Normative Authority and Eastern Orthodoxy: A Quandary

A while ago, I wrote a post containing (among other things) a reply to what might be called the "normative authority argument" commonly referenced by Eastern Orthodox apologists against Protestants. What is this argument? For example, from EO apologist Alex Sorin:

You are confusing (1) our critique of you lacking any binding, judicial authorities that have a final say in matters of scriptural interpretation, with (2) epistemic certainty.

In Orthodoxy, some things we are bound to believe, because the Church said so in ecumenical council—similar to the Supreme Court. These things are final. (link)

As I understand it, the EO argument basically runs as follows: on Protestantism, an individual is his own normative authority; but it is not true that an individual is his own normative authority; therefore, Protestantism is false. Said another way, the EO apologist alleges, "contrary to Protestantism, we don't bind our own consciences."

Steve Hays rebutted this a long time ago, and despite what EO apologists such as Perry Robinson would like one to believe (link), Hays' points have received no substantial response. I think I augmented Hays' response in the first link at the beginning of this post, and in what follows, I'll attempt to turn the tables on EO apologists.

A few years ago, I transcribed all of Roman Catholic scholar Richard Price's youtube lectures (link). That project provided an all-too-brief summary of some of content I am about to mention and inspired me to take the past few years to read (among other historical documents) the following translations of the acts or documents related to various councils:

Documents of the Early ‘Arian’ Controversy and the Council of Nicaea 

The Council of Ephesus 431 

The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon 

The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 

The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649 

The Canons of the Quinisext Council 691/692 

The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787) 

The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 869-870 

The Acts of the Eight Œcumenical Council [The Council of Constantinople 879-880] 

The Synods of Constantinople 1166 and 1170 AD

Gregory Palamas - [The Council(s) of Constantinople 1341-1368] 

Not all of the councils I mention above are regarded by EOs as ecumenical, binding, and/or infallible. For example, some EOs regard Constantinople 879-880 as the eighth ecumenical council, as indicated by the title of one of the books above. The book was produced by an EO publishing press and includes contributions from EO apologist Craig Truglia (who himself argues that there are more than seven ecumenical councils here). 

[Side note: I quite enjoyed the following from Eastern Orthodox scholar Constantine Siamakis (pg. 39 of The Acts of the Eight Œcumenical Council): 

In the Church, only the books of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures are accepted as divinely inspired and above all criticism on the part of the Christians. Other writings were written as human books and are so considered. For this reason, they are subject to Christian judgment and evaluation. This distinction had not been clarified until the ninth century. Photius was the first to make this distinction insightfully but reverently, which he articulates primarily in his letter to John, the metropolitan of Aquileia.

What a sharp contrast to what all of the aforementioned EO apologists think, and written in an EO publication on what some of these very EO apologists consider to be an "ecumenical council," no less!]

On the other hand, at a recent EO conference, bishop Maksim Vasiljević mentioned "that the Palamite councils" (Constantinople 1341-1368) "don't mention the Photian council" (Constantinople 879-880) "as ecumenical, which now creates a sort of discrepancy or discontinuity." Why does a lack of mention matter? Because, as bishop Vasiljevic says, "It was only at ecumenical councils that previous [councils] would be affirmed or not as ecumenical" (link).

That is, if the Palamite councils are ecumenical, why didn't they list the Photian council as ecumenical (along with the seven they do mention) from the first millennium? Was it not "received"? The bishop makes an historical concession amidst an equally honest appraisal of the Council of Crete, about which I wrote in my last post.

My last post on this subject also stated that EO apologists like Robinson sometimes contradict themselves on whether a single council is binding or infallible (see my comments on the Council of Jerusalem 1672 and Confession of Dositheus, the latter of which was ratified at said council). I followed that up with an a few difficulties that EOs face no matter depending on answer they give, including a critique of EO reception theory. 

[Side note: a link that is now broken - which is a shame (and strange timing, as I recommended it on X just 2 weeks ago) - demonstrated that Dositheus' confession, ratified in the 1672 Council of Jerusalem, "without using the term, contains the doctrine of purgatory." Yet in 1690, Dositheus "recanted" his position on the intermediate state (link). Why is this significant? Because, as EO apologist Craig Truglia notes, the 1672 confession of Dositheus, not the 1690 revision, was received by all patriarchs in the 1723 council of Constantinople (link). Truglia writes:

While the 1690 version in fact received reception from the Moscow Patriarchate, it did not meet the criteria of Pan-Orthodox reception unlike the 1672 version–which was accepted by all jurisdictions in 1723...

In other words, according the EO reception theory, oughtn't the 1672 version of the Confession of Dositheus be binding... despite Dositheus himself retracting his own views? Very weird! Imagine if there were a second letter to Titus in which Paul stated that he made a doctrinal mistake in his first letter to Titus. Without massive cognitive dissonance, could anyone trust the first letter to Titus to have been without fault? I think some arguments against Islam are made along these lines.]

The arguments from my prior post stand, but I want to push further by discussing the ecumenical councils on which all EOs agree.

The EO apologist takes the acts of ecumenical councils to be infallible and binding. Robinson claims in a recent post, "the councils also use the term infallible relative to their judgments" (link). Okay - are these councils binding and infallible in everything they produce? That is, do EO apologists think people are obligated to accept these councils could not have erred in any of the acts they produced? 

If so, scholarship - including EO scholarship (see below) - has found that the acts of these councils contain errors such as false attributions, forgeries, and historical revisions. So what is an EO to do?

The EO could reject consensus scholarship. For example, in the tenth session at the Council of Chalcedon, a letter was produced by opponents of Ibas of Edessa. As EO scholar John Meyendoff writes, "Ibas had written a letter to Maris the Persian, accusing Cyril of Apollinarism" (Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: the church, 450-680 AD, Meyendorff, pg. 178). 

The trouble is not so much that Ibas was rehabilitated during the tenth session of Chalcedon but that in the course of Ibas's rehabilitation, the acts record that bishop Maximus of Antioch said of Ibas that "from the reading of the transcript of the letter produced by his adversary his writing has been seen to be orthodox." Obviously, it's problematic that a letter accusing Cyril of Apollinarism would be said to be that by which the author, Ibas, "has been seen to be orthodox." This caused problems during 6th century discussions between Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians.

Thus, in contrast to current scholarship, the acts of the fifth ecumenical council (Constantinople 553, Session VI) deny that Ibas wrote the letter to Mari: 

The Letter to Mari the Persian was first read out (5), followed by a letter from Proclus of Constantinople to John of Antioch (7), which accused Ibas of so ‘loving the madness of Nestorius’ that he actually admired, translated into Syriac, and circulated certain heretical excerpts (from Theodore of Mopsuestia, though Proclus does not say so) which Proclus had appended to his Tome to the Armenians and circulated for execration (7.3). After this Theodore Ascidas took the floor. He first gave an account of Ibas’ chequered career as bishop of Edessa, omitting the fact that he was reinstated as bishop by the Council of Chalcedon (9.1—5). He then argued that the fathers of Chalcedon, so far from approving the Letter to Mari, only accepted Ibas because he anathematized the letter and denied that he had written it (9.7-15). (Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553)

If this were true, though, why wasn't such a defense mentioned during earlier dialogues with non-Chalcedonians? By all appearances, it is because this defense produced by the fifth ecumenical council was an historical innovation. Keep in mind that the central to the fifth ecumenical council was the "Three Chapters Controversy," and one of the "chapters" was specifically about the letter to Mari, which was anathematized during the proceedings of the council. 

Some EOs, then - feeling the sting of the suggestion that the fifth ecumenical council could get something so foundational to its purpose for meeting so wrong - deny the prevailing scholarship (e.g. Truglia). But frankly, these EOs have no good reply to the point that the only letter "produced by his [Ibas's] adversary" at Chalcedon was the letter to Mari. So what bullet does the EO apologist bite?

That is, the letter to Mari is worthy of condemnation, to be sure. There is no disagreement about that. Rather, the point is that the suggestion that Ibas didn't write this letter strains historical credulity - and this really is an understatement. Above, I haven't merely appealed to scholarship. But the consensus does exist for a reason. 

Yet to accept that Ibas actually wrote that letter comes at a double cost - it means that the acts of the fourth ecumenical council rehabilitated a man and pronounced his orthodoxy in virtue of an unorthodox letter he wrote, and it means the acts of the fifth ecumenical council would be, as Truglia concedes (ex hypothesi), historically revisionist.

So much for the letter of Ibas. Let's return to the question, "do EO apologists think people are obligated to accept these councils could not have erred in any of the acts they produce?" Here is a recent conversation I had on X with EO apologist Alex Sorin and a few of his followers (link). 

Sorin's original comment is a complaint regarding Protestants who fail to respond to the EO apologetic for "normative authority." His idea is that any time a Protestant responds to the EO by questioning the infallibility or fallibility of the authority in question, the Protestant has failed to discern that the real EO criticism is whether Protestants have an authority (outside oneself) which can bind one's conscience (on which, again refer to my links - towards the beginning of this post - by Steve Hays and myself). Thus, Sorin writes:

Sorin: You guys confuse personal epistemic certainty with judicial authority almost every single time without fail. I’m not talking about your personal confidence in the fallibility or infallibility of any dispute-resolution body. Now, totally independent from this issue of certainty is this idea that there is a class of judicial officers with authority from Christ to decide matters of interpretation and application of the scriptures. That is what I’m talking about. I’m not sure how else to get through to you guys that these are different categories. I’m starting to think it might just be a comprehension issue.

Sorin is responding to a Protestant interlocutor. Here is where I enter:

Me: If your conscience is bound with respect to conciliar statements that are false - and even EOs like Truglia agree not everything in the acts of ecumenical councils is true - you can keep your supreme court.

If not, it begs the question why the whole of the acts aren't binding.

Here, I am driving at whether Sorin is willing to defend that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding. If he is willing to argue that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding, then I will argue that Sorin's apologetic ought to be rejected on the grounds that ecumenical councils make false statements (cf. the letter of Ibas above; see below for further examples). Sorin, recognizing that the acts of the ecumenical councils contain falsities, tries a different defense:

Sorin: Just like a Supreme Court opinion, it’s the holding of the Council that’s binding—not dicta. 

Me: Who gets to decide what is dicta?

This is where Sorin tapped out of the conversation, rolling his eyes at my question - a sort of implicit argument from incredulity, I suppose. Being charitable, I guess Sorin (who is a lawyer) can't believe that anyone would have trouble discerning what are statements made by ecumenical councils "in passing." 

But is the orthodoxy of the letter of Ibas dicta? The fifth ecumenical council doesn't seem to have thought so, or it wouldn't have bothered addressing the matter. So does Sorin, like Truglia, reject scholarly consensus on who wrote the letter to Mari? At any rate, my response to Sorin highlights the hypocrisy of the EO argument from "normative authority." I continued:

Me: So, no response? If you're judging what is and isn't dicta - you're judging what statements made by a council you will accept or reject - you're in no obviously different position than a Protestant. 

Since, by this point, Sorin decided to discontinue the conversions, a few other EOs jumped in:  

Sorin follower #1: Which law school did you graduate from? Just curious.

