A Special Kind of Scripturalist

It takes is a special kind of Scripturalist to use historical development of a doctrine as the basis upon which to say, “No, you’ve got it all wrong.” Yet, that is exactly what Sean Gerety has done (link)... or rather, is trying to do, as he as yet has not even correctly handled the history of the Trinity. I keep waiting for him to address the following arguments, any one of which is sufficient to devastate his view of the Trinity:

1. Scripture always refers to the Father alone is always the referent of “one God” (Romans 3:30, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Ephesians 4:6, 1 Timothy 2:5) or “[only] true God” (John 17:3, 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 John 5:20). (link)

2. Jesus is the Son of God. Jesus is not the Son of a set of divine attributes, He’s the Son of a person. (link)

3. Divine [or human] attributes are predicated of persons. Persons are not predicated of divine [or human] attributes. (link)

4. Scripture always refers to the Father as Παντοκράτωρ or παντοκράτορος (“Almighty”). (link)

5. Not once does Sean himself examine what the Nicene Creed says. Allow me: The Creed says “We believe in one God, the Father Almighty.” The Creed says the Son is “God of God.” When the creed says that the Son is “God of God,” it is saying the Son is God out from (ek) the Father, or the Father is the source of the Son. Thus, the Creed does not say the Son is “God of Himself” (autotheos), it says He is “God of God.” This is problematic for Sean, as he denied any kind of intra-Trinitarian“from/to relationship.” (link)

6. Sean cannot even seem to define “eternal generation” or “eternal procession,” not surprising since Sean affirms the aseity of the Son. At most, then, he must think the second person derives His personal property from the Father, not His person from the Father. But then it would be more appropriate to refer to the Son as eternally adopted. Further, this neo-Adoptionism appears to make the relationships among the persons arbitrary, since there is no reason to suppose that the personal properties could not have been reversed. (link)

7. Three Trinitarians minds and three Trinitarian wills are necessary to preserve the distinct thoughts each possesses and roles each has in the covenant of redemption and economy of salvation. In this case, the idea the persons are united numerically can’t be true (link). But if Sean rejects numeric unity and the subordination of the Son and Spirit, then just as there is one definition of human but multiple humans, so there must, on Sean's view, be one definition of God but multiple Gods. (link)

These are just several of the relevant points of Scripture and logic I have mentioned in the course of our blog discussion, all of which he has had ample time to address. I have also received no reply to my post showing a difference between myself and Samuel Clarke – I believe the Son and Spirit to exist necessarily – which has, thus far, been critical to Sean’s accusation that I am a Unitarian. Nor has he responded to my post showing that Alexander of Alexandria who, of all things, was the primary opponent of Arius, thought that the Son is subordinate to the Father. He has, however, admitted on facebook that Novatian constitutes precedent for our view. But I suppose these early church fathers were just a bunch of Arians and Unitarians? Right.

Speaking of curious views of history, Sean apparently thinks I should acknowledge my conscience to be bound to the Athanasian Creed. So much for Scripturalism and sola scriptura. If he doesn’t think it to be infallible, then why should I really care what Sproul thinks about it? On that subject, though, I would note that Sproul doesn’t make a normative or universal statement. Rather, Sean leaves it to the reader to connect the dots: Ryan rejects the Athanasian Creed, so Ryan is obviously arrogant and obviously wrong.

But even assuming Sean’s tacit denial of the formal principle of the Reformation, it’s preposterous that Sean would presume to moralize on Trinitarianism in church history when he can’t even consistently affirm the Nicene Creed. If I’m culpable for denying a non-ecumenical creed not even written by the person after whom it was named, how much more is Sean culpable for denying the Nicene Creed? He objects that I misunderstand the Nicene Creed. But he has yet to make good on that objection.

Meanwhile, I have consistently explained why it is that I am able to affirm the co-equality or co-essentiality of the Son and Spirit with the Father in terms of their unity in distinctly yet univocally possessing the same attributes, a fact which renders Sean’s insinuations to the contrary a lie and his citations of Athanasius irrelevant. It is his burden of proof to show that being self-existent and autotheos are divine attributes. It is his burden of proof to harmonize his idea with the questions and arguments he has so far been unable to answer.

Furthermore, I would point out that Sean has admitted his view of the Incarnation is not compatible with Chalcedonian Christology (link). This isn’t even a question of logical inference: Sean openly denies that Chalcedon is true. But then I too can cite modern theologians who think this council is, as Sean puts it, “affirmed by virtually every historic Protestant church,” leaving it to the reader to follow my own trail of bread crumbs. In fact, I don’t need to look any further than Nick Needham, a cohort of R.C. Sproul (link):

It’s hard enough to pronounce “Chalcedon.” Getting to grips with its theology can be even more daunting. But the effort will be very richly rewarded. For the past 1,500 years, right up to the present day, virtually all orthodox Christian theologians have defined their “orthodoxy” with reference to the Council of Chalcedon. That certainly includes the Reformed tradition. We may not think that the early ecumenical councils were infallible. But we have generally held that they were gloriously right in what they affirmed, and that Christians who take the church and its history seriously must reckon with these great councils as providential landmarks in the unfolding life story of God’s people.

