Molinism and The "Publisher" of Evil

A friend forwarded me a recent James White and William Lane Craig discussion (link). I listened to the opening remarks (through 18 minutes) and had a few observations of and reflections on what Craig said.

The way Craig frames his position in his opening remarks about Scrooge is important. The spirit of Christmas future shows Scrooge what would (emphasis Craig) happen, given certain conditions. The critical point is at the 14 minute mark: Craig says God knows what "people would freely choose" in any circumstance "in which they might be placed" logically prior to decreeing in what circumstances people are placed.

This is the essence of Molinism. It's almost like God runs a simulation of what "I" would "freely" choose in scenario x, y, and z. God then determines to create the conditions for scenario y so that the simulation plays out in reality. In this way, the Molinist maintains that God is in control of all things. After all, God could have run scenario z if He wanted to, so He is "in control." Yet the Molinist will also claim that people are free in a libertarian sense, since "my" choice in scenario y was (allegedly) free. God's knowledge of what my choice would be in scenario y is not dependent on His decree that scenario y actually happens - just the opposite.

The problem with this is referred to as the grounding objection, and as I understand it, it can be explained in various ways:

If God's decree is "logically posterior" to His knowledge of what I would freely choose in a given scenario, the question is begged as to what "grounds" God's knowledge of what I would freely choose. God allegedly has middle knowledge, but how? It can't be grounded in God's natural (necessary) knowledge, because we aren't talking about necessary truths or realities. It can't be grounded in God's decretal knowledge, since God's decree is (allegedly) logically posterior to God's so-called "middle" knowledge of what I "would" "freely" choose in a given scenario.

So on what basis does God know what I would choose in a given scenario? A simulation? A simulation is never the reality. The question is how God can know, if I am free in a libertarian sense, that I would choose a definitively certain way given scenario y. For until the scenario is "run" (played out in reality such that I am able to make a choice in that scenario), I haven't actually made a choice (I am not the same as a simulated version of myself).

A Molinist will likely demure and say that the basis for God's knowledge is not a simulation. But since middle knowledge cannot be something tied to God's own nature (i.e. things dealing with necessary truths or reality) nor God's decree (i.e. things dealing with God's free choice), then it seems all that is left is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on a quasi-real version of myself. Perhaps a more neutral way to frame the point is by asking how I can be really free (in a libertarian sense) if God knows that I would act a certain way logically before I actually do.

Even if the Molinist continues to protest against these representations, the main point (that even the Molinist would seem to admit) is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on something external to Himself. Even Craig admits this when he elsewhere says, God "has to play with the hand He has been dealt" (link). This statement that Craig made in the past gives away his and the Molinist's position: it seems that someone else has dealt the cards and, therefore 1) God is not in control of all things (e.g. the dealt hand), and 2) God's knowledge is dependent upon whoever or whatever dealt these cards.

This is severely problematic. If God's knowledge is eternal (as I think and have argued it must be) yet dependent, then what is the nature of that on which His knowledge is dependent? Is that something else co-eternal with God? And aside from this question, is it possible for God to be eternally omniscient if His knowledge is dependent upon an extrinsic source (I would and have argued in the above link is not)?

This is the main counterargument against Molinism. Now, as for what Craig says about Molinists and Calvinists being like-minded in agreeing God has overriding purposes for moral evil yet there being a significant distinction in that for the Molinist, God can "will" in given circumstances that one choose good whereas a Calvinist cannot, his argument is equivocal. Calvinists can maintain the same distinction Craig would between God's moral or prescriptively will vs. His decretal will. In a given circumstance, a Calvinist can maintain God commands other than He had decreed.

Furthermore, for the Molinist, God does not merely permit moral evil, He decrees it. The Molinist would agree God could have not created at all. So the decree for God to create this world means that the Molinist must agree God wants moral evil to occur. Whatever reasons He might have for decreeing a world in which creatures freely choose evil, He wanted this world.

So much, I think, is the standard Calvinist reply to Molinism. I think the following illustration, however, highlights the point. In contexts involving the problem of evil and the Reformed response, I tend to hear a lot about God as the "author of evil." But consider two publishers:

1) Publisher 1 publishes a book he wrote, and the book he wrote includes characters that choose moral evil.

