conceptualism), a version of divine simplicity which allows for formal distinctions, an Aristotelian theory of universals, etc.</p><p>I've thought about this quite a lot, and while the above is not a full story, it's probably the best articulation I can come up with at the present. To your next question:</p><blockquote>If by inheriting one's father's "spirit" means those immaterial attributes that he possesses (analogous to the material attributes one possesses), then I think I can get my mind around what "spirit" means. Just as our bodies are made from our parents's bodies without being identical to them, so our spirits are made from our parents's spirits without being identical to them.</blockquote><blockquote>But then what distinguishes mind and spirit, or are they the same?<br /></blockquote><p>I think they are the same. Christ assumed a body and a rational soul or spirit without assuming a person, so there is no Christological difficulty, at least. Ken has elsewhere suggested that the "spirit is the seat of the will regarding moral matters" (<a href="https://theforgottenrealist.blog/2014/10/11/origin-of-the-soul-a-defense-of-paternal-traducianism/">link</a>), and I think this all dovetails with Clark's aforementioned thought that knowledge and assent are two functions of the same spirit.</p><p>Finally, I had written:</p><blockquote>The separation of body and spirit is "death," and such is predicated of our persons; but so too is the separation of our spirit from the Spirit "death" also predicated of our persons... suggesting the relationship between man's body and his spirit is analogically related to the dependency of our spirit to God's Spirit?<br /><br />Maybe all of this becomes simplified by looking at a case most Christians would agree with: Christians will be conscious in the intermediate state. Are these Christians still human? If so, then it appears that they just are, ontologically speaking, spirits. To say that the person experiences death is to say that his body has been separated from his spirit (i.e. himself). Men are not, ontologically speaking, composite beings, for although these spirits do normally have bodies, the separation of the normal unity between spirit and body does not ontologically change a person (spirit). Likewise, the separation of the designed unity between spirit and Spirit does not ontologically change a person (spirit). If physical death is not an ontological change, neither would be spiritual death.</blockquote><p>Your question: </p><blockquote>As for the subsequent post wherein you discuss the intermediate state, have you considered also that our spiritual bodies may be of a different order than our physical bodies? Paul's statements about the natural body and spiritual body are puzzling. "Adam became a living being. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit." The first man was made of the earth from dust, the last man is from heaven. <b><i><u>Is it not safe to say that even in our present state we not "fully human" but are "incomplete"</u></i></b> because the body we were given (even Adam's sinless body) was only the seed of what will only be completed in the resurrection? So, it may be the case that there is no ontological change since the separation of the spirit from the body in death is part of the planned transformation from natural body to spiritual body (like the seed germinating).</blockquote><p>Did you mean to ask whether it's possible that "even in our present state we [<i><u><b>are</b></u></i>] not "fully human" but are "incomplete""? If so, did the incarnate and yet-be-glorified Son assume a fully human nature? Further, when this Son died and was buried (prior to His resurrection), was He fully human or not? Surely the former. </p><p>I would also keep in mind the question of whether or not the reprobate are fully human: they will experience a bodily resurrection too, but their spirit remains severed from the life-giving Spirit of God and, thus, experience a second death. These points cumulatively suggest that death entails no change in nature.</p><p>Now, my original comment was about whether is ontological change at the time of death. Here, on the other hand, I am here emphasizing that there is never a change to the human essence each of us has. Ontology is indeed a broader category than humanity, I just wanted to answer your specific questions by distinguishing between an eschatological telos and a change in nature.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com35tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-66983100187813040232024-02-23T10:56:00.001-05:002024-02-26T15:55:56.083-05:00East of Eden<div>Some time ago, I answered a question on what might draw nominally Reformed Christians to Eastern Orthodoxy. Other points could also be made, but this provides some perspective for those thinking about how to engage with Eastern Orthodoxy and its apologists:</div><div><br /></div>1. Ecclesiastically, Eastern Orthodoxy is less centralized than Rome yet still has a hierarchy, meaning there isn't as much of a barrier to entry to the former as to the latter.<br /><br />2. Because Eastern Orthodoxy is less centralized (and, in the U.S., less prominent), it is less apparent to outsiders how the inside truly looks or operates, warts and all. This is all the more true when I hear of Eastern Orthodoxy congregations which experience functional segregation due to distinctive cultural backgrounds of said congregants (read: Galatians 2). It is easy to romanticize the unfamiliar.<br /><br />Further, Rome's councils and popes are constantly in the news as going the way of modernism. I don't read much news, but from what I see, Eastern Orthodoxy isn't as exposed. Former insiders to Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g. Joshua Schooping; see his free ebook <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Disillusioned-Eastern-Orthodox-Priesthood-Church-ebook/dp/B0B9B52WYG/ref=sr_1_1?crid=37RLF426DIGUB&keywords=schooping&qid=1697553954&sprefix=schooping%2Caps%2C78&sr=8-1&tag=puritanboard-20">here</a>) are relatively unknown - at least, they unknown <i>prior</i> to one's converting to Eastern Orthodoxy - and becoming aware of such insiders <i>after</i> one converts might be too late (rationalizations set in). This is not unique to Eastern Orthodoxy, but they are not immune to it either.<br /><br />3. Eastern Orthodox apologists and theologians largely stake their position on appeals to ecumenical councils or theologians whose theology is said to ground statements by ecumenical councils (Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus, John of Damascus, and Palamas being most prominent, if I am not mistaken).<br /><br />Examples of fallacies to watch out for: because they are called <i>ecumenical</i> councils, they must be <i>biblical</i> councils. Equally fallacious: because some ecumenical councils are biblically grounded, one must accept that <i>all</i> others are too.<br /><br />On the point of tradition, church history, etc., just like anyone else, people who claim to be Reformed can fall suspect to attempts to excuse their prior ignorance. For example: "church history is not in monolithic support of Reformed theology; I must have been ignorant/tricked; there must be a true monolith that is different from my prior (Reformed) conception." This is a non sequitur, but more importantly, <i>the reason </i><i>the fallacy occurs in the first place is because people have a false, a priori impression of how church history is supposed to look (monolithic)</i>. This assumption is the <i>root</i> of the problem; a <i>symptom</i> is to elevate historical theology above exegetical theology.<br /><br />Of course, Reformed theology as such isn't anti-historical, although Reformed individuals could do a better job of having awareness of and emphasizing important events in church history on which we might find agreement with Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g. Christology, Trinitarianism). In principle, however, these are not distinctives which mark off Eastern Orthodoxy. Rather, I find those distinctives which <i>do</i> mark off Eastern Orthodoxy to be problematic (e.g. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/a-critical-evaluation-of-eastern.html">anthropology and theology proper</a>; cf. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/contemporary-reformed-readings-on.html">link</a>).<div><br />4. I have noticed recently that Eastern Orthodox apologists are willing to copy, for example, Reformed presuppositionalism. Despite the fact they are inconsistent when they do so (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html">link</a>), such will appeal to the "have your cake (apologetic) and eat it too (monolithic church history)" audience.<div><div><br /></div><div>Another illustration of this is a recent trend in which Eastern Orthodox apologists are willing to suggest that penal substitution is, in some sense, true. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoYJ-YiA2dA">Here</a> is one video to this effect. As I pointed out in a comment I left on this video (to which I have no reason to expect an answer forthcoming), there is a seeming inconsistency in this appeal. If the Eastern Orthodox apologist really thinks Jesus tasted the penalty of sin for all men [without exception], how is it just for the damned to nevertheless experience the same penalty? </div><div><br /></div><div>Likewise, the Eastern Orthodox apologist in the video mentions that in the garden of Eden, Adam and Eve experienced alienation "from each other." But surely - and conspicuously left unmentioned by the Eastern Orthodox apologist - <i>the principal alienation they experience is alienation from God</i>! Surely <i>this</i> is the death of which God spoke even prior to Eve's creation in Genesis 2:17. If Jesus participates in "the deepest experience of our alienation," does that mean the Eastern Orthodox apologist thinks Jesus likewise experience this alienation - alienation from His own Father? I am unaware of any Eastern Orthodox apologists who admit this. The usual claim is that penal substitution is Nestorian (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=In3hE3u3uFo">link</a>). To the extent that Eastern Orthodox apologists shortchange the penalty Christ undertook on our behalf, they don't really accept penal substitution after all. Nuances like this might easily go unnoticed by converts.</div><br />5. Reformed theologians have - by and large - polemically ignored Eastern Orthodox theologians. Sure, there may be an article here or single chapter there that in a journal or book that gets lost in the mix of what the focus of a publication really is. Rarely have I seen a prominent Reformed theologian or pastor debate or engage in a book-length treatment of Eastern Orthodoxy. Compare this to the many popular polemical works against Roman Catholicism.<br /><br />Obviously, there is a history that somewhat dictates a larger interest in justifying Reformed separation from Rome. On the other hand, in the next century, I could easily see it turn out that Eastern Orthodoxy poses a bigger poaching threat to Reformed churches than Rome. In that respect, it would be better for our apologetics to look to future threats instead of looking back at old ones.<br /><br />Then again, this is admittedly tricky. What you don't want to have happen is something like what happens in the 1880s-1890s with higher criticism, where <i>The Princeton Review</i> gave a platform to heretics to debate their false doctrines and thereby legitimate/popularize them. </div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, this is somewhat reductionistic - there were other reasons for the increase in popularity of higher criticism, e.g. that seminaries were sending candidates oversees to Germany for training in the first place - but I don't see any reason to invite a heretic to a debate on my home turf. The best that could be hoped for is that people become more confident or assured that Reformed theology can handle heretics - it can, but a verbal debate isn't the only mode of communication to show that (let alone the best mode). The worst that can happen is that more people become intrigued with a faulty religion held by a fraction of the population.<br /><br />Along these lines, it <i>was</i> wise of Bahnsen to debate Stein - in a secular university where he was in the minority and when was able to ably defend his position. In that context, it's really only Bahnsen who could hope for the popularization of his view. So would it be wise of a Reformed theologian to debate an Eastern Orthodox? In my mind, it depends on context. <br /><br />Perhaps publications (or, less plausibly, conferences) are safer in terms of established ways of getting information out. Written works are more likely to have less pomp and circumstance <i>and </i>more usefulness in the long-run. In any case, resources on Eastern Orthodoxy by Reformed Christians are scarcer to the layman than resources on most other heresies (even ones smaller in number). Again, this reduces the barrier to entry.</div><div><br />6. I think there are legitimate questions of Reformed theology that are more deserving of robust answers than are currently available. For example, the question of artistry in the church. Is it wrong to desire a beautified church? I don't think so. Was it wrong that the temple was beautified? Is there a typological case for a beautified church, an adorned bride (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/mirror-images-city-as-biblical-paradigm.html">link</a>)? Is there something to the idea of wearing one's "Sunday best"? </div><div><br />Obviously, I'm not talking about venerating icons, whether images of Christ can be created, etc. I'm talking about whether the physical construction and layout of a church can be deliberately made attractive. I think this is a legitimate question, even if it is not a legitimate desire. I myself have never heard a good reason why it is an illegitimate desire.<br /><br />If a congregant has this question, how often is it that his pastor (who, let's say, thinks it is an illegitimate desire) is giving a good answer to this question? Is it a good answer to simply appeal to what Puritans thought without also expressing their reasons (let alone whether those reasons are biblical)? Is it a good answer to say that the purpose of a "simple" church layout is to avoid distractions? This sounds as if I were to tell my students I can't decorate my classroom because they would be too immature to handle it when I'm lecturing.</div><div><br /></div><div>I'm not judging churches whose attention has never considered its décor. In fact, my own classroom actually happens to be simple. There are ecclesiastical (and work-related) priorities, after all. Over time, though, one might expect the church to answer how God's people should present themselves: humbly yet aware of its clothing of glory in Christ. Externals should match internals. There may be an implicit eschatology in these points.<br /><br />Just like Eastern Orthodox apologists are becoming more aware of and willing to copy presuppositional arguments, they are also becoming more aware of Protestant resources on biblical theology - including but not limited to the more rampant speculations of federal visionists - and pivoting the same arguments to the need for a "higher liturgy." Yes, we must avoid the errors of federal visionism, but we must also understand the motivations for the questions they raised before we throw out <i>everything</i> they say. That includes understanding the need for a developed hermeneutic of typology that avoids the extreme of Marsh's dictum on the one hand and runaway typology on the other. Does such exist? </div><div><br /></div><div>That I even ask this question suggests a lacuna, although I could well be ignorant: perhaps Reformed Christians have given good answers to these sorts of questions. Then again, that is sort of the point: if I'm ignorant, I can understand why others might be as well. </div><div><br /></div><div>Further, the principle of this point is that regarding some questions, I think we would do well to respond with a measure of pause and grace. If this so happens to be a question that has an obvious answer, there are still other questions and questioners which and who don't deserve a slam-dunk response. Most people don't like getting dunked on, even with the truth.</div><div><br />7. A final point that dovetails with what I just said: it's okay not to have all the answers at the time these questions are raised. Answers to questions often are discovered over time. Contrary to the claims of Eastern Orthodox apologists, Scripture is materially and formally sufficient to defend the doctrine of the Trinity,<i> sola fide</i>, etc., but until such heresies arise that require sharper focus in how we answer them, it is often the case that questions that go unasked also go unanswered.<br /><br />These considerations are not all equally easy to see or deal with. Until people are settled enough in their assurance of Reformed theology to believe that - and to tactfully and truthfully project that confidence in the presence of others who are not - it is objectively unsurprising (if personally unsettling) that the whiff of a new wind of a new doctrine or question might carry some away from the faith.</div></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-78865334175560719202024-02-22T17:44:00.008-05:002024-03-03T00:38:35.294-05:00Clark and Nestorius<div><a href="http://tinyurl.com/2s55hmw2">John McGuckin </a>writes that Cyril of Alexandria<br /><blockquote>“…was appalled by the way Nestorius kept referring to the different prosopa as well as to the prosopon of the union… <b><u><i>The problem was that Nestorius was using one and the same technical term to connote the disparate concepts of differentiation and convergence: there are two prosopa (Jesus and the Logos) and only one prosopon (Christ).</i></u></b> There is of course, no sensible context whatsoever that would allow one to speak of three prosopa. It may well be that this economy of language in Nestorius led to a fatal weakness in the coherence of his theory, as Cyril argued, but it is clear enough that the caricature of his teaching that described it as no more than a repetition of the old Two Sons theory is an uneven reading of his intent. To this extent Cyril’s synopsis of his opponent was inaccurate. But Cyril had nonetheless put his finger on the key matter and his criticism still had force in the way he argued from Nestorius’ explicit statements to his necessary implications. In this regard Cyril had posed the essential question and voiced fears of many others when he asked whether such a theory had done enough to secure a concept of unitive subject in Christ.” (pgs. 149, 159)</blockquote>If true, Cyril makes an excellent point. Indeed, one can read Nestorius make this exact sort of statement in the <a href="https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nestorius_bazaar_4_book2_part1.htm">Bazaar of Heracleides</a>:<br /><blockquote>…<b><u><i>the union of the prosôpa took place for the prosopon</i></u></b> and not for the ousia and the nature. It is not indeed that one ousia without hypostasis should be conceived, as if by union into one ousia and there were no prosôpon of one ousia, but the natures subsist in their prosôpa and in their natures and in the prosôpon of the union. For in respect to the natural prosôpon of the one the other also makes use of the same on account of the union; and thus [there is] one prosôpon of the two natures. <b><u><i>The prosôpon of the one ousia makes use of the prosôpon of the other ousia in the same [way]. For what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity?</i></u></b> Therefore thou wilt not call God the Word flesh nor the flesh Son.</blockquote>This statement by Nestorius is troubling and why I find a graphic shown <a href="https://patricktdolan.wordpress.com/2010/06/02/nestorius-understanding-of-the-person-of-christ-34/?fbclid=IwAR0SZ3fxls56kB-FJvjz5zoK9awvogXQuK_zP8lh6fLjWNV1C9AAgt9Yyz4#_ftn10">here</a> to be misleading. Nestorius says that <i>the prosopon</i> (defined by McGuckin as the “observable character, defining properties, manifestation of a reality,” pg. 138) of the divine ousia (essence) and <i>the prosopon</i> of the human ousia are united in <i>one prosopon</i>.<br /><br />Two prosopa somehow unite such that one prosopon results. And yet, for Nestorius, <b><u><i>even given the resultant prosopon, there are still two prosopa</i></u></b>, each making “use” of each other. How is this intelligible? McGuckin goes on to argue that Nestorius grounded the union in God’s will: the prosopa of the Logos and the man Jesus are <i>extrinsically </i>related rather than <i>ontologically</i> grounded. Thus, when Nestorius rhetorically asks, “what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity?” it seems that <i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">Nestorius is denying an enhypostatic-anhypostatic distinction</i> - not that I think human nature can exist apart from a hypostasis but that Christ's human nature is enhypostatized by the divine Son, not a distinct individual/subject/person/hypostasis.<br /><br />Another implication would be that for Nestorius, the prosopon who was glorified with the Father before the world existed (John 17:5) cannot be the same prosopon as the enfleshed Christ whom the Father sent (John 17:3). Along these lines, I can understand better now the Chalcedonian concern regarding “theotokos” (on which, see below).<br /><br />Now, the same author who used the graphic I linked to above goes on to <a href="https://patricktdolan.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/nestorius-orthodox-position-44/">conclude</a>, “It is recorded that Nestorius agreed with Leo of Rome in regards to Chalcedonian Christology.” The author then cites a statement Nestorius made in The Bazaar of Heracleides: “I was content to endure the things whereof they accused me, in order that while I was accused thereof, they might accept without hindrance the teachings of the Fathers.” <br /><br />This appears a little too quick. Driver and Hodgson, who wrote an <a href="https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nestorius_bazaar_0_intro.htm">introduction</a> to The Bazaar of Heracleides, qualify this:</div><div><blockquote>The book must have been written by Nestorius in the year 451 or 452, seeing that there are references to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and to the flight of Dioscorus of Alexandria. Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, but though formally deposed by the Council in October of that year was not condemned to banishment until the following July. On the other hand, <b><u><i>Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon.</i></u></b> It appears, therefore, that Dioscorus must have fled when the Council decided against him, and that <b><u><i>when Nestorius wrote he must have heard of his flight, but not of the formal decision of the Council or of the imperial decree by which sentence of exile was pronounced upon him.</i></u></b></blockquote>Even if Nestorius knew of the council’s decisions and that there was a great deal of each side talking past one another, there certainly were substantial disagreements. Christology is very technical. It should not be surprising that the progressive, historical outworking of Christology was complex... let alone our second-order, contemporary reflection on this historical outworking. In any case, one should not look to Nestorius for a proper understanding of Christology.</div><div><br /></div><div>With the above in mind, I recently alluded to the way in which elder Gordon Clark's gradual, metaphysical synthesis (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/02/clarks-gradual-metaphysical-synthesis.html">link</a>) may have contributed to the two person theory that he proposed in the last book he penned, <i>The Incarnation</i>. Clark wrote:</div><div><blockquote>It seems absurd that the Second Person of the Trinity would
have gone to Gehenna, and certainly peculiar if he had gone to Hades, this
last because<b><u><i> the Second Person could not die</i></u></b>. He was the eternal,
immutable Son of God. Hence since “the man Christ Jesus” is the only
other possibility,<b><i> <u>the one who died on the cross</u></i></b> was a man, he had or was a
<i>soul</i>, he <b><i><u>was a human being, a person.</u> </i></b></blockquote></div><div>Note how late this particular change in Clark's mind must have been. In 1982, a Trinity Review article on <a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%200026a%20Traducianism.pdf">Traducianism</a> was published. This was taken from Clark chapter on <i>The Atonement</i> in Clark's unpublished systematic theology, completed some time around 1978. <i>The Atonement</i> itself was posthumously published in 1987. This suggests that Clark approved the publication of Traducianism in 1982 - at the very least, there is no record that Clark had any problems with its publication. Why is this point relevant? In the article, Clark writes:</div><blockquote><b><u><i>J. Oliver Buswell, Jr. defends creationism in a most unfortunate way.</i></u></b> In his A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Zondervan, 1962, Vol. I, 250-252) he speaks three times of Christ having been born with a sinless body: “The body of Christ was perfectly sinless.” Nothing is said about a sinless soul. This is peculiarly strange, for, <b><u><i>contrary to orthodox doctrine</i></u></b>, Buswell teaches, “He, that is, his personal eternal being, his soul, became a human person, a human soul, without in any way ceasing to be a divine person, a divine Soul” (251). But <b><u><i>this seems to be Nestorianism</i></u></b> unless Buswell means to annihilate the divine Person, and other creationists would not be pleased with this defense of their doctrine.</blockquote><p>This is consistent with another remark Clark makes in his in book, <i>The Trinity</i> (which was originally another chapter in his aforementioned systematic theology):</p><div><blockquote>As a prelude to the discussion of this Athanasian Creed, and all the more of later argumentation, certain terminological difficulties require attention. Some of these terms occur in the creed; others have come into use from other sources. Over the centuries discussions on the Trinity have utilized the words nature, essence, being, substance, subsistence, and the very unfortunate Latin term person. These are hardly ever defined with precision. For example, one would ordinarily think that a person must have a will. But the orthodox doctrine allows the three persons of the Trinity to have one will only, while surprisingly the incarnate <b><u><i>Jesus</i></u></b> has two wills, one divine, one human; and yet even with a human will, and “reasonable soul,” he <b><u><i>is not a human person. </i></u></b><i><u><b>Nestorianism, with its assertion that Christ was two persons, though plausible on the ground of this psychology, is nonetheless, on the ground of the mediatorial atonement, a heresy.</b></u></i> (Gordon Clark, <i>The Trinity</i>, chapter on The Athanasian Creed)</blockquote><p>Thus, in 1978 - and probably in 1982 - Clark rejected Nestorianism. Even in his book on <i>The Incarnation</i>, he denies association with Nestorius on the basis of having provided definitions for key terms. Clark thought Nestorius did not provide any such definitions (McGuckin might disagree, although I'm unsure on this point). Nevertheless, his admission to John Robbins in a 1985 that "it is hard to avoid Nestorianism" suggests that on this matter, Clark was of two minds(!)</p>Now, definitions are important. But how we formulate theological definitions is even more important, for these must accord with God's own self-disclosure in His word. With that in mind, the point Clark makes in his book on <i>The Trinity </i>is pertinent: Nestorianism is a heresy because its two-person Christology leads to a rejection of one Mediator. It is be strange that so specific and excellent a criticism should have been left unanswered by Clark himself upon his change of mind in <i>The Incarnation.</i> Of course, Clark passed away before completing the book to his personal satisfaction.</div><div><div><br /></div><div>Much of this is recounted in Doug Douma's book, <i>The Presbyterian Philosopher</i>. But what might also be pointed out is that it is hard to see how Clark's understanding could avoid the charge that the Son of God is not the Son of Man:</div><div><br /></div><div><div>Luke 22:69 But from now on the <b><u><i>Son of Man</i></u></b> will be seated at the right hand of the power of God.<br />70 And they all said, “So You are the <b><u><i>Son of God</i></u></b>?” And He said to them, “You say correctly that <b><u><i>I</i></u></b> am.”<br /><br /></div><div>Do two [per]Sons sit at God's right hand? Even <a href="https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nestorius_bazaar_4_book2_part1.htm">Nestorius insisted</a> that it is "not as though again two sons were sitting but one, owing to the union with his flesh." Nestorius verbally denied two that there were two Sons. Whether Nestorius' position is consistent with such a verbal denial is another question.<br /><br />Instead, the point I wish to make is that despite elder Clark's protestations against comparison to Nestorius, his position begs the same questions: who sits at God's right hand? Is there one mediator between God and man, or are there two? Who intercedes for us: God, man, or the God-man? Is the Son through whom God spoke the same Son whose throne is forever and ever (Hebrews 1:3, 8)? Etc.<br /></div></div><div><br /></div><div>For the same reasons, we should not hesitate to affirm that Mary was "theotokos." I've spoken with Protestants (and not only those who read Clark) who have had reservations about affirming this. But in his book on <i>The Trinity</i>, Clark said, "theology cannot be divorced from church history" (chapter on Athanasius). Well, did any patristic or theologian in church history who affirmed "theotokos" also affirm that Mary gave birth to <i>the divine nature</i>? Of course not. Any hesitation on this point seems to be a needless worry, whereas accidentally affirming Nestorianism is a real worry.</div><div><br /></div><div>Take an analogy: would the same people who have reservations about affirming Chalcedon's reference to Mary as "the mother of God" also hesitate to affirm that "the Father is God," "the Son is God," and "the Spirit is God" because they don't want to be confused with tritheists? Wouldn't they rather affirm each statement and just qualify them appropriately (such that monotheism is also affirmed)?</div><div><div><br />Or take Matthew 1:23. Mary is prophesied as the one who will give birth to Immanuel. She will give birth to "God-with-us." Should we have reservations about affirming this Scripture just to avoid a position that no important theologian in history has ever affirmed? These are fair challenges to those who refuse to accept orthodox doctrines and inferences.</div><div><p>Now, as with his Trinitarian model, I would like to think Clark's attitude regarding his theory of personhood was something along the following lines: </p><blockquote><div></div><div>The discussion of the main problem in the doctrine of the Trinity may now be called completed, even if it is not complete. <b><u><i>Other students and scholars may add to, subtract from, modify, contradict, or otherwise alter the foregoing.</i></u></b> Such responses would be a great improvement over the present almost universal neglect of the doctrine. (chapter on Individuation)</div></blockquote><p>Charity towards Clark would, I think, read him as primarily encouraging thoughtfulness regarding metaphysical conundrums. However, there can be little doubt that Clark's own thought has inhibited some people from accepting orthodox Christology. That's the charitable way to put the matter. One might reasonably be more blunt. Even so, it remains for us to take up Clark's challenge:</p></div></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>...if someone does not like these definitions, he is free to present his own for consideration. (<i>The Trinity</i>, Bavinck and Van Til).</div></blockquote><blockquote>I have offered a definition of the term person. Most people will
find it queer. Most theologians will find it unacceptable. Well and good, let
them formulate and propose a different definition. That is the honest and
logical thing to do. Then there will be an intelligible subject of discussion.
One can reasonably suppose that it could be a better definition than mine. (<i>The Incarnation</i>, Conclusion)</blockquote></div><p>A Nestorian Christology of any flavor is biblically untenable. Clark's view causes worse problems than it aims to solve. But unless we are content with apophaticism, some positive theory must be given. </p><p>The problem for Clark was when he defined a person as "his mind or soul" (<i>The Trinity</i>, chapter on Some Conclusions). In fact, for Clark, a single person always has a single mind because a single person <i>just is</i> his mind... not to mention that he is also the objects "he" thinks (I go into more detail about this ontological collapse <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/02/clarks-gradual-metaphysical-synthesis.html">here</a>). This too strict equation of a single person with a single mind led Clark to believe that Christ incarnate was two persons because Christ incarnate has two minds. That is the problem stated. </p><div></div><div>What follows is <i>a</i> solution - <i>a</i> positive theory which coheres with the foregoing analysis. I do not argue my solution is the <i>most</i> coherent one possible. But I take it as <i>prima facie</i> acceptable insofar as it can account for the Scriptural data while avoiding a few of the conundrums Clark mentions. I mentioned it <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/01/gordon-clark-metaphysics-and-personhood.html">a long time ago</a>, and as it's held up in my mind over time, I'll attempt to outline it in a little more detail below.</div><div><br /></div><div>A helpful way to begin a formulation of a definition for "person" is to point out that Jesus Christ is the <i>single subject</i> of many biblical propositions. Whatever explains the unity of Jesus Christ as a single subject might also help us to explain what persons are.<br /><br /></div><div>That is, suppose one wrongly accepted some version of Nestorianism (Clark's or otherwise). That person would still tend to make statements such as, “Jesus Christ is a human person and divine person.” But this still implies a <i>single subject</i>, Jesus Christ, which or who the Nestorian thinks is the unity of two persons. Well, <i>how</i> would the Nestorian unite the two persons in a single subject? </div><div><br /></div><div>Just as importantly, if and once such an explanation is provided, why can't <i>that</i> explanation about how Jesus Christ is a single subject <i>also</i> help us to explain how Jesus Christ is a single “person” in the first place (rather than two persons)? Christ is one subject. Therefore, is it not plausible that He is one person? However one attempts to explain that Christ is one subject can <i>also</i> be used to help explain how He is one person. I take this to be a good start.</div><div><br /></div><div><div>Pushing the matter a bit further, I think any thorough solution should recognize that Christ incarnate does indeed have two minds. Thus, the definition of "mind" is not identical to the definition of a person. Instead, a mind is that by which a person can think. Note that this does not suggest that the relationship between persons and minds is one of one-to-one correspondence (see below).</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, in certain cases, minds think self-referentially. Take an example: "Ryan is a male" is a true proposition. Because I am Ryan, I am also able to truthfully think, "<i>I</i> am a male." This thought reflexively indexes the true proposition "Ryan is a male." Other persons (like females) cannot truthfully use the reflexive indexical "I" to think the proposition that I think in the mode that I think it. Females would only be able to truthfully affirm the true proposition, "Ryan is a male," not the self-referential thought which indexes the proposition to myself.</div><div><br /></div><div>In normal cases, when we talk about one, singular person, we usually associate him or her one mind. Thus, Clark's faulty definition of persons is natural, if dangerous. However, given the unique case of Christ, we should allow for the possibility that a single person can have multiple minds. A better definition of "person" than Clark's, I think, is one which is not <i>too</i> far removed from it: <i>a person is a mind <b>or minds</b> <u>capable of reflexive indexation</u></i>. Perhaps the underlined portion is redundant, but at any rate, here's an example of how this cashed out in the case of Christ incarnate:</div><div><br /></div><div>The human mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "<i>I</i> grow in wisdom."<br />The divine mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "<i>I</i> am all-wise."</div></div><div><br /></div><div>In both cases, the "I" has the <i>same referent</i>, a <i>singular</i> subject, individual, or hypostases: Christ incarnate. Thus, one can truthfully affirm that "Christ incarnate grew in wisdom" and that "Christ incarnate is all-wise." This is not a contradiction, because Christ incarnate does not grow in wisdom in the same sense that He is all-wise. He grows in wisdom by His human mind and is all-wise by His divine mind. On this definition of "person," we can avoid the error of Nestorianism.</div></div><div><br /></div><div>Accepting this definition would mean one would have to reject elder Clark's metaphysical synthesis. But I think this turns out to be a case of addition by subtraction: the less one relies on Clark's metaphysics, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/01/thoughts-on-clarks-two-person-theory-of.html">the better</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, I have seen the following citation float around which might seem to pose a problem for the view I've expressed. In his book <i><a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hfhJAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA97&lpg=PA97&dq=%22If+claims+about+Jesus+possessing+two+distinct+ranges+of+consciousness%22&source=bl&ots=EvhbbkeRaK&sig=ACfU3U3dasrGZjBI_GcqZfZONguRq__egA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwmK7-xMCEAxXVkIQIHUrBDfgQ6AF6BAgmEAM#v=onepage&q=%22If%20claims%20about%20Jesus%20possessing%20two%20distinct%20ranges%20of%20consciousness%22&f=false">Paradox in Christian Theology</a></i>, James Anderson writes:</div><div><blockquote><b><u><i>If claims about Jesus possessing two distinct ranges of consciousness, two distinct sets of experiences, beliefs, etc., are to be coherent then it must be possible to refer to those mental features without those features being necessarily owned by any particular person.</i></u></b> Yet this is precisely what our concept of a person rules out. If experiences are necessarily individuated with respect to persons, then at the most fundamental logical level it makes no sense to speak of <i>one </i>person<i> </i>with<i> two</i> distinct consciousnesses (in the sense that each consciousness might in principle be ascribed to a different person that the other)...</blockquote><p></p><blockquote>If <i>persons</i> and not <i>minds</i> are the logically primary subjects of experiences and other mental states then it makes no more sense to say <i>Christ believe that water is H2O with respect to his divine mind but did not believe that water is H2O with respect to His human mind</i> than it does to say that <i>Christ broke break with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet</i>. A person either breaks bread or he does not; likewise, a person either believes that water is H2O or he does not. To try to isolate two distinct minds or consciousnesses within one person, as Morris seeks to do, is to kick against the goads of the very concepts needed to formulate the christological problem in the first place. (<i>Paradox in Christian Theology</i>, pgs. 97-98)</blockquote><p></p></div>Frankly, I personally don't see a problem with the statement that <i>Christ broke break with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet</i>. Despite his seeming incredulity, does Anderson think that this statement is false? In what way does this conflict with Anderson's argument that "If particular experiences are to be meaningful, they cannot be logically isolated from the <i>subjects</i> of those experiences"? Subjects are not attribution-less particulars. To say that there is a distinction between the subject or person of Jesus and His divine and human minds does not seem to entail that Jesus' divine mind (in particular) is not "necessarily owned" by the person of Jesus. <br /><br />Here is an analogy: "if claims about the person of the Father possessing two distinct attributes is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those attributes without those attributes being necessarily owned by any particular person." Does Anderson really think that [the divine] attributes are not "necessarily owned" by the Father? Or would Anderson suggest some sort of extremely strong, Plotinic view of divine simplicity on which God has no attributes? I wouldn't think so, as I recall Anderson had some relevant criticisms of Dolezal's book on divine simplicity (<a href="https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/god-without-parts-divine-simplicity-and-the-metaphysics-of-gods-absolutenes/">link</a>). <br /><br />In fact, Anderson himself accepts <a href="https://www.proginosko.com/2022/02/on-malpasss-dilemma/">theistic conceptual realism</a>. He thinks that God's thoughts are identical with propositions. Insofar as propositions are distinct, God's thoughts must also be distinct. So here's another, even better analogy: "if claims about the Father's possessing two distinct thoughts is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those thoughts without those thoughts being necessarily owned by any particular person." Would not Anderson deny that this follows? If so, that would mean his original argument doesn't follow either.<div><br /></div><div>One final thought: a separate objection to the definition I've proposed for what a "person" is might be that it is contrived. Well, in some sense, I grant that this is true: the incarnation is a <i>special</i> case, after all. The language of "personhood" is one the church <i>did</i> contrive to deal with heresies and of which the church <i>should</i> take the data of <i>special</i> divine revelation in account when formulating a coherent Christology. This is less a criticism and more so an obvious statement of a historical reality.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-87568156416539846122024-02-21T11:24:00.001-05:002024-02-21T11:26:16.207-05:00The Tortoise Is UnfairI was asked about <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?si=jqNO0UEfVlwQylIr&fbclid=IwAR2J_5qEa9drSGG8VLcDy2ra8mOYnjiwW9w17IYPgJGiU_JGKRkjNQshFR4&v=xO3Gw0zlmWM&feature=youtu.be">this video</a> in which the justification for deductive reasoning is put in question. The person who asked me to comment on it mentioned that followers of Van Til's brand of apologetics had forwarded him the video. <div><br /></div><div>Now, it is unclear to me what the purpose of that could be. Do these persons reject deductive reasoning despite Jesus Himself using it (Matthew 22:23-33)? Or are they perhaps suggesting that circular reasoning is acceptable (if so, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html">see here</a>)? Or perhaps they intended to use parity of reasoning to compare the way in which inductive reasoning is justifiable to the way in which deductive reasoning is possible? In this last case, I think "counter induction" (mentioned by the presenter around the 8 minute mark) provides a relevant problem for inductive reasoning that does not appear for deductive reasoning (see below).</div><div><br />Of course, one point of the video seems to be to question whether there is a problem for deduction relevantly similar to the problem of induction. One point made can be summarized as follows: if one can't use inductive reasoning to circularly justify inductive reasoning, it would seem one can't use deductive reasoning to circularly justify deductive reasoning. </div><div><br /></div><div>Well, I agree with this. But around the 13 minute mark, the presenter mentions that a form of deductive reasoning he calls "modus morons" (affirming the consequent). Now, if "modus morons" is alleged to be a problem for the justifiability of modus ponens similar to how counter induction is a problem for the justifiability of induction, I think point made around minute 25 illustrates a relevant disanalogy: "modus morons" leads to the principle of explosion and trivialism. </div><div><br /></div><div>If <i>anything</i> is derivable on "modus morons," this just means "modus morons" is self-admittedly self-defeating, unjustified, etc. This is not the case for the principle of counter induction (even though it might be counter-intuitive). Why, then, should anyone entertain that "modus morons" could be "justified"? What would that mean? The presenter says towards the end of the video that he still thinks "modus morons" could be meaningful but fails to expand on whether he thinks meaningfulness is a sufficient condition for justification.</div><div><br /></div><div>Likewise, if one who accepts inductive reasoning as "justified" goes on to say that conclusions of inductive arguments could be false, I have to wonder what sort of "justification" is being advocated. And <i>this</i> should be considered the central takeaway of the video: regarding the "justification" of anything (deduction or otherwise), one must define what he means for something to <i>be</i> "justified"! Whether or not this invokes a <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-problem-of-criterion.html">problem of the criterion</a>, without clarity regarding the sort of justification one is after, it will remain unclear when exactly one is justified in believing a certain form of reasoning.</div><div><br /></div><div>For example, is the sort of "justification" in which one is interested infallibilistic? If so, then as mentioned above, that would constitute a relevant distinction between inductive (fallibilistic) and deductive reasoning (infallibilistic) in terms of self-consistency: inductive reasoning does not always lead to true beliefs, so use of inductive reasoning to justify inductive reasoning does not necessarily lead to a true belief. By contrast, use of deductive reasoning <i>does</i> always lead to true beliefs <i>if</i> one's premises are true.</div><div><br /></div><div>In turn, this leads us to ask what structure of justification one accepts: foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, or positism? The presenter fails to mention that it just may be the case that deductive reasoning is itself [or legitimated by something which is itself] noninferentially, intrinsically, or foundationally justified.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, I say that less as a criticism of the presenter himself (since I'm sure he had his own reasons for the video) than I do as a criticism of those (perhaps certain Van Tilian apologists) who suggest deduction and induction are in the same justificatory boat. Nevertheless, I do wonder whether the presenter (since he styles himself as a skeptic, although to what extent is unclear) believes in epistemic neutrality, as if all positions are on equal epistemic footing and we are all capable of completely criterionless judgments. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/03/epistemic-neutrality.html ">This would be silly.</a></div><div><br /></div><div>Finally, I've read Lewis Carroll's tortoise story before (<a href="https://web.mat.upc.edu/rafael.cubarsi/intro/What%20the%20Tortoise%20Said%20to%20Achilles.pdf">link</a>). It is amusing, but it has never particularly bothered me. For starters, just because the tortoise doesn't accept the conclusion of a deductive argument doesn't mean Achilles is obliged to indulge him. If one presents a necessary truth and another rejects said truth, we can't compel that person to believe it. Our engagement may provide an occasion for the Holy Spirit to work, but how much effort one expends to persuade another who initially balks at truth is a matter of conscience, not obligation.</div><div><br /></div><div>Supposing one rejects the reasoning in this post, for example, I might attempt a few further remarks to persuade him, but at some point, I will simply recognize that I am not dealing with a fair individual. The root of the problem in such people is ethical, not rational (Romans 1, cf. Hebrews 10:26, etc.). They may reason validly, but they reason in vain because they would rather avow false premises and rebelliously refuse to submit their consciences to the foundational truth of God's word than to admit that valid reasoning is impossible apart from a Christian worldview.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-76185372620352203142024-02-14T12:17:00.001-05:002024-02-14T16:56:35.076-05:00Clark's Gradual, Metaphysical Synthesis<p>A recent question was asked about Clark's theology proper which allowed me to collect thoughts that I have been meaning to put into words for some time. The question was as follows:</p><blockquote>Clark was known to have translated John 1:1 so that the Logos was rendered as "Logic". Along these lines, Clark would argue to the effect that logic is the manner or characteristic of God's thinking. <br /><br /><div>How or where does Clark deal with the objection where logic is the art which orders discursive thought (something of which God does not have)? In other words, how can logic (as that which applies to reasoning from premises to conclusions) be said to be the characteristic of God's thinking if God's thinking is non-discursive?</div></blockquote><div>This is an excellent question in that it draws out some implications of Clark’s view that may not be immediately obvious to the ordinary reader. <div><br />Several people who responded to this question pointed out that an answer to it might depend on what the questioners thinks characterizes “discursive” reasoning. Clark himself used the word "discursive" to mean different things in different contexts.<div><br />For example, does “discursive” reasoning in the context of the above question involve a temporal succession and/or dependent process? If so, Clark would reply that God’s knowledge is <b><u><i>not</i></u></b> "discursive" in this sense:</div><div><blockquote>The Complaint admits that Dr. Clark distinguishes between what may be called the divine psychology and human psychology in the act of knowing. <b><u><i>God’s mode of knowing is intuitive, while man’s is always temporal and discursive.</i></u></b> This distinction, the Complaint claims, is insufficient; a further distinction is needed. It is obvious therefore that the complainants hold to a two-fold theory of something in addition to a two-fold theory of the act of knowing. (Winter 1946/1947. Studies in the Doctrines of the Complaint. PCA Archives and SDCS)</blockquote></div><div>Or does "discursive" merely suggest (in the context of the above question) that one’s thinking is syllogistically ordered? If so, Clark would reject the questioner's premise that God’s thinking is not "discursive":<br /></div><div><blockquote>God's knowledge is sometimes called intuitive rather than discursive. These terms are unfortunate, because <b><u><i>if discursive means “syllogistic,” then God thinks in syllogism</i></u></b> (Rom 4:2-3), and because men also presumably have intuitions. (1972. In Encyclopedia of Christianity. Philip E. Hughes, ed. Marshallton, Delaware: National Foundation for Christian Education. Feuerbach, Ludwig A.)</blockquote></div><div>For Clark, however, for God to think "in syllogism" does <b><u><i>not</i></u></b> mean that there is some so-called fundamental truth or truths from which God must deduce all others. That would mean there would be more fundamental parts of God than others since, for Clark, God just is truth itself. I'll return to this point below, but by way of anticipation, I think Clark does implicitly provide answer to the questioner's confusion (although in such a way that it still leaves problems with Clark's larger theology). </div><div><br />I'll put it another way: for humans, Clark says the law of contradiction is a test that requires supplementation – God’s word – in order for knowledge to be possible. <i><b><u>For God, this is not so</u></b></i>:</div><div><blockquote><i><b><u>The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth.</u></b></i></blockquote></div><blockquote><div><i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">Ideally or for God this seems to be the case</i>. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, <i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.</i></div><div><br />Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other...</div><div><br /><b><u><i>Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions.</i></u></b> Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that <b><u><i>the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest.</i></u></b> Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth.</div><div><br />Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation.// (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 287, 290)</div></blockquote><p>A shorter statement by Clark to the same effect is as follows:</p><blockquote></blockquote><blockquote></blockquote><blockquote><div><b><u><i>One who believes in the unity of truth may still believe that the false system entails contradictions; but to prove this is the work of omniscience. </i></u></b>(Historiography: Secular and Religious, 1971, pg. 370)</div></blockquote><p>Now, the following is very important: Clark held to a coherence or consistency theory of truth.</p><blockquote><div>This gentleman distinguishes between logical consistency and a coherence view of truth. Since he stresses the latter rather than the former, he might think that Nash rates me too highly by asserting that I hold to coherence. However, neither Professor Nash nor I acknowledge this distinction, and while I now prefer the word consistency for clarity’s sake, I have no objection to Nash’s statement at this point. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 142)</div></blockquote><div></div><div>For that reason, I believe, Clark came to reject that there could be multiple propositional systems that are completely coherent or consistent. If truth is coherence or consistency, there must be only <i><b><u>one</u> </b></i>completely consistent or coherent system. Clark considered this even as early as 1952. From the Introduction to his <i>A Christian View of Men and Things</i>, he writes:</div><div><blockquote><b><u><i>Now, there is a theory that the
ultimate test of truth is coherence, and on this theory it would be impossible
to have two self‑consistent, mutually contradictory philosophies.</i></u></b> A false
statement, so it is said, will always, if pursued far enough, imply its own
falsity. If this coherence theory of truth should be established, then we
could rely with confidence on this application of the law of contradiction.