For good measure, here is what R.C. Sproul says (link):

The fifth century saw the convening of perhaps the most important christological council in all of church history at Chalcedon in 451. Here orthodox Christianity had to fight a battle on two fronts. On the one hand was the opposition to the orthodox view of the nature of Christ in His incarnation by Eutyches. Eutyches was a monophysite — he declared that Jesus had only one nature. This nature was called a single “theanthropic nature,” meaning a divinely human nature or a humanly divine nature. This position, saying that Christ had one nature (Greek: monophysis), obscured both the real deity and the real humanity that were united in the incarnation of Christ. 

On the other side of the debate, the Nestorians argued that if Jesus had two natures, He had to have had two persons as well, so they separated the two natures of Christ into two persons. Over against both heresies, Chalcedon gave its famous formula by which it declared that Christ is truly God and truly man, with the natures perfectly united in such a way that they are not confused — the natures are without mixture, confusion, division, or separation; each nature retains its own attributes. This was a watershed council because it set the boundaries or parameters of christological speculation. The two natures were not to be merged or confused; the human nature, for example, would not be absorbed or swallowed up in the divine nature and vice versa. At the same time, the two natures were not to be separated so as to lose their unity in the one person. 

Throughout history since Chalcedon, the church in virtually every generation has had to face the tendencies of either confusing the two natures or dividing or separating the two natures. Orthodoxy in the fifth century declared that the natures must be distinguished yet never separated. They must be distinguished and never be co-mingled.

Now, does any of this bother Sean? Clearly not. And why should it? He has elsewhere lamented that “It’s a shame more Protestants don’t think like Calvin when it comes to the so-called “ecumenical” Councils” (link). Little did Sean know that he would become one of those Protestants. Clearly there is a double standard at play, and the reason is that Sean is not able to address the above arguments.

Really, this whole discussion of historical theology is a distraction. I don’t mind exposing Sean’s farcical view of church history, and I am in the process of doing just that, but the idea that two Scripturalists should be arguing about anything other than Scripture or that which can necessarily be inferred from it in a conversation about so serious a topic as the Trinity is ludicrous. Or maybe Sean wants to take a crack at naming all of the Scripturalists in the last millennium too. Anyway, moving on...

Instead the Son and Spirit derive their existence from the Father who then delegates his authority to them.  Neither the Son nor the Spirit are “autotheos” or God in themselves.  Their divinity is derived and contingent on the Father’s essential and supreme divinity.  According to Hedrich and Shelton only the Father can be called God in the fullest sense and the Son and Spirit are merely his messengers or servants both of whom act as pointers or emissaries leading people to the “one true God the Father.”  Ryan calls Jesus Christ a “vicegerent,” which means that he is God’s deputy who exercises power delegated to him by the Father and something He lacks intrinsically and in himself.  Shelton refers to Jesus as an “icon” who is not strictly speaking God incarnate (which in his warped mind would mean the Father is incarnate), but rather is  “the representative of God on earth who has de jure authority over all men.”   The important thing to keep in mind is that when these men say “God” they mean “the Father.”

Autotheos means God-of-Himself, not God-in-Himself. Sean would like it if I let this slip by without notice, because then he would indeed have good reason to say I think the Son lacks intrinsic power. But that isn’t the case, and he knows it. The Son is divine in Himself – and thus He is God in one sense – but not of Himself – and thus He is not God in a separate sense. Similarly, I am a man in myself, but I am not a man of myself. Sean conflated “in” with “of” in our facebook discussion and, when corrected, withdrew it. It appears he has forgotten this miscue.

The Son indeed has power and authority, but it is power and authority received from the Father (Matthew 28:18, John 17:2). Sean may reply that these are references to economic activity, as if it could ever have been said that the Father received power from the Son. Let’s take a look at these Scriptures:

John 10:17-18 For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life that I may take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again. This charge I have received from my Father.

John 12:49-50 For I have not spoken on my own authority, but the Father who sent me has himself given me a commandment—what to say and what to speak. And I know that his commandment is eternal life. What I say, therefore, I say as the Father has told me.

John 14:30-31 I will no longer talk much with you, for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no claim on me, but I do as the Father has commanded me, so that the world may know that I love the Father. Rise, let us go from here.

John 15:10 If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father's commandments and abide in his love.

Now, can we really say the Son could have refused the commandments of the Father, or is it the case the Father “has a claim,” so to speak, on Him? If obliged to obey, does not the Father have authority over the Son just as the Son has authority over us (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:3)? Or is the capacity of the Father to charge and command the Son just an arbitrary happenstance which could have been reversed? Could the Son have commanded the Father? What does Sean think? Well, maybe he’ll get around to answering these things in one of his posts.

