Normative Authority and Eastern Orthodoxy: A Quandary

A while ago, I wrote a post containing (among other things) a reply to what might be called the "normative authority argument" commonly referenced by Eastern Orthodox apologists against Protestants. What is this argument? For example, from EO apologist Alex Sorin:

You are confusing (1) our critique of you lacking any binding, judicial authorities that have a final say in matters of scriptural interpretation, with (2) epistemic certainty.

In Orthodoxy, some things we are bound to believe, because the Church said so in ecumenical council—similar to the Supreme Court. These things are final. (link)

As I understand it, the EO argument basically runs as follows: on Protestantism, an individual is his own normative authority; but it is not true that an individual is his own normative authority; therefore, Protestantism is false. Said another way, the EO apologist alleges, "contrary to Protestantism, we don't bind our own consciences."

Steve Hays rebutted this a long time ago, and despite what EO apologists such as Perry Robinson would like one to believe (link), Hays' points have received no substantial response. I think I augmented Hays' response in the first link at the beginning of this post, and in what follows, I'll attempt to turn the tables on EO apologists.

A few years ago, I transcribed all of Roman Catholic scholar Richard Price's youtube lectures (link). That project provided an all-too-brief summary of some of content I am about to mention and inspired me to take the past few years to read (among other historical documents) the following translations of the acts or documents related to various councils:

Documents of the Early ‘Arian’ Controversy and the Council of Nicaea 

The Council of Ephesus 431 

The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon 

The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 

The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649 

The Canons of the Quinisext Council 691/692 

The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787) 

The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 869-870 

The Acts of the Eight Œcumenical Council [The Council of Constantinople 879-880] 

The Synods of Constantinople 1166 and 1170 AD

Gregory Palamas - [The Council(s) of Constantinople 1341-1368] 

Not all of the councils I mention above are regarded by EOs as ecumenical, binding, and/or infallible. For example, some EOs regard Constantinople 879-880 as the eighth ecumenical council, as indicated by the title of one of the books above. The book was produced by an EO publishing press and includes contributions from EO apologist Craig Truglia (who himself argues that there are more than seven ecumenical councils here). 

[Side note: I quite enjoyed the following from Eastern Orthodox scholar Constantine Siamakis (pg. 39 of The Acts of the Eight Œcumenical Council): 

In the Church, only the books of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures are accepted as divinely inspired and above all criticism on the part of the Christians. Other writings were written as human books and are so considered. For this reason, they are subject to Christian judgment and evaluation. This distinction had not been clarified until the ninth century. Photius was the first to make this distinction insightfully but reverently, which he articulates primarily in his letter to John, the metropolitan of Aquileia.

What a sharp contrast to what all of the aforementioned EO apologists think, and written in an EO publication on what some of these very EO apologists consider to be an "ecumenical council," no less!]

On the other hand, at a recent EO conference, bishop Maksim Vasiljević mentioned "that the Palamite councils" (Constantinople 1341-1368) "don't mention the Photian council" (Constantinople 879-880) "as ecumenical, which now creates a sort of discrepancy or discontinuity." Why does a lack of mention matter? Because, as bishop Vasiljevic says, "It was only at ecumenical councils that previous [councils] would be affirmed or not as ecumenical" (link).

That is, if the Palamite councils are ecumenical, why didn't they list the Photian council as ecumenical (along with the seven they do mention) from the first millennium? Was it not "received"? The bishop makes an historical concession amidst an equally honest appraisal of the Council of Crete, about which I wrote in my last post.

My last post on this subject also stated that EO apologists like Robinson sometimes contradict themselves on whether a single council is binding or infallible (see my comments on the Council of Jerusalem 1672 and Confession of Dositheus, the latter of which was ratified at said council). I followed that up with an a few difficulties that EOs face no matter depending on answer they give, including a critique of EO reception theory. 

[Side note: a link that is now broken - which is a shame (and strange timing, as I recommended it on X just 2 weeks ago) - demonstrated that Dositheus' confession, ratified in the 1672 Council of Jerusalem, "without using the term, contains the doctrine of purgatory." Yet in 1690, Dositheus "recanted" his position on the intermediate state (link). Why is this significant? Because, as EO apologist Craig Truglia notes, the 1672 confession of Dositheus, not the 1690 revision, was received by all patriarchs in the 1723 council of Constantinople (link). Truglia writes:

While the 1690 version in fact received reception from the Moscow Patriarchate, it did not meet the criteria of Pan-Orthodox reception unlike the 1672 version–which was accepted by all jurisdictions in 1723...

In other words, according the EO reception theory, oughtn't the 1672 version of the Confession of Dositheus be binding... despite Dositheus himself retracting his own views? Very weird! Imagine if there were a second letter to Titus in which Paul stated that he made a doctrinal mistake in his first letter to Titus. Without massive cognitive dissonance, could anyone trust the first letter to Titus to have been without fault? I think some arguments against Islam are made along these lines.]

The arguments from my prior post stand, but I want to push further by discussing the ecumenical councils on which all EOs agree.

The EO apologist takes the acts of ecumenical councils to be infallible and binding. Robinson claims in a recent post, "the councils also use the term infallible relative to their judgments" (link). Okay - are these councils binding and infallible in everything they produce? That is, do EO apologists think people are obligated to accept these councils could not have erred in any of the acts they produced? 

If so, scholarship - including EO scholarship (see below) - has found that the acts of these councils contain errors such as false attributions, forgeries, and historical revisions. So what is an EO to do?

The EO could reject consensus scholarship. For example, in the tenth session at the Council of Chalcedon, a letter was produced by opponents of Ibas of Edessa. As EO scholar John Meyendoff writes, "Ibas had written a letter to Maris the Persian, accusing Cyril of Apollinarism" (Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: the church, 450-680 AD, Meyendorff, pg. 178). 

The trouble is not so much that Ibas was rehabilitated during the tenth session of Chalcedon but that in the course of Ibas's rehabilitation, the acts record that bishop Maximus of Antioch said of Ibas that "from the reading of the transcript of the letter produced by his adversary his writing has been seen to be orthodox." Obviously, it's problematic that a letter accusing Cyril of Apollinarism would be said to be that by which the author, Ibas, "has been seen to be orthodox." This caused problems during 6th century discussions between Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians.

Thus, in contrast to current scholarship, the acts of the fifth ecumenical council (Constantinople 553, Session VI) deny that Ibas wrote the letter to Mari: 

The Letter to Mari the Persian was first read out (5), followed by a letter from Proclus of Constantinople to John of Antioch (7), which accused Ibas of so ‘loving the madness of Nestorius’ that he actually admired, translated into Syriac, and circulated certain heretical excerpts (from Theodore of Mopsuestia, though Proclus does not say so) which Proclus had appended to his Tome to the Armenians and circulated for execration (7.3). After this Theodore Ascidas took the floor. He first gave an account of Ibas’ chequered career as bishop of Edessa, omitting the fact that he was reinstated as bishop by the Council of Chalcedon (9.1—5). He then argued that the fathers of Chalcedon, so far from approving the Letter to Mari, only accepted Ibas because he anathematized the letter and denied that he had written it (9.7-15). (Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553)

If this were true, though, why wasn't such a defense mentioned during earlier dialogues with non-Chalcedonians? By all appearances, it is because this defense produced by the fifth ecumenical council was an historical innovation. Keep in mind that the central to the fifth ecumenical council was the "Three Chapters Controversy," and one of the "chapters" was specifically about the letter to Mari, which was anathematized during the proceedings of the council. 

Some EOs, then - feeling the sting of the suggestion that the fifth ecumenical council could get something so foundational to its purpose for meeting so wrong - deny the prevailing scholarship (e.g. Truglia). But frankly, these EOs have no good reply to the point that the only letter "produced by his [Ibas's] adversary" at Chalcedon was the letter to Mari. So what bullet does the EO apologist bite?

That is, the letter to Mari is worthy of condemnation, to be sure. There is no disagreement about that. Rather, the point is that the suggestion that Ibas didn't write this letter strains historical credulity - and this really is an understatement. Above, I haven't merely appealed to scholarship. But the consensus does exist for a reason. 

Yet to accept that Ibas actually wrote that letter comes at a double cost - it means that the acts of the fourth ecumenical council rehabilitated a man and pronounced his orthodoxy in virtue of an unorthodox letter he wrote, and it means the acts of the fifth ecumenical council would be, as Truglia concedes (ex hypothesi), historically revisionist.

So much for the letter of Ibas. Let's return to the question, "do EO apologists think people are obligated to accept these councils could not have erred in any of the acts they produce?" Here is a recent conversation I had on X with EO apologist Alex Sorin and a few of his followers (link). 

Sorin's original comment is a complaint regarding Protestants who fail to respond to the EO apologetic for "normative authority." His idea is that any time a Protestant responds to the EO by questioning the infallibility or fallibility of the authority in question, the Protestant has failed to discern that the real EO criticism is whether Protestants have an authority (outside oneself) which can bind one's conscience (on which, again refer to my links - towards the beginning of this post - by Steve Hays and myself). Thus, Sorin writes:

Sorin: You guys confuse personal epistemic certainty with judicial authority almost every single time without fail. I’m not talking about your personal confidence in the fallibility or infallibility of any dispute-resolution body. Now, totally independent from this issue of certainty is this idea that there is a class of judicial officers with authority from Christ to decide matters of interpretation and application of the scriptures. That is what I’m talking about. I’m not sure how else to get through to you guys that these are different categories. I’m starting to think it might just be a comprehension issue.

Sorin is responding to a Protestant interlocutor. Here is where I enter:

Me: If your conscience is bound with respect to conciliar statements that are false - and even EOs like Truglia agree not everything in the acts of ecumenical councils is true - you can keep your supreme court.

If not, it begs the question why the whole of the acts aren't binding.

Here, I am driving at whether Sorin is willing to defend that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding. If he is willing to argue that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding, then I will argue that Sorin's apologetic ought to be rejected on the grounds that ecumenical councils make false statements (cf. the letter of Ibas above; see below for further examples). Sorin, recognizing that the acts of the ecumenical councils contain falsities, tries a different defense:

Sorin: Just like a Supreme Court opinion, it’s the holding of the Council that’s binding—not dicta. 

Me: Who gets to decide what is dicta?

This is where Sorin tapped out of the conversation, rolling his eyes at my question - a sort of implicit argument from incredulity, I suppose. Being charitable, I guess Sorin (who is a lawyer) can't believe that anyone would have trouble discerning what are statements made by ecumenical councils "in passing." 

But is the orthodoxy of the letter of Ibas dicta? The fifth ecumenical council doesn't seem to have thought so, or it wouldn't have bothered addressing the matter. So does Sorin, like Truglia, reject scholarly consensus on who wrote the letter to Mari? At any rate, my response to Sorin highlights the hypocrisy of the EO argument from "normative authority." I continued:

Me: So, no response? If you're judging what is and isn't dicta - you're judging what statements made by a council you will accept or reject - you're in no obviously different position than a Protestant. 

Since, by this point, Sorin decided to discontinue the conversions, a few other EOs jumped in:  

Sorin follower #1: Which law school did you graduate from? Just curious.

Sorin follower #2: Well since he doesn't understand what dicta is probably no law school.

Me: Cute. Now, who decides which statements are dicta? The dissenters of Constantinople 1351 would have appreciated it if they didn't have to embrace all "the Acts of the ecumenical councils."

Here, I am alluding to the following statement from the EO pan-orthodox Council of Constantinople 1351, in which the opponents of Palamas did not want to hear the acts of the sixth ecumenical council. See here:

12. In what the dissenters said, they were not only continuing to fight against the saints individually, but already were attempting to overthrow and dissolve the holy sixth ecumenical council itself. That council had no other purpose; its whole subject concerned the two natural wills and the two natural energies in our Lord Jesus Christ. Because of this it was necessary to bring in the Acts of the council and to read them, and from these to proclaim the true faith; so they were set out in the midst. But as soon as they were brought forth the dissenters at once cried out, “Not the Acts of the council, but read the definition only.” But while the divine synod was uncertain what this outcry meant, and why they rejected and did not accept the Acts, those men still did not depart in any degree from the same futile evil opinion and their twisted attitude, not at all accepting the reading of the Acts.

At this, by the glorious command of our most clement emperor, a passage was read from the Synodikon which is customarily read on the ambo on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, which word for word is this: “On those who reject the words of the holy fathers, which were expressed at the confirmation of the correct doctrine of the Church of God, of Athanasius, Cyril, Ambrose, Amphilochius who spoke God’s words, Leo the most holy bishop of the elder Rome, and the rest, and in addition on those who did not embrace the Acts of the ecumenical councils, the fourth, that is, and the sixth, anathema.”

