Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 4)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's third chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

The Test of Skepticism

The opening of Mr. Lazar's third chapter pithily asks whether Clark's philosophy is any more capable of deducing Herr Krug's pen than Hegel's philosophy was. Because Clark found fault with Hegel for being unable to deduce said pen (given Hegel's philosophy), the implication is that unless Clark can do so (given his own philosophy), Clark's criticism of Hegel blows back upon himself. 

However, in reply to the above suggestion about Herr Krug's pen, Clark could simply reply that the criticism lands against Hegel, but not himself, because Hegel "denies that there is any limit to knowledge" and that "there is no unknowable" (emphasis mine). In fact, Clark mentions these, in the context of Herr Krug's pen, as reasons why Hegel must deduce the pen (given Hegel's philosophy). All Clark must do, then, is affirm that there is a limit to knowledge, that there is an unknowable, to avoid the burden of deducing the pen on his philosophy.

And Clark does this, at least to some extent. I have written on the problem of partial knowledge and why it is a powerful apologetic argument that a Scripturalist can use against a wide variety of worldviews (cf. link). One such quote by Clark is the following, and it illustrates the relevant difference between his view and Hegel's such that Clark's philosophy needn't be able to deduce things such as Herr Krug's pen to be successful:

Plato and Hegel constructed theories of knowledge which, if pressed to their logical extreme, imply that man must be either omniscient or completely ignorant. If every item of knowledge is so intimately connected with every other that its true nature cannot be seen except in its relation to all, then either we know all or we know nothing. Plato and Hegel both had a hard time escaping this dilemma.

Now Moses said, “The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever” (Deut. 29:29). The Bible, therefore, both here and everywhere, assumes that we can know some truths without knowing all truths. Accordingly it is incumbent upon us to develop an epistemology in which the relationships are not such as to limit us to the disjunction of total ignorance or omniscience.

This epistemology may follow Augustine’s view that Christ is the light of every man: that is, mankind possesses as an a priori endowment at least the rudiments of knowledge, so that whenever anyone knows anything he is in contact with God. Or, the epistemology required may be more skeptical as to geometry and science and simply insist that God, being omnipotent, can be a verbal revelation make his truths understandable to me. (Baker's Dictionary of Theology, 1991, pgs. 245-246)

If there are limits to what we can know, we needn't be ashamed to admit them. Clark was not, for he knew he wasn't omniscient. On the contrary, precisely because he wasn't omniscient, he recognized the need to rely on the omniscient members of the Trinity for his knowledge. 

Therefore, as can be seen in the quote, Clark was comfortable in admitting that his epistemology could be regarded as relatively skeptical in regards to certain knowledge claims that other philosophical systems, such as Hegel's, make. To the scores of critics who cried out against him, Clark's reply was simple: "It is incorrect, therefore, to complain that the axiom of revelation deprives us of knowledge otherwise obtainable. There is no knowledge otherwise obtainable" (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 75-76). 

Now, Mr. Lazar is in good company among the many incredulous persons who wonder how Clark can admit he does not know his wife, pen, etc. Can one sanely suggest he does not know these things exist? Well, yes. Even as someone who now disagrees with Clark here - for I do believe such things are knowable in some sense - this criticism never impressed me. Clark's answer to it is quite satisfactory:

The objection was that even if revelation gives us some knowledge, it does not give us very much. In particular, it does not provide knowledge of zoology and Russian history. At that earlier point a systematically sufficient answer was given, namely, some knowledge at least is thus possible. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 77)

Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? When a chess club challenges another to a match, does any suspicion of fallibility impede its action? Cannot this club distinguish the dogma ecclesiastica that there actually is another club from the dogma haeretica that no other club exists? Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? (Karl Barth's Theological Method, 1997, pg. 146)

In other words, we may assume or believe to be true that our wife is not a substitution, a pen is in our hand, etc. We act as if our beliefs are true. But for Clark, "knowledge" is not a kind of belief that may turn out to be false. It may be that any reasons I have for believing a pen is in my hand are insufficient insofar as I am hallucinating. It cannot, on the other hand, turn out that divine revelation is false. 