Given this, we have reason to say that the Father is the ultimate object of worship. Sean notes a host of passages which state we ought to worship Christ. Well, no one denied that. But ironically, the context of one of the two other passages Sean cited clearly connects our worship and honor of the Son to the fact it was the Father – the head of the Son, a head without head – who placed Him at the head of creation:

John 5:22-23 The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son, that all may honor the Son, just as they honor the Father. Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him. 

Next, Sean writes:

Sadly, Hedrich’s failure to honor the Son while thinking he is honoring the Father stems from a complete misreading of the Nicene fathers and Athanasius in particular. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is the fact that all of church history, including the entirety of the Reformed tradition, stand in direct opposition to Hedrich.  Yet, this observation hardly gives this proud young man even the slightest pause.  But unlike “Athanasius contra mundum,” Hendich remains “contra Athanasius.” At the heart of Henrich’s departure from the faith lies the misplaced belief that the eternal generation of the Son necessitates the ontological and authoritative subordination of the Son to the Father, but that is precisely the  opposite of what Athanasius taught and what the Nicene creed affirmed.  For Hedrich, just as we derive out existence from our human parents, the Son as the only begotten of the Father derives his existence and divinity in a similar fashion, but that kind of one to one comparison is what the Nicene fathers wanted to avoid.  The irony is if Hedrich is correct then Athanasius would be advocating the very subordinationism he was opposing in his fight against the Arians and semi-Arians.   

Firstly, subordinationism refers to the heresy of stating the nature of the Son is unequal to that of the Father. I have not made that mistake. But his citation of Athanasius only proves that the nature of the relationship between the Father and Son is not corporeal. Who said it was? How does this prove that the generation of the Son can in no way be understood “after the manner of men”? For Athanasius also says “such as he that begets, such of necessity is the offspring” and asks, “for who hears of a son but conceives of that which is proper to the father’s essence?” (link) Likewise, in his chapter on Athanasius in The Trinity, Gordon Clark held that “Christ is the Son of God as Isaac was the son of Abraham: not a moral but a natural sonship.” I would admittedly be somewhat astonished that Sean could actually disagree with Clark. Interestingly, from that same work Sean quoted, we read Athanasius affirms the subordination of the Son (link):

(4.) Nor again, in saying that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is one only God, the only Ingenerate, do we therefore deny that Christ also is God before ages: as the disciples of Paul of Samosata, who say that after the incarnation He was by advance made God, from being made by nature a mere man. For we acknowledge, that though He be subordinate to His Father and God, yet, being before ages begotten of God, He is God perfect according to nature and true, and not first man and then God, but first God and then becoming man for us, and never having been deprived of being.

One can search high and low, but the context does not reference any economic activity. It is clear Athanasius is talking about the ontological Trinity. So will Sean say Athanasius a subordinationist? No. How do I know this? Because I’ve already pointed Sean to this passage in Athanasius, all he had to say in reply was: “You do have a problem as you no understanding of Athanasius and you read the economic Trinity back into the immanent Trinity. You're embarrassing yourself.” He almost convinced me with that one...

In fact, I see that he is recycling several Athanasian quotes from our facebook discussion, each of which only serves to show either he has forgotten the refutation or has hoped that I would. He says:

According to Athanasius, while the eternal generation of the Son is intended to individuate the Persons of the Godhead, it is the Godhead considered as “the eternal triad” that is the “monarche” or source of the essential divinity of the Persons and not the Father exclusively. Athanasius argues there is “a Holy Trinity but one Godhead and one beginning [arche], and that the Son is co-essential with the Father … while the Holy Spirit [is] proper to and inseparable from the essence of the Father and the Son.”

But that there is one genus “Godhead” and one “beginning” does not mean the Godhead is the arche. Again, I will cite for Sean now what I cited then (link):

Believing then in the All-perfect Triad, the most Holy, that is, in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and calling the Father God, and the Son God, yet we confess in them, not two Gods, but one dignity of Godhead, and one exact harmony of dominion, the Father alone being Head over the whole universe wholly, and over the Son Himself, and the Son subordinated to the Father; but, excepting Him, ruling over all things after Him which through Himself have come to be, and granting the grace of the Holy Ghost unsparingly to the saints at the Father’s will. For that such is the account of the Divine Monarchy towards Christ, the sacred oracles have delivered to us.

The Divine Monarch is the Father, not the Godhead. Sean didn’t even bother to reply to this quote in our facebook discussion. His cherry-picking of Athanasius doesn’t imply his inferences, and any careful reader will see this.

Next, Sean highlights Giles as saying all subordinationists describe the relationship between the Son and Father is asymmetrical. Okay. So? Sean’s arguments leave much to be desired. If his conclusion is that all those who describe the relationship between the Son and Father as asymmetrical are subordinationists, that’s an obvious fallacy, but what else could have been the point of the quote?

