Introduction
Eugen
von Böhm-Bawerk, author of Karl Marx and
the Close of His System, was, in his lifetime, met with responses from
prominent Marxists such as Rudolf Hilferding and Louis B. Boudin. It has been
nearly four decades since John Robbins wrote Answer to Ayn Rand, one of the earliest exhaustive critiques of Ayn
Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism, yet despite the enduring popularity of Ayn
Rand’s literature, no Objectivist publication has even acknowledged it or its
updated version, Without a Prayer: Ayn
Rand and the Close of Her System.[1]
Unfortunately,
any reply to Robbins now could not be endorsed by Rand. Therefore, the canon comprising
“the only authentic sources of information on Objectivism” is closed.[2]
Still, one would think the conclusion that Objectivism is a flawed philosophy
would elicit a reaction from its adherents. Perhaps Robbins’ criticisms are not
thought to be parallel in quality to Böhm-Bawerk’s criticisms of Marxism.[3]
If this were true, one would not expect Robbins to be so often cited by
non-Objectivists.[4] Hopefully,
the following will serve to clarify this mystery.
Objectivism
Summarized
Philosophy is the science that studies
the fundamental aspects of the nature of existence. The task of philosophy is
to provide man with a comprehensive view of life. This view serves as a base, a
frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or
existential. This view tells him the nature of the universe with which he has
to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the
means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to
choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics) –
and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is
given to him by esthetics.[5]
What
was Ayn Rand’s comprehensive view of life? “The essentials are: in metaphysics,
the Law of Identity – in
epistemology, the supremacy of reason
– in ethics, rational egoism – in
politics, individual rights (i.e.
capitalism) – in esthetics, metaphysical
values.”[6] In
dozens of books and hundreds of articles, Rand aimed to integrate these
principles into a coherent worldview and model for action. A rational assessment
of Objectivism must interact with Rand’s defense of it, chiefly consisting in surveying
whether her specific understandings of the various branches of philosophy are
internally consistent and, if they are not, whether slight or considerable
modifications must be made. The conclusion to such an investigation will be as
much an appraisal of Robbins’ exposition of Rand’s philosophy as it will be of
Rand’s philosophy itself.
Prefatory
Remarks
Matters
are complicated by Rand’s tendency to ascribe uncommon meanings to words, link
prejudicial language with alternatives to Objectivism, and bypass quoting or
referencing a philosopher when leveling accusations against him.
For
instance, Rand emphasized that “Man’s senses are his only direct cognitive
contact with reality and, therefore, his only source of information,”[7]
but because of her antipathy for identifying with groups, she rejected
empiricism, groundlessly asserting that empiricists think “man obtains his
knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of
immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts…”[8]
To
adduce one more example, Rand defined “sacrifice” as “the surrender of a
greater value for a lesser one or a nonvalue.”[9]
While Christianity does have a doctrine of sacrifice, it is not related to
Rand’s altruistic sentiments. Lamentably, because she failed to distinguish her
own understanding of sacrifice from that of Christianity, Rand blundered in
referring to the Protestant ethic as “a popular make-shift, a bootleg set of
rules for “practical” action – and, from the start, it was fighting a losing
war against the official morality of the Judaic-Christian tradition: the
morality of altruism, mysticism, and self-immolation to the welfare of others.”[10]
As Robbins cleverly remarked, “Rand should have gone to more baseball games.”[11]
A
major downside to Rand’s rhetoric is that it doubles the task of the critical
reader. Not only must he consider the merits of Rand’s arguments, he must first
ask whether they were even directed against accurate representations of others’
positions. To give Objectivism the just trial which Rand at times failed to
give her opponents, it will be necessary to avoid her apologetic methodology by
ensuring that the reader has means of verifying whether Rand is being given
fair treatment. In this context, that means dealing with Rand on and with her
own terms or, when appropriate, pointing out cases in which Rand’s terms were original.
Objectivist
Epistemology and Metaphysics
An
appropriate place to start an examination of Objectivism as such is in an
examination of Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology, for these compose “the
theoretical foundation of philosophy.”[12]
Indeed, when one makes a knowledge claim, there is both a metaphysical and
epistemological aspect to the assertion. The former pertains to [the nature of]
what is said to be known whereas the latter pertains to how one knows his
assertion is true. Epistemology cannot be completely divorced from metaphysics.
Rand’s
rejection of “the claim to a non-sensory means of knowledge”[13]
confirms her to have been a classical empiricist. Knowledge is described as
having been “reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason
based on perceptual observation) and omitting the particular fact(s) involved.”[14]
The suggestion is that Rand’s metaphysic should have been, if consistent with
her epistemology, a form of physicalism, for Rand’s claim that groups of sensations
are preconditions for knowledge acquisition would be metaphysically groundless
if that which can be known is not ultimately derived from sensations.
Though
physicalism is what one might anticipate, Rand actually distinguished matter
from volitional consciousness, equating to the latter to man’s soul or spirit.[15]
This raises an interesting question: how is one able to sense his conscious, free
will? Even if “the validity of the senses must be taken for granted,”[16]
unless a volitional consciousness can be tasted, touched, heard, seen, or
smelled – not merely unnecessarily inferred from the alleged effects thereof –
self-knowledge would apparently be impossible. Then again, if Rand had accepted
physicalism, she would have had to redefine volitional consciousness and knowledge
since the physical qua physical is
not mental.
Her
philosophy of knowledge must likewise have affected her philosophy of language,
which involves “a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts.”[17]
One ramification is that no observation of the physical world can warrant
belief in the following precondition for knowledge: “propositions may be true.”[18]
Moreover, if truth, knowledge, and language are creations of man, they must
have been the creations of a particular man who Rand would have argued was born
with a blank mind.[19]
This would make communication impossible, as no two individuals could ever
verify that the differences in their experiences and sensations are negligible
to the meanings each attaches to some word[s]. Of course, as Rand’s was not
even able to demonstrate how she could know herself, she certainly could not
have known any other consciousnesses.
