Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's second chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.
The Test of Reason
I agreed with most if not all of what I read in the first three sub-sections of this chapter ("Introduction," "Examples of Self-Refuting Claims," and "Axioms and Presuppositions"). One test of first principles for which Clark advocated was the test of reason. I would say that the test of reason is a good apologetic tool because it remarks upon the nature of truth: truths are mutually consistent, not mutually inconsistent. This is a characteristic of what truth is, and to defend one's worldview on such grounds is reasonable.
As Mr. Lazar notes, "self-contradiction is a sure sign of error." If the first principle of a worldview is self-contradictory, then it is "self-referentially incoherent" and "refutes itself." It is false. So long as one views this test as an apologetic test rather than an epistemic one (and that epistemology grounds apologetics, not vice versa), I would have little more to add. I was particularly pleased that Mr. Lazar pointed out that archaeological "evidence" has a role within Clark's apologetic, even though "ad hominem" and "elenctic" (link).
However, as I mentioned in my last review, I do believe that Mr. Lazar views the test of reason as an epistemic test, at least for the Scripturalist. Not only does he view Scripturalism as falsifiable, but he thinks Scripturalism actually "fails the test of reason." As a presuppositionalist, Clark did "assume" the truth of Christianity - but he did not thereby imply that Christianity could be false: "Logically the infallibility of the Bible is not a theorem to be deduced from some prior axiom. The infallibility of the Bible is the axiom from which several doctrines are themselves deduced as theorems" (What Do Presbyterians Believe? 1985, pg. 18). As Clark said, "my skepticism ends where divine revelation
begins" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 258). Likewise, I point out, for example, here (emphasis added):
...I think special divine revelation - the extant extent of which is concretely codified in the Scriptures - is the premise with which one must begin in order to intentionally defend his beliefs with full assurance. This is not to say that my arguments are reasons for this foundational belief, but as Gordon Clark put it, by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged. If an axiom doesn't produce a sufficiently coherent system, can't account for certain worldview necessities, isn't sufficiently explanatory - however you want to phrase it - the axiom itself fails to give us knowledge of the infallibilist and internalist variety. Of course, one may object that we need any such knowledge, which is itself another discussion, one about needs. One can also be mistaken in his judgment, and the "tests" - for the present lack of a better term - do not imply that the falsifiability of an axiom is a live possibility. Yet there is practical use for these tests, and apologists ought to be in the business of being practical whenever possible.
I wrote the above years before Mr. Lazar's book was published. What I am arguing about Clark and Scripturalism is not ad hoc. I truly think an understanding of the epistemology-apologetics distinction I mentioned in my previous review is fundamental to grasping why some of Mr. Lazar's criticisms miss the mark.
For Clark, the test of reason is not a test by which to epistemically justify the truth of his axiom. "This justification of axioms" would be "the
fallacy of asserting the consequent," as Clark suspects Spinoza or other rationalists did (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 24-25). Now, Mr. Lazar may not believe that Clark's Scripturalism accurately reflects divine revelation, so he can attempt a critique along those lines; my only point here is how Clark would have regarded his own position.
Having already covered that ground in my last post, I think it would be more useful to spend time evaluating Mr. Lazar's thoughts on the relationship and distinction between Clark's epistemic source of knowledge and his means of knowing the content of that source.
Epistemic Sources and Means of Knowledge
The arguments in Mr. Lazar's second chapter seem neatly divisible into two categories: against certain phrasings of the epistemic axiom of Scripturalism – one's epistemic "source" of knowledge – and against certain Scripturalist's account of one's epistemic "means" of knowledge. The distinction between one's source[s] of knowledge and means of knowing is one I have written about elsewhere (link):
A source of knowledge is something from which we acquire knowledge. Means of knowledge outline the process or processes by which we acquire knowledge from sources of knowledge.