Sean then cites my interpretation of Genesis 1:26 in which I state that I believed the Father to be referring to the heavenly court. This reason is given by Bruce Waltke: “the other four uses of the plural pronoun with reference to God ([Gen.] 3:22; 11:7; Isa. 6:8) do not seem to refer to the Trinity” (Genesis: A Commentary, pg. 64). Isaiah 6:2-7, for instance, pertain to the actions of seraphim. Are seraphim divine? No. Wallace writes (link):

In 2 Sam 24:14 David uses the plural as representative of all Israel, and in Isa 6:8 the Lord speaks on behalf of his heavenly court. In its ancient Israelite context the plural is most naturally understood as referring to God and his heavenly court (see 1 Kgs 22:19-22; Job 1:6-12; 2:1-6; Isa 6:1-8). (The most well-known members of this court are God’s messengers, or angels. In Gen 3:5 the serpent may refer to this group as “gods/divine beings.” See the note on the word “evil” in 3:5.) If this is the case, God invites the heavenly court to participate in the creation of humankind (perhaps in the role of offering praise, see Job 38:7), but he himself is the one who does the actual creative work (v. 27). Of course, this view does assume that the members of the heavenly court possess the divine “image” in some way. Since the image is closely associated with rulership, perhaps they share the divine image in that they, together with God and under his royal authority, are the executive authority over the world.

Does Sean’s view of the Trinity really hang on one Old Testament passage? What would it prove if his interpretation were correct? I think focusing on minutiae is Sean’s way of avoiding the more important questions while appearing to save face. He does, however, take this opportunity to conflate existing “in” oneself to existing “of” oneself, a notion Athanasius himself puts to rest here:

Christ is the Word of God. Did He then subsist by Himself, and subsisting, has He become joined to the Father, or did God make Him or call Him His Word? If the former, I mean if He subsisted by Himself and is God, then there are two Beginnings; and moreover, as is plain, He is not the Father’s own, as being not of the Father, but of Himself. But if on the contrary He be made externally, then is He a creature. It remains then to say that He is from God Himself; but if so, that which is from another is one thing, and that from which it is, is a second; according to this then there are two. But if they be not two, but the names belong to the same, cause and effect will be the same, and begotten and begetting, which has been shewn absurd in the instance of Sabellius. But if He be from Him, yet not another, He will be both begetting and not begetting; begetting because He produces from Himself, and not begetting, because it is nothing other than Himself. But if so, the same is called Father and Son notionally. But if it be unseemly so to say, Father and Son must be two; and they are one, because the Son is not from without, but begotten of God. But if any one shrinks from saying ‘Offspring,’ and only says that the Word exists with God, let such a one fear lest, shrinking from what is said in Scripture, he fall into absurdity, making God a being of double nature. For not granting that the Word is from the Monad, but simply as if He were joined to the Father, he introduces a twofold essence, and neither of them Father of the other. And the same of Power. And we may see this more clearly, if we consider it with reference to the Father; for there is One Father, and not two, but from that One the Son. As then there are not two Fathers, but One, so not two Beginnings, but One, and from that One the Son essential.

Athanasius rejects that the Word “subsisted by Himself” or “of Himself” – so much for autotheos or aseity – as such implies “two Beginnings” rather than one [God]. Yes, Athanasius did say, and correctly so, that “what is said of the Father, is said in Scripture of the Son also, all but His being called Father,” but what does it mean to be the Father? Until Sean can explain the doctrine of eternal generation, he has no answer. And even if he were to to do so, it appears he would disagree with Athanasius, the Nicene Creed, etc.

Sean wraps up his post by evading yet another question – does he hold to generic unity? – begging another – how is my explanation of generic and numeric unity faulty? – and relying on well-poisoning to prejudice his readers. I expect better in the future.

The Early Church, Trinitarianism, and the Subordination of the Son I

[This will be the first of a series of posts on the Trinitarian views of the early church fathers, particularly focused on the way in which they view the relationship between the Father and Son. I don’t know how long this series will be, but as a general outline of what each post will look like, I plan to include 1) a brief biography of the author, 2) the author’s own statements on the Father and Son in their full context, and 3) a concluding summary of these statements in my own words. Let others consider these fathers of Trinitarianism heretical anti-Trinitarians if they dare, but if so, may they also show such from Scripture.]

Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria at the time of the construction of the Nicene Creed, was the primary opponent of Arius up to that point in time. He was principally concerned with communicating  “knowledge of the Trinity” which had been received as “the apostolic doctrines of the Church” (link). It was of him that Athanasius, his deacon, wrote (link):

…when Alexander of blessed memory had cast out Arius, those who remained with Alexander, remained Christians; but those who went out with Arius, left the Saviour's Name to us who were with Alexander, and as to them they were hence-forward denominated Arians. Behold then, after Alexander's death too, those who communicate with his successor Athanasius, and those with whom the said Athanasius communicates, are instances of the same rule; none of them bear his name, nor is he named from them, but all in like manner, and as is usual, are called Christians.