Sorin follower #2: Well since he doesn't understand what dicta is probably no law school.

Me: Cute. Now, who decides which statements are dicta? The dissenters of Constantinople 1351 would have appreciated it if they didn't have to embrace all "the Acts of the ecumenical councils."

Here, I am alluding to the following statement from the EO pan-orthodox Council of Constantinople 1351, in which the opponents of Palamas did not want to hear the acts of the sixth ecumenical council. See here:

12. In what the dissenters said, they were not only continuing to fight against the saints individually, but already were attempting to overthrow and dissolve the holy sixth ecumenical council itself. That council had no other purpose; its whole subject concerned the two natural wills and the two natural energies in our Lord Jesus Christ. Because of this it was necessary to bring in the Acts of the council and to read them, and from these to proclaim the true faith; so they were set out in the midst. But as soon as they were brought forth the dissenters at once cried out, “Not the Acts of the council, but read the definition only.” But while the divine synod was uncertain what this outcry meant, and why they rejected and did not accept the Acts, those men still did not depart in any degree from the same futile evil opinion and their twisted attitude, not at all accepting the reading of the Acts.

At this, by the glorious command of our most clement emperor, a passage was read from the Synodikon which is customarily read on the ambo on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, which word for word is this: “On those who reject the words of the holy fathers, which were expressed at the confirmation of the correct doctrine of the Church of God, of Athanasius, Cyril, Ambrose, Amphilochius who spoke God’s words, Leo the most holy bishop of the elder Rome, and the rest, and in addition on those who did not embrace the Acts of the ecumenical councils, the fourth, that is, and the sixth, anathema.”

Notice, then, that Sorin's earlier attempt to establish non-binding "dicta" of ecumenical councils already is in tension with Constantinople 1341-1368. Are EOs prepared to admit these Palamite councils were neither binding nor infallible? Were they not received? How would such a view affect the dogmatic status of Palamas' essence-energies distinction? 

At any rate, the conversation with one of Sorin's followers continued and concluded:

Sorin follower #1: The consensus of US law decides.

Me: And the consensus of Constantinople 1351 was that the dissenters had to accept the acts of the ecumenical councils on pain of anathema. But the acts contain errors. So do you follow your authority here? Do you dismiss that anathema as dicta? Or what?

Sorin follower #1: Well dicta is a term in U.S. law. There is no 1 for 1 equivalent. Not every analogy is perfect. And what errors are you talking about? Can you steelman Orthodox ecclesiology?

Me: E.g. the 6th EC's judgment monothelites forged monoenergist statements in the acts of the 5th EC. The very integrity of acts are at stake.

Even this gets away from the apologetic reversal: does the individual EO decide which statements by his authorities (ECs) can be dismissed?

X has a limited number of characters, so to clarify the first half of my final comment, in the sixth ecumenical council, the following points by Richard Price in his book on The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 explain the trouble:

In its Session III of 13 November 680 a copy of the acts of 553 was read out and found to contain three monenergist or monothelete documents: inserted at the very beginning of the acts was a document entitled ‘A discourse by the sainted Archbishop Menas of Constantinople addressed to the most blessed Pope Vigilius of Rome on Christ’s possession of a single will’, while the acts of Session VII of 553 were found to contain two declarations of faith by Vigilius, one addressed to Justinian and the other to his consort Theodora, which professed belief that 'Christ is one hypostasis and one person and one operation'. The manuscript was immediately examined by the emperor Constantine IV (chairing the council), his officials and the bishops, who found that the discourse of Menas came on pages that had simply been stuck into the manuscript; it was agreed that a fuller examination of the latter would be carried out at an appropriate time. This further examination did not take place till Session XIV of 6 April 681, when it was found that the two declarations by Vigilius were likewise crude insertions into the manuscript read out in Session III; it was also revealed that on a scroll containing the acts solely of Session VII of 553 the offending additions to the text had been ‘written crosswise’ — that is, they were an addition written at right angles to the original text, presumably in the margin. As additional evidence of the spuriousness of all three inserted documents, a number of additional manuscripts were now produced that contained none of them.

What are we to make of all this? The discourse by Menas, whether genuine or a forgery,’ had no proper place in the acts of 553. But the evidence that the two declarations by Vigilius had likewise been clumsily stuck into the manuscript is more suspect: if this were so, why was the examination of the manuscript delayed for five months? It looks as if the evidence needed time to be concocted — by the simple device, it appears, of replacing a copy of the first edition, where the two declarations were integral parts of the text, by a copy of the second edition in which the two letters were indeed late insertions. And in fact, course, the two declarations were not spurious: they come in the first edition of the acts of 553 as preserved in our best Latin manuscript. On the other hand, the additions ‘written crosswise’ on the scroll must have been brief ones, which suggests that in this manuscript the two declarations were part of the original text but with the offending words ‘and one operation’ not in the main body of the text but in marginal annotation. But even if in this manuscript the phrase was an addition, this does not prove that it was absent from Vigilius’ original text, since a merely incidental use of monenergist language is perfectly credible in the mid-sixth century. The manuscripts that did not contain any of the offensive documents prove nothing, of course: they were clearly copies of the expurgated second edition discussed above. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the text produced and read out in November 680 was an authentic copy of the now lost first Greek edition of the acts of 553, in which, however, a monenergist-monothelete profession attributed to Menas had been inserted. That there was delay before evidence could be produced to ‘prove’ the monenergist version of Vigilius’ declarations a forgery, plus the preservation of this version independently in the extant Latin manuscript of the first edition, and also the confusion over whether the evidence was supposed to prove total forgery or simply interpolation, all suggests that Vigilius’ assertion of ‘one operation’ was original and authentic.

The sixth ecumenical council, which affirmed dyoenergism, had to deal with the question of why monoenergist affirmations by pope Vigilius (a key figure in the fifth ecumenical council) were contained in the acts of the fifth ecumenical council. As the fifth ecumenical council revised history on what happened at the fourth ecumenical council regarding Ibas, so, too, the sixth ecumenical council, according to Price, appears to have revised history regarding what the acts of the fifth ecumenical council originally contained.

It won't do to suggest that ecumenical councils are only infallible with respect to doctrinal matters. Firstly, monoenergism/dyoenergism is a doctrinal matter. 

Secondly, the idea that the members of these councils believed one could dismiss their historical arguments as untruths is itself historical revisionism, and one who so subverts said councils cannot consistently consider them to be normatively authoritative. The integrity of the acts of the fifth ecumenical council obviously mattered a great deal to those at the sixth ecumenical council (whether or not one agrees with the conclusions of the latter regarding Vigilius's remarks). 

Finally, EO introduction of "dicta" into this conversation recalls to mind Gordon Clark's point about the importance of the scope of infallibility for that which one takes to be foundationally authoritative:

After a few more slightly irrelevant questions, Dr. Foreman asks, “Is it necessary for the Bible’s geography to be above reproach before I can put my trust in the God of the Bible?” The series of irrelevant questions with their plausible negative answers has supposedly conditioned the reader to continue with a negative here also. But if the question is examined a little, the negative is not so plausible. If the Bible is mistaken on geography, which ought to have been easy for the writers to put down correctly, it might very well be mistaken on theology, which is much more difficult than geography. To this question an affirmative answer is at least as plausible as the negative answer was to the first question...

Indeed, we wish to ask these men what authority the Bible can have, if it is not true. The Neo-orthodox, or whatever name best suits them, talk a good deal about the Bible and its authority. But they are not at all clear as to why we should believe, submit to, or honor a book that is marred with discrepancies and errors. Karl Barth, it will be remembered, attributes to the Bible not only geographical mistakes and number mysticism, but errors in theology. But if a doctrine is false, why should it be authoritatively preached? The logic of such a position is more than puzzling...

Everywhere the Bible speaks of itself, it teaches verbal inspiration. The words are the words of God. It is nowhere said that the words contain geographical discrepancies and theological errors. No examination of the text itself can produce evidence that the words are not inspired. If we take our belief about the Bible from what the Bible say s about itself, we must conclude that the words are the words of God who cannot lie. (Clark, Holy Scripture, 1963)

Now replace "Neo-Orthodox," "Bible," and "book" with "Eastern Orthodox," "ecumenical councils," and "acts" in the second paragraph. See the problem?

Sadly, some EOs who concede that ecumenical councils taught historical falsehoods seem open to rejecting the infallibility of Scripture with respect to historical matters (link):

[minute 56:12] I'm going to give my personal opinion about something, which is that councils can make historical mistakes. Because I don't think councils are given a guarantee from the Holy Spirit they'll be preserved from making historical and scientific errors. So let me unpack this opinion of mine - and again, it's just an opinion. I have no authority in the church to bind anyone to this opinion. 

But in John chapter 17, Christ guarantees the apostles that can be led into all truth. But we see in the epistle of Jude, saint Jude speaks of the faith delivered once for all to the saints. And so the whole truth that the Holy Spirit guides the apostles into is the deposit - the apostolic deposit - of faith, which is the the beliefs, the morals, the disciplines of the church, right? How the church operates, what we believe. That is what's preserved. 

The historical evaluation of Jude of Enoch as Scripture, for example - and not to get all cope, "Oh, he never says 'the Scripture sayith,'" he appears to treat the book Enoch as Scripture. We don't think that because the Scriptures might have made a historical error with the Book of Enoch that the Scriptures don't have some sort of authority. 

Now this doesn't open up, for example, the book of Genesis and to allow for evolution or something like that. But the point is, even saint Maximus says, the Scriptures sometimes have deliberate historical errors, and the point is for us to look further and to look for figurative meanings and things like this. So the point is, if we don't even believe the saints, don't believe the scriptures themselves are in all respects preserved some historical error, I don't see the basis to apply that to councils.

It makes no difference to me that Truglia qualifies the above as his personal opinion. I find it not at all surprising that Truglia's openness to a lower estimation of Scripture would correspond to his hedged view of ecumenical councils. It strikes me as a sort of pre-emptive, apologetic tu quoque: "Sure, Protestant, ecumenical councils contain historical errors; but Scripture contains these kinds of errors too!" 

Would Truglia think the way he does about Scripture had he not already been forced to concede the fallibility of ecumenical councils? On that note, his contention about Enoch is weak. A text can reliably speak to what a prophet prophesied without itself being God-breathed.

Finally, is Maximus infallible? More to the point, this reference was an odd one anyways, since surely Truglia wouldn't admit that the many historical errors of ecumenical councils were deliberate? For example, in the acts of Nicaea II (what EOs consider to be the seventh ecumenical council), Severian of Gabala is repeatedly miscited as John Chrysostom. What makes this historical error especially embarrassing is that Severian of Gabala persecuted John Chrysostom. Certainly, this wasn't deliberate! Because of this, even some EOs who agree with icon veneration admit:

The issue becomes more significant, however, for those who hold an extremely strong view of conciliar inspiration or infallibility. The bishops at Nicaea appear to have acted sincerely and in good faith. They were trusting the manuscript traditions available to them. But the fact remains: the quotations were misattributed. The bishops believed they were appealing to the authority of St. John Chrysostom when in reality they were citing the writings of Severian of Gabala. (link)

In short, here is the quandary: according to the very "normative authorities" (ecumenical councils) EO apologists cite as providing some sort of advantage against Protestants (i.e. Protestants, unlike EOs, are like "sovereign citizens" without a "Supreme Court"), these same EO apologists must accept the acts - not merely the definitions - of ecumenical councils. What are the main options? The acts of ecumenical councils are: 

1. All true and all binding. This cuts against scholarship and historical evidence. I don't want to hear any EOs who take this route talk about being "deep in history."