Notice, then, that Sorin's earlier attempt to establish non-binding "dicta" of ecumenical councils already is in tension with Constantinople 1341-1368. Are EOs prepared to admit these Palamite councils were neither binding nor infallible? Were they not received? How would such a view affect the dogmatic status of Palamas' essence-energies distinction? 

At any rate, the conversation with one of Sorin's followers continued and concluded:

Sorin follower #1: The consensus of US law decides.

Me: And the consensus of Constantinople 1351 was that the dissenters had to accept the acts of the ecumenical councils on pain of anathema. But the acts contain errors. So do you follow your authority here? Do you dismiss that anathema as dicta? Or what?

Sorin follower #1: Well dicta is a term in U.S. law. There is no 1 for 1 equivalent. Not every analogy is perfect. And what errors are you talking about? Can you steelman Orthodox ecclesiology?

Me: E.g. the 6th EC's judgment monothelites forged monoenergist statements in the acts of the 5th EC. The very integrity of acts are at stake.

Even this gets away from the apologetic reversal: does the individual EO decide which statements by his authorities (ECs) can be dismissed?

X has a limited number of characters, so to clarify the first half of my final comment, in the sixth ecumenical council, the following points by Richard Price in his book on The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 explain the trouble:

In its Session III of 13 November 680 a copy of the acts of 553 was read out and found to contain three monenergist or monothelete documents: inserted at the very beginning of the acts was a document entitled ‘A discourse by the sainted Archbishop Menas of Constantinople addressed to the most blessed Pope Vigilius of Rome on Christ’s possession of a single will’, while the acts of Session VII of 553 were found to contain two declarations of faith by Vigilius, one addressed to Justinian and the other to his consort Theodora, which professed belief that 'Christ is one hypostasis and one person and one operation'. The manuscript was immediately examined by the emperor Constantine IV (chairing the council), his officials and the bishops, who found that the discourse of Menas came on pages that had simply been stuck into the manuscript; it was agreed that a fuller examination of the latter would be carried out at an appropriate time. This further examination did not take place till Session XIV of 6 April 681, when it was found that the two declarations by Vigilius were likewise crude insertions into the manuscript read out in Session III; it was also revealed that on a scroll containing the acts solely of Session VII of 553 the offending additions to the text had been ‘written crosswise’ — that is, they were an addition written at right angles to the original text, presumably in the margin. As additional evidence of the spuriousness of all three inserted documents, a number of additional manuscripts were now produced that contained none of them.

What are we to make of all this? The discourse by Menas, whether genuine or a forgery,’ had no proper place in the acts of 553. But the evidence that the two declarations by Vigilius had likewise been clumsily stuck into the manuscript is more suspect: if this were so, why was the examination of the manuscript delayed for five months? It looks as if the evidence needed time to be concocted — by the simple device, it appears, of replacing a copy of the first edition, where the two declarations were integral parts of the text, by a copy of the second edition in which the two letters were indeed late insertions. And in fact, course, the two declarations were not spurious: they come in the first edition of the acts of 553 as preserved in our best Latin manuscript. On the other hand, the additions ‘written crosswise’ on the scroll must have been brief ones, which suggests that in this manuscript the two declarations were part of the original text but with the offending words ‘and one operation’ not in the main body of the text but in marginal annotation. But even if in this manuscript the phrase was an addition, this does not prove that it was absent from Vigilius’ original text, since a merely incidental use of monenergist language is perfectly credible in the mid-sixth century. The manuscripts that did not contain any of the offensive documents prove nothing, of course: they were clearly copies of the expurgated second edition discussed above. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the text produced and read out in November 680 was an authentic copy of the now lost first Greek edition of the acts of 553, in which, however, a monenergist-monothelete profession attributed to Menas had been inserted. That there was delay before evidence could be produced to ‘prove’ the monenergist version of Vigilius’ declarations a forgery, plus the preservation of this version independently in the extant Latin manuscript of the first edition, and also the confusion over whether the evidence was supposed to prove total forgery or simply interpolation, all suggests that Vigilius’ assertion of ‘one operation’ was original and authentic.

The sixth ecumenical council, which affirmed dyoenergism, had to deal with the question of why monoenergist affirmations by pope Vigilius (a key figure in the fifth ecumenical council) were contained in the acts of the fifth ecumenical council. As the fifth ecumenical council revised history on what happened at the fourth ecumenical council regarding Ibas, so, too, the sixth ecumenical council, according to Price, appears to have revised history regarding what the acts of the fifth ecumenical council originally contained.

It won't do to suggest that ecumenical councils are only infallible with respect to doctrinal matters. Firstly, monoenergism/dyoenergism is a doctrinal matter. 

Secondly, the idea that the members of these councils believed one could dismiss their historical arguments as untruths is itself historical revisionism, and one who so subverts said councils cannot consistently consider them to be normatively authoritative. The integrity of the acts of the fifth ecumenical council obviously mattered a great deal to those at the sixth ecumenical council (whether or not one agrees with the conclusions of the latter regarding Vigilius's remarks). 

Finally, EO introduction of "dicta" into this conversation recalls to mind Gordon Clark's point about the importance of the scope of infallibility for that which one takes to be foundationally authoritative:

After a few more slightly irrelevant questions, Dr. Foreman asks, “Is it necessary for the Bible’s geography to be above reproach before I can put my trust in the God of the Bible?” The series of irrelevant questions with their plausible negative answers has supposedly conditioned the reader to continue with a negative here also. But if the question is examined a little, the negative is not so plausible. If the Bible is mistaken on geography, which ought to have been easy for the writers to put down correctly, it might very well be mistaken on theology, which is much more difficult than geography. To this question an affirmative answer is at least as plausible as the negative answer was to the first question...

Indeed, we wish to ask these men what authority the Bible can have, if it is not true. The Neo-orthodox, or whatever name best suits them, talk a good deal about the Bible and its authority. But they are not at all clear as to why we should believe, submit to, or honor a book that is marred with discrepancies and errors. Karl Barth, it will be remembered, attributes to the Bible not only geographical mistakes and number mysticism, but errors in theology. But if a doctrine is false, why should it be authoritatively preached? The logic of such a position is more than puzzling...

Everywhere the Bible speaks of itself, it teaches verbal inspiration. The words are the words of God. It is nowhere said that the words contain geographical discrepancies and theological errors. No examination of the text itself can produce evidence that the words are not inspired. If we take our belief about the Bible from what the Bible say s about itself, we must conclude that the words are the words of God who cannot lie. (Clark, Holy Scripture, 1963)

Now replace "Neo-Orthodox," "Bible," and "book" with "Eastern Orthodox," "ecumenical councils," and "acts" in the second paragraph. See the problem?

Sadly, some EOs who concede that ecumenical councils taught historical falsehoods seem open to rejecting the infallibility of Scripture with respect to historical matters (link):

[minute 56:12] I'm going to give my personal opinion about something, which is that councils can make historical mistakes. Because I don't think councils are given a guarantee from the Holy Spirit they'll be preserved from making historical and scientific errors. So let me unpack this opinion of mine - and again, it's just an opinion. I have no authority in the church to bind anyone to this opinion. 

But in John chapter 17, Christ guarantees the apostles that can be led into all truth. But we see in the epistle of Jude, saint Jude speaks of the faith delivered once for all to the saints. And so the whole truth that the Holy Spirit guides the apostles into is the deposit - the apostolic deposit - of faith, which is the the beliefs, the morals, the disciplines of the church, right? How the church operates, what we believe. That is what's preserved. 

The historical evaluation of Jude of Enoch as Scripture, for example - and not to get all cope, "Oh, he never says 'the Scripture sayith,'" he appears to treat the book Enoch as Scripture. We don't think that because the Scriptures might have made a historical error with the Book of Enoch that the Scriptures don't have some sort of authority. 

Now this doesn't open up, for example, the book of Genesis and to allow for evolution or something like that. But the point is, even saint Maximus says, the Scriptures sometimes have deliberate historical errors, and the point is for us to look further and to look for figurative meanings and things like this. So the point is, if we don't even believe the saints, don't believe the scriptures themselves are in all respects preserved some historical error, I don't see the basis to apply that to councils.

It makes no difference to me that Truglia qualifies the above as his personal opinion. I find it not at all surprising that Truglia's openness to a lower estimation of Scripture would correspond to his hedged view of ecumenical councils. It strikes me as a sort of pre-emptive, apologetic tu quoque: "Sure, Protestant, ecumenical councils contain historical errors; but Scripture contains these kinds of errors too!" 

Would Truglia think the way he does about Scripture had he not already been forced to concede the fallibility of ecumenical councils? On that note, his contention about Enoch is weak. A text can reliably speak to what a prophet prophesied without itself being God-breathed.

Finally, is Maximus infallible? More to the point, this reference was an odd one anyways, since surely Truglia wouldn't admit that the many historical errors of ecumenical councils were deliberate? For example, in the acts of Nicaea II (what EOs consider to be the seventh ecumenical council), Severian of Gabala is repeatedly miscited as John Chrysostom. What makes this historical error especially embarrassing is that Severian of Gabala persecuted John Chrysostom. Certainly, this wasn't deliberate! Because of this, even some EOs who agree with icon veneration admit:

The issue becomes more significant, however, for those who hold an extremely strong view of conciliar inspiration or infallibility. The bishops at Nicaea appear to have acted sincerely and in good faith. They were trusting the manuscript traditions available to them. But the fact remains: the quotations were misattributed. The bishops believed they were appealing to the authority of St. John Chrysostom when in reality they were citing the writings of Severian of Gabala. (link)

In short, here is the quandary: according to the very "normative authorities" (ecumenical councils) EO apologists cite as providing some sort of advantage against Protestants (i.e. Protestants, unlike EOs, are like "sovereign citizens" without a "Supreme Court"), these same EO apologists must accept the acts - not merely the definitions - of ecumenical councils. What are the main options? The acts of ecumenical councils are: 

1. All true and all binding. This cuts against scholarship and historical evidence. I don't want to hear any EOs who take this route talk about being "deep in history."

2. Sometimes true, but in every respect binding. Do any EO apologists really think that our conscience's are bound to accept falsehoods? If so, then as I said in my reply to Sorin, "you can keep your supreme court." It would be so much the worse for their apologetic, for as Steve Hays said, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right." 

3. Sometimes true, and sometimes binding. This begs the question: in what way does the EO avoid private judgment? Isn't it the individual EO who judges what to accept or reject in acts of ecumenical councils? But that is no different than the Protestant position, so the "sovereign citizen" pejorative ricochets against EOs.

WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.

Veneration, Prayer, and the Possibility of Apostasy: A Dilemma

Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Oriental Orthodox are known to venerate and pray to those whom they consider to be saints who have died: Cyril of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, etc. These traditions also are known to reject the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints: those who come to be saints at one point in life are thereafter capable of apostatizing, losing the salvation which they once possessed.

This leads to a question: do these traditions have grounds for believing that it is impossible that those whom they regard as saints apostatized on their deathbeds? Raising this hypothetical may be thought of as offensive, but if it is possible or may even have happened, the real offense would be against Christ.

Supposing it is possible that some of those whom these traditions regard as saints apostatized, is it not also possible that members of these traditions are venerating and praying to someone who is actually in hell? Orthopraxy depends on orthodoxy. If we cannot be sure someone is orthodox, should that not have implications for one's praxis involving them? Surely, veneration of and prayer to one who may be in hell cannot be obligated. I expect most of the aforementioned traditions would reject this supposition.

What is the alternative? Infallible assurance of another's faith (let alone perseverance) is ordinarily impossible. If these traditions argue that it is not possible that those whom they regard as saints apostatized - if one can have infallible assurance that those who are venerated and prayed to remained saints unto death - such can only be the case if they accept an extraordinary source of and means for such knowledge. I can think of no other possibility than that it somehow has been divine revealed which saints persevered.

The mechanism by which these traditions believe God has revealed those who persevered currently differs among these traditions. For example, papal approval obviously will not be viewed as necessary in Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy. Actually, though, while Roman Catholics would argue that papal approval is now required by canon law, the process of canonizing saints is apparently revisable. In fact, it seems that even Roman Catholics admit that papal involvement was not only unnecessary but also entirely absent in the first nine centuries (link). A Roman Catholic, then, would have to be open to defending different mechanisms.

Another consideration is that Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy consist of autocephalous or self-governing churches. This may lead some churches within these broader traditions to venerate as saints those who are not venerated by another church within the same, broader tradition. For example, within the broader tradition of Oriental Orthodoxy, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church venerates John of Damascus (link), whereas the Coptic Orthodox church does not. 