If a person is to know what are the means by which he obtains knowledge, it is fairly obvious this must be accounted for by his sources of knowledge. The primary question, then, is what is or are one’s source[s] of knowledge. Whether this or these sources account for the alleged means of obtaining knowledge is only answerable after this primary question has been answered. It may turn out that whether a source or sources are able to account for the means of obtaining knowledge can help us sort through which of the various proposed sources of knowledge are viable, but first things first.
In other words, when examining a worldview, you have to start with the alleged source[s] of knowledge. What one claims as his source[s] of knowledge functions as his stated sufficient condition for knowledge (link).
Our ability to test such source[s] is limited to examining whether or not they are “self-consistent,” which encompasses multiple evaluative procedures that an apologist can undertake, including but not limited to answering if the source self-attesting, if it provides a theory of knowledge, language, metaphysics, and ethics, and if any of the answers it provides mutually exclusive.
The discussion that follows below takes for granted that the reader has read this post. In it, I discuss in what meta-epistemic context one's epistemic sources and means of knowledge are, for Gordon Clark, seemingly meant to function (with a few additional thoughts of my own). With this context in mind, I turn to the evaluation of the remainder of Mr. Lazar's chapter on "The Test of Reason."
Source[s] of Knowledge
In the first few paragraphs of a subheading entitled, "Clark's Unclear Axiom," Mr. Lazar quotes several isolated statements by Clark in which different words are used to express his epistemic axiom. Mr. Lazar believes these statements could mean different things. I'm not so sure that is true, since we can't seriously think, for example, that Clark would have used the word "revelation" as Muslim would have. That is, context matters.
I will return to the question of "vagueness" later to provide some thoughts of my own, but that context matters is a point Clark himself made to Mavrodes long ago. The words used to express the axiom are not words "without content" or "empty." Clark's words intentionally referred to certain meanings. Thus, my initial reaction was the same as one Mr. Lazar himself anticipates: "You might think I'm being uncharitable to Clark, and that if you put those statements together, the general idea is clear enough: the Scripturalist takes the Bible as his axiom." If he had stopped on this note, Mr. Lazar's point thus far could have been well-taken: in our own explanation of our beliefs, we really ought to try to be as clear as possible.
Instead, Mr. Lazar continues in his criticism to say that the above "general idea" is "not what Clark meant (not exactly). Instead, what Clark meant was that Scripturalism takes the Bible as the only source of truth." Thus, the first argument against "Scripturalism" that Mr. Lazar makes is as follows: "The Scripturalist axiom states the Bible is our only source of truth, however, that is not a Biblical claim... Therefore, the axiom refutes itself, making it self-referentially incoherent. Scripturalism fails the test of reason..."
Here's the problem: Mr. Lazar does not produce any statement by Clark in support of the above, and I don't believe he can. What we instead find are quotes from other authors. I seem to recall that one of these authors does not even profess to be a Scripturalist (Cheung). While Mr. Lazar says that he will "leave [whether Clark had developed a new theory of knowledge] for the historians to debate," I was left with the feeling that a bait and switch had occurred. I had thought that what was going to be analyzed was what, as Mr. Lazar himself says, "Clark meant" - not what later Scripturalists either wrongly inferred or haphazardly phrased.
To be fair, readers should agree that Mr. Lazar is correct in his criticism of W. G. Crampton: the Bible does not have "a systematic monopoly on truth." God Himself clearly knows things that He hasn’t revealed in the Bible, such as when the Lord will come (Matthew 24:42). Jesus performed and communicated more to his disciples than what was written (John 20:30), and unless Jesus was mute until adulthood, we can say the same about things He told His earthly family as a child. Instead, God – or, rather, the Trinity – possess a monopoly on truth: therefore, what they reveal to us is the extent of what we can know. The Bible just is the extent of what has been revealed, so it is the extent of what we can know (again, keeping in mind that "knowledge" means something definitive and along the lines of what I argue in the aforementioned, linked post on meta-epistemology).
