In the first place, generic unity refers to unity among multiple subjects according to the genus under which they may be subsumed. This definition of generic unity is set up in such a way that it cannot be compatible with numeric unity. The former concept presupposes multiple subjects for there to be unity among them, whereas the latter concept seems to consider the unity of a subject in itself, which is why there can only be one subject. It would not surprise me if [absolute] divine simplicity stems from numeric unity for this reason.
Humans are generically united in that, for example, each human possesses his own distinct rational faculty and moral character. Now, it is true that there is unity among the Father, Son, and Spirit unlike that of humans insofar as the wills of the former are mutually entailing rather than those of the latter, which can, at least at times, be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the divine persons are generically united in just the same sense humans are. Each divine person has a will, is good, omniscient, etc.
To focus on divine omniscience, here is an argument I made a few posts ago:
To be a person is to possess a mind capable of reflexively indexing a certain set of propositions. So, for example, the reasons that the Father, Son and Spirit are distinct persons or minds is that only the Father can think “I am unoriginate,” only the Son can think “I am eternally begotten,” and only the Spirit can think “I eternally proceed.”Without delving deeply into Christology, then, it should be noted that while two minds can pertain to one person, three persons cannot collectively possess one mind. The reason is obvious: distinct persons reflexively index certain propositions which other persons can't. If the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons, there are at least two propositions which any given person cannot reflexively index. The Son and Spirit assent to the proposition "The Father is unoriginate," but neither can reflexively index it. Neither can say "I am unoriginate." Of course, none of the persons can reflexively index the proposition "Ryan Hedrich is writing a blog post," "Eve was the first woman," etc. either, but this is fairly trivial. It simply shows that:
...variances in reflexive thought do not imply that omniscience is impossible. The subject of the proposition "I am unoriginate" is, for the Father, "the Father," and both the Son and Spirit also assent to the proposition "the Father is unoriginate." Propositions are the meanings of declarative statements, and the meaning of the Father's thought "I am unoriginate" is synonymous with "the Father is unoriginate." Reflexive knowledge can accordingly be considered an indexation of propositional thought.What is the point of all of this? Well, Trinitarians do, in fact, affirm omniscience as a divine attribute. Trinitarians do, in fact, affirm the Father, Son, and Spirit to be distinct persons. Trinitarians do, in fact, affirm that only the Father can think "I am the Father," only the Son can think "I am the Son," and only the Spirit can think "I am the Spirit."
But the implication is that Trinitarians should therefore affirm that each person possesses His own, distinct omniscient mind. If there is any clear case against numeric unity from consideration of the divine attributes, this is it. Contrary to numeric unity, there is not only one subject of whom omniscience can be distinctly predicated. There are three subjects: the distinct persons of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Collapsing the subjects leads to Sabellianism. Collapsing the minds leads to the impossibility of any of the allegedly distinct persons to reflexively index a certain set of propositions which the other persons can't. This too would lead to Sabellianism. When we speak of the Trinity, we must think of three distinct divine persons and, respectively, three distinct omniscient minds.
Since there are a multitude of subjects-persons to whom the divine attribute of omniscience can distinctly apply, then in the context of Trinitarianism, numeric unity must be false and generic unity must be true.
17 comments:
Surely if there is a collective divine consciousness shared between the three subjects, whereby the other two persons have access to the viewpoints of each one, then omniscience could be predicated of this collective mind as well as of each individual person?
This does not collapse the persons, as it is an individual person thinking any given proposition whilst the other two are conscious of that thought, as well as conscious of to whom that thought belongs. This would seem to give numeric unity (insofar as the three persons are one being, united in will and perfection, such that there could not be an internal disagreement in the supervening collective consciousness) as well as generic unity.
For a better explanation than I could provide, please see the illustrious Steve Hays in his blog posts "God in three persons" and "Blessed Quaternity?", amongst others, who is my source for this suggestion.
