Discriminating Presuppositionalism

A few days ago, a friend asked me for my thoughts on this video. 

At the outset, the author, David Pallmann, asks, 

Just what is presuppositional apologetics? It is a school of apologetics which tries to show that Christianity is true via a transcendental argument (minute 1).

Now, this is quite a narrow view of presuppositionalism, especially in light of my own criticisms (as a presuppositionalist) of other presuppositionalists who thought transcendental argumentation could conceivably enable one to reason to God (link). His classification of versions of presuppositionalism which might differ from that of Greg Bahnsen as "deviant" (minute 8) is rather restrictive. If nothing else, I hope this post illustrates that one ought to discriminate the varieties of presuppositionalist perspectives. 

Mine bears an affinity with that of Gordon Clark and does not attempt to "show" (prove?) that Christianity is true via argumentation. Any arguments Clark might have made function as a defense of Christianity; but the arguments are not meant to function as "proofs," as if God's word (Clark's foundation or axiom) could have somehow been the conclusion to a (circular?) argument. 

Many flawed criticisms of Clark by fellow believers rest on a conflation between apologetics and epistemology. See my distinction between the two here. In short, apologetics or arguments presuppose epistemology or knowledge [of the most basic premise]. The two must be kept distinct. Apologetics is subordinate to epistemology. 

Another mistake is to think Clark was a traditional coherentist. Even people who claim to follow Clark's view sometimes make this mistake. He was a foundationalist. See point 5 here. A reason people make this mistake is because Clark accepted a coherence theory of truth; while I disagree with Clark on this, the point is that a coherence theory of truth (i.e. a definition of truth) is different than coherentism in epistemology (i.e. how we come to know the truth). See here.  

At minute mark 5, David says: 

In this video, I want to explore a response that has been periodically hinted at in the literature but is never, to my knowledge, been fully developed. I intend to defend the thesis that human reasoning is autonomous.

Given that his final quote in the video is from a chapter on autonomous human reason in a book written as a challenge to presuppositionalism (free on Kindle Unlimited here, by the way), I found this quote confusing. Does he think that his video or channel fully develops a thesis Joe Depoe does not?

Regarding the idea of autonomous human reason, in 1943, Clark anticipated the idea that this might be a problem for presuppositionalists in an article he wrote for The Presbyterian Guardian (link). Clark says: 

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision. 

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority? 

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority. 

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant. 

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason. 

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a, world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe.

Around minute 10, David says: 

By assumptions and presuppositions, I mean beliefs that are taken to be true apart from independent non-circular justification. In other words, I reject the idea that there are any beliefs that must be accepted without a justifying reason. 

I found this confusing too, since David elsewhere claims to be a foundationalist. The above quote appears to be a form of infinitism (link), not foundationalism. Unless I am misunderstanding him, his statement is not consistent with the rest of his video. 

At minute 12:20, David cites Timothy and Lydia McGrew: 

...to claim that there can be genuine epistemic principles that although rationally dubitable cannot be defended against someone who is skeptical about them is to allow an indefensible proposition to have epistemic weight. 

I had to read my own copy of that book for some context. The context is this: "Regardless of whether... a proposition is true, if it really is indefensible, it cannot be used as a premise to justify belief in anything else. If it is indefensible, it is epistemically irrelevant" (Internalism and Epistemology, pg. 80).

The question seems to be whether indefensible propositions can have epistemic weight (positive epistemic status). David blows by this question very quickly - too quickly (at this point) to allow for the nuance necessary to address the question. 

For instance, let's start with this: do axioms/foundations have positive epistemic weight? Well, a foundationalist had better say that in certain cases (i.e. God's word), "Yes, we can know axioms without having to defend them." There is positive epistemic weight regardless of whether we attempt to defend them. If God's word is our axiom and we can't know our axiom, then we are in trouble (this position is known as positism; link). 

Now, does the above mean that it is impossible to defend axioms/foundations? In one sense, yes; in another no. The epistemic justification of an axiom/foundation is not determined by a prior reason, premise, etc. For a foundationalist - as was alluded to above - the positive epistemic status must be intrinsic to the truth of the axiom/foundation itself. I interact with contemporary epistemologists on this very point here and here. 