And whether one agrees with Clark's restrictive understanding of "knowledge" or not, one would be wrong, as Mr. Lazar is, to suggest Clark's philosophy collapses into skepticism (and thus fails said test) unless one is willing to attack either the possibility of knowing divine revelation in general or knowing divine revelation on Clark's version of Scripturalism in particular. Knowledge of biblical propositions would be enough to pass the test of skepticism. Mr. Lazar will challenge Clark's ability to know even biblical propositions, as I will return to in a moment, but pausing to note the sufficiency of having some knowledge rather than none is, as Clark, says, important.

Miscellaneous Comments: An Intermezzo

There are some things in the chapter that I think would be beneficial to address even though they do not directly bear on the question of the test of skepticism:

1) Clark was wrong to say "science is always false." He probably meant that scientific analyses are always unknowable. For example, two scientists can, by similar procedures, arrive at opposite conclusions. One meteorologist may say it will rain tomorrow. Another may say it will not rain tomorrow. One's conclusion will be true and based on certain, scientific analyses, but the fact that his conclusion is true does not mean he "knows" his conclusion (at least, not in the sort of internalist, infallibilist sense I believe in which Clark was interested). That is, most meteorologists would admit that their individual conclusions could, for all they know, prove false. But, in fact, one (or more) will be right. So Mr. Lazar is right to correct Clark, but really, this is a simple error Clark made that isn’t relevant to whether or not Scripturalism is true or fails a test of skepticism.

2) Clark may have said that an objection to his philosophy was that we can't know zoology or Russian history. But he never said the objection was true. He simply dismissed the objection as relevant to the point that he was, in contrast to his critics, at least able to account for some knowledge. In fact, Clark wrote a whole chapter on [biblical] history in A Christian View of Men and Things. He did believe we could know some history, contrary to what Mr. Lazar states. Similarly, the Bible also mentions many animals. Is it enough knowledge to satisfy critics? Not usually. But it at least sets the record straight.

3) To Mr. Lazar's allusion to the difficulty of self-knowledge on a Scripturalist epistemology, the quote he mentions doesn’t show Clark regarded self-knowledge is impossible, just harder than people imagine. Personally, I believe Clark held different beliefs at different times in his life. At one point in his life, Clark rejected the possibility of self-knowledge (Modern Philosophy, 2008, pgs. 273-274). At another point in his life, he affirmed it (see below). I argue that self-knowledge is compatible with and necessary for Scripturalism. At any rate, I can do no better at this point than to repeat remarks I have elsewhere made, including the links provided:

I think Clark, consistently acknowledging the difficulty of the subject, both denies and affirms self-knowledge in various places (link). Personally, I defend it (link) and believe it to be as necessary to Clark's epistemology as logic or language. All of the points Butler makes, I address in that post, including that I needn't know my name to have self-knowledge, that the meaning of "I" can be gathered from Scripture, that there are various books of Scripture addressed to the elect in general, and that one must know he is a believer if he is to know Scripture comprises the extent of God's special revelation. There is no incompatibility between self-knowledge with the idea a certain kind of knowledge (i.e. infallibilistic, internalistic) must be divinely revealed, explicitly or implicitly. There is incompatibility between the impossibility of self-knowledge and the concrete revelation of Scripture, which just is the axiom by which we can know anything in an infallibilistic, internalistic sense. Therefore, self-knowledge is legitimate.

4) Mr. Lazar, citing Ronald Nash, supposes Clark must be using "knowledge" in "a very idiosyncratic way." This is an excellent thought! It is unfortunate that it was not followed up by a meta-epistemic discussion of what Clark meant by "knowledge," whether he was right or wrong to think of "knowledge" in that way, and/or what an alternative proposal would be. I will, as in my last post, defer to here for an explanation as to the kind of knowledge Clark had in mind for now (as well as some evaluative, parenthetical comments on where Clark's thought might be improved).