This is interesting in that John of Damascus opposed miaphysitism, a Christology typically characterized as distinctive to the tradition of Oriental Orthodoxy. In fact, as a Chalcedonian, John of Damascus is ironically anathematized by the Ethiopian Orthodox. Here, the problem is even more obvious than the hypothetical I posed above: how can one coherently venerate or pray to a theologian whom he regards as having been anathematized?

One possibility is that anathematizations can be lifted. One case of this happening occurred when the Roman pope and Eastern Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople mutually agreed to nullify the anathemas of 1054 (link). This appears to be mental gymnastics, however, and I know of some within the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church who would sooner admit John of Damascus should be removed from their synaxarium than defend the possibility that John of Damascus is venerable or worthy of hearing one's prayers. 

Another possibility is to suggest that a synaxarium (or parish, priest, bishop, or any other vehicle of communicating a list of saints) is only infallible indirectly, i.e. insofar as those who are listed as saints have been declared so by that which is the direct mechanism of divine revelation - say, a synod.

Regardless, the logical end of each of the aforementioned traditions is a hyper-realization of solo ecclesia. These traditions might speak of "historical investigation" that goes into their decision-making. These traditions might speak of only "recognizing" who already is or is not a saint. But this cannot be. 

Given their rejection of the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, to rule out deathbed apostasies as a live possibility presupposes that these traditions not only have the prerogative of interpreting divine revelation but also have the prerogative of actively creating such ex nihilo, upon which they further obligate the consciences and practices of their members. 

For these traditions, new and public divine revelation is ongoing. They are not merely drawing out inferences from the God-breathed Scriptures but are claiming themselves to be able to draw out the breath of God - through their papal, synodal, or popular voice - at will. Protestations to the contrary will logically entail, as has been pointed out, that members of these traditions could be venerating and praying to someone who is actually in hell.

Energetic Objections

I came across the Energetic Processions channel recently and took some time to listen to a few videos lodging objections to Protestantism on justification. It's a three and a half hour video, so I'm going to pick on just a few things the Eastern Orthodox panel mention. This originally was a longer post, but I already cut and published certain material in other posts, not all of which I can remember. For one example, though, see Robinson's comments at 52:20 in the video, which I address here and touch on again here).

One of the participants, Cyril Jenkins, says: 

The Bible's not a systematic theology. And systematics kind of has its place, but I would think only long after historical theology and biblical theology have done their work and that's that's not really what Calvinism largely is at all.

Setting aside the Eastern Orthodox professor's presupposition against sola scriptura in his prioritization of historical theology (a point Steve Hays dealt with long ago), fascinating about this is that Seraphim Hamilton - the young man in the video whose debate was being reviewed - self-admittedly owes much of his learning to the Calvinist theologian James B. Jordan, whom Seraphim has described as providing an "ocean of biblical material. It's a kind of a crash course in the whole Bible" (link). It's a shame Seraphim had dipped out of the conversation by this point, or he might have mentioned this to them. 

Likewise, Seraphim has favorably mentioned Peter Leithart's book A House for My Name. I'm probably missing other references, but Meredith Kline, Geerhardus Vos, Warren Gage, G. K. Beale, J. V. Fesko, etc. are a few other leading figures in biblical theology with whom Jenkins might want to become familiar.

Earlier in the discussion, an Eastern Orthodox pastor (De Young) offered the following comment on a lexical argument made by a debate opponent to Seraphim Hamilton on the topic of justification.

One of the the real issues especially with the Reformed approach to this is, as you said, they're going to Greek Lexicon and they're only talking about the New Testament. And a lot of this stuff really falls apart when you get into the Old Testament. And it's not a place where they really want to go, and so as a general future reference, you know, kind of dragging them there... I mean just as one example - as one example - the bit that he would consider Old Testament that's closest in time to the New Testament that talks about justification is Daniel 8:14. And that's where in the Aramaic, Daniel talks about the temple being trampled underfoot for a period of time, at which point the temple will be justified. It's tsadeq in Aramaic, and that is so clearly talking about cleansed, purified, re-established, right? Put back in order right? Any English translation you look at translates it that way.

De Young's intimation is that the justification has an ontological aspect to it along the lines of what EO espouses. Let's compare that to how James B. Jordan translates Daniel 8:14 - And he said to me, "Until evening morning two thousand and three hundred; and a sanctuary will be vindicated." Jordan argues:

The period of time from sometime in 64 A.D. to the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70 is about seven years, or just short of it. This period fits well with 2300 days, taken literally. During this time, a wicked host of priests performed the Continual, after usurping it from the righteous, from the Chief of chiefs. During this time also, both a (new) sanctuary, the Church, and its host (pastors) were trampled and persecuted in the Great Tribulation. After this time, the new sanctuary (the Church) was vindicated by the destruction of the Temple, Jerusalem, and the apostate Circumcision wherever they were. (The Handwriting on the Wall, pg. 437)

According to Jordan, then, De Young is suggesting the apostate temple order was "cleansed, purified, re-eastablished" when, in fact, it was destroyed (70 A.D.)! In contrast, Jordan's biblical-theological interprets the destruction of the apostate temple (vs. 13) as not only not cleansing or transforming the new, antitypical temple of the church (vs. 14), rather, the former (vs. 13) vindicates the latter (vs. 14).

While Young's Literal Translation of Daniel 8:14 is rather wooden, its translation of וְנִצְדַּ֖ק as "declared right" undercuts the Eastern Orthodox pastor's contention regarding English translations. This is even more ironic in that after he criticized Seraphim's opponent for apparently failing to exegete the proof-texts he offered during the debate, De Young does the very same thing. 

If De Young is willing to attempt to rebut Jordan's interpretation with an interpretation situated within a biblical-theological context, I should like to see it. Note EO apologists are even relying on Jordan - to repeat, a dastardly Calvinist! - to such an extent that they're using their own money to translate his commentaries (link). 

By the way, I mention Jordan so much because I think he could be an important figure in future dialogues, not just with EOs, but with others. I indicated as much four years ago when I mentioned him as only one of two examples (the other being Gordon Clark, of course) of someone worth researching (link) before I discussed how I recommended going about research. He appeals to many people whose faiths differ from his own. Even those who view him as dangerous seem to find some comments of his insightful. 

Moving on, a final comment is on the extreme opposition the EOs in the video have to the idea Reformed believers can have assurance of their own salvation. I'll skip over but note in passing a particularly out of place (and certainly fallacious) reference in the video to deathbed anecdotes as evidence that Calvinists have no assurance. This type of manipulation is not qualified to be called apologetics. 

Here is Robinson at minute mark 2:22:29:

On the reformed view can you know that you're elect? How? There's nothing external that happens in the world that's inconsistent with you being reprobate. There's nothing internal to you in terms of your thoughts or states of your soul that are that's inconsistent with you being reprobate. All of your data is consistent with you being elect or reprobate. There's nothing you can point to - "Oh, I have faith." Well, I can't have your toothache, right? So it's not like I can take my experience of having faith and compare it to your experience of having faith and say, "Ah, see, mine's genuine."

I find this objection very weak. Robinson is suggesting that we need to be able to compare experiences of faith to have assurance of which is genuine. But where did he find that as a criterion of assurance? Why can't I compare my experience to what the definition of faith just is: understanding of, assent to, and trust in the gospel of Jesus Christ? 

Does Robinson think he needs to compare himself to other dental patients to determine if he has a toothache? Did Adam need to ask anyone else if he heard God correctly in Genesis 2? Does Robinson not realize he has just prevented members of his own faith from having assurance? EOs can no more compare their experiences of toothaches than can Reformed believers. Here is what Gordon Clark has to say of Robinson's illustration (link):

Since two people cannot have the same sensation, for my toothache is not yours, two people never sense the same thing. Each person lives in a separate world of his own perceptions. Therefore whatever a man thinks is true, that is true for him, and no one else can judge. This is the theory of relativism, the denial of fixed, eternal truth.

Perhaps Robinson projects his own experience while he believes he was a Calvinist onto Calvinism itself (minute mark 2:11:28ff.). He struggled with assurance, asking himself whether his faith was "great enough" - there are, unfortunately, a minority of Reformed believers who do teach that assurance is of the essence of saving faith, and these men can have the tendency of pushing younger men and women into doubt. See the last link in this post where I specifically refute one such person. Robinson's experience is sad, but it cannot be taken as the marker for what Reformed theology actually is.

Another point Robinson makes involves Calvin (minute mark 2:23:09):

You look at Hebrews 6. What Calvin says there - Calvin says that God actually begins the process of regeneration in the reprobate and then withdraws it so that they feel like they're actually being regenerate and so that they end up falsely believing. Well, let's put aside God's moral character as a question at that point. Let's ask the question of, "Okay how do I discriminate between that situation and mine?" I don't know how Calvinists have any Assurance at all. Zero. Goose egg.

We can set aside the point that Calvin is but one exegete. It isn't necessary to make this observation (see below), so I only do so because I know - but readers might not - that this would just lead to EOs begging the question: "if we don't respect what the [alleged] founder of our religion says, then that says it all about his and your religion itself, huh?" 

It's an escape-hatch EOs (and RCs) use if they can, especially if they see no other way out of a conversation in which they no longer wish to participate: make Calvin to be the straw head of a straw man, call the man "Reformed theology," and chop off Calvin (Luther/Protestantism, etc.). A recipe for frustration on the part of the Reformed believer, unless he is willing to let lies and nonsense go. 

This is often called for and recommended. Knowing for yourself that Reformed theology is based on God's revelation is enough. Not every misrepresentation or bad argument should be responded to. There are better things to do.

Anyway, I believe Robinson is referring to Calvin's comments on verse 4 here:

God indeed favors none but the elect alone with the Spirit of regeneration, and that by this they are distinguished from the reprobate; for they are renewed after his image and receive the earnest of the Spirit in hope of the future inheritance, and by the same Spirit the Gospel is sealed in their hearts. But I cannot admit that all this is any reason why he should not grant the reprobate also some taste of his grace, why he should not irradiate their minds with some sparks of his light, why he should not give them some perception of his goodness, and in some sort engrave his word on their hearts. Otherwise, where would be the temporal faith mentioned by Mark 4:17? There is therefore some knowledge even in the reprobate, which afterwards vanishes away, either because it did not strike roots sufficiently deep, or because it withers, being choked up.

Robinson's argument is epistemic: two people experience different things (regeneration vs. taste of grace), yet they cannot distinguish themselves (regenerate vs. unregenerate). Thus, assurance is impossible. So goes the argument.

Firstly, I missed where Robinson got the idea Calvin says God "begins the process of regeneration in the reprobate and then withdraws it." Calvin's first line seems like a fairly straightforward statement to the contrary.

Secondly, does Calvin consider the reprobate to be believers or unbelievers at the time they taste God's grace? If the former, that would make him Augustinian. That would be inconsistent with Reformed theology and indeed undercut Calvin's ability to be assured (cf. link below)... but it would also in turn undercut Robinson's appeal to Calvin insofar as Robinson would no longer be objecting to Reformed theology. 

Now, if the latter - reprobates are never believers - do they ever believe they are? If not, there is no dilemma. If so, then (just as importantly) what are their epistemic grounds for the belief? We are returned to: do these people understand, assent, and trust in the gospel of Jesus Christ? Since we've assumed they are not believers at this point, the answer is no. So it is just a matter of discerning what they misunderstand or reject about the gospel.

These are questions which can't be skipped over, yet are. This is also where the "toothache" illustration turns out to be handy. It is true that I can never experience someone else's toothache or alleged experience of faith. That just means I can't have [infallible] assurance about their salvation, not mine. It also means I may remain ignorant about just what others are having trouble with when it comes to the gospel. Again, though, that has nothing to do with my faith in the gospel and whether I can be assured.

This might turn us to questions about how someone can know he is not ignorant of what saving faith entails. Having myself written a rather long excursus which preemptively answers most of the objections about assurance in the video and goes more deeply into the doctrine, I'll leave this link for those who want to read more, as we're turning more to the question of what is saving faith and less to whether Reformed assurance is possible.

But I will just remind readers that while we are called to full assurance, such not necessary to be saved. This is not to diminish the importance of assurance, but the author of Hebrews also recognizes a hierarchy of foods, some of which are more foundational to others. Assurance is typically something that comes with maturity in faith, and it can also be lost as well as be found again. 

This is not so on Eastern Orthodoxy. These men must admit that they could apostatize from the faith. Therefore, while they may say they are assured now, they cannot with boldness claim that when Jesus returns, they will be found with him. They note that any "divorce" (apostacy) can only initiated by themselves. Okay, are they that confident about themselves? Minute mark 2:26:31:

I'm in control of whether or not I decide to turn my back on Christ. Again, I'm totally capable of it. I do it in small ways all the time, right? But as long as I keep coming back, I know he's not going to turn his back on me.