Yours in Christ,
Tom
Thomas,
You and Steve may be defining generic unity differently than I have, as generic unity is clearly mutually exclusive with numeric unity as I have defined it. If the Father is omniscient, the Son, is omniscient, and the Spirit is omniscient but the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct subjects-persons, then I am arguing numeric unity is false by definition.
I am unclear as to what you mean when you say "the other two persons have access to the viewpoints of each one." Are you saying that the Father, for example, could ever think "I am the Son" or "I am the Spirit"? If so, then I insist you collapse the persons. You conflate what should be distinct egos.
If, on the other hand, you simply mean that the Father knows what it means for the Son to think "I am the Son" and for the Spirit to think "I am the Spirit," I would not disagree at all but fail to find it relevant to my post.
Steve's definition of "God" is clearly different than mine, and the result is that it seems he approaches the discussion from the viewpoint of "God" (the one being) rather than the persons of the Trinity. But this leaves me uncertain as to whether he would agree with me that the distinct persons of the Trinity distinctly possess the attribute of omniscience, as evidenced by the fact no one persons can reflexively index items of knowledge that the others can.
By referring to God as having multiple self-consciences, I assume Steve means something other than that "God" is a class or genus under which - since there are various members of species with distinct consciences - we can speak of multiple self-consciences. But if that assumption is true, I am left thinking that he believes God thinks "I am the Father," "I am the Son," and "I am the Spirit." The persons seem to collapse into "one after all, though in a sense different to the options I outlined in my post, because it almost appears as if Steve's position on God is similar to what I think is the orthodox view of Christ: each "person" systematizes distinct consciences or minds. The main difference would be that Christ's systematization is not of persons. If God systematizes the minds of the Trinity, then God would be a person after all, but the Trinity become the predicates of God rather than vice versa. I think that raises problems I mention in my last post on this issue.
We could really skirt this whole issue if we could, as Steve agrees, simply go to Scripture to see if there is a normative definition of "God" to decide between our different definitions. I happen to think we can by noting that in monotheistic contexts, "God" refers to the Father. But I guess this is a side point to the focus of this post.
Anyway, if you mean something else by "collective divine consciousness," you will have to tell me. I am uncomfortable referring to a "supervening" consciousness because I think divine nature is not self-conscious. Rather, it implies self-consciousness of whom it may be predicated.
Thanks for the reply.
"I am the Son" and "The Son is the Son" mean the same thing, stated differently. So there's no problem - both the Father and the Son think the same proposition (object of knowledge), only one is stated in the 1st person.
Max,
"I am the Son" and "The Son is the Son" mean the same thing only if the first is uttered by the Son. Only He reflexively indexes that item of knowledge which, since all the members of the Trinity are omniscient, He indeed has in common with the Father.
The variance in reflexive indexation implies distinct persons, whereas the commonality in "knowledge" (the propositional meaning of utterances) safeguards the distinct omniscience of each distinct person. This is why I find numeric unity - as I have defined it - to be false. More than one subject is omniscient.
Ryan,
You use the word, "index" frequently when discussing the ontology of persons. What do you mean by that?
Drake,
I'm referring to the fact certain words are used as reference points relating to an utterance - a [propositional] thought, speech, writ, etc. - in question. Words like "I" (self), "here" (spatial), and "now" (temporal) indicate reflexive indexation because when used, they point back to person, place, or time at which the utterance occurred.
In this context, I basically mean that only one person can say "I am the Father," only one person can say "I am the Son," only one person can say "I am the Spirit." The other persons can know what the Father means when He says "I am the Father" because they understand who it is that is uttering - the Father. So each person is omniscient, thought the way each person relates to certain items of knowledge differs. "The Father is the Father" is one such item of knowledge. The Father relates to that differently than do the Son and Spirit because He can "reflexively index" that proposition by using the indexical "I" as the subject without a loss or change in meaning.