...a Christian university should commit itself to the proposition that the triune, sovereign God, the creator and preserver of the universe, is the source of all truth, that as revealed in the Scriptures he directs the course of history to its determined end, and that the chief end of man is to glorify him... (The Philosophy of the Modern University)
It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. (A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005, pgs. 182-183)
Christ said, “I am the door”; but he did not mean that he was made of wood. Christ also said, “This is my body.” Romanists think he spoke literally; Presbyterians take the sentence figuratively. Similarly the statement, “I am…the truth,” must be taken to mean, I am the source of truth; I am the wisdom and Logos of God; truths are established by my authority. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 34-37)
In a broad sense, all Christians could and should say the ontological source of truth (and knowledge) is the Trinity, for they are the ontological source of all things. But the propositional, divine revelation particularly codified in the Bible is our sole, current epistemic source of "knowing" ontological (or any) truths insofar as it is the extant extent of divine revelation. It is the epistemic foundation for the extant extent of what we can know to be true:
The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation of the notion that theology has several sources such as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion, or psychology. There is but one source, the Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. Under the word truth there is included, in opposition to irrationalism, logic and the law of contradiction. Whatever contradicts itself is not truth. Truth must be consistent, and it is clear that Scripture does not both affirm and deny an atonement. God is truth. Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life. (How Does Man Know God?)
There is a difference between highlighting a source where truth currently is to be "found" (read: "known") and who the sources of truth ultimately and ontologically are. To show the difference, the Trinity will always be the ontological source[s] of truth. But sola scriptura will not be true forever, for Scripture will not always be the sole location from which we can find (know) truth. Even Clark recognized this:
...no limit is placed on the knowledge redeemed men man acquire in heaven. If the redeemed are to know as God knows them, it would seem that God will reveal a much greater amount of knowledge in the future life than we now expect. Furthermore this verse implies that though our present knowledge is partial, it is nevertheless true knowledge of the same meaning that God has. (The Answer, 1944, pgs. 13-14).
That is, the more abstract formulation of a Scripturalist's epistemic foundation (say, an appeal to "divine revelation" in general rather than the "Bible" in particular) will never change. But our concrete epistemic foundation will change, for Scripture alone does not comprise the entirety of what will ever be divinely revealed, only what is currently revealed. More knowledge is yet to come, for more divine revelation is yet to come.
But we must note that the concrete revelation we do have is not something we epistemically reason towards discovering, so referring to it (the Bible/Scriptures/codified propositional content) in our formulation of our epistemic axiom is not only understandably motivated, it is legitimate. We can qualify such formulations by noting that when divine revelation expands, so too will our epistemic foundation. To use a few quotes from Clark that Mr. Lazar brings up to illustrate, perhaps it's more digestible to distinguish our epistemic axiom in the following way:
Concrete formulation: "[L]et the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures." (How Does Man Know God?)
Abstract formulation: "[R]evelation should be accepted as our axiom." (An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, 1993, pg. 59)
Denotatively, these currently refer to the same thing: the content of Scripture. For only Scripture has been currently divinely revealed to us. But the latter formulation is generic enough to allow that the scope of the concrete formulation can broaden to include future divine revelations which will also be axiomatically knowable. Both formulations are true in that both new divine revelation (that will come in the future) and current divine revelation can be known axiomatically or apart from inference. Both formulations overlap in the propositional content they currently reference. It's just that the former content is static (Scripture will always remain Scripture) and the latter content is capable of expanding on the former content in the future.
Vagueness
To return to the question of vagueness or [lack of] clarity, perhaps this explains why Mr. Lazar believes Clark's formulation to be vague: to capture both our present circumstances and potential future ones, a Scripturalist might oscillate between concrete and abstract expressions of his axiom. Whether or not this was true of Clark, Scripturalists should find this to be a good thought for future consideration.