Its sufficiency would be inherent in the nature of truth. The mere fact that
the coherence theory of truth would eliminate a final impasse might even be
reason enough for adopting it. One might hold that all other theories of truth
lead to skepticism, and that therefore the coherence theory alone is coherent
and true. Possibly all this is so, but surely it needs some more talking about.
And in talking about it, there can be no logical objection to using the law of
contradiction as far as it will go.</blockquote></div><div>Over time, I think his acceptance of a coherence theory of truth pushed him to accept necessitarianism (see <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/05/gordon-clark-on-necessitarianism.html">here</a>). There is necessarily only one coherent or consistent system of propositions, and God necessarily just is this system.</div><div><br />For Clark, the idea of multiple propositional systems that are coherent or consistent would not only have posed an epistemic difficulty for God but also a metaphysical one since, for Clark, God just is truth. Clark himself says: "Truth is God... God is truth." (1984. In the Beginning. The Trinity Review Nov.-Dec.). This dovetails with his theory of personhood in which persons just are that which they think:</div><div><blockquote>As there is no temporal priority, so also there is no logical or analytical priority. Not only was Logic the beginning, but Logic was God. If this unusual translation of John’s Prologue still disturbs someone, he might yet allow that <b><u><i>God is his thinking. God is not a passive or potential substratum; he is actuality or activity.</i></u></b> (1980. God and Logic. The Trinity Review Nov.-Dec.)</blockquote></div><div>God thinks truth; therefore, God is truth. Returning to an earlier point, for Clark, the unity of truth (God) is such that any single, true proposition will mutually entail all others, whereas a false proposition will always lead to systematic inconsistency. God has no need for axiomatic truths (unlike us), for He is in no need of "supplementation" (unlike us) to apply the law of contradiction to Himself - or, what is equivalent, to His own knowledge - with complete sufficiency. God just is the <i>singly</i> coherent, consistent, <i>necessary</i>, logical system: truth itself. God is this truth actually and actively. <b style="font-style: italic; text-decoration-line: underline;">There is no potential for God to have been another system of so-called truths.</b> </div><div><br /></div></div></div><div><div>Roughly, then, one can argue that epistemological beliefs Clark became committed to in the 1940s-50s - e.g. man's knowledge is univocal with God's; coherence theory of truth; anti-empirical means of knowledge - shaped his later, metaphysical views. For example:</div><div><br /></div><div>- Clark's theory of truth was such that in order for Clark to account for knowledge of persons (e.g. man's knowledge of God or God's knowledge of men), he believed he had to change his views (cf. his earlier anthropological views <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/04/prelapsarian-emotions-and-gordon-clarks.html?m=0">here</a>) by collapsing personhood into 1) propositions or 2) thoughts. </div><div><br /></div><div>[As an aside, these two positions might be distinct (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/04/further-problems-with-clarks.html">link</a>). In particular, the second position - i.e. persons are what they <i>think </i>- might seem to require what Clark calls elsewhere a "subjective, psychological act" (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/12/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>), implying something seemingly <i>distinct</i> from propositional objects yet corresponding to them: i.e. think<i><u><b>ers</b></u></i>. </div><div><br /></div><div>An interesting question is whether <i>Clark</i> believed these positions were distinct. It does not appear so, for in his book <i>The Trinity</i>, he says in the same chapter ("Individuation") that persons are a "collection of <i>thoughts</i>" and that his wife is "<i>merely</i> a set of <i>propositions</i>." He appears to equate positions 1) and 2), at least in terms of his own, proposed definition of personhood.</div><div><br /></div><div>So did Clark think propositions can think <i>themselves</i>? Is this intelligible? And contrary to contemporary philosophers, did Clark think propositions have causal powers? Combined with his quote from the "God and Logic" article above, it does indeed appear Clark thought such to be the case! Of course, an obvious, unfortunate product of this position as held by elder Clark is a two-person theory of the incarnation (two thinkers = two persons).</div><div><br /></div><div>On the other hand, even if our "subjective, psychological act" of believing might itself be a proposition, Clark does nevertheless seem to introduce something distinct from propositions elsewhere in accepting Clark's acceptance of a "Platonic-Philonic" dualism (<a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%200085a%20TheTheologiansBesettingSin.pdf">link</a>). But this then begs the question as to whether one must know phenomena <i>qua</i> phenomena or if it suffices to know the noumenal, suprasensible world. Likewise, Clark's theory of language trades on nonpropositional "symbols" which, <i>in Clark's own words</i>, correspond to propositions (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/04/god-language-and-scripturalism-revisited.html">link</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>This would be problematic unless the following assertion Clark made to Buswell in 1948 is false: "The correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object." But if it is false (as I've argued, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">link</a>), it demotivates Clark's reason for accepting the coherence theory of truth and, in turn, the many metaphysical views Clark was led to as a result.]</div><div><br /></div><div>- Likewise, Clark's theory of time as a "succession of ideas" suggests yet another collapse of a metaphysical category into an epistemic one. </div><div><br /></div><div>[Another aside: I wonder if this may function to explain why Clark waffled on the age of the earth prior to the creation of man. Clark did believe angels had successions of ideas; I suppose only the hypothesis that angels were the first creations would prevent one from asking Clark "how much time elapsed between the creation of the heavens and the creation of angels?" This question might be problematic if no angels existed to have a succession of ideas according to which the elapse between the creation of heaven and the creation of angels might be measured.]</div><div><br /></div><div>- Returning to Clark's metaphysic of persons, one might suggest that whereas Thomistic divine simplicity is subject to comparison to Plotinus' One, Clark's version of divine simplicity is more subject to comparison to Plotinus' Divine Mind (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/03/theistic-conceptual-realism-theistic.html">link</a>). To the chagrin of adherents to these versions of divine simplicity, I think the comparisons are warranted.</div><div><br /></div><div>To expand on Clark's view, it is fairly apparent that Clark's affirmation of univocal knowledge plays a part in his unique understanding of divine simplicity. If Clark can be categorized as a classical theist - for he did accept divine simplicity, immutability, timelessness, and impassibility - he is certainly an odd one! On the other hand, that a comparison to Plotinus might nevertheless be made to Clark's views might lead one to theorize that Clark had a tendency to overly depend on ancient philosophers (with whom Clark was so familiar).</div><div><br /></div><div>- In support of this thesis, 1) Clark's view of time depended on Augustine; 2) elder Clark seemed to deny the possibility of an infinitude of knowledge in <i>The Incarnation</i>, a denial which <a href="http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2005/06/gordon-clark-2.html">Steve Hays once point out</a> presupposes a pre-Cantorian definition of "infinity" and simultaneously demonstrated Clark's ignorance of mathematics (cf. <i>Personal Recollections</i>, pg. 117); 3) elder Clark's acceptance of necessitarianism is somewhat similar to Plotinian necessitarianism. In this last case, however, I would say his view is rather more similar to that of Leibniz, which is nevertheless striking in that so far as I am aware, elder Clark never responded to his own, proleptic criticism (written in 1957) of his later acceptance of necessitarianism: </div><div><blockquote><b><u><i>If all truths are to be deduced by
logic alone from the being of God, this world cannot be the best of all
possible worlds because there are no other possible worlds.</i></u></b> Are the
theorems of geometry the best of all possible theorems? The question is
meaningless, for there are no other theorems. <b><u><i>God, therefore, exercised no
choice in causing the world</i></u></b>; he is its cause in precisely the same sense in
which the axioms of geometry are the cause of the theorems. (<i>Thales to Dewey</i>, pg. 327, 1957)</blockquote><p>Clark wrote other criticisms of necessitarianism he also neglected to address when he later came to accept the position (cf. <i>Karl Barth’s Theological Method</i>, 1997, pg. 36).</p></div><div>- One final metaphysical category that seems driven by Clark's epistemic beliefs pertains to causation. I've suggested that elder Clark's acceptance of occasionalism (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/06/did-gordon-clark-ever-espouse.html">link</a>) was due to his anti-empirical epistemology. Clark might have feared that an alternative account of causation would support his critics, who perpetually asked if Clark had to read his Bible in order to know its contents. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now, I've also argued there was no reason for Clark to have had this fear (if he did; <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>). It is possible for propositional truths to <i>correspond</i> to nonpropositions - and even for the truth-values of contingent propositions to be <i>determined </i>by nonproposition[s] (for God Himself is not a [set of] proposition[s], <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/01/gordon-clark-metaphysics-and-personhood.html">link</a>) - without devastating a revelational epistemology. Additionally, in the context of the specific critique regarding the reading of one's Bible, it is possible Clark conflated the basing relation in epistemology (or something like it) with causation <i>simpliciter</i>.</div><div><br /></div><div>These are the beginnings of an interesting story one might tell about how Clark's unique thought developed and converged over time, a story I eventually hope to narrate in a more ordered form. </div></div><div><div><br /></div><div>As a perhaps unnecessary outro, I don't agree with Clark on several of these points. Nor were his views on several points I've outlined above always the same. For example, as I point out in one of the above links and quotes, one will find statements earlier in his life in which he (correctly) rejects necessitarianism. </div><div><br /></div><div>However, I think there is a gradual, metaphysical synthesis in Clark's thought that implies his awareness of such problems as the one posed at the beginning of this post. Even though I think Clark gets quite a few things wrong, his attempted synthesis is nonetheless impressive. Clark's following speech "from the grave" was a little too humble: "Clark never had much to
do with <i>ta meta-ta-phusica</i>."</div></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-20309501897931099432024-01-31T09:29:00.003-05:002024-01-31T09:29:25.665-05:00"Graph"ted into Christ<div>As a math teacher, I find that visual portrayals facilitate understanding of mathematical concepts. Sometimes, my attempts to think visually bleed into my more theological thoughts. Among other loosely related mathematical concepts I've heard or considered that have afforded some cause for reflection:</div><div><br /></div><div>#1 - Upon the consummation of the present world, one wonders if our knowledge (or, perhaps, certain other capacities indicating spiritual growth) in this present life will become statically determined by our course in this life or able to further increase. If the latter - which is my intuition and suggested in eschatological passages such as Isaiah 65 and Revelation 21-22 - we might consider our relationship to God as <i>asymptotic</i>. Often times, we hear or talk about God as "infinite." In this analogy, God would rather be like the definitive line towards whom we would ever become closer over the unending progression of time - but without intersection or mergence. This analogy would preserve the Creator-creature distinction but allow us to entertain hypothetical futures as fully sanctified and glorified people yet with the potential for greater conformity to Christ-likeness.</div><div><br /></div><div>#2 - Some biblical scholars (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2018/05/rhetorical-criticism_28.html">example</a>) have found what appear to be intricate patterns in Scripture. Chiasms and parallelisms are more well-known examples, but so-called "deltaforms" remind me of the concept <i>periodicity </i>or<i> </i>reverberations. In fact, one day, I envision the possibility of something like a huge screen (extrapolate an IMAX theatre) in which it might be possible to display the entire Bible. To fit our field of vision, perhaps the display would have be coded. In any case, given this scenario, I imagine it would also be possible to highlight or "colorate" verses in this display in which certain symbols, words, numbers, letters, phrases, sentences, themes, and so forth appear. Upon doing so, it would not at all surprise me if patterns were to emerge in some cases - even intertextually, depending on one's canonical organization (e.g. Hebraic Tanakh vs. Protestant Old Testament). This could make for compelling apologetic argumentation regarding textual issues.</div><div><div><br /></div><div>#3 - <i>Factor trees</i> are akin to Porphyrian trees. These are useful in various contexts in which one wants an understanding of the scope of subject matter. One might take inspiration from these paradigm models. A massive project I've imagined would be to classify how different traditions interpret various verses. I don't have in mind an atomistic structure in which literally every interpretation provided by every person who has ever lived is displayed within the "tree." Selectivity would be needed regarding which traditions to include and who would function as representatives within each tradition. Even so, an interactive layout along these lines would be quite helpful for catechesis, systematics, comparative religion, etc. </div><div><br /></div></div><div>#4 - Finally, what prompted this post is a recent mathematical metaphor has come to mind: in our postlapsarian context, I think we can picture ourselves as zero-dimensional figures, "points" on a one-dimensional, bisected line that represents our lifetime. Even from conception - our "origin" and the "origin" or middle of the bisected line - we have a continuous orientation, attraction, and/or "face" towards negative "values" (which is typically leftwards on a number line). </div><div><br /></div><div>There are layers here: without divine intervention, our negative <i>moral </i>"values" from conception become intensified the longer we live, i.e. the further that we walk "leftwards" over time. In fact, in a sense, the timeline of our lives started at zero from birth. This is interesting in that typical countdowns end with zero; otherwise, we tend to count upwards from zero. In this picture, however, we are at allowed to continue to exist on the number line of life with an orientation and intensification towards <i>negative</i> values. This exhibits the extent to which our lives are on borrowed credit and the extent to which we presume upon God's goodness and patience.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, it takes a transcendent God immanently applies higher dimensional, redemptive grace to our zero-dimensional selves through His incarnate Son. Mathematically speaking, we literally experience a "<i>transformation</i>" as we are reflected across the axis of the number line and turned "about face" to become soldiers for Christ, oriented on a path towards positive "values," i.e. the "right[ward]," heavenly city.</div><div><br /></div><div>I've thought about whether this illustration could be depicted in different terms. For example, can we consider ourselves as two-dimensional figures who must live and move - whether we travel up, down, left, or right - on a sinful plane of existence? If this is intelligible, it would seem to similarly require a transcendent God to immanently apply higher dimensional grace to our two-dimensional selves through His incarnate Son. In this case, it would seem our selves would be transformed into three-dimensional figures with the orientation towards moving forward towards Christ-likeness (albeit the potential to slide "backwards").</div><div><br /></div><div>There are both limitations to these metaphors and potential for further development. For example, a limitation of these metaphors is that they are best understood within the setting of a postlapsarian context. In particular, the illustration in which we <i>become</i> "three-dimensional" objects might provoke the misconception that our <i>ontology </i>changes when God applies redemptive grace to our lives, whereas our sinfulness is <i>accidental</i> to our human nature. What is essential to humanity is to <i>have</i> an ethical orientation. The fall of mankind in the first Adam and redemption of those in the last Adam connote changes to our ethical orientation, not to our ontology. Therefore, perhaps the metaphor in which we begin <i>and </i>end as zero-dimensional "points" is more apt (although having a so-called negative orientation again suggests it is better thought of given a postlapsarian context).</div><div><br /></div>Speaking of that former metaphor, it is possible to develop it further. Clearly, the end behaviors of the line indicate the destination toward which one is heading - heaven or hell. We might also mark on the number line a time after which God will no longer apply redemptive grace to whose those orientations [and actions] are continuously "negative" or sinful (cf. the consummation of this present world). <div><br /></div><div>Or consider that while the timeline which we have been considering <i>may </i>be conceived of as <i>strictly</i> one-dimensional - a straight line in either direction - it is <i>also </i>possible to conceive of it as, say, two-dimensional. For instance, humans are three-dimensional: it is easy enough for us to conceive of a situation in which we view something that initially appears to be a simple, straight line is actually a two-dimensional figure once we pivot our perspective. Say we have a overhead, helicopter view of what appears to be a straight line. When our helicopter lands, we actually see that the object is actually a two-dimensional polynomial (like a rollercoaster that never turns sideways but does go up and down).</div><div><br /></div><div>Applying this new setting to the metaphor, we would still be zero-dimensional points on this polynomials, and references to end behaviors, timelines, etc. would still apply. Now, however, we are afforded more freedom of imagination. Consider relative maximums and minimums: these might depict temporal goods or trials that people experience. Or think about the fact that different polynomials have different y-intercepts: from an "overhead" perspective, this would be the "origin" of man, the point on the "line" in which the x-coordinate is zero. From a perspective in which we can view the two-dimensional polynomial, however, we can speak of different y-intercepts as depicting natural or circumstantial advantages or disadvantages that exist from conception. God gives some more "talents" than others, after all. </div><div><br /></div><div>Surely, more could be said. I wish I had artistic or technological proficiency to show these or other ideas I've had (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2012/11/connect-dots.html">example</a>). But those are certainly not talents with which I have been endowed!</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-50714684895333340442024-01-13T00:57:00.003-05:002024-01-29T22:46:59.199-05:00Self-Attestation vs. Self-Authenticity<p>As I read more and more examples in which I find a conflation between epistemology and apologetics (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_84.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/06/scripturalism-and-plausibility.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/04/apologetics-and-epistemology.html">link</a>), I am reminded of Anthony Bryson's thoughtful chapter in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Calvinism-Problem-Evil-David-Alexander/dp/1620325780?tag=puritanboard-20">Calvinism and the Problem of Evil</a> called, <i>Calvinism, Self-Attestation, and Apathy toward Arguments From Evil</i>. Unlike many authors, Bryson is aware of the distinction between the two:</p><p></p><blockquote>...my aim is not to look at what role self-attestation should play in apologetics. I'm interested in how the Christian can know that the Bible is the word of God. In the SA literature, these sometimes get confused.</blockquote><p></p><p>In his chapter, Bryson detects apathy from presuppositionalists towards the problem of evil and thinks such is due to their reliance on the principle of "self-attestation." He writes that some presuppositionalists think as follows: </p><div><blockquote>We clearly know that God exists because of what the Bible says. Since God is its author, it is infallible. And <u><b><i>we know its author is God because of its own self-testimony. In short, the Bible is self-attesting</i></b></u>... </blockquote><blockquote>...how can we know that the Bible is inspired? The most common answer from self-attestation theorists is that Jesus and the rest of the Scriptures teach that it is… we know that it was written by God because God, in the Bible, has written that it was written by him. (pgs. 275, 280-281)</blockquote></div><div>Now, some authors of books in the Bible do claim their own or other biblical writings have been divinely revealed. But any reliance on self-attestation to function as a positive evidence, proof, or defense of one's belief in the Bible <i>already presupposes</i> that the Bible is trustworthy. Circular argumentation (apologetics) may be permissible (see below). But argumentation presupposes epistemic justification, and circular justification (epistemology) is <i>not</i> permissible (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/12/monkey-see-monkey-dont.html">link</a>). Bryson is interested in the latter, not the former.</div><div><br />Here's another problem with "apathetic" presuppositionalists Bryson mentions: does every proposition the Bible communicates begin with a self-attestation (e.g. "I am the Lord...")? Obviously not. How, then, are we able to know those propositions? Not by an appeal to self-attestation! There must be some other way in which we <i>know</i> each biblical proposition, in which case Bryson has a point that the motivation for a lazy self-attestation epistemology is undercut. </div><div><br /></div><div>Further, suggesting that self-attestation is an epistemic <i>necessity</i> would seem to lead to a vicious regress: with respect to any purported revelation from God, God Himself would have to attest that He is attesting that He is attesting <i>ad infinitum</i>. Divine revelation could not be known if it requires infinite content.</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, none of this suggests that self-attestation arguments are irrelevant to <i>apologetics</i>. Self-consistency is a virtue, after all. The Bible may even allow for [apologetic] tests according to which one may <i>dis</i>confirm knowledge claims, which is not the same as suggesting the Bible requires tests for knowledge-claims to be epistemically justified (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>Even so, should one <i>solely</i> rely on self-attestation arguments in one's apologetic (let alone in one's epistemology)? No. For example, other religious apologists might make self-attestation arguments. It would be useful to show in what ways Christianity has comparatively unique evidence or in what ways those religions are internally inconsistent. In other words, if he had cared to make an argument against a purely self-attestation apologetic, Bryson would also have had a point. To this extent, I have no issue with him. </div><div><br /></div><div>On pg. 282, however, Bryson seems to equates <i>self-attestation</i> with <i>self-authenticity</i>:</div><div><blockquote><i><u><b>SA</b></u></i> arguments fence off inerrancy claims so that we cannot possibly acquire good reasons for thinking that the Bible, or just a part, is uninspired. God's <i><u><b>self-authentication</b></u></i> is the most fundamental and important piece of evidence for the inspiration/inerrancy of Scripture. All other evidence depends on it and must be interpreted in light of this epistemic base. The <i><u><b>self-attestation</b></u></i> of Scripture is not one piece of evidence among others that happens to weigh more. It determines what else can count as evidence, including how or whether we even ought to search for evidence. Put another way, for the SA theorist belief in biblical inerrancy resembles the sort of belief lodged in the middle of a Quinean doxastic web. The belief will (and ought to) be held, come what may.</blockquote></div><div>Perhaps Bryson only means to summarize certain presuppositionalists. In footnotes for this paragraph and elsewhere in his chapter, he mentions Frame and Kruger. Indeed, his critiques of these and other presuppositionalist may land. For example, Kruger, whose work I do respect, has said (<a href="https://michaeljkruger.com/is-the-concept-of-a-self-authenticating-bible-a-modern-invention/?fbclid=IwAR2-2S7I9cvMrXUOLt6B-4NQbL83ptlaSHcpbeDIDArvzSBeKia7BwZtT9Y">link</a>):</div><blockquote>Christian theologians—especially in the Reformed world—have long argued that <u><b>there is a more foundational way we can know books are from God: the <i>internal qualities</i> of the books themselves.</b></u></blockquote><div>In this case, Bryson's response appears devastating:</div><div></div><p></p><blockquote><p>Kruger believes that SA sanctions the use of other kinds of evidence, like the internal virtues of a book, to pick out the divinely inspired books. Yet, despite this broadening of potential evidence, his view collapses into the strict self-attestation view. He requires that we beg the question and assume which books belong in the cannon [sic] to figure out which books should be included in the canon. <i><u><b>Unless God, via some other form of communication, enlightens us as to the list of canon making attributes, we must rely on God's word. Consequently, we must have already isolated the right books so that we can extract from them the criteria for canon inclusion.</b></u></i></p><p>For instance, Kruger believes that the beauty of the Bible, along with its efficacy and harmony, is evidence of inspiration. <i><u><b>But how does he know to search for these attributes?</b></u></i> Primarily because of what he knows about God and his character. And he acquired this knowledge, I believe he would say, from Scripture.</p><blockquote><div></div></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote><div>At this point, we've hit upon the second horn of our dilemma: <i><u><b>We must already know some of the books that belong in the New Testament canon apart from this method.</b></u></i> For if we know that book X belongs in the canon and then learn that according to that book, properties a, b, and c are indicative of divine inspiration, <i><u><b>those properties must not initially explain how we first learned that book X is inspired</b></u></i>. (pg. 293)</div></blockquote><div></div><div>Touché. Is there an alternative, or is the presuppositionalist out of luck? Perhaps Bryson would agree that "self-authentication" can refer to some meaning that is distinct from "self-attestation" if an author defines his terms. That is the route I would wish to take.</div><div><br /></div><div>Self-attestation would be something along the lines of a speaker identifying himself as such while speaking. Bryson's definition of self-attestation (provided above) is just fine. On the other hand, I have mentioned <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/10/scripturalism-and-foundationalism.html">elsewhere</a> that I think self-authenticity means that the truth content of one's belief is the very justification one has for believing it. Self-authentication would be synonymous with self-justification.</div><div><br /></div><div>As such, these are distinct ideas. In my mind, then, equating <i>self-authenticity</i> with <i>self-attestation</i> would be to commit the same sort of conflation between <i>knowledge</i> (epistemology) and <i>defense</i> of knowledge (apologetics) I've seen elsewhere. Consider an analogy I've mentioned before:</div><div><p></p><blockquote>When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness). (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/11/discriminating-presuppositionalism.html">link</a>)</blockquote><p></p></div><div>To expand on this, a child is playing outside of his house. His mom calls him home for dinner. How does the child "know" to come home for dinner? Well, the epistemic starting point must be the mother's voice. </div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, the voice doesn't exist without the mother first existing, but that's a point of ontology. An ontological precondition for a situation in which a child is able to "know" to come home for dinner is distinct from what the child himself must take as his epistemic foundation for knowing to come home for dinner. Again, when a child hears his mother's voice, she doesn't need to say, "This is your mom speaking!" for the child to "know" and obey his need to come home.</div><p><i>A fortiori</i>, as sinners, we are playing outside of the safety and nourishment of God's house. When He calls his children home by His word - Scripture; the Bible - the recipients of His effectual call may - with <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_22.html">full assurance</a> - know, hear, follow His voice. They will do this even if the word they hear does not contain a reference to self-attestation ("Thus saith the Lord")! That being said, our God is gracious, and if we listen long enough, we find that He does give us behavior reinforcement and so forth by self-attesting as to the fact that it is He who is calling.</p><div>The epistemic justification we have for believing God's speech is true - the content of which are biblical propositions - is the very fact that His word is truth. There is no prior premise. There is no circular reasoning in which a proposition[al belief] somehow becomes justified <i>only after</i> one makes a circular argument. As I said before, we don't know Scripture because it is "self-attesting" - i.e. because Scripture says it was written by God. We know it because it is "self-authenticating" - i.e. the truth of God's word and nothing else is our epistemic justification for foundational belief in it. </div><div><br /></div><div>In short, I think self-authenticity is to epistemology as self-attestation is to apologetics. Neither "prove" the<i> </i>Bible is God's word. But self-authenticity (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2010/01/johannine-corpus-and-canon.html">John 10</a>) is the principle by which Christians are able to know<i> </i>what is indemonstrable, whereas self-attestation is one reason (among many) Christians can cite in defense of what they already know.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-73216211618389965962024-01-11T11:18:00.000-05:002024-01-11T11:18:36.624-05:00We Have HistoryI spent some time last year familiarizing myself with the historical background of the denomination of which I am a member, the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC). Among these include, in no particular order: <div></div><blockquote>- Articles from the early days of <a href="https://www.opc.org/guardian.html" style="font-style: italic;">The Presbyterian Guardian</a> </blockquote><blockquote><i>- </i>Articles from the current denominational magazines <a href="https://opc.org/nh.html?target=archive" style="font-style: italic;">New Horizons</a> and <i><a href="https://opc.org/os.html?target=archive">Ordained Servant</a></i></blockquote><blockquote><blockquote></blockquote><div>- <a href="https://opcgaminutes.org/">Minutes from the general assemblies of the OPC</a> </div></blockquote><blockquote>- <i>Pressing Toward the Mark </i>(Compilation of Essays by OPC churchmen, 50th denominational anniversary) </blockquote><blockquote><div>- <i>Confident of Better Things</i> (Compilation of Essays by OPC churchmen, </div>75th denominational anniversary)</blockquote><blockquote>- Gary North's <i><a href="https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/crossed_fingers.pdf">Crossed Fingers</a></i></blockquote><blockquote>- John Muether and Darryl Hart's <a href="https://opc.org/books/fighting/index.html" style="font-style: italic;">Fighting the Good Fight</a> </blockquote><blockquote>- John Muether and Darryl Hart's <i>Seeking a Better Country</i> </blockquote><blockquote>- Darryl Hart's <i>Between the Times</i> </blockquote><div><div>Those who know me well might be somewhat surprised at this, for my typical preferences tend towards writings that are more self-consciously "theological" or "philosophical."</div><div><br /></div><div>A prologue to the main point: no work of man is neutral. A work of history - which primarily consists of a record of past events - is as much dependent upon the historian's presuppositions as a work of theology or philosophy will depend upon the theologian's or philosopher's presuppositions. For example, an historian makes value-judgments such as what past events are worth recording, what is worth omitting, how to frame conflicting reports of or interpretations about an historical event he wants to record, etc. </div><div><br /></div><div>True, an historian may communicate truth as much as a theologian or philosopher. After all, Christianity is an historical religion, one which must and does rely upon the qualification of <i>divinely</i> revealed truths as a sufficient response to skeptics who might question the presuppositions of Moses, Paul, etc.</div><div><br /></div><div>Nevertheless, most authors in history have not been divinely inspired. My experience is that historians are less likely than theologians or philosophers to examine or state their own fundamental beliefs, methodological presuppositions, or motivations for their work, so I often find historical works to be more opaque than theological or philosophical works. Additionally, it is easier to compare purported theological and philosophical truths to a rule of faith (Scripture) than it is to ascertain the truth of an historical report. </div><div><br /></div><div>For example, it may take a little effort to discern that a Christology such as is ascribed to Nestorius is not compatible with Scripture, but such is manageable. On the other hand, <i>most contradictory historical reports</i> - such as whether Nestorius actually affirmed so-called "Nestorianism" - <i>seem to equally cohere with one's rule of faith</i>. Further, theological or philosophical works on "Nestorianism" would likely have more explicit dependence on [or, in heretical works, antagonism towards] Scripture than would be apparent in a primarily historical account of Nestorius.</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, if one's goal is to <i>know</i> (in the sense of having <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_22.html">full assurance</a>) any truths that are communicated, reading philosophical and theological works would seem to afford more opportunity for epistemic reflection. Theologians, philosophers, and historians may each communicate truth, but I find that the propositional <i><u><b>content</b></u></i> which is communicated through a theological or philosophical work may be <i>known</i> in a sense that that which is communicated through a strictly historical work typically cannot. </div><div><br /></div><div>To return to the above example, suppose Nestorius never actually affirmed Nestorianism. A theological treatise on Christology need not even provide an historically accurate report of that to aid one in understanding what is the problem with affirming that Christ is two persons. Christological truths such a treatise could communicate would be valuable regardless of whether the work simultaneously communicated historical truths regarding the person of Nestorius.</div><div><br /></div><div>If the reasoning thus far is legitimate, it begs a question: what profit is there in directing one's attention towards a field of study such as history, one whose primary content (propositions about the past) cannot usually be "known" in the sense of affording one full assurance (i.e. the content will not be strictly deducible from divine revelation)? While Christians may technically have the liberty to read such works, is there more that can be said in favor of reading works of history? </div><div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, reading a historical work might incidentally stimulate theological or philosophical reflection. Given the non-neutrality of man's works, it is not surprising to consider that an historian's own theological or philosophical beliefs would be implicitly present in their efforts to record past events. </div><div><br /></div><div>But a richer answer as to the favorability of reading historical works would be that <i>one cannot divorce Christianity from history</i>. Such an idea would be gnostic. The importance of this can be understood through the example that Christians have the responsibility of guarding the deposit entrusted to them (I Timothy 6:20). Guardianship entails contending for the faith (Jude 3) in response to heresies. Heresies don't arise <i>ex nihilo</i> but through heretics (Jude 4, 2 Peter 2:1), men who have lived and acted in time.</div><div><br /></div><div>While it is unclear that the "knowledge" Christians may have of heretics (e.g. Matthew 7:15-20) is the same sort of "knowledge" which we may have of God's own word - again, I would suggest only the latter is the sort of which one may have full assurance (which is not to diminish the importance of the former sort) - what is clear is that Christians have a responsibility to identify and reject heresy when they think they hear it. This is an apologetic task. One must be able to fend off attacks to one's own faith.</div><div><br /></div><div>As I've said in many other posts, apologetics depends on epistemology: a <i>defense</i> of one's knowledge depends on one's first <i>having</i> knowledge (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_84.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/06/scripturalism-and-plausibility.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/04/apologetics-and-epistemology.html">link</a>). We must know God's word to use God's word. If one doesn't know how to handle the sword of the Spirit, when it comes time to battle, he'll likely be cut down by his failure to make proper use of it. The wound one incurs might even be self-inflicted. This highlights the importance of reading theological and philosophical works, as such may help us more easily recognize what can be derived from Scripture with full assurance.</div><div><br /></div><div>At the same time, apologetics is an important discipline in its own right. Because we are called to have answers at the ready when asked questions of our faith (1 Peter 3:15), merely having knowledge is not designed to be an end in itself. Wisdom entails <i>application </i>of one's knowledge to circumstance. It is obviously important to <i>have</i> a sword for a battle, but we should not forget that the sword is <i>for</i> battle. It is unrealistic to expect that God would give us a sword but never call on us to unsheathe it. Having a sword does one no good in a battle if he fails to parry or block with it.</div><div><br /></div><div>Hence, to the extent that writings of <i>all</i> kinds - historical, theological, philosophical, etc. - pose and answer various questions which will either tend towards a defense or attack upon our faith, we have good reason to direct our attention to such writings. In fact, this principle expands to works of all kinds. Literature is just one example.</div><div><br /></div><div>To return to the case in point, the historian is an apologist. He provides ready answers to questions he thinks are significant enough to ask: "Who is ______?" "What is ______?" "How did ______ happen?" As has been emphasized, historian have presuppositions too. Thus, historians may turn out to be allies or enemies. </div><div><br /></div><div>This outlines my new interest in the works mentioned at the beginning of the post. Being a member of the OPC means it would be helpful to know the battle lines the OPC has drawn. And I believe that the aforementioned authors would tend to be my allies in most battles. However, to mix metaphors, one must also watch out for friendly fire. Historians are as susceptible to mistakes, biased framing, or incomplete information as theologians and philosophers (I have a few concrete cases in mind, but I'll return to those in a different post).</div><div><br /></div><div>For these reasons, from an apologetic standpoint, one is better served by prioritizing the reading of primary, source documents when such is feasible. Admittedly, this learning process takes longer than would reading a summary. Summaries are useful to the extent that the content summarized is uncontroversial. On the other hand, when it comes to events that have varying interpretations, primary sources will be more reliable communiqués. In the case of the OPC, such would include approved minutes of general, presbytery, or local church assemblies, committee reports that have been accepted by said assemblies, etc. </div><div><br /></div><div>One final point about history. It has been said that "history is written by the victors." Interestingly, we are seemingly approaching a point in time when this may no longer appear true (if it ever was). That is, peoples who lose battles - military or otherwise - are now in a position to record their perspectives of the past in ways which were not possible prior to the advent of the printing press, internet, etc. Can't losers write history after all?</div><div><br /></div><div>Now, whose historical records are <i>accepted</i> in the mainstream is a separate question. But even this question may not seem to be definitively answerable insofar as people who are "losers" at one point in history may become victors or be accepted by victors later on (and vice versa for people who are "victors").</div><div><br /></div><div>Gathering the strands together, we live in the middle of a long and ongoing battle. Those who live after us would seem to have the advantage of us. It is one thing to argue that Christians are called to read and convey history for apologetic purposes. It's another to wonder what confidence we can have that we will be remembered as we truly have been.</div><div><br /></div><div>By His omnipotent Word, God has preordained what will occur in time. Even if we have reason to expect persecution - e.g. misrepresentation, slander, exclusion - we have assurance that when the long battle is consummated, what we have worked in Christ will come to light (John 3:19-21). Even <i>during</i> this battle we are more than conquerors, for we are the very letters by which the eternal and unchangeable decree of God is writ in time (Romans 8:37, 2 Corinthians 3:1-3). In a quite literal sense, then, it is true that "history is written by the victor[s]" - we are the words of God (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/sound-theology-parallelisms-and-words.html">link</a>). If nothing else, meditation on this should give us some relief from our own, internal battles (Romans 7-8). Truth wins out in the end.</div></div></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-77800181195548897822023-12-31T22:40:00.003-05:002023-12-31T22:53:31.730-05:00Trinitarianism and PhilosophyI asked a recent acquaintance of mine who has an interest in Trinitarian metaphysics whether he had come across any contemporary philosophers who attempt to explain how the <i>three </i>members of the Trinity could have or share <i>one</i> numeric will. I was particularly seeking if any such authors also affirm that the three persons of the Trinity are distinguished by having self-consciousness.<div><br />My question mainly stemmed from pg. 83 of Clark's <i>Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine?</i> Clark writes, "Assent then is an act of will." Of course, Clark is talking about humans, but if Clark is right, and if there is an analogy (!) to be made here - as Clark himself felt free enough to do in discussing Trinitarian minds and thoughts - I wondered how or if contemporary philosophers address the question of whether three distinct persons who assent to three distinct thoughts ("I am the Father" vs. "I am the Son" vs. "I am the Spirit") might not (<i>ex hypothesi</i>) thereby have three distinct wills. </div><div><br /></div><div>There are assumptions laden in this question. Of course, if human relationships and the relationship amongst the members of the Trinity <i>are</i> analogous, questioning would then turn to what is <i>relevantly</i> disanalogous such that, say, the Trinity might have distinct thoughts without distinct wills. To merely say there <i>is</i> a difference between humans and the Trinity does no work towards explaining <i>what</i> the differences are - let alone <i>why</i> there are differences - when we expect or intuit otherwise.<br /><br />With these prefatory remarks out of the way, to my surprise, I was impressed that my acquaintance was quickly able to provide me with <a href="https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fplace.asburyseminary.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D2258%26context%3Dfaithandphilosophy%26fbclid%3DIwAR22MnOfmPv7QdvOf07OqHamFfxZ_cwDyaopolgAzQ6xgBvSx78zgQs-3sY&h=AT2mCv3VERuTxsmplJVjcNsrf8rIf7J32I0lNxWp1uIqkfXOJWE15icyOSj8UkXFdEqOFS0z-2k2YYcjWuJFg74cvOXUwwJps1MqAO4eu5TChydqVKs4UPfxfNPoQF7d92rQ&__tn__=R]-R&c[0]=AT1CUCeVNJwh4AO0ttZhQ1UXMPCQH_SZsfkF1WBym-ZXahnoS90jjXjejTC8gcj7o1uZKPkeSbrUDnmuqCYIDz7Iw0pHEqX8j5I7Dv_Tv-oXWAhL12GBds8Vb3SLS3m0wdTPRluKXtuBGSYeWMwnRZ8rApac8Zop4bnQBbY6trR4O6A2_xd5LL-ad2OgxKlIkEp7mEhmmtvWY7RZJVTfHHFq">this article</a> by Scott M. Williams entitled, "Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity." It was an interesting read, but I found it ultimately unsatisfying. From the article:</div><div><blockquote>If the agent is not the same person as the person referred to in the predicate, then the copula expresses essential numerical sameness without identity. (I am unaware of any creaturely analogue to this. It is the divine persons’ sharing numerically the same nature, numerically the same uses of a mental token, and omniscience, that render this a unique case.) For example, if the Father uses a mental token of “I am God the Father” and in so doing affirms a proposition, then the Father affirms that God the Father is identical to God the Father. <i>If <b><u>the Son uses the same mental token of “I am God the Father”</u></b> so as to affirm a proposition and never affirms something false (given omniscience), then relative to the Son, </i><u><b><i>the Son affirms the proposition</i></b></u><i> that </i><u><b><i>the Son is</i></b></u><i> essentially numerically </i><u><b><i>the</i></b></u><i> same <b><u>divine nature</u></b> as the Father without being identical to the Father.</i> (pg. 331)</blockquote>For starters, <i><u><b>I have never heard of a theologian who would argue that the Son might utter, "I am God the Father."</b></u></i> Now, I understand the author's idea, in context, is that the same token can entail affirmation of different propositions if said token is uttered in different contexts (e.g. by different persons). But unless I misread him, he distinguishes the divine nature from the divine persons by arguing the former is a constituent (i.e. part?) of the latter. </div><div><br /></div><div>If we assume he is correct, on what intelligible grounds could the Son's use of a mental token such as "I am God the Father" be in the sense of affirming a proposition such as "the Son is... the... divine nature"? On what intelligible grounds can the Father be considered <i>interchangeable</i> with what the author says is His <i>constituent </i>divine nature? Synecdoche? To put it mildly, would indeed be an "unique" understanding of the token in question as well as tokening in general, especially in the case of concretes (as the author argues the divine nature as well as divine persons are).</div><div><br /></div><div>I found his explanations of other tokens he thinks <i>all three</i> divine persons can affirm on pg. 332 (“The Son and I are sent, and the Father is not sent”) and pg. 337 (“I shall be one who becomes incarnate”) similarly unpersuasive. Metaphysically speaking, is it not strictly the case that <i>persons</i> are sent or become incarnate? Even if it were or is true that the <i>persons</i> who are sent or become incarnate are numerically united in terms of divinity, I don't see how the tokens he mentions can be stretched to accommodate the sort of meanings he attaches as possible, propositional renderings of said tokens. In short, it looks as if the author attempting to retrofit a theory of tokens to suit a theory of numerical unity but has some difficulty accounting for certain tokens. </div><div><br /></div><div>With these disagreements registered, to speak of the project the author undertook in more broad terms, I don't criticize him for his thoughtful effort toward the attempt to put forth a coherent Trinitarian theory. Early church fathers made use of the philosophical language of their day, and even the most "traditional" of Protestants seem inclined to agree that the very best of man-made creeds are subject to scrutiny and, at times, even revision (e.g. <a href="https://www.opc.org/documents/WCF_orig.html">link</a>). ["Man-made" is not meant pejoratively, by the way, as we all make confessions, prayers, hear or give sermons, etc. using words other than those found in Scripture.]</div><div><br /></div><div>I've also spoken positively of the role of speculation in apologetics elsewhere (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/02/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>). Of course, the secret things belong to the Lord our God (Deuteronomy 29:29). But we cannot default to shutting down difficult questions about faith, for some answers to difficult questions may by good and necessary consequence be deduced from Scripture (WCF 1.6). Further, even if theories to certain, difficult questions are underdetermined by Scriptural testimony, providing these as <i>possible</i> answers may hearten one's assurance, discourage confusion of Christianity with worldviews which are internally contradictory, etc. </div><div><br /></div><div>What can be personally challenging is that those who are philosophically inclined (such as myself) can, at times, be so enamored with a <i>possible</i> answer to a difficult question that we confuse it with a thoroughly, exegetically grounded one such as is described by the Westminster divines. This was the case with my tendency towards dogmatism on the monarchy of the Father in the early to middle 2010s, at least in the way I presented myself. Having a sense of coherence (a <i>possible</i> answer) is not the same as having truth (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/07/puzzling-on-trinity.html">link</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>I use myself as an example so that others exploring difficult questions - as one may - may tread with care so as not to stumble over their own pride as I did. For despite my criticisms of the above author, I do understand reasons why one might favor a "one <i>numeric</i> will" model even if it is difficult to explain, one reason being that will must be "located" in nature rather than hypostasis to avoid monotheletism. I've spoken more to that point <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/a-critical-evaluation-of-eastern.html">here</a> as I continue to try to think through this particular Trinitarian puzzle, although I won't act as if I've found the one and only piece that fits. Sometimes, wisdom simply dictates the need for silent meditation on God's word, patient prayer for grace and spiritual illumination, and respect for God's thrice holy name.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-18749308863123807872023-12-31T16:00:00.007-05:002024-01-04T12:16:41.519-05:00Monkey See, Monkey Don't<div class="xdj266r x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs" style="margin: 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div dir="auto">I recently talked to someone who observed that Eastern Orthodox apologists have, in the past decade or so, been more apt to try appropriating Reformed apologetics. I've witnessed the same tendency in the likes of Jay Dyer, Joshua Schooping (before he became <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Disillusioned-Eastern-Orthodox-Priesthood-Church-ebook/dp/B0B9B52WYG/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2C91YHLU06Y6F&keywords=disillusioned+joshua+schooping&qid=1704008668&sprefix=disillu%2Caps%2C80&sr=8-1">disillusioned</a> regarding Eastern Orthodoxy), and others I've happened across now and then.</div><div dir="auto"><br /></div><div dir="auto">Truth is attractive; hence, many of these Eastern Orthodox apologists once nominally identified as Reformed Christians. As for what reason those who identify as formerly Reformed fall away from the truth, I give some possible reasons <a href="https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/reformed-persons-going-eastern-orthodox.112217/#post-1347032">here</a>. Regardless, on one level, that such persons retain <i>some</i> truths they learned even after public deconversion is unsurprising. On another level, it is surprising that such apologists have not, by and large, critically self-reflected on whether a fundamentally Reformed apologetic can makes sense within the context of a non-Reformed faith. </div><div dir="auto"><br /></div><div dir="auto">For example, I was recently linked to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/45384040/An_Orthodox_Theory_of_Knowledge_The_Epistemological_and_Apologetic_Methods_of_the_Church_Fathers?fbclid=IwAR3kEBZFAMX9A5cD32L1R_Nz22lE_g6cmADPqPgUbphXXks8skjUxtDP9P8">this article</a> by an Eastern Orthodox philosopher name Erik Sorem. A glaring omission in it - and in Eastern Orthodox apologetics in general - is the connection between <i>apologetics</i> and <i>anthropology</i>. For the Reformed presuppositionalist, one practical purpose for apologetics may be to undermine the false confidence of unbelievers. However, the Reformed Christian acknowledges that man's sinful rebelliousness to God cannot solely be overcome by argumentation. Because of the extent of man's sinfulness, the Holy Spirit must graciously change the mind of the rebellious apart from the help of the rebellious. <i><u><b>There is no synergy in regeneration.</b></u></i></div><div class="xdj266r x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs" style="margin: 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word;"><br /></div>By comparison, the author of this article rightly denies the concept of epistemic neutrality but fails to situate the explanation for his denial within the context of a Reformed anthropology, particularly the doctrine of original sin. Thus, <i><u><b>the Eastern Orthodox</b></u></i> apologist may try to borrow from Reformed apologetics, but their <b><u><i>denial of the need for monergistic regeneration both understates man's sinfulness and thereby undercuts any nominal agreement that an "autonomous" epistemology will be false</i></u></b>. Gordon Clark didn't write about Eastern Orthodoxy very much, but here's one reference that brings with it a useful reminder:<div dir="auto"><blockquote>Eastern orthodoxy stresses the rational nature of man and insists that man remains man after the fall. So far, so good. But the value of this sound position is vitiated by <i><u><b>the Eastern churches' failure to recognize the extent of the fall and therefore their inability to see the full need of grace.</b></u></i> Some of their theologians toy with a verbally pleasing analogy: as God became man, so man will become God. This is similar to the Gnostic notion that salvation is deification. Partly because of this, some very conservative Protestants have reacted against the identification of the image as reason, believing that this identification implies a superficial view of sin. The implication, however, is fallacious and the reaction extreme. (<a href="https://www.etsjets.org/.../12/12-4/12-4-pp215-222_JETS.pdf">link</a>)</blockquote>Speaking of Clark, in my experience, most Eastern Orthodox apologists find their roots in other presuppositionalists such as Bahnsen, Frame, or Van Til (cf. Sorem's article above). Thus, some Eastern Orthodox apologists are unaware that grounding one's justification for belief in the Trinity in <i>Scripture</i> makes more sense than grounding one's justification for belief in Scripture in the <i>Trinity</i> (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/05/presuppositions-of-van-tils-tag.html?m=1&fbclid=IwAR2yzpXybJhQwMNFG-5QsyYWg9Ys_y9xbUy0ZnO6m6e_aEmwsN_g9L-6Lp0">link</a>; cf. my discussion of transcendental argumentation <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_16.html">here</a> and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-problem-of-criterion.html">here</a>). </div><div dir="auto"><br /></div><div dir="auto">Of course, there is no question that the Trinity ontologically precede the Scriptures, but I have never witnessed one who takes the Trinity as his <i>epistemic</i> foundation be able to deduce, say, the canon of Scripture. On the other hand, one who takes <i>Scripture</i> as his epistemic foundation may be able to deduce the doctrine of the Trinity. The upshot of this is that presuppositionalism is tied to the doctrines of sola scriptura, perspicuity, self-authenticity, etc. As with the anthropological objection, this epistemic foundations objection is fatal to Eastern Orthodox apologetics and the epistemology its apologists try to defend. </div><div dir="auto"><br /></div><div dir="auto">Such are the <i>general</i> problems with Eastern Orthodox persons who attempt to co-opt presuppositionalism. There are more particular problems I've observed, ones which stem from attempting to follow the Van Tilian brand of presuppositionalism (as all the Eastern Orthodox apologists I have in mind tend to do). </div></div><div><br /></div><div>For instance, I don't know to what extent Eastern Orthodox apologists are familiar with contemporary epistemology - in some cases, self-admittedly not (see Jay Dyer at minute mark 2:03:00 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTcFCYLZfEY">here</a>, for example) - but what I tend to read or hear basic mistakes such as what the meaning of classical foundationalism even is! </div><div><br /></div><div>Classical foundationalism is a theory regarding the structure of epistemic justification. In contrast to Sorem's apparent misunderstanding (in which he writes, "Presuppositional apologetics, first and foremost rejected... classical foundationalism"; see pg. 12ff of his article), foundationalism <i>as such</i> says nothing about whether such justificatory foundations are or must be "autonomous" or "theonomous." Sorem uses the guilt by association fallacy and/or genetic fallacy when he dismisses classical foundationalism seemingly for no other reason than that Aristotle accepted natural theology, that empiricism is flawed, etc. It is painfully apparent Sorem is unaware of theistic foundationalists such as Gordon Clark. </div><div><br /></div><div>Ironically, the sort of coherentism Sorem goes on to espouse (see footnote 28) itself <i>collapses into foundationalism</i>, as epistemologists such as Peter Klein have noted: </div><div><b><u><i></i></u></b><blockquote><b><u><i>The function of the type of reasoning we are considering is to enhance the epistemic status of our belief-states with their propositional contents, and circular reasoning cannot do that.</i></u></b> It might appear that some progress has been made when a reason for y, namely x, is offered, but when it turns out that the reason for x is nothing other than y, it is pyrrhic progress.<br /><br />The second, more plausible form of coherentism - emergent of holistic coherentism - holds that when our reasons have a reciprocal structure they are all at least prima facie justified. The epistemic status of all members of the coherent set is determined by the degree to which the propositions in the set are R-related plus, perhaps, some other properties obtaining. If x and y are members of the coherent set {x, y, ...} and xRy and yRx, it is not x that makes y justified and it is not y that makes x justified, rather what contributes to making each of them justified is that they are members of a coherent set. Being a member of such a set makes them prima facie justified, or, at least contributes significantly to each being prima facie justified (see BonJour 1989). I will not contest that in this paper. What is important to see here is that <b><u><i>emergent coherentism, as Ernest Sosa has shown, is a form of foundationalism</i></u></b> (Sosa, 1980). <b><i><u>The foundational property is being a member of a coherent set of propositions. This form of coherentism is just as much a foundationalist account</u></i></b> as, say, an account that takes all believed propositions which represent my conscious mental states as (at least) prima facie justified. Thus, any rapprochement with foundationalism is applicable to emergent coherentism as well." (Klein, <i>Ad Infinitum</i>, pgs. 110-111)</blockquote></div><div>Likewise, Jay Dyer also misunderstands this (see ~minute mark 1:43:00 in the aforementioned video). This is especially inexcusable in that <i><b><u>both Dyer and Sorem are aware of and have approvingly cited a paper that makes the same point Klein does above</u></b></i>! Both of the apologists recommend Russell Manion's "The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism," in which he writes:</div><div><blockquote>Circularity is also not satisfactory, but it is much more interesting. Advocates of a philosophical position
called coherentism think they have beaten the foundation dilemma. They point out that beliefs do not
neatly divide into the categories of foundational beliefs and justified beliefs. All our beliefs are related to
one another in the form of a coherent web. Some subset of our beliefs may be more important and juridical
than other beliefs, but all beliefs hang on all other beliefs, and nothing is foundational. </blockquote><blockquote><i><u><b>But as Michael Depaul in his article “Coherentism” points out, coherentism really doesn’t escape the
foundational problem at all. It is simply another “version of foundationalism that holds all beliefs to be
foundational.”</b></u></i> (<a href="https://www.patristicfaith.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/The_Contingency_of_Knowledge_and_Revelatory_Theism.pdf">link</a>)</blockquote></div><div>Further, Dyer and Sorem also miss the important difference between one's <i>having</i> noninferential knowledge and one's <i>defending</i> said knowledge (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_84.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/06/scripturalism-and-plausibility.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/04/apologetics-and-epistemology.html">link</a>). The structure of one's knowledge - assuming one has "knowledge" (and here I am speaking of "knowledge" about which one may have infallible assurance) - must be founded on divine revelation. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now, any <i>defense</i> of our knowledge will of course presuppose that we do indeed <i>have</i> knowledge, but this just means that our <i>defenses</i> or <i>articulations</i> of<i> </i>of our epistemology will ultimately derive from our said foundation, our belief in which is <i>intrinsically</i> justified and meaningful.</div><div><br /></div><div>So even if circularity appears in one's <i>apologetic</i> argumentation - as Clark might put it, axioms leads to certain theorems, and theorems can help inform whether an axiom has confirmatory evidence or is disconfirmed (e.g. <i>Clark and His Critics</i>, 2007, pg. 53) - it is nevertheless true that we can know the <i>epistemic</i> foundation of revelation without requiring an argument for it. As I suggested earlier, Eastern Orthodox confusion on these points may stem from that they generally follow <i>Van Tilian</i> presuppositionalism, apologists who have discussed epistemic justification in terms of coherence or circularity (e.g. <a href="https://davenantinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Without-Excuse-Sample.pdf">link</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>A side point: contemporary epistemologists such as Richard Fumerton also make use of what are called "conceptual regress arguments" (which are distinct from justificatory regress arguments) to illustrate that the <i>meaning</i> of terms must be intrinsic:</div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>Consider an analogy. One of the earliest distinctions made in ethics is the distinction between different ways in which something can be good. Some things, like taking blood-pressure medication, are good only as a <i>means</i> to something else that is good (perhaps health of the happiness that comes from being in good health). But, one might argue, it can't be the case the <i>everything</i> that is good is good only as <i>means</i> to something else that is good. While we can (partially) define being good <i>as a means </i>in terms of having good outcomes, we cannot <i>complete</i> our definition of goodness this way. To find, even in thought, the source of goodness, we need to form the thought of something that is good <i>in itself</i> (intrinsically good, good just in virtue of what it is).</div><div><br /></div><div>The suggestion here is that inferential justification stands to noninferential justification as being good as a means stands to being good in itself. (<i>Foundationalism</i>, Cambridge Elements in Epistemology, pg. 8)</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div>Now, Clark and I might nuance where meaning is to be found (e.g. propositions vs. concepts) - and Fumerton in particular might not quarrel with this - but in any case, anyone who has read Clark's book on <i>John Dewey</i> (1963) will recognize Clark's critique of Instrumentalism to be essentially the same as what Fumerton here states. Fumerton also gives the helpful example on the same page of the above work of what it means to be a "descendant": it is to be a child of some<i>one</i>, or a child of a child of some<i>one</i>,<i> </i>or a child of a child of a child of some<i>one</i>, etc. At some point, <i>the ancestor has to make an appearance</i> for it to be <i>meaningful</i> to call a person a "descendant." Recursion eventually bottoms out in foundations.</div><div><br /></div><div>I'll add to what Fumerton says against an implicitly infinitist view of meaning. When we ask someone to explain what they mean by something like "goodness," we tend to have the expectation that the<span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 11pt;"> </span>definiendum <i><u><b>won't</b></u></i> occur in any attempted definition. If I ask, "what is free <i>choice</i>?" and an Arminian responds, "the ability to <i>choose</i>" (which happened quite often when I used to dialogue with Arminians), I would have to point out that they are repeating what I am asking for them to define (the definiendum) in their attempted definition. That is, such an Arminian has not made any clearer what they mean by "free choice." Of course, I would not childishly ask them to define "free choice" <i>ad infinitum</i>, but the goal was, at some point, to consider a stated definition as symbolizing an intrinsically meaningful proposition... <i>and this is a strike against a circularist view of meaning</i> which, by analogy, helps argue a case for epistemic foundationalism over against epistemic coherentism.</div><div><br /></div><div>Finally, suppose an Eastern Orthodox apologist were to attempt to reformulate presuppositionalism to be more in line with Clark's view. If they're willing to copy one Reformed view, why not a better one? If one monkey sees another swinging like an Olympic gymnast from one branch of philosophy, he might think to try to graft that branch onto his own tree. Well, because philosophy is interconnected, the monkey's attempt to graft the good branch onto a rotten tree won't take. How much less successful the subsequent <i>mental</i> gymnastics will be as the monkey tries and fails to swing from that branch!</div><div><br /></div><div>That is, I've already outlined tensions regarding the anthropology and the doctrine of Scripture of Eastern orthodoxy and its presuppositionalist embezzelment. But an Eastern Orthodox apologist has further problems given their theology proper, some of which I've already outlined <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/08/a-critical-evaluation-of-eastern.html">here</a> and will continue to build a case against now. For instance, take a look at what Eastern Orthodox apologist Perry Robinson admits:</div><div><blockquote>For my part, I affirm rather that God is more than his revelation to put it in biblical terms. Contrary to the Reformed (and the Lutherans) and Rome, <i><u><b>metaphysics applies to everything except God ad intra</b></u></i>, which is why for them theology is a science and for us it is about the spiritual life in Christ. (<a href="https://greenbaggins.wordpress.com/2012/03/29/the-communication-of-attributes/?fbclid=IwAR2GIwK6Yxv_NZXGYwN2eht3GU--lLgQKoK6iirDakLfgLXedyyLjTbHTtI">link</a>)</blockquote></div><div>This is quite similar to what Eduard Borysov says in "The Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Pavel Florensky and John Meyendorff: A Critical Examination" (<i>Greek Orthodox Theological Review</i>, 2011):<br /></div><div><blockquote>Palamas's theology of energies, according to Meyendorff, has no philosophical rationale behind it. However, one should not forget that the philosophical notions of hypostasis, nature, and energies played a key role in the Christological controversies and had become the basic principles for Palamas's theology proper as well as his soteriology. <i><u><b>God is, by definition, unrelated to and above any essence, hence he is unknown by any essence.</b></u></i> (Gregory Palamas, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, § 3.2.24, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), 95)</blockquote></div><div>Borysov extends the logic of Robinson's statement: insofar as metaphysics and epistemology are intertwined, to say that there can be no divine metaphysics means there can be no knowledge of God. Now compare these statements to what Eastern Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky says:<br /></div><div><blockquote><b style="font-style: italic; text-decoration-line: underline;">All the Fathers of the Church</b>, both of East and of West, are agreed in <b><u><i>see</i></u></b>ing a certain co-ordination, a primordial <b style="font-style: italic; text-decoration-line: underline;">correspondence between the being of man and the being of God in the fact of the creation of man in the image and likeness of God</b>. (<i>The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church</i>, pg. 114)</blockquote></div><div>Robinson and Borysov's statements on metaphysics and epistemology logically extend to anthropology. If metaphysics don't apply to God such that He is unrelated to and above <i>mankind</i>, then there is no "correspondence," "image," or "likeness" of God in man. Considering the emphases Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to put on the early church fathers, it is almost as if the Eastern Orthodox position doesn't <i>cohere</i> at all! Now, where does this finally lead? Palamas says:</div><div><i><u><b></b></u></i><blockquote><i><u><b>...God is not only beyond knowledge, but also beyond unknowing; His revelation itself is also truly a mystery of a most divine and extraordinary kind, since the divine manifestations, even if symbolic, remain unknowable by reason of their transcendence.</b></u></i> They appear, in fact, according to a law which is not appropriate to either human or divine nature - being, as it were, for us yet beyond us - so that no name can properly describe them. (<i>The Triads</i>, pg. 32)</blockquote></div><div>Following the logic all the way down, the doctrine of Scripture (and divine revelation) is also destructed. The disharmony of Eastern Orthodoxy leads its apologists to defend they know not what. What one needs for a coherent worldview is not Neo-Orthodoxy or Eastern Orthodoxy but Scriptural orthodoxy:<br /></div><div></div><blockquote><div>In reaction against the optimistic modernism of the nineteenth century, contemporary <i><u><b>neo-orthodoxy</b></u></i> (q.v.) has insisted on the transcendence of God. But it <i><u><b>has distorted the biblical concept of transcendence to the degree of making God completely unknowable.</b></u></i> Some of their phraseology may be repeated as examples. God has been called the Wholly-Other. Brunner writes, “God can, when he wants to, speak his word even through false doctrine.” Another author denies that a proposition can have the same meaning for man as it does for God. Several theologians collaborated to say that “we dare not maintain that his (God’s) knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point.”<br /><br /></div><div>Now, it seems obvious that <i><u><b>if a man knows any truth at all, he must know a truth that God knows, for God knows all truths.</b></u></i> A sentence must mean to a man who knows its meaning precisely what it means to God; for if the man does not know God’s meaning, he does not know the meaning of the sentence. Hence, <i><u><b>if man is to know anything, it cannot be denied that there are points of coincidence between human and divine knowledge</b></u></i>. Similarly <i><u><b>God cannot be Wholly-Other, for this would deny that man was created in the image of God.</b></u></i> (<a href="https://gordonhclark.com/knowledge-by-gordon-h-clark/">link</a>)</div></blockquote><div>For those interested in further reading, I recommend Steve Hays's interactions with EO apologists; e.g. on the issue of divine transcendence, see <a href="https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/08/energetic-processions-of-quaternity.html?fbclid=IwAR2ICVV2osRLJbJE9cmY8hmbAxBWzsPDnvVy-rxyKt1o0kdHmudtmWhXIfo">here</a>.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-90414822978137066072023-12-12T10:39:00.002-05:002023-12-12T10:39:30.841-05:00Contemporary Thought on Gordon Clark<p>Since the start of this blog, I've reviewed many books which interact with the thought of Gordon Clark - in the past year or so, see <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_6.html">here</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/07/clark-van-til-and-som-extended-thoughts.html">here</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/06/gordon-clark-and-anthony-flood-part-2.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/03/gordon-clark-and-phil-fernandes.html">here</a>. Among contemporary authors, Doug Douma has probably invested more time into original, primary research on Clark's life than any other. Included in Doug's contributions to the field of Clark research include his <a href="https://www.trinitylectures.org/the-presbyterian-philosopher-the-authorized-biography-of-gordon-clark-p-215.html">biography of Clark's life</a>, <a href="https://www.trinitylectures.org/clark-and-his-correspondents-selected-letters-of-gordon-clark-p-216.html">transcriptions of Clark's correspondence</a>, and <a href="https://gordonhclark.com/writings-of-gordon-clark/">transcriptions of Clark's lesser known or available writings</a> (cf. <a href="https://www.douglasdouma.com/2017/01/01/introduction-to-theology-by-gordon-h-clark-introduction-and-table-of-contents/">link</a>). He has also been a kind correspondent, patiently answering various, abstruse questions of mine by email.</p><p>His latest book, <i><a href="https://www.trinitylectures.org/grand-old-doc-the-articles-on-the-thought-of-gordon-clark-p-236.html">The Grand Old Doc: Articles on the Thought of Gordon H. Clark</a></i>, is a compilation of articles and addresses. Excepting a comment here or there in his earlier books, several chapters express Doug's first publication which incorporates philosophical and theological evaluation. Other chapters still contain historical discoveries, research, and analyses for which Doug has been known.</p><p>I had read some of the chapters in this book before purchasing it (on Doug's blog or <a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/archive.php?s=1">TrinityFoundation</a> review archives) and even engaged one of them this past summer: "<span style="text-align: center;">Gordon Clark and the Philosophy of Occasionalism"</span> (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/06/did-gordon-clark-ever-espouse.html">link</a>). Regarding this chapter, I was hoping to see Doug follow-up on <a href="https://anthonygflood.com/2021/01/what-are-we-doing-when-were-reading-part-2-gordon-clarks-occasionalism-and-bernard-lonergans-accumulation-of-insights-converging-on-a-viewpoint/">a comment he made</a> to another author who has also discussed Clark and occasionalism. But as <i>The Grand Old Doc</i> may have been in the works for a while and as awareness of new material by and on Gordon Clark has rapidly expanded in the past 10 years, perhaps this was too much to hope for.</p><p>In any case, I'll plan to review various chapters in Doug's book in the future. There was much with which I found myself in agreement, areas which I might offer an alternative perspective, ideas I had not considered, and still others I wish were explored more. More than anything else, though, as someone who has also spent much time profiting from reading Clark's work, I appreciate Doug's effort and care to advance the thought of Clark <i>vis-a-vis</i> raising awareness regarding its depth, diversity, and potential for development, which has facilitated <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/04/600th-post-indulgent-look-back.html">my own efforts</a> to that same end.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-88670988493714502442023-12-05T10:34:00.002-05:002023-12-05T10:34:53.151-05:00What Can You Do?Barriers to belief in Christ or barriers to growth in sanctification can be dealt with in different ways. What can you do to help someone overcome those barriers? The question is somewhat difficult to answer because, as phrased, it is nebulous. It's vague and abstract. It's like asking, "would barriers to belief and sanctification exist without sin?" Well, of course not. On the other hand, is it especially helpful to raise that point and offer no further insight to a believer trying to counsel someone? Of course not. <div><br /></div><div>You wouldn't go to fellow believer for advice and say, "I'm having a problem in dealing with a family member. The problem is they're sinners." Getting advice is excellent and one of the first things a believer should do <i>in a concrete situation</i>. But then they should also <i>express the situation in concrete terms</i>. As such, the rest of this post won't feign to give comprehensive answers, because situations differ. There are many proximate causes of barriers to faith or good works. </div><div><br /></div><div>Apologists tend to think in terms of rationality and argumentation. This <i>may</i> be what is called for, but as I've said elsewhere, apologetics is a practical enterprise. It takes some skill and experience to have a sense for <i>what</i> is helpful for people and <i>when</i> it is helpful for them. Not every issue someone experiences is a nail that needs to be hammered. Not every situation in which you are trying to offer counsel requires a syllogistic argument. <div><div><br /></div><div>Some people are ready talkers. They raise issues when they realize they have issues - although in some cases, the issues they raise are more so symptoms of underlying issues they don't even realize they have. This is as true in relationships with others as it is with one's relationship to Christ. A fight with a spouse may be triggered by one event but have an underlying cause due to unresolved past events ("Do I trust him or her?"; "Does he or she care about me?"; "Do I have any worth?"). If someone is reaching out to you for assistance, listening is important (to nonverbals as well as verbals; <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/12/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">link</a>). </div><div><div><br />Other people are avoidant. They don't want to make the first step in reaching out for assistance. In such cases, probing questions may be useful. Have a target goal for your conversation. A goal can be as challenging as bringing up a difficult topic, like inviting an apathetic family member to church - "Hey, have you considered...?"; "I was just thinking, would you be interested in...?" - and then, without being pushy or harping on the issue every time you see them, letting them know every so often that you hope they will be blessed by and be a blessing for others. Or your target in a conversation can be as simple as disarming someone: showing vulnerability; not jumping them for having an area of disagreement; not caving to the pressures of a situation; not ignoring their questions; showing that you enjoyed talking to them; etc. </div><div><br /></div><div>Having goals may facilitate others being able to see you in a different light than they did before or view you differently than they view others - approachable yet truthful, honest yet tactful (cf. Colossians 4:6). Facilitating a relationship in this way is not manipulative, by the way. You're <i>supposed</i> to love others and want what is best for them. You're <i>supposed</i> to act Christ-like. You don't know who has been chosen by God to receive grace sufficient to convict them of sin, much less how He has ordained for this to take place in time.<br /></div></div></div></div><div><br /></div><div>Finally, there are some situations which require more forceful action. The above scenarios presuppose those with whom we interact are not <i>actively </i>antagonistic to the faith. But persecution - in contemporary America, this typically takes the form of religious ridicule - is unavoidable. There is not only one right course of action in these (and other) circumstances. Because apologetic engagement is practical, Christians often have some liberty in how they act - so long as it is in accordance with truth. In some contexts, this may mean removing yourself and those who are with you from a derisive situation. It is not a cowardly suppression of truth to protect others or yourself from aggressors or temptations (cf. destruction of Jerusalem; Joseph and Potiphar's wife; Christ Himself hid at times). In other contexts, your conscience may lead you to stand up for truth without even fearing death (cf. Stephen; Christ's crucifixion). However you respond: what's the goal? What's your hope? Consider these questions in subservience to God's word: having a conscious, godly goal you are aiming toward makes it easier to walk a godly path.</div><div><br /></div><div><div>As I said above, we should always keep in mind that we have no control over how others will respond to our engagement with them. And we can't forcibly change one's ethical orientation. Nevertheless, we can always do <i>something</i>. Calvinism is not fatalism, and what we <i>do</i> makes a difference. Thinking about or planning for different situations before they happen helps one to be prepared to actually follow through when it comes time to make good (whether proactive or responsive). The less we reflect, the more apt we may be to hesitate on how to rightly respond when particular opportunities arise for exemplifying particular fruits of the Spirit.</div><div><br /></div><div>Regardless of how others (or even we) respond, all things Christians experience have been ordained for a reason. The Spirit will use our experience to some end that is good for us, others, or both - even if, in the moment, we don't understand how. I tend to try to live with Romans 8:28 in the back of my mind, and it saves me from anxiety. In fact, my struggle is less with assurance (keeping the big picture in mind) and more with daily application (focusing on immediate needs). I tend to need to set conscious, proximate goals for myself or make little progress. My weakness may be another's strength and vice versa: each of us needs the support of others (Hebrews 10:24-25).</div></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-84168016242501464512023-12-02T02:31:00.004-05:002023-12-02T03:06:06.541-05:00Try THIS On For Size!<p>Having a worldview is like wearing pants: wearing a pair that fits keeps you from being exposed in front of others. Much of the apologetic of unbelievers - social activists in particular, although there is a trickle-down effect - is to use manipulative tempt-tactics to entice believers to drop their drawers. </p><p>On the one hand, to professing Christians who take a hard stance on the importance of truth, words like "tolerance," "empathy," "understanding," "social justice," etc. are weaponized, redefined so as to either force a capitulating compromise or - if one persists in defending and emphasizing the importance of truth - bad press. </p><p>[By the way, this can be just as true of so-called right-wing activists as left-wing activists. For example, right-wing activists may be just as disposed to use the above subterfuge when abolishing abortion or prosecuting those who facilitate abortion are live options on a legislative table. Hypocrisy may be found in every age. Why would people who <i>say</i> they oppose something turn around and intentionally <i>act</i> in a way which undermines their stated position? Well, people may have motivations ulterior to a defense of truth. </p><p>Ironically, if "social activism" is made an end in itself, then social activists can't have a terminus to their cause without also admitting a terminus to their own purpose or reason for being. This is as true on a global scale as it is on a national or local scale. But a worldview that purports to survive on conflict is, as Christ said, as a house divided: it cannot stand. Resolution, consummation, telos: God's will will be done.]</p><p>To Christians who understand the importance of a true worldview, they should know this. As much as one might try to suck in his or her gut and squeeze into a pair of Syncretic Slacks, they won't fit - and even if one might think they do, everyone else can see through them. With compromise off the table, bad press is the least of the persecution Christians ought to expect as they live out the Christological pattern of suffering before glory (cf. Romans 8, 1 Peter). </p><p>On the other hand, to professing Christians who are less educated or less self-conscious about the need for a Christian worldview and the dangers of straying from it, unbelieving activitsts are eager to market their causes as new, fresh, trending, adventurous, etc. "Aren't you curious? Do you really want to miss out on the 'experience' we have to offer? Try THIS on for size!" Such sycophants make nihilistic nudists appear honest by comparison.</p><p>This analogy is more fitting when one considers the biblical metaphor of playing the harlot. For whom or what are professing Christians willing to undress themselves before the Lord, exchanging the Christological covering He requires (Exodus 28:42-43) for a fling? Just so, broad-mindedness is not a virtue. The book of Proverbs contains no such adage as, "you'll never know unless you try." To evaluate a worldview, we only have to look at it to know it won't fit.</p><p>A professing Christian who does not dress themselves in heavenly attire will not be distinguishable from worldly society (Matthew 7:16ff.). We are blessed that God's word provides a tailor-made remedy to our naked condition. May we teach and clothe our children accordingly.</p>Colossians 2:8 See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ.Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-47150966586684920652023-11-29T23:52:00.008-05:002023-11-30T16:27:32.301-05:00Epistemic Contextualism, Internalism, and Externalism<div>A friend who recently read <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/05/scripturalism-occasionalism-and-kinds.html">this post</a> had a question about epistemic externalism. In that post, I ask the following question: "Can some beliefs we have be in some sense justified by virtue of having been caused a certain way...?" My friend, noting that causation is more immediately linked to metaphysics than to epistemology, expressed confusion about whether one who espouses epistemic externalism has conflated a metaphysical question with an epistemological one. For example, if we're asking about what justifies a belief, a common answer is that beliefs are justified in virtue of <i>reasons</i>. This is certainly different than the idea beliefs could be justified in virtue of being <i>caused</i> a certain way.</div><p>Epistemology is the study of
knowledge. Now, when we specify a subject of study - like knowledge - we are
specifying some <i>thing</i> that we think exists, is real, etc. Consider Gordon
Clark’s book, <i>A Christian View of Men and <b><u>Things</u></b></i>. Well, what is one of the “<i><b><u>Things</u></b></i>”
in his book about which he attempts to give a Christian View? Epistemology! Metaphysics and epistemology are related. You can’t have a “study of knowledge”
(epistemology) unless there <i>is</i> a thing such as “knowledge” to be studied
(metaphysics).</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A question Clark often asked was, “How do you know?” Clark
dealt a lot with comparing and contrasting theories by which people argue we
attain “knowledge.” Less often did Clark engage with the question of what
knowledge itself is. What <i>is</i> knowledge? <i>Note: this is a question of
metaphysics.</i> Of course, if we give an answer to the question “What is knowledge?”