2. Sometimes true, but in every respect binding. Do any EO apologists really think that our conscience's are bound to accept falsehoods? If so, then as I said in my reply to Sorin, "you can keep your supreme court." It would be so much the worse for their apologetic, for as Steve Hays said, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right." 

3. Sometimes true, and sometimes binding. This begs the question: in what way does the EO avoid private judgment? Isn't it the individual EO who judges what to accept or reject in acts of ecumenical councils? But that is no different than the Protestant position, so the "sovereign citizen" pejorative ricochets against EOs.

WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.

Church History and Presuppositions: Dioscorus and Oriental Orthodoxy

In a post last year, I noted that works of history involve presuppositions (link). History is not methodologically neutral. So, too, it is with those who read church history. So, too, it is with this post. 

This does not lead to skepticism, however. Truth is objective. When two people agree about what is historically true, it becomes easier to compare and evaluate their presuppositions at points of disagreement.

When I read church history, I don't expect to see pristine models of perfection. Why? Because I accept the doctrines of total depravity and progressive sanctification. Professing Christians can be nominal Christians, and true Christians battle sin (Romans 7-8, Galatians 2, 1 John 2). While we can commend the faith of those who've gone before us (Hebrews 11), Christ is our model of perfection, and it is in His image Christians are conformed. This presupposition dovetails with sola scriptura, for it is what Scripture itself teaches.

Contrast this to the presuppositions of those whose traditions align with solo ecclesia (link). Because adherents of this sort of tradition - e.g. Oriental Orthodoxy, Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism - tend to create lists of venerable "saints" from church history which are discordant with lists of other traditions, adherents are incentivized to be zealous for the sake of sinful men rather than God. Solo ecclesia entails a distorted anthropology.  

One example of this can be seen in a recent dialogue I had with an Oriental Orthodox believer (link) who attempted to defend the actions of Dioscorus at the council of Ephesus II (otherwise known as Ephesus 449). Dioscorus is regarded as a saint in Oriental Orthodoxy. 

I pointed out that on Oriental Orthodoxy's own presuppositions, Dioscorus seems to have acted wrongly at Ephesus II. In particular, Dioscorus did not follow Apostolic Canon 74 (link):

If any bishop has been accused of anything by men worthy of credit, he must be summoned by the bishops; and if he appears, and confesses, or is convicted, a suitable punishment must be inflicted upon him. But if when he is summoned he does not attend, let him be summoned a second time, two bishops being sent to him, for that purpose. [If even then he will not attend, let him be summoned a third time, two bishops being again sent to him. ] But if even then he shall disregard the summons and not come, let the synod pronounce such sentence against him as appears right, that he may not seem to profit by avoiding judgment.

Maria Constantinou's article, "The Threefold Summons at Late Antique Church Councils," details in what way Dioscorus, who presided over Ephesus II, subverted this canon (link):

It is fortunate that the details of the parallel ecclesiastical threefold summons procedure and the way it evolved can be deciphered from the copious pertinent evidence from conciliar acts of the fifth and sixth centuries. The fact that detailed accounts of threefold summonses are a substantial and extensive part of conciliar proceedings and the minutes thereof does not come as a surprise, since the validity of a trial in absence depended upon the attestation of the orderly conduct of the summons...

A trial in absentia without three summonses was considered illegal, since the accused had to be given the opportunity to defend himself. It is indicative that the condemnations at the Second Council at Ephesus 449, almost all of which were imposed on absentees and uninvited, were unanimously declared void at the first session of the Council of Chalcedon; see, for instance, the bishops’ request to annul the deposition of Ibas of Edessa at the tenth session of Chalcedon: κακῶς ἐποίησαν οἱ παρὰ τοὺς κανόνας κατακρίναντες αὐτόν. τὰ κατὰ ἀπόντος γενόμενα ἀργείτω. ταῦτα πάντες λέγομεν· οὐδεὶς ἀπόντα κατακρίνει: Those who condemned him contrary to the canons did so wrongly. The proceedings against an absentee should be annulled. We all say this: nobody condemns someone in his absence, ACO II.1.3 § 5 p. 17 lin. 16–18; cf. also the verdict regarding Ibas’ reinstatement pronounced by Francion of Philippopolis and Basil of Trajanopolis: τὸν ἐν τῆι κρίσει μὴ παρόντα, ἀλλὰ μήτε προσκληθέντα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον βλάπτεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξενεχθείσης κατ’ αὐτοῦ ψήφου δοκιμάζομεν: Since he was not present at the trial and was not even summoned, we decide that he should in no way be wronged by the sentence passed against him, ACO II.1.3 § 175 p. 41 lin. 31 to p. 42 lin. 2; cf. Steinwenter, Kirchlicher Rechtsgang (fn. 4) 66–67; Troianos (fn. 4) 78 with n. 49...

ACO II.1.2 § 5 p. 9 lin. 16–19. Eusebius emphasised that he and Flavian were deposed at Ephesus II without being summoned to defend themselves.

Likewise does Richard Price speak of Ephesus II and Dioscorus in his The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. I (pg. 34):

None of those accused and condemned was present to defend himself – a breach of due process that was one of several reasons why this council ultimately acquired its distasteful reputation… 

Theodoret had been barred from the council by imperial decree (Chalcedon, I. 24) and Ibas was actually imprisoned (Chalcedon, X. 1). Although Domnus was in town, pleading absence due to illness, the synod made no attempt to give him any notification that he was to be put on trial – let alone the canonical three summonses – before proceeding with his case. None of the other bishops dealt with at the second session appears to have been present.

In short, Dioscorus acted uncanonically and against his own presuppositions. This is a problem for Oriental Orthodoxy. The problem is not merely that someone who is regarded as a saint did something bad - rather, it's that also Oriental Orthodoxy holds Ephesus II rather than Chalcedon (the latter of which condemned Dioscorus and revoked decisions made at Ephesus II) to be "ecumenical." If decisions made at Ephesus II were uncanonical (which, the Oriental Orthodox must admit, entails immorality), that must in turn affect Oriental Orthodoxy's theology of "ecumenical" councils and jeopardize its underlying presupposition of solo ecclesia. 

The Oriental Orthodox believer with whom I spoke attempted to undercut my argument in four different ways:

1) He argued that Chalcedon also acted uncanonically.

2) He argued that Ephesus II was accepted by the emperor at the time.

3) The Apostolic Canons only apply to Christians.

4) Ephesus II had good reasons for their charges against those they accused.

The first counter is a tu quoque fallacy. He appears to have assumed that I was an Eastern Orthodox believer. His reasoning was that if I take it that Oriental Orthodoxy has a problem in dealing with Ephesus II, I would similarly have a problem in dealing with Chalcedon. Firstly, that wouldn't discharge the burden he bears regarding Ephesus II; secondly, because I am not Eastern Orthodox, even if I did admit that Chalcedon acted uncanonically, there is no issue. On the contrary, errors and immorality in church history are to be expected (WCF 31.4). As an aside, though, Chalcedon did follow Apostolic Canon 74 before ratifying the deposition of Dioscorus (Price, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. II, pgs. 69ff.).

The second response is irrelevant. If churchmen can make mistakes, so can an emperor. Even Dioscorus tries to blame the emperor instead of owning his own mistakes (see below). It might also be pointed out that when the emperor who accepted Ephesus II (Theodosius II) died and the new emperor called and then accepted Chalcedon, does that therefore obligate Oriental Orthodoxy to accept Chalcedon? Obviously, Oriental Orthodox believers say no. Further, how does Oriental Orthodoxy view the decision of Theodosius II to depose Cyril of Alexandria for a time at Ephesus I (i.e. Ephesus 431)? Did that deposition put in question the ecumenicity of Ephesus I? From conversations I've had, this is not the perspective of the Oriental Orthodox. In fact, I've been told by notable Oriental Orthodox apologist Daniel Kakish that 1) Ephesus I "could have been been considered ecumenical" even during the time Theodosius II deposed Cyril and, therefore, 2) imperial policy is "irrelevant as a criterion for ecumenicity. Eventual imperial backing of the determinations of the Cyrillian council is a bonus rather than a necessary condition" (link). 

The third assertion is absurd. Nowhere do the Apostolic Canons say that they only apply to those one regards as Christians. On the contrary: "If any bishop has been accused of anything by men worthy of credit, he must be summoned by the bishops..." The idea that the Apostolic Canons only apply to those whom one regards as a Christian would undermine the very purpose of canon 74. Even Nestorius was summoned three times at Ephesus I. He ignored the summons and was deposed.

Like the second response, the last one is irrelevant. The question is whether Dioscorus and Ephesus II acted canonically, not whether they had good reasons for charging those they accused. Did not those accused have canonical rights which, in the case of Ephesus II, were prevented them? Why were the accused 1) barred from being able to defend themselves or 2) uninformed they were even on trial? When Eusebius confronted Dioscorus about this at Chalcedon, Dioscorus' response to to try to pass the blame:

187. During the reading Eusebius the most devout bishop of Dorylaeum said: ‘When Eutyches, whom I had accused, presented his plaint to the holy council, he mentioned that I was his accuser. I demand an inquiry of how, when the judge Flavian of sacred memory demanded that I as the accuser should appear, as proper procedure and the canons required, I was prevented from doing so.’ 

188. The most glorious officials and the exalted senate said: ‘When Flavian of sacred memory requested the appearance of Eusebius as Eutyches’ accuser, why did you, to whom authority to act as judge had been committed, not give orders for this in accordance with the canons?’ 

189. Dioscorus the most devout bishop of Alexandria said: ‘I ask that the testimony of Helpidius be read. I would not have had the power to prevent it, had not Helpidius brought an instruction in which he certified that the emperor had ordered him [Eusebius] not to appear.’ 

190. Juvenal the most devout bishop of Jerusalem said: ‘It was the admirable count Helpidius who didn’t allow him to appear.’ 

191. Thalassius the most devout bishop of Cappadocian Caesarea said: ‘I was not responsible.’ 

192. The most glorious officials and the exalted senate said: ‘When the faith is being decided, this is no excuse.’

Dioscorus tried to excuse his uncanonical action by blaming emperor Theodosius II for barring Eusebius from appearing at Ephesus II - yes, the same emperor that the Oriental Orthodox believer above appealed to regarding the ecumenicity of Ephesus II is the same emperor to whom Dioscorus attempts to shift blame. Dioscorus is justly reprimanded.

When his responses failed, the Oriental Orthodox believer turned to obscenities (link), at which point I ended the conversation. 

