Molinism and The "Publisher" of Evil

A friend forwarded me a recent James White and William Lane Craig discussion (link). I listened to the opening remarks (through 18 minutes) and had a few observations of and reflections on what Craig said.

The way Craig frames his position in his opening remarks about Scrooge is important. The spirit of Christmas future shows Scrooge what would (emphasis Craig) happen, given certain conditions. The critical point is at the 14 minute mark: Craig says God knows what "people would freely choose" in any circumstance "in which they might be placed" logically prior to decreeing in what circumstances people are placed.

This is the essence of Molinism. It's almost like God runs a simulation of what "I" would "freely" choose in scenario x, y, and z. God then determines to create the conditions for scenario y so that the simulation plays out in reality. In this way, the Molinist maintains that God is in control of all things. After all, God could have run scenario z if He wanted to, so He is "in control." Yet the Molinist will also claim that people are free in a libertarian sense, since "my" choice in scenario y was (allegedly) free. God's knowledge of what my choice would be in scenario y is not dependent on His decree that scenario y actually happens - just the opposite.

The problem with this is referred to as the grounding objection, and as I understand it, it can be explained in various ways:

If God's decree is "logically posterior" to His knowledge of what I would freely choose in a given scenario, the question is begged as to what "grounds" God's knowledge of what I would freely choose. God allegedly has middle knowledge, but how? It can't be grounded in God's natural (necessary) knowledge, because we aren't talking about necessary truths or realities. It can't be grounded in God's decretal knowledge, since God's decree is (allegedly) logically posterior to God's so-called "middle" knowledge of what I "would" "freely" choose in a given scenario.

So on what basis does God know what I would choose in a given scenario? A simulation? A simulation is never the reality. The question is how God can know, if I am free in a libertarian sense, that I would choose a definitively certain way given scenario y. For until the scenario is "run" (played out in reality such that I am able to make a choice in that scenario), I haven't actually made a choice (I am not the same as a simulated version of myself).

A Molinist will likely demure and say that the basis for God's knowledge is not a simulation. But since middle knowledge cannot be something tied to God's own nature (i.e. things dealing with necessary truths or reality) nor God's decree (i.e. things dealing with God's free choice), then it seems all that is left is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on a quasi-real version of myself. Perhaps a more neutral way to frame the point is by asking how I can be really free (in a libertarian sense) if God knows that I would act a certain way logically before I actually do.

Even if the Molinist continues to protest against these representations, the main point (that even the Molinist would seem to admit) is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on something external to Himself. Even Craig admits this when he elsewhere says, God "has to play with the hand He has been dealt" (link). This statement that Craig made in the past gives away his and the Molinist's position: it seems that someone else has dealt the cards and, therefore 1) God is not in control of all things (e.g. the dealt hand), and 2) God's knowledge is dependent upon whoever or whatever dealt these cards.

This is severely problematic. If God's knowledge is eternal (as I think and have argued it must be) yet dependent, then what is the nature of that on which His knowledge is dependent? Is that something else co-eternal with God? And aside from this question, is it possible for God to be eternally omniscient if His knowledge is dependent upon an extrinsic source (I would and have argued in the above link is not)?

This is the main counterargument against Molinism. Now, as for what Craig says about Molinists and Calvinists being like-minded in agreeing God has overriding purposes for moral evil yet there being a significant distinction in that for the Molinist, God can "will" in given circumstances that one choose good whereas a Calvinist cannot, his argument is equivocal. Calvinists can maintain the same distinction Craig would between God's moral or prescriptively will vs. His decretal will. In a given circumstance, a Calvinist can maintain God commands other than He had decreed.

Furthermore, for the Molinist, God does not merely permit moral evil, He decrees it. The Molinist would agree God could have not created at all. So the decree for God to create this world means that the Molinist must agree God wants moral evil to occur. Whatever reasons He might have for decreeing a world in which creatures freely choose evil, He wanted this world.

So much, I think, is the standard Calvinist reply to Molinism. I think the following illustration, however, highlights the point. In contexts involving the problem of evil and the Reformed response, I tend to hear a lot about God as the "author of evil." But consider two publishers:

1) Publisher 1 publishes a book he wrote, and the book he wrote includes characters that choose moral evil.

2) Publisher 2 has drafts of books handed to him (by whom? who knows!), and he chooses to publish one in which characters choose moral evil over any drafts of books in which no one chooses moral evil.