One
of the primary epistemological debates Objectivism was supposed to solve is how
concepts are formed. All concepts are universals or abstractions.[20]
Interestingly, however, Rand denied the existence of abstractions.[21]
How can abstractions be formed yet be said not to exist? “To exist is to
possess identity,”[22]
and as abstractions certainly possess identity, it is unclear what reason can
be offered as to why Rand would have rejected the “existence” of abstractions
apart from the fact her empirical epistemology could not account for them.
There
is also quite a bit of irony in the idea Objectivists do not think abstractions
exist. There can be no more fundamental or well-known Objectivist axiomatic
concept than Rand’s mantra that “existence exists.” But as a concept, “existence” is an
abstraction, and Rand said abstractions as such do not exist. So, after all,
existence as such does not exist.
Regardless,
it is not clear in what way the concept “existence” could even be formed, since
“Cognitive abstractions are formed by
the criterion of: what is essential?
(epistemologically essential to distinguish one class of existents from all
others).”[23]
Existence does not distinguish any class of existents from any other class of
existents,[24] which
is why Rand wrote, “Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible
primaries, the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive
definition—e.g., to define “existence,” one would have to sweep one’s arm
around and say: “I mean this.””[25]
But in her dichotomization of the primacy of existence from the primacy of consciousness,
she gave several conceptual equivalents to it:
The
primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e.,
that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they
possess a specific nature, an identity.
The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of
perceiving that which exists – and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking
outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primary of
consciousness – the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that
it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The
epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by
looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelation it
receives from another, superior consciousness).[26]
In
what is an otherwise able summary of contrasting positions, Rand defines existence
as “reality” or “the universe.” Elsewhere, she equated the universe to nature:
“To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature,
i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot
come into or go out of existence.”[27]
Finally, comparing this statement to the following gives credence to the idea
existence is nothing other than matter: “Matter is indestructible, it changes
its forms, but it cannot cease to exist.”[28]
The
point is that the affirmation of the primacy of existence over against the
primacy of consciousness is really the affirmation of the primacy of the
physical or material realm over against the spiritual or mental realm. It is
here that the root of these most basic problems with Objectivism is to be
found. Rand was clearly aware of but unwilling to accept the alternative to the
primacy of existence. There are many other particular inconsistencies in Rand’s
epistemology and metaphysic which could be mentioned, but it would take a book
like Without a Prayer to list them
all and is unnecessary for the purposes of showing how systemic the errors of
Objectivism are.
Objectivism
and Ethics
When
confronted with any secular philosophy, one of the more basic questions is
whether or how it purports to account for morality. As Rand defined morality as
“a code of values to guide man’s choices and actions,”[29]
the next natural question may seem to be whether there are choices or actions
men should or are obligated to make and, if so, why. But because Objectivism’s
concept of “man” is loaded, it is more appropriate in this circumstance to
first inquire as to Rand’s understanding of the nature of man.
Rand
believed that man is a volitional consciousness; that is, a man is a man he is
because he has chosen to be a man.[30]
He was born with the potential to be human or subhuman. Free will is not only a
precondition for responsibility[31]
but also for becoming man. In a way, Rand was an existentialist: existence
precedes essence. What may be said in reply to this?
Firstly,
Robbins correctly notes that “Just as a tabula
rasa consciousness is a contradiction in terms, so is a tabula rasa moral nature. A being of
self-made soul is a contradiction, because nothing can cause itself.”[32]
Secondly, even if it were possible for existence to precede essence, that would
undermine Rand’s attempted solution to the is-ought dilemma,[33]
viz. “The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do.”[34]
However, if existence precedes essence, there is no necessary reason to choose
to be human, in which case Rand’s particular code of morality would not apply. In
fact, Rand openly agreed that suicide can be a value[35]
or right[36] and
that “Reality confronts man with a great many “musts,” but all of them are
conditional.””[37] This
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Objectivist morality is subjective. As
Rand said, “‘Value’ presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and
for what?”[38]
It is hard to overstate the implications of these meta-ethical points.
There
are also a few difficulties inherent to Rand’s ethical theory, which is
comprehended in John Galt’s oath: “I swear-by my life and my love of it-that I
will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for
mine.”[39]
While Rand defined good and evil in various ways,[40]
the import of each is essentially the same: the “good” is that which enhances
life in some sense, whereas the “evil” is that which negates it. Quite aside
from the question of why it is irrational to pursue death as a goal, Rand did not
explain how a man who does not know when or how he will die can see “his
interests in terms of a lifetime and selects his goals accordingly.”[41]
Nor did she convincingly elaborate on why it would be immoral to extend one’s
own life by force.[42]
And given Objectivist epistemology and metaphysics, the cause of a proper
furtherance of life is unknowable. In short, the troubles of Objectivism are
pervasive, not minor, correctable inconsistencies.
Objectivism
and Politics
While
politics in general and capitalism specifically are said to be based upon more
fundamental branches of philosophy,[43]
some of what Rand wrote can give a reader the impression that her motivation
for speaking at length about these fundamental branches is ad hoc.[44]
When it comes to actually examining whether capitalism is necessary on
Objectivist premises, the answer is not so evident. It is at least clear that some
men do not need society because they do not seek a quality of life gained by
knowledge and trade,[45]
and because she regarded such men as free, Rand accepted the Lockean principle
that “The source of the government’s authority is “the consent of the
governed.””[46]
What
makes this interesting is that it is opposed to Rand’s insistence that
government must hold “a legal monopoly on
the use of physical force.”[47]
For if unanimity does not exist, then government, defined as “an institution
that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social
conduct in a given geographical area,”[48]
is unjustified in imposing these rules on everyone who owns property in a given
area. Instead, the principle of unanimous consent seems to make the
relationship between a government and its constituents little – if at all –
different from the relationship between an employee and an employer.[49]
But a market analogy would open the door to the possibility of competing
governments rather than a natural monopoly.