There is an irony in having zeal for sinful men rather than God: a distorted elevation of sinful men will always lead to a distorted degradation of others. A distorted anthropology leads to a distorted understanding of history. Both of these follow from a distorted theology, such as when one fails to uphold solus Christus, sola scriptura, soli Deo gloria, sola fide, and sola gratia. Presuppositions matter, and history confirms the principle that we become like that which we worship (Psalm 115:8, Romans 8:29). Let us take care to avoid idolatry.

Clark's Critics II

This is a post in which I hope to round out some commentary on OPC critics of Gordon Clark. As I said in a recent and similar post (link; here and here are the other posts I've written), I cannot now dedicate time to responding to every such critic. Some men's material is book-length (at minimum). I am satisfied by my present efforts, though, and I look forward either to writing posts on other subjects or, as I really should be doing, returning to my transcription efforts on unpublished works of Clark, which have been slack. Below, I'll be analyzing works by Charles Dennison, Michael Horton, and John Muether.

Charles Dennison

The first critic with whom I'll interact is Charles Dennison, author of History of a Pilgrim People. I'll not repeat Robbins' critiques of this book (link). I recommend link two in paragraph 1 above for more information on the accurate timeline involving the "program of action." 

I'll point out Robbins writes that some things in Dennison's book are "helpful" - as do I - as high praise as I think I've ever heard Robbins say of one who sides with Van Til rather than Clark. Generally, this is a book with quality information. I had to borrow a copy from an OPC friend and take numerous pictures, since no copies were available for below $125. I do hear it is being reprinted, however, which could explain the drop in price of currently available, used copies.

Dennison doesn't downplay the importance of the theological issues and offers some counter-historical claims to Frame's assertion that Van Til and Clark misunderstood each other; later, Muether will as well. He is certainly more measured than the authors mentioned in my last post, although like them (and just as Robbins says), he too nearly always fails to footnote a primary source for his more challenging intimations regarding Clark. 

Thus, there are gaps. For example, Dennison tries to explain how the accusation that Clark was a hyper-Calvinist could have been correct given his OPC cohorts (e.g. Robert Strong, Richard Gray). They apparently "looked past his theological positions" (pg. 134). No evidence or specificity is given for or to any of this.

Most of what Dennison has to say about the 1940s debate is extremely short. Dennison also does not note that Clark not only distinguished God's knowledge and man's knowledge quantitatively but in respect to mode (pg. 133). He mentions Clark's view of the primacy of the intellect as one of the inciting issues and that for Van Til (emphasis mine), "Man's knowledge is like (analogous to) God's knowledge but it is not the same" (pg. 133). I'll discuss these topics later, under a different author, below.

What cannot be missed is that Dennison pictures Clark as a "front man" (his words) for a larger network of OPC churchmen who wished "to bring the church back to an American Presbyterianism of an evangelical stripe" (pgs. 133-134). Now, where the idea of a "front man" comes from, I don't know - it isn't footnoted in any author I've read who has made the claim. I do, however, recommend the following writings by Clark - written around the time of the controversy - so readers can see if they find anything objectionable or anti-Reformed about his position on Christianity and culture: link, link ("The Next War"). 

Dennison's thesis - a negative view of the so-called "evangelical stripe" defended by Clark et al. - depends on his view of Machen (and our relationship to him) being correct: "Because we in the OPC lack a cultural tie, we lack an indigenous American identity and a route to larger appeal. This cross has been difficult first us to bear. So far we have been unwilling to abandon it, possibly because we sensed our relationship to Machen would never be the same if we did" (pg. 7). 

What of North's interpretation of Machen (see my last post)? And are we really going to suggest we should follow Machen in all respects? Dennison doesn't (pg. 13ff.), and North's book shows Machen had his faults. I'm also somewhat skeptical of the idea that OPC churchmen dwell on their "relationship" to Machen concerning this whole question. 

There are a few ways of framing the issue. One is to ask, as Dennison does, are we better off "culturally disenfranchised," without an "establishment identity" (pg. x)? For example, can the church without this identity "better declare God's word? advise foes? manifest a true catholicity? be a servant in the world for the sake of the Savior whose kingdom is not of the world? If it can, we dare not shrink from such a liberation..."? 

Wait - what if it can't? A church can always serve in the ways Dennison describes, but I've noticed a persistent theme in OPC literature on this point: to leave questions about whether cultural engagement is better or not in the hypothetical and to assume the very point at issue. What if our being honest about the horrors of sin that are perpetuated, regulated, or even legislated and enforced in our country enables us to "better declare God's word" et al.? 

If Dennison considers his position a liberation, what would he consider this hypothetical requirement? Or, what is the antonym of liberation? Since I can speak in hypotheticals as easily as Dennison, if the church is, say, supposed to speak (to political representatives, even!) and act on behalf of the oppressed in society, wouldn't it be quite ironic for Dennison to think of the hypothetical requirement I'm presenting as itself oppressive? 

What are the best arguments Dennison has? One is a series of rhetorical questions. From pg. 40: "...in the culture, is [the church] to dominate? Take over? Is she the purveyor of some sort of religious imperialism? Or is she to seek marriage with the culture and become indistinguishable from it?" These hyperboles are quite a far distance, though, from Dennison's original contention that "Simply put, the OPC has no cultural or social agenda" (pg. 7). 

A better argument, I think, would be to bring to the forefront what some OPC theologians have alluded to but not explored deeply when it comes to this topic: eschatology. Dennison notes that it was linked to "the new Westminster apologetic" (pgs. 111ff.) by Buswell, but Dennison too seems to leave the point to others to debate and discover. I'm speaking here of the implicit amillennialism of a number of authors whom I have mentioned have written about or commentated on this topic. I mentioned one framing of the issue earlier, here is another: is this being argued as a part of our denominational identity? 

If so, it needs to be made explicit. Further argumentation would be also needed that amillennialism encourages some kind of ecclesiastic invisibility or silence. Whereas Dennison views his position as liberating, I would think ecclesiastic freedom to speak and act on current, cultural events would be more liberating. The OPC has even seemingly done this prior to the time of Dennison's publication (link).

Muether and Hart do at least make explicit, in Fighting the Good Fight, that "the leaders of the OPC fully embraced the teaching of amillennialism as the view on Christ’s return most consistent with Scripture." Muether and Hart are referring to the Westminster faculty of the time. But I don't find any clear indication that amillennialism was a mark of the OPC's identity. Clark rejected amillennialism as a founding member and leader, although he accepted that "In this world the Christian is a pilgrim and a stranger" (Readings in Ethics, 1931, chapter on Early Christianity). 

It is obviously not in the scope of this post to attempt to answer which eschatological view is more or less true. There is another wrinkle here, however: dispensational premilennarians split from the OPC in 1937. Granted, they left for reasons not exclusive to eschatology, but when they formed the Bible Presbyterian Church, the former OPC members who split off made changes to the Westminster Standards "to reflect the premillennial doctrine held by the founders of the synod" (link).

Clearly, eschatology had some role in the 1937 split. This could be taken to mean the OPC had a distinctive eschatological identity after all, or it could simply mean the OPC by and large rejected the pretribulational premillennarian (and often dispensational) theology of those who left. The latter seems more likely to me, since, as the Bible Presbyterian Church members themselves implicitly acknowledged by attempting to reformulate them, the Westminster Standards as accepted by the OPC don't specify one millennial position as correct.

Either way, Clark's recommendation to become a member in the American Council of Christian Churches, stated at the OPC's twelfth general assembly (link), was a recommendation to regarding a council founded by the leader of those who split off from the OPC in 1937 to help form the Bible Presbyterian Church: Carl McIntire (see Dennison's chapter on Tragedy). 

Clark was, of course, also formerly employed by his friend, J. Oliver Buswell, another OPC member who split with McIntire in 1937 - who is credited with partially convincing Clark of premillennarianism by the time he was hired at Wheaton College (where Buswell was president), in 1937. Although Clark remained in the OPC and maintained a fundamentally different position on premillennialism than the Bible Presbyterian Church members, the two remained in friendly correspondence.

In 1937, we see an indication of how members who were soon to split from the OPC perceived treatment against their views by who Muether and Hart regard as the leaders of the OPC. In a recorded statement from the third general assembly (link), we read: "Mr. Laird resigned from the Board of Westminster Seminary on April 27 because the seminary had in recent months turned from exposure and attack upon modernism to an attack upon premillennialism." 

The open question is whether eschatology was relevant to the 1940s OPC debate. In short, did these same leaders - the Westminster faculty - see it as a success when in Clark, another advocate (and perhaps advocates, depending on what were the eschatological views of others who left the OPC with Clark) for premillennialism left the OPC... or was this largely unrecognized as an after- or non-thought? 

A subject worthy of further research, I can only offer a few comments before I leave most of it for another time or person to pursue. Those interested are encouraged to pay careful attention to Dennison's chapter on Vos and the "otherworldliness" of the Christian religion (pg. 85ff.). Compare Daryl Hart, who uses the same language here and, as I recall, in his book on The Lost Soul of American Protestantism. 

The key question, I think, is what does the "not yet" part of history look like. In his last sentence to his chapter on Clark and others, Dennison says, the OPC "has been stamped with an other-worldliness and waits for further help as to how she, rather than seeking to regain the world she has lost, might be of service to her Lord in the world" (pg. 136). On and for what is the OPC waiting? 

It is true that Adam had a pre-redemptive eschatological goal and that Christ has already granted to His people eschatological blessings (pg. 85). But is the Christian religion "otherworldly" in the sense that we lose all touch with our life as pilgrims as we look to Christ's return? Dennison correctly notes that the "wholly-other" god of neo-orthodoxy "generated their own irrelevance" (pg. 100) - is he in similar danger here with respect to the church? 

Michael Horton

Horton's chapter on Clark and Van Til in Reason and Revelation: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics (link) was one I wasn't aware about until relatively recently. Diving in, Horton says:

In biblical thought, truth is not simply the correspondence of words to things—a mirror of the eternal forms. It is a stance taken in relation to reality as God’s creation and to oneself as God’s creature—which creature in the covenant of grace is rightly related (justified) and rightly ordered (by the new birth and sanctification) to God’s purposes for human flourishing (pg. 132).

I don't find this especially helpful as a definition of truth. Why couldn't one say that falsity is also "a stance taken in relation to reality as God’s creation and to oneself as God’s creature"? Further, to say truth is a stance taken is to imply it is taken by someone. Who? God? Creature? Both? Is "truth" such that whoever is taking the "stance," others might also know the same truth?

Horton begins to move in the direction of a critique of Clark in some preliminary historical exposition in which he alludes to "medieval theologies" that "affirmed divine transcendence and, consequently, denied noetic access to God's essence on the part of humans" (pg. 132). On the other hand, Horton also recognizes that John Duns "Scotus, among others, insisted upon at least some “univocal core” if our attribution of being to God and ourselves is to have any legitimate purchase (anticipating in some ways the famous Van Til—Clark debate)" (pg. 133). 

At the bottom of pg. 134, Horton begins a subsection on "Archetypal/Ectypal Theology, or, The Creator-Creature Distinction." Horton describes archetypal theology through Wolfgang Musculus, who said believers can neither "comprehend" nor have a "plain a perfect" knowledge of "the Majesty of God." There would be no argument from Clark on this point. 