"As long as I..." is not comforting to one stuck in sin. This almost comes off as cavalier. In their minds, their wills are decisive in salvation, not God's. I really do find it strange that they brought this topic up when it is so clear that what they offer is not the full assurance to which we are called: 

Colossians 4:12 Epaphras, who is one of you, a servant of Christ Jesus, greets you, always struggling on your behalf in his prayers, that you may stand mature and fully assured in all the will of God.

Divine Determinism: Engaging Eastern Orthodox Criticisms

In a few posts, I've mentioned Eastern Orthodox apologist Russ Manion. Since numerous Eastern Orthodox apologists and philosophers seem to have been influenced by his [rather scantily available] work, I've found it useful to read him myself. Elsewhere, I've outlined how he borrowed from Reformed presuppositionalists in ways current Eastern Orthodox apologists have either failed to grasp or follow (link, link). 

I've also acknowledged that it is of course the case that I would find areas of disagreement with him. I'm not Eastern Orthodox, after all. This post will engage one such area. In the course of an hypothetical dialog on metaphysical naturalism, Manion writes (link):

“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature?” I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was reasoning with him, wasn’t I? I answered, “of course it is. As you have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I would not be a naturalist.” “Then they must all be determined, aren’t they?” He affirmed. And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct. There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I wasn’t about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to make it. “So, they are determined.” I said. “What has that to do with reason?” “I would think that is quite clear.” He began. “If all your beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn’t it?” “Now you’re stating the obvious.” I replied. “You’re taking awfully small steps aren’t you?” “Would you prefer I skip a step?” he countered smiling, “Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not.”

Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, “What if the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn’t it be the case then that we are caused to believe something because it is true?” He didn’t even flinch. He simply responded, “That makes no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but every notion, justification, and thought you have. “The second problem has to do with the fact that there are those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your naturalistic belief is. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is not the case that all beliefs are true.”

Note again that the context of this dialog is between a metaphysical naturalist and a Socratic figure - the latter of whom also turns out to be a metaphysical naturalist (albeit a more "consistent" one in that he follows their premises to the absurd entailments). As we will see below, by the end of the conversation, the roles reverse, and the former protagonist for metaphysical naturalism will turn the tables on his Socratic interlocutor by abandoning the position.

Now, what I've highlighted above must be disambiguated from this context in order to assess whether the stated problem with the determinism of the protagonist is 1) in virtue of his "metaphysical naturalism" or 2) is a problem with determinism as such. I think Manion just has the former in mind - here, at least. If so, perhaps I wouldn't disagree with Manion after all. 

In fact, a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion's points if he indeed restricts the problem to the domain of "metaphysical naturalism," the definition of which can be hard to pin down (link) but seems to be associated by Perry Robinson - the author of the Eastern Orthodox blog in which this conversation was posted - with some form of materialism. In his final comment on the post, Robinson writes:

As for logic and the universe, the reason why the naturalist has a hard time with this is manifold. Presumably the laws of logic aren’t material things or reducible to material things.

If logic is immaterial and "good reason" presupposes logic, then it would indeed be impossible for a materialist to have determined beliefs which are held "on the basis of good reason."

A further reason a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion here is that unlike the metaphysical naturalists in his dialog, a Reformed Christian would say that effects are always determined by the "antecedent state of the universe." After all, unlike the metaphysical naturalist, the Reformed Christian will regard the "universe" itself is an effect - of God's free, non-necessitated choice. Just so, God's free choice may effect our beliefs by supernatural means (as well as by ordinary, second causes). An obvious example would be that Reformed Christians argue regeneration leads to belief in the gospel. I'll speak more on this below.

Another reason to think he only has metaphysical naturalism in mind is that his following statement seems to entail fatalism or necessitarianism, which a Reformed Christian is quite capable of denying (link, link, link): 

If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.

To spell out a reply in a little more detail, while the Reformed Christian does indeed believe our positions are determined, we might not have held them were God to have decreed otherwise. Indeed, I think this argument in italics is quite weak, as the very next line concedes that "the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify." That being the case, it cannot be that even a metaphysical naturalist would hold a position "regardless of the reasons given" except insofar as naturalism is incompatible with logic (in which case my response would be the same as what I mentioned earlier) or is necessitarian (unlike Reformed theology). On the contrary, one's position is held precisely because of the reasons given - in other words, only certain means lead to certain ends, which is anti-fatalistic. 

Further, if one is determined to offer invalid reasons for a position, does that mean it is impossible for anyone whose discernments are determined to discern said invalid reasoning? Not for a Reformed Christian. God can determine that people hold [right] beliefs for right reasons or to discern when people (or, upon self-reflection, even oneself) hold beliefs for wrong reasons. Again, then, a charitable understanding of Manion would be that he is specifically arguing against metaphysical naturalism. The context of the above quote and later ones like it seem to confirm this interpretation: 

I sat around for weeks in an epistemic frump. I spent my time flipping through magazines and popularized treatments on modern physics. You know, Schrodinger cat stuff. Every once in a while I would get a surge of confidence and blurt, “Of course I know some things.” Then I would remember that as the chemical tide of my brain ebbs and flows, I would think such things whether they are true or not. Tide in, “I believe such and such to be the case because I have good reason to believe it.” Tide out, “I believe the universe is acting out in me the belief that such and such is the case and that I have good reasons to believe it, whether or not such and such is true.”

Now, it is often true that one might mistakenly believe that he has good reasons for a position. But this is true irrespective of whether one's belief [as well as his reasons] are determined. The point, then, is that apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminianism, et al. cannot misapply these arguments to the context of Reformed theology. 

A while later in Manion's dialog, we read:

"...Would it be fair to say I believe nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?” “Yes I think that would be an accurate statement,” I replied. “I don’t think it’s accurate at all.” He surprised me. “The language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all phenomena of nature haven’t you?” I thought a moment, “Sure,” I said. He continued, “It would follow then, that we do not do anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is an idea that nature has in me. The “idea” is an event in nature that occurs in association with the event in nature called “me.” Do you agree with this?"

“I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend nature.” I answered. “But this is in keeping with my robot paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive. Obviously, they knew something the others didn’t.” He countered, “The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don’t, don’t. Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the way? Does water that finds its’ way to the ocean know something that other water doesn’t? You see, water simply does what nature would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature.”

“OK,” I said. “I already agreed everything is determined, and I’ll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism.” “Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural world?” he asked. “Certainly,” I answered, “No one would question that.” “Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you than it does for me?” he asked. “No, of course not,” I replied. “Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that causes my beliefs?” he asked. “No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. Please stop trying to lead me,” I responded. “Then,” he asked, “how is it that you and I disagree?” I believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spatial and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism.”

I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn’t have much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still had. “How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in naturalism and reason.” “I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise.”

There is quite a lot here to untangle. Once again, it seems as though Manion targets a specific kind of determinism: one in which our actions do not "transcend nature," in which our actions are "of nature," "naturalistic," etc. Does nihilism follow from this sort of determinism? Yes. If "nature" is all that is, then "nature" itself is meaningless; there are neither communicable, shareable, immaterial propositions nor corresponding metaphysical realities. 

Essential persistence and contingent change presuppose metaphysical grounding for a distinction between the two. If nature is all that is, there can be no distinction and you either have hyper-necessity or hyper-contingency. Eleatic monism is unintelligible due to its reductivity, and that which is unintelligible is meaningless; Hyper-Heraclitianism - on which the "man" changes as much as the "river" - is unintelligible for the opposite extreme of rejecting any commonalities. Hope for "meaning" utterly impossible, for "hope" is impersistent! There is no other option for the metaphysical naturalist, though, so nihilism follows. 

But Reformed theology is not subject to these criticisms (link). Man in particular transcends the rest of creation in being images of God. But our freedom is analogical to that of God. We will never be as God Himself is, so we don't function as the final, decisive factors who determine between contingent alternatives. God already did that according to His wisdom and good pleasure. Now, our freedom is genuine - we genuinely are free to desire, feel, think, choose. These have been determined - our freedom is a freedom "to," not a freedom "from" (especially not freedom "from" God's sovereign and eternal decree) - but these determinations could have been otherwise, and there is no resistance from us to that which we already [are determined to] want, do, believe, think, feel, etc. 

Criticisms such as that man must have an indeterministic freedom for it to be genuine really intend to suggest we must conceive of man's freedom as equivalent to God's freedom. Man is put too on par with God. It's idolatry. And raising man to equivalency with God will always, by the same token, lower God to the position of man. In this case, such is evident in that if man's freedom is indeterministic, God cannot be eternally omniscient. His knowledge would (per impossibile) depend on the temporal decisions of men. 

Men have all sorts of inventive ways to try to circumvent this inconvenient, simple truth. As I recall, in this case, Robinson's own preference is to advocate for what is called "suppositionalism," a pedantic position defended by philosopher Jonathan Kvanvig, particularly in chapter 8 of his Destiny and Deliberation. I read this chapter with all the sense of a man (who has realized his former position of Molinism is no good) trying to do his best to push and keep together two repelling magnets. I do not recommend anyone waste his or her time on the book. Bruce Langstry has given a good summary and then critique of Kvanvig here, the latter of which I quote:

Does the theory fulfill its restrained but important aims? Suppose that in the actual world God constructs, at some time t0, a complete suppositional story that specifies the occurrence, at time t10, of such-and-such undetermined events including free human actions. Suppose that God then, at time t1, resolves to bring about all and only the states of affairs that the complete suppositional story says he directly brings about, and that at time t2 he starts implementing his resolution. There is no room in the story for anything to occur which defeats the suppositional justification either for the chronicle of events or for the epistemic conditionals which undergird it. But even assuming that God in fact strongly actualizes all the states of affairs which the story says he strongly actualizes, there is room in the actual world for events to occur which defeat the justification God has at t2 for believing that what in fact happens will not deviate from the story.

Bearing this point in mind, consider the propositions (P) The specified undetermined events will occur at t10 and (Q) There will be no defeaters for the justification of (P). Assume that at t2 God has adequate reasons for believing P. These very same reasons also constitute adequate reasons for his then also believing Q. But neither the truth of Q nor God’s having adequate reasons for believing it establishes that God’s adequate reasons for believing P are indefeasible. According to Kvanvig, ‘grounds are defeasible when it is possible for these grounds to fully justify a given belief and yet that justification be overturned by further learning’ (p.157); presumably he means epistemically possible. For any agent who is aware that adequate reasons for belief are sometimes defeated, the mere possession of adequate reasons for a specific belief does not exclude the epistemic possibility that the belief is false. I can see no way that Kvanvig can rule out its being epistemically possible, relative to the adequate reasons God has at t2 for believing Q, that P is false and that God will, at least by t10 and afterwards, have learned that P is false.

It might be replied: If, in the circumstances under discussion, God’s belief P is false, God has at t2 no way of obtaining evidence that this is so; but this contradicts Kvanvig’s general premise that no truths are inscrutable, a premise which implies that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can in principle become aware and which would thereby undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth.

The reply is mistaken. The general premise does not imply that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can here and now in principle become aware and whose use as a premise would undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth. After all, if scientists are currently justified in believing that no humans will exist 10 billion years from now, and their belief is in fact false, then defeaters for their current reasoning might not become cognitively available in principle until a million years from now. Hence if in the circumstances under discussion, God’s beliefs P and Q are false, the general premise is compatible with the proposition that God at t2 has no way obtaining evidence that P and Q are false.

See also a sort consideration offered by Hugh McCann (link):

...it is hard to intuitively reconcile Kvanvig’s solution here with the reality that all of this reasoning is merely suppositional and each step on its own is fallible; couldn’t it turn out to be mistaken at some point once the suppositions are made reality and the divine fallible reasoning collides with what actually happens?

In short, the moment one starts talking about the possibility of God having false beliefs (and how could this not be possible if God has prior beliefs about man's future, indeterministic decisions?), one has abandoned the sovereignty of God.

Certain statements made in what Manion says above might have been intended only to apply in the context of metaphysical naturalism. But if an analogy by parity of reasoning might be attempted, let's look at the result. Take the following statement from the dialog: "I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid." 