5) One final comment that I will keep brief, since I've mentioned the distinction between epistemology and apologetics in my last two reviews (link and link), is that when Mr. Lazar saying "Clark's negative and positive apologetics both result in skepticism," he really should be speaking about Clark's epistemology, not his apologetic. Mr. Lazar's comments come in the context of his support for Gordon Lewis' criticisms of Clark. I have already addressed Gordon Lewis here. I will only highlight the following points from that post to reiterate what the proper function of tests for truth are (i.e. apologetic, not epistemic): 

Note that the following isn't true: "Clark chooses to believe their truth because Christianity... is alone consistent." Rather, Clark chooses to argue their truth because Christianity is alone consistent. This is the difference between apologetics and epistemology. Apologetics consists in making arguments. This is not always so in epistemology - axioms are not known because they are the conclusion of some argument, they are known because they are self-authenticating. 

Clark has to argue for Christianity via logical consistency and practicality because, at the risk of stating the obvious, he can't know Christianity for those to whom he is engaging in apologetics. He could just say divine revelation is self-authenticating and leave it at that, but it is more persuasive (which is another function of apologetics) to additionally point out, when applicable, that an opponent's system 1) can't be self-authenticating if his system inconsistent or impractical, or 2) that his system is less coherent than Christianity is, in the case of something like Judaism. 

Lewis seems to think that Clark's tests for truth are the basis on which Clark claims to know Christianity. That is really the only explanation for why Lewis would think Clark would have to sift through infinitely many systems before knowing that just one, Christianity, is consistent. But that interpretation goes completely against what Lewis himself stated Clark believed regarding the nature and knowability of axioms earlier in his summary.

While "test[s] for truth" can serve as confirmatory evidences of Christianity, they shouldn't function as the ground of knowledge; divine revelation does. Elsewhere, I have called tests for truth necessary conditions for knowledge and the postulate[s] by which one claims to know anything the sufficient condition[s] for knowledge (link). The former are the means by which we make arguments for (i.e. apologetics) the latter (i.e. epistemology).

Again, apologetics should include an explanation of the epistemology of the system one is defending. Any good defense of a system of knowledge should explain what that system says about how we can know anything. But that explanation and defense should not be confused for that actual process of knowing. In fact, apologetics is only possible insofar as we know the system we are defending is true in the first place (see here).

As I've mentioned, it seems Mr. Lazar doesn’t understand that for Clark, we know the axiom of Scripturalism because it is self-authenticating. Clark was an internalist and foundationalist. We don’t know our axiom because other, non-Christian systems are false. That would be to make the axiom a conclusion, which Clark clearly rejects. It also means we would be searching for a true first principle, system, or worldview by sifting through false ones first, which would be circular, anti-foundationalistic, and/or question-begging given that such an enterprise would already presuppose knowledge of what a true first principle, system, or worldview would look like. Instead, given that apologists or defenders of the faith engage with other worldviews which have their own first principles, we argue about or against those first principles and their relationship to the resulting belief systems they produce. Such apologists already know (or should know!) their own system is true before they argue against others’. 

That is, the “tests” Mr. Lazar mentions are not neutral methods by which one can choose an epistemological first principle/axiom (which, again, would be impossible; cf. link). Rather, they are apologetic tools used to display or witness to the superiority of one epistemological system over against another. There is a very clear distinction between from what all our knowledge claims derive from (our epistemological axiom) and how we then go about trying to defend all of our knowledge claims (which is apologetics, not epistemology as such). We ought to defend our faith in a manner consistent with our epistemology, but it is a common mistake to conflate the two, as Mr. Lazar does in his appeal to Lewis’ critique of Clark.

The [Real] Test of Skepticism

The most noteworthy section in this chapter is entitled, "Is Scripturalism Skeptical of Revelation?" It must be an enticing thought to the critic, for if it were possible to show that Clark's philosophy results in skepticism of divine revelation itself, Clark would be in real trouble! This type of criticism would be much more problematic than one which suggests that Clark can't know certain propositions that other people normally take to be knowable. It would actually be an attempted reductio ad absurdem of [Clark's] Scripturalism. This section of Mr. Lazar's writing is worth quoting at length:

...here's the problem: according to Scripturalism, I can't gain knowledge by reading the Bible. In fact, I don't even know if my mother's New Testament exists. I have opinions about it, but I don't have knowledge of it. So where does that leave my Bible memorization? Do I really know those Biblical propositions or do I merely opine that I do? And how do I tell the difference which verses I know and which I merely opine?