Is there a significant moral difference between the two publishers? I fail to see one. One might argue that because publisher 1 was also the author of the book, he is morally "responsible" for causing the characters who choose moral evil in a way that publisher 2 was not.

Now, a publisher who is also the author has more direct, intentional impact on why characters act a certain way. But his reasons for writing them the way he does need not differ from the reasons a mere publisher perusing the same book might choose it involving the same characters. If it is morally acceptable for the second publisher to publish the same book as the first publisher (who also authored the book), the burden is on the one who argues that the first publisher acted in a morally unacceptable way to pinpoint why the first publisher's more direct and intentional connection is morally unacceptable. Simply stating that the first publisher was also the author is not an argument against the moral acceptability of his actions.

In fact and on the contrary, I would argue that an author who intentionally writes characters a certain way is, if anything, in a better position to know why the book is worth publishing in contrast to a publisher who has been handed several drafts ("dealt" a hand) and left to divine - pun intended - which one tells the best story!

So while Molinists like Craig may charge Reformed Christians with believing God is the author of sin - and I have argued elsewhere that whether or not this is accurate or even problematic depends on what the person making the charge means by "author" - Molinists like Craig believe God is the publisher of sin. For the same reasons Craig would not view his position as problematic, Reformed Christians have analogous appeals as to why their view is not problematic. A book that is worth publishing was a book worth authoring.

When Is or Was Atonement Made?

In his exposition of Hebrews, John Owen said:

The high priest of old made atonement, and typically purged the sins of the people, by sacrificing of beasts according to the appointment of the law, Lev. xvi. This our high priest did by the sacrifice of himself, Isa. liii. 10. Heb. ix. 12. Of the nature of propitiatory or expiatory sacrifices, we must treat at large afterwards. We keep ourselves now to the apostle’s general proposition, expressing briefly the sacerdotal office of Christ, and the excellency of it, in that he really purged our sins, and that by the sacrifice of himself. And this was in and by his death on the cross, with his antecedent preparatory sufferings. Some distinguish between his death and the oblation of himself. This they say he performed in heaven, when as the High Priest of his church, he entered into the holiest not made with hands, whereunto his death was but a preparation. For the slaying of the beast, they say, was not the sacrifice, but the offering of its blood on the altar, and the carrying of it into the holy place. But this utterly overthrows the whole sacrifice of Christ, which indeed is the thing by them aimed at. It is true the slaying of the beast was not the whole sacrifice, but only an essential part of it, as was also the offering of its blood, and the sprinkling of it in the holy place, in the anniversary sacrifice of atonement, but not in any other. And the reason why the whole sacrifice could not consist in any one action, arose merely from the imperfection of the things and persons employed in that work. The priest was one thing, the beast to be sacrificed another, the altar another, the fire and the altar another, the incense added another, each of them limited and designed to its peculiar end, so that the atonement could not be made by any one of them, nor the sacrifice consist in them. But now in this sacrifice of Christ all these meet in one, because of his perfection. He himself was both priest, sacrifice, altar and incense, as we see in our progress, and he perfected his whole sacrifice at once, in and by his death and blood-shedding, as the apostle evidently declares, chap. ix. 12. 14.
 Thus by himself did Christ purge our sins, making an atonement for them by the sacrifice of himself in his death, that they should never be imputed to them that believe.

Recently, I watched a debate between James White and Robert Sungenis on whether the Mass is a propitiatory sacrifice (link). It reminded me of discussions I’ve had with Roman Catholic on this subject. I’ve spoken with Roman Catholics who have pointed out that Leviticus 16:17 says that the sacrificial ritual which [typically] made atonement for the people of Israel was incomplete until the high priest sprinkled the blood of the sacrifice in the holy of holies; Owen agrees. But they would then use this to argue that Christ’s antitypical death on the cross was a necessary but insufficient condition for our atonement, for it is clear in Hebrews 9 that Christ’s entrance into the holy of holies followed His death. You might ask why it would matter so much to Roman Catholics when atonement was or is made. Philip Hughes touches on the seeming answer here:

Another view, which is similar only in incidental respects and which is advocated in the main by Anglo-Catholic and Roman Catholic scholars, is that in the heavenly sanctuary a perpetual sacrificial offering by Christ of Himself takes place. This interpretation is commonly linked with a particular doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice taking place simultaneously here on earth. It is argued, further, on the basis of Hebrews 8:3, according to which “every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices,” so that “it is necessary for this priest (the ascended Lord ministering in the true tabernacle, 8:1-2) also to have something to offer,” that if Christ is not offering sacrifice He cannot fulfill the priestly function, and that therefore His role in heaven must be that of a constantly sacrificing priest. Because of the emphatic teaching of the New Testament, and not least the Epistle to the Hebrews, regarding the final once-for-all character of Christ’s atoning sacrifice on the cross, it is hardly open to anyone to suggest that in heaven He offers an atoning sacrifice other than that which He offered on the cross; consequently the explanation is proposed that it is a perpetual offering of this same sacrifice that takes place in the heavenly sanctuary.

Before recently studying the subject, this used to trouble me quite a bit. The doctrinal system Roman Catholics have erected is quite intricate, and to an inexperienced Christian, a knowledgeable Roman Catholic can put a daunting amount of words to paper on pet subjects like the Eucharist.

Now, though, I find it rather ironic that some of the same Roman Catholics who argue for a strict correspondence between type and antitype also argue that the throne on which Christ is seated is an altar. Though this would need to be true for a Eucharistic sacrifice, there is never said to be an altar in the typical holy of holies. Speaking of altars, though, Hebrews does clearly use the Day of Atonement ritual as a lens through which believers can understand the import of Christ’s work:

Hebrews 13:9 Do not be carried away by all sorts of strange teachings. For it is good for the heart to be strengthened by grace, not ritual meals, which have never benefited those who participated in them.

10 We have an altar that those who serve in the tabernacle have no right to eat from. 

11 For the bodies of those animals whose blood the high priest brings into the sanctuary as an offering for sin are burned outside the camp. 

12 Therefore, to sanctify the people by his own blood, Jesus also suffered outside the camp.

While priests were usually apportioned meat to eat from a sin or purification offering, they were precluded from this rite when blood was required to be brought into the tent of meeting to make atonement (Leviticus 6:24-30). Such offerings occurred after the anointed [high (cf. Numbers 35:25)] priest or the congregation had inadvertently sinned (4:7, 18) as well as on the annual Day of Atonement (16:3, 5). Rather than being permitted to eat of these sacrifices, following the priestly ritual, the bodies of the priest’s bull and the congregations’ bull or goat were carried to and burned outside of the camp (4:12, 21, 16:27). 

  

Clearly, Christ’s suffering and abuse which the author of Hebrews intended to parallel to the sin offering is in reference to His sacrificial, bodily, bloody crucifixion, the result of which sanctifies the people. The cross corresponds to the altar of burnt offering on which sacrifices were made under the OT sacrificial system. The cross was outside Jerusalem (John 19:20), the camp.

So Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is the Christian altar from which grace can be conferred to believer-priests who eat from it. Such participation in His sacrifice is through assent to right doctrine. Thus, no spiritual benefit can come from accepting and acting upon strange teachings such as an inordinate or passé emphasis on ritual meals. Those who still serve in earthly tabernacles have forsaken the realized reality for the external shadow which merely typified it. 

This is all very interesting, but we have to be careful not to push parallels too far. There are the obvious examples: Christ needs no sacrifice for Himself, His sacrifice for those whom He functions as a priestly representative is Himself rather than some other living entity, etc. These manifest His superiority, the central theme of Hebrews. After reviewing the rites performed by the high priest under old system in the first section of chapter 9, the author of Hebrews mentions another dissimilarity:

Hebrews 9:11 But when Christ appeared as a high priest of the good things to come, He entered through the greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this creation;

12 and not through the blood of goats and calves, but through His own blood, He entered the holy place once for all, having obtained eternal redemption. 

13 For if the blood of goats and bulls and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling those who have been defiled sanctify for the cleansing of the flesh,

14 how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?

15 For this reason He is the mediator of a new covenant, so that, since a death has taken place for the redemption of the transgressions that were committed under the first covenant, those who have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance. 