In any case, I argue that the basic thrust of the axiom and what Clark says is clear enough, however we end up parsing or attempting to fine-tune it. We can agree that there is a more precise way to state the axiom of Scripturalism... just as there is a more precise way to phrase most other statements we make. For example, this blog could probably be more clear!
Nevertheless, we can't necessarily call vagueness a failure of the test of reason for the same reason that we can't refer to Paul's difficult sayings in Scripture (2 Peter 3:16) to be due to a failure of the test of reason. Rather, these difficulties may be expected due to the deep questions being asked. Sometimes, clarity requires background knowledge. Other times, vagueness is even useful: think of double entendres. Vagueness is important so that both meanings can be communicated with one line. Similarly, in this context, we want both the concrete and abstract formulations of our axiom communicated. Regardless, in the whole of his works, Clark does define, elaborate on, or specify the relevant terms Mr. Lazar questions.
History and Apologetics
In conclusion, Scripturalism does not fail the test of reason here, for it is not self-referentially incoherent. Or, at least, Mr. Lazar's attempted blow may hit the mark against some disciples of Clark, but from what I've read, speaking of "Clark's later formulation of the axiom" is historically inaccurate, for there is no such thing.
One can't leave a critical point of historical accuracy for "historians to debate" when one's criticisms of a person depend on historical accuracy. Likewise, it would hardly be fair for me to say that Mr. Lazar revised his position based on what some readers of his book say, attack that position, and leave it to others to decide whether Mr. Lazar himself even believed what I attacked.
Should Mr. Lazar provide evidence that Clark himself did change his axiom or was imprecise at certain points, I would have no problem admitting that (so long as I understand such evidence rightly). Lord knows I've criticized Clark as much as anyone else! That is because I respect the man and his work, as I believe Mr. Lazar does. Because we both respect him, when we criticize him, we should be careful to depict his thoughts as they were, not as others have construed them to be.
[Side Note: Mr. Lazar references extra-Scriptural knowledge as a reason for considering the Scripturalist's axiom to be self-referentially incoherent. I will interact with this more so when reviewing chapters 7 and 8 of the book, chapters to which Mr. Lazar also defers when making this reference. To briefly anticipate: if we construe "knowledge" to refer to a certain kind - along the lines of what I mention in my post on Clark and meta-epistemology linked above - I believe any perceived tension in the Scripturalist's epistemic axiom evaporates. Analogously, a Scripturalist can and should accept that husband can sexually "know" his wife without inference of such from Scripture. The kind of "knowledge" we are speaking about in different contexts is important and why Scripturalists should be more precise about and interested in what sort of epistemic "knowledge" they intend to apologetically defend.]
Means of Knowledge
In any case, Mr. Lazar quotes Ronald Nash favorably: "In order to know what the Bible says, I must be able to read it with my eyes or hear it with my ears or touch the braille with my fingers. But this is sense perception." The issue at hand is that Clark rejects sensation as a means of knowledge. The criticism is that Scripture is physical. It is writ. That writ corresponds to propositions, but it is not itself propositions. So how do you "get" the propositions from the physical writ if you reject sensation as a means of knowledge? Mr. Lazar cites Crampton’s following argument as Clark's response:
Since all knowledge is propositional, and since the senses in interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation. Rather, as noted above, the senses seem to stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition, to attend to or to recollect the God-given innate ideas that man already possesses. Dr. Clark used the illustration of a piece of paper on which is written a message in invisible ink. The paper (by illustration, the mind) might appear blank, but in actuality it is not. When the heat of experience is applied to the mind (as when heat is applied to the paper), the message becomes visible. Human knowledge, then, is possible only because God has endowed man with certain innate ideas.
Mr. Lazar refers to this as an extra-biblical theory and, therefore, dismisses it. His point is that Clark only believes biblical theories can be known. Since this view is extra-biblical, it cannot be known on Clark's own grounds.