On the other hand, it is possible to "apologetically" defend one's axiom/foundation. What does this mean? It means that in everyday conversations with others, one can point out that his axiom/foundation coheres with that which is derivable from it, that it answers important questions, etc. It is in this sense that we can understand Clark's affirmation that: "by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged." 

A self-defeating axiom cannot be defended (or known), whereas a self-consistent axiom can be defended insofar as the claims of its adherent can be harmonious, although we should not say we know said axiom by means of this or any other such defense. 

In other words, I agree with his denial around minute 13 of any attempt to circularly justify a knowledge-claim. I (and Clark) reject traditional coherentism, since it would be impossible to discriminate between circles without a foundational principle (like John Frame's foundational principle about the different between "narrow" and "broad" circles at minute 14; how could Frame say one is better than the other without assuming axiomatically that there is a difference in desirability?). 

As an aside, it's a bit funny that if Van Tilians defend traditional coherentism, then Clark's presuppositionalism is somehow "deviant." One would think that the very name of "presupposition"alism would more closely associate with foundationalism, not coherentism. 

Anyways, the point is that apologetic defenses of axioms/foundations are practical and persuasive, not epistemic. I put it this way in a post I have elsewhere said (link) I am planning to write in response to an article by Dan Kemp (link), whom David cites at minute 14:40:

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

Apologetics or defenses of our axioms can be useful in terms of being means by which the Spirit convicts the hearts of others without thereby becoming premises or reasons by which we somehow circularly know the axioms/foundations. Indeed, our methods for apologetic defenses ought themselves to be derivable from our axiom/foundation (e.g. 1 Peter 3, Acts 17, etc.). 

One final point. A phrase that David cites which caught my eye is "rationally dubitable." If David is talking about principles that are open to rational doubt and whether these can be defended in the face of a skeptic, he seems to suggest that if the answer is no, there is a problem. But if I am understanding him correctly, I don't see the problem? If something is "open to doubt" (dubitable), of course it is possible a skeptic is going to doubt it. In fact, some skeptics will even claim to doubt even those things which are indubitable, such as the revelation or promises of God. Just because we can't prove to the skeptic that God's word is God's word (or would David claim to be able to do this?) does not mean there is a problem - nor does it mean that our axiom/foundation is "rationally dubitable" after all. On this point, the problem with the skeptic is ethical. He refuses to submit to the self-justifying truth of God's word. 

Maybe I am misunderstanding what David means by a "defense" - or maybe I am misunderstanding something else But this is why it is important to provide some nuance to statements and quotes of other authors. Instead, David skips quickly to the claim that he sees no other way forward than to vindicate deduction and induction. That is much too fast a conclusion. If it isn't a non sequitur, then at the very least, I couldn't follow his reasoning. 

At around 18:30, David distinguishes between "self-justifying" beliefs and "immediately justified" beliefs. He thinks the former implies justificatory circularity (traditional coherentism) and the latter implies foundationalism. I disagree with his definitions, and so do contemporary epistemologists - see here, where Jeremy Fantl refers to "self-justifying" reasons or beliefs in the context of foundationalism. But to be clear, I also reject justificatory circularity. 

I've read Fumerton's work. I actually quite like him. I gave a former student his introductory book on epistemology. At the same time, I don't agree with everything Fumerton says (link). And I suspect that the idea of "direct acquaintance" (which David gets from Fumerton) might be another area of disagreement. He says: 

Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so... Direct acquaintance is not itself a belief but it relates a subject to a fact in such a way that the subject is aware of the correspondence between his thought and the fact that makes it true. 

Notice what is being argued: justification for beliefs depends on "acquaintance." But "acquaintance" is not itself a belief. Well, if "acquaintance" is not a belief, can "acquaintance" be a truth-bearer? If it can't, then how is it that "acquaintance" can "ensure" the justification of beliefs? Can that which does not bear a truth-value function as a justification for that which does? 

In other words, what does it even mean to say that direct acquaintance can "ensure" justification? That sounds suspiciously like saying that acquaintance is itself a logically distinct and preceding justificatory condition for one's belief(s) - a reason. But this would undermine the David's claim to be a foundationalist. 