2) Publisher 2 has drafts of books handed to him (by whom? who knows!), and he chooses to publish one in which characters choose moral evil over any drafts of books in which no one chooses moral evil.

Is there a significant moral difference between the two publishers? I fail to see one. One might argue that because publisher 1 was also the author of the book, he is morally "responsible" for causing the characters who choose moral evil in a way that publisher 2 was not.

Now, a publisher who is also the author has more direct, intentional impact on why characters act a certain way. But his reasons for writing them the way he does need not differ from the reasons a mere publisher perusing the same book might choose it involving the same characters. If it is morally acceptable for the second publisher to publish the same book as the first publisher (who also authored the book), the burden is on the one who argues that the first publisher acted in a morally unacceptable way to pinpoint why the first publisher's more direct and intentional connection is morally unacceptable. Simply stating that the first publisher was also the author is not an argument against the moral acceptability of his actions.

In fact and on the contrary, I would argue that an author who intentionally writes characters a certain way is, if anything, in a better position to know why the book is worth publishing in contrast to a publisher who has been handed several drafts ("dealt" a hand) and left to divine - pun intended - which one tells the best story!

So while Molinists like Craig may charge Reformed Christians with believing God is the author of sin - and I have argued elsewhere that whether or not this is accurate or even problematic depends on what the person making the charge means by "author" - Molinists like Craig believe God is the publisher of sin. For the same reasons Craig would not view his position as problematic, Reformed Christians have analogous appeals as to why their view is not problematic. A book that is worth publishing was a book worth authoring.

Time and Calvinism

I don’t usually sit on the fence about an topic I’ve spent a significant amount of time studying, but the philosophy of time still has me somewhat stumped. Still, it seems to me there are some relevant points that can be made regardless, such as that how a Calvinist could deal with a temporal God would significantly differ from how an Arminian and Molinist could. I read a recent challenge to this, which prompted the following [edited] response.

Whether the A-series or B-series theorists have it right - that is, whether or not tensed utterances can be reduced to tenseless propositions without a loss of meaning - for every tensed utterance, there is a corresponding tenseless proposition. For example, on the assumption that the tensed utterance “I am presently typing [now]” is true, the corresponding tenseless utterance “I type on 4/29/2013” would also be true because either 4/29/2013 is the ever-flowing “now” or “the present” (A-series) or because the utterance of the tensed expression is simultaneous in the causal chain with the change in date to 4/29/2013 (B-series).

If we assume God is in time, as some Arminians but especially most Molinists are wont to argue, then the A-series theory is correct. But in that case, on Calvinism, God would know this and every other tenseless truth which corresponds to a tensed truth because He has predetermined all things. That is, even if God is in time, “the future” is not open to Him. God may “take on new knowledge” in the sense that His affirmation of tensed propositions would vary according to their change in truth-value, but God would know beforehand what that He will take on “new knowledge” as well as what the content of this “new knowledge” is.

On the other hand, for the Arminian or Molinist, God’s knowledge of tenseless truths relating to His creatures who act “freely” is contingent on their fulfillment in time. So the future is open to God, at least in this respect. Molinists will debate this, but I think the grounding objection is sound (link). When we say God “takes on new knowledge” in this case, then, we mean something more than “God believes to be true what He knew He would believe to be true.” For on Arminianism and Molinism, God didn’t know what He would believe with respect to our allegedly free choices before we made them. He couldn’t have, or else they weren't really “free” in the sense both Arminians and Molinists want to preserve. That is, if God knew beforehand what they would choose, then men couldn’t have exercised their wills according to two or more courses of action. 

Impossible Worlds, Absolute Necessity

Almost a year ago, I wrote a post which, for me, was unique in that I prefaced the thoughts stated therein with a bit of hesitation. Recent reading and a guest post on Molinism have caused me to reconsider those thoughts.