Now change "nature" to "God" and ask yourself if Manion might have made the same argument to a theological determinist. If not, well and good. If so, the desire to get "behind" God - as if! - is the same idolatry I mention above. And if what Manion says in here might have been analogized by him (or might be by other EOs) to the context of theological determinism, Manion's (or their) epistemology is flawed. To say that neither of two contradicting determinists could "know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given" presupposes that indeterministic freedom is a necessary criterion for knowledge. But what possible relevance could being able to indeterministically choose to have bad beliefs or reasons have to being able to know that one's current beliefs or reasons are true? 

In fact, we can't always "compare" beliefs and "evaluate" reasons. Everyone has to make an assumption for reasoning to even get off the ground. I've argued for foundationalism elsewhere numerous times. One can have immediate, non-inferential justification for at least one belief. So if I don't need indeterministic freedom there - if I don't need to "get behind" anything to compare the foundational belief to x, y, or z in order to know it - then why would I need it anywhere else?

I can imagine one final analogization from Manion's foregoing dialog: "“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature? ...We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature." Again, for the sake of argument, exchange "God" for "nature." 

Obviously, a Reformed Christian will hold to a Creator-creature distinction and deny that we are a part of God. As I said above, we have our own thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions. That these are caused does not make them any less ours. When God created the earth, His causing its existence does not imply that the earth was a part of God.  

Nor are we passive creations, mere vessels or repositories. We move. It's just that our movement is not by way of self-origination. Sometimes, only God moves, such as when He first gives us the regenerative grace necessary and sufficient for us to only then have the possibility - indeed, it determines us - to move back toward God. To use an illustration opposite to one I mentioned earlier, in regeneration, God, as He brings Himself near to us, changes our magnetic pole to such that we become drawn and move to Him. God is the originator of His and our movement, yet it is still we who move. And in our movement back to God, we are shown why indeterministic freedom is not needed to explain how co-operation or synergy with God is possible. 

Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:

What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us? 

Now, these reflections leave off the table the possibility that supernaturalism and some form of determinism are compatible. This is short-sighted unless Manion really does think - contrary to the way in which I have tried to charitably interpret his arguments thus far - that all forms of determinism are problematic.

Before I address what seem to be Manion's counters to all varieties of determinism, notice that he alludes to an "eternal being" with a "character" and "attributes." This cannot be the god of Eastern Orthodoxy, though: the god of Eastern Orthodoxy is supposed to utterly transcend metaphysics and epistemology (cf. here, here, Robinson's comment 181 here). Revealed religion indeed!

Manion's two arguments against all varieties determinism seem to be as follows: 1) we ought to say that "something is true for reasons rather than causes," and determinism doesn't allow for that; 2) "freedom make[s] us morally accountable," and determinism doesn't allow for that. 

To the first argument: why can't a determinist say something is true for reasons? Reasons can be caused and causes. Manion seems to have conflated epistemology with metaphysics and presented us with a false dilemma. I also already discussed earlier why our reasons being caused by God is unproblematic.

The answer to the second argument is particularly simple, one which I was able to answer in my early 20s (link). 

Manion's criticisms of determinism are as weak as any other I've read. His criticisms of metaphysical naturalism and the like are well-founded only to the extent they agree with the 20th century Reformed theologians and determinists whose thoughts on worldview formation and critique he consciously borrowed.

Before concluding this post, there are two other points I wish to make since they often make the rounds in EO apologetics (of which I'm aware). The first is Christological: if that which the Trinity has decided is not necessitated (although grounded in the divine nature such that certain, imaginings - like that God could have made a world in which He lies - are impossible), then must the Son also be indeterministically free in his humanity? This does not follow, no. 

It's not much different than asking, "could or would Christ have ever sinned in His humanity?" The answer is no. Is it not obvious why this is the case? Christ is the singular subject of His divine and human wills. For the same reason, the Son sent could and would never have abandoned his mission to save humanity - not even in the garden of Gethsemene can we say this was a possibility. Christ is and was not schizophrenic, and Nestorianism is false.

This is admitted by Robinson (link): "The cardinal text is Christ is Gesthemane. “Not my will but thy will be done.” Could Christ have botched it and disobeyed the Father? Obviously not. But how then being God and it being impossible for him to sin can he have free will?" 

Note that Robinson has just admitted what I said earlier: determinism is compatible with genuine, human willing. Christ genuinely chose to obey His Father, even if He could not do otherwise. Robinson goes on to say that He thinks Christ can be indeterministically free because there are a plurality of goods - while Christ is not free, He can still, then, indeterministically choose from among these goods. 

The problem with this is that the death of Christ was necessary for salvation from sin. Since it was the good pleasure of God for man to be saved from sin, Christ's human will must have necessarily acted in co-operation with His divine will to accomplish the single end (man's salvation) by the single means to that end (His own death). Synergy between God and men, then, does not presuppose indeterministic freedom. This disarms a few EO objections against determinism.

Robinson continues to say that "“Not my will but Your will” expresses that Christ initially wills two good things." These are said to be self preservation and the salvation of humanity. But he fails to be clear: was Christ's preservation of Himself a "genuine alternative possibilit[y]" (as Robinson puts it)? Would not Christ's choosing to preserve Himself from death meant He "botched it"? This is supposed to be a "good" Christ could have chosen? The very idea is self-refuting (note Robinson does not really answer JohnD in the comments on just this point here). This closes comments on the first point I wished to make.

The last point I wish to make concerns an argument regarding the alleged "dialectic" of Augustine, the person many EOs take as the forerunner of determinism. The argument comes from Joseph Farrell's Chapter 9 (and the rest of the book) here as well as his God, History, and Dialectic. 

One might introduce the argument with a question: in the eschaton, are there multiple goods from which we can choose? If not, then how can we have indeterministic, free will? Indeterministic, free will would seem to instead be a dialectic of oppositions: a choice between good and evil. EOs use the doctrine of divine energies to get around this: we can participate in one of any number of "good" divine energies, so indeterministic, free choice in the eschaton is possible after all. But those who hold to a certain, strong view of divine simplicity (e.g. Augustine, Aquinas), have hamstrung themselves - since they don't have access to a doctrine of divine energies, their predestinarian theologies are driven by a dialectic of opposition. Origen and Plotinus are other key figures.

Farrell is a creative thinker. One unfamiliar with his reasoning will need to read him to process his arguments. Nevertheless, he is not above criticism, as I've shown here, and his criticisms mentioned above has the following shortcoming: they will only go so far as one is fully Augustinian (or an Origenist or a Plotinist or so forth). One can accept determinism without also accepting certain lines in the thought of Augustine et al. that give rise to the dialectic Farrell mentions. Further, it is an EO assumption that Reformed Christians implicitly (if not explicitly) depend on Augustine rather than divine revelation for their views on determinism. The framing is biased from the outset and can only be convincing to those who are already EO, not those who aren't.

Now, I don't accept something like Thomistic divine simplicity but rather that the divine attributes are formally distinct (see here and Richard Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3, pgs. 284ff. for more). I lean away from acceptance of the filioque. And I don't have an issue with distinguishing between God's necessary character or attributes (for which EOs cannot account) and His indeterministically free operations or actions or energies, the latter with which we can co-operate or act in synergy. I believe there are multiple goods from which we can choose even in this life (e.g. what to eat in the morning). These truths are indeed contingent, not necessitated. Yet this does not entail indeterministic, free will, and EOs will have to do better in their future apologetics.

Various Debates on Eastern Orthodoxy

In the past months, I've had several debates with those who are Eastern Orthodox on various topics. I will indent the comments of the various EO responders and not indent my own comments. One debate was on penal substitution (link):

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This is basically a repost of a video you made which is now private. I asked on that video (and did not receive a response): 

If the Eastern Orthodox apologist really thinks Jesus tasted the penalty of sin for all men [without exception], how is it just for the damned to nevertheless experience the same penalty? 

Likewise, you said in the now private video that in the garden of Eden, Adam and Eve experienced alienation "from each other." But surely - and conspicuously left unmentioned by the Eastern Orthodox apologist - the principal alienation they experience is alienation from God! Surely this is the death of which God spoke even prior to Eve's creation in Genesis 2:17. If Jesus participates in "the deepest experience of our alienation," does that mean the Eastern Orthodox apologist thinks Jesus likewise experience this alienation - alienation from His own Father? I am unaware of any Eastern Orthodox apologists who admit this. The usual claim is that penal substitution is Nestorian. To the extent that Eastern Orthodox apologists shortchange the penalty Christ undertook on our behalf, they don't really accept penal substitution after all. Nuances like this might easily go unnoticed by converts.

EO #1 The damned experience the penalty because they never appropriated to themselves the benefits of Christ's redemption through living faith. 

Christ bore the punishment in His humanity and experienced what a human experiences who is abandoned by God. He remained fully God Himself though, and fully united to the Father and Spirit. But in His humanity He did not feel the consolation and blessing which the blessed feel from the Godhead, but rather the wrath deserved by sinners. "He said 'My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' to show the magnitude of His penalty, for He was suffering so grievously, as if He were not the Son of God, but God's enemy." –St. Bede the Venerable, Meditation on the Passion of Christ for Seven Hours of the Day

Redemption entails forgiveness. If the benefits were never appropriated, Christ never substituted Himself for them. This is limited atonement. 

What you are describing is characteristic of Reformed theology and opposed to much of what I've heard from EO apologists such as Jay Dyer. It's nice to see!

EO #1 The atonement is objectively unlimited. Christ paid the debt for all. 

But not all people appropriate the benefits of Christ's redemption.

The atonement and redemption ARE appropriated benefits of Christ's work. God is not at-one with faithless individuals, for their sins have not been substitutionally "covered" ("kaphar" = atonement) by Christ's blood.

EO #1 Fine but Christ's atonement objectively provided atonement for all of them, paid the debt for all of them. Until this is appropriated though, yes, people are still in their sins

If everyone's debt has been paid, you are a universalist.

EO #1 Christ paid the debt for all, but all are not saved, because not everyone appropriates the benefits of Christ's all-sufficient Redemption to themselves, and thus their sinfulness is not done away with on their subjective end, though on the objective side of Christ's work itself, He died for them too

Payment of debt entails forgiveness of sin (Colossians 2, Matthew 6, 18). Again, universalism.

EO #1 Sins are forgiven when people appropriate to themselves the saving benefits of Christ's work, which is sufficient for all but only efficient in those who are saved. So sure, Christ has not wiped out every individual's sins, but He has made a payment to divine justice sufficient for all, for He bought even those heretics who would deny the Lord who bought them

To say Christ's death is sufficient for all is NOT the same thing as saying He paid the penalty for all. You keep relocating soteric categories from application to accomplishment. Payment is in the former. Atonement is in the former. Etc. To say Christ's death actually paid for MY sins, YOUR sins, and EVERYONE'S sins is to say we owe God no more debt, that Christ was the substitute for even unbelievers - universalism. 

Also, 2 Peter 2:1 is not a reference to God as Redeemer but rather as Creator. As Dr. Gary Long notes, "agorazõ is never used in a salvation context (unless II Peter 2:1 is the exception) without the technical term “price” (times — a technical term for the blood of Christ) or its equivalent being stated or made explicit in the context (see I Cor. 6:20; 7:23; Rev. 5:9; 14:3-4)."

EO #1 He paid a price sufficient, and so we each can know that we CAN be saved if we appropriate those benefits

Christ's death is such that it COULD pay the price for all, not that He does. The point is: FOR WHOM is Christ penal substitute?

EO #1 The Holy Spirit in the Scriptures was fine with saying Jesus gave Himself a ransom for all, and bought those who would deny Him. Therefore I am content to say so, while denying that everyone appropriates this benefit

All of whom? All without exception (every individual)? Or all without distinction (categories of men)? If a train conductor says, "All aboard!" do you think he means every individual ever or all those who have a ticket? When Luke says Caesar Augustus made a decree to all the world, you think he was talking about North American Indians? Try applying a little context and coherence to 1 Timothy 2. You're advocating universalism. Is Christ the penal substitute for Judas?

EO #1 For all in the same sense I've been explaining: that it is sufficient for all.

No, Paul says Christ gave Himself as a ransom for all. That does not mean He merely made salvation POSSIBLE but ACTUAL: 

Job 33:24 and he is merciful to him, and says, ‘Deliver him from going down into the pit; I have found a ransom 

Psalm 49:15 God will ransom my soul from the power of Sheol 

Isaiah 35:10 And the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with singing; everlasting joy shall be upon their heads; they shall obtain gladness and joy, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away 

Revelation 5:9 And they sang a new song, saying, “Worthy are you to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slain, and by your blood you ransomed people for God from every tribe and language and people and nation, 10 and you have made them a kingdom and priests to our God, and they shall reign on the earth 

Does God do this for everyone without exception? Universalism.