Relatedly, a topic in contemporary epistemology is how something without that is neither true nor false - say, a sensory experience qua experience - could function as a justification for the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]. This seems to be a directly relevant question, for David goes on to say: "...one can be immediately justified through direct perceptual awareness..." 

Notice the word "perceptual" (and see his headache example at minute 21 and his direct reference to sensation at 21:30). Recall every Clarkian argument against empirical knowledge (link). He even admits that one's sensations may not correspond to external states of affairs (but attempts to suggest that our beliefs regarding our private experiences are not open to question - this move doesn't work insofar as David later admits to holding to fallibilism, contrary to his above statement that direct acquaintance can ensure "infallible" justification, on which see below). 

In short, his reply to possible objections at minute 22 is dismissive and avoidant. He responds to an easy objection while failing to address more difficult ones (how is "direct acquaintance" able to function as justification). This is a meta-epistemic concern, but meta-epistemology has direct relevance to normative epistemology. Analogously, infinitism is a meta-epistemic position on the structure of epistemic justification. If infinitism is inherently problematic, an infinitist does not actually know anything by the structure he claims is correct. If "direct acquaintance" is inherently problematic, a direct acquantaincist does not actually know anything by "direct acquaintance" (so-called).

This gets a little deep, but here is another question David fails to entertain: while I agree that there is a correspondence between truths and other realities - I reject the idea that everything is metaphysically reducible to [sets of] propositions - does that mean non-propositional realities (like my body) are truth-makers (like propositions about my body)? 

As a Reformed Christian, I rather think that God is the truth-maker of all propositions. In particular, it is He who determined the truth-values of contingent propositions in accordance with His eternal decree. As such, it's possible that the truths God has eternally decreed may, in some way, actually be means by which non-propositions (like my body, which is not eternal) are made. For a probably clearer idea of what I'm getting at, read this article by Clark in which he writes: "when compared with verses in the Pentateuch the words strongly suggest that the visible world came from a suprasensible, ideal world."

Moving ahead to minute 26: "Knowledge does not require certainty." Three questions: 

1) Is David certain of this? If not, wouldn't such an admission be problematic in the possible case that certainty actually is required for one's beliefs to count as knowledge (a possibility which I don't understand how he could rule out non-arbitrarily)? 

2) I thought that David earlier said, "Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so..." What happened? When is and is not infallibility applicable to one's beliefs? 

3) If knowledge does not require certainty, then what does it mean to say that any beliefs are "justified"? 

Around 30:30, David shows the three potential responses to Aristotle's transcendental argument for the laws of logic. They are ones I've encountered and thought about before. In response, I will offer three counters: 

1. David basically says that "Aristotle might be right that one must think in accordance with the laws of logic, but that this doesn't establish anything is true." In response, two questions: 1) What is the David's alethiology (theory of truth)? Perhaps one's alethiology (which might entail consistency amongst true propositions) would entail that in accordance with said theory, the laws of logic cannot be false. He somewhat gets around to this at minute 37. 2) If David acknowledges that one cannot speak without first assuming the laws of logic, then his own response admittedly presupposes the laws of logic. But in that case, is it legitimate to use that which he might purport to reject? Is it legitimate to admit that a hilltop (truth) can only be reached by climbing a ladder (the laws of logic) and then from said hilltop deny that he ever used a ladder? Ironically, in another video David makes against presuppositionalists, he cites a "magic 8-ball" illustration that it seems he himself falls prey to here. 

2. David's response to Aristotle certainly isn't a persuasive response. But that's how I interpret a correctly oriented defense of the laws of logic in the first place: again, a defense or apologetic needn't be interpreted as a circular justification. 

3. David's reference to dialetheism returns us to the question of alethiology. This is probably the strongest counter he raises (then again, he addresses his own concerns by providing a very good quote at 38:55 which undercuts dialetheim). I needn't say much more, since David denies dialetheism himself (44:45ff.).

Nevertheless, I will offer a few more thoughts. In particular, are there some cases in which the law of noncontradiction do not hold? Typically, a dialetheist will not be a trivialist; he will not suggest that every pair of contradictories can be or are true (which is subject to the principle of explosion). 