More interesting was Horton's admission that nowhere (to his knowledge) does Van Til even use the terms "archetypal" or "ectypal" knowledge. That being the case, I didn't find it especially prudent to continue the article through this terminological lens, regardless of whether Horton thought the concepts were present. I suppose that's more so my opinion than an objection.

At any rate, I likewise found that archetype-ectype terminology was not used in the 1940s OPC debate until 1946 (see Puritanboard post 31ff. here), well after much debate already had taken place. The following is the first I can find that the terminology is used (link):

Were it true that Dr. Clark affirmed a propositional character of divine knowledge it would appear that he had made a temporal form fundamental to the archetypal knowledge of God, which would indeed be making truth fundamentally quantitative. The perfect unity of the knowledge of God would be subjected to a manifold of propositional units temporal in their character.

Unfortunately, missing in these conversations is the question, what is the definition of God's "knowledge" about which we are talking? I personally think "knowledge" (of the sort intended as referent in the 1940s debate) is propositional. On the other hand, I've argued that God Himself is not propositional, a set or collection of propositions, etc. 

Instead, then, I think propositions are part or the result of God's activity. Horton knows of an essence-energies distinction. The truth of some propositions may be part or the result of natural (necessary), divine activity - like truths about the Father, Son, and Spirit - whereas the truth of other may be part or the result of freely willed (contingent), divine activity - like the truth about whether or not God creates. In either case, all God's activity is eternal, and all propositions would be eternal.

That is my position. If it's wrong, I'll own it and be happy to learn the truth. But the position of the committee members of the above, OPC report - that propositions are temporal - appears nonsensical to me. Propositional truths (like those in Scripture) don't change. I can only gather, then, that just as whatever else first was created (and, therefore, temporal and contingent), propositions must, in their view, likewise have been immediately and completely created (and, therefore, temporal and contingent). 

That is, had God not created, there would have been no propositional truths. All propositions revealed to us in Scripture would have then been non-existent - even those truths which refer to that which was prior to creation. The absence of ectypal knowers would seem to mean the absence of ectypal knowledge (including propositions).

Now, this begs the question - that only ectypal knowledge is propositional. It really is just a prejudicing of the root of the epistemic question of the 1940s OPC debate: is there any qualitative overlap between the knowledge of God and man? The complainants suggested that there is not. There are a few responses in supply:

- The Son, according to His divinity (not humanity, although the speech is verbal if one wants to be technical), communicates to His divine Father regarding the glory they shared prior to creation, and He does so in terms of propositions. This is does after creation (and incarnation), but it suggests He could have done so beforehand too. It's not as if the divinity of the Son or Father changed after creation.

- If propositional knowledge requires ectypal knowers, then God could not know that which He reveals to us. On the other hand, if propositional knowledge does not require ectypal knowers, that can only mean God can know propositions as well as men. In that case, does He know them (in which case there is qualitative overlap in knowledge between God and man) or not (meaning He doesn't know that which He reveals to us)?

- What even is "archetypal knowledge" according to the OPC committee (complainants, etc.)? It is allegedly a "perfect unity." Does unity imply distinction? Is this an oblique reference to a theory of divine simplicity? In any case, these men can only speak of "archetypal knowledge" from the perspective of "ectypal knowledge" - where is their ectypal evidence, then, for their assertions about archetypal knowledge? 

More responses could be provided (see the Puritanboard link above - read on after post 31), but these are enough to show that those who protested against Clark's views are not without questions in need of answering. In fact, these questions and more have been asked in the past.

Horton's follow-up - in which he finally brings up Van Til - is baffling. He quotes a passage from Van Til's The Defense of the Faith to the effect that "Our knowledge of God is not and cannot be comprehensive," and then Horton immediately says of this, "In his debate with Gordon Clark, Van Til defended the classical Reformed insistence on this distinction" (pg. 136). 

Does he think Clark denied this? What is happening here seems to be an assuming of what needs to be proved: that the meaning of "comprehensive" is something more than the usual meaning of the word, that we cannot have complete or total knowledge of God. Like Dennison, Horton also fails to acknowledge that Clark stated God's mode of knowledge is different from ours. 

Later on the same page, Horton virtually gives the case back to Clark:

As far back as the Fourth Lateran Council, even the medieval church recognized that in ever analogy between God and humans, there is always more dissimilarity than similarity.

Granting this account is true, Clark's point is that there is similarity at all. Similarity (and analogy) presuppose univocity. Two things cannot be similar if there not any sort of overlap between them. But that's just to say that God is not completely Other, and neither is His knowledge. 

The creature is image, God is archetype. The knowledge of the creature is thereby analogous to the knowledge of the Creator. The previous sentences are true given what was just said in the last paragraph. It's when these sentences are stated without any definitions of key terms (or in defining key terms in a way that is self-refuting) that there is a problem. But this is just what Horton does on the next page:

...not even the glorified saints in heaven overcome the Creator-creature distinction in their epistemology any more than in their ontology.

All knowledge of God, therefore, is analogical rather than univocal. (pg. 137)

All of this is a non sequitur. Again, analogy presupposes univocity. No one denies that the Creator-creature distinction is not something to be "overcome" - it is a reality to be acknowledged - but so too must we recognize the Creator-creature overlap lest we follow the likes of Paul Tillich and fail to do justice to man as image of God. We not only empty the word "image" of meaning if we overemphasize our differences with God (innumerable as they are), we by extension unintentionally weaken other doctrines, like the Trinity (cf. the Son as image of the Father).

On pg. 138, in an argument against univocity, Horton suggests we cannot know anything as it is in itself. While cannot have comprehensive knowledge of anything, what Horton says sounds Kantian. Horton's support - which is to defer to Van Til's claim that our knowledge "must be paradoxical" - is anything but convincing, as I discussed in my last post. Horton also conflates what we know (univocally) with how we know it (by revelation vs. autonomously).

After a few pages discussing other theologians, Horton returns to Clark. He may be correct that "Clark was apparently unaware that there even was such a thing as Protestant scholasticism" (pg. 143). On the other hand, on the same page, one can compare Clark's own words to Horton's interpretation of them to see that Horton has badly misunderstood and misrepresented Clark. Here is Horton:

Professor Clark not only fails to properly define analogy; he conflates analogy with “metaphorical or symbolic” language as employed by “the adherents of the dialectical theology” (ibid.). Analogy is distinguished from metaphorical or symbolic approaches in that it affirms the literal truth of its language while not reducing the relation of the two terms to one of identity. The view that all religious language is metaphorical or symbolic is simply a hyper-allegorical view that has nothing in common with an analogical view. 

Here is what Clark actually says in the source material Horton cites (link):

Now Van Til's comment on Thomism is not that analogy is a fruitless expedient, but, quite the reverse, that Romanism does not take analogy seriously enough (p. 56). Romanism still retains too much, shall we say, univocity. Not Christian thought, but, says Van Til, "Non-Christian philosophies hold that human thought is univocal instead of analogical" (p. 65). In view of the fact that Romanism allows univocal predication in the sphere of science and of ordinary experience, Van Til's assertion is most easily understood to mean that univocal predication is impossible for man in any subject. In this Van Til shows a close affinity to neo-orthodoxy. The adherents of the dialectical theology teach that all language, or all religious language, is analogical, metaphorical, or symbolic. Not language only, but conceptual knowledge also. Intellectual knowledge, Es-Wahrheit, is only a pointer, a pointer to something that cannot be thought. Therefore creeds are not to be taken univocally or literally, but in some analogical and therefore undefined meaning.

Clark doesn't "define" analogy, he just outlines what dialectical theology teaches and compares that to "Van Til's assertion," "...most easily understood to mean that univocal predication is impossible for man in any subject." Horton's own statement that a true definition of analogy "affirms the literal truth of its language while not reducing the relation of the two terms to one of identity" doesn't go deep enough into the questions already asked regarding whether similarity and analogy presuppose overlap.

I have probably repeated myself too many times, but here is Horton's final reference to Clark, found in his conclusion:

Evangelical apologists (as well as biblical scholars, theologians, and pastors) are increasingly divided as to how to respond to the crisis of modernity. On one hand are those who apparently cling to the modern project, identifying the crumbling of autonomous foundationalism with the demise of truth itself, Many of these writers carry on the apologetic strategies of Gordon Clark, the medieval synthesis, or evidentialism—usually a combination of these.

But Christianity has never depended on the success or failure of the empires that wax and wane. The “crisis of Western civilization” is not the same as “the crisis of Christianity.” Reformed theology, as we have seen, has long been a critic of the idolatries of the former and can continue to guide our response to the current situation. (pgs. 147-148)

Perhaps some evangelical apologists rely on the apologetic of Clark et al. to respond to the "crisis of modernity." Does Horton mean to intimate these writers conflate said crisis with "the crisis of Christianity"? What if they didn't? Who are these nameless people? 

More importantly, Clark himself did not think "Christianity... depended on the success or failure of the empires that wax and wane." The following might almost be mistaken to be a direct response to Horton, except that Clark wrote it over 50 years beforehand:

It is true, I admit, that while rejecting Spengler's political theory and underlying philosophy, I agree that civilizations have come and gone, empires waxed and waned, and that the U.S.A. will probably not last forever; in fact I hold that our government has deteriorated considerably in the past twenty years; I hold too that the total depravity of man makes political deterioration inevitable and that the only permanent government will be the Kingdom of our Lord Christ. Perhaps this is cynical (i.e. snarling, contemptuous, misanthropic, pessimistic, and gloomy); modernists and humanists regularly say that it is; but I hold that it is unadulterated Christian truth. (link)

John Muether

One final critic I want to analyze is John Muether. I discussed his book co-authored with Daryl Hart in my last post. This one will look at his book, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed apologist and churchman (link). For that reason, this review will be disproportionately longer. Dennison's book covered the entire OPC's history, so Clark references were present but not as prolific. Horton's article was decidedly shorter, of course. 

Muether's book was informative in a few ways. For example, I didn't know Van Til was invited but declined to participate in Clark's festschrift (pg. 112). Also, this early comment caught my eye: 

Readers of Van Til are familiar with his genealogy of non-Reformed apologetics: Aquinas led to Bishop Butler’s analogy, which begot Charles Hodge, who produced Buswell and Clark. (pg. 56)

Clark would have been shocked to be told his apologetic forefather was Aquinas, a man whose apologetic he refuted repeatedly. This somewhat explains "the Butler type of analogy comment from Van Til's lecture cited in my last post on "Clark's Critics." From Rushdoony's By What Standard?, we read:

Van Til is emphatic on the fallacy of all attempts to establish a principle of interpretation other than God. If, after the fashion of Thomas Aquinas and Bishop Butler, we establish a neutral principle of coherence or rationality, or like Clark and Carnell, enthrone the law of contradiction, two major concessions are involved. First, we reason from man’s principle to God and enthrone our law over God as basic to all human and divine process. (pg. 22)

There's the connection, I think. Van Til thought Aquinas, Butler, Clark, and so forth reasoned from a "principle of interpretation other than God." Rushdoony also mentions that Christianity is only probably (i.e. not certainly) true for at least a few of these men. I addressed this in my last post, so I won't dwell on it here, but I'm glad if I have found some clarification of what Van Til and Muether meant.