EO #2 "Christ's work" 

The uncreated Son does not have to "work" 

nestorian phraseology for nestorian reformed PSA

Reread the gospel of John and tell me again Christ did no VOLUNTARY work on behalf of His people. 

Your Nestorian strawman is goofy, by the way.

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That ends the first debate. The first commenter was no better than an Arminian in failing to discern between redemption accomplished and redemption applied. The atonement falls into the latter category.

The original video I responded to is one I reference here. The maker of that video, Seraphim Hamilton, was not one of the responders. He's also one of the new-trend EO apologists who are trying to co-opt Reformed thinking. Some EO are doing this with apologetics (link), Seraphim Hamilton is mostly doing it with typology in the mold of James B. Jordan and Peter Leithart. Yet you'll find that these EO apologists have obvious double-standards. 

"Penal substitution is Nestorian if Reformed Christians believe it, but not if we do" (oh, and we'll fail to substantiate our charge, ignore questions about whether Jesus suffered only bodily or in His full humanity, and if all else fails, well, we'll allow nuance or room for intramural discussion for us but not you). 

"Jordan's typology is great and extends to various EO dogma" (but we'll just ignore Jordan's comments on iconography). 

"The transcendental argument refined by Reformed apologists can really only be applied to EO" (but we'll just ignore original sin and fail to articulate or perhaps even understand how how this apologetic is integrally connected to a revelational epistemology).

The next debate is on what EO considers infallible: link

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Is there any infallible list of infallible EO dogma?

EO Truglia: Is there any infallible list of RC dogma? 

Everything received with consensus is the infallible in EOy.

That doesn't really answer my question: is there an infallible list of "everything received with consensus"?

I'm a Protestant, by the way. 

Let's take an example of why I find issue with your reply: Mogila's confession was received "with consensus," was it not? But he taught inherited guilt, something by and large rejected by the current EO "consensus." So which is infallible?

EO Truglia: similar to the Protestant Canon, there is firmness on canonical questions because of consensus. We discern this consensus as a matter of historical fact. 

As a matter of your other questions about the contents of these documents, that's all that can of worms which is worth discussing, but I really don't want to pack it here and so few words in a comment.

I'll leave other considerations aside, but Protestantism actually lists what it considers infallible. Does Eastern Orthodoxy do this? Where?

EO Truglia: yeah, the bible. We do too, the Scriptures and Sacred Tradition. What constitutes both for the both of us is a historical question for both of us. No need to be polemical.

I'm sorry, but this comes across as avoidant - perhaps unintentionally. 

Like I said, I'm willing to leave other considerations aside - including the attempts to analogize our positions, with which I wouldn't agree - but for Eastern Orthodoxy, what actual, concrete, specifics does "Sacred Tradition" entail? I've never seen anyone comprehensively list this out. 

This could be due to my own ignorance, but I hear some EO apologists say that only the 7 ecumenical councils are infallible. Others say 9. Others include pan-orthodox councils. Others include doctrines not taught in these councils but are alleged to be "received" universally, by consensus, etc. How am I supposed to examine Eastern Orthodoxy if I can't know what it regards as infallible?

EO Truglia: im on my phone, but the universal traditions are all consensus base. The liturgy, hymnography, and 7 councila have universal agreement. Just like every prot church has the same Bible, every single Ortho church is the same on these other than hymns to local saints. We have second tier authorities which though having pan episcopal acceptance (like the pan orthodox councils) lack mass commemoration (in effect, their reception among the laity is incomplete.) so, similar to prots being divided upon whether the longing ending of mark is infallible, leading to uncertainty, these second tier authorities have less certainty. Just as not morally safe to reject the longer ending of mark, it isn't safe i feel to reject these secondary authorities--especiakly if received on an official, episcopal level. 

This stuff is not nebulous as you imply. When the Anglicans wanted union in 1720, they were essentially told to accept these things.

For something like the council of Jerusalem, why would what the laity receives be the standard for certainty if, as you suggest, the authorities of the laity all received it? 

Separately, I've already been looking for a good, primary source (free or not, whichever is more comprehensive) record of EO liturgy if you know of one.

Even better: is the version of reception theory you espouse itself consensually received by bishops, laity, etc.? 

I'd never even heard of such a thing before the past 5 years or so, but again, I could be ignorant.

EO Truglia: you're being polemical again. The answer is yes. I did not invent it.

I'm asking sincere questions in good faith and admitting the potential for ignorance. That said, I do not deny my questions convey light jabs intended to discover whether EO has any counters to them. As you seem to be intent on parrying my questions, I suppose I'll have to look for a polite spar elsewhere.

EO Truglia: Too old and tired for needless "light jabs" honestly

I honestly don't know how else I could have posed the questions for which I am interested in answers. I thought I was using kid gloves, but you've no obligation to answer me.

EO #2: You could look up some scholarly material on the history of the Liturgical corpus but since the orthodox catalog of daily cycles feats synaxarium, and services is a whole libraries worth if material you will not find anything even close to such a thing in English or any available language in publication

That's a shame. How else am I supposed to know that to which EO would commit me?

EO #2: Read whats available its all lives of the saints, kontakions or get a complete set of the horologion and daily offices listed in the anthologian as well as whats listed in the matins and vespers. If you want a list like denzinger it doesn't exist but you could get the rudder which is more of a commentary of the canons throughout the ages but some councils are missing, the synodikon also has an extensive list of beliefs as well as the corpus of Gregory palamas, so stop complaining and do some leg work I did and so can you

EO #3: by going to a church and talking to the priest.

[Response to EO #2] Since when is asking questions complaining?

[Response to EO #3] I can only learn of infallible list of EO dogma from fallible sources?

EO #2: Your last question was in regards to "how am supposed to learn" its complaint I had to do alot of leg work that you won't get in any parish catechism, but we don't have that many dogmas that you have to use every loving manuscript to figure out so I don't really get why you want every single liturgical hymn do have any idea how many there are? If thats too much work then I don't know what else to tell you.

Ok, what is the content of the dogma? The acts of ecumenical councils? Just its decrees? More?

EO #2 decress such as the confessions of faith and the theological anathemas such as the condemnation of nestorius and pelagius

the content is the confessions and the updated synodikon that affirms all theological topics of dogmatic importance.

Thank you - where may I find this updated synodikon?

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And that is the end of this debate. A few observations:

Truglia seemed put off when I questioned whether his reception theory was 1) self-consistent 2) as well as consistent in practice (on the question of inherited guilt; cf. link).

Notice none of them could provide me with somewhere to go to for the content of their allegedly infallible liturgy. Apparently, just like a RC has to pre-commit to hoping he doesn't receive any lumps from the pope, to accept EO, you have to buy before sight. In both cases, I guess one is left to hope he doesn't find himself with buyer's remorse (link). 

The reply of third EO commenter brings up an interesting point: can EO (including its liturgical decisions) only know of the infallible contents of EO from fallible bishops? This EO either also applies buy before sight or almost makes it sound like another borrowing Reformed apologetics, this time in the way of R. C. Sproul's view of the canon as a fallible list of infallible books. In fact, either despite or as a supplement to his reception theory, Truglia himself says this exact thing on his blog (link)! Truglia says:

My final reflection now drags Anglican apologist "The Other Paul" to the mix. He claimed in a debate with myself that because there is no infallible list of sacred tradition, it is too vacuous a concept to hold to. This led not only to the absurdity that we (he alleges) do not infallibly know the Gospel of John to be Scripture (by my above criteria, we obviously can and everyone knows the Orthodox are correct about this), but it puts him into contradiction with Ortlund and Sproul who give the only remotely satisfying answer to the Scriptural canon question, even if their apologetic is incomplete.

If Protestants insist their canon is fallible, but this has no effect on moral certainty on the question (I grant the latter, but not the former due to the quibbles above), then they are stuck granting the same to sacred tradition or at least in matters of degree (we have more consensus on biblical canon than on X tradition, and so we are by that degree more certain).

I respect Truglia more than other EO apologists I encounter. He tends to apply standards more evenly (unlike EOs I mentioned above). But to that extent, it makes his position more easy to critique.

That is, "The Other Paul" got him on this one. I would add to the vacuity of "Sacred Tradition" my earlier argument that EO apologists have to sell their goods before allowing the buyer to see it. His assertion that Sproul's view of the canon is "the only remotely satisfying answer" begs the question, and his "I'll look the other way if you will" tactic only works if he gets away without being called out for it. My position is that we have an infallible list of infallible books, for the Protestant canon just is the self-authenticating, extant extent of divine revelation. I expect that this is not the answer Truglia wants to hear.

The last debate also involves Truglia and others, this time on original sin.

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Mogila says original sin renders one liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath. That sounds like original guilt to me (contra Pomazansky, for example).

EO Truglia: If taken in isolation it can be taken in that way, but if we understand "guilt" to be the right judgment for a defective tropos/will, then it harmonizes.

Does "defective" mean "sinful"? 

If not, your response does not explain on what account we are held liable to the eternal punishment of divine wrath. 

If so, then since the mode of will for the people in question is due to Adam's sin, that just is original guilt. 

As you would say, "it's a good question" :) 

Fortunately, Mogila even tells us the answer to this question: 

"...whosoever is not a partaker [of baptism,] such a one remains unabsolved from his sin, and continueth in his guilt, and is liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath: As it is said (John 3.5), Verily, verily, I say unto you, that except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." 

The persons of whom he speaks are ones unabsolved from his sin. Unabsolved = guilty. His sin = reason. His sin = "hereditary sin." That's original guilt.

EO #2 Yes we are guilty because we are liable this is why palamas stretches the fact that man was corrupted by Adam's fault but this does not negate man from grace in all sense but as Popovich states that we have an indelible mark on the soul that enables us to do natural good

Shouldn't it be that we are liable to punishment because we are guilty? Divine punishment is grounded in man's guilt. Otherwise, that's voluntarism (highly ironic, since that's what EO's commonly charge Reformed believers of). 

Who's Popovich?

EO #2: well yes thats why St Gregory palamas and Philaret of moscow say it's necessary for Christ to become man and aleviate the sickness in our nature by giving man eternal life.

St Justin popovich is an Orthodox theologian and philosopher who also cites the catechism of peter mogila but of you want modern Orthodox statements free from free from Romanides and Yannaras liberalism heres from the 80s "catechism" 

Orthodox Catechism by Metropolitan Sotirios Athanassoulas (Ecumenical Patriarchate): “That is original sin. And its consequences? A.) Spiritual death. That is, the separation of man from God, the source of all goodness. B.) Bodily death. That is, the separation of the body from the soul, the return of the body to the earth. C.) The shattering and distortion of the “image.” That is, darkness of mind, depravity and corruption of the heart, loss of independence, loss of free will, and tendency towards evil. Since then “the imagination of man’s heart is evil “(Genesis 8:21). Man constantly thinks of evil. D.) Guilt. That is, a bad conscience, the shame that made him want to hide from God. E.) Worst of all, original sin is hereditary. It did not remain only Adam and Eve’s. As life passes from them to all of their descendants, so does original sin. We all of us participate in original sin because we are all descended from the same forefather, Adam.

So you disagree with EOs who reject original guilt? 

Does that mean you admit Mary was conceived guilty in the same way Mogila describes? (i.e. that she was rendered liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath) 

Finally, if one is guilty, presumably it is of original sin. What is the connection between Adam and ourselves if we are guilty of the sin he personally committed? Reformed theology would follow Augustine (Against Julian) in saying that we are not only guilty but culpable for Adam's sin, having participated in it (reatus culpa in addition to reatus poenae). That is, you can't have guilt without culpability (else, voluntarism again). What is your thought on that?

EO #2: Not culpable but liable we never lost the Image of God but as the confession of dositheos explains we are damaged, and yes I disagree with modern orthodox because are mostly ignorant on their own literature I'm not

Also I have to disagree with your assessment I've studied many documents in Orthodoxy on original sin and mogila and pomazansky dont conflict pomazansky cites the encyclical of the eastern patriarchs and the Russian confession which doesn't deny the use of guilt but lists how some sects over emphasis phrases to lead to different anthropologies "In order to restore the order which had been violated, it was necessary first of all to give satisfaction for the offense given to God, and by this means to remove the guilt of mankind and the punishment that weighs upon him." orthodox dogmatic theology 

Also

"Before Christ we all shared the same ancestral curse and condemnation poured out on all of us from our single forefather, as if it had sprung from the root of the human race and was the common lot of our nature. Each person’s individual action attracted either reproof or praise from God, but no one could do anything about the shared curse and condemnation, or the evil inheritance that had been passed down to him and through him would pass to his descendants." St Gregory palamas

EO #3: There is a difference between being guilty of Adam's transgression (direct imputation of what he personally commited), and being guilty of our own sinful condition/nature that we inherited from Adam.