There are a few comments to be made here. Firstly, Mr. Lazar cites the book "Lord God of Truth" as where he finds Clark's theory of recollection. Perhaps he meant to cite Religion, Reason, and Revelation, where Clark does speak to that. I don't know what pages he has in mind because Clark himself is not quoted at this relevant juncture. While Crampton and others might summarize Clark rightly, I think it best to deal with a person's own publications when advancing arguments against him.
In Lord God of Truth, Clark defends Malebranchian occasionalism (pg. 27) and thinks that Augustine's theory of divine illumination anticipated it. He also thinks Jonathan Edwards, an Islamist, and the Westminster divines (timidly) support the position. Clark's idea that the "second causes" in the WCF can be identified with Malebranche's occasions is absurd, but nonetheless, whether one agrees with Clark or not, it is not as if Clark never defended his premises from Scripture (or, at least, others' expositions of Scripture). See Lord God of Truth (pgs. 16-18):
More surprisingly Jonathan Edwards, of all people, provides some support for Malebranche’s views. This is not to say that the great Puritan agreed with Malebranche in great detail. He does, however, provide some Scriptural support for the doctrine of divine illumination. The general Christian public, then, will be somewhat disabused of their anti-philosophical, pragmatic prejudices, and the apologetes will be warned not to strain out a Plato and swallow an Aristotle.If Mr. Lazar thinks the theory Clark presents is extra-biblical, he ought to engage with Clark at these points, since Clark does attempt to defend his theory as biblical. Note, by the way, that Clark is arguing (through Edwards) that knowledge acquisition is immediate. The question is not whether or not there are innate ideas. That may be a further inference Clark makes elsewhere. But the question in Lord God of Truth and the question about whether Clark "has" to read his Bible is, for Clark, satisfied if he can show that "God alone is the cause" of everything.
Though there is enough in Malebranche that Edwards would not like, nevertheless in his sermon on A Divine and Supernatural Light Immediately Imparted to the Soul, Section three, he goes further than one might anticipate. Note the word Immediately in the title. The subhead to Section III refers to a “spiritual light that has been… immediately let into the mind by God.” Hence sensation cannot be the means. This he supports by a number of Scripture verses: 1 John 3:6, negatively, “Whoever sins has neither seen him nor known him.” John 17:3, not obviously pertinent, “And this is eternal life, that they may know you.” More clearly pertinent is his comment, “This light and knowledge is always spoken of as immediately given of God.” Of Matthew 11:25-27 he writes, “This effect is ascribed exclusively to the arbitrary operation and gift of God.” I have italicized immediately and exclusively because apologetes, confronted with the Scriptures, make a last ditch stand and argue that God uses other and necessary means. Edwards continues with 2 Corinthians 4:6, “For it is the God who commanded light to shine out of darkness who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God….” Again he comments that this light is “immediately from God… the immediate effect of his power and will.” There is also Psalm 119:18, “Open my eyes, that I may see wondrous things from your law.”
In paragraph 2 of his Secondly (pg. 18) he repeats: “It is rational to suppose that this knowledge should be given immediately by God, and not be obtained by natural means.” He then continues to stress its immediacy, using the word several times on this one page, and negatively adding, “it should not be left in the power of second causes…. Immediately by himself, as a thing too great for second causes to be concerned in…. immediately by himself, according to his own sovereign will” (18, 19).
The empiricists, as hinted at above, will no doubt remark that the reference to beholding wondrous things in the Law shows that sensations of black on white are necessary second causes, so that our knowledge of divine truth is obtained by “natural means.” For the moment, and not to repeat or anticipate all the arguments against empiricism, it will suffice to say that Jonathan Edwards denies it. The empiricists may find some solace in Abraham Kuyper and Guido de Brès, who had some idea of divine illumination, but who did not go so far as Malebranche and Edwards. However, I neither assert that Edwards totally agrees with Malebranche, nor that the latter is infallible. But both men show that Christianity cannot be empirical.