Another piece of information of which I was unaware was that Clark actually compared Van Til and Barth prior to the 1951 letter I quoted in my last post (cf. Muether, pg. 126, endnote 26). Muether mentions that Van Til wrote to his nephew indicating awareness that Clark compared he and Barth in 1948. I would like to have heard more from Muether on whether Cornelius Van Til offered any pushback to this charge or merely reported it to Henry Van Til, but the tidbit was interesting enough.

There is more from Muether. Van Til apparently wrote (to an unknown addressee) in October of 1953 that:

We went through the same sort of struggle in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church with Dr. Clark. He insisted that there was exact identity of content in the mind of man with the content of the mind of God in his knowledge. Over against this view we argued that man as the creature of God is analogical of God in his knowledge. And we stressed the fact that this meant a one way dependence of man on God. Clark argued that such a view led to equivocism in knowledge.

For all Clark's efforts, years after the controversy, Van Til was still perpetuating what Clark once called "incomprehensible" "false statements" (link). Clark constantly called for precision and, in his mind at least, rarely received it. It is not whether the content is an exact identity (as if we are omniscient), it's whether the what content man has and what content God has means the same - refers to the same object of knowledge (truth). If so, Clark's position is vindicated. If not, then there really is not qualitative overlap between God's knowledge and ours, and it is equivocal to even speak of man's "content" and God's "content" of knowledge. 

I was not aware Van Til (pg. 127) compared Clark to Barth. Given the above, though, it does make some sense:

...as far apart as they were, Barth and Clark shared the common error of a defective starting point, a non-Christian doctrine of creation. No theologian of Van Til's time had a more robust doctrine of creation or explored as fully as Van Til its covenantal character and its philosophical consequences. He often asserted that creation is the foundation stone of Reformed theology. "The most fundamental distinction of orthodox theology, he wrote in The New Modernism, "may be said to be that of Creator and creature."

In other words, Van Til thought Clark did not respect enough the distinction between Creator and creature. Obviously, this involves the doctrine of creation. I said enough on this, I think, in my interaction with Horton, especially in that no Christian (such as Clark) denies a distinction. The question is whether there is a Creator-creature distinction (true) or an absolute divide, dissimilarity, or chasm (false). I don't think it is Clark who missteps here.

Despite the above information - making the book worth the read - Muether gets many things wrong. He says on pgs. 187 and 201 that Van Til "refused to link" Clark with the "new evangelicals." On the contrary, we saw in my last post that Van Til's 1967 lecture on The New Evangelicalism featured Clark quite prominently as an alleged member of this group. Muether's evidence is, according to an endnote, a 1963 letter to Ronald Nash, but Muether doesn't provide the contents of this letter (perhaps he changed his mind within 4 years; I doubt it). 

Muether also makes reference to Clark's "hyper-Calvinistic leanings" with no evidence to support the assertion (pg. 272). The only other time hyper-Calvinism is mentioned is on pg. 107, and that just says "some in the OPC suspected" Clark "of hyper-Calvinism." This is Dennison redux. 

Granted, pg. 272 is found in a sort of appendix called Bibliographic Essay, in which Muether attempts to hurriedly summarize and sometimes provide passing comment on source material, but for that matter, the entire paragraph in which this accusation is found was written in poor taste. It implies that the work of men like Robert Strong and John Frame can be dismissed because they left the OPC - they are "marred by their disillusionment with their former church." Would it be fair to dismiss Muether's work as "marred by his enamourment with his current church"? 

The bulk of Muether's attention toward Clark occurs from pages 98-116. Now, as I said in my last post, I don't really want to go over ground that I think has been sufficiently covered elsewhere. For example, Doug Douma explains why Clark did not return to the OPC in The Presbyterian Philosopher during the 1980s, a fact which Muether raises (pg. 251). And I've said elsewhere that there may be something to the idea the 1940s OPC debate - as I neutrally refer to it nowadays - is  "better described as the Clark-Murray debate" as opposed to Clark-Van Til (link). This same link, though, refutes Muether's following attempt to water down the significance of Clark's nomination of Machen as the first OPC moderator. Here is Muether: 

As a ruling elder in the church since its inception in 1936, Gordon Clark (1902-85) was well known in the denomination, and it was he who nominated J. Gresham Machen as the moderator of that first Assembly. (Clark’s nomination of Machen does not mean that he was an especially close intimate of Machen’s. Machen was surely everyone’s choice as the inaugural moderator of the church, and Clark simply beat other nominators to the floor. Similarly, Van Til’s nomination of Buswell as the moderator of the second assembly was no indication of a close bond between those two.) (pg. 100)

And here is what actually happened:

A caucus of leaders had met prior to the First General Assembly. Those leaders included Dr. Machen and certain men involved in the present controversy. These men were zealous for a pure Calvinistic church as is manifest by the series of articles to which Mr. Heerema referred, "The Reformed Faith and Modern Substitutes." This caucus picked Dr. Gordon H. Clark to nominate Dr. Machen. At that time his differences with Dr. Cornelius Van Til were well known, as those who were students at Westminster Seminary at that time can testify.

Clark didn't beat others nominate Machen before anyone else, as if he was seeking the personal honor. Machen himself (and John Murray, for that matter) were among those who orchestrated ahead of time that Clark would be given the honor. I don't expect Muether or any historian to have all the facts before them. But Muether's suggestion that Clark may not have been a "close intimate of Machen's" shows some ignorance of source material - Clark-Machen letters, the Reformed Fellowship, the League of Evangelical Students, etc.

Speaking of this, as with Dennison and Horton, source material is really needed where Muether provides none. The following has no endnote (by the way, endnotes are infinitely inferior to footnotes), nor is a date even mentioned:

Greater differences began to emerge when Van Til solicited Clark’s feedback on his metaphysics syllabus. In his response, Clark wrote that there was nothing objectionable in the human pursuit of comprehensive knowledge of God. Clark argued that it was sinful to aspire to God’s being but not to his knowledge.

Compare this to Clark's answers during his ordination exam. Here is part of his exchange with Reverend Clelland:

Q You believe the statement in Chapter 2. Section 1, that the one only living and true God is incomprehensible?

A I believe that there are indications in Scripture that when we shall be glorified, our knowledge will continue to increase forever, and that in all probability there will be no end to such increase.

Q That there will always be then, something which we could not yet comprehend?

A It seems to me entirely likely, though the exegeses of it are a little weak, but it seems to me entirely likely that there will always be certain particular truths that we do not know.

If it isn't possible to attain infinite knowledge, wouldn't it be sinful to seek it? Clark's answers here are a bit tentative, but he leans the correct way and may simply have been nervous. It's hard for me to accept what Muether asserts about Clark's "feedback" on Van Til's syllabus. Muether's following sentences on pgs. 101-102 are also source-less:

Later that same spring Clark published “On the Primacy of the Intellect” in the Westminster Theological Journal. Van Til again pressed Clark on the Creator-creature distinction, fearing that Clark’s argument failed to distinguish between a Christian and a pagan understanding of the intellect. Van Til cited Calvin and Warfield to argue that the intellect was no less fallen than other human faculties. Further conversations confirmed for Van Til his suspicion that Clark’s thought was deeply grounded in Greek philosophy; Van Til summed up Clark’s position in the Socratic motto that “knowledge is virtue.”

To be sure, Van Til was willing to affirm the primacy of the intellect in a certain sense: coming to faith is no mere act of emotional enthusiasm. But Van Til believed that faith is deeper than mere assent, because the Word of God makes an impact on the believer’s heart. Van Til feared that Clark’s exclusive emphasis on assent to doctrine denied the demands that Scripture places on the whole man. The Bible shapes what one knows, but also what one loves and how one behaves.

I have read Clark's article on The Primacy of the Intellect (1943) very closely and do not find that Clark says anything remotely close to the idea our intellect was or is unfallen. Nor does Clark even discuss saving faith. Muether's point about "Clark's exclusive emphasis on assent" indicates he is conflating of what Clark believed later in his life with what he believed earlier in it; or if Muether means Van Til argues this against Clark in the 1940s, I want to see where he does this. 

The evidence I can find against this idea is only indirect, but here is a snippet from an article in The Presbyterian Guardian (link). Note that there is no indication that Clark disagreed that there were three elements of saving faith: 

Mr. Hamilton then again rose to deliver another paper on the relation between regeneration and human understanding, which again he said had received Dr. Clark's approval. Confusion was injected, however, by the interpolation of some of Mr. Hamilton's own observations which had not been approved by Dr. Clark. In the course of the speech, Mr. Hamilton declared that notitia (knowledge) and assensus (assent) could be possessed by the unregenerate man but that fiducia (trust) could not. These are three theological terms to designate the three elements of saving faith. Mr. Hamilton was promptly challenged for holding that the unregenerate man possesses two-thirds of the elements of saving faith. On this position, said the complainants, the only thing wrong with the unregenerate man is that his saving faith is one-third incomplete. Moreover, since the answer terms assent the central element in faith, the unregenerate man might then, on Mr. Hamilton's position, be said to possess the central element of saving faith.

Mr. Hamilton then said that he had just been told that Dr. Clark would not agree that the unregenerate man was in possession of the first two of the three elements, but only of the first.

Now, I have read Clark's 1943 article was the tipping point for some concern among men in the OPC. But I have not heard sufficient explanation - with references to the actual article itself - as to why. Clark summarizes the positions of philosophers and theologians, occasionally remarks on which thoughts they had were good or bad, discusses emotions, volition, and intellect as activities (not divided parts) of a man, and then argues that the intellect has primacy because it is that by which we will enjoy God forever. This appears to me to be unrelated to what Muether mentions about the fallenness of the intellect and definition of faith, but since he cites no sources, I have no idea what to think. 

What, then, was the problem? I'll provide some facts and then some speculation. It is a fact that Clark wrote letters - some dating back to at least 1938 - and likely had conversations with Van Til, Buswell, and perhaps others relating to the content of the final article seen in 1943. How Clark's understanding was interpreted in those writings and discussions he had with others prior to the publishing of the 1943 product may have been the underlying cause for concern. An example that comes to mind would be that in "The Primacy of the Intellect," Clark writes:

...voluntarism conceived reality as fundamentally irrational, as ultimately an unknowable mystery before which man must remain a skeptic; whereas intellectualism with a love of truth resolutely affirms that reality is essentially rational, logical, and knowable.

While this may seem innocuous at first glace, it would possibly recall to Van Til's mind (and Buswell's, who read and agreed with Van Til's letter) a letter he wrote to Clark on December 5th, 1938 (link):

If we say that the real is the rational and the rational is the real we must apply this first to God as He exists by Himself apart from the created world. To that we must add the doctrine of creation into nothing. Thus we make a basic distinction between the reach of God's intellect and the reach of man's intellect.

Reality, uncreated reality, divine reality may and must, it seems to me, be forthwith identified with rationality. God's consciousness and His being are coextensive; His being and His attributes are one. Created reality too is rational in the sense that whatsoever comes to pass happens in accord with the counsel of God. On the other hand God might have created the universe otherwise than He did. There might be various rational ways of existing for the created universe. Hence with respect to the created universe we cannot say that the rational is the real.

