Several Reformed theologians hold to the position that the "person" of the Son is generated whereas the Son's participation in the "divine essence" is not.
For the strictest of Clarkians this would be rather bizarre, since for them the person of the Son is the sum of His predicates. Tautologically speaking, the person of the Son is the definition of the Son, and "definition" is precisely what Clark equated with "essence." In other words, if the person of the Son is generated, that would seem to imply, given Clark's terminology, that the essence (definition) of the Son is generated.
This would be a problem if they wish to hold, as did Clark, that the Son is autotheos. But I suspect this is, in fact, probably not a case of inconsistency so much as an inconsistent reliance on Clark's definitions. I imagine that these Clarkians who argue that the Son's essence is not generated mean that the divine nature or set of attributes of the Son is not generated. In other words, the Father doesn't "communicate" the [or a] divine nature to the Son if such implies the divinity of the Son is in some sense derived from the Father; rather, Clark (and probably these Clarkians) thinks "communicate" merely suggests that the Son has the [or a] divine nature "in common" with the Father. This would suggest that the Son may well communicate the [or a] the divine nature to the Father, but the strange sound of this suggestion is not the focus of this post.
The main point of this post is what I now turn to: even if one holds to this now qualified Reformed view that 1) the Son is autotheos, and 2) the person of the Son is generated but not His essence, terminological difficulties remain in respect to the meaning of "generation." If the Son is autotheos, how is it that His "person" can be generated? What does that mean? Generation is a word which implies logical, if not temporal, derivation. But if the "second person" of the Trinity is self-existent and autotheos, He cannot be said to be eternally generated; that is, the second person wasn't "generated" per se, since the second person qua second person is allegedly underived, self-existent, and God-of-Himself.
Rather, it would appear that in this case, "eternal generation" actually means the second person merely eternally assumed the personal property of Sonship. If the second person of the Trinity only derives His property of Sonship from the Father, it's misleading to say the second person qua second person is eternally generated. For the person of the Son isn't generated at all.
At most, the second person derives His personal property from the Father, not His person from the Father. But then it would be more appropriate to refer to the Son as eternally adopted. Furthermore, this neo-Adoptionism appears to make the relationships among the persons arbitrary, for I see no reason to think that the personal properties could not be reversed. To us, the first person may be the Father and the second may be the Son, but why may it not have been the case that the first person be the Son and the second the Father? Or, why must the second person have "derived" His property from the first if each of the persons of the Trinity are autotheos, ontologically co-equal in every respect?
I cannot see how eternal generation is compatible with the view that the persons of the Trinity are each autotheos and self-existent.
25 comments:
Ryan,
In my understanding of the Latin system, it is compatible because the three are one numerical and individual autotheos and self existant being, there is only one being, but three modes of subsistance.
So that the generation of the second person pertains to one mode of subsistance eternally generated another mode of subsistance, the one essence is unchanged, or composed but just modified. Because a person is not like a human person or individual it is a mode in which the one numerical essence subsist. So the problem can be solved by a generic unity understanding.
If my memory serve, Calvin in the Institute does not say the Son speaking of his person is autothoes, but speaking of his deity is autotheos. So there is a separation of person and essence, that is what I found Bishop Bull's assessment so accurate and precise, namly, such a separation of essence and person is plain Sabellienism.
Thanks,
Mark
If the second person is Himself generated, and generation indeed implies derivation, then the Son cannot be said to be self-existent or autotheos, regardless of whether numeric or generic unity is true. If the second person merely assumes the personal property of Sonship - for whatever reason - then the person is not generated at all.
Hi Ryan,
I got your point, even if it is a numerical unity, only a relationship is generated between the two modes of subsistance, not a real generation.
However, if you say the mode of subsistance being called autotheos, simplyly is refering to the one numerical essence that subsist in that mode, then it is going to work. The person, namely the mode is truly generated, but the essence behind that mode is autotheos. Thus three autotheos.