The dissimilarity with which this post is concerned is that Jesus obtained eternal redemption for those who have been called prior to His entry into the holy of holies. He offered Himself to God, a bloody sacrifice by which our consciences are cleansed so that we may on that account serve God. He made purification for sin by having offered one sacrifice for sins for all time, and He did this before He sat down at God’s right hand (1:3, 10:12). All these passages used aorist participles, on which basis Hughes notes they each convey “the same emphasis on the finality and the pastness of the unique sacrifice of Calvary. Nowhere is there any mention of a sacrifice that is prolonged in some manner or continuous in the heavenly sanctuary.” Even Hebrews 8:3, which Hughes noted Roman Catholics sometimes cite as proof that Christ must sacrifice in heaven or else He would lose His status as High Priest, uses an aorist participle; that is, the meaning is rather against the idea a perpetual [Eucharistic] offering is needed.

Thus, the throne is not an altar or mercy-seat on which Jesus must sprinkle His blood or sit in order to make atonement; Jesus Himself is the propitiatory (compare Romans 3:25 to Hebrews 9:5). That He sits down in the holy of holies – unlike the high priests of old – is conclusive evidence that far from being perpetual or ongoing, His sacrifice was completed, finished, and accepted by the Father upon His death. He now only needs to wait for what He has secured by His work to be fulfilled in due time. For by one offering He has perfected for all time those who are being sanctified:

Aaron certainly carried the sacrificial blood into the holy of holies, but our author deliberately, avoids saying that Christ carried His own blood into the heavenly sanctuary. Even as a symbolic expression this is open to objection. There have been expositors who, pressing the analogy of the Day of Atonement beyond the limits observed by our author, have agreed that the expiatory work of Christ was not completed on the cross — not completed, indeed, until He ascended from earth and “made atonement ‘for us’ in the heavenly holy of holies by the presentation of His efficacious blood.” But while it was necessary under the old covenant for the sacrificial blood first to be shed in the court and then to be brought into the holy of holies, no such division of our Lord’s sacrifice into two phases is envisaged under the new covenant.  When upon the cross He offered up His life to God as a sacrifice for His people's sin, He accomplished in reality what Aaron and his successors performed in type by the twofold act of slaying the victim and presenting its blood in the holy of holies. The title of the Anglican Article XXXI speaks rightly “of the one oblation of Christ finished upon the cross.” (F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, pg. 213)

Numeric and Generic Unity

I've had a few questions about what "numeric" and "generic" unity means, so I thought I'd write a post expanding on what I said in an earlier post.

To aid in explanation, an example might help. I'm going to pick on Dr. James White, not because I dislike him - just the opposite. He can be a little condescending at times - and I'm certainly not free to point fingers at others in this respect - but his books and debates were instrumental to my understanding of how to construct several good arguments for Calvinism and Protestantism. But I do have some difficulties with his view of the Trinity. I haven't read his book on it in a few years, but I think his "brief definition of the Trinity" in this article is a fair representation of it. He begins by stating:

The doctrine of the Trinity is simply that there is one eternal being of God - indivisible, infinite. This one being of God is shared by three co-equal, co-eternal persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.

That is, the "one being of God" is simply a single set or list of attributes. Later in the article, he defines "being" as "what something is." God is "one what, three who's." The Father, Son, and Spirit "share" the attributes of eternality, goodness, etc. 

The question is, what does Dr. White think "share" means? When he refers to "being" as "what something is," he continues to say "yet we also recognize individuals within a classification." Does he mean, then, that "being" refers to the class or genus under which some subset of "individuals" are members? That is, is "being" a universal which covers a set of particulars which "share" the same set of predicates or attributes? If so, then White believes in three Gods, for the Father, Son, and Spirit would be the "individuals" we would "recognize" as each individually possessing the attributes of eternality, goodness, etc. This interpretation of "share" would make sense in the context of the article, where Dr. White refers to the "being of man," rock, dog, cat, etc. in the same breath as the "being of God." 

Perhaps he would contest the "three Gods" conclusion, but surely he would agree that there are many men, rocks, dogs, and cats - there are a plurality of these individuals. On his view, are there not likewise a plurality of Gods, then? If "God" refers to the divine nature, it would seem so. The Father is God (eternal, good, etc.), the Son is God (eternal, good, etc.), and the Spirit is God (eternal, good, etc.) just as Tom is human, Joe is human, and Billy is human. If this is what Dr. White means, though, would be imprecise for him to say God is "one what, three who's." Rather, God is one "what" - i.e. the definition of the genus or class or set or universal or attributes by which an individual is classified - but there are three Gods. Even on this view, God is not Triune; the Trinity are God[s]. Similarly, human is not "triune;" Tom, Joe, and Billy are human. God is not the subject and the persons the predicates. It's the other way around.