There is no prior (nor posterior) letter of which I'm aware that was written by Clark to provide context to this. Clark, who gave Buswell access to this letter with Clark's notes in the margins, tells Buswell in a different letter that Van Til quotes him (Clark) from a previous discussion they had, so an in-person conversation may have precipitated Van Til's above letter. Regardless, Van Til is correct to mention God's freedom. To say "the rational is the real" implies creation was and is necessary, that there is a single intelligible world (with Creator and creation) which can comprise reality. This ruins numerous doctrines.

In an ironic, prophetic twist on Clark's negative view of the word "exists" later in his life, Buswell (writing to Clark; letter dated January 26, 1939) adds to Van Til's criticisms: "If you mean that the rational is the whole of reality, then the word rational ceases to have any meaning." Buswell also dislikes a comment Clark wrote in the margins of Van Til's letter. Clark highlighted Van Til's statement that "with respect to the created universe we cannot say that the rational is the real" and wrote in the margins, "In which case the world cannot be known." But Clark's reply to Buswell in a letter from February 9, 1939 somewhat clarifies matters on all these points:

You are perhaps unduly exercised about my note at the top of page two of Van Til’s letter. In reading a letter I sometimes jot down notes hurriedly to guide me in my reply. Van Til said the rational is not the real with respect to the created universe. You take this to mean that there are ideas in God’s mind which are not realized in creation. Quite true; but whether God might have created some other sort of world is a slightly different question, on which Augustine and Anselm disagree... Very consciously I tried to avoid this particular problem in my paper. So there is not the profundity in my note at the top of p.2 of Van Til’s letter which you find there. As a matter of fact, I had in mind the notion that the real is not rational (granted that is not what he said) and I drew the conclusion that it could then not be an object of knowledge.

In other words, Clark wrote a note quickly that didn't respond to what Van Til said but still was of use in that Clark believed both uncreated and created reality must be rational. Clark then used that idea in his article on "The Primacy of the Intellect": reality is rational. The final product does not suggest the converse, and this is where a careful reading is required.

To my knowledge, Van Til was not aware of Clark's exchange with Buswell. That's one reason which may have contributed to any worry Van Til and/or other of his acquaintances may have had about the 1943 article. Another might be the further suggestions that the discussions between Van Til and Clark revolving around Van Til's December 5th letter definitely contributed to Clark's 1943 article. For example: 

- From both Van Til's letter and the 1943 article (Van Til may have been quoting Clark from a prior conversation): "Life is not deeper than logic." 

- Van Til from his letter: "As we say, personality is a unit, which thinks and wills and loves. Psychologically we may and must speak of the priority of the intellect but not logically." On the other hand, Clark from the 1943 article: "Each man is a single personality... The question at issue, then, treats not of the temporal order but of the logical order, or to repeat more exactly, of an order determined by the degree to which these actions unite us to God." This indicates a disagreement between Van Til and Clark. 

- Another disagreement is that Clark speaks of intellect as the only "mode of action" by which our telos can be fulfilled, i.e. to contemplate God. Clark: "if in Christianity the end of all human endeavor is to see or contemplate God, evidently the desire for God or the love of God is subordinate." Contrast this to Van Til: "The 'vision of deity' is no more ultimate as an end for man than the love of deity or the work for deity" (vision of deity is in quotes because Van Til is quoting Clark).

Perhaps more examples could be given, but this sufficiently shows that "The Primacy of the Intellect" was long in the making. Clark definitively staked out a different position than Van Til. But to assert Clark's position was "pagan" or "grounded in Greek philosophy" takes a little more effort to substantiate, especially since these do not deal with Clark's arguments. 

As I said, those are the facts. Now, the speculation: while not said in print, it may have been clear to many OPC churchmen that for the first time, Clark publicly opposed Van Til on intellectual grounds. It was only during Clark's examination that these men had an opportunity to challenge Clark with little to lose. 

[As a side note, the stenographic record (link, link) is obviously wrong in some places. For example, "the premise of the intellect" should obviously be "the primacy of the intellect" - the men are clearly questioning Clark based on his 1943 article.]

In his examination, Clark answers Welmers and Stonehouse - both of whom unsurprisingly turned out to be complainants - very thoroughly when they ask about this article, even citing John 17:3 as (a non-pagan, non-Greek) reason for his views. It is a shame Stonehouse was cut off just as it seems he was about to elaborate on "a deep-seated difference between" his and Clark's conceptions. Following this exam, the next significant mention of Clark's article or its contents was The Complaint and The Answer themselves (and since Muether mentioned him as a source Van Til used, note Clark's citations of Calvin; pgs. 23-24 in Douma's typed version), and here, I think, we can stop.

In terms of issues at stake regarding Clark's ordination, Muether mentions procedure, theology, and ecclesiology. The last one is a familiar topic, since Muether mentions it in his books with Hart (cf. my last post):

Should the church cooperate with other forms of conservative Protestantism in America? Or ought it to preserve its distinctively Reformed identity? How could the church best combat the modernism of its day: by joining the emerging evangelical movement or by defending and propagating the Westminster Standards? (pg. 103)

This is an unjustified dichotomy. It presupposes a both-and answer isn't possible. Maybe that's true, but it isn't obvious to me, and it is more or less an unargued assumption in many of the OPC historical works I've read. See my interaction with Dennison above.

As an aside, though, I'd like to mention a point that often gets brushed over: the procedural question. Take the Presbytery of Philadelphia, which was found to be in error on failing to follow the Form of Government in acting too hastily regarding Clark's examination process. This is usually all that is said about the matter, but minutes from the Presbytery of Ohio tell a different story. The following is a communication to the 14th OPC General Assembly recorded in the Ohio Presbytery's minutes from the their meeting on April 8, 1947:

The four ministers who reside within the bounds of the Presbytery of Ohio were compelled, by their calling and by the failure of the Thirteenth General Assembly to finish its business in five days, to return to their pressing duties and to miss the final sessions of that Assembly. It is common knowledge that commissioners from other Presbyteries also were likewise compelled to miss the final sessions.

The Presbytery of Ohio therefore requests the Fourteenth General Assembly to make strenuous efforts to finish its business before too many of the commissioners must leave.

If this is impossible, the Presbytery of Ohio implores the Fourteenth General Assembly, in the interests of justice, not to make decisions in the final sessions on matters of vital importance to the Church as a whole; but to confine its actions to routine matters.

Some of us came out of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., and we know the practice of deferring important matters to the closing session. This practice is not conducive to justice and fair dealing. The Thirteenth General Assembly in the evening session of its last day, after a noticeable proportion of the commissioners had left, took action with regard to a matter that had presumably been settled three days previously. This action was taken after the time limit for reconsideration had expired.

The injustice of this action is further seen in the fact that that Assembly, diminished in numbers, elected a quasi-judicial committee in which one of the interested parties but not the other of the interested parties was represented.

The Presbytery of Ohio therefore prayerfully implores the Fourteenth General Assembly to proceed with justice and equity.

Sincerely yours, MARTIN J. BOHN, 

Stated Clerk Presbytery of Ohio

These minutes confirm Clark and the only three other ministers of his presbytery (4 total - Thomas Gregory was ordained later that year as a 5th member) missed the final, Monday sessions of the 13th OPC General Assembly. This is important, as it was during these late, final sessions that the following occurred (link):

It was moved and carried that this Assembly instruct the Clerk of the Assembly to inform the Presbytery of Philadelphia of the action of the Assembly, to wit, that “this Assembly finds that there is ground for complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia and declares that the Presbytery of Philadelphia, at its meeting on July 7, 1944, erred in the decision to deem the examination sufficient for ordination, and in the decision to ordain Dr. Gordon H. Clark at a subsequent meeting of the Presbytery called for that purpose, in that the Presbytery failed to observe the plain intent of the provisions of the Form of Government (XIV, 1 and XV, ll), in circumstances which made the propriety of these provisions apparent.” This Assembly also. implores the Presbytery of Philadelphia to make acknowledgment of these errors and of its failure thereby to preserve the peace of the Church, and to report accordingly to the Fourteenth General Assembly... 

It was moved that: 

Whereas the purity and the peace of The Orthodox Presbyterian Church are of the deepest concern to the General Assembly, and 

Whereas “to the General Assembly. . . belongs the power of deciding in all controversies regarding doctrine . . ." (Form of Government, XI, 5), and 

Whereas there has appeared to be a difference in our Church concerning the Scriptural teaching pertaining to the doctrines of the incomprehensibility of God, the position of the intellect in reference to other faculties, the relation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, and. the free offer of the gospel, 

Be it resolved that Messrs. Murray, Clowney, R. Gray, W. Young and Stonehouse be appointed to study these doctrines in the light of Scripture and the Westminster Standards in relation to all expressions of views on the doctrines that have appeared or may appear in connection with the discussion of the Complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia in the matter of the licensure and ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark, for the purpose of clarifying these matters, and report to the Fourteenth General Assembly.

In other words, Clark left the 13th General Assembly unaware that of what happened in the Monday afternoon and evening sessions, including the movement made to form a study committee stacked with ministers whom he, as an "interested party," found no representation. This is all the more important when one considers Muether's point that:

Strictly speaking the General Assembly never addressed the substance of the complaint against Clark. Instead, it assigned the theological issues of the debate to study committees that reported over the course of three years, and these reports were distributed to congregations for their study. (pg. 103)

I don't find (and this could be my mistake) any reference in the minutes for the 13th General Assembly as to how this committee was elected - or how the committee itself was even proposed. Three of the five members were from the study committee formed by the 12th General Assembly; Stonehouse surely would not have been viewed as a welcome addition by Clark. The Ohio presbytery's allusion to the injustice of the PCUSA is quite striking - Clark is nearly being styled as a new Machen.

If not a procedural error, the Ohio Presbytery certainly was not happy with the conduct of the 13th General Assembly. Sympathizers with Clark (and Clark himself) appear to have had good reason to be upset at important decisions - decisions about presbytery fault and committees which would inform and color the minds of OPC commissioners less able to devote time to study of the issues in The Complaint and The Answer - made during extra meetings without any prior indication given to officers who had to leave at the expected time. 

Here's how the 14th General Assembly's COMMITTEE ON OVERTURES AND COMMUNICATIONS responded to the Ohio Presbytery:

8. With regard to the communication from the Presbytery of Ohio imploring the Assembly to conclude important business in five days, the committee recommends that the Assembly take cognizance.

The final note on how the 14th General Assembly itself reacted to this recommendation is anti-climactic:

It was moved and carried that the Assembly take no action on the eighth recommendation.

So, after all, the Presbytery of Philadelphia was "implored" to acknowledge error, and it did so... barely. Muether reports that "The Presbytery registered its contrition by the slim margin of 16-14" (pg. 103). Well, if the imploring occurred after many interested commissioners went home - again, not a procedural error, but, perhaps, a bad look - the reticence of some members of the Philadelphia presbytery makes sense. 