In agreeing with Alexander’s statements regarding the subordination of the Son to the Father, then, I show that I am not presenting a historical novelty but rather upholding a mainstream view of the fathers of the Nicene Creed. More importantly, in holding this view I no more count myself as among those who diminish the deity of the Son as would these authors; rather, this view allows me to be able to pay proper respect to the words of the Son Himself who said, “My Father is greater than I.”

11. And let these things be now urged according to our power against those who, with respect to matter which they know nothing of, have, as it were, rolled in the dust against Christ, and have taken in hand to calumniate our piety towards Him. For those inventors of stupid fables say, that we who turn away with aversion from the impious and unscriptural blasphemy against Christ, of those who speak of His coming from the things which are not assert, that there are two unbegottens. For they ignorantly affirm that one of two things must necessarily be said, either that He is from things which are not, or that there are two unbegottens; nor do those ignorant men know how great is the difference between the unbegotten Father, and the things which were by Him created from things which are not, as well the rational as the irrational. Between which two, as holding the middle place, the only begotten nature of God, the Word by which the Father formed all things out of nothing, was begotten of the true Father Himself. As in a certain place the Lord Himself testified, saying, “Every one that loves Him that begot, loves Him also that is begotten of Him.”  

12. Concerning whom we thus believe, even as the Apostolic Church believes. In one Father unbegotten, who has from no one the cause of His being, who is unchangeable and immutable, who is always the same, and admits of no increase or diminution; who gave to us the Law, the prophets, and the Gospels; who is Lord of the patriarchs and apostles, and all the saints. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God; not begotten of things which are not, but of Him who is the Father; not in a corporeal manner, by excision or division as Sabellius and Valentinus thought, but in a certain inexplicable and unspeakable manner, according to the words of the prophet cited above: “Who shall declare His generation?” Since that His subsistence no nature which is begotten can investigate, even as the Father can be investigated by none; because that the nature of rational beings cannot receive the knowledge of His divine generation by the Father. But men who are moved by the Spirit of truth , have no need to learn these things from me, for in our ears are sounding the words before uttered by Christ on this very thing, No man knows the Father, save the Son; and no man knows who the Son is, save the Father. That He is equally with the Father unchangeable and immutable, wanting in nothing, and the perfect Son, and like to the Father, we have learned; in this alone is He inferior to the Father, that He is not unbegotten. For He is the very exact image of the Father, and in nothing differing from Him. For it is clear that He is the image fully containing all things by which the greatest similitude is declared, as the Lord Himself has taught us, when He says, “My Father is greater than I.” And according to this we believe that the Son is of the Father, always existing. “For He is the brightness of His glory, the express image of His Father's person.” But let no one take that word always so as to raise suspicion that He is unbegotten, as they imagine who have their senses blinded. For neither are the words, “He was,” or “always,” or “before all worlds,” equivalent to unbegotten. But neither can the human mind employ any other word to signify unbegotten. And thus I think that you understand it, and I trust to your right purpose in all things, since these words do not at all signify unbegotten. For these words seem to denote simply a lengthening out of time, but the Godhead, and as it were the antiquity of the only-begotten, they cannot worthily signify; but they have been employed by holy men, while each, according to his capacity, seeks to express this mystery, asking indulgence from the hearers, and pleading a reasonable excuse, in saying, Thus far have we attained. But if there be any who are expecting from mortal lips some word which exceeds human capacity, saying that those things have been done away which are known in part, it is manifest that the words, He was, and always, and before all ages, come far short of what they hoped. And whatever word shall be employed is not equivalent to unbegotten. Therefore to the unbegotten Father, indeed, we ought to preserve His proper dignity, in confessing that no one is the cause of His being; but to the Son must be allotted His fitting honour, in assigning to Him, as we have said, a generation from the Father without beginning, and allotting adoration to Him, so as only piously and properly to use the words, “He was,” and “always,” and “before all worlds,” with respect to Him; by no means rejecting His Godhead, but ascribing to Him a similitude which exactly answers in every respect to the Image and Exemplar of the Father. But we must say that to the Father alone belongs the property of being unbegotten, for the Saviour Himself said, My Father is greater than I. 

While he is everywhere cautious not to speculate as to the nature of eternal generation, in the first paragraph, Alexander abuses the stupidity of those who argue that a denial that the Son is a creation ex nihilo from the Father implies “two unbegottens.” This is a false dichotomy. The nature of the Son is said to hold a “middle place” between creation and the “true Father Himself” from whom He was begotten – here, interestingly, Theodoret, a 5^th century early church historian, records Alexander as having said “the self-existent Father” instead of “true Father Himself” (link). 