we might further ask “How do you “know” that “knowledge” is what you claim?” <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">Similarly, ethics is the study of
moral principles, i.e. obligations to act in certain ways. A specific ethical
theory I accept is that men are obligated to obey God. In fact, I believe God <i>created</i> men with such an obligation. <i>Note:
creation is tied to causation and, therefore, metaphysics.</i> If the [created] nature
of man is such that he is obligated to obey God, I think this in turn shows
that ethics is rooted in ontology (which is a branch of metaphysics). </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">[Parenthetical: in fact,
I think God’s own nature obliges Himself to act in certain ways. For example,
God cannot lie. God cannot fail to love Himself. He cannot annihilate Himself.
In fact, these statements are even more absurd than statements like “5 equals 6.”
Being free from all external constraints and self-sufficient, God’s own actions
are rooted in His nature. Ironically, only in this way, I think, is one able to defend against theistic necessitarianism (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/04/reflections-on-contingentarianism-and.html">link</a>).]<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">Nature, knowledge, and moral principles: these are, of course, distinct, and we should not conflate them. But if we elevate the importance of any one or two of these to the exclusion of the
other[s], we will end up in serious error. If we slight the importance of metaphysics
or have a skewed view of the nature of reality, we might be tempted to denied the
correspondence theory of truth (like Clark), to understate the importance of
using our God-given talents in <i>this</i> world, etc. If we slight the importance of
epistemology or have a skewed view of knowledge, we might rationalize the ethical
destruction of others (like Hitler), find ourselves zealous but destroyed by
God for a lack of knowledge, etc. If we slight the importance of ethics or have
a skewed view of our moral obligations, despite our cries on the day of
judgment, the Lord Jesus will not recognize our fruitless selves. For more on the point that a Christian worldview is an integration of equally important considerations, see <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2012/08/knowledge-and-metaphysics.html">here</a>.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">Let’s return to a specific question: what is knowledge? Most
philosophers seem to agree that knowledge involves certain kinds of beliefs in propositional truths:
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">Example: if I understand a truth (like “Jesus is Lord”) but do
not believe it, then I don’t have knowledge of that truth.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Example: If I believe something that is not true (like “Jesus
is not Lord”), then I also don’t have knowledge of that proposition.</p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">Is “belief in truth” a sufficient
condition for “knowledge”? This is where the discussion gets tricky. For
example, who has the privilege or right to decide what “knowledge” can or does mean?
Even the question itself is vague. Are we talking about the <i>word</i> “knowledge” (what
we can physically write, speak, etc. - this would deal with the philosophy of
language) or a particular <i>concept</i> of “knowledge” (the subject of an immaterial
proposition - this would deal with epistemology)? And, of course, how do we
know whether our answers to these questions are true? </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">It would take me a long time to provide
a thorough answer to these questions, let alone justification for them. In fact, I have even skipped mention of associated questions like the “problem of the criterion.” I have defended my position on many of these questions elsewhere (e.g. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-problem-of-criterion.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/07/clark-van-til-and-som-extended-thoughts.html">link</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/06/gordon-clark-and-anthony-flood-part-2.html">link</a>), so I will simply summarize my views below to the extent I think they will help alleviate my friend's concern.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 182.3pt;">Physical words like “k-n-o-w-l-e-d-g-e”
are symbols. These symbols encode meaning. Clark seems to agree:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>…words are instruments or symbols for expressing thoughts.
The letters t, w, o or the Arabic numeral 2, are not
the number itself, they are the visual or audible symbols used to refer to the
intellectual concept. (<i>A Christian View of Men and Things</i>, pg. 211)</blockquote><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In one context, the use of a physical word (like
“knowledge”) might symbolize a particular thought. In another context, the use of a physical word (like “knowledge”) might symbolize another
thought. </p><p class="MsoNormal">[Parenthetical: an interesting point which could be raise is that no two
physical words or verbal expressions are exactly alike; for example, there are different
pixels and even atoms being used on your computer screen for every time I write
the word “knowledge.” But for the sake of space, I'll set aside this curiosity.] </p><p class="MsoNormal">The point is that what a physical word symbolizes will depend upon context. In fact, physical objects may even symbolize different meanings to different people<i> within the same setting</i>. A swastika will symbolize something quite different to Nazis than it will to Jews. Again, Clark seems to agree. More importantly, his agreement with this can be seen <i>regarding the very question of what “knowledge”
means</i>:</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>The various Scriptural usages of the verb <i>know</i> raise
a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote.
The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there
is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But
sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek <i>know</i> means believe, obey, choose, have
sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In
their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential,
emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the
intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This
contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so
used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the
apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended
meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is
irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or
defect is that these apologetes fail to explain <i>knowledge</i> in its
basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no
substitute for a basic epistemology.” (<i>The Pastoral Epistles</i>, pg. 166).</blockquote><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In my opinion, this is one of the most important yet
overlooked Clark quotes of which I am aware. It suggests that Clark could be
considered an epistemic contextualist:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote>…whether S knows something - that she has two hands, for instance - depends on the context of the person who is saying S knows it. If I, a philosopher, worried about brains in vats and Cartesian demons, say it, then S doesn’t know she has two hands… But if S, an ordinary person on the street, someone without the least tincture of philosophy, says she knows that she has two hands, what she says is true. She attributes knowledge to herself in an ordinary, practical, context, in which demons and handless-brains-in-vats are not relevant possibilities…</blockquote><blockquote><div> <br />So who, according to contextualism, is right? Am I, a philosopher, right when I (given my context) say that nobody knows they have hands. Or is S right? We are, I’m afraid, both right. And that is where my low opinion of contextualism comes from. (Fred Dretske, pg. 45, <i>Contemporary Debates in Epistemology</i>)</div></blockquote><div>
<p class="MsoNormal">While I agree with Dretske that as a standalone epistemic position, contextualism would not offer much in the way of clarity to important philosophical questions, the position does allow for nuanced, developed epistemic theories within the different contexts one has in mind. I'll return to this in a shortly.</p><p class="MsoNormal">When we talk about Scripture and sentences, we are talking
about “script,” i.e. physical writing. Yes, of course, Clark and I acknowledge
that “meaning is exemplified” or symbolized in such things, but the point is
that the subject under discussion in the above quote is about <i>the physical symbols
themselves</i> and that in God’s own inscripturated revelation to us, Clark admits
that the physical word “know” can encode different meanings (“believe, obey, choose, have
sexual intercourse”). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Clark refers to one of these meanings as “basic” for
intellectualism and epistemology. One can only glean so much from a footnote,
but taken together with his other writings, I believe Clark is saying that we
must accept a particular meaning of “knowledge” as a necessary precondition for
any other meaning of “knowledge” to be intelligible or defensible to us. I
outline what I think Clark particularly believed is the “basic” meaning of “knowledge” below, and if I am correct, I agree with Clark:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>To summarize, to "knowledge" is about truth.
Truth is the set of coherent or consistent propositions. When one reflects upon
a true proposition, believes it, has either deduced it from an axiom or
believes it axiomatically, and the axiom [and/or deduction] is infallibly
justified, he can be certain (in an epistemic, not merely a psychological,
sense) that what he believes is truth. (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">link</a>)</blockquote><o:p></o:p><p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Here is where I finally get around to answering my friend's question. His question is on the right track <i>if</i> we were to say that
externalism is sufficient as a “basic” definition for knowledge. I have argued
in many places that <i>epistemic externalism fails to provide us with a full
assurance of our beliefs</i>. For a Christian, this should be seen as problematic. See
<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_22.html">here</a>, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_23.html">here</a>, and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2019/11/gordon-clark-and-necessity-of.html">here</a>. At the same time, remember that Clark admitted and Scripture
indicates that the physical word “knowledge” may symbolize different meanings in
different contexts. </p><p class="MsoNormal">This brings me to <i>meta</i>-epistemology, a discipline which questions the assumptions and commitments of epistemology (<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaepistemology/">link</a>). When
we think about what “knowledge” means, we might also consider what questions or
concerns a particular meaning of “knowledge” would satisfy. For example, Paul encourages
believers to reach for <i>full assurance</i> of understanding and <i>knowledge</i> (Colossians 2:2-3; see the links in the previous paragraph for a fuller discussion). Thus, if we accept what Paul says as true, we ought to have a definition
and theory of “knowledge” that aims for that end. An externalist epistemology
cannot accomplish <i>that</i> “basic” end.<i> Full assurance can only be had if we are
infallibly aware of our epistemic justification, and this is a variety of
epistemic internalism.</i></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">[Important tangent: most internalists would acknowledge that
we don’t always “show” our justification in the sense of an infinite chain of reasons or proofs. For example, a consistent Scripturalist wouldn't attempt to “show” the epistemic justification for his belief in God’s word. For him, God’s word is a axiomatic, not founded on a prior reason. It isn’t provable - so he can’t “show” his justification to anyone else in that sense. Yet unlike an externalist, he can still reflect on or be aware of the justification he has for his belief in it. He can be conscious of God’s word as self-authenticating: God’s
word is true, and its own truth suffices for the justification of one's belief in
it.]<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On the other hand, I think Mark 6:38, 13:28, 15:44-45, etc.
(again, see the two links a few paragraphs ago) encode a <i>different</i> meaning of “knowledge” due to their <i>differing</i> contexts - ones that
don't require full assurance. In <i>these</i> contexts, an externalist epistemology
has potential to provide us with a definition and theory of “knowledge” that
aims for a <i>different</i> end than full assurance. Of course, the aim of an externalist epistemology has <i>some</i> overlap with the aim of an internalist epistemology: both would involve “justified” true beliefs, i.e. something more than a lucky,
true opinion. Guessing the lottery numbers does not count as knowledge.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Epistemic “justification” is a way of talking about how we non-arbitrarily or non-luckily “track” truth. Epistemic contextualism allows space for there to be different ways in which this is explained. One context - epistemic internalism - affords a definition and theory of “knowledge”
which allows for the <i>conscious</i> tracking of truth. That is why an epistemic internalism
(like Clark’s, at least broadly considered) is capable of aiming for full
assurance. </p><p class="MsoNormal">By contrast, another context - epistemic externalism - affords a definition and theory of “knowledge” which allows for the <i>unconscious</i> tracking of truth. As such, we cannot be fully assured regarding a given [dispositional] belief we have which was either unconsciously formed or relies on the presence of factors about which we cannot be conscious. On the other hand, that doesn't mean the aims of epistemic externalism are useless:</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>Externalism is the theory that we can, to varying degrees
and depending on the justificatory factors involved, know or be epistemically
justified in our beliefs due to something to which we don't have cognitive or
reflective access - say, a causal process. We can think about or reflect on a
causal process, but we can't re-experience it, whereas we can periodically
access or experience the same beliefs. A causal process might be considered
able to epistemically justify us because that process in general produces true
beliefs in the mind of the person who undergoes it. The causal process tracks
truth, whether we are aware of it or not.<br />
<br />
That kind of "epistemic justification" allows for the possibility of
our knowing what are generally considered "common sense" beliefs. I'm
typing on my computer, you're reading a blog post, etc. The causal process by
which we know these propositions is usually physical media. But the chain of
causes which produce a belief need not be evidentiary reasons for my belief.
For example, while God is the ultimate cause of all things, not all people's
beliefs will be reasoned from or evidenced by a belief they may have - or, more
pertinent to this example, may lack - about God. Similarly, while I may have a
sense experience which causes a belief in divine revelation, I needn't infer my
belief in divine revelation from a belief about my senses. So if, after a
causal process consisting of the examination of textual variants, you believe
something to have been divinely revealed, that doesn't require you to
epistemically ground your belief regarding the content of divine revelation on
a belief about that causal process. Again, I would argue a belief about that or
any causal process is itself infallibly defensible only by ultimately appealing
to special divine revelation.<br />
<br />
That doesn't mean the causal process is irrelevant to your belief. If we have a
belief that certain causal processes track truth better than others, it makes
sense to position ourselves and those around us to more often experience the
better kinds of causal process. If I want you to know about the Grand Canyon, I
may talk to you about it or show you a picture of it, but I wouldn't shut your
eyes or close your ears while I did those things. I think sense experiences
often cause true beliefs. If I want you to know a truth, and if I believe there
is a kind of experience which may be useful in producing a true belief, I'll do
what I can to help you experience that.<br />
<br />
I believe the above illustration provides a fair analogy of how I think we can
regard at least one goal of textual criticism. There are textual variants among
what copies of Scripture we have. Some do not affect the meaning of a passage.
Some are evidently the result of mistranslation. Some are more significant in
implication - the variants may affect the meaning of a passage, or they may
exhibit disagreement with other texts about whether a passage is even
canonical. Thus, while I think the goal of the textual critic shouldn't be to
collect texts, compare and contrast them, and use that as an evidentiary basis
to infer or reason to what has been specially divinely revealed, there
certainly would be use in disposing ourselves and others to a causal process
which tracks truth about what has been specially divinely revealed and codified
in physical media - in this case, texts. So one function of textual criticism
could lie in its capability to cause externalist knowledge of special divine
revelation. In any case, there is certainly some apologetic role textual
criticism may play within one's worldview, so long as it is remembered that
apologetics is subservient to and in fact derives from one's epistemology... (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2016/10/textual-criticism-revisited.html">link</a>)</blockquote><p>In short, the aim of an internalist theory of knowledge is to explain how we may have “justification” in terms of full assurance. An externalist theory of knowledge cannot explain how one may have “justification” in terms of full assurance - but as long as we don’t need “justification” in terms of full assurance for everyday, unconsciously formed beliefs such as “I'm reading a blog post,” that’s okay. </p><p>The aim of an externalist theory of knowledge is to explain how it is possible that everyday, unconsciously formed beliefs such as “I'm reading a blog post” can be the result of a truth-tracking process and, in that context, count as legitimately “justified.” An internalist theory of knowledge (at least of the infallibilist variety) cannot explain how it is possible that everyday, unconsciously formed beliefs such as “I'm reading a blog post” can be the result of a truth-tracking process and, in that context, count as legitimately “justified” - but as long as we don't need “justification” in such terms for beliefs about which we can have full assurance, that's okay.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Now, the only way we could <i>unconsciously</i> track truth is by nature; if something happens unconsciously, it happens involuntarily (e.g. breathing). As you’ve read this post, you've perhaps been caused to form a [dispositional] belief that “I'm reading a blog post,” a belief that is formed apart from a syllogistic process of reasoning. This happens many times throughout the day. We don't always reason from premises to conclusions, because we don't always form beliefs by tracing them back to axioms or foundations. We often form [dispositional] beliefs without even being aware of it. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Analogous to the way in which God created us with an obligation to obey him, God may also have created Adam - as morally upright and very good - with a tendency to track truth (even unconsciously). Just as a correct theory of ethical obligation is rooted in a correct ontology, a correct theory of how our beliefs may be causally formed is rooted in a correct ontology. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Thus, in this context, metaphysics may inform an <i>externalist </i>theory of knowledge without conflating the two. After all, by definition, knowledge involves beliefs (a metaphysical truth). So <i>if</i> we allow that what enables us to track truth is something external to us, then as I mention above in the context of textual criticism, it might be helpful to learn what kinds of actions seem to cause belief in truth. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>Of course, while Adam remained ethically obligated to God after the fall, Adam's (and our) capacity to track truth has been hindered by our sinfulness. Ultimately, this inhibition can only be overcome by the (external!) movement of the Spirit to indwell us. </o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>Nevertheless, even unbelievers have the ability to track true beliefs </o:p>(e.g. Mark 15:44-45), even if they cannot have conscious, internalist, infallible justification for them. Since the Spirit works in the hearts of unbelievers by means of Christians He has already indwelt, it is still incumbent upon us to think about what we can do to work in the lives of unbelievers to lead them to the truth. Romans 10:14-17 is a prime example of this.</p></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-41976262953430105292023-11-19T02:08:00.007-05:002023-11-19T02:11:05.546-05:00Discriminating Presuppositionalism<p>A few days ago, a friend asked me for my thoughts on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGty9nX9_8U&list=PLzjQv4A03oinfVNA9PtYn39lcDrcIZBn8&index=2">this video</a>. </p><p>At the outset, the author, David Pallmann, asks, </p><p></p><blockquote>Just what is <b><u><i>presuppositional apologetics</i></u></b>? It <b><u><i>is a
school of apologetics which tries to show that Christianity is true via a
transcendental argument</i></u></b> (minute 1).</blockquote><p></p><p>Now, this is quite a narrow view of presuppositionalism, especially in light of my own criticisms (as a presuppositionalist) of other presuppositionalists who thought transcendental argumentation could conceivably enable one to reason to God (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/05/presuppositions-of-van-tils-tag.html">link</a>). His classification of versions of presuppositionalism which might differ from that of Greg Bahnsen as "deviant" (minute 8) is rather restrictive. If nothing else, I hope this post illustrates that one ought to discriminate the varieties of presuppositionalist perspectives. </p><p>Mine bears an affinity with that of Gordon Clark and does not attempt to "show"
(prove?) that Christianity is true via argumentation. Any arguments Clark might
have made function as a defense of Christianity; but the arguments are not meant to
function as "proofs," as if God's word (Clark's foundation or axiom) could have somehow been
the conclusion to a (circular?) argument. </p><p>Many flawed criticisms of Clark by
fellow believers rest on a conflation between apologetics and epistemology. See
my distinction between the two <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_84.html">here</a>. In short, apologetics or arguments presuppose
epistemology or knowledge [of the most basic premise]. The two must be kept
distinct. Apologetics is subordinate to epistemology. </p><p>Another mistake is to
think Clark was a traditional coherentist. Even people who
claim to follow Clark's view sometimes make this mistake. He was a
foundationalist. See point 5 <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2016/11/michael-butler-on-gordon-clark.html">here</a>. A reason people make this mistake is because Clark accepted a coherence theory
of truth; while I disagree with Clark on this, the point is that a coherence
theory of truth (i.e. a definition of truth) is different than coherentism in
epistemology (i.e. how we come to know the truth). See <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">here</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At minute mark 5, David says: </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>In this video, I want to explore a
response that has been periodically hinted at in the literature but is never,
to my knowledge, been fully developed. I intend to defend the thesis that <b><u><i>human
reasoning is autonomous</i></u></b>.</blockquote><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Given that his final quote in the video is from a chapter on autonomous human reason in a book written as a challenge to presuppositionalism (free on Kindle Unlimited <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Without-Excuse-Scripture-Presuppositional-Apologetics-ebook/dp/B08LMRC4GL/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">here</a>, by the way), I found this quote confusing. Does he think that his video or channel fully develops a thesis Joe Depoe does not?</p><p class="MsoNormal">Regarding the idea of autonomous human reason, in 1943, Clark anticipated the idea that this might be a problem for presuppositionalists in an article he wrote for <i>The Presbyterian
Guardian </i>(<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/02/gordon-clark-how-firm-foundation.html">link</a>). Clark says: </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot
abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making
the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides.
Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not
he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the
decision. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose
from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of
the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion.
That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes
reason as the final court.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can
make without denying the principle of authority? </p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">The first observation is that
the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final
authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only
two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is
not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of
appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final
court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a
yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision,
but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of
being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to
being bound by an external authority. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">Since all analogies have their limits, a
second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a
throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has
never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man
is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne,
and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely
irrelevant. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The
liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among
other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the
truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the
common ground of reason. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p class="MsoNormal">This very plausible argument is obtained only by
misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict
supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately.
The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from
combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of
persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if
persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency
can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground
between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a, world naturalistically
conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view
that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation.
Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian
reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit.
The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it
and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit
regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of
what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a
common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe.</p></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal"></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Around minute 10, David says: </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>By assumptions and presuppositions, I
mean beliefs that are taken to be true apart from independent non-circular
justification. In other words, <i><b><u>I reject the idea that there are any beliefs
that must be accepted without a justifying reason</u></b></i>. </blockquote><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">I found this confusing too, since David elsewhere claims to be a foundationalist. The above quote appears to be a
form of infinitism (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/10/contemporary-epistemology-infinitism.html https://www.scribd.com/document/470052688/Infinitism">link</a>), not foundationalism. Unless
I am misunderstanding him, his statement is not consistent with the rest of his
video. </p><p class="MsoNormal">At minute 12:20, David cites Timothy and Lydia McGrew: </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>...to claim that there can be genuine
epistemic principles that although rationally dubitable cannot be defended
against someone who is skeptical about them is to allow an indefensible
proposition to have epistemic weight. </blockquote><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">I had to read my own copy of that book for some context. The context is this: "Regardless of whether... a proposition is true, if it really is indefensible, it cannot be used as a premise to justify belief in anything else. If it is indefensible, it is epistemically irrelevant" (<i>Internalism and Epistemology</i>, pg. 80).</p><p class="MsoNormal">The question seems
to be whether indefensible propositions can have epistemic weight (positive
epistemic status). David blows by this question very quickly - too
quickly (at this point) to allow for the nuance necessary to address the
question. </p><p class="MsoNormal">For instance, let's start with this: do axioms/foundations have
positive epistemic weight? Well, a foundationalist had better say that in
certain cases (i.e. God's word), "Yes, we can know axioms without having to defend them." There is positive epistemic weight regardless of whether
we attempt to defend them. If God's word is our axiom and we can't know our
axiom, then we are in trouble (this position is known as positism; <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/02/contemporary-epistemology-positism.html">link</a>). </p><p class="MsoNormal">Now, does the above mean that it is impossible to defend axioms/foundations? In
one sense, yes; in another no. The epistemic justification of an
axiom/foundation is not determined by a prior reason, premise, etc. For a
foundationalist - as was alluded to above - the positive epistemic status must
be intrinsic to the truth of the axiom/foundation itself. I interact with
contemporary epistemologists on this very point <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/10/scripturalism-and-foundationalism.html">here</a> and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/12/strong-access-internalism-synthesis-and.html">here</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal">On the other hand, it is possible to "apologetically" defend one's
axiom/foundation. What does this mean? It means that in everyday conversations
with others, one can point out that his axiom/foundation coheres with that which is
derivable from it, that it answers important questions, etc. It is in this
sense that we can understand Clark's affirmation that: "by the systems
they produce, axioms must be judged." </p><p class="MsoNormal">A self-defeating axiom cannot be
defended (or known), whereas a self-consistent axiom can be defended insofar as
the claims of its adherent can be harmonious, although we should not say we
<i>know</i> said axiom by means of this or any other such defense. </p><p class="MsoNormal">In other words, I
agree with his denial around minute 13 of any attempt to circularly justify a
knowledge-claim. I (and Clark) reject traditional coherentism, since it would
be impossible to discriminate between circles without a foundational principle
(like John Frame's foundational principle about the different between
"narrow" and "broad" circles at minute 14; how could Frame
say one is better than the other without assuming axiomatically that there is a
difference in desirability?). </p><p class="MsoNormal">As an aside, it's a bit funny that if Van
Tilians defend traditional coherentism, then Clark's presuppositionalism is
somehow "deviant." One would think that the
very name of "presupposition"alism would more closely associate with
foundationalism, not coherentism. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Anyways, the point is that apologetic
defenses of axioms/foundations are practical and persuasive, not epistemic. I
put it this way in a post I have elsewhere said (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/07/clark-van-til-and-som-extended-thoughts.html">link</a>) I am planning to write in response to an article by Dan Kemp (<a href="https://davenantinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Without-Excuse-Sample.pdf">link</a>), whom David cites at minute 14:40:</p><p class="MsoNormal">When a
mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the
child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such
self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t
be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation
might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from
questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic
purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).</p><p class="MsoNormal">Apologetics or
defenses of our axioms can be useful in terms of being means by which the Spirit
convicts the hearts of others without thereby becoming premises or reasons by
which we somehow circularly know the axioms/foundations. Indeed, our methods
for apologetic defenses ought themselves to be derivable from our
axiom/foundation (e.g. 1 Peter 3, Acts 17, etc.). </p><p class="MsoNormal">One final point. A phrase
that David cites which caught my eye is "rationally dubitable." If David is
talking about principles that are open to rational doubt and whether these can
be defended in the face of a skeptic, he seems to suggest that if the answer is
no, there is a problem. But if I am understanding him correctly, I don't see
the problem? If something is "open to doubt" (dubitable), of course
it is possible a skeptic is going to doubt it. In fact, some skeptics will even
claim to doubt even those things which are indubitable, such as the revelation
or promises of God. Just because we can't prove to the skeptic that God's word
is God's word (or would David claim to be able to do this?) does
not mean there is a problem - nor does it mean that our axiom/foundation is
"rationally dubitable" after all. On this point, the problem with the
skeptic is <i>ethical</i>. He refuses to submit to the self-justifying truth of God's
word. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Maybe I am misunderstanding what David means by a "defense" - or maybe I am misunderstanding something else But
this is why it is important to provide some nuance to statements and quotes
of other authors. Instead, David skips quickly to the claim that he sees no other
way forward than to vindicate deduction and induction. That is much too fast a
conclusion. If it isn't a non sequitur, then at the very least, I couldn't
follow his reasoning. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At around 18:30, David distinguishes between "self-justifying" beliefs and "immediately justified" beliefs. He thinks the former implies justificatory circularity (traditional coherentism) and the latter implies foundationalism. I disagree with his definitions, and so do contemporary
epistemologists - see <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/search?q=fantl">here</a>, where Jeremy Fantl refers to "self-justifying" reasons or beliefs in the context of foundationalism. But to
be clear, I also reject justificatory circularity. </p><p class="MsoNormal">I've read Fumerton's work. I
actually quite like him. I gave a former student his introductory book on epistemology. At the same time, I don't agree with
everything Fumerton says (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/12/strong-access-internalism-synthesis-and.html">link</a>). And I suspect that the idea of "direct acquaintance" (which David gets from Fumerton) might be another area of disagreement. He says: </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><blockquote>Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and
truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so... Direct
acquaintance is not itself a belief but it relates a subject to a fact in such
a way that the subject is aware of the correspondence between his thought and
the fact that makes it true. </blockquote><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Notice what is being argued: justification
for beliefs depends on "acquaintance." But "acquaintance"
is not itself a belief. Well, if "acquaintance" is not a belief, can
"acquaintance" be a truth-bearer? If it can't, then how is it that
"acquaintance" can "ensure" the justification of beliefs?
Can that which does not bear a truth-value function as a justification for that
which does? </p><p class="MsoNormal">In other words, what does it even mean to say that direct
acquaintance can "ensure" justification? That sounds suspiciously
like saying that acquaintance is itself a logically distinct and preceding
justificatory condition for one's belief(s) - a reason. But this would
undermine the David's claim to be a foundationalist. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Relatedly, a topic in contemporary epistemology is how something without that is neither true nor false - say, a sensory experience <i>qua</i> experience - could function as a justification for the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]. This seems to be a directly
relevant question, for David goes on to say: "...one can be
immediately justified through direct <i><u><b>perceptual</b></u></i> awareness..." </p><p class="MsoNormal">Notice the
word "perceptual" (and see his headache example at minute 21 and his
direct reference to sensation at 21:30). Recall every Clarkian argument
against empirical knowledge (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2011/04/philosophy-of-gordon-clark.html">link</a>). He even admits that one's sensations may not
correspond to external states of affairs (but attempts to suggest that our
beliefs regarding our private experiences are not open to question - this move doesn't work insofar as David later admits to holding to fallibilism, contrary to his above statement that direct acquaintance can ensure "infallible" justification, on which see below). </p><p class="MsoNormal">In short, his reply to possible objections at minute 22 is dismissive
and avoidant. He responds to an easy objection while failing to address more difficult ones (how is "direct acquaintance" able to function as
justification). This is a meta-epistemic concern, but meta-epistemology has
direct relevance to normative epistemology. Analogously, infinitism is a
meta-epistemic position on the structure of epistemic justification. If
infinitism is inherently problematic, an infinitist does not actually know
anything by the structure he claims is correct. If "direct acquaintance" is
inherently problematic, a direct acquantaincist does not actually know anything
by "direct acquaintance" (so-called).</p><p class="MsoNormal">This gets a
little deep, but here is another question David fails to entertain: while I agree
that there is a correspondence between truths and other realities - I reject
the idea that everything is metaphysically reducible to [sets of] propositions
- does that mean non-propositional realities (like my body) are truth-makers
(like propositions about my body)? </p><p class="MsoNormal">As a Reformed Christian, I rather think that
God is the truth-maker of all propositions. In particular, it is He who
determined the truth-values of contingent propositions in accordance with His
eternal decree. As such, it's possible that the truths God has eternally
decreed may, in some way, actually be means by which non-propositions (like my
body, which is not eternal) are made. For a probably clearer idea of what I'm
getting at, read <a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=68">this article</a> by Clark in which he writes: "when
compared with verses in the Pentateuch the words strongly suggest that the
visible world came from a suprasensible, ideal world."</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Moving ahead to minute 26: "Knowledge does not require certainty."
Three questions: </p><p class="MsoNormal">1) Is David certain of this? If not, wouldn't such an
admission be problematic in the possible case that certainty actually is
required for one's beliefs to count as knowledge (a possibility which I don't
understand how he could rule out non-arbitrarily)? </p><p class="MsoNormal">2) I thought that David earlier said, "Direct acquaintance with correspondence between
truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly
so..." What happened? When is and is not infallibility applicable to one's
beliefs? </p><p class="MsoNormal">3) If knowledge does not require certainty, then what does it mean to say that any beliefs
are "justified"? </p><p class="MsoNormal">Around 30:30, David shows the three potential responses to Aristotle's transcendental argument for the laws of logic. They are ones I've encountered and thought about before. In response, I will offer
three counters: </p><p class="MsoNormal">1. David basically says that "Aristotle might be
right that one must think in accordance with the laws of logic, but that this
doesn't establish anything is true." In response, two questions: 1) What
is the David's alethiology (theory of truth)? Perhaps one's alethiology
(which might entail consistency amongst true propositions) would entail that in
accordance with said theory, the laws of logic cannot be false. He somewhat
gets around to this at minute 37. 2) If David acknowledges that one
cannot speak without first assuming the laws of logic, then <i>his own response</i> admittedly presupposes the laws of logic. But in that case, is it
legitimate to <i>use</i> that which he might purport to <i>reject</i>? Is it legitimate to admit that a hilltop (truth) can only be reached by climbing a
ladder (the laws of logic) and then from said hilltop deny that he ever used a ladder? Ironically, in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZqgV8IK0ag&list=PLzjQv4A03oinfVNA9PtYn39lcDrcIZBn8&index=3">another video</a> David makes against presuppositionalists, he cites a "magic 8-ball" illustration that it seems he himself falls prey to here. </p><p class="MsoNormal">2. David's response to Aristotle certainly
isn't a persuasive response. But that's how I interpret a correctly oriented
defense of the laws of logic in the first place: again, a defense or apologetic needn't be interpreted as a circular justification. </p><p class="MsoNormal">3. David's reference to
dialetheism returns us to the question of alethiology. This is probably the
strongest counter he raises (then again, he addresses his own concerns by providing a very good quote at 38:55 which undercuts dialetheim). I needn't say much more, since David denies dialetheism himself (44:45ff.).</p><p class="MsoNormal">Nevertheless, I will offer a few more thoughts. In
particular, are there some cases in which the law of noncontradiction do not
hold? Typically, a dialetheist will not be a trivialist; he will not
suggest that every pair of contradictories can be or are true (which is subject
to the principle of explosion). </p><p class="MsoNormal">Underlying this theory, then, seems the
assumption of alethic particularism: rather than start with a broad, theory of
truth (e.g. consistency among propositions which may correspond to kinds of
realities), we might start with what we consider are intuitive and particular
examples of truths - some of which might consist of contradictories which can
both be "true" - and attempt to form a resultant theory of truth
(such as dialetheism) with these examples in mind. </p><p class="MsoNormal">While I would like to flesh
an argument against dialetheism further than I am able at present, given the above,
one possible line of argument against it and its implicit alethic particularism
could perhaps be made along the same lines as I have made against epistemic
particularism (in isolation from epistemic methodism) <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/02/the-problem-of-criterion.html">here</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal">This is probably a more important point than I can emphasize here, for
repeatedly in the video, David often uses paradigm cases to defend his position. For example, at minute 36:10, he uses an particular example that he assumes his audience will
agree is justified to defend a broader methodological principle. That is, in
appealing to his audience's intuitions, he appears to be a
particularist, and if he is not, he does not sufficiently distance himself from
particularism; a quote around minute 52 might obliquely allude to it, but even
there, not enough context in the quote is provided to even understand its
purpose. </p><p class="MsoNormal">With the above in mind, can logic justify logic? No. Again, circularity is
not the structure of epistemic justification. In other words, we do not know
anything by reasoning in a circle. As I've mentioned before, though, we can
still make arguments for propositions we know non-inferentially or
foundationally. These arguments do not <i>justify</i> said foundations but can
function to persuade others [especially that alternatives to our view are
non-viable]. </p><p class="MsoNormal">The laws of logic in particular are embedded within the
Scripturalist's foundation as a subsidiary, ontological precondition for
knowledge, as I argue <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/02/necessary-and-sufficient-conditions-for.html">here</a> and <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/07/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_16.html">here</a>. Thus, our knowing them is, in
conjunction with our knowledge of God's revelation, immediate or non-inferential. </p><p class="MsoNormal">I don't have much further to say about his discussion on analyticity, except to
note that he doesn't think he needs to explain how we have them "so long
as we do" (minute 26:30). Well, does he have concepts? If the answer is
<i>potentially</i> "no," that is a serious problem. </p><p class="MsoNormal">But as I said in an
earlier post, God's word is not rationally dubitable. The problem the skeptic
has is one of <i>ethical</i> rebellion (which affects his ability to reason soundly,
not his ability to reason validly <i>per se</i> a la Clark). </p><p class="MsoNormal">David's part of the video on
induction was extremely weak. He did not address the question of what number of
observable cases would suffice for epistemic justification. He does not address
what constitutes a "large sample." The concept of "large"
is finite and therefore relative. As one might approach infinitely many
observations, any concrete number of observations is infinitesimally small by
comparison... in which case, is not an inductivist's epistemic justification
(and "confidence" therein) virtually (as well as really)
non-existent? This is a much more difficult issue than David intimates. </p><p class="MsoNormal">In my opinion, the best one can expect on this topic is doxastic defendability.