Do you see the problem?

...So far as I can tell, Scripturalism has no way of distinguishing between knowledge of Biblical propositions and mere opinions.

Above, I quoted from 1 John 5:7. If you're familiar with textual criticism, you know the special problem associated with that verse, namely, most Greek manuscripts omit it. It may not be Scripture. In fact, the textual evidence is against it...

I have to wonder, how did Clark acquire his propositions about the evidence for or against the TR? And did he know them or merely opine them? Did the amount to revelation knowledge or something less?

And what about other textual issues? How about the longer ending in Mark?

Or the Pericope Adulterae?

Or Psalm 151?

Are the Scripture or not? How does the Scripturalist know?  

...How does the Scripturalist know if it really is Scripture? What does he check his beliefs against? Anything?

I'll tell you what I do. When I'm in doubt about something being Biblical - regarding the best translation, or the best reading, or whether something is canonical at all - I get out my Bible and check it. If necessary, I'll refer to my Greek New Testament, and to the best scholarship on the issue.

But the Scripturalist can't do that because he can't get such information by reading the Bible or other books. What, then, can he do? How does he distinguish between knowledge and opinion when it comes to Biblical propositions? So far as I can see, the Scripturalist has no way of discerning between the two. Yes, he can say that Scripture is his axiom, and he can formally define that to mean the 66 books of the Protestant canon, but he can't know if any of the propositions he believes are, in fact, part of the canon, can he? What would he do to check to see if there were? He can't check his Bible.

The result is that Scripturalism leads to skepticism about Biblical propositions, too. They function as a Ding an sich (the unknowable thing-in-itself), in the send that Biblical propositions are postulated by the system, but the actual content of the propositions are unknowable.

Hence, despite Clark's claims to the contrary, Scripturalism leads to skepticism about the Bible, too. 

One point of tension Mr. Lazar touches on is between Scripturalism and textual criticism. Clark himself never made much of a deliberate attempt to harmonize the two, although he does mention it in one or two instances I'll come back to later. It doesn't much matter, though, for in seeming contrast to Mr. Lazar, Clark believed that the Bible was propositional, not "ink marks" (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 180-182). Clark has his own method of answering how we acquire biblical propositions - occasionalism, as was mentioned in my last review. I would venture to guess that Clark would have resorted to this if someone had pressed him on the matter of textual criticism. 

Then, if someone complained that such meant he can’t know about textual variants – since they haven’t been divinely revealed – I can just imagine Clark being delighted to reply that it is so much the better for Clark not to have the trouble of needing to respond to any criticism dealing in it! Rather, the trouble would be for the person on whose epistemology textual variants are known to exist and inhibit him from knowing the content of divine revelation.

As I said in my last review, I disagree with occasionalism. I'll return to why this hypothetical approach by Clark would be suboptimal. But it is worth taking a moment to appreciate why the response would have some merits. Take Mr. Lazar's own implied position. I question whether Mr. Lazar can claim to be any kind of Scripturalist (neo- or whatnot) when he says that if he is in doubt about something being biblical, he resorts to "the best translation… reading… [or] scholarship." Wait... "best" by whose definition? In the scenario Mr. Lazar outlines, is Scripture his ultimate, epistemic foundation? Rather, does it not seem that his real epistemic foundation is whatever source he defers to in order to erase his doubts and come to assurance regarding what the content of Scripture is? 

Not only does this apply to textual variants (what some have called "micro-canonical" issues), the same question applies to the books of the Bible at large (a "macro-canonical" issue). How does Mr. Lazar claim to know that entire books of the Bible are divinely revealed? Is it the epistemic axiom, presupposition, or foundation with which he begins divine revelation? It seems not. Instead, he first "get[s] out [his] Bible and check[s] it." 