A
government is justified in using physical force only in retaliation to the
infringement of individual rights.[50]
In an ideal society, what reason does a sovereign individual have to submit to
a governmental authority? Anarchism as well as competing governments appears to
be a live alternative to Rand’s conception of capitalism. Interestingly, Rand’s
description of Galt’s Gulch was anarchistic,[51]
and what arguments Rand elsewhere presented against anarchism were either
pragmatic or straw men.[52]
Even
if it turns out the capitalist system Rand proposed deserves attention, it too
is rife with questions. For instance, it has already been pointed out that on
Objectivism, man is not man by nature but by choice. This means his rights are
not inalienable. One who chooses to act irrationally is no longer a man and
thus no longer has the rights of a man. Far more horrific is the realization
that “Rights do not pertain to a potential, only to an actual being”[53]
means that the rights of a man do not apply to beings that have not yet
developed the opportunity to choose to be men. This would include infants. Is infanticide
a holdover from Aristotelian common sense?[54]
Speaking of “actual beings,” what about the plants or animals which supposedly
have knowledge, values, and codes of action?[55] Rand expressed
no repugnance at the fact men kill the lives of these actual beings all the
time. What of their rights? Rand provided no criterion for distinguishing
who or what possesses what rights and why. A super-race may come along and
squash men like the relative ants they would be; what could Rand have said
about that?
It
is true that Rand could have avoided several of these moral and political
inconsistencies and begged questions by biting the secularist bullet and
denying normative statements are meaningful.[56]
In turn, ethical and political nihilism would have allowed her to remain
consistent relative to the confines of her flawed epistemology and metaphysic.
The point in addressing Rand’s moral and political inconsistencies, however, is
not the same as the point in addressing Rand’s epistemic and metaphysical
inconsistencies. The latter are sufficient to disarm whatever intellectual ground
Objectivism lays claim, whereas the former are primarily meant to disarm the
rhetoric which prevents people from noticing this.
Objectivism
and Esthetics
Despite
Rand’s protestations to the contrary,[57]
Objectivism entails a pessimistic view of life. Rand believed that “Life can be
kept in existence only by a constant process of self-sustaining action. The
goal of that action, the ultimate value
which, to be kept, must be gained through its every moment, is the organism’s life.”[58]
But Rand is dead. Aristotle, her greatest influence, is dead. It is difficult
to be optimistic when it appears impossible for even the most rational animal
to keep his or her ultimate value. And, after all, the limitations of and
external impediments to the matter which constitutes a man are not the only
obstacles he must overcome in his never-ending quest to live. Rand repeatedly complained
about the lack of intellectual integrity in every aspect of modern culture.[59]
Does
the cynicism which follows from Objectivism imply that Objectivism is false?
Not by itself. It does, however, have significance with respect to Objectivist
esthetics:
Art
is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical
value-judgments. Man’s profound need of art lies in the fact that his cognitive
faculty is conceptual, i.e. that he acquires knowledge by means of
abstractions, and needs the power to bring his widest metaphysical abstractions
into his immediate, perceptual awareness. Art fulfills this need: by means of a
selective re-creation, it concretizes man’s fundamental view of himself and of
existence. It tells man, in effect, which aspects of his experience are to be
regarded as essential, significant, important. In this sense, art teaches man
how to use his consciousness.[60]
A man has various
metaphysical value-judgments which “represent his implicit view of reality,”
and an important one is his answer to the question of “whether he can achieve
his goals in life or not.”[61]
Can a man, according to Objectivism, achieve his goals in life? Can a “constant
process of self-sustaining action” be unfailingly maintained? If Rand really
considered the validity of scientific induction to have been proved,[62]
it seems she would have had to answer negatively. Against nature and evil, men
are rather impotent.
Curiously,
however, man’s glory as a rational animal and end unto himself is a central
motif in Rand’s writings.[63]
An individualistic culture naturally finds that to be attractive, which would
explain why her novels have sold well. Howard Roark, John Galt, and Prometheus
are a few of the fictitious abstractions that were supposed to accomplish the
goal of Rand’s writings: “the projection
of an ideal man.”[64]
Her
less than ideal philosophy prevents them from that consideration. It would be
superfluous to list all the ways in which Rand’s esthetic theory is uprooted by
its dependence on her mistaken philosophical convictions, but it is ironic that
her exaltation of man was predicated on a philosophy in which matter, not
[volitional] consciousness, is unconditional, indestructible, and primary.[65]
What is man’s distinction to that? Just as Rand’s choice to value life rather
than non-existence was arbitrary, so too her choice of which values to regard
as important and thus select for artistic recreation were arbitrary. [66]
Ideal
Philosophy: The Alternative
These
drawbacks of Objectivism convincingly vindicate Robbins’ conclusion that
Objectivism is a contradictory philosophy. But a critique – even an internal
one – presupposes a worldview of one’s own; that is, in order for Robbins to have
known he undercut Objectivist principles, he must have been able to provide an
alternative to them. This he attempted, both in the latter half of Without a Prayer and in numerous other
books and articles, by presenting Scripturalism as his philosophy of choice.
What, then, does Scripturalism propose? Robbins provided the following summary:
1.
Epistemology: Propositional Revelation
2.
Soteriology: Faith Alone
3.
Metaphysics: Theism
4.
Ethics: Divine Law
5.
Politics: Constitutional Republic[67]
To
know what these positions mean and whether they are true, it is first necessary
to explain what knowledge and truth are. Rand’s notion of knowledge, for
example, permitted error.[68]
Robbins, on the other hand, accurately identified the nature of truth and
knowledge:
Truth
and error are opposites. Truth, by definition, neither contains error, nor is
uncertain, nor is liable to error. Knowledge, by definition, is apprehension of
what is true. One cannot be said to know
what is false. One can have false information, but one cannot have false
knowledge. “False knowledge is a contradiction in terms.” What is true cannot
be in error. What is known cannot be false. Therefore, knowledge is infallible.[69]
However, it must once
again be pointed out that showing Rand’s position to be self-defeating is not
equivalent to a demonstration that his own position is accurate. Thus, a brief
exposition as to how Robbins was able to know what knowledge and truth are is
necessary.