To say "the senses stimulate the mind of man to intellectual intuition" rather seems to suggest that senses could play a causal role in knowledge acquisition. If it does, I would agree, but I doubt Clark would go that route. The whole point of his appealing to occasionalism is to say that sensation is not causal. Or if Clark would not mean that senses play a causal role when speaking of their capability to "stimulate," then such a position must basically collapse back into occasionalism to explain what does cause the ideas in question. Hence, I personally try to speak directly against Clark's occasionalism.
I have criticized Clark's occasionalism here. I think the criticisms are sufficient to show the inconsistency of the position both with Scripture and several of Clark's other beliefs. However, for my part, to respond to Clark by way of responding to Edwards' comments on the Scriptures mentioned, God can be an ultimate cause without being an immediate cause. God opens eyes, yes. He also opens wombs. But while he may be the ultimate cause of these things, it is still the eyes that see and wombs that give birth as mediate or secondary causes. Even supposing that divine illumination is immediate in some circumstances, it would be fallacious to infer it is immediate in all circumstances. Edwards' and Malebranche's comments do not warrant Clark's conclusions in favor of occasionalism in Lord God of Truth. But interaction with these comments is needed so that readers are aware of the reasons for the theory (even if they are wrong).
There are a few more things to say about why Clark was an occasionalist. To me - and I could be wrong - it is as though Clark felt pressured by the "don't you have to read your Bible?" criticism and took up occasionalism in order to refute it. This could have been another stepping stone toward the propositional monism that, while he never fully embraced, Clark was heading towards. Clark may have reasoned that if our "knowledge," properly speaking, is of propositions (which is true), then it would be problematic if these propositions corresponded to non-propositional realities (which is false, but it is something Clark seemed to reject in rejecting the correspondence theory of truth). For then how could we know that the propositions we claim to know correspond to these physical or spiritual non-propositional realities (e.g. Scripture, persons, etc.)?
Even if that was not Clark's concern - again, I am only hypothesizing as to why Clark accepted certain, extreme positions like occasionalism, the idea that persons are propositions, etc. - I think Clark would have done better to respond to the criticism in the following way: do I have to read my Bible (or hear someone preach it) to know the propositions encoded therein? Perhaps, perhaps not.
If I do, however, this only speaks to an ontological precondition for me to come to know anything. Consider that God is an ontological precondition for me to come to know anything, my parents were ontological preconditions for me to come to know anything, etc. I wouldn't exist and so could not know anything unless God or my parents existed. Similarly, is it impossible to conceive of sensations as ontologically causing thoughts? No. God could certainly decree that sensations function as a mediate cause of my thoughts just as He decreed my parents to function as mediate causes of my existence (and, therefore, thoughts). My thoughts may exist because of certain sensations I've had.
However, whether I do or do not have to hear or read the Bible for ontological preconditions to be satisfied such that I can come to know the corresponding, propositional content, the point is that I don't need to give a particular account of the causal chain by which I come to know anything in order to know anything. If I didn't know who my parents were, I would still know I needed parents in order for it to be ontologically possible to be who I am and know what I do of myself. If I don't know the particular chain of sensations (or other potential causative factors) that have led to my beliefs, that doesn't mean I can't know what I believe. To take another example:
The Bible may have been written by the apostles such that their births were ontologically prior to inscripturation, but the only reason I know about apostleship in the first place is by means of Scripture. So Scripture is epistemically prior to the birth of the apostles. Scripture is a historical document. Things occured prior to inscripturation on which inscripturation depended (ontological preconditions), but the point is these can only be known by Scripture (epistemological precondition). (link)
That is, analogous to the distinction between ontological and epistemic sources of knowledge mentioned above, there is a distinction we can make between ontological and epistemic means of knowledge. The ontological source or foundation of all knowledge and truth and things are the Trinity. But they are not the sole cause of all things (a la occasionalism). The [current] epistemic source of all "knowledge" (of a certain kind) of the truth is divine revelation in general and Scripture in particular.