What I'm left wondering is in what way this procedure cures his doubts. What is it about a physical book in his mother's library that gives him confidence? Is he really suggesting that he can reason his way towards knowing the content of divine revelation? As I wrote on the Scripturalist's ability to know the canon of Scripture long ago (link), such an answer would falsely suppose:

...that it is more legitimate to evaluate a creator by His creation than creation by a creator. Are any of these options really more plausible than a self-authenticating revelation? Do any of these alternatives have something more substantial than a superficially intuitive appeal? Well, I must leave that to the reader to decide. I would obviously answer in the negative...

Of course, there are perspectives which I would allege attempt to copy the method of knowing God's word, distorting it by substituting in place of Scripture something not of divine origin. And this troubles people, because if revelation is supposed to be self-authenticating, then how is it possible to sift through all these varying claims? Is playing a back-and-forth game of "my source is true and yours is not because my source says so" really the best that a Christian apologist has to offer? Still more troubling, how can our answer to such questions be made without presupposing revelation? After all, if some sort of revelation is necessary, then we wouldn't be able to answer any question without first specifying said revelation.

Well, actually all of this doesn't turn out to be so problematic. For the reply to this last question just is that we can't answer any question without first presupposing a specific, concrete revelation. So what? The reason why some accept and others reject one proposal over against another should depend on what one's revelation has to say about such. In the case of Scripture, while God's word may be self-evident, the only means by or reason for which any sinner would acknowledge it as such is grace.

Even so, we may further note that we are not left without means of distinguishing false claims to divine revelation. Keeping in mind that no necessary condition for knowledge can ground or function to demonstrate a sufficient condition for knowledge (link), there are nonetheless tests we can perform which serve as confirmatory evidences.

...the Bible itself prescribes criteria against which we can test its claims. Prophecy is one example. Internal consistency is another necessary condition for some communication to have been revealed by God. Etc. I have outlined and dealt with numerous such conditions elsewhere on this blog. Once again, no matter how many of these subsidiary conditions we show the Bible must and does satisfy, our trust in it must ultimately be based on its own, self-authenticating claim to be God's word. But by applying these subsidiary conditions to other worldviews, we can falsify them and thereby lend credibility to our own. While this is not demonstration - no first principle can be demonstrated anyway - it is a technique which is seemingly the most plausible means of persuasion available. The rest is left to God.

So, to summarize, Scripturalism - the axiom that the canon of divine revelation in general and the Bible in particular comprises the extant extent of that which men can know - is clearly not the conclusion of a set of theorems, no matter how necessary those theorems may be in order for a system to be true. Axioms must be self-authenticating or self-evident.

But the acceptance of an axiom is not arbitrary. If it were arbitrary, then it would be unnecessary. One of the necessary conditions, however, is that partial knowledge requires self-authenticating communication from one who is omniscient. We may not be able to demonstrate or prove the Bible in particular is said revelation, but this isn't relevant. For the Bible is taken to be the sufficient condition, not a mere necessary condition, and no axiom can be demonstrated, proved, or externally justified. The fact it just is self-authenticating is enough. People may not accept this, but then again, people may not accept that I know myself. I can't demonstrate that either, but is that any reason to think I can't know myself? No.

I do not see in what way Mr. Lazar could 1) think our epistemic foundation is not divine revelation but 2) also think that the alternative he will eventually prescribe can legitimately be called "neo-Scripturalism." Given the nature of his criticisms against Clark, Mr. Lazar's epistemology apparently relies upon an empirical method of inferring truth from sensations (i.e. referring to his Greek NT, a physical Bible, scholarship, etc.). I hope I am wrong, I just do not know how else to take Mr. Lazar's criticisms of Clark's epistemology than as a reflection upon his own.