Rand
described an axiom as “a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact
that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny
it.”[70]
Among other “axioms,” Scripturalism teaches that one must implicitly assume the
laws of logic, adequacy of language, and a self-authenticating and omniscient
epistemic source in order to convey one’s rejection of them. “I deny the
epistemic adequacy of logic and language,” for example, is an assertion which
must presuppose the epistemic adequacy of both logic and language in order to
be intelligible. Skepticism, therefore, is self-defeating.
The
last axiom may seem a little less intuitive than the first two, but it follows
just the same. One who is not omniscient must acquire his knowledge from some
source. If the source from whom or which one ultimately learns is not omniscient,
it begs the question: how does one know that the truth value of any given
knowledge-claim is not predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition?
This is a problem, because the claim to know that not all propositions are
related to one another itself presupposes omniscience.[71]
Hence, an omniscient source of knowledge is necessary, and the nature of this
source must be self-authenticating for those who are not omniscient to be able
to know that the source is what it claims to be.
Nevertheless,
one cannot validly infer from the collection of a few necessary preconditions
for knowledge that one possesses a sufficient condition for knowledge.[72]
Hence, Scripturalists appeal to a top-down epistemic approach, beginning with a
presupposition which is the sufficient condition for knowledge and accounts for
all subsidiary, necessary preconditions for knowledge: divine revelation. Men do not need to be omniscient to know truth, but men are only able to know that because Scripture is the sole, extant extent of God's self-authenticating, self-attesting, and rational revelation which communicates this. One who by grace is enlightened about the epistemic
sufficiency of divine revelation is able to avoid the infinite regress of
perpetual external validation of beliefs. From this source of knowledge, knowledge
pertaining to every other branch of philosophy follows.
Metaphysically,
Scripturalism does not necessarily promote a purely mental realm. Propositional
truth, however, maintains a logical primacy over a “physical” realm insofar as
the latter is a creation patterned after the former. The physical qua physical cannot be “known” by
definition;[73]
knowledge is propositional belief in which the possibility of error is
precluded. In other words, this is a sort of opposite to the correspondence
theory of truth; it is a correspondence theory of corporeality in which the
physical provides a sensible representation of eternal truth.
Ethically, God created man to be accountable to His law.
That is simple justification for normative statements. Rand would not have
denied that creator has the right to dispose of a creation as he sees fit, and though
the chief end of man is to glorify God, this too is not contradictory to a type
of rational self-interest.[74]
Undoubtedly, a theocentric worldview will not be as persuasive to an immoral
culture as declaring man to be the crown jewel of the universe. Perhaps more
persuasive is the fact that Christianity, not secularism, can provide a
principled reason for opposing suicide, infanticide, etc. Anyway,
persuasiveness is superfluous to truth.
Politically, the law can function to restrain sin only
when penalties may be imposed on those who violate it. Governments are divinely
ordained subordinate authorities designed to mete out punishment to criminals.
As such, government is a function of sin; when there will be no more sin, there
will be no need for such a hierarchy among men. There is no mythical Atlantis
in this life, so citizens can and should use what opportunities arise to
influence government towards a Christian worldview.[75]
The extent to which governments – that is, men who claim governmental positions
– abuse power determines under what circumstances civil disobedience is
justified.
Esthetically, “The purpose of art is expression,”[76]
and the subject matter and skill in execution are the criteria according to
which it is to be judged. So, if “God created man as essentially a rational
being,” that “implies that man’s most valuable expressions are rational and
intellectual.”[77]
One’s epistemology, metaphysic, and ethic delimit the bounds of legitimate
artistry. “For a Christian, art is subordinate to a higher purpose, and only
insofar as it serves that purpose is it justified.”[78]
All
of these philosophical ideas can be or have been developed. But is it enough? People
cannot be forced to assent to the truth. Both Rand and Robbins believed that.
Readers must judge for themselves whether Robbins’ analyses definitively
cripple Objectivism, just as they must judge whether Robbins’ own philosophical
system suffices as an alternative. Though those who closely follow Robbins’
arguments ought to find them sound, some may refuse to listen. But it is not
the responsibility of the philosopher to change minds. If a productive Atlas
should shrug off the materialistic looters of society,[79]
how much more should a philosopher shrug off the intellectually indifferent?
[1]
A few short articles have been written in rejoinder, but none are by
Objectivists; cf. Roy A. Childs Jr., “Answer to Ayn Rand, by John W. Robbins,” The Libertarian Review (November, 1976);
David Gordon, “Crank vs. Crank,” The
Mises Review (Winter, 1997). Disagreements notwithstanding, the former
remarked that Answer to Ayn Rand is
“the best critique of Objectivism which has yet seen print in book form,” and
the latter, if less effusive in praise, grants that Robbins constructs “a devastating
analysis of Rand’s position on abstraction and knowledge.”
[2]
cf. Ayn Rand, The Objectivist (June,
1968). If neither Rand nor those whose writings she supported have provided a
coherent philosophical system, it may be suspected that present philosophers who
affiliate with Objectivism can do little better. For corroboration, see
Appendices A, B, and C in John Robbins’ Without
a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System (2006) for his reviews of
treatises by modern Objectivists.
[3]
In his capacity as an Austrian economist, Böhm-Bawerk might be surpassed in
importance only by his student, Ludwig von Mises, who, incidentally, was a
friend of Ayn Rand. Rand herself owned that she was not an economist; cf. Ayn
Rand, The Voice of Reason (1990), pg.