This view would be close to generic unity, the obvious difference being that Dr. White has asserted the definition proper of "God" is the attributes of the divine nature as opposed to the person of the Father. This begs an interesting question: Dr. White is a monotheist, presumably because of the reasons I outline above (God is "one what"). But given his references to the being of man et. al., is Dr. White a monoanthropist et. al.? He could, of course, consistently say "yes" and I would have to argue on other grounds why I think he should abandon his definition of God as a set of attributes. But I would like to hear whether this question gives him any pause.

Another possibility that would seem to be less likely is that Dr. White thinks the Father, Son, and Spirit "share" the attributes in a sense differently than I have outlined above; namely, that each person is not Himself eternal, good, etc. but are rather collectively so. If this is what he meant, his allusion to humans, rocks, etc. is very misleading, for as an individual human, I have my own rational and moral faculty, body, etc. I don't "share" it except in the sense that these attributes may be predicated univocally - though distinctly - of another human as well as myself. Thus, I don't "share" it except in the sense that I am a member of the same class or genus as Tom, Joe, and Billy. All of this leads me to believe Dr. White can't mean "share" in this sense, though even if he did, I don't know how he could avoid Sabellianism or some bizarre view that the persons are incomplete parts of God. If there is only one subject x of whom or which "eternality, goodness, etc." may be predicated, and the Father, Son, and Spirit are all said to share in these attributes, the conclusion that x = Father = Son = Spirit or x = Father (1/3) + Son (1/3) + Spirit (1/3) cannot be avoided.

This latter possibility is just what numeric unity is and entails. As soon as one affirms that the set of attributes (eternality, goodness, etc.) may be predicated of more than one subject - e.g. person - he admits that there are multiple members or individuals of the genus which is defined by that set of attributes. Each member himself or itself possesses the set of attributes. [How such are possessed is a separate question, so we need not get into eternal generation in this post.] But this is generic unity, not numeric unity. This is unity according to the members being classified under one genus. In this case, we say that the Father, Son, and Spirit are each individually "divine" (Dr. White would say "God"). Divinity is predicable of the Father Son, and Spirit, and they don't "share" divinity in any other sense. [They work together, obviously, but that too is a separate question.] 

Simplified, then, the difference between numeric and generic unity is this: on numeric unity, there is only one subject of whom some set of attributes is predicable; on generic unity, there are multiple subjects of whom some set of attributes is predicable. Thus, if the set of attributes which Dr. White defines for "God" - for him, the definition proper - and I would define for "divinity" or "the divine nature" can be predicated of the Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct persons (subjects), then there numerically are three "Gods" (Dr. White) or "divines" or "divine natures" (me), not one. 

I suspect most Trinitarians would be comfortable referring to the Father as divine, the Son as divine, and the Spirit as divine. But for some reason, they avoid the following conclusion or contradict themselves elsewhere: because there are three such subjects, it follows there are three such divine natures. Therefore, numeric unity is false. That is the only way the individuals can each be considered as a member of the class or genus of divinity without conflation or contradiction.

White vs. Sungenis on Predestination

After listening to a recent debate between James White and Robert Sungenis on predestination and free will, which the reader can listen to here, I felt compelled to write some notes on the more confusing and erroneous points Sungenis made in his opening statement. I have tried to categorize his statements as best I can.

Church History

Sungenis cited the Council of Orange to explain in what way he believes man possesses free will: enabling grace. However, it is not clear to me in what way Sungenis purports to harmonize Catholic soteriology with several of its canons. He cited Canon 4:

“If anyone maintains that God awaits our will to be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our will to be cleansed comes to us through the infusion and working of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit himself who says through Solomon, "The will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35, LXX), and the salutary word of the Apostle, "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:13).”

Canon 6 makes a similar condemnation:

“If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).”