Does this not mean that any confidence he has from these sources is on shaky grounds? As I mentioned in my last review, Mr. Lazar would have to confront Sellars' Dilemma and explain how he can start with a non-propositional Bible in his hand and somehow use that as a premise (seemingly without a truth value, since it is non-propositional) from which he is able to infer a propositional truth about what the true content of Scripture actually is... unless Mr. Lazar plans on addressing the whole host of criticisms regarding empirical knowledge that Clark argues in his many works. Even if it is not a pure empiricism to which Mr. Lazar holds, so long as he relies on empirical elements for his epistemology to function - as would be the case if he thinks he can avoid Sellars' Dilemma by actively, consciously derive propositional thoughts from sensations - Clark's criticisms are relevant and must be addressed.

Alternatively, the only way in which one could try to read Mr. Lazar's section here that would enable him to avoid the set of above problems and questions is if Mr. Lazar intends to criticize Clark's apologetic rather than his epistemology. But given that, in this section, Mr. Lazar discusses knowledge vs. opinion and believes he is reducing Clark's Scripturalism to skepticism, it is quite clear that he really is attacking Clark's epistemology after all. 

If Mr. Lazar restricted his critique to Clark's apologetic - if his criticism is merely that Clark cannot defend his beliefs as Mr. Lazar can - then Clark would not fail the test of skepticism. One's doubts could be relieved by recalling that one's apologetic abilities and lines of defense are subordinate to his epistemology. Neither Mr. Lazar nor Clark would (or could) defend their beliefs by appealing to some mysterious, spontaneous intuitions, yet neither would (or should) feel unconfident because of that apologetic limitation. As has been emphasized, apologetics presupposes an epistemology to defend. A more skeptical epistemology will entail a more skeptical apologetic, but "more skeptical" is not "totally skeptical," and is still better than epistemologies that make grand claims but collapse into skepticism upon closer examination.

Textual Criticism

Turning now to a more positive reply to the subject of textual criticism, I have addressed the subject in a few places (link, link, link) that are intended to be supplement a developed Scripturalism - that is, relevant differences between Clark's thought and my own are accounted for within these posts. But even Clark and I could agree with "rhetorical critical" arguments that do not depend on evaluating external, non-propositional realities (such as examining textual transmission and the like) but rather internal ones (such as examining literary structure or implicit, authorial themes present within the propositional revelation itself). 

That is, Clark could easily find common ground with me in giving apologetic reasons, for example, for why the so-called "longer ending" of Mark is divinely revealed. Two such reasons would be the Elijah theme and chiastic parallelism, both of which internally refer to the propositional (including interrogative and imperative) contents of Mark itself and, thus, are not extra-biblical. Of course, one can’t use apologetic arguments or defenses to, say, bootstrap axiomatic belief in Mark or its ending, but that’s true of any epistemic first principle. Clark's epistemology is in much safer territory than Mr. Lazar's.

Now I will return to discuss why I believe the above apologetic possibilities available to Clark are, while sufficient, incomplete. They are only part of a more robust defense available to a Scripturalist. First, let's take a look at a few instances in which Clark mention textual criticism in the context of apologetics:

Once when I quoted a verse from John’s Gospel to a modernist, she quickly replied, “But how do you know that he actually said that?” By the grace of God, I was able immediately to shoot back, “How do you know Jesus said anything?” The other faculty members at the lunch table gave vocal evidence of a point scored. The modernist woman professor and missionary to India wanted to use some verses, but not others. But she saw then that if she insisted on her verses, she could not object to mine. At any rate the attempt to destroy Christian faith by an appeal to the difficulties of textual criticism has been based on considerable exaggeration. (Against the World, 1999, pg. 147) 

Here, Clark made a fair point in the right context. Once one begins to cherry-pick which biblical statements can be regarded as trustworthy, one has begun to slide upon a slippery slope that will, if left unchecked, lead to skepticism. But what of a woman professor who would bit the bullet and admitted that nothing could be known of what Jesus said? Some time ago, I read Gordon Clark's thesis for his doctorate at UPenn. Clark must have been about 27 when he wrote the following:

In the case of Aristotle we are not dependent on fragments, for we have his complete works; we are perfectly familiar with the usages of his language; the only difficulty is textual and whoever bases a skepticism in textual criticism asserts that not only nearly all philosophy, but nearly all history as well, before the Renaissance, it forever unknowable. This is a reductio ad absurdem. We can with tolerable certainty ascertain the exact working of Aristotle, but to understand his thought we need also to know the arguments and discussion of previous arguments men which were the motives to his solution. Are these unknowable? My answer would be, try and see. (pg. 10)

Ironically, Clark would later reverse his thought and admit most of what is commonly supposed to be known is not. He no longer considered it to be a reductio ad absurdem to follow through the logical implications of a textual criticism which often presupposes an empirical methodology. Far from attempts to destroy Christianity through textual criticism being based on an "exaggeration," as Clark said, is this not what we are seeing in modern day anti-Christian polemics? 

The Bart Ehrman's of the world undermine the confidence of Christians, with Muslims and new atheists in tow appealing to their publications (which Mr. Lazar must hope does not constitute the "best" scholarship!) to attack the Christian faith. If anyone should have anticipated this, it should have been Clark, who recognized in other areas that the doctrine of Scripture "on which all other doctrines depend is the one most viciously attacked of all. By a satanic instinct, the battle against Christianity is directed against its citadel" (God's Hammer, 1995, pg. 113). Whatever was the case when Clark wrote the following, it no longer matches the landscape of today's textual criticism:

The author suggests that there is no use discussing whether the alleged error was missing from the original until we have the original. This seems to betray a forgetfulness of textual criticism. The differences between the Greek New Testament which we have and the autographs are few in number and of slight consequence. Most of them are differences in spelling, or in word order, or in some small detail that does not affect the sense. To suppose that we are so ignorant of the original wording as this argument requires is to cast aside the whole science of textual criticism. (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 122-123)

The above, originally written in 1963, makes it sound as though Clark thought the science of textual criticism could indeed play an apologetic role to build up the confidence of believers... and he is right, although 20 years later, Clark seemed to have come around a little to look upon textual criticism with suspicion, remarking that modern textual criticism is "untrustworthy" (Behind the Versions, 1983, link). It is easy to understand why, for we can fast forward to present day in which modern textual scholars are positing that "the process of transmission of the New Testament texts resulted in a high degree of contamination" (link). We now have computers that attempt to reconstruct what the original or earliest texts may have been: 

The stated goal of the CBGM is to help pastors, scholars, and laypeople alike determine, “Which text should be read? Which should be applied? ... For the New Testament, this means trying to determine, at each place where our copies disagree, what the author most likely wrote, or failing this, at least what the earliest text might have been.” (link)

Likely wrote? Might have been? The problem with foundationally relying on the "best" scholars is that one has no idea to what conclusions their hidden assumptions will lead. There is no problem with scholarship per se unless one suggests, as Mr. Lazar implicitly has, that one's knowledge of God's word and divine revelation are end-products of such investigation. At that point, we have abandoned presuppositionalism in favor of rationalism, empiricism, some hybrid, or, for all intents and purposes, skepticism. Still worse, the doubt a Christian who subordinates his knowledge of Scripture to knowledge of creaturely authorities faces is left unresolved when the best that these "authorities" can offer are probabilistic "knowledge" of God's word (and we might even, as Clark did, contest how such an "authority" calculated the probabilities).

As I mentioned in my last review, I disagree with Clark's occasionalism. I think Clark's occasionalism would have, if push came to shove, forced Clark to fall back to internal, confirmatory evidences. In light of the above, it can be tempting for Scripturalists to abandon the enterprise of textual criticism - of understanding and evaluating the physical codifications of God's propositional revelation in history - when one begins with the propositions and not the physical codifications anyways. Why bother?

We are to take every thought captive to Christ (2 Corinthians 10:5). Educated Christians equipped with the word of God are equipped for every good work, including providing pushback to modern textual critical methodologies that, intentionally or not, undermine or control God's word. No such methodology is neutral. Assumptions are always built in to anyone's investigations. 