4. For Robbins’ view of secular economic theories in general and Mises’ in
particular, read “The Failure of Secular Economics,” The Trinity Review (February-March 2000) and “The Promise of
Christian Economics,” The Trinity Review
(August-September 2000).
[4]
Of the
recent book-length evaluations of Objectivism, two authors in particular
acknowledge their indebtedness to Robbins: Scott Ryan, Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality (2003), pg. xii;
Michael B. Yang, Reconsidering Ayn Rand
(2000), pg. 155. Others who recognize Robbins’ proficiency in highlighting
discrepancies in Rand’s philosophy include Mimi Gladstein, The New Ayn Rand Companion, Revised and Expanded Edition (1999),
pg. 101; Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Ayn
Rand: The Russian Radical (1995), pgs. 278-279; Clarence Carson, Swimming Against the Tide (1998), pg.
122.
[5]
Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive (1999), pg. 45.
[6]
Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It (1982), pg. 22;
cf. The Voice of Reason, pg. 4.
[8]
Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (1963), pg. 27.
The Encyclopedia Britannica correctly
states that empiricism entails “the view that all concepts originate in
experience, that all concepts are about or applicable to things that can be
experienced, or that all rationally acceptable beliefs or propositions are
justifiable or knowable only through experience,” none of which are tenets Rand
would have disputed.
[9]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (1964), pg.
50.
[10]
Ayn Rand, Why Businessmen Need Philosophy (2011),
pg. 305.
[11]
John
Robbins, Without a Prayer, pg. 179.
Sacrifice bunts or sacrifice fly-outs are not cases in which greater values are
exchanged for lesser ones. So too Christ’s death [and resurrection] for the
life His people was not a forfeiture of value.
[12]
Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 3.
[13]
Ibid., pg.
63; cf. “Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only
means to gain it. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and
integrates the material provided by his senses” (Atlas Shrugged (1957), pg. 942) where perception refers to “a group
of sensations” (The Virtue of Selfishness,
pg. 20).
[14]
Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology:
Expanded Second Edition (1990), pg. 35.
[15]
Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto (1971), pg. 29; Atlas Shrugged, pgs. 943, 945. Although
she never provided a solution, Rand did seem quite aware of the difficulty in
explaining how man as a consciousness who possesses free will could have
evolved from inanimate, determinate matter; cf. Philosophy:
Who Needs It, pg. 45.
[16]
Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology,
pg. 3. Just what it means for sensations to be “valid” isn’t specified. Rand
said: “No one can perceive literally and indiscriminately every accidental,
inconsequential detail of every apple he happens to see; everyone perceives and
remembers only some aspects, which are not necessarily essential ones; most
people carry in mind a vaguely approximate image of an apple’s appearance.” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 48).
Presumably, the axiom of the validity of sensations was meant to excuse Rand from
showing how she knew that those details of an “apple” which are not perceived
are inconsequential.
[17]
Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive, pg. 195. Rand
often wrote about “conceptual knowledge,” so the following statements by Rand
will hopefully save the reader some trouble in having to explain to
Objectivists that knowledge is always propositional: “Every concept stands for
a number of propositions.” (Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 48); “Words without definitions are not
language but inarticulate sounds.” (Ibid., pg. 11).
[18]
According
to Rand, “Truth is the recognition of reality” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 943). One recognizes reality when he assents to
a proposition which corresponds to it; cf. Philosophy:
Who Needs It, pg. 14. But on the assumption of empiricism, to what physical
event could “propositions may be true” correspond? If truth as recognition of
reality and reality itself do not overlap at any point, the correspondence
theory of truth is question-begging.
[19]
cf. Ayn
Rand, Return of the Primitive, pg.
54. Rand explained the Lockean theory of tabula
rasa by using the following metaphor to describe a newborn: “…he has a
camera with an extremely sensitive, unexposed film (his conscious mind), and an
extremely complex computer waiting to be programmed (his subconscious). Both
are blank.” Other statements by Rand herself show the faultiness of this
theory: “A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in
terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious
of something.” Atlas Shrugged, pg.
942.
[20]
cf. Ayn
Rand, Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology, pg. 1.
[21]
“Remember
that abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man’s epistemological
method of perceiving that which exists – and that which exists is concrete.” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 23). Under
what conditions could an abstract proposition be true, given that truth is
recognition of reality and abstractions do not exist in reality?
[22]
Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 960; cf. Ibid., pg.
942.
[23]
Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology,
pg. 41. Ostensive definition, which is the attempt to communicate by pointing
at something physical, simply repeats the error of assuming that two
individuals could share sensations, identified above in the discussion of the
Objectivist philosophy of language.
[24]
This
process would have been arbitrary anyway if one is, like Rand was, an
ontological nominalist whose consciousness creates abstractions ex nihilo.
[26]
Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 24.
Obviously, there is no way that she could have known whether the “universe” can
have existence or identity independent of a consciousness.
[28]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 16.
[29]
Ibid., pg.
13.
[30]
“No, you
do not have to live as a man; it is an act of moral choice. But you cannot live
as anything else-and the alternative is that state of living death which you
now see within you and around you, the state of a thing unfit for existence, no
longer human and less than animal, a thing that knows nothing but pain and
drags itself through its span of years in the agony of unthinking
self-destruction” (Atlas Shrugged, pg.
941). Why, given a secular worldview, are false beliefs necessarily
maladaptive? Blankout.
[32]
John Robbins,
Without a Prayer, pg. 176.
[33]
The
“is-ought dilemma” refers to the question of how a normative statement can
follow from a descriptive statement.