A Scripturalist (and only a Scripturalist, insofar as any kind of "defenses" are
parasitic upon internalist and infallibilist "knowledge") might be able to defend his extra-Scriptural beliefs
to the extent that they conform to his alleged experiences (this would be
inductive), but he must also be open to revising such beliefs in the case of
alleged defeaters, e.g. experiences which do not conform to what he has experienced
previously. This theory only would apply to extra-Scriptural information, and
it would not qualify as strict epistemic justification (although we might also colloquially refer to any such beliefs as "known"). </p><p class="MsoNormal">Another reason
the response to the problem of induction was weak was because David only
went so far as to address Hume's skepticism. Clark's concerns regarding
induction - as an anti-empiricist - deserved more attention than Hume's. </p><p class="MsoNormal">My friend mentioned that he thought David is an evidentialist. In his last part of the video, I can see why: he says as much. In particular, at 1:00:50, he cites an author who says, "<i><u><b>the
epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the
believer's evidence for the belief</b></u></i>." Again, I am confused how such a view
can be consistent with foundationalism. If foundations do not rely on evidence,
then one's justification for one's foundational beliefs cannot fall within the
realm of an evidentialist theory. David appears plainly inconsistent on
several points. </p><p class="MsoNormal">David concludes, "...the Christian [presuppositional] apologist tries to
gerrymander the rules of epistemology..." </p><p class="MsoNormal">I had a
good chuckle at this! Still, I enjoyed the video insofar as I'm glad to see professed Christians engaging in contemporary epistemological issues. I agreed with him regarding
foundationalism, the resolvability of paradoxes, and some other points. I
wouldn't want my above responses to be taken as suggesting his videos are
valueless, only that, as with anyone (Clark and myself included), one must
wisely apply discrimination where appropriate.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-58054106612588627662023-10-01T02:28:00.000-04:002023-10-01T02:28:07.030-04:00Gary North on Gordon Clark<p>A fellow church member recently loaned me a copy of <i><a href="https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/crossed_fingers.pdf">Crossed Fingers</a></i>, by Gary North. This is the first book by North that I have read, and I can't recall a history book that I found more enjoyable than this one. It chronicles how the PCUSA declined into liberalism. Originally written in 1996, it outlines questions and considerations still relevant to contemporary Presbyterians and contemporary Presbyterianism. Any further recommendation would be admittedly generic, for I don't intend to review the 1,000+ page book here. I do recommend it, though. It is not faultless - for a balanced review, see <a href="https://chalcedon.edu/resources/articles/crossed-fingers-a-review-of-gary-norths-history-of-the-liberal-conquest-of-the-northern-presbyterian-church">here</a> - but it is engaging, thoughtful, and challenging. </p><p>At the time he wrote this book, North seems to have espoused Van Til and Rushdoony (North's father-in-law) as the foremost Presbyterian apologists of the twentieth century. A few comments in the book pertained to Gordon Clark, and I can't resist a thought or two on them:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>In 1955, a book was published with the
title, <i>What Presbyterians Believe</i>. I can think of no book with a more
misleading title, given its date of publication. It was a study of the
Westminster Confession of Faith (1647). It was written by a Calvinist
minister, theologian, and philosopher, Gordon H. Clark. Clark was a
member of the United Presbyterian Church of North America, which
three years later would merge with the far larger mainline denomination, the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
(PCUSA), at which time Clark left the denomination. The United
Presbyterian Church in 1955 was drifting into liberalism. It had been
dabbling with liberalism for a quarter of a century. It had initiated
discussions on a possible merger with the larger denomination in
1930, but then had voted not to follow through after the PCUSA
voted for the plan in 1934. It was obvious in 1930 that the PCUSA's
liberals had brought the conservatives under control. Nevertheless,
from 1948 to 1958, Clark subordinated himself to the jurisdiction of
men who did not believe in Calvinism, and who proved it in 1958
when they voted to join the PCUSA. Had Clark been more honest in selecting a title for his book, he would have called it <i>What a Handful
of Presbyterians Believe</i>, or <i>What Presbyterian Officers Swear They Believe, But Rarely Do</i>, or even <i>What Presbyterians Believe in the Small
Denomination I Abandoned as Hopeless in 1948 When I Joined This
One</i>. But he didn't. Instead, he pretended in public that he was not a
minority voice, that he was not under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of
Presbyterians who did not believe. In this, he was not alone. </p><p>Today, there are millions of confessionally faithful but ecclesiastically compromised Church members and thousands of compromised
pastors who are in a condition similar to Clark's in 1955. (pgs. xv-xvi)</p></blockquote><p></p><p>This is over the top. Given that the UPCNA (of which Clark became a member after his departure from the OPC in 1948) did not vote to merge with the PCUSA in 1934, I would have liked for North to expand upon his reasons for stating that the men of the UPCNA "did not believe in Calvinism" during the time Clark was a member. I gather North means the UPCNA was drifting towards liberalism in an inevitable manner; otherwise, a merger never would have occurred. Even if this assumption were true, North seems to further assume Clark was aware of such when he joined the UPCNA. But hindsight is easier than foresight. </p><p>Additionally, would North have considered Machen an "ecclesiastically compromised Church member" while Machen remained a member of the PCUSA until the mid-1930s, long after the PCUSA "had been dabbling with liberalism for a quarter of a century" (at the very least, according to North)? Did not Machen subordinate himself "to the jurisdiction of men who did not believe in Calvinism"? Would North say that Machen "pretended in public that he was not a minority voice"? If asked these questions, North may very well have acknowledged Machen was susceptible to these analogous criticisms. For example, North does not spare criticism of Machen for the latter's rejection of 6 day creationism. </p><p>The point, though, is that North's framing is selective. The book provides plenty of context and understanding for Machen's actions; in the above quote, no qualifying context is spared for Clark. No mention is given as to why Clark left the OPC in the first place (e.g. chapter 8 of <a href="https://www.trinitylectures.org/the-presbyterian-philosopher-the-authorized-biography-of-gordon-clark-p-215.html">Doug Douma's bibliography</a>; cf. <a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%2000238%20239CanOPCBeSaved.pdf">John Robbins' account</a> that Clark "would have preferred to stay in the OPC"). No suggestion is given as to why Clark might have chosen the UPCNA (e.g. the UPCNA was the denomination in which Clark's grandfather ministered).</p><p>Is it more misleading for a Presbyterian minister in the UPCNA which had rejected a merger with the PCUSA to write a book about <i>What Presbyterians Believe</i>? (Clark) or more misleading for a Christian who accepted liberalist presuppositions in an increasingly liberal PCUSA denomination to write a book on <i>Christianity and Liberalism</i> (Machen)? This is less a shot at Machen and more a shot through North's slight of Clark.</p><p>In fact, North was a Presbyterian himself. It is my understanding is that he died last year as a member of the PCA - the same denomination which Clark opposed an RPCES merger with in the early 1980s (<a href="https://gordonhclark.com/the-proposal-to-abolish-the-rpces-by-gordon-h-clark/">link</a>). Was Clark less scrupulous than North... or more? In this book, North never asked - let alone answered - whether he considered <i>himself</i> a "compromised Church member." From North's concluding proposals (pgs. 931-935), it is hard to imagine he thought any Christian - including himself - could have been a consistent, Bible-believing Christian without being "ecclesiastically compromised." Whose fingers <i>aren't</i> crossed? </p><p>[Funnily enough, while I haven't read anything else by North, I would not put it past him to have intended to provoke this question. An evident purpose of this book is to prompt Presbyterians to self-reflect on the current state of ecclesiastic affairs, including Presbyterian governmental structure, membership qualifications, confessional progress (with fidelity), and priorities. With respect to these questions, I take no issue with North raising them. Several of his proposed answers seem sensible, albeit distantly achievable in the short-term. All I am pointing out is North's assessment of Clark's actions is unreasonably cursory and uncharitable.]</p><p>The following is the only other time Clark is mentioned in North's book:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>Schaeffer took Van Til's apologetic method, which Van Til had
taught him at Westminster, and the philosophy of Gordon Clark,
which was a common-ground rationalistic system, and reworked them
into a partially presuppositional, partially Clarkian-logical hybrid.
Never did he footnote Van Til in any of his books. For that matter,
neither did he footnote Clark. When asked in 1968, "Where did your
husband get all this?" Mrs. Schaeffer offered a long, rambling disquisition about his discussions with "existentialists, logical positivists, Hindus, Buddhists, liberal Protestants, liberal Roman Catholics, Reformed
Jews and atheistic Jews, Muslims, members of occult cults, and people
of a wide variety of religions and philosophies, as well as atheists of a
variety of types." This went on for two pages. </p><p>The hybrid nature of his apologetic method made it difficult for
him to come to grips with the idea of the common ground between
believer and unbeliever. Van Til argued that the common ground or
point of contact is the image of God in man. Covenant-breaking man
knows that he is a covenant-breaker. Clark argued that it is common logic: the principle of non-contradiction. Schaeffer was more Clarkian
than Vantillian. This made him more susceptible to the idea that
Christians might have a positive influence on non-Christians even
though Christians must remain as minority participants. Somehow,
Christians can argue their way into the dialog. Van Til, as an amillennialist, had no illusions in this regard. He expected increasing persecution for the Church as each side becomes increasingly consistent with
its presuppositions. This is certainly more consistent with Schaeffer's
premillennial belief that the Great Tribulation lies ahead of us, and
the Church will go through it. Historic premillennialists generally
share this eschatological belief with amillennialists.</p></blockquote><p>Firstly, I might as well point out that Clark himself did not think Schaeffer even qualified as a philosopher, much less one whose thought aligned with Clark's own:<br /></p><blockquote>These notes, however, are only a semi-defense of Francis Schaeffer. <i><b><u>If I were criticizing him, I should first say that he is not a philosopher at all.</u></b><b><u> To be sure, he discusses certain philosophical problems, but he omits so much that he does not deserve the title.</u></b></i> In fact, I rather guess that he admits that he is not a philosopher. His great work lies in other fields, particularly the field of evangelism. And there are others who discuss more of philosophy than he does and still omit a great deal. It is not enough to state that the doctrine of the Trinity solve the one-many problem. One must state what the problem is and show just how the Trinity solves it. It is not enough to assert the trustworthiness of sensory experience in an attempt to avoid skepticism. One must define sensation, prove that there are uninterpreted elements in the mind, show how these can be combined into perceptions, and then develop concepts without assuming, what is factually false, that all men have sensory images. Besides which, one much choose from among Plato's, Aristotle's, and Kant's theories of individuation, or produce a further alternative. Schaeffer is not the only one who omits these essential elements in a philosophy. (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/07/gordon-clark-semi-defense-of-francis.html">link</a>)</blockquote><p>Secondly, Clark did emphasize "that the common ground or point of contact is the image of God in man." In chapter 4 of <i><a href="https://archive.org/details/karlbarthstheolo0000clar/page/n7/mode/2up">Karl Barth's Theological Method</a> </i>("Prolegomena and Apologetics"), Clark spends 17 pages on the following subsections: "Common Ground" and "God's Image to Man." Any writer who fails to see that Clark linked the common ground a believer has with an unbeliever to the image of God indicates they have not read Clark:<br /></p><p></p><blockquote><p>It is indubitable that the heathen and the believer have this knowledge in common.</p><p>Although indubitable, Barth doubts and denies it. In addition to the passages so far examined, others, perhaps not independently important, corroborate Barth’s rejection of a common ground. Since the idea of the image of God is uniformly conjoined with that of a common ground, the latter vanishes with the removal of the former...</p><p>The point of interest is a common ground between believer and unbeliever. In spite of his aim Barth has not succeeded in erasing a common ground; at most his argument denies that the image consists of rational personality and asserts that it consists in being a witness.</p><p>...Barth rules out a common ground by denying the image of God in man... (pgs. 105-107 in above link)</p></blockquote><p>Regarding Van Til, North says, "Van Til argued that the common ground or point of contact is the image of God in man. Covenant-breaking man knows that he is a covenant-breaker. Clark argued that it is common logic: the principle of non-contradiction. Schaeffer was more Clarkian than Vantillian." North obviously intends to contrast Clark and Van Til. </p><p>But how can an unbelieving man "know" that he is a covenant-breaker without using the principle of non-contradiction (even if he is unaware that he is using it)? Did North think that the knowledge that a covenant-breaker possesses is possible or intelligible without the principle of non-contradiction? </p><p>Of course, anyone who has read Clark would also know that to argue an unbeliever is able to exercise logic does not mean the unbeliever does so <i>soundly</i>. Even if the reasoning of unbelievers can be valid (and it can be) and even if unbelievers can have meaningful, true thoughts (and they can - this is one sense in which unbelievers can be said to have "knowledge"), unbelievers ultimately reason from false premises. Whatever knowledge unbelievers possess, their reasoning is unsound, all of which enables believers to have an apologetic point of contact with unbelievers. As I address all of these points <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/01/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">here</a>, I digress.</p><p>Finally, for all of North's footnotes throughout the rest of his book, his section on Schaeffer, Van Til, and Clark was a let down. He does not give a citation for Van Til's belief that "Covenant-breaking man knows that he is a covenant-breaker." On the other hand, Clark did give citations for Van Til's statement that "<i><u><b>It will be quite impossible then to find a common area of knowledge between believers and unbelievers unless there is agreement between them as to the nature of man himself. But there is no such agreement</b></u></i>" (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/01/gordon-clark-apologetics-contemporary.html">link</a>). Contra North, is this not to say that Van Til believed that covenant-breaking man <i>cannot</i> know anything regarding himself? I </p><p>Nearly 10 years ago, I advocated the following (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-future-of-scripturalism-revisited.html">link</a>):</p><blockquote>My opinion: if Scripturalism is to have a bright future, Scripturalists need to start talking to and about people with opposing views that fall between the extremes of materialistic, empiricistic, skeptical atheism on the one hand, and Van Tilianism on the other. More often than not, that doesn't seem to be the case. In addition to explicating Scripturalism beyond the introductory level of, say, Crampton's Scripturalism of Gordon H. Clark - again, there's nothing wrong with introductory material, but at some point a position has to adapt to new challenges or be abandoned - that's a lot of uncovered ground.</blockquote><p>I do still believe this. However, my research on Clark has required me to spend more time on church history and less time on philosophical theology. As this has been the case, over time, I have become more sympathetic with those who are constantly irritated by poor misrepresentation of Clark's thought. Such misrepresentation is pervasive; North is just one example of an educated writer who should have known better than to make there kinds of ill-informed critiques. </p><p>Nevertheless, I hope like-minded readers remember that there is much good in North's book and much in need of improvement in Clark's thought. One Christian's admiration of another ought to be measured in proportion to the latter's agreement with Scripture. Let us not catch ourselves crossing our fingers as we affirm that in this life, all Christians - Clark's included - were and are progressively sanctified.</p><p></p><p></p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-38525778096536925162023-07-14T15:14:00.000-04:002023-07-14T15:14:03.812-04:00Gordon Clark: Ancient Philosophy (A History of Philosophy)<div>In 1941, Gordon Clark wrote part one of a three part book called <i>A History of Philosophy</i>, published by F. S. Crofts and Company. Clark's contribution, the first part of the book, was on ancient philosophy. One may read the entirety of a searchable version of the book and Clark's contribution to it <a href="https://archive.org/details/historyofphiloso0000seym/page/6/mode/2up">here</a>. Below, I've transcribed the introduction to his contribution, one which is missing in the 1997 TrinityFoundation republication, <i>Ancient Philosophy</i>:</div><blockquote>Part One <br /><br />Ancient Philosophy <br /><br />600 B.C.- A.D. 500<br /><br />Introduction<br /><br />Philosophy originated in the ancient world among the Greek people. Unquestionably they were far superior to other ancient races in those intellectual traits which philosophical reflection presupposes—curiosity, free imagination, freshness of outlook upon life, intellectual ambition, and broad and comprehensive vision. After two centuries of remarkable development, their philosophy reached its highest points in the fourth century. And long after the states of Greece had lost their political independence—first to the Macedonian empire and later to the empire of Rome—Greek philosophical “wisdom” dominated the thought of the Mediterranean world. Ancient philosophy becomes, therefore, almost synonymous with Greek philosophy. <br /><br />Plato (427-347 B.C.) is the earliest Greek philosopher whose extensive writings have been preserved down to our own day in anything even approximating their entirety. But Plato’s thought was shaped and informed by a philosophical tradition which reached back two centuries. From these pre-Platonic centuries very scant literary records remain. More or less extensive quotations from the earlier philosophers have been preserved by later writers. The interpretation of these fragments will probably always remain uncertain in many details. But from these fragments, together with the second-hand accounts given of their authors by writers of a later age, critical scholarship can reconstruct with a fair degree of accuracy, it seems, the main outlines of philosophical history during those two centuries of original and important speculation, the fifth and sixth centuries. <br /><br />In approaching the study of Greek philosophy, one needs to bear in mind two facts: (1) that the ancient Greek world was not restricted geographically to the Greek peninsula proper, and (2) that ancient Greece never became a nation, in the proper sense of that term. Politically the Greeks never united into a single state; Greece consisted of numerous politically independent and autonomous city-states: Thebes, Sparta, Corinth, Elis, Athens, and others. A great common danger, like the Persian invasion in the early fifth century, might draw them together into concerted action for a time; but characteristically they were more often engaged in endless dissensions and warfare among themselves. The unity of the ancient Greek world was not, then, political, but rather racial and cultural: common language, common religion, and common traditions. In the sixth century B.C. Greece extended far beyond the Greek peninsula; it included to the westward the island of Sicily and a considerable part of southern Italy, and to the eastward the numerous islands of the Aegean and a broad strip of the coast of Asia Minor. It was in these outlying parts of Greece, where in the earlier times culture was furthest advanced, that Greek philosophy was born.</blockquote>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-51762381275593496532023-07-12T04:37:00.001-04:002023-07-12T14:40:12.179-04:00Clark, Van Til, and Some Extended Thoughts on a Footnote (Without Excuse)<p>Some time ago, my friends and I had a podcast. One of the books we had intended to review was <i>Without Excuse</i>, a compilation of essays which are "quite critical of the philosophy of Cornelius Van Til" (pg. viii.). I had been looking forward to this review before my friends and I decided that our time was better spent on other activities. While this is not to say we won't do podcasts ever again, it does mean that I might as well post what I had planned to discuss, particularly from my perspective as a presuppositionalist who has been more influenced by the work of Gordon Clark than Van Til. </p><p>Generally, <i>Without Excuse</i> suffers from the lack of an index. Likewise unfortunate is that Clark appears to be mentioned in just two chapters - the first and the eleventh - and scantly at that. In a book whose subtitle is "Scripture, Reason, and Presuppositional Apologetics," I consider this a glaring oversight. </p><p>I'll discuss the first chapter in a separate post. <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">The eleventh chapter, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">written by </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;">John R. Gilhooly,</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;"> is entitled,</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 16px;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">"Van Til's Transcendental Argument and Its Antecedents." </span>Clark is <span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">mentioned once in a footnote</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt;">. Normally, I would not pass comment on something so apparently trivial, but the footnote puzzled me. Further investigation has led to some reflections I felt were worthwhile to post. The footnote reads:</span></p><p></p><blockquote>It seems one of the biggest complaints against Van Til (particularly with reference to the transcendental argument) is that he does not clearly state what it is. For example, Gordon Clark, "Apologetics," in <i>Contemporary Evangelical Thought</i>, ed. Carl F. H. Henry, 140, or Norman Geisler, <i>Christian Apologetics</i> (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), 58; both suggest what ghe is calling a transcendental argument is really fideism.</blockquote><p>Gilhooly's edition must be different than mine, as page 140 of my hardback (which has no edition remarks) doesn't mention anything like this. In fact, I've transcribed Clark's entire article on "Apologetics" (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/01/gordon-clark-apologetics-contemporary.html">link</a>), and although Clark does criticize Van Til in it, he never explicitly mentions a transcendental argument or fideism. </p><p>Possibly, Gilhooly thought Clark alludes to these things. For example, after quoting Van Til as saying, "The argument for the existence of God... is objectively valid," Clark does rhetorically question "how an argument can be known to be objectively valid and absolutely sound, when the argument has never been formulated." Maybe this is where Gilhooly thought Clark criticizes Van Til for failing to "clearly state" what the transcendental argument is. If this is not what Gilhooly had in mind, I don't know what else in the article Gilhooly could be referring to.</p><p>If this is what Gilhooly had in mind, though, the context of this apologetic interlocution takes place under subsection III on "The Cosmological Argument." The following ruminations of Clark have little to do with a transcendental argument (pgs. 148-149):</p><blockquote>Strange as it may seem, and it will seem still stranger as we proceed, Van Til also asserts "the Reformed apologist maintains that there is an absolutely valid argument for the existence of God" (p. 121). Van Til, of course, is less Aristotelian than Hamilton. If the Van Til does not start from sensory experience, he ought to state his basic premises and give the argument step by step. <i><u><b>He seems to suggest that the premises have something to do with the doctrines of creation and providence</b></u></i>, and "when the proofs are thus formulated they have absolute probative force" (p. 196). Here one must ask whether it is valid to argue from creation to the existence of God, or whether the notion of creation does not already presuppose the existence of God? Has not Van Til interchanged premises and conclusion? However, though the phrase "probative force" suggests valid demonstration, Van Til immediately disclaims the pure deduction of one conclusion after another from an original premise. Instead of syllogisms he prefers a method of analogy, to which reference will be made later. Finally he repeats "The argument for the existence of God... is objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be absolutely stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound" (p. 256).</blockquote><blockquote><i><u><b>One pauses to ask only how an argument can be known to be objectively valid and absolutely sound, when the argument has never been formulated</b></u></i>. Could we judge the Pythagorean theorem, if it were defectively stated? The Roman Catholics appeal to Romans 1:20 as guaranteeing the validity of <i><u><b>the cosmological argument</b></u></i>. Similarly, Dr. Buswell in The Bible Today (Oct., 1947, p. 6) writes, "The so-called <i><u><b>cosmological argument</b></u></i> is precisely the teaching of Paul in Romans 1:20." But surely Paul did not mean precisely to confer infallibility on Thomas Aquinas. Still less did he confer formal validity on the sketchy summaries of other writers. And to avoid all confusion, it should be noted that any assertion to the effect that Romans 1:20 is <i><u><b>the cosmological argument</b></u></i> is false. The verse has neither premises nor conclusion; it contains no hint of an implication; it is a simple statement, and simple statements are not arguments and can be neither valid nor invalid. Beyond this, <i><u><b>there is no point in talking about a perfect argument that no one has ever correctly formulated</b></u></i>.</blockquote><p>Another reason I find the footnote puzzling is that upon an initial scan of Clark's article, the nearest reference to fideism seems to implicate Warren Young, not Van Til (pg. 151):</p><p></p><blockquote><p>Although many popular preachers use the unscriptural antithesis of head verses heart, <b><u><i>anti-intellectualism is still a minority view among evangelicals</i></u></b>. Carl Henry writes on "The Reasonableness of Christianity" in Remaking the Modern Mind: "Revelational theism has never offered itself as an escape from rationality... it offered a rationally consistent view of existence" (pp. 213, 215), and he clearly expresses his displeasure with anti-intellectualism. Carnell commences his "Preface" by accepting the task of constructing a rational explanation for the whole course of reality; he emphasizes systematic consistency (though he believes that consistency is insufficient and must be supported by coherence - a different concept, though many other writers use the two terms as synonymous), and he even dares to accept the term rationalism (pp. 7, 56, 152, 153). <i><u><b>My own writings also emphasize logic.</b></u></i></p><i><u><b>But Warren Young disagrees.</b></u></i> He does not accept the task of attempting to demonstrate that Christian philosophy is more coherent (consistent?) than other systems (p. 200); coherence itself is always relative, <i><u><b>depending on assumption of faith</b></u></i> rather than on rational demonstration (p. 201). </blockquote><p>Perhaps the question turns on Gilhooly's understanding of "fideism." Is fideism a rejection of an apologetic or epistemology in favor of so-called <i>blind</i> faith ("anti-intellectualism")? Given Clark's awareness of Van Til's affirmation of objectively valid and absolutely sound argumentation for God, surely Clark did not consider Van Til a fideist in this sense. Clark or others might say that Van Til did not provide <i>clear</i> argumentation, but Clark is at least aware that Van Til advocated <i>for</i> argumentation.</p><p>On the other hand, if a "fideist" is simply one who believes that knowledge depends on [faith in] divine revelation, Gilhooly could be onto something; Clark <i>does</i> take issue with some statements by Van Til that he interprets to mean Van Til thinks unregenerates or unbelievers are "totally ignorant" and "totally devoid of knowledge." That is, Clark does think that in some places, Van Til made remarks which indicate that <i>only</i> regenerates or believers are able to know anything. I suppose it is possible that Clark understood Van Til to be a "fideist" in the sense that knowledge depends on [faith in] divine revelation. </p><p>If Clark did<i> </i>view Van Til as a fideist in this sense, Gilhooly <i>might</i> also be right to say that such is traceable to Van Til's transcendental argument. As Clark writes (pgs. 154-155): </p><blockquote>Van Til emphatically asserts that no "area or aspect of reality, any fact or any law of nature or of history can be correctly interpreted except it be seen in the light of the main doctrines of Christianity" (p. 113). Therefore an apologist cannot "agree with the non-Christian in his principles of methodology to see whether or not Christian theism be true." Romish and Arminian apologists, e.g. Thoman, Butler, A. E. Taylor, to the extent that they believe in human autonomy, try to use the unbeliever's methodology; but a truly Reformed Christian must disagree "with the natural man on the nature of the object of knowledge [and]... on the method to be employed in acquiring knowledge" (p. 116). In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought. </blockquote><p>Before unpacking this, a side note: this last sentence would have been a welcome inclusion in chapter 1 of <i>Without Excuse</i>, particularly in M. Dan Kemp's subsection on "Justification and Circularity." Clark is mentioned just once in that section and given short shrift, as I will aim to show in my review of that chapter. To repeat, I think contemporary philosophers do themselves a disservice when they more or less fail to engage Clark's thought in such discussions. </p><p></p><p>In any case, as I said, one <i>might</i> be able to argue that the above summary is suggestive that Clark was aware of so-called transcendental argumentation in the writings of Van Til. <i>Assuming</i> that this is true - and to me, it is still by no means obvious that it is true - then rather than asserting that Van Til fails to "clearly state" the transcendental argument, Clark says Van Til's thought "will not be too difficult to grasp"! So much for comment on Gilhooly's footnote.</p><p>I have some extended thoughts, however. <i>If</i> Clark thought that Van Til was a "fideist" in the sense that <i>only</i> regenerates or believers are able to "know" anything - for "knowledge" depends on [faith in] divine revelation (and only regenerates have faith) - a Scripturalist ought to be quite interested in the fact that in this article, <i>Clark</i> <i>rejects fideism</i>, at least insofar as Clark does <i>not</i> agree with Van Til - or, to be more precise, certain statements made by Van Til - that <i>only</i> regenerates or believers are able to know anything (pg. 158):</p><blockquote>One important reason for maintaining the distinction between consistent systems and inconsistent persons is that <u><i><b>unregenerate persons are thereby permitted to have at least some knowledge</b></i></u>. Since the Scriptures base responsibility on knowledge, and since Romans 1:32 assigns to the wicked an amount of moral knowledge sufficient to make them guilty of sin, <i><u><b>the evangelical must frame a theory by which this knowledge is shown to be possible.</b></u></i> Were a man totally ignorant, he could not be guilty of sin. </blockquote><p>Why do I find any of this is noteworthy? Well, if unregenerates and unbelievers have <i>some</i> knowledge, the question naturally arises: how? Clark himself admits that he "must frame a theory by which this knowledge is shown to be possible." What, then, is Clark's theory? </p><p>Clark's theory dovetails with his criticism of Van Til - he distinguishes, unlike Van Til (or, at least, so Clark argues), between systems and persons. This is reminiscent of Clark's exchange with Buswell in 1947-1948 (<a href="https://continuing.wordpress.com/2011/07/24/clarks-reply/">link</a>, <a href="https://continuing.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/clark-elaborates-his-approach/">link</a>). Clark even references this very exchange on pg. 150 of his article on "Apologetics," on which page he affirms that "the truth is a perfectly consistent system." Here, I will leave aside the question whether truth is <i>just</i> a consistent system [of propositions] or if truth <i>also</i> involves something like "correspondence" - a question which arises in the Clark and Buswell exchange and one on which I've critiqued Clark's view (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">link</a>). </p><p>Of greater moment is that Clark's disagreement with Van Til on this point appears to stem from their debate in the OPC. To see this will take some effort. I'll begin that effort by returning to the paragraphs by Clark that follow what I already cited above from pages 154-155:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.</p>In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry,<b> <u>it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry. Euclid and Lobachevsky may both use the <i>phrase</i> "parallel lines," but they mean different things</u></b>; and when a perpendicular crosses them, Lobachevsky's results differ from those of Euclid. <u><b>Similarly, in Christianity and in a naturalistic philosophy the <i>words</i> fact, reason, and God may occur, but the <i>meanings</i>, determined by the axioms, are not the same<i>.</i></b></u> Hence <u><b>even if two <i>sentences</i> are composed of identical </b></u><u style="font-style: italic;"><b>words</b></u>, if one is in a naturalistic system and the other in a Christian system, <u><b>it does not indicate that the two systems have a <i>proposition</i> in common.</b></u><br /><br />Does it follow, however, that two persons, a Christian and a naturalist, can have no knowledge in common? A person is not a system, and hence we cannot say of a person what we say of a system, unless some further reasons be adduced.</blockquote><p>Before I come to any point on which Clark and Van Til disagreed, it ought to be observed on what point they <i>did</i> seem to agree. Both men seemed to agree that different systems or philosophies entail different meaning. Words, phrases, and sentences (see the italics above) are utterances that express some meaning. To put it simply, two people might <i>say</i> the same thing but <i>mean</i> different things. One who strictly adheres to a pantheistic system may talk about "god," but what he affirms is obviously <i>meaning</i>fully different than what one who strictly adheres to the Christian system affirms. This seems clear enough.</p><p>At this juncture, Clark's distinction between persons and systems also seems relevant: "A person is not a system, and hence we cannot say of a person what we say of a system, unless some further reasons be adduced." The implications of a system are fixed. A system is either consistent or inconsistent, true or false. A system does not change. Individual persons, on the other hand, can change. They may also be relatively more or less inconsistent with the system they verbally espouse at a particular point in time. As an example, the system of scientism does not entail ways in which one ought to act, yet an adherent of scientism may come to accept that there are ways he and others ought to act. </p><p>Indeed, this is often the case. The thought of an adherent of scientism is not <i>ontologically</i> restricted to the <i>epistemic</i> philosophy he verbally espouses. This very ontological - specifically, "psychological" (see the below quote) - inconsistency is Clark's basis for apologetic interaction with them. Such is his "point of contact," as he puts it in <i>Karl Barth's Theological Method </i>(which I outline <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/01/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses.html">here</a>). I think Clark's debates with Buswell and Van Til afforded him sharpened focus when expositing and critiquing Barth in the early 1960s: </p><blockquote><i><u><b>Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge. Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of contact for the Gospel.</b></u></i> What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans. Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of heathen responsibility.<br /><br />Now, because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation. (<i>Karl Barth’s Theological Method</i>, 1997, pgs. 117-118)</blockquote><p>The similarities to what has been discussed already on systems and persons are only too obvious, which is why, I suppose, Clark says, in the "Apologetics" article, that "Van Til shows a close affinity to neo-orthodoxy" even though he also recognizes points at which "Van Til diverges from neo-orthodoxy."</p><p>With this background in order, can we specify a definition of knowledge Clark would have accepted and applied to unregenerates given that they do not accept the [axiom of the] Christian system? Here, as with his book on Karl Barth (see the linked outline above), I think Clark must be defining knowledge as "<i><u><b>belief in or acceptance of a true proposition</b></u></i>" (<i>Karl Barth’s Theological Method</i>, 1997, pg. 169).</p><div>Back in 2015-2016, something of an intramural debate occurred amongst Scripturalists regarding how Clark defined knowledge. Now and then, this question resurfaces. In 2015-2016, I was asked for my view on the matter by several people: did Clark consider knowledge to be <i>mere</i> true belief or <i>justified</i> true belief? At the time, I made it clear that I thought Clark subscribed to a theory of knowledge that entails "justified" true belief, and I even tried to defend what sort of epistemic justification I thought Clark [implicitly] held. I particularly recall a set of emails in which I provided a number quotations of Clark which eventually made their way into <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160820232633/http://scripturalism.com/gordon-clark-and-knowledge-on-justification/">this post</a> (on the now defunct scripturalism.com webpage). Since then, I've elaborated this defense in a number of places (e.g. <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/05/meta-epistemology-and-gordon-clark.html">link</a>), and I still believe it holds up. Clark too was a fideist (even accepting the moniker as a synonym of presuppositionalism, <a href="https://gordonhclark.com/veridicalism-by-gordon-h-clark/">link</a>) in the sense that he believed that knowledge depends on [faith in] divine revelation.</div><p>However, it does look like - given his belief that unregenerates and unbelievers have moral knowledge - that Clark <i>also</i> had a place for considering knowledge as <i>mere</i> true belief. Unregenerates and unbelievers have no epistemic justification available to them - at least, not the sort of epistemic justification for which Clark elsewhere advocated - due to their adherence to false systems or philosophies; consequentially, they can provide no defense or apologetic for any true beliefs they may have. </p><p>As Clark says in the "Apologetics" article, while "Romans 1:32 assigns to the wicked an amount of moral knowledge," it is also true that "Christian morality <i><u><b>cannot be defended</b></u></i> without the prior principle of revelation." Epistemology grounds apologetics (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/04/book-review-scripturalism-and-senses_84.html">link</a>), and whatever sort of "knowledge" the wicked have, it is not such that they have epistemic justification, let alone a robust defense, for their beliefs.</p><p>Did Clark change his views on what "knowledge" means over time? Well, he himself was <i>not</i> a system [of propositions]... despite what he may have said later in his life! It would take some research to substantiate the following, but more likely than not, I think the most charitable reading of Clark leads to the view that he was a contextualist. The <i>word</i> "knowledge" has a "variety of meanings," and the context in which the word is used will determine which of these meanings is the one intended:</p><blockquote>1) The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. (<i>The Pastoral Epistles</i>, 1983, pg. 166) </blockquote><p>In some cases, then, "knowledge" can <i>only</i> mean <i>mere</i> true belief. Such is the case with unregenerates or unbelievers. In other cases, "knowledge" can mean something <i>more</i> than mere true belief. Such is the case for a Christian who, like Clark, has a consistent, systematic basis upon which to affirm that "<span style="font-family: "Open Sans";">there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge"</span> (<i>Lord God of Truth</i>, pg. 40). Although more could be said on the matter, I hope this first extended thought has provided a resolution to the intramural Scripturalist debate on how Clark defined "knowledge."</p><p>A second extended thought regards Clark's point that "A person is not a system, and hence we cannot say of a person what we say of a system, <i>unless some further reasons be adduced</i>." Did Van Til have "further reasons" to think that an unregenerate or unbeliever could not know the truth? </p><p>Before answering this, it is worth pointing out that in his "Apologetics" article, Clark claims Van Til contradicts himself. On the one hand, he cites Van Til as saying, "It will be quite impossible then to find a common area of knowledge between believers and unbelievers unless there is agreement between them as to the nature of man himself. But there is no such agreement." On the other hand, Clark cites Van Til as saying, "I have never denied that he [the natural man] has true knowledge." </p><p>This should cause some pause. Just as I have tried to be charitable in reading Clark - explaining that in different contexts, I think Clark believed the <i>word</i> "knowledge" can <i>mean</i> to different things - one should also afford Van Til the same courtesy. I found one article (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200413081321/http://christianciv.com/blog/index.php/2020/02/28/another-round-of-the-thomist-rumor-mill/#_ftnref24">link</a>), for example, that defends the consistency of Van Til on just this point by an appeal to context. The article's author, Michael Warren, attempts to resolve the tension between the preceding quotes of Van Til by an appeal to a third quote: for Van Til, Warren says, "men in general “are first of all truth <i>possessors</i>, or truth-knowers, who have, by sinning, become truth <i>suppressors</i>.”" </p><p>Well, isn't this <i>exactly</i> what Clark thought? In his theological examination conducted in 1944, Clark said that "knowledge is the possession of truth" (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/02/gordon-clark-examination-in-theology.html">link</a>)<i>.