EO #2: I guess you concede liability then thanks I accept your concession.

[Response to EO #2] If you don't click to reply button, I don't get notified and assume the conversation is over. So you can make up whatever nonsense in your mind you want, but it's not like I sit around clicking refresh on this video hoping you have responded. 

As for your comment, for you to say we are liable without culpability is voluntarism. It makes us subject to punishment for no other reason than mere, divine will. We have done nothing to deserve punishment if we are not also culpable, as Augustine recognized. In other words, you've compromised God's justice.

[Response to EO #3] Was this meant for me? If so, what does Romans 5 say about the contrast between the first and second Adam's acts?

EO #2: by sending his only Son into this world, who might take flesh of a most unspotted virgin, by the operation of the Holy Spirit and redeem lost man; and receive him into his kingdom, from question 25 of Mogila establishes that he views the virgin as spotless now whether she was made spotless at her entrance to the temple as some fathers say or as Some scholars theorized that she was born spotless as some who beleive Mogila himself held the view you're making a statement about the mother of God mogila himself doesn't hold and in Orthodoxy we do hold that the liability keeps one out of the flock of Heaven which is why baptism is necessary. There's a spectrum of sin as people who are born into it are under but not all people experience eternal punishment the same you're just making a mistake of incorporating a sweeping view based on your prior precepts

You do realize it's possible to culpable while not being fully liable "The servant who knows the master’s will and does not get ready or does not do what the master wants will be beaten with many blows. But the one who does not know and does things deserving punishment will be beaten with few blows" Luke 12 also St Gregory nanzianzus says infants who die unbaptized don't face the same degree of punishment as Adam would have

Reread your own citation of Luke 12: "But the one who does not know and does things DESERVING PUNISHMENT will be beaten with few blows" 

Ironically, your own citation refutes you. The point is, if you reject infant culpability, you have no basis upon which to assert they deserve ANY punishment, no matter how many or few blows. And let's not pretend that Mogila doesn't say that it is the eternal punishment of the divine wrath that infants deserve. Next time, please address the point. 

You've compromised God's justice in suggesting God punishes those who bear no culpability for sin.

EO #2: Still awaiting an answer since ive already provided the Orthodox dogmatics and the subsequent councils your charge that we have no dogmas failed and now you're just arguing with nothing concerning original since im not a romanidean .

EO #4: “However, it is called sin, not in such a way that it makes us guilty, but because it is the result of the guilt of the first man and because by rebelling it strives to draw us to guilt, unless we are aided by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, lest even the dead sin so rebel that by conquering it revives and reigns.” 

This is what St. Augustine says in Against Julian. He's saying we aren't guilty of Adam's personal sin, but we are in a guilty state before God prior to baptism due to our sinful nature inherited from Adam. This is cleansed at baptism, for we are baptized for the remission of sins. This is why the exercism prayers are read even for infant baptisms. 

Here is Canon 121 of Carthage 418 (which is dogmatically binding per Trullo): 

"It has pleased the Council to decree that whosoever denies the little ones newly born from the wombs of their mothers when they are being baptized, or asserts that they are baptized for the remission of sins, but that they have inherited no original sin from Adam obliging them to be purified in the bath of renaissance (whence it follows that in these persons the form of baptism for the remission of sins is not true, but is to be regarded as factitious), let him be anathema; for no other meaning ought to be attached to what the Apostle has said, viz., "Sin entered the world through one human being" (Rom. 5:12), and thus it passed over into all human beings; wherefore all of them have sinned, than that which the catholic Church diffused and spread abroad every-where has ever understood those words to mean. For it is on account of this Canon of the faith that even the little ones too, who are as yet incapable of committing if any sin of their own to render them guilty of any offense, are truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that what sin they inherited from the primordial birth may be purified in them through the process of renaissance."

[Response to EO #2] My charge is you've compromised God's justice in suggesting God punishes those who bear no culpability for sin.

[Response to EO #4] You cited canon 110, not 121. I'm well aware of it, as was Augustine (present at that council). So since you mention Augustine, let's see what else he says in Against Julian: 

//I ask you by what justice must an image of God that has in no way transgressed the law of the God be estranged from the kingdom of God, from the life of God? Do you not hear how the Apostle detests certain men, who, he says, are 'estranged from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart'? Is a non-baptized infant bound by this sentence or not? If you say he is not bound, they you will be vanquished and punished by the evangelical truth and by the testimony of Pelagius himself, for where is the life of God except in the kingdom of God, into which none but those born again of water and the Spirit can enter? But, if you assert that he is bound, you acknowledge the punishment. Then you must acknowledge the guilt (culpam). You confess the torment—confess, then, that it is deserved.// 

But Eastern Orthodoxy denies that infants are culpable (see [EO #2] right above you). Most EO don't even affirm inherited guilt.

EO #2: Do you have a place where I ever say that as the case? I do have Peter Mogila saying that the virgin mary was pure and even some evidence suggesting he may have held to the immaculate conception so your attempt to target the doctrine of the purity of mary off your speculative case isn't gonna work here

"And this is done in the mystery of holy Baptism; and whosoever is not a partaker thereof, such a one remains unabsolved from his sin, and continueth in his guilt, and is liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath" 

Mary isn't even mentioned, but that's irrelevant anyways. Mogila says all infants are under original sin and therefore guilty and liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath. For you to say infants aren't culpable makes them be subject to undeserved punishment. That is what destroys the justice of God in your system. You can avoid the point or address it.

EO #4: I cited Canon 121 according to the Masterjohn translation of The Pedalion (Rudder). Canon 110 refers to people returning from Donatism and bishops. 

I agree with [EO #2] and The Church's teaching that infants aren't culpable because they haven't committed personal sin. However, they are liable for Adam's sin because they were found in Adam at the Fall, as all humanity was. We have our nature from Adam, and that nature was corrupted by his sin. Therefore, we fall under the same curse. You can find this language in St. Cyprian of Carthage, St. Ambrose, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, St. Ephraim the Syrian, St. Hilary of Poitiers, and St. Symeon the New Theologian, and several other Church Fathers. 

Again, it depends on what you mean by guilt. St. Augustine used three words for that English word: culpa, reatus, and reus. 

As a side note, I don't really care what the average (or most, as you said...which is a claim that will be hard for you to prove) EO person today affirms. I care about what the dogmatically binding councils and Holy Scriptures say. Individual saints are not infallible. The consensus of the Fathers, which is borne out in the dogmatically binding councils, is. Carthage 418-419 is one of those councils.

From the Church Fathers I mentioned: 

But again, if even to the greatest sinners, and to those who had sinned much against God, when they subsequently believed, remission of sins is granted — and nobody is hindered from baptism and from grace— how much rather ought we to shrink from hindering an infant, who, being lately born, has not sinned, except in that, being born after the flesh according to Adam, he has contracted the contagion of the ancient death at its earliest birth, who approaches the more easily on this very account to the reception of the forgiveness of sins— that to him are remitted, not his own sins, but the sins of another.” – St Cyprian of Cathage, Epistle 58 

“In Adam I fell, in Adam I was cast out of paradise, in Adam I died. How shall God call me back, except He find me in Adam? For just as in Adam I am guilty of sin and owe a debt to death, so in Christ I am justified.” – St Ambrose of Milan, On the Death of His Brother Satyrus 

“Thus has the guilt of the disobedience that is by Adam been remitted; thus has the power of the curse ceased, and the dominion of death been brought to decay. And this too Paul teaches, saying, ‘For as by the disobedience of the one man, the many became sinners, so by the obedience of the One, the many became righteous.’ For the whole nature of man became guilty in the person of him who was first formed; but now it is wholly justified again in Christ. For He became for us the second commencement of our race after that primary one; and therefore all things in Him have become new.” 

“How did many become sinners because of Adam?… How could we, who were not yet born, all be condemned with him, even though God said, ‘Neither the fathers shall be put to death because of their children, nor the children because of their fathers, but the soul which sins shall be put to death’? (cf. Deut. 24:18) … we became sinners through Adam’s disobedience in such manner as this: he was created for incorruptibility and life, and the manner of existence he had in the garden of delight was proper to holiness. His whole mind was continually beholding God; his body was tranquil and calm with all base pleasures being still. For there was no tumult of alien disturbances in it. But because he fell under sin and slipped into corruptibility, pleasures and filthiness assaulted the nature of the flesh, and in our members was unveiled a savage law. Our nature, then, became diseased by sin through the disobedience of one, that is, of Adam. Thus, all were made sinners, not by being co-transgressors with Adam,… but by being of his nature and falling under the law of sin… Human nature fell ill in Adam and subject to corruptibility through disobedience, and, therefore, the passions entered in.” - St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on St. Luke's Gospel; Commentary on Romans 

“When Adam had transgressed, his sin reached unto all men.” - St Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians and On the Incarnation of the Word 

“Just as Adam sowed sinful impurity into pure bodies and the yeast of evil was laid into the whole of our mass [nature], so our Lord sowed righteousness into the body of sin and His yeast was mixed into the whole of our mass [nature]” – St Ephraim the Syrian“ 

“Having been sent in a flesh in the likeness of that of sin, He did not have sin in the same way that He had flesh. But as all flesh comes from sin, that is, it derives from the sin of Adam the progenitor, He has been sent in a flesh similar to that of sin, because in Him sin does not subsist, but the image of sinful flesh.” – St Hilary of Poitiers, Commentary on Psalm 118 

“Human nature is sinful from its very conception. God did not create man sinful, but pure and holy. But since the first-created Adam lost this garment of sanctity, not from any other sin than pride alone, and became corruptible and mortal, all people also who came from the seed of Adam are participants of the ancestral sin from their very conception and birth. He who has been born in this way, even though he has not yet performed any sin, is already sinful through this ancestral sin.”

"Thus, in soul Adam died immediately, as soon as he had tasted [from the fruit of that tree from which God had commanded him not to taste, threatening him that if he should only taste of it he should die]; and later, after nine hundred and thirty years, he died also in body. For, as the death of the body is the separation of it of the soul, so the death of the soul is the separation from it of the Holy Spirit… Later, for this reason, the whole human race also became such as our forefather Adam became through the fall – mortal, that is, both in soul and body. Man such as God had created him no longer existed in the World.”– St Symeon the New Theologian, Homily 37:3; Homily 45:3

You may have meant to "cite canon 121 according to according to the Masterjohn translation of The Pedalion (Rudder), but, no, you did not cite that. Here's how that translation reads: 

"It has pleased the Synod to decree that whosoever denies the little ones newly born from the wombs of their mothers when they are being baptized, or asserts that they are baptized for the remission of sins, but that they have inherited no propatorical sin from Adam obliging them to be purified in the bath of renaissance (whence it follows that in these persons the form of baptism for the remission of sins is not true, but is to be regarded as factitious), let him be anathema; for no other meaning ought to be attached to what the Apostle has said, viz., “Sin entered the world through one human being” (Rom. 5:12), and thus it passed over into all human beings; wherefore all of them have sinned, than that which the catholic Church diffused and spread abroad every where has ever understood those words to mean." 

This is not what you cited in your last comment. Be more honest. 

Also be more honest in that you are quoting material from another website (The Orthodox West). You come off as if you haven't done any research yourself. 

Since you yourself say "Individual saints are not infallible," I'll mostly skip responding to your list. You've already skipped responding to my citation of Against Julian, so that's even. I too prefer to focus on what you consider to be dogma. In fact, that's why I cited Mogila at the beginning - his catechism has pan-orthodox acceptance. But let's hover on Symeon the New Theologian's following statement: 

//...all people also who came from the seed of Adam are participants of the ancestral sin from their very conception and birth...// 

This is excellent, but it also means infants are culpable. The only one's who teach reatus culpa are us - pesky, Reformed Christians. I'm pleasantly surprised that we have more in common with him than you and "The [EO] Church" does. 

And I'm well aware of the meanings of "guilt." Did you not see me specify one of them (culpam) in my citation of Augustine's Against Julian? I have been very specific in my critique of [EO #2] that he (and you, apparently) have compromised God's justice in suggesting God punishes those who bear no culpability for sin. Your following statement does not help: 

//However, they are liable for Adam's sin because they were found in Adam at the Fall, as all humanity was. We have our nature from Adam, and that nature was corrupted by his sin. Therefore, we fall under the same curse.// 

Can you even explain what this means - in your own words? For example, define "nature." 

If we were truly in Adam (traducianism, which I accept), not nominally, then we are, as Symeon says, participants in Adam's sin. You've begged the question by assuming "that infants aren't culpable because they haven't committed personal sin." "Personal sin" is not the only sin for which one may be culpable.