[35]
“Death is
the standard of your values, death is your chosen goal” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 1025). “It is not mere death that the morality
of sacrifice holds out to you as an ideal, but death by slow torture. Do not
remind me that it pertains only to this life on earth. I am concerned with no
other. Neither are you” (pg. 954). The reader should keep these sorts of
statements in mind when he reads Rand describe the Argument from Intimidation as
an “appeal to the moral self-doubt and its reliance on the fear, guilt, or
ignorance of the victim” (The Virtue of Selfishness,
pg. 163). Intriguingly, John Galt contemplated suicide. He said that if Dagny
Taggart were to be threatened, he would kill himself because there would have
been “no values for me to seek after that” (Atlas
Shrugged, pg. 1013). But Dagny switched lovers regularly, each of whom
matched her values. Why would Galt choose suicide over the possibility of
finding another woman with the same values? Was this really Rand’s ideal and
rational man?
[36]
“It is
only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the men who starts
its use. No, I don’t share his evil or sink to his concept of morality. I
merely grant him his choice, destruction, the only destruction he had the right
to choose: his own.” (Atlas Shrugged,
pg. 1024).
[37]
Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 99.
[38]
Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 939. “Value” is that
which one acts to gain and/or keep” (The
Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 15).
[39]
Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 993. Rand was
consistent with this principle in stating that “The small minority of adults
who are unable rather than unwilling
to work have to rely on voluntary charity” (Capitalism:
The Unknown Ideal (1986), pg. 19). She was not consistent when she writes
that adults have a “moral obligation toward a child” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 149). Why are there obligations toward
children who have not made the choice to be human when there are no obligations
toward adults who are invalid and have chosen to be human?
[40]
“An
organism’s life is its standard of value:
that which furthers its life is the good,
that which threatens it is the evil”
(The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 17). “All
that which proceeds from man’s independent ego is good. All that which proceeds
from man’s dependence on men is evil” (The
Fountainhead (1994), pg. 681). “All that which is proper to the life of a
rational being is the good; all that which destroys it is the evil” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 940).
[42]
What she did
say is that “To force a man to drop his own mind and to accept your will as a
substitute, with a gun in place of a syllogism, with terror in place of proof,
and death as the final argument-is to attempt to exist in defiance of reality.
Reality demands of man that he act for his own rational interest; your gun
demands of him that he act against it” (Atlas
Shrugged, pg. 949). However, it is unclear how demanding another to act
against his rational interest implies that the one making the demand is himself
defying reality.
[43]
“Politics
is based on three other philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology,
and ethics – on a theory of man’s nature and man’s relationship to existence.”
(Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg.
vii.). “The moral justification of capitalism is man’s right to exist for his
own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to
himself; it is the recognition that man – every man – is an end in himself, not
a means to the ends of others, not a sacrificial animal serving anyone’s need.”
(Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 67).
[44]
cf.
footnote 66. “If you want to save capitalism, there is only one type of
argument that you should adopt, the only one that has ever won in any moral
issue: the argument from self-esteem. (Capitalism:
The Unknown Ideal, pg. 279). Is totalitarianism necessarily opposed to
self-esteem and rational egoism? The production, management, and maintenance of
slave-labor is a sort of skill which could, given secularism, be in one’s
self-interest.
[45]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 35.
[46]
Ibid., pg.
129.
[47]
Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 43.
[48]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 125. Is
this geographical range non-arbitrarily determined? How do governments
interact? It is strange that Rand would not have considered these questions,
yet no answer can be found to them in her books.
[49]
Some of
what Rand asserted can be interpreted this way as well: “In order fully to
translate into practice the American concept of the government as a servant of the citizens, one has to
regard the government as a paid servant”
(The Virtue of Selfishness, 138). “In
a fully free society, taxation – or, to be exact, the payment for government
services – would be voluntary. Since
the proper services of a government – the police, the armed forces, the law
courts – are demonstrably needed by individual citizens and affect their
interests directly, the citizens would (and should) be willing to pay for such
services, as they pay for insurance.” (Ibid., pg. 135).
[50]
“It is
only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the man who starts
its use” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 950). In fact, “the
protection of individual rights is the only proper purpose of government” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 128). “Individual rights are the means of
subordinating society to moral law.” (Ibid., pg. 108) Rand’s dependence on Lockean political
philosophy seemingly extended to the idea physical force encompasses any type
crime which costs a man his life force; cf. Ibid., pg. 106.
[51]
“Miss, Taggart, we have no laws in this valley, no rules, no formal organization of any kind” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 664). “We are not a
state here, not a society of any kind – we’re just a voluntary association of
men held together by nothing but every man’s self-interest” (Ibid., pg. 695).
[52]
In one
place, she describes anarchism as “a naïve floating abstraction: for all the
reasons discussed above a society without an organized government would be at
the mercy of the first criminal who came alone and who would precipitate it
into the chaos of gang warfare” (The Virtue
of Selfishness, pg. 131). But pragmatic arguments can cut both ways. Just
as there has never existed “A system of pure, unregulated laissez-faire” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 45),
so too there has never existed an ideal, anarchistic Atlantis. If capitalism
can get credit for success in America when a mixed economy was actually in place,
why not anarchism? One other time Rand mentioned anarchism, she novelized it to
unilaterally oppose private property, which is not the case for some
individualist anarchists: “The chaos of the airways was an example, not of free
enterprise, but of anarchy. It was
caused, not by private property rights, but by their absence.” (Ibid., pg. 135).
[54]
“That
which today is called “common sense” is the remnant of an Aristotelian
influence” (For the New Intellectual,
pg. 39).
[56]
Clearly,
if she had done this, Objectivism would not be Objectivism. Furthermore, it
would have rendered pointless and purposeless any actions she took. If “one
should assent to truth” is false, anything goes.
[57]
cf. Ayn
Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pgs.
56, 134; The Voice of Reason, pg. 39;
Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 159; Atlas Shrugged, pg. 950. Of course, men
can act rationally. But it is not the norm, as Rand herself seemed to admit;
cf. footnote 60.
[58]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 17.
[59]
cf. Ayn
Rand, The Voice of Reason, pgs. 114, 138,
150, 160, 182, 247; Philosophy: Who Needs
It, pgs. 118, 156; The Romantic
Manifesto, pgs. 97, 102-103, 128; Capitalism:
The Unknown Ideal, pgs. 24, 238.