Interestingly, Dr. Beeke said in his beginning part of the first lecture on Trinity (the audio clip on sermonaudio) that all three person are very God of very God.
Regards,
Mark
It seems to me that you're arguing that the "mode" isn't self-existent, the divine essence or nature is. And in that case, more detail would be need as to what it means that one "mode" generated another, for I don't see how any "mode" can be autotheos if generated. The fact that the divine essence may be autotheos - which makes the divine essence a person, by the way - does not mean a "mode" in which it may subsist is likewise autotheos.
That is the only way it can possibly work under our opponent's system, if they make a mode itself autotheos, then it falls so nakely into polytheism.
They distinguish between person and deity and acknowledge that the person is generated, but like Drake pointed out before, a person is reduced to a mere empty relationship or name.
Our opponents' scholastical sayings are to me and many common people are not even words, but mere sounds that have no actual meaning.
Ryan, did my first comment get deleted?
I saw on God's hammer that the issue of the Son's necessity was brought up. I have many times affirmed that the Son extends from God eternally and necessarily:
http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2012/10/31/eternal-generation-a-necessity-of-nature-will-or-hypostasis/
Yeah. I'm not sure why. But I know you agree with me about that.
Well what I was going to say was that I agreed with your criticism of their view of the Sonship of the Logos. This is why I subsumed my debate with Jnorm under the title, "Ad hoc reasoning". We are beginning with the Father's hypostatic monarchy and watching the godhead extend organically and logically from that position. The Triunists arbitrarily attach names and concepts on to their doctrine of God without explaining where it came from. They begin with Plotinus' monad which was designed for a pantheistic system of eternal emanation and somehow try to fit it in with a Christian theory of creation and time. To maintain this they must define the persons as relations instead of minds. Then in their epistemology, at least with Sean, they turn around and say persons are now minds. It is a total arbitrary Frankensteinish mess.
Mark, that sounds similar to Lee Irons' summary of Turretin here: http://www.upper-register.com/papers/monogenes.html
I tried to clarify this by reminding everyone that Clark replaced essence/nature/substance with "definition." The definition of deity is uncaused, as it is possessed by the Father. The Son and Spirit, who are generated by and proceed from the Father, univocally possess the definition of deity, which is itself 'a se,' although their persons are not.
I thought I was getting somewhere when both Ryan and Sean seemed to agree, but it quickly went to pot after that.
Patrick, I recall that you agreed with this:
//If you are talking about the idea of deity rather than a specific member of said genus, then it is clear that the idea is grounded in the thought of the Father. An idea cannot exist "a se" - ideas require thinkers.//
But I don't believe you responded to a further clarification:
//...if we were to state a comprehensive definition of the Father - which would include but not be limited by the definition of deity or divinity or the set of divine atrributes - we could state that the [tautologous] sum of His predicates is self-existent. I would be comfortable with that contextual nuance, as one such predicate of the Father would be "person." It's just when we speak of the divine nature itself as aseity that I think we run the risk of subordinating the persons to it, intentionally or not.//
This came on the heels of my argument that aseity or "self" existence can only be predicated of persons. Divinity exists because it has a definition, but it clearly cannot exist abstract from the Father of whom divinity is predicated. As such, I disagree that divinity itself is aseity. Only the Father - or, equivalently, the set of predicates which comprehend Him, just one of which is divinity - is aseity.
Ryan, Sorry if I never responded to your clarification. I did/do agree with it.
Now, regarding your last paragraph, I think I understand your concern, but I suppose I'm thinking in terms of the 'a se' divine nature being part of the definition of the Father, rather than somehow attached to a natureless person. Does that make sense? So the divine nature is 'a se' because it is part of the definition of the Father, who is 'a se'.
Moving to the Son, I believe Turretin would say something like the Son (a person) is not 'a se', because his person is generated by the Father. However, the divine nature is part of the total definition of the Son, and that part is 'a se' because those qualities belong to the Father.