Either way, this middle place preserves the Father’s “proper dignity” as alone unbegotten or without cause, the implication of which is that the Son, because of His generation from the Father, is caused [yet not thereby created]. This is a peculiar property of the Father, and as such, it does not imply a rejection of the Godhead or deity of the Son. For like the Father, the Son is eternal and immutable, having always existed. In fact, as being the perfect image of His Father, He is no different except insofar as He is not unbegotten: “in this alone is He inferior to the Father.” This is the position of “the Apostolic Church.”

Unitarianism, Samuel Clarke, and Assorted Details

One of Sean's stated reasons I am a hell-bound Unitarian is that historically, my view "most accurately mirrors" that of Samuel Clarke (link). Clarke was a Unitarian, so I must be too - or so, it seems, the argument goes. Now, I assume that Clarke is considered a Unitarian because his views in turn are aligned with those of Unitarianism, as Clarke predated the actual Unitarian movement by a half a century. If this assumption is correct, I would reply that even if it were the case that, historically speaking, Clarke's views were the most closely aligned with my own, that would not prove I am a Unitarian, for it may be and in fact is that I disagree with Clarke on a significant issue: the issue of whether eternal generation and procession are necessary. Clarke states in The Modest Plea (pgs. 15-18):

(1) Length of duration, how unlimited forever, either a parte post or a parte ante, in a person begotten by the Power and Will of Him that begat, does not imply Necessary Existence. And 'tis a great Presumption to affirm that, what the Scripture always expresses by a word denoting an Act, may as well be expressed by a word denoting not an Act. As to Antiquity; The Doctrine of Necessary Emanations, sprung from the Notions of Valentinus, Cerinthus, Manes, Montanus, &c. But in opposition to the numerous Passages cited by Dr. Clarke, wherein the Fathers expressly affirm the Son to be begotten by the Power and Will of the Father; 'tis observable, Dr. Waterland has not been able to produce so much as ONE single Passage out of any One Ante-Nicene Father, wherein the Son is affirmed to have emaned or been emitted by Necessity of Nature. Even They who supposed him, in an unintelligible manner, to have been the internal Reason or Wisdom of the Father, before his Generation; still suppose him to have been Generated into a real person by the Power and Will of the Father. And They who compared his Generation, to the Sun's sending forth his Rays of Light, or to One Fire lighting Another; yet All of them suppose, and Some of them expressly distinguish in this Similtude, that whereas the Sun emits his Light, and one Fire lights another, by Necessity of Nature; the Father begat the Son by his Power and Will. See Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, Part II, 17.  

(2) "A Necessary Emanation from the Father, by the Will and Power of the Father;" is an express contradiction. Because Necessity, in its very Notion, excludes all operation of Will and Power, though it may be consistent with Approbation. Whatever is by Necessity of Nature, cannot, without the highest Absurdity, be said to be By any one's Will and Power; though it may well be Agreeable and Pleasing to him. A Necessary Emanation from the Father, can no more be said to be Begotten of the Father, to be Begotten by his Power and Will; than the Father can be said to have begotten, or given Being to himself, or to his own Reason or Understanding. On the contrary, Such an Emanation, and the Essence from which it emanes, would Both be as equally self-existent, as 'tis equally necessary for God to be an Intelligent Being, and to Be at all. Whatever necessarily and essentially belongs to That which is self-existent, is itself Self existent, as being indeed only the very same thing apprehended under a partial consideration. "God" (as this matter has been expressed in the Letter to the Author of the True Scripture-Doctrine, &c. pag. 267,) "is necessarily Omnipresent and Eternal; doubtless, not without [much less against] his own Liking and Approbation: But was ever any Man therefore so absurd, as to say that he was Omnipresent and Eternal BY his will? He is likewise by Necessity of Nature, Wise and Good; that is, he always necessarily sees and knows what is right, and approves what is good; And in all this, his will is no way concerned: But whenever he Acts, whenever he Does any thing, then 'tis not by Necessity of Nature, but by the Choice of his Will." The contrary Supposition, is, in the truth of things, making him No Agent at all; 'Tis devesting him (as Mr. Hobbs has done) of the Prime Glory of all his Attributes.  

(3) But (says Dr. Waterland), "Will is One thing, and Arbitrary Will another." I answer. This is one of the greatest and most unreasonable Abuse of words, that I have ever met with in Any Writer. For the only true difference between Will and Arbitrary Will, is, that Arbitrary Will signifies Willing a thing unreasonably, and without any just Cause. But to make Arbitrary Will signify barely the Choice or Free Act of the Will, and to make Will signify mere Approbation without Any Choice or Act of the Will at all; is taking away all Sense from words. For, at This rate, a Man's Heart may be said to beat by the Will and Power of the Man, though his Will and Power have no influence at all upon it. And the Sun may be said, in the same sense, to rise and set by the Will of Man, that is, with his good Liking and Approbation. And a Balance, if it could feel itself Necessarily turned by a Superior Weight in One Scale, might justly be said to Turn itself by its Will and Power. If this be not indeed in the highest degree (to use Dr. Waterland's phrase) "elusive and equivocating," 'tis hard to say What is.