[60]
Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 45.
[61]
Ibid., pg.
28.
[62]
Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (1963), pg. 26.
It is noteworthy that in none of her published works did she actually attempt
to prove the validity of [scientific] induction. This not only evidences an
obvious epistemological predicament but also poses an esthetic difficulty, for
Rand said the interpretation of an artist’s work “resembles a process of
induction” (The Romantic Manifesto,
pg. 35). If inductive reasoning is fallacious, then art qua art cannot necessarily communicate an artist’s metaphysical
value-judgments. But this would mean, contrary to Rand, that art cannot be an “indispensable medium for the communication
of a moral ideal” (Ibid., pg. 21).
[63]
cf. Ayn
Rand, Anthem (1964), pg. 105; We the Living (1959), pgs. 40-41; The Fountainhead, pg. xi; Atlas Shrugged, pg. 947; The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 172.
[64]
Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 162.
[65]
cf. Ayn
Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 939; Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 24.
[66]
“Artists
may inconsistently be humanists, but a humanistic, atheistic, purposeless universe
provides no basis for art” (Gordon Clark, A
Christian Philosophy of Education, pg. 51).
[67]
John
Robbins, Without a Prayer, pg. 336.
For all of her mischaracterizations of others, even Rand realized that
“extremism” is a smear word designed to avoid engagement; cf. Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg.
191ff. Let no one dismiss Scripturalism on such weak grounds.
[68]
“Errors of
knowledge are no breaches in morality; no proper moral code can demand
infallibility or omniscience.” (The
Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 88). “It is the epistemological obligation of
every individual to know what
his
mental file contains in regard to any concept he uses, to keep it integrated
with his other mental files, and to seek further information when he needs to
check, correct or expand his knowledge” (Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 67). Was Rand claiming that only an
omniscient individual could have inerrant beliefs? Was that claim inerrant? And
if knowledge can be erroneous, can certainty be possible? These would be strange
qualifications for someone who wrote that “in epistemology, the cult of
uncertainty is a revolt against reason” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 90).
[69]
John Robbins,
Without a Prayer, pgs. 255-256.
[70]
Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 965.
[71]
cf. Gordon
Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things
(2005), pg. 22. Since Rand admitted she was not omniscient yet rejected the
idea of divine revelation as mystical, she was guilty of the so-called
“stolen-concept” fallacy; cf. Rand, Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 9.
[72]
Even if
sensations were a means to knowledge, Robbins pointed out that Rand made this
mistake: “Empiricism does not follow from the absurdity of skepticism. Both
Rand and Branden begged the question” Without
a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System, pg. 33.
[73]
This does
not mean Scriptualists act on “the belief that reality is an illusion” (Ayn
Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg.
16). Opinions about what proposition[s] the physical – Rand’s “reality” – is
meant to image are well within the bounds of Scripturalist philosophy: “Must
not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true?” (Gordon
Clark, Karl Barth’s Theological Method
(1997), pg. 146). If nothing else, the physical world serves a pragmatic
purpose in causing opinions according to which men can to put into practice
ethical beliefs.
[74]
“The Bible
appeals directly to fear and self-interest; it teaches that absolute destruction
awaits him who rejects Christ; and it also teaches that although the Christian
may have temporary tribulation, he ultimately loses nothing but gains
everything in accepting Christ.” (Gordon Clark, Without a Prayer, pg. 307).
[75]
Rand’s
representation of the implications of the doctrine of total depravity on
political theory is astonishingly pejorative: “The cynical, man-hating
advocates of this theory sneer at all ideals, scoff at all human aspirations
and deride all attempts to improve men’s existence” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 222).
[77]
Ibid. “A
work of art is an integrated whole; it is not a disjointed aggregation of
unrelated things; and knowledge and appreciation depend on an understanding of
the plan according to which it was formed.” (Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, pg. 19).
[79]
cf. Ayn
Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 429.
10 comments:
Thank you for this. I am dealing with an objectivist right now.
Hi Ryan,
In your introduction, you wrote: "Still, one would think the conclusion that Objectivism is a flawed philosophy would elicit a reaction from its adherents."
Or, one might think not, since Objectivists are under no obligation to go around answering every single objection to their philosophy. However, in this instance, Mr. Robbins has been answered. For example, from Dawson Bethrick's blog, "Incinerating Presuppositionalism," you'll find the following entry:
John Robbins and the Foreclosure of His Critique of Objectivism
http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2010/03/john-robbins-and-foreclosure-of-his.html
Also see:
A RENAISSANCE IN RAND SCHOLARSHIP(1)
By Chris Matthew Sciabarra
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/essays/rprev.htm
By the way, come on over to Dawson's blog and comment some time, if you're up for it.
Ydemoc
Ydemoc,
I remember coming across that blog while I was doing research. Dawson had a few posts in which he mentioned Robbins, but nothing that struck me as relevant to the points I wanted to highlight in my own review of Robbins, Rand, and Robbins commenting on Rand. I had already written a post on Rand and causation (link), and the section on a tabula rasa anthropology didn't touch on the solipsistic nature of the theory.
I hadn't read the Sciabarra article, but it seems less like an analysis of of Robbins' arguments and more like a commentary on the evolution of Objectivist epistemology in the context of critical response. Which is fine, just not what I was looking for when writing this piece.
Thanks for your invitation.
Hi Ryan,
Thanks for your reply. Dawson Bethrick has posted a very short reply to your above entry, over on his blog, Incinerating Presuppositionalism. You can find them in the comments located here:
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=11714522&postID=7751752625451257260&isPopup=true
Also, in his brief reply, Dawson also supplied a couple links that you may be interested in:
Has Objectivism Been Refuted?
by Brian Register
http://katholon.com/Register.htm
John Calvin vs. Ayn Rand Or, The Theological Theatrics of John Robbins,
by Jim Peron
http://katholon.com/Peron-Robbins.htm
Ydemoc
Your statement that "Rand was clearly aware of but unwilling to accept the alternative to the primacy of existence" indicates that at the level of the Objectivist axioms your understanding of them is lacking.