You said:
"I am the Son" and "The Son is the Son" mean the same thing only if the first is uttered by the Son. Only He reflexively indexes that item of knowledge which, since all the members of the Trinity are omniscient, He indeed has in common with the Father.
The variance in reflexive indexation implies distinct persons, whereas the commonality in "knowledge" (the propositional meaning of utterances) safeguards the distinct omniscience of each distinct person. This is why I find numeric unity - as I have defined it - to be false. More than one subject is omniscient."
Ok thank you, I was a bit lost there. I agree of course. The Father is the One God (1 Cor. 8:6)
Thanks for the response.
You and Steve may be defining generic unity differently than I have, as generic unity is clearly mutually exclusive with numeric unity as I have defined it. If the Father is omniscient, the Son is omniscient, and the Spirit is omniscient but the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct subjects-persons, then I am arguing numeric unity is false by definition.
Unless it is possible to have a subject who is himself made up of three distinct subjects. That way we could refer to a generic unity of divine persons and a numeric unity of one God which refers to the collective consciousness of the three persons, which each person possesses.
I am unclear as to what you mean when you say "the other two persons have access to the viewpoints of each one." Are you saying that the Father, for example, could ever think "I am the Son" or "I am the Spirit"? If so, then I insist you collapse the persons. You conflate what should be distinct egos.
No, because to think “I am the Son” is active and voluntary. Rather, I am saying the Father would be conscious of the Son’s consciousness thinking that. It would be somewhat analogous to telepathy, but with the minds being connected by a oneness of being rather than a passive perception on the part of another.
If, on the other hand, you simply mean that the Father knows what it means for the Son to think "I am the Son" and for the Spirit to think "I am the Spirit," I would not disagree at all but fail to find it relevant to my post.
What would it mean for the Father to know what it means for the Son to think “I am the Son” (apologies for the cumbersome sentence)? For Him to merely understand the content and indexing of the proposition or for Him to experience the Son thinking the proposition? If it were the former then that would simply be a function of His omniscience, but the latter implies a different kind of unity which, allowing for the collective consciousness of the one being, would allow expressions such as “We know” to be intelligible as spoken from a single agent. Thus when God says “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (Gen 1:26), we are not forced to conclude that there is some unspoken interlocutor, but that this is speech that can be properly ascribed to the Trinity.
I am left thinking that he believes God thinks "I am the Father," "I am the Son," and "I am the Spirit." The persons seem to collapse into one after all, though in a sense different to the options I outlined in my post, because it almost appears as if Steve's position on God is similar to what I think is the orthodox view of Christ: each "person" systematizes distinct consciences or minds. The main difference would be that Christ's systematization is not of persons. If God systematizes the minds of the Trinity, then God would be a person after all, but the Trinity become the predicates of God rather than vice versa. I think that raises problems I mention in my last post on this issue.
God would not think that as those personal properties are properties particular to each person rather than to the divine essence. What we have is three individual minds who are also a single collective mind such that, for example, omniscience can be predicated either of any one person or of the divine being, God. (Steve Hays has described the persons with the analogy of symmetry, where any symmetrical image is equipollent and irreducible, as for example when you look in a mirror (your hands are the most obvious example of this); since the divine persons are irreducible, I don’t think he would see them as synthesised).
I happen to think we can [skirt this issue] by noting that in monotheistic contexts, "God" refers to the Father. But I guess this is a side point to the focus of this post.
I disagree, and think that one of your own proof-texts is one that militates importantly against your case, viz. 1 Cor 8:6: “yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.” There is agreement amongst commentators (e.g. Richard B. Hays) that this is Paul’s reworking of the Shema, from Deuteronomy 6:4. This presents two problems for you- firstly, in the Shema the two persons are not separated (The LORD our God, the Lord is one). Hence you have a monotheistic statement which includes (at least) God and Jesus. Secondly, Jesus is given the title “κύριος”, which is actually in the Shema rendering the divine name, YHWH. Thus you have Paul seemingly identifying Jesus with YHWH (as the one YHWH, no less).