What then? The Scripturalist should, armed with God's word as his foundational assumption, be encouraged to apply it to textual criticism. Rather than merely retreat to defend our citadel, we must attack other citadels from it (which, in turn, is a form of apologetic defense). There is ample supply of apologetic material a Scripturalist can use that has already been provided in this [series of] post[s] by which he can defend himself against those who would use textual criticism to spread doubt. 

But we needn't only rely only on internal, confirmatory evidences and reductio ad absurdems, sufficient though they may be. A complete, optimal Scripturalist apologetic should feel free to incorporate textual critical evaluations that are appropriately guided by his epistemic foundation of Scripture itself into his defense of the faith. 

Example: patristic quotations can be used to argue that the books of the New Testament were written early and relatively shortly after Jesus' ascension. This is an example of how our confidence is confirmed and how doubt can be caused in those who oppose the faith. It is not that the argument is then used as a basis upon which to believe the New Testament, for from the divine revelation itself with which we epistemically begin, we can know the New Testament was written by contemporaries of Jesus. Rather, the point is that the truth of Scripture with which we begin has empowered us to find and then speak of extra-biblical confirmations of these truths, confirmations we already had reason to expect to find from divine revelation itself. All of creation is a superabundance of evidence for the Trinity we worship.

Of course, a through-and-through follower of the thought of Clark may ask, for example, how we know patristic quotations are authentic. Or perhaps they might ask how a Scripturalist can know that textual critical evaluations accurately depict the history of the transmission process. The question is legitimate. Because externalism is addressed in a future chapter in Mr. Lazar's book, I will leave most of my reply for a later review. But between this post, the last review, and this link (particularly the last four paragraphs), interested readers can anticipate what to expect. In short, because our epistemic foundation, God's word, indicates that extra-biblical knowledge is possible, we can construct arguments regarding "knowing" extra-biblical ideas. 

Can extra-biblical ideas conflict with our epistemic foundation? No - the latter always establishes the limits of the former. If, for example, it should appear that external, textual critical indicators are apologetically insufficient for defending the longer ending of Mark, Scripturalists should simply use what other apologetic defenses he has available to him to defend what he already knows is true.

Does extra-biblical knowledge eliminate the need for Scripturalism? No - "need" is context based, and I can think of a few reasons why the kind of knowledge Scripturalism defends is needed that the kind of extra-biblical knowledge on offer cannot supply (link, link). 

The upshot of this is that Mr. Lazar can know about the Bible in his mother's library, even though he should not found his epistemological axiom on it - again, see my last review for argument as to why we do not begin with the physical, non-propositional text that codifies the propositional revelation (the latter which we do epistemically begin with) - much less what creaturely scholars[hip] have to say about it. 

One final comment regarding Mr. Lazar's statement that biblical propositions, for Clark, "function as a Ding an sich (the unknowable thing-in-itself), in the sense that Biblical propositions are postulated by the system, but the actual content of the propositions are unknowable." This criticism by Mr. Lazar doesn't make sense. Propositions are the only kinds of things "knowable" (at least if we are speaking about "knowledge" literally). If Mr. Lazar is saying that Clark did not have had a criterion for epistemically deciding between two textual variants, that is because Clark's epistemic first principle already takes care of that question in the first place. Clark doesn't reason to divine revelation, he begins with it and defends from it. The absence of a criterion for discovering one's first principle is something inherent in every first principle, for every first principle must be self-authenticating:

But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth. (Today's Evangelism, Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 113)

This disjunct faces two replies. First, it assumes that a first principle cannot be self-authenticating. Yet every first principle must be. The first principle of Logical Positivism is that a sentence has no meaning unless it can be verified (in principle at least) by sensory experience. Yet no sensory experience can ever verify this principle. Anyone who wishes to adopt it must regard it as self-authenticating. So it is with all first principles. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pgs. 46-47) 

This is how to approach questions concerning the canon and textual criticism from a Scripturalist perspective. Thus, in the final analysis, while there is some truth in this chapter mixed in with some error, and while the truths are worth the emphasis, none of them result in a decisive failure of Scripturalism (not even Clark's occasionalistic version of Scripturalism) to pass the test of skepticism. 

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 4, which Mr. Lazar calls the test of explanatory power.