In that post, I was trying to provide a Reformed reply to the following question put forward by Carl Henry: "Does the very notion of "events which could have been otherwise" violate divine omnipotence and omniscience?" Notwithstanding my attempt to answer in the negative, even a few weeks after writing the post, I frustratingly wrote to a friend:

I cannot say that I am quite satisfied with it. For instance: why did God choose to effect this possible world? Presumably because it pleased Him. Why did it please Him? Presumably the answer has something to do with His nature. But it seems to me such an answer implies that God must have effected this possible world, since God's nature is not itself effected but rather that by which all other things are effected. God's nature is determinative. That in turn implies this is the only possible world, in which case the problem reasserts itself: how does God know counter-factuals if this is the only possible world? Vexing...

It wasn't until recently I discovered that there is precedent in the history of Reformed theology for rejecting the concept of counter-factual knowledge (cf. Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics pgs. 428-432). I may write a separate post on this. Here, however, I will only be concerned with explaining why I have come to think - in contrast to an assumption of the aforementioned blog post - that this is the only possible world. In so doing, I will be providing an alternative Reformed defense of the biblical doctrine of divine omniscience.

At the same time, I do not wish to imply that I think everything I wrote in my post from a year ago is wrong. I still believe God's righteousness and the manifestation of His glory are correlated in that God's righteousness is demonstrated in what John Piper would call His unswerving commitment always to preserve the honor of his name and display his glory. I still believe God's decree must be non-arbitrary. I still believe that:

God's decree to effect this possible world implies that this possible world is entailed in God's decree to maximally manifest His glory; that is, given God's purpose to maximally manifest His glory, God necessarily must have decreed to effect this possible world.

What I have reconsidered is whether or not there could be "possible worlds" - worlds God could have instantiated - other than this actual world. There are several reasons for this:

1. As my remarks to a friend indicated, I believe there is reason for everything God has decreed. That would include the teleological end of all things, God's glory. Ironically, I wrote a post 3 years ago (republished here) in which I made a statement very much in line with what I think now:

For God to act in a manner which would not bring Himself maximal glory… would constitute a contravention of the divine nature, and since God cannot deny Himself, God’s actions too are determined [by His own, immutable nature].

Why did God decree to maximally manifest His glory? I don't see any other possible conclusion than something similar to this or what I said to my friend. In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one?

2. Let us suppose God had actualized a different possible world; after all, if God's actualization of this world wasn't absolutely necessary, He could have chosen to actualize a different possible world. But this means God's knowledge is not eternal, since His knowledge [of what is the actual world] would not be necessary.

God knows that this is the actual world. But if God has a libertarian free will, it cannot be denied He could have chosen to instantiate (and therefore could have known as actual) a completely different possible world. Making God's knowledge contingent on a "free" choice - even His own - requires a succession of ideas in His mind (knowledge of possible worlds -> choice -> knowledge of the actual world), and that destroys His eternal omniscience. Not only is God's instantiation of this world non-arbitrary, but God also didn't compare multiple possible worlds in order to come to a decision as to which to put into effect.

This is a most important objection because it cuts across all [Christian] systems which believe in an eternally omniscient God.

3. Suggesting God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability.

Conclusion: God knows who He is because of who He is. He knows this world is possible both because He has the power to effect it and because effecting it would not contradict who He is. He necessarily effected this possible world because no other world fits this criteria. This is not to say God's will is under any external compulsion; rather, His works are intrinsically determined by His nature.

Guest Blogging on Molinism

I have written a post on Molinism as a guest blogger here. Some time in the next few days I will write a follow-up post on the - or at least a (!) - Reformed position regarding God's "types" of knowledge.

Molinism Revisited

Jamin Hubner at ProsApologian has posted an excerpt of an excellent critique of Molinism by Herman Bavinck. As long as one keeps in mind Bavinck's conception of middle knowledge is case specific, the second to last paragraph is as fine a summary of the problems of Molinism as I've read:

"The doctrine of middle knowledge, however, represents contingent future events as contingent and free also in relation to God. This is with reference not only to God's predestination but also his foreknowledge, for just as in Origen, things do not happen because God knows them, but God foreknows them because they are going to happen. Hence, the sequence is not necessary knowledge, the knowledge of vision, the decree to create (etc.); instead, it is necessary knowledge, middle knowledge, decree to create (etc.), and the knowledge of vision. God does not derive his knowledge of the free actions of human beings from his own being, his own decrees, but from the will of creatures. God, accordingly, becomes dependent on the world, derives knowledge from the world that he did not have and could not obtain from himself, and hence, in his knowledge, ceases to be one, simple, and independent - that is, God. Conversely, the creature in large part becomes independent vis-a-vis God. It did indeed at one time receive "being" (esse) and "being able" (posse) from God but now it has the "volition" (velle) completely in its own hand. It sovereignly makes it own decisions and either accomplishes something or does not accomplish something apart from any preceding divine decree. Something can therefore come into being quite apart from God's will. The creature is now creator, autonomous, sovereign; the entire history of the world is taken out of God's controlling hands and placed into human hands. First, humans decide; then God responds with a plan that corresponds to that decision.”

- Reformed Dogmatics

On Molinism

Explanation

Firstly, Molinism is an attempt to resolve tension between God's sovereignty and man's allegedly free [extrinsically, antecedently uncaused] will. Essentially, it is the position that, because God is omniscient, He knows what His creatures will "freely" choose in any hypothetical circumstance. Molinists call these hypotheticals "possible worlds." From these possible worlds, God has "sovereignly" chosen to effect one. The Molinist's contention is that God's choice to effect this possible world was unconditional - so God was in control ("sovereign") - yet, because this possible world is one in which we have "freely" chosen (given the circumstances), there is no mutual exclusivity between God's sovereignty and man's allegedly free will.

Secondly, Molinism is an attempt to resolve tension between God's omniscience and man's allegedly free [extrinsically, antecedently uncaused] will. Matthew 11 is a passage in which Jesus reveals that He knows what would have happened in a different possible world. Molinists attempt to reconcile that fact with God's knowledge by distinguishing between types of God's knowledge:

1. Necessary knowledge - knowledge of what must be (e.g. self-knowledge)
2. Middle knowledge - knowledge of what would be (e.g. possible worlds)
3. Free knowledge - knowledge of what is (e.g. the actual world)

Middle knowledge includes knowledge of what men freely choose and is the type of knowledge about which I spoke in the first paragraph, the one by which God was able to execute His sovereignty. This is thought to be sufficient explanation as to how God's omniscience is compatible with man's allegedly free will.

Evaluation

The primary problem with Molinism pertains to how God's omniscience can harmonize with alleged creaturely freedom.

The difference between God's alleged "types" of knowledge is logical. Free knowledge, for example, is logically dependent on middle knowledge, for God could not know what "is" without knowing what "could be." The problem is that Molinists provide no explanation as to how God possesses knowledge of what men would freely choose; that is, how does God know what "would be"? They beg the very question which is in need of answering, i.e. how God knows what men will freely choose. Steve Hays summarized this dilemma as follows:

What is a possible world? What is a possible agent?

Here I’m puzzled by the position of Craig, Plantinga, et al. They treat possible persons as a given. Given possible persons, with determinate character
traits, God chooses which world to instantiate in light of what possible agents would do in different possible worlds. He chooses the possible world which achieves his objective.

But it’s unclear to me how Craig, Plantinga, et al. account for the given. How do possible persons subsist, with determinate character traits, such that God’s choice is responsive the free choices?

To me, the only logical way to embed this notion, consistent with libertarianism, is to go the route of Richard Creel. There’s a platonic plenum which is populated by possible agents in possible worlds. This exists independently of the divine nature or will. It’s like a mail order catalogue from which God can make his selection.

But, of course, the notion of a coeternal, self-subsistent plenum, alongside God, is profoundly heretical. It’s also metaphysically bizarre. What is the plenum? Is the plenum a mind-like entity?

Molinists essentially treat middle knowledge as a brute fact. However, how God knows what men would "freely" choose in a hypothetical situation is not dissimilar to the question regarding how God knew what I have actually chosen with alleged free will. If God doesn't cause our choice (directly or indirectly), God's knowledge (whether of the actual or a possible world) must itself be predicated on our [temporal] will, in which case God is not eternally omniscient.

In fact, the only thing Molinists present which remotely resembles an argument is that middle knowledge is the only position compatible with God's knowledge of counter-factuals. But consistent Calvinism provides a more cogent answer to the issue: God ultimately causes all things, so He knows counter-factuals because He knows what would have happened had He ultimately caused events other than as He actually has.