Moreover, I believe your exegesis brings its own problems, as if you say that the verse must mean that Jesus is not God in one sense that the Father is God then you are committed by the text to say that the Father is not Lord in one sense that Jesus is Lord. How would you parse this? In what sense would you say that Jesus is Lord that the Father is not Lord? Doesn’t this seem to rather threaten your own view that the Father is the divine monarch?
Anyway, if you mean something else by "collective divine consciousness," you will have to tell me. I am uncomfortable referring to a "supervening" consciousness because I think divine nature is not self-conscious. Rather, it implies self-consciousness of whom it may be predicated.
Each person would have their own consciousness as well as an entire Trinitarian consciousness. Perhaps supervene was an inappropriate choice of words, as this Trinitarian perspective is not over and above the three persons, but simply is the collection of their three perspectives shared by each one of them.
I hope that was intelligible, as I’m still thinking through this whole issue myself.
Thomas,
Unless it is possible to have a subject who is himself made up of three distinct subjects. That way we could refer to a generic unity of divine persons and a numeric unity of one God which refers to the collective consciousness of the three persons, which each person possesses.
As I mentioned in my last reply, would it not have to be the other way around in that case? The persons would not possess the collective conscience; the collective conscience would possess the persons. The persons would be the predicates of "God," not the subjects. That's the only way to preserve numeric unity.
Rather, I am saying the Father would be conscious of the Son’s consciousness thinking that.
I agree. So then you do truly believe that the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct. But then that begs the question as to how you believe they may be predicated of one conscience. If "God is the Father, Son, and Spirit" is true, as you seem to think, then what does it mean? It doesn't appear to be a tautology, since you speak of a "collective conscience."
What would it mean for the Father to know what it means for the Son to think “I am the Son” (apologies for the cumbersome sentence)?
It would mean He knows "The Son is the Son."
...the latter implies a different kind of unity which, allowing for the collective consciousness of the one being, would allow expressions such as “We know” to be intelligible as spoken from a single agent.
"We" is plural, not singular, which makes sense since the Father and Son are distinct subjects. As for Genesis 1:26, I think you would agree that there is a danger in trying to fit a systematic doctrine through an interpretation of a particular passage which we would like to be true.
God would not think that as those personal properties are properties particular to each person rather than to the divine essence.
But this means God cannot be the Father, Son, and Spirit. The personal properties cannot be divorced from the Father, Son, and Spirit. As one of those personal properties is the capacity to reflexively index certain propositions the other person's can't, it seems to be the idea of a collective consciousness fails - at least when it is taken as the subject to the persons rather than a common predicate.
What we have is three individual minds who are also a single collective mind such that, for example, omniscience can be predicated either of any one person or of the divine being, God.
So God cannot think "I am the Father," "I am the Son," or "I am the Spirit." Then either God is a distinct person - in which case there is a quaternity - or "God" simply refers to the divine nature (an attribute of which is omniscience) predicable of the Father, Son, and Spirit - in which case tritheism follows. What isn't possible is "God is the Trinity," as "God" cannot think "I am the Father, Son, or Spirit."
This presents two problems for you- firstly, in the Shema the two persons are not separated (The LORD our God, the Lord is one). Hence you have a monotheistic statement which includes (at least) God and Jesus. Secondly, Jesus is given the title “κύριος”, which is actually in the Shema rendering the divine name, YHWH. Thus you have Paul seemingly identifying Jesus with YHWH (as the one YHWH, no less).
Your interpretation of the Shema presupposes two persons. That isn't possible given what the passage actually says. When Paul repeats that the Father is the one God without including Jesus, I am at a loss as to how you think that Jesus can be identified with the one God? I do not see how Sabellianism could be avoided when you equate the persons, as would have to be the case. And while YHWH may be translated κύριος, does κύριος always mean YHWH?