Does Sungenis believe the Holy Spirit is infused into unbelievers and, if so, what is the nature of such an infusion if not regenerative? White cited a staple passage for the doctrine of total depravity, Romans 8:7-8, in his opening statement, but the verse following is more relevant to this question:

Romans 8:9a You, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you…

If indeed Sungenis believes that the infusion of the Spirit is of a similar nature to that described by Paul – and if the Spirit is said to be infused, I do not see how he could contend otherwise – then in order to remain consistent, he would have to contend a prima facie absurdity: that to be “in the spirit” implies nothing more than that one’s nature, upon infusion, is enabled to choose to believe or disbelieve God’s word; one is not neutral if he is in the spirit.

This confusion aside, Augustine’s influence is nowhere else more evident than in the particular Scriptures the council cites to support its declarations, for Augustine was not shy about repeating passages like 1 Corinthians 4:7, 15:10 in order to press his [similar] arguments. That Sungenis believes Lucidus from the 5th century is the first [post-apostolic] forerunner of “absolute predestination” – i.e. predestination without respect to free will – betrays an unfamiliarity (to put it generously) with Augustine, who most certainly believed in monergism.

Calvinism

After a little church history, Sungenis proceeds to explain how free will is incompatible with total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints.

Sungenis’ understanding of unconditional election is somewhat questionable, as he believes it implies God elects arbitrarily; in a later clip, he asserts that a God who decrees sin in order to manifest His justice and wrath as well as His mercy and grace is arbitrary. But this doesn’t make sense at all. God’s choices are grounded in His consistent, righteous desire to uphold that which is infinitely worthy: His glory. How exactly is that arbitrary? Sungenis’ unsupported accusations, arguments from incredulity (“What kind of God would [do this]?”), arguments from silence (“Wouldn’t God get more glory if He saved all men without exception?”), and utter failure to distinguish between a desire to manifest of His nature to His people from a sub-human need to “prove who He is” are just several samples of the kind of question-begging and straw man argumentation Sungenis resorts to throughout his opening statement, as will become more apparent.

In any case, Sungenis is obviously not a Molinist, since he believes free will and unconditional election are not compatible. Moreover, Sungenis appears equally unswayed by the argument that new Eden provides an example par excellance of a situation in which man could possess free will and yet be unable to fall away; perhaps he doesn’t believe Christians will retain free will after death. I cannot discern that free will bears any direct relation to the extent of the atonement, but at least Sungenis seems to recognize that classical Arminians cannot consistently believe in total depravity and that free will is mutually exclusive with sola gratia.

Coherence

After this contrast, Sungenis explains why he believes in a kind of predestination that works “in conjunction with” free will: the Bible says so. Now this is an admirable reason to believe a doctrine is true, but if one were, on this account, to expect that Sungenis would endeavor to immediately substantiate his assertion and explain the way in which free will relates to predestination, he would be disappointed. Instead, the audience is treated to a lengthy speech in which Sungenis more or less says that systematic theology is hard and God is incomprehensible. One of his arguments could be constructed as follows:

P: Philosophers have debated God’s nature for thousands of years.
P: It is possible that, in some way we do not understand, God’s nature is reflected in all the variant positions which have been advocated during these debates.
C: Analogously, free will and predestination could cohere.

Or maybe:

P: Contrasted concepts of either/or questions which I can’t answer can both be taught in Scripture.
P: The coherence of free will and predestination is such a question.
C: The Bible teaches free will in conjunction with predestination!

Though spoken in a bit of jest, it was truly painful to listen to the way in which Sungenis attempted to excuse his prefatory gymnastics. His follow-up argument was nothing more than a tu quoque argument against White: since White believes Adam possessed free will yet believed God ordained the Fall, White must believe that predestination and free will can cohere. But even if all this were true, it does not follow that free will is biblical.

Even more painful is to listen to Sungenis couch his arguments in hypothetical language and then proceed to pontificate as though the hypothetical is a given. For example, he argues: “If God Himself commands that man participate in salvation by exercising his free will to accept or reject God, then… etc.” But since Sungenis never actually gets around to demonstrating that God commands man participate in salvation by exercising his free will, whether or not his conclusions follow from this conditional are irrelevant. Sungenis will later assume that the fact that all men are commanded to believe implies they can believe and that an “invitation” to believe likewise implies such a capacity, but when push comes to shove, he can provide no substantial argument.

Distinguishing Factors

Sungenis was eager to intercept the argument that free will implies that one who chooses to believe is smarter, more spiritually sensitive, or in some general way “better” than Joe Reprobate who chose, also by free will, to reject God. Yet if Sungenis believes it is within bounds to criticize the Calvinist for believing in a God who chooses arbitrarily, it is unclear why he would consider it out of bounds for the Calvinist to criticize Sungenis’ position on similar grounds.