Clark would later rebuff his old Philadelphia presbytery for an actual procedural mistake in his tenure within the Ohio Presbytery: 

The Presbytery of Ohio of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church hereby replies to the Presbytery of Philadelphia, relative to the latter's complaint dated July 21, 1947:

The said complaint states that the Presbytery of Ohio acted illegally in receiving licentiate Thomas M. Gregory. The ground alleged in support of this charge is an action of the complaining Presbytery relative to granting licentiate Thomas M. Gregory a letter of dismissal.

The Presbytery of Ohio wishes it to be known that its action commenced with the presentation of the letter of dismissal. The Form of Government, Chapter XX, states, "It shall be the duty of the clerk... to grant extracts from them (the minutes) whenever properly required; and such extracts under the hand of the clerk shall be considered as authentic vouchers of the fact which they declare, in any ecclesiastical judicatory and to every part of the church."

Whatever method the Presbytery of Philadelphia chose to follow in granting the letter of dismissal could not properly have been and was not a matter for the Presbytery of Ohio to act upon.

The Presbytery of Philadelphia seems to believe that Mr. Gregory was not a resident of the state of Indiana when he was received by the Presbytery of Ohio. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Gregory has established residence in Indiana before he was received. However, this has no bearing on the case, and the Presbytery of Ohio repudiates the notion that such a consideration was or ought to have been before it. The Presbytery of Ohio received Mr. Gregory on the basis of a regular letter of dismissal from the Presbytery of Philadelphia. There is nothing illegal in such a procedure.

The Presbytery of Philadelphia in the second part of the same complaint charges that the Presbytery of Ohio ordained Mr. Gregory illegally. The ground alleged in support of this charge is that Mr. Gregory had no call warranting ordination.

The Presbytery of Ohio replies that the determination of such a question of fact lies in the discretion of the examining Presbytery. Questions of fact that are placed in the discretion of Presbyteries cannot be reviewed by another Presbytery or even by a higher court. An attempt to sit in judgment on matters within the discretion of another Presbytery is in effect an attempt to destroy Presbyterian polity. If such a complaint were allowed standing in a court, it would mean that every ordination and every action of every Presbytery might have to await the approval of the Presbytery of Philadelphia. The Presbytery of Ohio therefore is compelled to reject the complaint addressed to it by the Presbytery of Philadelphia.

Clark (who wrote the above) defended the ordination of a man against the very Presbytery which questioned his own ordination. The Presbytery of Philadelphia seems to have backed off, and Mr. Gregory's ordination stood.

Perhaps these observations are incidental to Muether, but as much as I have heard OPC historians remark that the broader ecclesiastic and cultural views played a bigger role in the 1940s debate than some have thought - it's not all just about the theology - I haven't heard as much about the loosely "procedural" dimensions. There is much background context to the 1940s debate that has not been available to the public, so I thought to include some of that context here just as example of how much influence one can have (or try to have) without relevant parties (Clark, OPC commissioners) even being present.

Moving on, Muether's summary of the incomprehensibility of God question (pgs. 104-105) is typical and does not need comment, especially since I've already said so much about that. What is worth comment is Muether's following citation of Robert Strong, a supporter of Clark. Strong said Clark's ordination was "a very great victory" for the church because it recognized that "there could be some difference at minor points without a man's loyalty to the system of doctrine being impeached." 

In his book, Muether adds in brackets "[of the Westminster Standards]" after "system of doctrine" and makes an interpretive statement of Strong's citation that I don't understand. Muether says, "This was a revealing statement, because Clark himself never conceded that his views required an exception from the church's standards" (pg. 105). 

Maybe I'm reading the Strong or Muether horribly wrong, but this doesn't make any sense to me. Strong wasn't saying anything close to the idea that Clark's views required an exception; he was saying the opposite and celebrating that especially on points where the Westminster Standards are silent, "there could be some difference" while yet allowing that both sides are loyal Presbyterians. I have no idea what Muether means by Strong's statement being "revealing" of something. Strong may well have had in mind something like what he helped with as Committee Secretary of The Answer:

The second problem of this section is one of human psychology, and its discussion will again underline the fact that the Complaint is not a matter of the doctrines of the Westminster Confession but of technical and abstruse subtleties more suitable for philosophers than for preachers. 

The rest of what Muether says about Strong can be skipped, as can his comments about "whether the church's ecclesiology would be Reformed or evangelical" (pg. 107). There isn't anything Muether says that hasn't already been discussed or accounted for above or in one of the links at the beginning of this post. The next interesting thing Muether says is found on pg. 108:

By the controversy’s end they had persuaded the church that its Reformed militancy needed to express itself in careful distinction from Reformed evangelicalism. It is in this sense that Van Til “won” the debate, and in the larger context of Reformed ecclesiology, Van Til’s role in the Clark controversy, far from being an embarrassment, should be interpreted as one of his finest moments.

Over whom was Van Til victorious? Clark? If that is Muether's implication, he has not nearly established Clark's Reformed views were one rather than the other, as if they can't be both. This was addressed in my last post, and it also applies to Dennison. 

Further, on the point of Reformed ecclesiology, there may have been some ecclesiological questions - including whether Westminster Theological Seminary should remain independent, which is not, as far as I can tell, mentioned by Muether - but so far as Clark is strictly concerned, the 1940s debate must remain a strictly theological matter.

There remain only a few matters on which I will comment. Much of Van Til's admiration for Murray, Klooster, and Bavinck as well as Reymond's admiration for Clark can be omitted, but to just point out how easy it is for contemporary theologians to speak in terms which will give a wrong view of those with whom they disagree, take Muether here:

If Clark and Reymond resisted the notions of mystery, Van Til found himself at home with that expression, because of his deeper commitment to revelation and covenant. Van Til was comfortable even to the point of embracing the language of his mentor, Herman Bavinck, that “mystery is the life of all dogmatics.” Because the finite cannot contain the infinite, Bavinck underscored that the revelation of the infinite God to the finite creature cannot be exhaustive of the being of God, and so God remains incomprehensible. (pg. 110)

"Mystery" must mean "paradox." In any case, nothing Bavinck says in the highlighted portion is disagreeable with what Clark argued. Clark didn't argue we exhaust God, so if that were the only question, the whole debate would have been moot. The highlighted portion simply has nothing to do with Clark's concerns, but Muether gives the impression that Van Til was opposed by them on this point. 

Speaking of Bavinck, buried in an endnote is a definition of analogical knowledge according to Bavinck, though. On pg. 250, Muether references Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatic, 2:28, which states:

The knowledge we have of God is altogether unique. This knowledge may be called positive insofar as by it we recognize a being infinite and distinct from all finite creatures. On the other hand, it is negative because we cannot ascribe a single predicate to God as we conceive that predicate in relation to creatures. It is therefore an analogical knowledge: a knowledge of a being who is unknowable in himself, yet able to make something of himself known in the being he created. Here, indeed, lies something of an antinomy. Rather, agnosticism, suffering from a confusion of concepts, sees here an irresolvable contradiction in what Christian theology regards as an adorable mystery. It is completely incomprehensible to us how God can reveal himself and to some extent make himself known in created beings: eternity in time, immensity in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in change, being in becoming, the all, as it were, in that which is nothing.

In other words, when we say "God is good" and "man is good," "good" cannot be ascribed to God as it is to creatures. And this goes for every single predicate. So it isn't just that "good" means something different when ascribed to God, it means something totally different. Were this not the case, we could then use a single predicate to meaningfully ascribe similarity regarding what "good" means. This is equivocity, not analogicity.

This criticism will sound familiar to those who have actually read the whole of this long-winded post, for it is yet again the same criticism that "analogical knowledge" is a misnomer as it is applied by Van Til, the other complainants, and, it seems his Dutch forefather. 

On another note, Muether says Nash called Clark a "rationalist presuppositionalist" and Van Til a "revelational presuppositionalist" (pg. 113). If there is one persisting complaint I have, it's that Muether does not provide enough sources for his statements. I would have been interested in following up on this, but yet again, I have nothing to go on.

To close with one more engagement with Muether, he criticizes Clark for violating a common classroom illustration by Van Til. Pay attention to the kicker at the end:

The most memorable feature of Van Til’s teaching involved a diagram of the two circles that he drew in his classroom lectures. Van Til positioned the larger one above the smaller one, and the two did not overlap. The former represented God, and the latter the world that he created, which was always dependent upon God and his revelation. The two circles represented not only the creaturely and analogical standing of humanity and God’s transcendence, but as Van Til connected them with two vertical lines, they indicated man’s covenantal standing before God. By connecting creation and covenant in this way, Van Til established the similarity of the being and knowledge of man, as God’s image bearer, with God’s while denying their identity at any point. Gordon Clark, intolerant of any notion of mystery, committed the error of allowing the circles to touch. (pg. 116)

Two last points on this:

1) Muether admits that there must be "similarity of the being and knowledge of man, as God's image bearer, with [God]..." This is an admission which, as I said with Horton, gives the case away. If analogy does indeed involve similarity, it involves overlap. It is unintelligible to compare two subjects, call them similar, and yet have no account for the similarity. On the other hand, any such account will involve univocal predication, for whatever is taken to be the account for the similarity will also be that whereby univocal predication is possible. 

Example: is Van Til's account that of "connecting creation and covenant"? If so, then "God is covenanted" and "man is covenanted" mean the same thing. If not, there is no similarity after all, for the meaning is equivocal. We can and should qualify these propositions by adding information - "God is covenanted [in that He is the Suzerain]," "man is covenanted [in that he is the vassal]" (or whatever) - but the content of the additional information will not change the content of the simple, singular predication. 

2) Van Til seems to have forgotten what he wrote to Clark in the December 5th, 1938 letter. God must be considered first as apart from creation. Drawing two circles already presupposes two realities. More accurate, I think, would be to make the creation circle dotted rather than solid to indicate its contingency. 

Further, on the assumption of creation, these circles are similar insofar as they are circles - why does it matter if they touch? "Similarity" returns us to point 1). It doesn't matter that God needed to breathe "life" ("color" might be apt if Van Til had used a markerboard) into creation. That's the trouble with illustrations, especially in this context: no matter if Van Til were to make different colors, shapes, or drawings, the nature of his attempted illustration itself requires a comparison between two of some same, univocal category (that is, between two colors, shapes, drawings, etc.). 

So it is with language, and I would not think Muether has plans to pull up a Wittgensteinian ladder by discarding the very revelation we use to talk about God, nor do I think Van Til would discard the use of "reality" in his "analogization" (let's say) of Creator to creation.

Finally, if the circles are just to illustrate the dependence of creature on God and His revelation, Clark would never have allowed the circles to touch if that mean some part of creation did not stand in such a dependence relation. If Van Til or Muether were to reply that while this may not have been Clark's intent, he nevertheless did so in his refusal to accept man's "analogical standing," these men have much they need to respond to - see this entire post - before that charge can be taken seriously.

Postscript

The nature of the content discussed and resultant disagreement can tend to give an unwanted impression. These men have all labored for the kingdom of God. I appreciate the work they have done and continue to do for my church, for I too attend and love the OPC. I have tried to restrict my comments to the relevant content, so if anything else seems to have bled through the text, it is unintentional.