</i> Might not Van Til have said the same - that belief in the Christian system is necessary for knowledge in <i>one</i> sense but not another? Is Clark being overly critical of Van Til, finding contradictions where he instead ought to find context?</p><p>If he is overly critical, it is not without reason. Here we see in what way Clark's "Apologetics" article finds its origins in the 1940s OPC debate. Consider the following account of a debate (on March 19th, 1945) within the Philadelphia Presbytery of which Clark and Van Til were members: <br /></p><blockquote>...according to Mr. Kuschke,<b style="font-style: italic;"> </b><b style="font-style: italic; text-decoration-line: underline;">"Dr. Clark regards man's intellect as occupying such high rank that the understanding of the natural man can grasp the meaning of the words 'Christ died for sinners' 'with the same ease' as the born-again man.</b><b><u><i> If that is the case, the understanding does not need to undergo renewal like the rest of the human personality."</i></u></b> Mr. Kuschke quoted and discussed at length the statement of the proposed answer that "regeneration, in spite of the theory of the Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these words [Christ died for sinners]." He pointed out that the Bible teaches that all of man's faculties are corrupted by sin, and that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually. <i><u><b>"If regeneration did not change our understanding of the words 'Christ died for sinners,' " he declared, "then we would never be saved!"</b></u></i> </blockquote><p></p><blockquote>...The supporters of Dr. Clark's theology made valiant effort to defend the statement of the answer that "regeneration... is not a change in the understanding of these words [Christ died for sinners]." <i><u><b>Mr. Kuschke, on the other hand, defended the position of the complaint and pointed out that, when content is injected into the sentence, the unregenerate man must invariably inject the wrong content</b></u></i> and the regenerate man the true content. (<i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>, April 10th, 1945, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/07/gordon-clark-philadelphia-presbytery.html">link</a>)</blockquote><p>Arthur Kuschke, like Van Til, was one of the men who signed the original complaint against Clark (written in 1944, <a href="https://gordonhclark.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Unpublished-112.-The-Complaint-original.pdf">link</a>). Kuschke admits that the complaint denies that unregenerates possess <i>any</i> component of saving faith... <u><b>including the unregenerate's ability to even <i>understand</i> the gospel</b></u>. </p><p>Clark agreed that unregenerates do not <i>assent</i> to or <i>believe</i> the gospel. But it is not clear why unregenerates would <i><u><b>invariably</b></u></i> inject the wrong content regarding the <i>gospel</i> truth unless the same would hold for <i><u><b>any</b></u></i> truth. That is, Kuschke seems to be suggesting that since unregenerates don't accept the Christian system, they can't understand the truths of said system. This would conflate systems and persons, as Clark points out, but it would at least explain why the complainants didn't think it was possible for unregenerates to understand the gospel in particular. </p><p>As I see it, then, the complainants are caught on the horns of a dilemma: if they only think that unregenerates cannot understand the <i>gospel</i> truth, they are begging the question: why is <i>this</i> truth unable to be understood by unregenerates? On the other hand, if the complainants deny that unregenerates can understand <i>any</i> truth, they avoid begging this question, but in turn, Clark is right: there can be no <i>context</i> in which Van Til can have grounds to say that unregenerates know anything, for knowledge, like faith, presupposes understanding.</p><p>Were Kuschke's expressions agreeable to Van Til? Van Til was recorded as present for March 19th and 29th debates during which this question - the question of what can unregenerates understand - arose within the Philadelphia presbytery. If Van Til spoke a word of correction against his fellow complainants in defense of Clark, Birch didn't record it (as one would think Birch would have done). </p><p>As a complainant, I think Van Til had an obligation to correct his fellow complainants if he disagreed with them, especially in defense of the one against whom the (i.e. his, at least in part) complaint was directed. If Van Til did not confront them on this point, Clark had good reason to take his silence as implying Kuschke and others accurately "defended the position of the complaint." </p><div>To focus on Kuschke's remarks, they are to the effect that something is wrong about the idea that the unregenerate does not need to have his understanding "undergo renewal like the rest of the human personality." Kuschke says, "If regeneration did not change our understanding of the words 'Christ died for sinners'... then we would never be saved!" These are not so much arguments as they are insinuations that beg the question. The burden of proof lies on Kuschke to justify these claims, for as they stand, they are assertions in search of an argument. </div><div><br /></div><div>But we might also ask what is wrong with the idea that Adam's sin concerned a change in his <i>ethical</i> disposition to the truth as opposed to his capacity to understand [and even, in some non-salvific contexts, to "know"] it? Analogously, Van Til himself says in his <i>Survey of Christian Epistemology</i> (originally a syllabus written in 1932, <a href="https://presupp101.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/van-til-a-survey-of-christian-epistemology.pdf">link</a>):</div><div><blockquote>It is not, then, as though the clear recognition of the fundamental ethical difference between the regenerate and the non-regenerate consciousness implies that there is a twofold truth, or that we must use one type of argument for one type of consciousness and another type of argument for the other type of consciousness. It is exactly the deep conviction that <i><u><b>there is metaphysically only one type of consciousness, and that the nonregenerate and the regenerate consciousness are but ethical modifications of this one fundamental metaphysical consciousness</b></u></i>, that leads us to reason with unbelievers. And it is exactly because of our deep conviction that God is one and truth is therefore one, that we hold that there is only one type of argument for all men. All that the recognition of the deep <i><u><b>ethical</b></u></i> difference does is to call attention to this very fact that it is God who must make this one truth effective in the hearts of men. Magna est veritas et praevalebit!</blockquote></div><div>Would Kuschke say that Van Til was wrong to believe that the type of metaphysical consciousness unregenerates have is the same as the type of metaphysical consciousness unregenerates have? Is it a problem for Van Til to implicitly deny that the consciousness "need[s] to undergo renewal like the rest of the human personality"? </div><div><br /></div><div>I could leave matters at that, but I'll posit four counters to Kuschke's position. Firstly, Adam accepted revealed truths in Genesis 2. Once Adam sinned, did Kuschke think Adam somehow was rendered unable to <i>understand</i> these truths which were previously revealed to and accepted by him? I don't see any reason to think so. In fact, Adam's subsequent action - hiding from God - suggests that Adam still had an<i> </i>understanding and belief in the consequences of sin(Genesis 2:17) - "knowledge," of a sort<i>. </i></div><div><br /></div><div>Secondly, Satan seems to have some understanding of the truth (not to mention demons who have true beliefs; cf. James 2). Why else would Satan have tempted Adam in the garden in the first place? Satan's attempt to suppress the truth is not <i>accidental</i>. Satan understood the truth God has revealed to His people, and he opposes it <i>intentionally</i>. </div><div><br /></div><div>Thirdly, the fact that Paul reasoned with unbelievers in Acts 17 indicates that unbelievers can understand truth. Van Til admits as much when we says that "we hold that there is only <i>one type of argument</i> for all men." Does not one present an argument so that others may understand him (to say the least)? </div><div><br /></div><div>Finally, if Kuschke is worried that Clark underestimated the depths of renewal necessary for redemption, one wonders whether Kuschke believed that unregenerates could be images of God. That is, if one believes that both unregenerates and regenerates are images of God, then there is something about a sinner that is not in need of change or renewal upon his conversion. Why can't this "something" involve man's capacity for understanding truth? More could be said, but these replies should be more than sufficient to show that a converted Christian may have understood the gospel or even had some true beliefs prior to his or her conversion.</div><div><br /></div><div>To close out this second extended thought, I tried to think of what motivation Kuschke et al. had for insisting that an unregenerate's understanding of the gospel cannot be the same as a believer's understanding. The only possibility that came to mind is that they inferred that if an unregenerate's understanding is not in need of renewal, then total depravity is being denied. That is, did they think that a mere <i>understanding</i> of the gospel constituted some sort of ethical good on the part of the unregenerate? If so, that would be a <i>non sequitur </i>and biblically falsifiable (Hebrews 11:6). </div><div><p>While I am quite removed from anything Gilhooly had in mind when he mentioned Clark in his footnote, I have one final, extended thought based on my recent reading related to the 1940s "Clark case" in the OPC. Consider the issue of <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i> that came out a little later in the same month as one quoted above. The following is from an article by the same author as the one above - Thomas Birch, managing editor of <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i> - containing an account of a debate within the same Philadelphia Presbytery on March 29th, 1945 (10 days after the debate recorded in the above article):</p><blockquote>Dr. Strong questioned Dr. Clark as to what occurs when a man is born again. He replied, in words similar to those of the answer, that regeneration did not necessarily involve a change in the understanding of the words, "Christ died for sinners," but that regeneration brings belief in the truth of those words where formerly there was denial of them...</blockquote><p></p><blockquote>Much other debate filled the late hours of the evening, all of it no doubt profitable but much of it contributing little new light to the problems facing the presbytery. <u><b>The high point of the meeting was an unexpected speech by Mr. Kellogg. He said that he had previously been one of those who had championed Dr. Clark but that he no longer felt able to do so." <i>If knowledge of a proposition is the same for God and man," said Mr. Kellogg, "then you must have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of each word of the proposition."</i></b></u> He felt that this was a serious and central flaw in Dr. Clark's position, and was therefore forced to retreat from his earlier support of Dr. Clark. (<i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>, April 25th, 1945, <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/07/gordon-clark-philadelphia-presbytery.html">link</a>)</blockquote><p>To anyone reading the excerpts of these accounts, it should be obvious that <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i> sympathized with the complainants. In fact, two of the five members of the editorial council - Ned Stonehouse and Leslie Sloat - were, along with Kuschke and Van Til, signers of the original complaint against Clark. Along these lines, Thomas Birch, the author of the two articles I just cited, said, in the April 10th article, that in the course of the March 19th debate, Van Til provided "a masterful exposition of the meaning of analogy and its inherent proof of incomprehensibility" (how one wishes he recorded this exposition!). For Birch to call Mr. Kellogg's speech a "high point" of the meeting further suggests it was another speech with which the complainants agreed. </p></div><div><div>Let's examine Kellogg's argument more closely: "If knowledge of a proposition is the same for God and man... then you must have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of each <i><u><b>word</b></u></i> of the proposition." In response, for starters, one could be technical: propositions don't contain <i>words</i>. As was mentioned above, words, phrases, or sentences are <i>utterances</i> (i.e. physical symbols) that <i>express</i> propositions. Clark has well said that "The letters dog and the letters hund and the letters chien are all adequate to <i>represent</i> a certain type of animal. <i>Symbols</i> are always adequate, just because they are <i>symbols</i>" (<a href="https://gordonhclark.com/language-truth-and-revelation-part-2-by-gordon-h-clark/">link</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>To provide an illustration: if someone asks, "what is the animal on the card?" I can reply "a dog" and the meaning of my reply is clear. Those <i>words</i> I uttered (i.e. verbalized, wrote, or otherwise physically communicated) <i>represent</i> the immaterial <i><u><b>proposition</b></u></i> that 'The animal on the card is a dog.' While physical communication may involve sentences (speaking them, writing them, etc.) to express propositions, such isn't always necessary, for such utterances are merely <i>symbols</i> of an immaterial proposition. Perhaps this point goes some way in supporting an idea I've had that commands and questions can symbolize propositional content (<a href="http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/06/david-p-hoover-on-gordon-clark.html">link</a>).</div><div><br /></div><div>So then, [immaterial] propositions don't contain [material] words; but propositions do contain <i>concepts</i>. Perhaps Kellogg was speaking colloquially, equating concepts and words. If this theory is correct, the technical way to express Kellogg's intention would be as follows: "If knowledge of a proposition is the same for God and man... then you must have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of each [<u style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">concept</u>] of the proposition." If this wasn't his intention, then whatever changed Kellogg's mind from Clark's position to that of the complainants is unintelligible to me. If I'm on the right track, though, then a theory I had 10 years ago seems to have been correct: "whether Van Til's metaepistemology emphasizes <i><u><b>concepts</b></u></i> over <b style="font-style: italic; text-decoration-line: underline;">propositions</b>... is probably something worth looking into" (see my first comment in <a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/06/hegelian-internal-relations-and-van.html">this post</a>). </div><div><br /></div><div>A further reason to consider this theory as plausible is that in the same issue as the one in which Kellogg's quote is found, Ned B. Stonehouse - another co-signer of the complaint against Clark, fellow editor of <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>, fellow faculty member of Van Til at Westminster Theological Seminary, and member of the Philadelphia presbytery in which the original debates already cited occurred - wrote an article in which he said, "<i><u><b>If the content of</b></u></i> the knowledge of the truth, or of <u style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">a truth, and the truth itself may not be distinguished</u>, then indeed one would have to insist upon identity of content or land in skepticism. <i><u><b>On Dr. Clark's definitions of knowledge, the position of the complaint is indeed an absurdity.</b></u></i>" This is quite an admission!</div><div><br /></div><div>In Doug Douma's <i>The Presbyterian Philosopher</i>, he showed that what the complainants considered to be the "content" of knowledge was opaque. See pg. 137, footnote 7: Clark writes, in 1952 a letter to D. Clair Davis, that the complainants "have (to this day, as far as I know) refused to define content so as to distinguish it from mode and object" [of knowledge]. </div><div><br /></div><div>In the thick of the original debate, the above quote of Stonehouse makes it clear that the content <i>of</i> a truth was distinguishable from the truth <i>itself</i>; otherwise, Stonehouse admits, the position of the complainants collapses into absurdity. Since objects of knowledge are truths, if the "content" of a truth is distinguishable from truth itself, then, as Clark mentions, "content" must likewise be distinguishable from the "objects" of knowledge. What could be this "content" of one's knowledge if not truth itself? What is the "content" of a truth? </div><div><br /></div><div>Douma points out that in the 13th General Assembly, the OPC majority report found that the complainants "do not define" this term. One might speculate that the "content" Stonehouse intended is "concepts." If this is the case, Stonehouse appears to have been cognizant that concepts are not truths and, therefore, cannot be known. </div><div><br /></div><div>Whether this speculation is true or not, Kellogg seems to have been under the misimpression that concepts can be known: God has "exhaustive knowledge of each [<i><u><b>concept</b></u></i>] of the proposition." Here is a line of questioning from Clark's original examination in theology:</div><blockquote>Q What is your - shall I say in the introduction, in connection with the term "omnisciened", the subject of the manner of God’s knowledge? I of course agree that subject is one of greatest importance when we consider the difference between God and man. God knows truth in a different way than man does know truth. But, why do you introduce that in connection with the subject of omniscience, and you won't -- why they are not restricted to the items of his knowledge. </blockquote><blockquote>A In the previous examination last March, I did restrict myself to the <i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">concept</i> -- <i style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration-line: underline;">to the content or items of his knowledge</i> -- and that produced misunderstanding among a few people and I found out since there are some gentlemen in the room who don't think that it mentioned God knows everything and hence, in order to make it quite clear, I make the distinction so that anyone can understand what I mean.<br /><br />Q Would you say all the <b><u><i>contents</i></u></b> of God's knowledge is communicable to man?<br /><br />A I would say any particular <b><u><i>proposition</i></u></b> is communicable.</blockquote><div><div>Upon reading this transcript, one might initially mistake Clark to mean that he himself identifies the content of God's knowledge with concepts. But as was even noted at the time of this written transcript was created, the meaning of it is notoriously difficult to decipher. What Clark <i>actually</i> seems to means is that "the content or items of [God's] knowledge" is itself <i>a</i> concept - one which he discussed in another examination. What is in quotes here - "the content or items of his knowledge" - is obviously not in the form of a proposition. It is, instead, a concept. </div><div><br /></div><div>To say that Clark discussed a concept (God's knowledge) is not even remotely to suggest that Clark thought concepts just <i>are</i> the contents of God's knowledge. As is evidenced from his answer to the follow-up question, Clark equated "contents" of knowledge with "objects" of knowledge, and for Clark, a fundamental character of knowledge is that its "content" or "objects" are propositions. This is also clear from other lines of questioning in his theological examination. See here:</div><div><blockquote>Q I will ask you this question, which you may have already answered: Is all truth in the mind of God, capable of being addressed in propositions intelligent to the mind of man?<br /><br />A I would no know what the word: "truth" meant unless as a quality of proposition. <i><u><b>I cannot conceive of anything that is of truth that is not a proposition</b></u></i>.<br /></blockquote><p>And here: </p><blockquote>Q Will the infinite mind be able to know God directly in His wisdom, apart form God's revelation of Himself, in the finite?<br /><br />A By “Infinite" you mean - proposition? No, <i><u><b>I think only through propositions.</b></u></i><br /><br />Q And, is the finite mind limited by the finite?<br /><br />A Yes, <i><u><b>we know by propositions</b></u></i>, -- by means of propositions and <i><u><b>that is the only way we do know</b></u></i>.<br /></blockquote><p>And here: </p><blockquote>A <i><u><b>The only kind of knowledge which I am familiar - is the knowledge of the proposition</b></u></i>, <i><u><b>knowledge is the possession of truth, and the only truth that I know anything about is - a proposition. If you are talking about something else. I don't know just what you are talking about.</b></u></i></blockquote><p>Again, for Clark, a fundamental characteristic of "knowledge" - whether knowledge as "mere true belief" or knowledge as "justified true belief" - is that its objects are propositions. Concepts themselves are neither true nor false. </p><p>For that matter, a word, phrase, sentence, or utterance <i>qua</i> symbol isn't a truth-bearer any more than a concept is. Rather, that which words et al. <i>symbolize</i> or refer to - propositions - are truth-bearers. This analogy is expressed in an article by Marla Perkins Bevin called, "Linguistics and the Bible" (<a href="https://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=230">link</a>): "Knowing the syntax in order to know the meaning of the elements of a sentence is a corollary of the logical principle that the proposition is the basic unit of rational thought; its components, such as words, phrases, and sounds, are not." She would have been better off referring to <i>concepts</i> as the "components" of propositions, but the spirit of the statement is sound.</p><p>[Parenthetical thought: I have elsewhere written on concepts (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2015/07/challenges-for-scripturalism.html">link</a>). I think concepts may "connote"<i> </i>or<i> "</i>tag" propositions that are tied to a proposition in question. For example, take the proposition, "<i>Ryan</i> is a Christian." Here, "<i>Ryan"</i> is a concept within the proposition and is the subject of the proposition. The concept-subject of this proposition ("<i>Ryan</i>") is also the concept-subject of other propositions. </p><p>The proposition "<i>Ryan</i> is a Christian" has a corresponding referent - an ontological individual whose name is Ryan - who isn't reducible to a proposition or propositions. The proposition refers to Ryan, as do many others of which "<i>Ryan</i>" is the subject. Insofar as the referent, Ryan, is he in whose existence the many propositions of which "<i>Ryan</i>" is a concept-subject are "tied together," so to speak, it is in this sense that although the concept-subject "<i>Ryan</i>" is neither true nor false - a concept is not the basic unit of thought - the concept-subject is that "component" of the proposition which connotes or tags other propositions associated with this referent. That is, a concept-subject that is not tied to the referent Ryan would entail a different propositional thought, referent, and set of corresponding propositions.</p><p>Perhaps this is unclear, but it is a line of thought in working progress.]</p><p>Returning to Clark, the simpler point is that this is one interpretation of what Stonehouse objects to when he writes, "On Dr. Clark's definitions of knowledge, the position of the complaint is indeed an absurdity." If what Stonehouse and the complainants mean by "content" is too ambiguous, at least Kellogg's remarks seem clear enough that the "Clark case" was not only a debate about epistemology but also about <i>meta-epistemology</i>: what <i>is</i> knowledge [and its objects]? What is the character of knowledge and that which is known? From the complaint itself (<a href="https://gordonhclark.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Unpublished-112.-The-Complaint-typed.pdf">link</a>):</p><p></p><blockquote><i><u><b>The fundamental assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth, whether in the divine mind or in the human mind, is always propositional. Truth, it is said, cannot be conceived of except in terms of propositions</b></u></i> (Cf. 2:9ff.; 11:2, 14f.; and especially 22:19ff.). It will be observed that Dr. Clark does not claim to derive this judgment from Scripture; it is rather regarded as an axiom of reason (Cf. 36:13-17; 19:19ff.). </blockquote><blockquote>It is not necessary or appropriate to consider here all of the implications of this fundamental assumption. A few observations are, however, of immediate importance. <i><u><b>This view of truth, it will be noted, conceives of truth as fundamentally quantitative, as consisting of a series of distinct items.</b></u></i> Now even if it could be assumed that human knowledge has this propositional character, it would still involve a tremendous assumption to conclude that the divine knowledge must possess the same character. Since our thinking is pervasively conditioned by our creaturehood, <i><u><b>we may not safely infer the character of our knowledge what must be true of the knowledge of the Creator.</b></u></i> Even if we could be sure that human knowledge might be resolved into distinct propositions, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of God, who penetrates into the depths of his own mind and of all things at a glance, would be subject to the same qualification. And it may not be overlooked in this connection that Dr. Clark does not claim Scriptural proof for his fundamental assumption as to the character of knowledge. </blockquote><p></p></div><div><p>Not to delve even deeper into this rabbit trail than I already have, a key disagreement between Clark and the complainants seems to be whether it is legitimate to conceive that for God, "truth [i]s fundamentally quantitative, as consisting of a series of <i><u><b>distinct</b></u></i> items." </p><p>With respect to Scripture, would the complainants have considered Psalm 139:17-18 an anthropomorphism? If truth is neither quantitative nor a series of distinct items, then there are not a <i>literal</i> plurality of truths about which God would have a <i>literal </i>plurality of thoughts. Take note of a common remark made by the complainants, that "truth is one." Thomas Birch reports, in the March 19th debate, that Stonehouse argued this:</p><p></p><blockquote>Dr. Stonehouse then discussed in considerable detail the doctrine of the knowledge of God. <b><u>As there are two levels of being, the Creator level and the creature level, so there are two levels of knowledge</u></b>, and man's knowledge must necessarily always be analogical to God's knowledge. "<i><u><b>Truth is one</b></u></i>. And man may and does know the same truth that is in the divine mind because of his likeness to God and because of the fact of divine revelation."</blockquote><p></p><p>Before rushing past this quote too quickly, notice that Stonehouse assumes that a difference in "level of being" entails the kind of difference in "levels of knowledge" suggested by the complainants (i.e. that "man's knowledge must necessarily always be analogical"). I don't see how this follows. Sure, God is eternal, and we are not. Therefore, God knows eternally, and we do not. Were this all Stonehouse intended, Clark would have agreed. But the complaint goes farther, and so does Stonehouse. </p><p>A relevant consideration to keep in mind when reading the above quotation of Stonehouse is that God is <i>not</i> identical to His thoughts and His knowledge. Such an idea would lead to necessitarianism (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/04/reflections-on-contingentarianism-and.html">link</a>). God exists necessarily, whereas some of the objects of His knowledge are contingently true. If we say that God's knowledge of Himself <i>necessarily</i> entails knowledge of <i>me</i> - e.g. that "God created me" - then insofar as God is necessary, this proposition would be necessarily true. My existence, in turn, would be necessary. This is a problem, and the way to avoid it is to reject that "God created me" is a necessary truth, one entailed by God's necessary knowledge of Himself. I'll return to this later.</p><p>Thus, at stake in the "Clark case" is not only [meta-]epistemology but also metaphysics. Of course, that upon which God's knowledge is contingent is His own, eternal will; nevertheless, there is a distinction to be made between God and His knowledge. Stonehouse and the complainants cannot legitimate the inference that a difference in "level of being" entails that man's knowledge is "analogical."</p><p>Moving on, Van Til was also cited earlier in this post as having affirmed (back in the 1930s) that "God is one and <i><u><b>truth is therefore one</b></u></i>." What does it mean to the complainants to say that "truth is one"? To return to the language of systems, for Clark, truth comprises one <i>system</i>. In this sense, Clark would and did accept that "truth is one" (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/12/gordon-clark-studies-in-doctrine-of.html">link</a>), for the meaning here would be that "truth" (a metonymy for the singular system) consists of truths are neither disconnected nor disjointed, truths that are the same objects of knowledge for both God and man. </p><p>In other words, the one system consists of <i>multiple</i> truth<i>s</i>. A system itself is said to be "consistent" or "inconsistent" to the extent that the proposition<i>s</i> (plural) contained within said system are consistent with each other. The objects of knowledge are truth<i>s</i>. Truth<i>s</i> are propositional. Proposition<i>s</i> are <i>distinct</i>. In his <i>Survey of Christian Epistemology</i>, Van Til himself wrote things that seem to agree with Clark on this point:</p><div><p></p><blockquote>It is not the impartation of <i><u><b>intellectual truths only</b></u></i> that we meet in the Christian revelation. There is a constant danger lurking here. We tend so easily to think of Christianity as <i><u><b>a series of intellectual propositions only</b></u></i>. But the intellectual element cannot be separated from the factual element.</blockquote><p></p><p>Van Til denies that intellectual truths (plural!) <i>alone</i> comprise the Christian revelation, but <i>he does not deny</i> that there <i>are</i> a "series of intellectual propositions" or "intellectual truths." Plurality implies distinction, so in what way does Van Til avoid the charge of the complaint regarding what truth fundamental is? If truth does not (as a system) consist of a series of distinct items, what did the complainants think instead?</p><p>All one can do is work with what is given. Unfortunately, the complainants did not outline their own view. If I had to take an educated guess as to what the complainants meant when they said that "truth is one," we must return to Kellogg's argument and Clark's theological examination. Just as I tried to understand the motivation for Kuschke's arguments above, I have tried to understand Kellogg's motivation for his change of mind below. If I'm right, I didn't have to look far. In the transcript of Clark's theological examination, we read:</p><div><blockquote>BY DR. WELMERS: Q I have three questions and it may turn out to be one or more less, or the parts of the questions may be in one: Apart from the argument as to whether God's knowledge can be spoken of as a series of propositions, would it be your opinion that some of those propositions, if they are propositions, are, of themselves, an infinite content? For example: The proposition - God is Love, that is a proposition as much as A plus B. <b><u><i>Does that, in your opinion, have, in itself, an infinite content?</i></u></b><br /><br />A <b><u><i>No, in itself, it is just that one proposition, no more.</i></u></b></blockquote>Clark even emphasizes this point in his handwritten notes in the margins of a personal copy of this written transcription. He writes, "Can a proposition have <u>infinite content</u>? <u>No.</u>" I think this functions as a direct response to Kellogg. Kellogg said, "If knowledge of a proposition is the same for God and man... then you <i><u><b>must</b></u></i> have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of each word of the proposition." </div><div><br /></div><div>Ignoring the point that concepts cannot be objects of knowledge, let's run with Kellogg's line of thinking. Take a concept <i>X</i> in a proposition. If, per Kellogg, God's knowledge of a proposition entails perfect and exhaustive knowledge of <i>X</i> within said proposition, does he not mean to say that in turn, God's knowledge of <i>X</i> will entail "perfect and exhaustive knowledge" of anything used to define <i>X</i>, <i>ad infinitum</i>? If not, what would it mean to have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of <i>X</i>?</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, Kellogg's apparent motivation for demurring from Clark's defense is that he thinks <i>God's</i> knowledge of any single proposition entails "infinite content." Man's knowledge of a proposition is, as Van Til puts it in <i>A Survey of Christian Epistemology</i>, only true "as far as it goes." In contrast, God's knowledge "goes all the way," so to speak, for God, in the words of the complaint, "penetrates into the depths of his own mind and of all things at a glance." </div><div><br /></div><div>Perhaps this interpretation of Kellogg still makes it seem as though the disagreement between Clark and the complainants was simply about quantitative knowledge: God has infinite knowledge, whereas we don't. This is not all that is at play, though. Kellogg could have misinterpreted the complainants, but the complainants seem to suggest that "truth is one" in a "fundamental," holistic, deeper sense than that it comprises one system of multiple truths. If the complainants reject that truth is fundamentally a series of "distinct items" and if Kellogg implies a "perfect and exhaustive" knowledge is entailed by God's knowledge of any one proposition, these men appear to be in danger of serious conflation. They are in danger of thinking "truth is one" in that in some sense, there is fundamentally only one, single, ultimate meaning of which God alone perfectly and exhaustively "knows." </div><div><br /></div><div>This is an ironic extreme that at first glance appears to be on the other end of the spectrum of the equally extreme supposition that propositions have infinite content. Yet this oscillation is sometimes the sense I get when I've talked to people who stress a radical archetypal-ectypal distinction in the knowledges of God. Scripture itself expresses distinct propositions, and if God knows His own revelation, God knows distinct propositions. Defenders of the complainants typically respond that divine revelation is an "accommodation" to men, an "ectype" of God's "archetypal" "knowledge." Apparently, God metaphysically possesses two kinds of knowledge at the same time. </div><div><br /></div><div>While it is easy to talk past others in conversations on this subject, I think the main question is how God's alleged archetypal and ectypal knowledges relate. If they don't relate, then how could truth be "one"? Better still, if they don't relate and yet one insists that truth is one, then does this not mean that either archetypal knowledge is unrelated to truth or ectypal knowledge is unrelated to truth? In an Introduction to Warfield's "The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible," Van Til writes:</div><blockquote>“When the Christian restates the content of Scriptural revelation in the form of a ‘system,’ such a system is based upon and therefore analogous to the ‘existential system’ that God himself possesses. Being based upon God’s revelation it is on the one hand, fully true and, on the other hand, <b><u><i>at no point identical</i></u></b> with the content of the divine mind.”</blockquote><div>Van Til apparently denies that the two systems God knows - the archetypal and the ectypal - are related. Either this entails advocacy for two systems of truth or a denial that "the ‘existential system’ that God himself possesses" is related to truth. The former would mean Clark was spot on criticism of the complainants for failing to maintain that "truth is one" (see the most recent link). The latter would render the word "system" unintelligible.</div><div><br /></div><div>One must avoid the idea that propositions have "infinite content" and the idea that truths are not "distinct items." God's knowledge of contingent truths reflects the contingency of creation. Contingency is a precious safeguard of divine self-sufficiency in opposition to necessitarianism. While contingent truths are connected to necessary truths - there is one system of truth - one must be careful regarding the metaphysical <i>grounds</i> of this system, for contingency and necessity must be kept distinct. Here, a brief digression on truth-makers might be helpful, for again, what is at stake is not just epistemological concerns (which alone suffice to vindicate Clark against the complainants) but also metaphysical ones.</div><div><br /></div><div>Truths are connected, yet they cannot be internally related such that to know one truth entails knowledge of every truth. Clark outlines the epistemological problem with this:</div></div><div><blockquote>That relations are internal, and especially that the truth is the whole, are themes hard to deny. Yet their implications are devastating. So long as you or I do not know the relationships which constitute the meaning of cat or self, we do not know the object in question. <i><b><u>If we say that we know some of the relationships – e.g., a cat is not-a-dog and admit that we do not know other relationships – e.g., a cat is not-an-(animal we have never heard of before) – it follows that we cannot know how this unknown relationship may alter our view of the relationship we now say we know. The alteration could be considerable. Therefore we cannot know even one relationship without knowing all. Obviously we do not know all. Therefore we know nothing.</u> </b></i></blockquote><blockquote>This criticism is exceedingly disconcerting to an Hegelian, for its principle applies not merely to cats, dogs, and selves, but to the Absolute itself. The truth is the whole and the whole is the Absolute. But obviously we do not know the whole; we do not know the Absolute. In fact, not knowing the Absolute, we cannot know even that there is an Absolute. But how can Absolute Idealism be based on absolute ignorance? And ours is absolute ignorance, for we cannot know one thing without knowing all. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 153)<br /><br />A further insuperable hurdle for rationalistic logic is a proposition’s meaning. <b><u><i>The meaning of a sentence depends on its context. Logicians recognize this fact, but they identify the context as the totality of knowledge. Hence, as is all too evident with Plato and Hegel, one must be omniscient to grasp the meaning of even a single sentence. This obviously rules out all human knowledge.</i></u></b> (Thales to Dewey, 2000, pg. 398) </blockquote><blockquote><i><u><b>When the unity of truth and personality is so stressed that one must be omniscient in order to know anything, the theory for all its superficial piety is as skeptical as Hume's</b></u></i> (<a href="https://gordonhclark.com/the-nature-of-truth-by-gordon-h-clark/">link</a>). </blockquote>Accepting that truths are internally related would mean that our knowledge is not true "as far as it goes;" our knowledge wouldn't "go" anywhere. Fundamentally, and contrary to the complaint, truths must be "distinct items," albeit metaphysically connected in some way. How is this possible?</div><div><p>The Reformed distinction between God's natural and free knowledge is crucial (<a href="https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2021/12/molinism-and-publisher-of-evil.html">link</a>). Both God's natural knowledge and His free knowledge are grounded in God, yet they are grounded in different ways. God's natural knowledge is of Himself. God exists necessarily; just so, God's natural knowledge is of necessary truths: God knows who He is, what He is, and what He has the power to do. What metaphysically grounds necessary truths? God Himself.</p><p>God's free knowledge, on the other hand, is of what God actually and freely decrees and does with His power. While God was never in a state of "suspended animation" - His exercise of His power is timeless or eternal - it is nevertheless true that His exercise of His power was externally uncoerced and internally non-necessitated. God freely created me in accordance with His nature and natural knowledge. That is, my existence is contingent rather than necessary or necessitated; just so, God's free knowledge is of contingent truths. What metaphysically grounds contingent truths? God's free exercise of His will.</p><p>To conclude this extended thought (and post), God is the truth-maker for necessary and contingent truths, and truths are thereby systematically connected. Yet it is equally important to maintain that God is the truth-maker of necessary truths in a different way than He is for contingent truths, or else we run into epistemic issues (skepticism) and metaphysical issues (necessitarianism). Contrary to the complainants, then, a fundamental character of truth is that it is a series of distinct items (but not <i>separate </i>items, as if there a source of truth other than God). This rebuts any motivation Kellogg or others might have had for shying away from Clark's view.</p></div></div></div></div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-19822794471223473782023-07-05T09:19:00.001-04:002023-07-05T09:20:39.926-04:00Gordon Clark: [More Deliberations on the Clark Case] (The Presbyterian Guardian)<p>1945. [More Deliberations on the Clark Case]. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>. Vol. 14 No. 8. Mar 29. pgs. 115-116, 128.</p><p>On March 29th the Presbytery of Philadelphia of The Orthodox
Presbyterian Church met in an adjourned session at Mediator Church,
Philadelphia, to continue consideration of matters growing out of the
complaint filed last fall against actions
of the presbytery relative to the licensure and ordination of the Rev. Gordon H. Clark, Ph.D.* </p><p>After prayer by Moderator Edward
L. Kellogg, the Rev. Professor Paul
Woolley moved that the proposed
answer to the complaint, prepared by
a committee of presbytery but not
offered by that committee for adoption by the presbytery, be rejected and
the committee be dismissed. A motion
to lay this motion on the table failed
to carry the presbytery. </p><p>The right of a ruling elder to represent a church of which he was a
member but on whose session he did
not serve was unsuccessfully challenged.
The Rev. Floyd E. Hamilton
offered, as a substitute for the motion
of Professor Woolley, that presbytery
deny the plea of the complainants that
the meeting of July 7, 1944, be found
to have been illegally convened and
that its acts arid decisions are thus
void. </p><p>Speaking against Mr. Hamilton's
motion, Dr. Ned B. Stonehouse urged
that the presbytery not consider the complaint in that fashion until it had
first disposed of the prosposed answer.