The axioms of Objectivism are perceptually self evident facts. The fact that existence exists, and consciousness exists, and existence is identity, and are present in every perception we make leads to the conclusion, as Rand noted, that any attempt to deny these axiomatic facts would have to make use of them in the denial.
The primacy of existence follows directly from these axioms. To be conscious is to be conscious of objects, that is, to be conscious of existence, therefore existence precedes consciousness. Having identified the proper orientation of existence to consciousness how can you be at all surprised that Rand recognizes the primacy of consciousness to be invalid. In addition, how can you characterize this as an inconsistency of Objectivism when in fact the acceptance of two contradictory metaphysical ideas would be what is inconsistent.
It must be noted that no assumptions or presuppositions need be made at this perceptual level of our consciousness. Our senses, being automatic biological functions, provide us with an awareness of the objects of existence which we need only identify. Unlike Objectivism where no assumptions are necessary in regard to the axioms, you at least admit that Scripturalism requires assumptions to even get started. But then you mistakenly refer to these assumptions as axioms because you seem to think that the quote you provide from Rand describes all that an axiom need be, preferring to forget the self evident part.
An entire paragraph devoted to justifying an omniscient epistemic source as an axiom makes a mockery of the concept of axiom.
You won't have much look if you go by this misguided attempt at refuting objectivism by misunderstanding it ... or by misrepresenting it. Whichever it was.
johzek,
"The axioms of Objectivism are perceptually self evident facts. The fact that existence exists, and consciousness exists, and existence is identity, and are present in every perception we make leads to the conclusion, as Rand noted, that any attempt to deny these axiomatic facts would have to make use of them in the denial."
Defined in a certain way, I have no problem with the idea that these statements are necessary truths and so in a significant sense implicit in any knowledge claim we make.
That wasn't the point of what I said in that quote. The point was that the "primacy of existence" over against a "primacy of consciousness" presupposes an ability - given my citations regarding what Rand seemed to define "existence" as (the physical realm) - to know that anything can exist apart from consciousness. But how could Rand be conscious of that? How could she be conscious... of what preceded her own consciousness?
"To be conscious is to be conscious of objects, that is, to be conscious of existence, therefore existence precedes consciousness."
What about self-knowledge? It's not as though anything else would need to exist for God to know Himself and then create that which "exists" (i.e. for Rand, the physical realm). Again, I am only operating on my understanding of Rand's terms.
Photosynthesis seems to think I don't know Rand well enough to present her views. Maybe I don't, but I own most of her books and read everything I could (except We the Living, which was too dry for me). I don't see that I misstated anything from the quote in footnote 25, so if he has something else in mind I'll need him to tell me what it is.
"It must be noted that no assumptions or presuppositions need be made at this perceptual level of our consciousness. Our senses, being automatic biological functions, provide us with an awareness of the objects of existence which we need only identify."
Objectivists believe existents exist apart from our own consciousnesses, yes? How is a rejection of solipsism not an assumption? How is the idea that our senses "automatically" provide us with existents as opposed to hallucinations/dreams/etc. not an assumption?
Ydemoc,
Thanks for the links. Objectivism isn't really a topic of interest to me - I only studied it because I wanted to enter a few essay contests - and I'm not very interested in defending Robbins per se. He made some goods points, I think, but I consider my critique to stand on its own, so replies to Robbins don't necessarily impact this essay. If you have something you think applies, you can feel free to specify it, though.
As for Dawson's remarks:
"The concept ‘arbitrary’ essentially denotes a position or view accepted without the support of evidence. It’s hard to see how one can suppose that a living organism with conceptual ability would have no alternative but to make the choice to live arbitrarily. If Rand enjoyed living and was aware of this fact, that would be more than sufficient evidence to ground her choice to live rather than to die."
What evidence does Dawson have or did Rand have that enjoying life and self-awareness of this fact is sufficient to ground a choice to live rather than die? Why should one do what one enjoys?
"Does Ryan not eat food, drink fluids, work for an income, maintain a shelter, etc.? Our nature as biological organisms is the metaphysical basis of what we identify as values and how we determine their importance."
This sounds like Rand's "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do." You can refer to the original essay for my reply.
"Elsewhere, in a footnote (#24), he asserts that Rand was “an ontological nominalist whose consciousness creates abstractions ex nihilo” What support is given for this? Rand did not hold that abstractions were mind-independent entities to begin with, but rather the *form* in which the mind integrates and retains knowledge."
If I'm not mistaken - and you or Dawson may feel free to correct me - Rand held no two physical entities are exactly alike. Is that not true?
"Metaphysically, knowing is a type of *activity* - which ultimately means that abstraction is a type of action, not an entity as such."
Depending on how you define entity, ok.
"The entity involved is man and anything or things he perceives, identifies and integrates. Also, since abstractions are formed by means of a conceptual process (cf. concept-formation), there would be no “ex nihilo” to speak of: concepts are formed on the basis of perceptual input. What part of “the material provided by the senses” does Ryan not get?"
The part where I pick and choose what characteristics of two "entities" seem similar enough for me to refer to them by the same concept (allegedly) even though there is no ontological overlap between those two "entities." In short, the basic problem of nominalism: what legitimately grounds our use of universals?
Ryan,
Thanks for your reply. Dawson has responded here:
http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2014/09/what-alternative-do-apostates-have.html
His comments start at timestamp SEPTEMBER 25, 2014 5:28 AM; or I can copy and paste them here if it would be more convenient.
Ydemoc
Nice post about Ayn Rand Objectivism as Objectivism being Ayn Rand's philosophy of reason, egoism, capitalism. Read more - https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/
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