Even the truths we know are 'a se', because they are part of the eternal definition of the Father. That obviously doesn't make us 'a se' as well.
Let me know if I need to clarify that some more. Hard to put into words sometimes.
Isn't that the fallacy of division, though?
Wikipedia gives this as an example of the fallacy of division:
1. A Boeing 747 can fly unaided across the ocean.
2. A Boeing 747 has jet engines.
3. Therefore, one of its jet engines can fly unaided across the ocean.
Are you understanding my argument as:
1. The Father is 'a se'
2. The Father possesses the divine nature.
3. The divine nature is 'a se'
?
If so, I don't think we're comparing apples to apples.
The person of the Father doesn't cause the divine nature. It is part of the very definition of the Father. Every part of the Father must be uncaused. Goodness is eternal and uncaused because it can be traced back to the Father who possesses it as part of his inherent definition. Like I said, even the truths we possess are uncaused and 'a se'.
(Also, don't take my use of the word "part(s)" in some technical theological sense. I just mean goodness is one of many attributes of the Father.)
Also, when are you going to switch to Wordpress? :P
Patrick,
I think you are conflating generic nature with numeric. Your assertion that the definition of divinity-generic nature, is a se, is a conflation of categories. Only numeric natures-subjects can act-cause or be begotten.
I will have to think about it. I would definitely reject that any individual predicate of the Father is self-existent, however. That no one predicate of the Father is caused would not imply each predicate is aseity. There is only one self-existent subject.
Patrick, however, what you are saying does sound like what Basil taught in Letter 236 section 6.
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3202236.htm
Drake,
//I think you are conflating generic nature with numeric. Your assertion that the definition of divinity-generic nature, is a se, is a conflation of categories. Only numeric natures-subjects can act-cause or be begotten.//
I'm not saying each individual attribute acts, causes, or is begotten. I mean that everything the Father is (goodness, truth, omnipotence) is real and self-existent.
Ryan,
"There is only one self-existent subject."
Why can't we think of goodness as a subject? Is goodness somehow generated or caused by the Father? I would say that goodness is not caused. It is part of the very being/definition of the Father, and is therefore uncaused/of itself.
"Why can't we think of goodness as a subject? Is goodness somehow generated or caused by the Father? I would say that goodness is not caused. It is part of the very being/definition of the Father, and is therefore uncaused/of itself."
You can think of goodness as a subject, but again, even if goodness were uncaused, that's not relevant to aseity. For something to be self-existent implies that the reason it exists is not found in any other subject. But you are saying the reason goodness exists or is uncaused as a subject is that it is a predicate of the self-existent Father.
Ryan, perhaps I am merely misunderstanding you. Defining a subject and its predicates is one thing, but you seem to be describing predicates/attributes that are attached to a subject/person. But the Father does not merely possess goodness; He is goodness.
You are saying the reason goodness exists is because it belongs to the Father. I am saying that goodness is the Father, and as such has nothing prior to it temporally or logically.
Patrick,
"Why can't we think of goodness as a subject?"
>>>This was exactly my point when I said, "Only numeric natures-subjects can act-cause or be begotten." Thus my meaning was only numeric natures can be subjects. Goodness qualifies a subject, it does not constitute it.
"Is goodness somehow generated or caused by the Father?"
>>>Not in a chronological sense or logical because goodness pertains to something ad intra. A caused person pertains to ad extra.
"You are saying the reason goodness exists is because it belongs to the Father. I am saying that goodness is the Father, and as such has nothing prior to it temporally or logically..."
>>But your use of the word "is" when you say "goodness is the Father" properly pertains to nature not hypostasis, so i think you are conflating nature and person, and that overlaps into your conflation of generic with numeric nature.
I believe I understand what is meant by the terms "nature" and "person" and why they are distinct terms, but I cannot conceive of person-as-distinct-from-nature.