Dr. Robert Strong then added as an
amendment the words, "and adopt the
legal section of the answer in justification of this denial." </p><p>Professor Woolley objected to this
amendment. The answer, he asserted,
cites the meeting to ordain the Rev.
Eugene Bradford as a parallel to the
July 7th meeting complained against.
But in Mr. Bradford's case, said Professor Woolley, something happened
to him between the last meeting and
the special meeting which required
that he be ordained at that time. No such emergency had been proven in
the case of Dr. Clark. He hailed as
specious the argument of the answer
that the chosen date was proven convenient by the fact that it had a large
attendance. There is no evidence in
the answer, said Professor Woolley, to
show the existence of an emergency
as that word is used in the dictionary
or in The Orthodox Presbyterian
Church. After further debate, the
amendment was defeated. </p><p>The Rev. Edwin H. Rian then
moved as a substitute "that the presbytery adopts the first conclusion of
the answer which reads, 'the Presbytery denies that the meeting of July
7, 1944, was illegal and that its actions
are thus void.'" This was an attempt to relate the motion to the answer
rather than to the complaint, without
changing the force or substance of it.
Mr. Rian's substitute became the main
motion, by a vote of 19 to 14. </p><p>Speaking to the motion, the Rev.
Robert S. Marsden said that the complaint bases its attack upon its assertion that there was no emergency.
But there were important elements,
unknown at the time of the last regular meeting, which entered into Dr.
Clark's life; there was an emergency
at that time in Dr. Clark's own plans.
Unless the matter of ordination were
quickly settled, it would be impossible
for him to arrange his next year's
work. Moreover, said Mr. Marsden,
even if illegal elements were found
to have existed, that would not necessarily invalidate the actions of the
meeting. </p><p>Professor Woolley replied that an
emergency is something which
emerges or is newly arisen. So far as
Dr. Clark's contemplated teaching
post at the Reformed Episcopal Seminary was concerned, he had taught
there before ordination and presumably
might just as easily do so again. The
Rev. Leslie W. Sloat contended that
the emergency for which a meeting is called is the business to be dealt with,
not some related factor in the life or
mind of an individual. He said that
this was not a question of a few
illegal elements, but whether or not the calling of the meeting was illegal
and therefore the entire existence of
the meeting illegal. </p><p>A roll call vote on the motion
showed that it carried 23 to 14. </p><p>Dr. Strong then moved that presbytery acknowledge that "the various
views of Dr. Clark as set forth in the
meeting of July 7, 1944, and with
which the complaint is concerned, are
in error and in conflict with the constitutional requirements for licensure
and ordination, and that, therefore,
the decision to sustain his theological
examination, the decision to waive two
years of study in a theological seminary, the decision to proceed to license
Dr. Clark and the action of licensing
him, the decision to deem the examination for licensure sufficient for
ordination, and the decision to ordain
Dr. Clark, were in error and unconstitutional, and are, therefore, null and
void." Dr. Strong, who. obviously
would not have wanted his motion to be passed, explained that he had moved it for the purpose of showing
that the complaint, in asking for this,
was in reality pressing heresy charges
"by indirection." </p><p>Mr. Rian said that such a motion
would call for deposition, and that
therefore the motion was out of order.
The moderator ruled that the motion
called for an unconstitutional method
of making amends and was therefore
out of order. On a roll call vote, the
moderator was sustained in this ruling
22 to 16. </p><p>Dr. William E. Welmers moved
"that sections 2 through 5 of the proposed answer be rejected and the
committee be dismissed." Speaking to
this motion, the Rev. Arthur W.
Kuschke said that it has been urged
that Dr. Clark has denied the charges
of the complaint. He therefore had
prepared a series of parallel columns
which quoted first from the charges of
the complaint and secondly from the
proposed answer which Dr. Clark had
signed. He read these quotations to
prove that the answer supports and
does not deny the charges of the
complaint. </p><p>Dr. Clark, in rejoinder, said that if we have any truth at all it is God's
truth and at that point we have the
meaning that God has of that one
proposition. Dr. Strong questioned Dr.
Clark as to what occurs when a man
is born again. He replied, in words
similar to those of the answer, that
regeneration did not necessarily involve a change in the understanding
of the words, "Christ died for sinners,"
but that regeneration brings belief in
the truth of those words where formerly there was denial of them. Asked
by Dr. Strong about the paradox of
divine sovereignty and human responsibility which Dr. Clark had claimed
to have solved, Dr. Clark replied that
it was legitimate to study Scripture "as
much as you can" and to get as much
out of it as possible. Asked again
about his reluctance to use the word
"sincere" in describing the universal
offer of the gospel, Dr. Clark replied
that he did not like the word, since it
had been widely used by the enemies
of Calvinism. He therefore avoided it,
preferring the word "freely." He explained that the word "sincere" had
not been defined at the July 7th meeting of presbytery, so he just avoided
it in the interests of not being inadvertently misunderstood. </p><p>Elder H. Evan Runner delivered an
address on the subject of analogy, in
the course of which he declared that,
since propositional knowledge was
revelational knowledge, God's knowledge of man's knowledge would be the
same as man's knowledge. But the uncreate knowledge possessed by God
cannot be identified with man's
knowledge and is not expressed propositionally. Mr. Runner quoted from
theologians of the past to show that
historic Calvinism has always held
that even God's communicable attributes are incommunicable as they exist in God, since they are of His very
essence and are therefore impossible
of communication. </p><p>Dr. Clark quoted Charles Hodge
and declared that he held Hodge's
position on incomprehensibility. Professor Woolley declared that the proposed answer says that the essence of
God's being is incomprehensible except as God reveals truths concerning
His own nature, whereas the Reformed
theology holds that the essence of
God's being is incomprehensible, with
no exceptions. Mr. Hamilton attempted some clarification, and Dr.
Stonehouse said Dr. Clark is challenged not so much on his doctrine of knowledge as on the question
whether he accepts the doctrine of
God's incomprehensibility. The issue
is not whether or not God can be
known, but what limits are placed on
man's knowledge. </p><p>Dr. Cornelius Van Til, in commenting on the fact that Dr. Clark and his
supporters had maintained that the
proposed answer was in accord with
the position held by Charles Hodge,
said that Hodge argues that all of
revelation is an accommodation to the
limitations of man and that when
man restates revelation as propositions
he cannot have in his mind exactly
that which God has in His mind. Dr.
Clark had expressed a need for the
complainants to define the qualitative
distinction they claimed between the
contents of man's and God's knowledge. If they were to be required to
give such a definition, declared Dr.
Van Til, then Dr. Clark should also be
able to define and tell all about the
mode of God's knowledge, since Dr.
Clark admits there is a difference between the mode of man's knowledge and the mode of God's knowledge. </p><p>In reply Dr. Clark attacked Dr. Van
Til's logic in arriving at implications
drawn by Dr. Van Til from written
statements of Dr. Clark. A test of
orthodoxy must be clear, he said, and
this matter of the qualitative distinctions in the contents of knowledge is
unclear. But we can, he affirmed, describe the mode of God's knowledge
and say some things about it. </p><p>At long last the motion to reject
the doctrinal sections of the proposed
answer and to dismiss the committee
was laid on the table. </p><p>With no motion of any sort before
the house, Dr. Strong began to direct
a series of questions to certain of the
complainants. He asked Dr. Welmers
whether he wrote the charge in the
complaint that Dr. Clark had "studiously avoided answering" a certain
question. Dr. Welmers replied that he
honestly didn't know. "Do the complainants accept the repudiation of
that invidious statement?" asked Dr.
Strong. Mr. Kuschke made vigorous
objection to the question and Dr.
Strong was instructed by the chair to
"watch his language." The right of
Dr. Strong to conduct this form of
examination with no motion of any
sort on the floor was challenged. The
moderator - pro - tem, Mr. Marsden,
ruled that the questioning was in order
on the ground that it was germane to the report of the committee elected
to prepare the answer and that the
report was before the house even
though no motion about it was on
the floor. The ruling was challenged
and the moderator sustained. </p><p>Dr. Strong resumed by directing a question to Dr. Stonehouse who said
that, while he would be glad to answer the question in private conversation, he objected so strenuously to
the moderator's ruling and to the procedure being followed by Dr. Strong
that he felt compelled to refuse to
answer. Another question to Dr. Welmers elicited the same response. Dr.
Strong then directed his inquiries to
Dr. Clark, asking him how he felt
about certain accusations of the complaint. Dr. Clark replied in detail,
pointing out that he considered the
complaint a personal affront. </p><p>After more of this type of unfortunate procedure, which many presbyters
considered the low point of the day, Professor Woolley moved that the
presbytery declare the decision of the
July 7th, 1944, meeting to sustain
the theological examination of Dr.
Clark to have been in error. This motion was rather promptly tabled by
a vote of 19 to 17. </p><p>Dr. Stonehouse then moved that
the presbytery acknowledge that the
various views of Dr. Clark as set forth
in the July 7th meeting and the decisions relating to his licensure and
ordination are in error and unconstitutional. When the motion was challenged as being the same in essence
as a previous one that had been ruled
out of order, Dr. Stonehouse replied
that he had omitted the words to
which objection had previously been made and had left open the question
of what amends should be made. The
moderator ruled the motion in order,
his ruling was challenged, and he was
not sustained by the presbytery. The
Rev. John P. Clelland then moved the
same motion with the deletion of the
last two words "and unconstitutional."
Again, the motion was challenged and
again the moderator ruled it in order.
Several of the complainants protested
that not to sustain this ruling would
be to deny elemental justice to a minority; the right to appeal from an act
or decision of the presbytery, they
said, was a fundamental right that the
judicatory dare not deny. Mr. Hamilton cited as precedent the famous Van
Dusen case in the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and Professor
Woolley said he was sorry to see the
day in The Orthodox Presbyterian
Church when appeal was made to a
case in the Presbyterian Church in the
U.S.A. in which two men who denied the virgin birth were allowed to remain in the church and their presbytery went scot-free. The moderator
was sustained. </p><p>Much other debate filled the late
hours of the evening, all of it no doubt
profitable but much of it contributing
little new light to the problems facing the presbytery. The high point
of the meeting was an unexpected
speech by Mr. Kellogg. He said that
he had previously been one of those
who had championed Dr. Clark but
that he no longer felt able to do so.
"If knowledge of a proposition is the
same for God and man," said Mr.
Kellogg, "then you must have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of each
word of the proposition." He felt that
this was a serious and central flaw
in Dr. Clark's position, and was therefore forced to retreat from his earlier
support of Dr. Clark. </p><p>Mr. Clelland's motion was defeated
by a roll call vote of 16 to 20. The
full text of this final defeated motion
is as follows: </p><p></p><blockquote>That the presbytery acknowledge that
various views of Dr. Clark as set forth
in the meeting of July 7, 1944, are in
error and that therefore the decision to
sustain his theological examination, the
decision to waive two years of study in a
theological seminary, the decision to proceed to license Dr. Clark and the action of
licensing him, the decision to deem the
examination for licensure sufficient for
ordination and the decision to ordain Dr.
Clark were in error. </blockquote><p></p><p>The presbytery thus clearly demonstrated to the complainants that even
their mildest request would be refused
and that there was, in effect, no use in making further attempts to gain
recognition for their position. </p><p>The presbytery adjourned at approximately 12.55 A.M. </p><p>In the course of the day, Mr. Rian
gave notice that he expected to propose an overture to be sent up to the
general assembly, requesting that body
to elect a committee to study the various doctrinal questions which had
been involved in the Clark case.</p><p>* For a report of the preceding deliberations on this matter, see THE PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN, April 10, 1945, pp. 108ff.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-35596462074072625522023-07-05T08:38:00.002-04:002023-07-05T08:45:26.383-04:00Gordon Clark: [Summary of the First 3 Days of the OPC's 12th General Assembly] (The Presbyterian Guardian)<p>1945. [Summary of the First 3 Days of the OPC's 12th General Assembly]. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian. </i>Vol. 14. No. 11.<i> </i>May 18-19. pgs. 172-176</p><p>The Complaint </p><p>The complaint signed by thirteen
members of the Presbytery of Philadelphia against certain actions of the
presbytery relative to the ordination
of Dr. Gordon H. Clark was the
order of the day. The following letter
from a committee of the complainants was read by the clerk: </p><p></p><blockquote>This letter presents to you a complaint
against actions and decisions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia. The complaint is
presented by those whose names are attached to it as filed with the Stated
Clerk of the Presbytery of Philadelphia
on October 6, 1944. The original is in
the hands of the Stated Clerk of the
Presbytery of Philadelphia who will
doubtless, in accordance with the Book of
Discipline, Chapter X, section 4, lodge
it with the General Assembly upon the request of the latter. A copy of the complaint is attached hereto. </blockquote><blockquote>The Presbytery of Philadelphia has
given prolonged consideration to aspects
of this complaint and some consideration
to all of it. That Presbytery has not,
however, seen fit to acknowledge that it
has erred in any respect with reference
to the actions and decisions against which
complaint is made, although it has had
sufficient time and repeated opportunities
so to do. </blockquote><blockquote>With reluctance, therefore, the complainants are compelled to present the
complaint to the General Assembly, for
they are convinced of the weighty character of the errors of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia. </blockquote><blockquote>In this connection we wish to center
the attention of the Assembly upon a
most important distinction which is made
by the complaint. This is the distinction
between the essence of the complaint
and the particular amends which are asked.
The essence of the complaint is that it
charges the Presbytery of Philadelphia
with error in several actions and decisions.
The question of the particular amends
which should be made is, accordingly, a
matter of secondary and subsequent consideration. The essential validity of the
complaint does not stand or fall with any
judgments that may be made as to proper
amends but rather with the primary and
fundamental matter of error in the several actions and decisions against which
complaint is made. </blockquote><blockquote>Discussion in the lower judicatory indicates that there are passages in the complaint which have been misunderstood.
The complainants are also aware of infelicities of expression in the complaint.
They would desire, were it possible at
this stage, to make certain alterations of
wording and statement. However, they
believe that the complaint is a substantially accurate statement of the errors of
which the Presbytery of Philadelphia has
been guilty, and because of the weighty
character of these errors they wish, in
bringing the complaint to the attention of
the General Assembly, to request that
the Assembly give to it its most careful
and kindly consideration. </blockquote><blockquote>Although various persons have stated
that there are elements in the complaint
which are personally objectionable, the
complainants did not have, and do not
now have, any intention of including any
such elements in the complaint. On the
contrary, they deeply regret that any have
chosen to make such statements, for they
serve only to confuse the momentous issues which are before the Church. The
complainants trust, therefore, that the
members of the Assembly will accept their
avowal, made in good faith, that no elements of this sort are intended to be
expressed in the complaint. </blockquote><blockquote>The complainants hope that the gravity
of the decision which is to be made by
the General Assembly will be apparent to every member of that body and that
each will face his duty with respect to
the future of our beloved church with a
due sense of his responsibility. </blockquote><blockquote>In the hope that the Assembly may
take such action as will safeguard the
purity and peace of the Church, we are, </blockquote><blockquote>Fraternally, </blockquote><blockquote>ARTHUR W. KUSCHKE, JR., </blockquote><blockquote>N. B. STONEHOUSE, </blockquote><blockquote>PAUL WOOLLEY, </blockquote><blockquote><i>For the Complainants</i>. </blockquote><p></p><p>The Rev. Professor Paul Woolley
attempted to make a motion calling
for the election of a committee of
five to consider the complaint, secure
information concerning the facts involved, and make recommendations
to the Thirteenth General Assembly.
The moderator promptly ruled him
out of order on the ground that the making of motions involved taking
part in decisions, and since no member of the Presbytery of Philadelphia
could vote it followed that no member of that body could introduce
motions. The moderator's ruling was challenged, but he was sustained by
the assembly. </p><p>Immediately Mr. DeWaard made
the motion Professor Woolley had
attempted to make, which was this:
"That a committee of five be elected
by this assembly to consider the complaint against certain actions of the
Presbytery of Philadelphia, to secure
information concerning the facts involved, and to make recommendations to the Thirteenth General
Assembly." </p><p>Professor Woolley said that he believed this would result in the presentation of a formal record to the next
assembly which would facilitate action and that it would provide opportunity for study of the facts during
the coming year so that at the next
assembly the vote could be made
intelligently. </p><p>Legality of the Meeting </p><p>Mr. Smith moved, as a substitute,
"that the action of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia, in denying that its meeting of July 7, 1944, was illegal and
its actions thus* null and void, be
sustained." </p><p>Before debating this motion, the
various pertinent actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia were read by
the clerk of that presbytery. These
supplied the information that the
presbytery had defeated two motions,
one to dismiss the complaint and the
other to find the presbytery in error
in its decisions at the July 7, 1944,
meeting. </p><p>Professor Woolley urged that the
complaint be not chopped into pieces,
with decisions rendered on some
points and delayed on others, but that
the whole complaint as a unit be
handed to the committee for a well-rounded consideration of the whole
position. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard declared that the
question of the legality of the meeting had no reference to "unfrocking
Dr. Clark by indirection," a phrase
which Dr. Clark's supporters used repeatedly throughout the remainder of
the debate on the legal aspects of
the case. If it should be decided that
Dr. Clark had been illegally ordained,
said Mr. DeWaard, the alternative
was not deposition but legal ordination. </p><p>Shall we keep the church in a state
of tension for a year over this matter?
asked Dr. Strong. The assembly, he
said, was competent to deal with the
case, and could and should make
a start in that direction by dealing
with the legal portion of the complaint. </p><p>Finally the motion proposed by Mr.
Smith was substituted for the motion
of Professor Woolley and became the
main motion before the assembly. At
this point, the section of the complaint dealing with the legality of the
meeting was read by the clerk. </p><p>The traditional understanding of
the word "emergency" was dealt with
at some length by Professor Woolley.
The framers of the Form of' Government in the Presbyterian Church in
the U.S.A. in the eighteenth century considered it to mean something
which emerges or arises, something
not of long standing, and something
not known at the time of the preceding meeting. We have, said Professor Woolley, historical evidence of
the meaning of the word "emergency" and that meaning cannot be
applied to the meeting of last July.
There was no evidence that the matter could not have been safely deferred for ten more days, until the
regular meeting of presbytery. </p><p>Dr. William E. Welmers drew the
significant difference, apparently disregarded by those who opposed the
position of the complaint, between
emergencies arising from the cause of
the church of Jesus Christ and emergencies arising out of matters concerning the convenience of individuals. </p><p>Mr. Hamilton then read the
section of the proposed answer dealing with the legality of the July 7th
meeting. He added that at the time
of the previous meeting it was not
known that Dr. Clark would be unable to attend the regular meeting
and therefore, he declared, there was
an emergency even on Professor
Woolley's definition of that word.
Mr. Hamilton ignored the contention
of the complainants that an emergency for this purpose must be an
emergency to the church, not just the
personal emergency of an individual. </p><p>Speaking to the motion, Mr. Marsden said that, if the legal matter is
settled as the complaint requests, the
doctrinal questions will become purely
academic. He appealed to the dictionary's definition of "emergency" as "a pressing necessity, an exigency,"
but likewise seemed to feel that it
made no difference whether the emergency was the church's emergency or
Dr. Clark's emergency. He declared
that, even if it were granted that
there were illegal elements in the
meeting, those illegal elements would
not necessarily require that all the
actions were therefore null and void.
This argument overlooked the fact
that the complainants were not claiming merely a few illegal elements, but
that, since the calling of the meeting
was illegal, the entire existence of the
meeting was illegal. </p><p>Presbytery was not at that meeting
faced with a new matter of business,
declared Dr. Stonehouse, so that elements in the life of an individual
could not constitute an emergency.
Moreover, the matter of inconvenience to other presbyters which was
involved in the calling of the July
7th meeting was in his opinion subordinate to the infringement of the
rights of presbyters. We dare not, he
said, establish a precedent that circumstances of this nature be considered valid reasons for the calling of
special meetings. </p><p>On request, Dr. Clark told of factors unknown to the presbytery or to
himself at the previous meeting. These
were (1) that he and his family were
in process of moving, so that it
would have been impossible for him
to be present at the regular meeting,
and (2) that he was going to be in
the East for the Quarryville conference, and that was why the meeting
was called for that particular time.
Both of these unknown factors, it
should be noted, concerned an individual and neither of them constituted emergencies to the church. </p><p>Mr. Hills declared that an emergency would be an external call to
some gospel ministry requiring ordination. Mr. Hamilton replied that Dr.
Clark had come East expecting to
enter the active ministry but, after
his ordination, the existence of a complaint blocked the possibility of a call
to certain churches. It was pointed
out that the complaint was not in
existence until about three months
after the disputed ordination, and Mr.
Hills suggested that the church does
not ordain men because they intend
to enter the ministry but only when
they have received a definite external
call to some particular field. </p><p>Mr. Dyrness held that Dr. Clark's ordination was granted on the basis
of his call to an evangelistic ministry
and that there was no reason why he
should be delayed in beginning the
exercise of that ministry. He closed
with a plea that the assembly face the
main issue of doctrine, but first clear
the decks of this subordinate question
of legality. </p><p>The main motion, which reads as
follows, was finally adopted: </p><p></p><blockquote>That the action of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia, in denying that its meeting
of July 7, 1944, was illegal and its actions thus null and void, be sustained. </blockquote><p></p><p>Legality of the Amends </p><p>This disposed of one important section of the complaint. The second
of the two so-called "legal aspects"
of the case concerned the constitutionality of the amends asked by the
complainants. The complaint asked
that if the presbytery (and, on this
appeal, the general assembly) were
not ready to acknowledge the meeting as illegal and its actions thus null
and void, it acknowledge that various
views of Dr. Clark set forth in that
meeting were in error and in conflict
with the constitutional requirements
for licensure and ordination, and that
therefore all the later actions of the
presbytery leading up to his ordination were in error and unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
(It should be remembered that one
of the signers, Leslie W. Sloat, signed
the complaint only to the extent of
the reasons for it, but did not concur
in the request for specific amends.) </p><p>It was the contention of the supporters of Dr. Clark that the amends
asked by the complainants actually
would have the effect, if granted, of
unfrocking or "unordaining" Dr.
Clark by indirection, without allowing him his day in court or according him a proper trial. In an attempt
to remove this threat to Dr. Clark's
ordination, Mr. Gray moved "that
the portion of the complaint which
requests the general assembly to ask
the Presbytery of Philadelphia to declare null and void the actions of the
meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia of July 7, 1944, re Gordon
H. Clark, Ph.D., be declared unconstitutional because it seeks in effect
to depose or to unfrock a minister of
the church in good and regular standing without filing charges or without
due process of a trial." </p><p>On challenge, the moderator ruled this motion in order, and his ruling
was sustained. The challenge was
based on the contentions (1) that
the motion asks the assembly to
decide the question of amends before
deciding whether or not error exists,
and (2) that it contains a charge of
unconstitutionality despite the fact
that the constitution of the church
contains no specific provisions as to
the method of punishing a judicatory
found to be in error. </p><p>In speaking to his own motion, Mr.
Gray said he proposed it in the interests of disentangling the legal aspects
from the doctrinal questions. He held
that the complaint was a matter of
administrative discipline, but that the
requested amends were those of judicial discipline. </p><p>It was again stated by Dr. Stonehouse that the motion dealt with the
question of amends before deciding
the existence of error, that it "put the
cart before the horse." He also
pointed out a central factor, often
repeated in later debate but apparently never adequately appreciated by
the supporters of Dr. Clark, that no
action of this assembly could be binding upon the next or any subsequent
assembly, and that if the existence of
error were granted by the Thirteenth
General Assembly, no action of the
Twelfth could dispose of the question
of amends. </p><p>The questions of whether or not Dr.
Clark was really ordained, what would
happen to the marriages he had performed if the amends were later
granted, and other related matters,
were then freely argued. The complainants apparently failed to reassure
their opponents by repeated protestations that of course Dr. Clark was
ordained. He was ordained "de facto";
if might later develop that he had
not been legally ordained, but beyond
a shadow of a doubt he was definitely
ordained. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard moved that the motion before the house, together with
the doctrinal portion of the complaint, be referred to a committee of
five to be elected by this assembly to
bring in recommendations to the
Thirteenth General Assembly. This
motion was quite promptly laid on
the table. </p><p>Dr. Welmers drew the analogy of
a man found to have entered the
country illegally. The authorities do
not, he said, hold a trial and deport
him; they merely take him outside the country and tell him to enter
legally. If Dr. Clark has been illegally
ordained, he would be given the
opportunity of a legal ordination and
it would be hoped that the requirements could be fulfilled. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard then moved that
the motion of Mr. Gray be referred
to a committee of five elected by this
general assembly to report to the Thirteenth General Assembly. That motion was carried by a vote of twenty
to sixteen. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard moved that the doctrinal portion of the complaint be
referred to the same committee to
report to the next assembly, but this
motion was laid on the table. </p><p>Upon motion, the assembly voted
to reconsider the first motion of Mr.
DeWaard to refer the question of the
legality of the amends to a committee
of five. This was for the purpose of
changing the size of that committee
to three, but before the amendment
could be offered Dr. Burton L. Goddard moved that the assembly dismiss
that portion of the complaint which
specifies the nature of the amends
asked. Although this was a most unfortunate motion which certainly
should not have been made at this
juncture in the reconsideration of the
motion to refer, the moderator was
forced to rule it in order. Dr. Goddard, however, was persuaded to withdraw it. The reconsidered motion was
amended to call for "a committee of
three, none of whom are members of
the Presbytery of Philadelphia." The
amended motion was then re-adopted. </p><p>It was moved that the doctrinal
portion of the complaint be referred
to a committee of five, none of whom
are members of the Presbytery of
Philadelphia, to be elected by this
assembly to report to the Thirteenth
General Assembly. The assembly recessed without action on this motion. </p><p>Devotional exercises on Saturday
morning were led by the Rev. W.
Benson Male. </p><p>After roll call and approval of the
minutes, Dr. Edward J. Young urged
passage of the motion to refer the
doctrinal portion of the complaint to
a committee of five. He based his
remarks upon the gravity of the questions at stake and the centrality of the
doctrines involved. He declared that
this was no question of apologetics,
but of theological considerations of
the most profound importance. These
matters, he said, should not be dealt with in a summary fashion. </p><p>As a complete surprise came a motion by Dr. Lawrence B. Gilmore to
reconsider the motion which referred
the question of amends to a committee of three. Since this was a
second reconsideration of that motion,
it was challenged. The moderator
ruled it in order, however, since he
considered it had been "materially
changed" at the time of the first
reconsideration. He was sustained in his ruling. The motion to refer the
doctrinal portions of the complaint to
a committee of five was then laid on
the table. </p><p>Dr. Gilmore then spoke to his
motion to reconsider. He said he
wanted his motion passed for three
reasons. First, he had been confused
on Friday afternoon about the intent
and motive behind that motion. Secondly, he felt that to have the question of the constitutionality of the
amends go unsettled for another year
would work an injustice to the security
of any newly-ordained minister of
the denomination. For a period of
three months after any ordination, a
minister could not know for certain
that he was really ordained, and if
a complaint were lodged his ordination might be in jeopardy for two or
three years. Thirdly, Dr. Gilmore was
concerned because the matters of
the complaint were a stumbling-block
to many laymen. He spoke of the
discouraging effect upon the laymen
of what he held to be an overemphasis
on doctrine. He mentioned a prospective member of his church who
had been disturbed by items concerning the case appearing in THE
PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN. The technical considerations had worried her
and the reputed lack of human charity shown by participants in the debate had made her reluctant to become a member of the denomination.
Therefore, Dr. Gilmore held that
since these matters were so disturbing to the laymen, the assembly would
do well to dispose at once of the
technical aspects of the case and then
to study the doctrinal questions in
committee. He warned of what he
termed the dangers of establishing
"extra-confessional standards of orthodoxy." </p><p>Professor Woolley took issue with
the third portion of Dr. Gilmore's
position and declared it to be contrary to the whole principle on which
The Orthodox Presbyterian Church was based. He opposed the policy of
placing the acquisition of members
above the stressing of the importance
of the doctrinal foundation of the
church, which policy he considered
Dr. Gilmore's remarks to have encouraged. Dr. Gilmore's basis for reconsideration, said Professor Woolley,
would disintegrate the church faster
than any other means. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard said that referral of
the question of amends to a committee would not establish the precedent
that a man may be unfrocked in other
than the constitutional manner - it
would make no decision whatever.
After more debate, the motion to
reconsider was finally carried. </p><p>After
additional discussion, the motion itself, which had been adopted twice
the day before, was defeated. This
brought the original motion on this
same question before the house. That
was the motion which asked that the
portion of the complaint concerned
with amends be declared unconstitutional because it seeks to depose without filing charges and without a trial. </p><p>Again there were pleas for the passage of the motion on the same
grounds as before, and those pleas
were again met by the same answers.
In the midst of the debate, Dr. Clark
suggested that if the complainants
were afraid that the transcript of his
pre-ordination examination would be
ineligible as a basis for a heresy trial,
the proposed answer to the complaint,
signed by him and others, might well
be used as grounds for charges against
him and the other members of the
committee. </p><p>The previous question finally shut
off debate, and the motion was carried by a vote of twenty-one to nine.
To avoid confusion, this motion is
here repeated: </p><p></p><blockquote>That the portion of the complaint
which requests the general assembly to
ask the Presbytery of Philadelphia to declare null and void the actions of the meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia
of July 7, 1944, re Gordon H. Clark,
Ph.D., be declared unconstitutional because it seeks in effect to depose or to
unfrock a minister of the church in good
and regular standing without filing charges
or without due process of a trial. </blockquote><p></p><p>Mr. Heerema moved "that a committee of five be elected to make a
thorough study of the doctrinal sections of the complaint in the matter
of the ordination of Dr. Clark and
make recommendations to the Thirteenth General Assembly regarding
these doctrinal charges. </p><p>Mr. Gray moved, as a substitute,
that the complaint be dismissed. </p><p>The Chaplaincy </p><p>The time was now noon, which was
the hour previously set aside for the
consideration of the work of the denomination's chaplains and for prayer
for them and the members in the
armed forces. This service had been
recommended, together with the importance of having the churches keep
in close touch with the chaplains, by
the Committee on Overtures and
Papers in reply to the following communication from the Presbytery of
California: </p><p></p><blockquote>The Presbytery of California of The
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, meeting
at San Francisco, California, April 12,
1945, made the following recommendation to the Twelfth General Assembly:
The presbytery voted to "Recommend
that the Twelfth General Assembly instruct the presbyteries to recognize the
excellent work of their chaplains and to
urge them to maintain regular correspondence with their chaplains." </blockquote><p></p><p>The service was conducted by
Chaplain A. Culver Gordon, USA,
and Chaplain E. Lynne Wade,
USNR, who told of the open door
for evangelism which was theirs in
the work of the chaplaincy. Following
the two brier talks, specific prayer was
offered by members of the assembly
on behalf of the chaplains of the
denomination, the members in the
armed services, and others serving with
the fighting forces of the nation. </p><p>Doctrinal Portion of the Complaint </p><p>Although the docket provided for
a week-end recess beginning at 12.30
Saturday, the commissioners decided
to reconvene for an afternoon session. </p><p>The motion to dismiss the complaint was substituted, by a vote of
nineteen to eight, for the motion to
refer to a committee. The assembly
was now faced with discussion of the
entire doctrinal question - a question
which Philadelphia Presbytery had debated for more than a year and which
the supporters of Dr. Clark considered
the assembly capable of settling in a
matter of hours. </p><p>Dr. Strong charged the complaint
with being a "bad document." He
said that it makes accusations not in
accordance with the facts. To demonstrate his claims, he began a series of questions directed at Dr. Clark.
The strategy, obviously unrehearsed,
was for Dr. Strong to read a paragraph from the complaint, ask Dr.
Clark whether he ever said anything
to justify the complaint's charge, and
for Dr. Clark to deny categorically
that he ever said - or even that he
ever believed - what the complaint
charged him with holding. This system of testimony was ruled in order
by the moderator, who was sustained
in that ruling by the assembly. Although Dr. Strong got no farther than
his second question, he and Dr. Clark
managed to create a general impression that the same sort of categorical
denial could be given to just about
every accusation of the complaint,
that they considered the document
libelous and without justification in
fact. </p><p>What terminated the questioning
abruptly was a call for the reading
of the stenographic transcript of
Dr. Clark's theological examination,
which record alone could supply a
valid support or denial for the charges
of the complaint. Despite additional
warning that to embark on a consideration of the doctrinal portions of
the complaint would require at least
another week of deliberation, it was
voted that the transcript be read.
Faced with that grim prospect, Mr.
Gray moved the tabling of his own
motion to dismiss the complaint, and
it was tabled by an overwhelming
majority. </p><p>Dr. Gilmore moved the "election of a committee of five, not members of Philadelphia Presbytery, to
study the following doctrines involved in the complaint, namely, the
incomprehensibility of God, the relation of intellect, will and emotions,
the divine sovereignty and human
responsibility, and the free offer of
the gospel, and report its findings to
the Thirteenth General Assembly."
The effect of this motion would be a mere study of the isolated doctrines without relation to the complaint, and the formulations of the
committee would have no constitutional status whatever. </p><p>Mr. DeWaard moved, as a substitute, that "a committee of five,
none of whom ate members of the
Presbytery of Philadelphia, be elected
by this assembly to study the doctrinal parts of the complaint of certain
members of the presbytery and report
to the Thirteenth General Assembly and that the report be distributed to
ministers and sessions at least six
weeks prior to the convening of the
general assembly." In contrast to Dr.
Gilmore's motion, this motion would
have the effect of evaluating the
doctrinal position of the complaint in
relation to the standards of the
church, and thus provide progress
toward an eventual verdict on the
validity of the complaint. </p><p>The remainder of the Saturday
session was consumed by a discussion of whether or not to substitute
the DeWaard motion for the Gilmore motion. At 3.45 the assembly
recessed for the week-end. </p><p>On Monday, after further debate,
the motion of Mr. DeWaard calling
for a committee to study the doctrinal parts of the complaint was
adopted by the assembly, and the following ministers were elected, in this
order, to that committee: John Murray; Edmund P. Clowney, convener;
Lawrence B. Gilmore; Burton L. Goddard; and Richard W. Gray. </p><p>The assembly instructed the clerk
to send mimeographed copies of the
transcript of Dr. Clark's theological
examination to ministers and sessions
as soon as possible. </p><p>Actions of the concluding three
days of the assembly will be reported
in the June 25th issue of THE PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN.</p><p>* The word "thus" was not in the
original form of the motion but was later
added by amendment.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-12938248426055273652023-07-04T15:06:00.001-04:002023-07-04T15:08:18.449-04:00Gordon Clark: [Philadelphia Presbytery Considers Clark Case] (The Presbyterian Guardian)1945. [Philadelphia Presbytery Considers Clark Case]. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>. Vol. 14. No. 7. Mar 19. Pgs. 108-112.<br /><br /><div>The Presbytery of Philadelphia of
The Orthodox Presbyterian Church
held its regular spring meeting on
March 19th in Mediator Church,
Philadelphia. The principal item of
business was the consideration of the
proposed answer to the complaint
against the actions of the presbytery
relative to the licensure and ordination
of the Rev. Gordon H. Clark, Ph.D.
Discussion of the Clark case lasted for
ten hours without reaching any final
conclusion of the matter, and presbytery adjourned at midnight to reconvene ten days later. </div><div><br /></div><div>The devotional hour was led by the
Rev. Glenn R. Coie, pastor of Knox
Church, Silver Spring, Md., and the
subject of his meditation was "Holy
Boldness."
The presbytery was called to order
at 11:30 and constituted with prayer
by the Rev. Edward L. Kellogg, moderator. Following the reading of communications, and after lengthy discussion of the docket, the presbytery
placed only two matters ahead of consideration of the Clark case. A pastoral
call from Faith Church, Lincoln,
Nebr., which had been referred from
the Presbytery of the Dakotas, was
placed in the hands of licentiate Delbert Schowalter, and an Auditing Committee was appointed. After disposal of
these two matters, the presbytery recessed for lunch. </div><div><br /></div><div>Corresponding members who were seated by the presbytery included Mr.
Mark Fakkema, general secretary of the
National Union of Christian Schools
and an elder of the Christian Reformed
Church, and all ministers and elders of
other presbyteries of The Orthodox
Presbyterian Church, of whom there
were a great many in attendance. </div><div><br /></div><div>Ruling Elder Alan Tichenor, chairman of the committee elected to answer the complaint, gave a brief report
of the committee's work. The answer
was not presented for action but was
filed with the clerk. It was merely
stated that the committee had prepared an answer, printed two hundred
copies, and distributed one hundred
twenty-five, leaving seventy-five still
available. Thus the report which takes
the form of a reply of the presbytery,
and is introduced as an answer proposed to the presbytery by the committee, was not actually proposed to
the presbytery as presbytery's answer
to the complaint. Immediately after
this brief report, Dr. Robert Strong
of Willow Grove moved that the complaint be dismissed. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Ned B. Stonehouse of Westminster Seminary then delivered a
lengthy address designed to show that
the evidence which the complainants
had presented to the presbytery in the
complaint established their claim that
various views of Dr. Clark were contrary to Scripture and the subordinate standards of the church and that there fore presbytery should make amends
by granting the pleas of the complaint.