Underlying this theory, then, seems the assumption of alethic particularism: rather than start with a broad, theory of truth (e.g. consistency among propositions which may correspond to kinds of realities), we might start with what we consider are intuitive and particular examples of truths - some of which might consist of contradictories which can both be "true" - and attempt to form a resultant theory of truth (such as dialetheism) with these examples in mind. 

While I would like to flesh an argument against dialetheism further than I am able at present, given the above, one possible line of argument against it and its implicit alethic particularism could perhaps be made along the same lines as I have made against epistemic particularism (in isolation from epistemic methodism) here.  

This is probably a more important point than I can emphasize here, for repeatedly in the video, David often uses paradigm cases to defend his position. For example, at minute 36:10, he uses an particular example that he assumes his audience will agree is justified to defend a broader methodological principle. That is, in appealing to his audience's intuitions, he appears to be a particularist, and if he is not, he does not sufficiently distance himself from particularism; a quote around minute 52 might obliquely allude to it, but even there, not enough context in the quote is provided to even understand its purpose. 

With the above in mind, can logic justify logic? No. Again, circularity is not the structure of epistemic justification. In other words, we do not know anything by reasoning in a circle. As I've mentioned before, though, we can still make arguments for propositions we know non-inferentially or foundationally. These arguments do not justify said foundations but can function to persuade others [especially that alternatives to our view are non-viable]. 

The laws of logic in particular are embedded within the Scripturalist's foundation as a subsidiary, ontological precondition for knowledge, as I argue here and here. Thus, our knowing them is, in conjunction with our knowledge of God's revelation, immediate or non-inferential.  

I don't have much further to say about his discussion on analyticity, except to note that he doesn't think he needs to explain how we have them "so long as we do" (minute 26:30). Well, does he have concepts? If the answer is potentially "no," that is a serious problem. 

But as I said in an earlier post, God's word is not rationally dubitable. The problem the skeptic has is one of ethical rebellion (which affects his ability to reason soundly, not his ability to reason validly per se a la Clark). 

David's part of the video on induction was extremely weak. He did not address the question of what number of observable cases would suffice for epistemic justification. He does not address what constitutes a "large sample." The concept of "large" is finite and therefore relative. As one might approach infinitely many observations, any concrete number of observations is infinitesimally small by comparison... in which case, is not an inductivist's epistemic justification (and "confidence" therein) virtually (as well as really) non-existent? This is a much more difficult issue than David intimates. 

In my opinion, the best one can expect on this topic is doxastic defendability. A Scripturalist (and only a Scripturalist, insofar as any kind of "defenses" are parasitic upon internalist and infallibilist "knowledge") might be able to defend his extra-Scriptural beliefs to the extent that they conform to his alleged experiences (this would be inductive), but he must also be open to revising such beliefs in the case of alleged defeaters, e.g. experiences which do not conform to what he has experienced previously. This theory only would apply to extra-Scriptural information, and it would not qualify as strict epistemic justification (although we might also colloquially refer to any such beliefs as "known"). 

Another reason the response to the problem of induction was weak was because David only went so far as to address Hume's skepticism. Clark's concerns regarding induction - as an anti-empiricist - deserved more attention than Hume's. 

My friend mentioned that he thought David is an evidentialist. In his last part of the video, I can see why: he says as much. In particular, at 1:00:50, he cites an author who says, "the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief." Again, I am confused how such a view can be consistent with foundationalism. If foundations do not rely on evidence, then one's justification for one's foundational beliefs cannot fall within the realm of an evidentialist theory. David appears plainly inconsistent on several points. 

David concludes, "...the Christian [presuppositional] apologist tries to gerrymander the rules of epistemology..." 

I had a good chuckle at this! Still, I enjoyed the video insofar as I'm glad to see professed Christians engaging in contemporary epistemological issues. I agreed with him regarding foundationalism, the resolvability of paradoxes, and some other points. I wouldn't want my above responses to be taken as suggesting his videos are valueless, only that, as with anyone (Clark and myself included), one must wisely apply discrimination where appropriate.