This is where I think Clark is at his most helpful. He gets rid of nature/essence/substance and replaces them with 'definition.' So while all three persons share the one definition of deity, the Father's definition is not the Son's, etc.
"Goodness" belongs to the definitions of the Father and deity. The Son, God of God, is also deity, and therefore possesses goodness. He is good as the Father is good. Goodness has its own definition, and the definition is exactly the same for the Son as it is for the Father.
Patrick,
"Defining a subject and its predicates is one thing, but you seem to be describing predicates/attributes that are attached to a subject/person."
Well, yes. "The Father" is not predicable of anything except the tautologous sum of what may be predicated of Him, whereas "goodness" is predicable of many subjects other than the Father. The manner in which other subjects may be said to possess goodness may differ, but that is a distinct point; indeed, it is because the manner of possession is distinct that no other subject can be self-existent even if a predicate of the subject is itself uncaused. I am still mulling that part over, as I too suspect a possible conflation of a numeric instance of a generic attribute.
"I am saying that goodness is the Father, and as such has nothing prior to it temporally or logically."
But that's false. Goodness is not the Father. Goodness is one attribute among many of the Father. Do you think all the Father's attributes mean the same thing? Because that's the implication of saying "Goodness is the Father."
Ryan, I mean the Father's attributes are the Father. Together they constitute the person of the Father. None of the Father's attributes are caused. Everything that constitutes the Father, all of his attributes and personal properties, are uncaused and 'a se'.
The definition of the Son contains all attributes contained by the definition of deity. The definition of goodness is the same for the Son as it is for the Father, therefore it is the same goodness.
Do you agree with Clark's assessment of the unhelpfulness of terminology like nature/substance/essence, and his suggestion to replace them with the clearly understood word, "definition"?
"I mean the Father's attributes are the Father. Together they constitute the person of the Father."
Not just attributes - predicates too. But yes, *together* they constitute the person of the Father. No one single attribute can be said to be the Father.
"None of the Father's attributes are caused. Everything that constitutes the Father, all of his attributes and personal properties, are uncaused and 'a se'."
I don't think "uncaused" and "a se" are synonyms. To be a se is to exist of oneself or itself. But only the Father exists of Himself; equivalently, only the predicates of "the Father" *together* exists of Himself.
"The definition of the Son contains all attributes contained by the definition of deity. The definition of goodness is the same for the Son as it is for the Father, therefore it is the same goodness."
But the application of the definition to the Son is distinct, right? Otherwise, I do not see how one can account for the difference between generic and numeric unity. It is the same goodness in the first sense, not the latter.
"Do you agree with Clark's assessment of the unhelpfulness of terminology like nature/substance/essence, and his suggestion to replace them with the clearly understood word, "definition"?"
This conversation has been more confusing than my reading about the meaning of nature/substance/essence ever was :)
Patrick says,
"Do you agree with Clark's assessment of the unhelpfulness of terminology like nature/substance/essence, and his suggestion to replace them with the clearly understood word, "definition"?"
Only with respect to generic nature not numeric nature. Definition is fine when we speak of generic nature but not when speaking of numeric nature. When I say that I am a mind, a will, and a body, the word "am" with respect to definition pertains to generic nature-the eternal virtual, but the word "am" with respect to numeric nature refers to the temporal actual. I spoke to this here:
http://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/12/28/what-is-it-are-all-things-sets-of-propositions/
"This idea, I take to be a set of propositions. These propositions take form in time. They provide the pattern of a created form. The created form is and is not a set of propositions, in distinct senses. It is, in the sense that the set of propositions for Drake, exist as realities in the mind of God in their own eternal mode, but with reference to me, they are virtual while my created physical form and my rational faculty are the temporal actuality. That is, I am a set of propositions in the sense that I participate in and am patterned after this set of propositions. That set is my definition."
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