Sungenis is also critical of being labeled a synergist or anthropocentric because he does not wish to be associated with others who have dissimilar beliefs to his own. Read that again and see if it makes sense. Even more puzzlingly, he says that if one wishes to learn about synergism, he needn’t look any further than the variance amongst Reformed Theologians regarding lapsarianism &c. Needless to say, Sungenis made not one whit of sense throughout this portion of his diatribe.

He continued in this nonsensical fashion by further criticizing Reformers for making such distinctions in the first place, accusing the origin of disunity on a general lack of possession of the truth; of course, given that Sungenis cannot likewise account for Molinism and Thomism within Roman Catholicism, it is little wonder that Sungenis feels the need to employ yet another disguised tu quoque argument, viz. for no other reason than to attempt to drag his opponents down to ground equal to his own: none.

Exegesis

A little more than halfway through his opening statement, Sungenis finally gets around to putting forward positive evidence for his position… or so it would seem.

In his first cited text, 1 Timothy 2:4, Sungenis assumes that “all men” refers to men without exception rather than without distinction when he in fact cites verses in context which would seem to support the latter interpretation (verse 1 and 6, cf. verse 2). Using his argumentation, Roman Catholics would retranslate Romans 3:23 such that Mary and Jesus are excluded. Apparently, Roman Catholics don’t believe all means all! Comically, Sungenis doesn’t ever connect God’s alleged desire to save all without exception to man’s free will, so one is left to speculate as to just how 1 Timothy 2:4 teaches the concept. The same goes for his throwaway citation of 1 John 2:2 (in which the analogous John 11:51-52 is unsurprisingly left unmentioned).

His other citations fare little better. Neither John 5:39 nor Matthew 23:37 imply, in their respective contexts, that the men mentioned could have been willing to act contrary to what they did, and in 2 Timothy 2:13, Sungenis reverts to assuming that a conditional statement implies actuality – whereas Christ and the apostles repeatedly said he who denies Christ is an antichrist. With that, Sungenis has run out of ammo. That’s all he had to offer.

Logic

The shallow nature of Sungenis’ argumentation is no more evident, however, when Sungenis is reduced to appealing to the emotions of the audience. Sungenis would seemingly have his audience believe that all unbelievers are poor, needy souls who are crying out for a Savior only to be stiff-armed at the goal line by the tyrant God of Calvinism. What rubbish! Men are slaves to sin and lovers of darkness before they are regenerated. White often uses imagery of a man standing on the precipice of Hell shaking his fists at his Creator. In less dramatic terms, he has related times when he has spoken to people who say they cannot possibly accept the God of Calvinism, to which he replies: “I know.” That is to say, apart from God’s unobligated grace and mercy, sinners are quite content with going about their own business of living in sin, thank you very much. Of course they reject God. Sungenis is a very good example of this: he presumes a loving God must attempt (and fail more often than not) to save all men without exception and is further willing to call the biblical God monstrous. One would do well to observe how quickly Sungenis proceeded from an incomprehensible God to an anthropocentric God.

One final attempt is made by Sungenis to show that God can predestine men according to their free will. The CCC, paragraph 600, states:

“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of "predestination", he includes in it each person's free response to his grace”: "In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place." For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.”

Sungenis claims that this illustrates how Roman Catholics are able to interpret Scripture at face value and compatibilize free will with predestination. But firstly, after complaining that White must interprets the “all men” of 1 Timothy 2:4 according to his preconceptions, it is ironic that Sungenis cites an interpretation of Acts 4:27 which substitutes “permitted” for “predestined” without further ado. And secondly, it is very interesting that this catechism predicates God’s predestination on creaturely wills. One wonders how Sungenis would respond to the objection that free will necessarily implies that God cannot be eternally omniscient.

Conclusion

Contrasted to White’s opening statement, Sungenis’ was poor. I had hoped Sungenis would challenge White, but even a lowly layman such as me can perceive the ridiculousness of Sungenis’ arguments. I may listen to the rest of the debate at some other time, if only to hear White’s rebuttal and the cross-ex, but if this is seriously the best non-Calvinism has to offer by way of a defense of free will, what a let-down.