This is similar to the position of American Unitarians, a group to which Sean at one time thought and perhaps still thinks I should belong (link):

But in regard to all such accounts of the doctrine, it is an obvious remark that the existence of the Son, and of the Spirit, is either necessary, or it is not. If their existence be necessary, we have then three beings necessarily existing, each possessing divine attributes, and consequently we have three Gods. If it be not necessary, but dependent on the will of the Father, then we say that the distance is infinite between underived and independent existence, and derived and dependent, between the supremacy of God, the Father, and the subordination of beings who exist only through his will. In the latter view of the doctrine, therefore, we clearly have but one God, but at the same time the modern doctrine of the Trinity disappears. The form of statement too, just mentioned, must be abandoned, for it can hardly be pretended that these derived and dependent beings possess an equality in divine attributes, or are equal in nature to the Father. Beings whose existence is dependent on the will of another cannot be equal in power to the being on whom they depend. The doctrine, therefore, however disguised by the mode of statement which we are considering, must, in fact, resolve itself into an assertion of three Gods, or must, on the other hand, amount to nothing more than a form of Unitarianism. In the latter case, however objectionable and unfounded I may think it, it is not my present purpose to argue directly against it, and in the former case, it is pressed with all the difficulties which bear upon the doctrine as commonly stated, and at the same time with new difficulties, which affect this particular form of statement. That the Son and the Spirit should exist necessarily, as well as the Father, and possess equally with the Father all divine attributes, and yet be subordinate and inferior to the Father—or, in other words, that there should be two beings or persons, each of whom is properly and in the highest sense God, and yet that these two beings or persons should be subordinate and inferior to another being or person, who is God—is as incredible a proposition as the doctrine can involve.

The arguments are easy enough to reproduce, so I will do so in turn, explaining why each fails. In this last paragraph, we find a few arguments: 1) if the Father, Son, and Spirit each necessarily exist, then there are three Gods; 2) if the Son and Spirit are derived, then the Son and Spirit cannot be consubstantial or of the same essence or nature as the Father, as, for example, the Father’s power is supreme; 3) the Son and Spirit cannot exist necessarily yet be subordinate to the Father.

In reply, we may note that 1) and 3) both beg the question: why? No supporting arguments are provided, and I can think of none. Clarke provided a more nuanced argument which I will turn to in a moment, but no immediate objection sprang to mind when considering the possibility that the Son and Spirit necessarily exist because the Father necessarily eternally generates the Son and spirates the Spirit; in that case, then, we may say the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father is precisely found in the fact that they are [necessarily] derived from Him. In reply to 2), the presumption is that “power” is a divine attribute. What sort of power is the author referring to? Obviously, the Son and Spirit have power or authority, but that is because such has been given to them by the Father. The Father alone is called “Almighty” (2 Corinthians 6:18, Revelation 1:8, 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 16:7, 14, 19:6, 15, 21:22) and ultimate “Sovereign” (1 Timothy 6:15). This, I think, is a sufficient reply to American Unitarianism.

Turning to Clarke, one of his first objections is that his opponent produced neither Scripture nor an early church father which taught that the Son or Spirit existed necessarily. Now, if this is one area of disagreement I have with the majority of the early church as Clarke thought, is it not ironic that it is on a point which would imply I am against rather than for American Unitarianism? And yet Clarke has exaggerated, for a Nicene father no less than Athanasius thought that eternal generation was according to a “necessity of nature” (link): 

If then there is another Word of God, then be the Son originated by a word; but if there be not, as is the case, but all things by Him have come to be, which the Father has willed, does not this expose the many-headed craftiness of these men? That feeling shame at saying 'work,' and 'creature,' and 'God's Word was not before His generation,' yet in another way they assert that He is a creature, putting forward 'will,' and saying, 'Unless He has by will come to be, therefore God had a Son by necessity and against His good pleasure.' And who is it then who imposes necessity on Him, O men most wicked, who draw everything to the purpose of your heresy? For what is contrary to will they see; but what is greater and transcends it has escaped their perception. For as what is beside purpose is contrary to will, so what is according to nature transcends and precedes counselling. A man by counsel builds a house, but by nature he begets a son; and what is in building began to come into being at will, and is external to the maker; but the son is proper offspring of the father's essence, and is not external to him; wherefore neither does he counsel concerning him, lest he appear to counsel about himself. As far then as the Son transcends the creature, by so much does what is by nature transcend the will. And they, on hearing of Him, ought not to measure by will what is by nature; forgetting however that they are hearing about God's Son, they dare to apply human contrarieties in the instance of God, 'necessity' and 'beside purpose,' to be able thereby to deny that there is a true Son of God. For let them tell us themselves—that God is good and merciful, does this attach to Him by will or not? If by will, we must consider that He began to be good, and that His not being good is possible; for to counsel and choose implies an inclination two ways, and is incidental to a rational nature. But if it be too unseemly that He should be called good and merciful upon will, then what they have said themselves must be retorted on them—'therefore by necessity and not at His pleasure He is good;' and, 'who is it that imposes this necessity on Him?' But if it be unseemly to speak of necessity in the case of God, and therefore it is by nature that He is good, much more is He, and more truly, Father of the Son by nature and not by will.