When newer prophets, apostles, or Christ Himself quote older prophets as Scripture (divinely revealed), they refer to the propositional content those prophets communicated. They were not primarily referencing a particular, physical text, although there were and are such texts that correspond to, codify, and perhaps even cause thoughts regarding these propositional contents. This should be especially clear given that when new prophets do reference Scripture, they often do so to an audience through an entirely differently codified sensory medium (like speech) than that by which Scripture was originally revealed (writ) as well as that what writ they did possess wasn't the same as that which originally codified the revelation.
Hence, the WCF also is completely sensible when it says that things may be "deduced" from Scripture by good and necessary consequence. These deductive inferences come by reflection and are our means of knowledge. The WCF is, I think, clearly referring to Scripture as a primarily propositional source from which we can make propositional inferences, not primarily as a physical, non-propositional text.
Again, this is not to diminish the value of non-propositional texts or roles they can play in knowledge acquisition, as they do codify the propositions in language. We are an embodied, physical people. It would make sense that we ontologically come to causally acquire knowledge by means physical, non-propositional realities. Thus, we can construe sensation as having a causal role (ontological) in knowledge acquisition. This is not troublesome, and in that sense, sensation can be a means of knowledge (of a certain kind).
It is only if we suggest sensation has an inferential role (epistemic) in knowledge acquisition that we would have to confront Sellars' Dilemma: how can that without propositional content - that which cannot be either true or false, like a sensation - be a foundation or means from which we attempt to infer or deduce the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]? In this sense, a Scripturalist would (correctly, I think) deny that sensation is a means of knowledge (of another kind).
Instead the epistemic means of knowledge is the other side of the coin of the epistemic source of knowledge. In conjunction, these refer to the structure of our epistemic justification for knowledge, which is foundationalistic. Foundationally, we begin with propositions. We make propositional inferences from propositions. The codification of a proposition may be in or from a text such that it is a secondary causal means by which the propositions are effected as ideas we have, but we epistemically start with the propositions that have been codified and only can only "know" (in a certain sense) this hypothetical by deduction from said propositions.
In this way, Clark would have avoided the trap in which his critics wanted to catch him. They want Clark to defend himself with occasionalism, for that theory is rife with problems. Or they wanted Clark to admit that sensation does play a role in knowledge acquisition, for then they could ask why Clark would say it can only play that role for acquiring knowledge from reading Scripture. That would be special pleading, and the critics would be right to say so. But if we approach the question as I have above, I think there is a way in which to preserve the heart of what Clark wants to get at... although this would seem to concede to critics of Clark (including myself) that there are other kinds of knowledge that can indeed be acquired apart from Scripture.
Now, this begins to wade us into the waters of discussing the differences between internalist and externalist accounts of knowledge, which is why I having been alluding to different senses or kinds of knowledge throughout this post. But as this will be addressed in future chapters of Mr. Lazar's book, I will reserve comment on that until later. Textual issues will also be something Mr. Lazar brings up in a later chapter. I will likely revisit what I have said here, which I think is a good start for confronting later questions that will arise.
For those interested in reading more now on the relationship between the divinely revealed propositions, texts in which those proposition have been correspondingly encoded, and externalism as an explanation for why such propositions have been encoded even though I am here suggesting that the Scripturalist's epistemic axiom primarily refer to the propositional content of divine revelation, I'd suggest the following (link, link).
I will conclude that while Mr. Lazar could have said more to the effect of why it is wrong, he is ultimately correct that Clark's occasionalism is in need of revision. Yet this is not fatal to the project of Scripturalism, and I do not think that Clark's epistemic axiom fails the test of reason. Instead, I conclude Clark failed to make correct inferences about means of knowledge from his epistemic axiom.
In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 3, which Mr. Lazar calls the test of skepticism.
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