He also attempted to prove that the
proposed answer to the complaint,
rather than setting aside the contentions of the complaint, actually went
far in confirming its substantial validity. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse accused the proposed answer of failing to set forth
accurately the theology of the complaint and asserted that many of the
charges of misrepresentations of Dr.
Clark's views "would also fall to the
ground upon a more careful reading
of the complaint." The answer, moreover, "leaves no doubt that there is a
real difference between the theology of
the complaint and the theology of Dr.
Clark." He denied that the issue revolves about Dr. Clark's declaration
that he "'accepts the Westminster
Confession of Faith.' To say that is to
make subscription to our standards a
mere formality." He also denied that
the issue was one of apologetics or that
the complainants were insisting on subscription to a particular apologetic.
"Rather," he said, "we are insisting
that theology shall be truly Scriptural,
and that there shall be no compromise
with rationalism at any point." </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse then discussed in
considerable detail the doctrine of the
knowledge of God. As there are two
levels of being, the Creator level and
the creature level, so there are two
levels of knowledge, and man's knowledge must necessarily always be analogical to God's knowledge. "Truth is
one. And man may and does know the
same truth that is in the divine mind
because of his likeness to God and because of the fact of divine revelation."
But God is also incomprehensible even
when truly known, since His revelation
of Himself is always a revelation to a
finite creature and is therefore a condescension to man's finite capacities.
Dr. Stonehouse then discussed the
concept of analogy, and stated that,
since Dr. Clark "repudiates the doctrine that man's knowledge of a particular proposition necessarily is on a
lower level than God's knowledge of
the same proposition, and insists that
knowledge of propositions must be
identical for God and man, it is clear
that he holds a view of this doctrine
sharply at variance with the Reformed
doctrine." He cited quotations from
Dr. William Brenton Greene, to whom
the answer had made strong appeal in
support of its concept of divine incomprehensibility, to prove that Dr.
Greene actually held to the view of
the complainants. </div><div><br /></div><div>The proposed answer strongly emphasizes that Dr. Clark holds that
"'the manner of God's knowing, an eternal intuition, is impossible for
man.'" Dr. Stonehouse acknowledged
this and agreed with it, but declared
that "a mere distinction as to how
knowledge is possessed does not demand the conclusion that the content
of knowledge differs:" He also held to be inadequate Dr. Clark's contention
that God's knowledge differs from
man's because God knows all the implications of any proposition, for it is
a fact that even the human mind "cannot know it as a bare proposition, apart
from an actual understanding of implications. The revelation of it to man
brings knowledge of it, but the divine
knowledge of it necessarily stands on a
different level... The distinction
drawn between propositions and their
implications does not as such establish
a qualitative difference between the
knowledge which God possesses and
that which is possible to man." </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse attacked as inadequate Dr. Clark's introduction of "infinity" into his formulation of this doctrine. For Dr. Clark, he said, it is only
the infinite number of propositions
which God knows which stands between man and the possibility of an
exhaustive knowledge of the content
of the divine mind. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse concluded his address with a detailed consideration of
the answer's treatment of a large number of Scripture passages dealing with
the doctrine under scrutiny. He maintained that the interpretation and exegesis of the answer were faulty and inadequate, and attempted to prove that
these passages of Scripture, far from
supporting Dr. Clark's position, really
supported the position of the complaint. In numerous instances he. appealed to commentators in support of
his contentions. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse was followed immediately by the Rev. Floyd E. Hamilton who, throughout the debate,
appeared to be the best informed protagonist of the theology of Dr. Clark.
"There is still misunderstanding," he
declared, "in the minds of the complainants regarding Dr. Clark's position." To try to clear up that misunderstanding, he read the following
statement, prepared by him and approved by Dr. Clark as being in agreement with his position: </div><div></div><blockquote><div>The position of the complainants regarding the incomprehensibility of God seems
to be that incomprehensibility is an incommunicable and unchangeable attribute of
God that existed before the creation of
men or angels, and is not in any way
affected by revelation to man or by man's
understanding that revelation. No matter
how much man may come to know about
God throughout eternity God will be just
as incomprehensible and His knowledge
will be just as incomprehensible to man
after aeons in eternity as it is today. God's
knowledge and His incomprehensibility are
on a different plane from man's knowledge,
and are not in any way affected by the
knowledge which man may come to enjoy
of God's revelation. They therefore hold
that it is an error to speak of God's being
"incomprehensible except as He reveals
truths concerning His nature." In using
the word "except," it is claimed that we
are impinging on the majesty of God and
bringing Him down to the level of the
creature. </div><div><br /></div><div>It would seem that in using the term
incomprehensible in this way the complainants are really confusing incomprehensible with God's omniscience and knowledge, and adding the content of these
terms to the meaning of incomprehensibility. It is perfectly true that God's omniscience and knowledge do not change in
any way through the process of revelation,
and all the knowledge that man may come
to enjoy about God throughout eternity
would not change God's omniscience in
any way. Man could not become omniscient without becoming God. God was
omniscient before creation, and His attribute of omniscience is not affected by
revelation or by the increase in man's
knowledge. But that is an entirely different
thing from saying that God is incomprehensible. The moment this word is used it
has a double reference, namely, toward
man as well as toward God. Its principal
reference however is toward man and has
to do with what man knows about God. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now there are two meanings of the
word comprehend. It means first, to apprehend, or to understand, and to say that
God is incomprehensible in this sense is to
say that man cannot understand Him. He
becomes comprehensible to man, in proportion as man understands the revelations
which God gives to man about His nature
or knowledge. It is in this sense that the
answer declares that God's nature is incomprehensible to man except as God reveals
truths to man concerning His own, nature. </div><div><br /></div><div>The other meaning of the word comprehend is to have complete and exhaustive
knowledge of an object and to place a
limit around that which is comprehended,
so that everything about it is included in
that limit. To say that God's knowledge
is incomprehensible in this sense of course is to say that man can never place limits
around the knowledge of God and can
never have a complete and exhaustive
knowledge of any phase of His knowledge,
for, in order to have such knowledge man
would have to know as God knows, with
the same mode of knowing, as well as to
know the knowledge God has in all its
relationships and implications. It would be
correct to say that God's knowledge of any
truth is always incomprehensible to man
in this sense, for if it were comprehensible
in that sense, man would have to know it
as God knows it, and to know all that God
knows about it, that is, to know all its implications and relationships to other truth.
It would also be true to say that God's
knowledge of a truth is a unitary thing, so
that the mode of His knowing, the implications and relationships to other truth all
color His knowledge of the meaning of any
individual truth. To say that, however, is
really to confuse the implications, relationships and mode of knowing with the
specific meaning of the truth itself. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now Dr. Clark's position is that if man
comprehends, or understands the meaning
of any truth, truly, that meaning is the
same for, both God and man. That meaning is not incomprehensible for man in one
sense for man understands the meaning
God places on the truth revealed to man.
That meaning is the same for God and
man. In the other sense, however, God's
knowledge of the truth is incomprehensible to man even when the meaning is the
same for God and man, for God's knowledge of the truth is God's mode of knowing the truth in all its relationships and
implications. </div><div><br /></div><div>It seems quite evident that there are two
confusions in the minds of the complainants regarding these matters: (1) In the
first place they assert of incomprehensibility what is true of omniscience when
they say that God was incomprehensible
before His works of creation. (2) At the
same time they confuse the two meanings
of comprehensible, so that when the answer uses the term in one sense they, i.e.,
the complainants, deny that position while
they really have in mind the other meaning of the word incomprehensible. For example, God's knowledge of the Trinity is
incomprehensible to man, in the sense that
man can never know it as God knows it,
cannot understand it in all its implications
and relationships and cannot enter into the
self-consciousness of God. That knowledge
will always be incomprehensible to man in
these senses. However, at the same time
man can comprehend, i.e., understand, any
revelations God may choose to give man
about the Trinity, and those revelations
have the same meaning for both God and man. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now there are two levels of <i>knowledge</i>,
one for God and the other for man but
there are not two levels of <i>truth</i>. The complaint teaches that there are two levels of
truth, when they assert that the meaning of a proposition is different for man and
for God and that these meanings do not
coincide at any point. Dr. Clark's position
is that while God's knowledge is always incomprehensible to man on God's level of
knowing, man's knowledge of a truth, if
it is correct, is true for both God and man.
In other words, man's level of knowledge
is always accessible to God for God is the
creator and preserver and controller of man,
but God's level of knowledge is inaccessible and therefore incomprehensible to
man. God however has revealed facts about
His knowledge to man, and when they arc
revealed and understood by man, they are
true for both God and man and have the
same meaning for both God and man. God
has brought the revelation of His truth
down to man's level so that man can know
it, without bringing His. i.e., God's, <i>knowledge</i> of the truth down to man's level. </div></blockquote><div></div><div>Mr. Hamilton asserted that the complaint talks about "analogical truth,"
not about "knowing truth analogically." This statement was challenged
by the complainants, and proven contrary to the facts. Mr. Hamilton then
declared that he had isolated fifty-seven
separate misrepresentations of Dr.
Clark's position in the text of the complaint. Since some of these were called
to the complainants' attention by Dr.
Clark at the November meeting of
presbytery, Mr. Hamilton contended
that the complainants should not have
printed nor circulated the complaint
until after an attempt had been made
in conference with Dr. Clark to clear
up those points. </div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Hamilton then enumerated
some of the fifty-seven alleged errors.
He insisted that Dr. Clark does not
hold that all truth in the divine mind
is always propositional; that Dr. Clark
does not hold that the divine knowledge consists of an infinite number of
propositions, but rather that God can
adduce an infinite number of propositions from His knowledge. He said
that the complaint was "almost libelous" when it averred that "'his [Dr.
Clark's] approach... is to a large extent rationalistic.''' He also charged
the complaint with being "insulting"
when it declared that, at his July examination in theology, Dr. Clark
"studiously avoided answering" a question as to whether there was any faculty in God which is neither intellectual nor volitional and which underlies
or accompanies volitional activity. It
was later pointed out by the Rev.
Arthur W. Kuschke that the complainants did not feel that Dr. Clark
was deceptively trying to avoid answering the question, or that he was afraid
to answer it, but only that he preferred
not to answer it either because he believed it irrelevant or that it would
divert attention from what he considered the main matter. No insult was
intended or implied. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. William E. Welmers clarified
the complainants' position on the matter of analogy and emphatically denied
that the complaint taught a doctrine
of two levels of truth. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Stonehouse pointed out that
the complaint did not ask for endorsement of the entire contents of the
document, but only for action on certain pleas, whereas the answer was
framed with a view to becoming in its
entirety the answer of the presbytery.
The presbytery, he said, has not yet
faced the question of what it will do
with that answer, nor had Mr. Hamilton really joined issue with the formulation of Dr. Clark's position as given
in Dr. Stonehouse's opening address of
the debate. </div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Hamilton made brief reply to
Dr. Stonehouse, after which Mr.
Kuschke discussed at considerable
length the twin problems of emotions
in God and the primacy of the intellect in man. The complaint, he said,
denied that God had emotions in the
sense of agitations, but again Mr.
Kuschke asked the question whether
there was any faculty in God, distinct
from the intellectual and the volitional,
which gives rise to volition. When
Scripture says that "God so loved the
world... ," does the word "loved"
mean only something volitional, a matter of mere unemotional choice? Or
does God really love men in the sense
of having real feelings of compassion
and pity for them? "When Dr. Clark
says God's love is a volition," declared
Mr. Kuschke, "and then speaks of
God's faculties as comprising intellect
and will, it is to be feared that he falls
far short of the meaning of God's love.
The complainants are extremely anxious that Dr. Clark should not detract
from the love of God. They don't care
what name he gives to God's love, but
they are concerned that the compassion and tender mercy of God be not
denied." </div><div><br /></div><div>The complainants believe, said Mr.
Kuschke, that God does have feelings
which are analogous to ours. He quoted
I John 4:7-10. "Each instance of the
word 'love' in this quotation, with
respect to God's love and man's, is of
the same Greek words. Surely at this place in His Word God means to
ascribe to Himself true feelings and
true love which are analogous to feelings and love in us. This we fear Dr.
Clark denies." </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Clark defines the apex of religious activity, declared Mr. Kuschke,
in terms of intellectual contemplation
of God. In contrast, the complainants
hold that glorifying God is the total
response of man's whole being to
God's manifestation of His perfections.
"Obedience and love to God," said
Mr. Kuschke, "are not less important
than intellectual contemplation; they
are not on a lower plane." Moreover,
according to Mr. Kuschke, "Dr. Clark
regards man's intellect as occupying
such high rank that the understanding
of the natural man can grasp the
meaning of the words 'Christ died for
sinners' 'with the same ease' as the
born-again man. If that is the case,
the understanding does not need to
undergo renewal like the rest of the
human personality." Mr. Kuschke
quoted and discussed at length the
statement of the proposed answer that
"regeneration, in spite of the theory of
the Complaint, is not a change in the
understanding of these words [Christ
died for sinners]." He pointed out that
the Bible teaches that all of man's
faculties are corrupted by sin, and that
every imagination of the thoughts of
man's heart is only evil continually.
"If regeneration did not change our
understanding of the words 'Christ
died for sinners,' " he declared, "then
we would never be saved!" He concluded his address in these words:
"Thus Dr. Clark's doctrine of man,
both as to the faculties of the soul and
as to the pervasive corruption of original sin, is wrong, because contrary to
the Bible and our standards. For the
fallen human intellect is corrupt and
blind; without the new birth the intellect is unable to understand the
things of God. And the Christian
ideal, even for the hereafter, is not intellectual contemplation, but rather
the total response of man's entire being to God's revelation of His glory." </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Clark then spoke for the first
time and denied that he held to "identity of man's and God's knowledge."
As for the quotation from Dr. Greene,
adduced by Dr. Stonehouse to show
that Dr. Greene did not support the
answer's view of incomprehensibility,
Dr. Clark said that he agreed with the
quotation. On the subject of emotions,
he said, "If you take the trouble to find out what I mean by emotions,
God certainly has none." </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Cornelius Van Til of Westminster Seminary then made a plea for
a serious consideration of the complaint, despite Mr. Hamilton's alleged
fifty-seven varieties of error. He made
a masterful exposition of the meaning
of analogy and its inherent proof of
incomprehensibility. He added further
light on the issue of the primacy of the
intellect, declaring that it was no mere
matter of a difference in terminology. </div><div><br /></div><div>After Dr. Van Til's speech, Dr.
Clark moved the previous question,
which, if it had passed, would have
forced an immediate vote on the motion to dismiss the complaint. Dr.
Clark's motion was lost: He followed
with a declaration that Dr. Van Til
had tried to equate his position on the
matter under discussion with that of
Plato. Dr. Clark repudiated vigorously
the position Dr. Van Til had outlined,
said that he had time and again denied
it, and that not one shred of evidence
had been adduced to prove that Dr.
Van Til was right in his allegations. </div><div><br /></div><div>Professor Woolley then briefly discussed the question of the legality of
the July 7th meeting, and followed
this with a discussion of the effect
upon the witness of the church that
would result from any attempt to carry
through the Clarkian emphasis on the
primacy of the intellect to its logical
conclusion. He cited the history of the
development of the New England theology as proof of the devastation that
would follow an insistence upon making logical consistency the final test of
doctrine, and said that now was the
time for this tendency to be nipped
in the bud. </div><div><br /></div><div>Professor R. B. Kuiper discussed Dr.
Clark's attempt to solve the paradoxes
of divine sovereignty and human responsibility and of the decree of reprobation and the universal sincere offer
of the gospel. He said that Dr. Clark
does not recognize that there are paradoxes which are intrinsically paradoxical to man because of his very finiteness. A doctrine, said Professor Kuiper,
may be revealed in Scripture and yet
the human mind be incapable of fully
comprehending it. This is a far cry
from the notion that God is incomprehensible except as He reveals truths
concerning His own nature, and that
when the Scriptures teach that God
is unsearchable, they mean merely that
God is unsearchable in so far as man
by his own unaided efforts cannot search out His understanding. </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Clark made brief and violent
reply in which he designated the attack on his position as "a matter of
persistent misrepresentation. The answer is printed, he said, "and I have
nothing further to say." </div><div><br /></div><div>A substitute motion, that the answer of the committee be made the
answer of the presbytery, was defeated
as a substitute. The previous question was again moved and again failed to
carry by the needed two-thirds vote, so
that debate was continued. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Rev. George T. Marston reread the statement which Mr. Hamilton had prepared and with which Dr.
Clark had expressed himself in agreement, and asked the complainants to
comment upon it. The Rev. Leslie W.
Sloat objected that an answer had been
prepared by the committee but that
the committee had made no attempt
to have its printed answer considered
for adoption; instead, a wholly new
document which no one had had an
opportunity to study had been introduced by one individual, and the complainants were now being asked to discuss it as representing Dr. Clark's
position. </div><div><br /></div><div>The Rev. Franklin S. Dyrness said,
"We should be sane and sensible in
facing this matter." He declared that
the presbytery was not in session to
consider the answer but to examine
the complaint. The presbytery had
really been indulging in a reexamination of Dr. Clark. He referred to Mr.
Hamilton's allegation of fifty-seven
errors in the complaint and to a previous speaker's statement that they
were not in reality of central importance. "If those items were not important," he asked, "why did the complainants put them in the complaint?"
He cited Dr. Clark's denial that the
complaint gives a fair representation of
his position, and pled for fairness and
honesty. </div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Marston felt that. while the
complaint and the answer had been
widely circulated, the presbyters had
never had what they really needed
most-an opportunity for each one to
have his own copy of the transcript of
the record of Dr. Clark's theological
examination, on which both the complaint and the answer had been based.
"Without it," he asked, "how can we
judge?" </div><div><br /></div><div>After recessing for dinner, the presbytery voted down a motion to postpone further consideration until after mimeographing and circulating the
written speeches which had been delivered by several of the complainants
and by Mr. Hamilton. </div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Hamilton then again rose to deliver another paper on the relation between regeneration and human understanding, which again he said had
received Dr. Clark's approval. Confusion was injected, however, by the
interpolation of some of Mr. Hamilton's own observations which had not
been approved by Dr. Clark. In the
course of the speech, Mr. Hamilton
declared that <i>notitia</i> (knowledge) and
<i>assensus</i> (assent) could be possessed
by the unregenerate man but that
<i>fiducia</i> (trust) could not. These are
three theological terms to designate
the three elements of saving faith. Mr.
Hamilton was promptly challenged for
holding that the unregenerate man
possesses two-thirds of the elements of
saving faith. On this position, said the
complainants, the only thing wrong
with the unregenerate man is that his
saving faith is one-third incomplete.
Moreover, since the answer terms assent the central element in faith, the
unregenerate man might then, on Mr.
Hamilton's position, be said to possess
the central element of saving faith. </div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Hamilton then said that he had
just been told that Dr. Clark would
not agree that the unregenerate man
was in possession of the first two of
the three elements, but only of the
first. It then became clear that this portion of Mr. Hamilton's speech was
his own interpolation and had not received Dr. Clark's agreement. It
seemed also that Mr. Tichenor, chairman of the committee, held to a different conception of the subject from
that which had been defended by Mr.
Hamilton. </div><div><br /></div><div>The supporters of Dr. Clark's theology made valiant effort to defend the
statement of the answer that "regeneration... is not a change in the
understanding of these words [Christ
died for sinners]." Mr. Kuschke, on
the other hand, defended the position
of the complaint and pointed out that,
when content is injected into the sentence, the unregenerate man must invariably inject the wrong content and
the regenerate man the true content. </div><div><br /></div><div>The complainants' contention that
Dr. Clark apparently was reluctant to
characterize the free offer of the gospel
as "sincere" was discussed after Dr.
Clark had left the meeting. In the
course of debate Mr. Tichenor said that in his own opinion Dr. Clark
would probably interpret as referring
only to the elect the following two
passages: "God our Saviour, who will
have all men to be saved, and to come
unto the knowledge of the truth" (I
Tim. 2:3, 4) and "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the
death of the wicked; but that the
wicked turn from his way and live:
turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways;
for why will ye die; a house of Israel?"
(Ezek. 33:11). </div><div><br /></div><div>Dr. Edward J. Young of Westminster Seminary gave a detailed and carefully worked out exegesis of many of
the Old Testament passages dealing
with the doctrine of incomprehensibility, but lack of space forbids an inclusion of them in this report. </div><div><br /></div><div>The question was again called for.
Professor Woolley had already reminded the presbyters that they should
vote for the motion to dismiss the
complaint only if they were completely
satisfied that Dr. Clark's theology was
a proper presentation of the-Reformed
Faith. </div><div><br /></div><div>A roll call vote was taken, showing a
tie vote of twenty to twenty, which
meant that the motion to dismiss the
complaint was lost. </div><div><br /></div><div>Since there was obviously little
chance of completing the business of
the presbytery at this session, the meeting was adjourned until 11 A.M. on
Thursday, March 29th.</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-54712500382458217252023-06-30T14:53:00.000-04:002023-06-30T14:53:10.531-04:00Gordon Clark: Statement of Protest (The Presbyterian Guardian)<p>1944. Statement of Protest. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>. Vol. 14, No. 2. pgs. 25-26. Nov 20.</p><p>As a matter of personal privilege I
desire at this time to protest against the misrepresentations of the Complaint that
has just been read. It was not until November 6, 1944 that I was able to obtain
a copy of a copy of the Complaint. With
the unusual pressure of duties during
this month I have not had time to prepare a full reply; and if I had, there would
hardly be time enough today to read it.
Hence this briefest possible statement
does not discuss the poor logic of the
Complaint, but merely protests against the
most salient misrepresentations. </p><p>On page 20 of my copy of the Complaint I read, "Clark holds that man's
knowledge of any proposition," if it is
really knowledge, is identical with God's
knowledge of the same proposition."
This statement is false. Nothing I have
said or written supports this false statement. I have always carefully explained
that man's knowledge of a proposition
and God's knowledge of a proposition
are radically and completely different.
The series of conclusions based on this false statement therefore does not represent my views at all. </p><p>On page 36 I read in my copy: "A
recollection of Dr. Clark's forthright
denial of anything that might be called
'emotion' in God, cited above, will thus
impress us . . ." I never made any such
sweeping denial, and no citation justifies
the complainants' statement. The tissue
of distortion woven around this false
statement of the complainants seriously
misrepresents what I have said and written. And that their charge against me is
false may be seen from their own significant confession on page 51. It reads,
"In this connection reference must again
be made to Dr. Clark's view that God
has no emotions, If his definition of
emotions be granted, God certainly has
none." In other words, they admit that
if attention is paid to what I actually
said or wrote, my doctrine will be seen
to be correct. Note also that my definition of emotion is not some queer,
a priori oddity, as is suggested on page
29, but is based on that in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. </p><p>The lengthy quotations of the Complaint are sometimes beside the point and
sometimes they definitely support my
position. If I can publish a full reply,
other passages will be adduced from men
such as Charnock, Witsius, Augustus
Toplady, and others to show my accord
with the historic position of Calvinism. </p><p>On page 40 I read, "there is not one
shred of evidence that man's religious
activity undergoes any qualitative change
through regeneration. That bears all the
earmarks of rationalism, humanistic intellectualism. It seems to share the very
same vicious independence from God..." These intemperate words may perhaps be referred to a faulty memory. In
the first, six-hour examination before
Presbytery I was questioned on regeneration, and my views, substantially those
of John Laidlaw in <i>The Bible Doctrine of
Man</i>, were judged satisfactory. For this
reason the subject received little or no
attention in the second examination.
How could there then be many shreds
of evidence in the transcript of the second examination? And because the Presbytery, the complainants included, did
not ask questions about regeneration, I
am now charged with "rationalism, humanistic intellectualism. . . vicious independence from God." </p><p>Because of the ambiguities in the complainants' argument and because of the
many details it is no less difficult to reply
briefly to the remainder of the Complaint. Exegesis is involved. Discussion
would be required as to how much "by
good and necessary consequence may be
deduced from Scripture." Is not the
setting of a limit a claim to have exhausted the Bible? Is it not a claim that
every implication of every verse has been
discovered? Discussion would also be
required as to whether logic were merely human or whether it is a divine gift - the light that lighteth every man that
cometh into the world. Comparison
would have to be made between the
ambiguous statements and questions of
the complainants on the sincere offer
of the gospel and the very precise and
acceptable language of R. L. Dabney.
Also the several distinct meanings of
human freedom and their differing implications, which the complainants fail
to consider, would require analysis; as
also the principle they seem to adopt,
viz: that a man, to be subject to God's
Word, must fail to understand it. These
points. all occur in the last two sections of
the Complaint. </p><p>There is no doubt a difference between my views and those of the complainants. On page 20, after the false
statement quoted above and just after
another statement that in no way represents my views, the Complaint concludes,
"a proposition would (therefore) have to
have the same meaning for man as for
God." Do the complainants deny that a
proposition has the same meaning for
God and man? Now, I believe in the
doctrine of verbal inspiration and inerrancy. The proposition "Christ died for
our sins" has a single definite meaning.
The words are plain. To say that God
places some other undiscoverable meaning upon these words, perhaps that God
means Christ did not die for our sins,
is to empty the Bible of all truth and to
deny that it really reveals God's mind. I
am content to believe that God means
what he says.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-77879845883779587002023-06-30T12:04:00.003-04:002023-06-30T12:05:02.922-04:00Gordon Clark: Resolution Against Purported "Discipline" (The Presbyterian Guardian)<div>The following resolution, read by Clark, was one which was unanimously adopted by the Philadelphia Presbytery of which he was a member. </div><div><br /></div> 1936. Resolution Against Purported "Discipline." Knox Presbyterian Church. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>. Vol. 2. No. 8. June 30. Pg. 181.<div><br /></div><div>"Inasmuch as it has been reported in
the daily press that the body known as
the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the
body known as the Presbytenan Church
in the U.S.A. has purported to 'depose,' or otherwise discipline ministers who are
members of this Presbytery and of the
Presbyterian Church of America, a sovereign ecclesiastical body; Be it resolved as follows; </div><div><br /></div><div>"(1) That this Presbytery of Philadelphia of the Presbyterian Church of
America calls the attention of the public,
all ecclesiastical bodies and all the civil
authorities who may have a proper interest in this matter, to the resolution
adopted by the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church of America concerning this subject: 'The First General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of
America, having had brought before it
questions concerning the status of certain persons under its jurisdiction, and
being cognizant of the facts in these
cases, does authoritatively declare and
adjudicate as follows: 1. The final judgments of the 148th General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
in Judicial Cases 1-5 before that body,
were, in our judgment, contrary to the
Bible, to the Protestant genius of the
Reformed Churches, and in violation of
the Constitution of the' Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. These judgments
amounted to a substitution of the word
of man for the Word of God. Since any
action of any judicatory which is contrary to the Word of God cannot be held
to be the lawful act of a church which
acknowledges the Bible as its primary
standard, we believe the action in these
cases to have been void ab initio, and to
have been merely a pretended adjudication. 2. Concerning those ministers, parties in the cases cited above, who are
now under the jurisdiction of the Presbyterian Church of America, this General
Assembly hereby formally declares them
to be ministers of the Gospel in this
church in good and regular standing with
all the rights, privileges, and duties pertaining to lawfully ordained ministers.
3. Since certain ministers now under our jurisdiction did, on June 8, 1936, withdraw from the body claiming and bearing
the title of the Presbyterian Church in
the U.S.A., and did send notice thereof
to the presbyteries of that body in which
they had until then been members, be it
declared and adjudged by this General
Assembly (a) That it is the inalienable
right of any minister, elder, deacon, or
layman to withdraw from any body claiming to be a branch of the visible church
of Christ, such withdrawal to be immediately effective, if in the judgment of
the person concerned there are sufficient
reasons for such action. To deny this
right is to affirm that a member of an
essentially voluntary religious body' may
be held in it against his will, which would,
we believe, be a denial of the first principles of civil and religious liberty. (b)
That any so-called infliction of ecclesiastical censure made by any body upon
persons who have before the alleged infliction of such censure severed their
connection with the organization in question is only a pretended infliction, null
and void entirely. (c) That any further
action on the part of any of the judicatories claiming the name and rights of
the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
against any minister, elder, deacon, or
member of this church will be deemed an unwarranted, presumptuous, and unlawful interference by one religious body in
the internal affairs of another. Ministers,
elders, deacons, and members of the Presbyterian Church of America are under
the sole and exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the judicatories of this church.
Ecclesiastical actions concerning them by
the courts of any other religious body are
hereby declared null and void. 4. All censures inflicted by the courts of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. upon any of
the defendants in Judicial Cases 1-5 mentioned above are by the action of this
Assembly as the supreme judicatory of
this church, terminated, lifted, and declared at an end. 5. The provisions of
this action are hereby declared to extend
to all parties concerned who shall be- come ministers or members of the Presbyterian Church of America, thus submitting to its jurisdiction, before the next
General Assembly.' </div><div><br /></div><div>"(2) That this Presbytery declares
that the following ministers, whom the
body known as the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the body known as the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. has
purported to "depose" are not deposed,
have never been deposed, cannot be deposed by the body mentioned above which
has no jurisdiction over them, and that
they are lawfully-ordained ministers of
the Presbyterian Church of America;
The Rev. H. McAllister Griffiths, the
Rev. E. H. Rian, the Rev. Charles J.
Woodbridge, the Rev. Paul Woolley. </div><div><br /></div><div>"(3) That this Presbytery declares
that the following ministers are members
of the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the
Presbyterian Church of America, subject
to the jurisdiction of this church alone,
and that any so-called acts of "discipline"
purportedly done against any or all of
them by any other ecclesiastical body
whatsoever are unlawful, null and void: </div><div><br /></div><div>Dean W. Adair </div><div>Carl Ahlfeldt </div><div>Philip B. Arcularius </div><div>Robert K. Churchill </div><div>John P. Clelland </div><div>Bruce A. Coie </div><div>Calvin K. Cummings </div><div>Peter De Ruiter </div><div>Everett C. DeVelde </div><div>Albert B. Dodd </div><div>Franklin S. Dyrness </div><div>Frank L. Fiol </div><div>W. K. Fleck
David Freeman </div><div>A. Culver Gordon </div><div>Robert H. Graham </div><div>H. McAllister Griffiths </div><div>R. Laird Harris </div><div>R. Moody Holmes </div><div>Bruce F. Hunt </div><div>J. Gresham Machen </div><div>Allan A. MacRae </div><div>George W. Marston </div><div>Robert S. Marsden </div><div>Thomas H. Mitchell </div><div>Edwin H. Rian </div><div>Charles G. Sterling </div><div>N. B. Stonehouse </div><div>John B. Thwing </div><div>Kelly G. Tucker </div><div>Cornelius Van Til </div><div>Peter F. Wall </div><div>Henry G. Welbon </div><div>Charles E. Wideman </div><div>Charles J. Woodbridge </div><div>Paul Woolley </div><div>V. V. Wortman </div><div><br /></div><div>"(4) That this Presbytery declares
that the purported acts of dieipline of the
body in question are an unwarranted,
presumptuous and unlawful interference
by one religious body in the internal
affairs of another."
</div>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-30373942666009684622023-06-30T11:39:00.008-04:002023-07-04T14:31:06.080-04:00Gordon Clark: [PHILA. PRESBYTERY HEARS COMPLAINT IN CLARK CASE] (The Presbyterian Guardian)1944. [PHILA. PRESBYTERY HEARS COMPLAINT IN CLARK CASE]. <i>The Presbyterian Guardian</i>. Dec. 10. Pgs. <p>THE regular meeting of the Presbytery of Philadelphia of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church was held on Monday, November 20th, at Eastlake
Church, Wilmington, Del. The morning devotional service was conducted
by the Rev. Samuel J. Allen of Philadelphia. </p><p>The Rev. Glenn R. Coie, pastor-elect of Knox Church, Silver Spring,
Md., was received from the Presbytery
of California. Mr. David W. Kerr, a
senior at Westminster Seminary, was
examined and taken under care of presbytery as a candidate for the gospel
ministry. The amendment to the Book
of Discipline, Chapter II, Section 3,
proposed by the last general assembly,
was approved by the presbytery. </p><p>By far the largest portion of the day
was consumed in hearing and intaking actions in connection with a complaint filed by thirteen members of the
presbytery against actions of that body
in the matter ·of the licensure and ordination of the Rev. Gordon H. Clark,
Ph.D. </p><p>The actions complained against
were taken in connection with the
meeting of presbytery on July 7, 1944.
The complaint, which was read in full
to the presbytery, states that in the
opinion of the complainants the meeting itself was illegal and that the theological views of Dr. Clark as indicated
in his examination were of such a character as not to warrant presbytery in
proceeding to his licensure and ordination. </p><p>In support of the claim that the
meeting itself was illegal, the complainants state that it was called as a
special meeting, but that there was no
good reason why a special meeting
should have been called, since the matter was neither an emergency nor
something newly arisen since the previous meeting of presbytery. The history of the calling of special meetings
in the Presbyterian Church in the
U. S. A. from 1789 to 1936 is reviewed, as well as the special meetings
of the Presbytery of Philadelphia since
its formation, with a view to showing
that the calling of a special meeting
for a purpose such as this has no
parallel in the past. In support of the
second part of the complaint, four
considerations were advanced, which
are summarized near, the end of the
text of the complaint itself as follows:
"The very doctrine of God is undermined by a failure to maintain a
qualitative distinction between the
knowledge of God and the knowledge
possible to man, thus denying the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of
God and impinging in a most serious
fashion upon the transcendence of the
Creator over the creature. The interpretation of Christianity as being
fundamentally intellectualism subordinates the volition to the intellect in a
manner that is flagrantly in violation
of the teaching of Scripture and of the
Reformed theology. Similarly emotion
as an element in the mind of God and
in the mind of the Christian is disallowed. And the views concerning
human responsibility and of the free
offer of the gospel likewise clearly
affect decisively one's conception of
matters that are of the greatest possible moment to every Christian. </p><p>"Nor do these errors concern only
isolated details. In all of these matters
there is manifest a rationalistic approach to Christian theology. The
highest activity in man is the intellectual activity; his. highest goal is the
intellectual contemplation of God. In
connection with his answer, to the
question as to the extent to which man
may comprehend God, Clark admits
the dependence of man upon the revelation of God but, on the basis of a
rationalistic dialectic, maintains that
any knowledge that man possesses of
any item must coincide with God's
knowledge of the same item in order
to be true knowledge, thus failing to
distinguish with respect to content between the Creator's knowledge of any
thing and creaturely knowledge of the same thing. And, even though he speaks of the infinity of God's knowledge, he does not rise above a quantitative distinction between the content
of the knowledge of God and the content of the knowledge which man may
possess. And in pursuance of his effort
to penetrate into the mind of God he
sets aside, or attempts to set aside, by
resort to reason, the paradoxes which
Reformed theology has recognized as
existing for the human mind between
the divine foreordination and human
responsibility and between predestination and the divine offer of salvation
to all men, with the consequences that
the doctrines of human responsibility
and of the free offer of salvation to all
fail to be set forth in any adequate
way. These innovations are then not
curiosities of an innocent sort, but
concern some of the most central doctrines of the Christian faith, including
even the all-decisive subject of the doctrine of God. And the result of this
rationalistic approach to theology is a
failure to maintain the balanced, comprehensively Biblical, character of historic, classic Calvinism which is set
forth in the standards of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church." </p><p>The complaint was signed by John
Wistar Betzold; Eugene Bradford;
R. B. Kuiper; LeRoy B. Oliver; N. B.
Stonehouse; Murray Forst Thompson;
William E. Welmers; Paul Woolley;
Cornelius Van Til; Edward J. Young;
David Freeman; Arthur W. Kuschke,
Jr.; and in a limited fashion by Leslie
W. Sloat. </p><p>Following the reading of the complaint, Dr. Clark read a brief statement in lieu of a full answer which he
had not yet had time to prepare. He
charged that the complaint was characterized by "poor logic", "false statement", "intemperate words", and
"ambiguities", while remarking at the
end, "There is no doubt a difference between my views and those of the
complainants"; </p><p>The presbytery elected the following members to serve as a committee
to reply to the complaint, with instructions to report to the presbytery not
later than March 19, 1945, and to prepare the reply for distribution to the
presbyters at least two weeks prior to
the meeting: Ministers: Gordon H.
Clark; Robert Strong; Floyd E. Hamilton; and Edwin H. Rian. Elder:
Charles A. Tichenor. </p><p>An overture had been received from
the session of Calvary Church, Willow
Grove, asking that the presbytery request THE PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN
not to publish the text of the complaint. After lengthy debate, the presbytery, by the close vote of fourteen
to thirteen, advised THE PRESBYTERIAN
GUARDIAN not to publish the complaint until an answer had been prepared. </p><p>Although THE PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN is not including the text of the
complaint in the magazine, it is glad
to announce that the full text is being
privately printed and that copies may
be had at ten cents each upon application to THE PRESBYTERIAN GUARDIAN,
1505 Race Street, Philadelphia 2, Pa. </p><p>Attention is also called to the editorial, "Issues and Convictions", .on
page 349 of this copy of the GUARDIAN.</p>Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.com0