Finding Scriptures which deal with this issue will require consideration of logical implications, for to my knowledge there is no explicit passage which addresses it. My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. There are, however, several objections to my own position – some made by Clarke and others I have received from those who are in most other respects in agreement with my Trinitarian views – so I will try to address them in a short amount of space.

Clarke thinks the idea that something can be willed necessarily is a contradiction in terms. Thus, he, Athanasius, and others dichotomize that which is willed from that which is a “necessity of nature.” But I do not find his reasons for saying so persuasive: he mentions that I might as well say that a man’s heart beats by his will, the sun rises by man’s will, and a balance which turns necessarily turns by its will. These are just examples of what a proof by example fallacy looks like. What Clarke rather ought to have done is define what it means “to will” or “to choose” or “to act.” As a Calvinist, I don’t have any problem with a definition of these terms which excludes the notion of freedom of contrariety – the ability to have willed, chosen, or acted differently than one did. In fact, freedom of contrariety itself presupposes a definition of willing, choosing, and acting. I would define these words in terms of the mind’s volitional selection, determination, or performance.

Where the line is between providing mere synonyms and providing a clear metaphysical definition can be challenging, but in any case, I am in no worse a position than Clarke, who must also define these terms. Until he does, the burden of proof is on him to explain why necessity is mutually exclusive with will. Anyway, I don’t suppose Sean will have any issue with my explanation, as this is entirely consistent with Gordon Clark’s view 1) that God’s existence is necessary yet by His eternal will and choice, and 2) that the generation of the Son is voluntary and necessary like creation (see his chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity).

This last remark brings me to the objection from the other side to my position, viz. my thinking creation is necessary as well as the Son and Spirit. Whereas Sean thinks I bring the Son and Spirit down to the level of creation by making the them contingent – a counter which backfires, as [I would hope] Sean would not say the person[al property] of the Son is created even though he holds that the person[al property] of the Son is contingent – the objection here is that I raise the creation to the level of divinity (see here and here for examples).

Now, I admit I have perhaps missed some solution which would resolve the tension between an unnecessary creation and a seemingly arbitrary God, but if so, I have not encountered it. It seems easier for me to explain why a necessary creation is not divine than it is to explain why an unnecessary creation is not arbitrary. As I understand it, the reason there is an objection to the idea that who the Father is determines everything He wills is that such means the Son, Spirit and creation all originate from the Father in the same way. I suspect the argument is that since “like causes like,” one whose nature is divine must, if He acts according to a “necessity of nature,” cause another with a divine nature.

But I do not see why this needs to be the case. The nature or person of the Father may determine His causation of this possible world as well as the Son and Spirit, but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not on my view have willed to] communicate His nature to creation. Thinking about this question recently, I found myself asking: is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them? If the latter is possible, then is this not a reasonable answer as to why the necessity of creation would not imply consubstantiality with its Creator?

Putting these questions to the side as I wait for an answer to them, I return to some last statements by Clarke concerning whether the necessary existence of the Son and Spirit would somehow imply their self-existence. The first argument is that it is equally necessary for God to be an Intelligent Being, and to Be at all; the second seems to suggest that if eternal generation is necessary, that which is eternally generated would be a predicate of that which is self-existent and thus itself be self-existent.

To be honest, I didn't follow either of these arguments. They were too short for me to tease out the intended implications. If the first argument relies on divine simplicity, I would have to know what sort of simplicity Clarke held to. Obviously, “intelligent being” and “being qua being” are distinct. If the point is that for God to be He must also be intelligent, I have no idea how I am supposed to connect that to the conclusion that the Son is self-existent if necessarily existent. Perhaps Clarke is conflating divine attributes with divine properties. I just don’t know.

As to the second argument, I don’t understand why Clarke thinks that something which is necessarily generated belongs to that which is self-existent as the very same thing apprehended under a partial consideration. What “very same thing” is Clarke referring to? The Father? Is he saying the Son “belongs to,” is “partially apprehended under,” and is a mere predicate of the Father? Why? And even so, is it not the case that to assert that a particular predicate is self-existent because the sum of a (i.e. the Father’s) set of predicates is self-existent an instance of the fallacy of division (see the comment section here)?

Perhaps Clarke has elsewhere dealt with these issues more in depth, but he breezed by them too quickly here. Regardless, I hope this post puts into perspective why this particular argument that I am a Unitarian is groundless.