...if you say that the verse must mean that Jesus is not God in one sense that the Father is God then you are committed by the text to say that the Father is not Lord in one sense that Jesus is Lord. How would you parse this?
I don't see an issue in specifying Jesus as the one Lord insofar as He has been appointed such by the one God:
1 Corinthians 15:57 But thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.
58 Therefore, my beloved brothers, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is not in vain.
Jesus is God's vicegerent. He comes is God's name to fulfill God's purpose.
Each person would have their own consciousness as well as an entire Trinitarian consciousness.
I don't see the need for "an entire Trinitarian consciousness." What does this consciousness account for that their own consciousnesses cannot?
...this Trinitarian perspective is not over and above the three persons, but simply is the collection of their three perspectives shared by each one of them.
Consciousnesses can share their perspectives and know those of others without the need for a middleman.
Does "God" possess "His" own consciousness? Is God a "person"? I don't see how, if "He" has no personal properties of "His" own and is predicated of rather than the subject of the members of the Trinity.
I'd be very interested if you did a post (or comment, for that matter) interacting with Joel Parkinson's "The Intellectual Triunity of God." It presents God as Truth, that is, the complete set of objective true propositions. There are three persons/minds which possess all of these, with differences in their subjective thoughts. Could this be a legitimate way of understanding the ontological Trinity, with the Monarchy of the Father of the Nicene Creed providing us with an understanding of the economical? Thanks
Patrick,
Parkinson's statements that "The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are each fully and co-equally God," "God is both three and one," etc. and such are "essential to the doctrine of God" will obviously mean that I would disagree with him to some level.
If you are asking about the subjective/objective difference in knowledge which Parkinson suggests, I believe I understand the gist and is in line with what I state, but I wouldn't refer to statements using the indexical "I" to be "subjective knowledge." That's imprecise. Knowledge is propositional, and there is no proposition unknown to each divine person.
I would also be careful not to define God through the lens of one attribute. What does it mean to say God is truth? God is not the entire set of true propositions. God thinks truth and nothing but, but does that imply no other person could? I think not since persons are not individuated by what they know but by which propositions they can reflexively index (i.e. for which they can substitute "I" for the relevant subject).
Ryan, If Jesus is merely the "viceregent" of God (the Father) as you are suggesting, could you explain how it is that Jesus would recieve worship, seeing as He is NOT the "One True God" in some sense? Also, similarly, in what way does THE LORD (YHWH) "NOT give glory to another" as stated in Isaiah 42:8? In your mind, would Jesus be categorized as "another?" Just some questions that sort of popped up as I was reading. Very interesting post. I am trying to follow the logic the best I can here.
Well, to say that Jesus is "merely" the Father's viceregent is misleading, for the Son is the perfect image of the Father. He is as close to being the Father as can be possible without actually being the Father. This and His economic activity qualifies Him for worship.
The issue of worship itself is still something I am sorting through - as in whether there are degrees of worship and questions of the kind. But in regards to Isaiah 42:8, I can say that all worship given to Jesus does not exclude the Father, so I don't think Jesus ought to be categorized as "another." He is not the "one God" as I show here, but I don't think that's a problem. He's obviously not the Father either, and yet there are numerous places in Scripture in which it is said believers worship the Father through Jesus. For how can we worship the Image and not that which it images?
Understood, and thanks for your response. So I am curious, what would be your exegetical interpretation of John 1:1-3 (in light of what you have already worked through, concerning the personages of the Father and the Son)?
Well, it is obvious the Word, Jesus, was not with Himself. So it should be equally obvious "God" means two different things. The "God" with whom the Word eternally co-existed is the Father. The Word was with the Father, and the Word was "God," or divine. This is one of the few passages in which I think "God" can refer to divinity or the divine nature rather than a person. Normally, "God" refers to a person. John 1:3 is a reference to the work of the Word and distinguishes His eternality with and in the Father from that which "come[s] into being."
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