EO #2 I pointed out where mogila said mary is spotless you can ignore that if you want but it just shows your bias confirmation and i already posted that culpability is via liability not for the things sake. It's why if they die they don't suffer like Adam would have suffered

Whether Mary is spotless has nothing to do with my criticism of your position. So I will ignore it. 

In your fourth comment in this thread, you said: "Not culpable but liable." 

But Mogila says all infants (exclude Mary if it makes you feel better) are under original sin and therefore guilty and liable to the *eternal punishment of the divine wrath*. That's suffering, and it doesn't matter what the degree of it is. It's undeserved if one has no culpability. So you make infants subject to undeserved punishment and, thus, compromise God's justice in suggesting God punishes those who bear no culpability for sin.

EO #2: You're either being obtuse or arguing just to argue I already stated as did ancient insights that liability was due to Adam's culpability being upon all men which makes us have a loss due to adams transgression so we are depraved of the inherentance, which you confuse and conflate every man has done what adam has done. We are still guilty because we are stricken with adams penalty by being his sons

Ancient Insights? You mean Ben? You said that Ben said "that liability was due to Adam's culpability being upon all men." But that's false. In a video he made with Truglia 3 years ago, Ben says that "the only person culpable for Adam's sin is Adam himself." I think you have no idea what you are talking about. 

Can you even define liability and culpability? Please do so.

EO #4: I'm staring right now at the 2006 Masterjohn version on my computer. It says what I posted in my comment. Which version are you looking at? You also accused me of citing Canon 110 of Carthage, so now you're changing your accusation. 

I'm happy to admit that those quotes were found on The Orthodox West's blog. I don't see where I found them having an impact on the content of the saints' words. The reason I brought up the various saints is to show that there's a wide consensus of the Church Fathers teaching original sin and that we are found guilty before God because of it before we even commit personal sins. That's why infants are baptized for the remission of sins. 

I would affirm St. Peter Mogila's confession, as did the Synod of Iași in 1642. The patriarchates of Jerusalem, Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria all signed on to it by 1643, making it dogmatically-binding. I'd especially affirm his response to Question 24, which is relevant here: 

"Whether all men are liable for the sin of Adam? 

As all mankind, during the state of innocence, was in Adam; so in him all men, falling from what he fell, remained in a state of sin. Wherefore mankind has become, not only subject to sin, but also, on account of sin, to punishment; which, according to the sentence pronounced by God, was (Gen. 2.17): “In the day that thou eatest of the tree, thou shalt surely die.” And to this the apostle alludes (Rom. 5.12): “Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.” So that we are conceived in our mother’s womb, and born in this sin, according to the holy psalmist (Ps. li.7): “Behold, I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother conceived me.” This is called ancestral sin, first, because before this, man was free from all sin; although the devil was then corrupt, and fallen, by whose temptation this ancestral sin sprang up in man; and Adam becoming guilty, we all likewise, who descend from him, become also guilty. Secondly, this is called original sin, because no mortal is conceived without this depravity of nature." 

You'll get no argument from me about this statement. You might get some modernist EOs denying that, but they would be going against the tradition of The Church. 

For the record, I'm using the translation from Maksimologija because I couldn't copy the one made by J.J. Overbeck. The essence of the text is the same. 

Let me define my position better because I think we are talking past each other but might actually agree. If by culpable you mean liable for punishment because all of humanity was present in Adam when he sinned, then I would affirm that infants are culpable. If by culpable you mean that Adam and I (or infants) both chose to commit the original sin with the same level of intention, then I would not affirm that they are culpable. I believe St. Symeon is speaking of the former when stating that we are participants in Adam's sin. Therefore, I would say infants are culpable in the former sense mentioned above. 

I'm currently undecided between traducianism or creationism with regard to the creation of the soul because, as far as I'm aware (open to correction here), The Church has not dogmatically made a pronouncement. There were saints that held each of these views. St. Symeon's statement above would imply he affirmed some sort of traducianism. That said, I would say traducianism offers a simple explanation as to why Christ did not have original sin in His humanity (virginal conception by His mother). What IS condemned by The Church, however, is the preexistence of souls.

The copyright I'm looking at is 2005. If you have a different version, I apologize for my assumption. It makes little difference. 

This is quite a turnaround from early today, when you said, "I agree with [EO #2] and The Church's teaching that infants aren't culpable because they haven't committed personal sin." 

You are now the closest I have come to discussing with an EO who understands the point I have been getting at. I know of no one else who would accept what I have said as you have: that we are culpable (deserving of blame) for the original sin because we are and always have been (since our conception) participants in it. It wasn't an atomistic Adam who sinned, but his agency by which he sinned is shared with his progeny traduced out of him. As a friend of mine says, there cannot be a continuity of the substance of the soul without a continuity of being and moral agency. 

Of course, Christ is not culpable is that He was never "in" the first Adam and, thus, never [culpably and participatively] sinned in Adam (unlike the rest of Adam's progeny). He was not paternally traduced. 

This is indeed the way to resolve how infants could be subject to eternal punishment without compromising divine justice. 

But accepting imputed guilt and reatus culpa sounds good in theory. In practice, I have never heard any EO accept this. I wonder if you take this to your deacon, priest, or bishop, what will you say if, as I suspect, he or they tell you that these are wrong?

EO #4: I thought [EO #2] and I were saying the same thing, but I realized we weren't, especially with regard to the Theotokos. The Fathers teach that she had original/ancestral sin but no personal sin (thus, why she is spotless) but was cleansed of original sin at a given point. 

This is from Bishop Theophilus of Campania in Greece (1749-­‐1795) in a chapter titled "On the Ancestral Sin of the Holy and Ever-­Virgin Mary": 

"Athanasius the Great in his Discourse Against Apollinaris 4, says: "He [the Son of God] united to Himself a soul-endowed body, which had the possibility to suffer willingly, and which did not pre-exist and was afterwards united with Him because of its virtue. This body did not simply come forth from the human side, i.e. from Mary, but after she had been sanctified, and then, God the Word became through her a partaker of humanity by uniting to Himself by way of condescension (economy) a soul-endowed body, so that He is one and the same person, God and man." Do you hear this? He said, "after she had been sanctified, and then, God the Word became through her a partaker of humanity", i.e. after she was cleansed from the ancestral sin. Because, what other sin had this blameless and pure Virgin committed? 

And again the same Father, in his work On the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, says the following: "And so man is divided into two parts and was condemned to end up in two places. This is why there was need of Him who pronounced this, so that He would Himself dissolve His decision by appearing with the uncondemned and sinless form of the condemned humanity, and thereby God’s reconciliation with man might be achieved and man’s freedom might be restored through a man in communion with the image of the Son, the Lord Jesus Christ." Consider this, then! He pronounced the curse of the ancestral sin for the entire humanity, and He, too, dissolved it, by appearing with the uncondemned and sinless form of the condemned humanity, so that man’s reconciliation with God might be achieved and the freedom of all human beings, all without exception, including His Mother, might be granted through Him by condescension (economy)." 

Some of the Fathers point to the Annunciation and indwelling of the Holy Spirit as the moment the Theotokos was cleansed of original sin, and this seems to be backed up by the liturgical texts on that feast day: 

"Ode VII in Matins: My soul hath been cleansed, my body sanctified; I am made a temple fit to hold God, a divinely adorned tabernacle, a temple rendered animate through the visitation of the most holy Spirit, and am the pure Mother of the Life!” 

With regard to culpability (worthy of blame), now you have my clarification of terms and my position. 

Unfortunately, many modern Orthodox people end up falling into a crypto or outright Pelagian position to avoid sounding "too Western" (whatever that means). This is really a 20th century innovation. The Eastern Patriarchs did not mention original sin or the atonement in their list of grievances against Papism in their 1848 encyclical to Pius IX. Following the scriptures, dogmatically-binding councils and confessions, and the consensus of the Church Fathers is a better way to go than renovationism.

Thank you, you are correct about Mary. And I am inclined to agree with you in really quite every respect. This has been most encouraging. 

But that 20th century trend you mention is what gives rise to my last question: hypothetically, let's say you take what you've said and present it to your deacon, priest, or bishop. If they tell you that these are wrong, would you believe yourself to be conscience bound to your interpretation of the matter or to what your deacon, priest, or bishop tells you to believe instead? 

This is no impractical question. I've watched dozens of videos of these EO authorities teach exactly against what you've said.

EO #4: I'd be conscience-bound to the teachings of The Church, which any clergyman who denies original sin would be against. As you know individual clergymen are not infallible and also must abide by the teachings of the Church (especially in dogmatic areas). What's a shame is that you have bishops in the early 20th century who held the Church's teaching like Abp Theophan of Poltava and New Martyr Victor of Vyatka who have been, in a way, swept under the rug (so to speak). That's why I appreciate resources like The Orthodox West's blog for showcasing what The Church actually teaches on the matter from the works of the Fathers themselves. 

Out of curiosity, can you name the clergymen you've seen who deny original sin publicly? I'm not denying that they exist, but I want people to know who they are.

Search youtube for "What is the Orthodox Perspective on Original Sin?" and listen especially to minute 9:42 and following: 

//...we have this development, this theological development which is based on this erroneous concept but we also have among the Reformers John Calvin who embraced a lot of the Augustinian concepts including predestination and he also embraced the understanding of Original Sin and the transmission of sin and guilt and the responsibility of Adam based on Augustine's understanding and that has been the case until this day for those who have followed the Calvinist understandings. Of course in the Orthodox Church this is not even a topic to be discussed because we do not see any such possibility of transmission of sin and guilt and responsibility in any possible way.// 

The video has over 100k views. Eastern Orthodox bishop Irenei of London & Western Europe was forced to backtrack what he said in a video ("Are We Born Guilty of Sin?) when he said: 

//We are born spotless. There is no human ever ever born sinful, as if he were already a sinner by virtue of his constitution. God does not create like this, and every human being is born pure as Adam was fashioned pure. Yet we are touched by sin from the very beginning. By the time we open our eyes to the world, the sinfulness of the world is already having an impact on us.// 

In a note on Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, we read: 

//Some Orthodox Christians have mistakenly defended the Augustinian notion of "original guilt" — that is, that all men have inherited the guilt of Adam's sin — and others, going to the opposite extreme, have denied altogether the inheritance of sinfulness from Adam. Fr. Michael rightly points out, in his balanced presentation, that from Adam we have indeed inherited our tendency towards sin, together with the death and corruption that are now part of our sinful nature, but we have not inherited the guilt of Adam's personal sin.// 

See also Romanides, Andrew Louth (Original Sin and the Fall: Five Views), Josiah Trenham on Reason and Theology (minute 107:54ff.), etc. 

I respect your answers. You seem like someone who would not so easily put out straw men against Reformed theology that I hear so often in these contexts (e.g. it's Manichean). Would you agree that EO and Protestantism share more in common on the topic of private judgment than. We both agree that there are higher and lower authorities. We both agree that where in disagreement, we need to accept the higher authority. Do we not then agree that we must judge when such occurs? This is another straw man argument I often hear against Protestantism. 

Dialogue would be much better between both sides if we set aside the bad arguments.

EO #4 The examples you shared with me are atrocious to hear as an Orthodox Christian. St. Augustine is always the strawman scapegoat for these types of people. They don't seem to actually read what he wrote, nor do they know that the "Eastern Fathers" also teach original sin. The article about inherited guilt in St. Augustine and St. Cyril on the Orthodox West's blog is helpful in this regard. Same with the Ancestral/Original Sin article. Anytime I hear "East vs West" nonsense, I walk away. 

I remember commenting on Bp Irenei's video. That statement is pretty darn close to Pelagianism. Even his walk back statement was still crypto Pelagian (see from 11:41-12:54 of the video). I wish more Orthodox people knew that Pelagianism (in the form of Caelestius and Julian of Eclanum) was condemned at the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus. In fact, Nestorianism and Pelagianism were both linked by St. John Cassian and Marius Mercator: 

"[T]he error of Pelagius ... that in saying that Jesus Christ lived as a mere man without any stain of sin, they actually went so far as to declare that men could also be without sin if they [chose]." - St. John Cassian, On the Incarnation against Nestorius 

Accusing Theodore of Mopsuestia of being the father of the Pelagian position: "T]hat the progenitors of the human race, Adam and Eve, having been created mortal by God, did not wound any of their descendants when they strayed by their transgression, but harmed only themselves; that they made themselves guilty of the command before God, but absolutely no one else." - Marius Mercator, Commonitorium 

Romanides is just...he shouldn't even be taken seriously. Same with Yannaras. 

Orthodox people are better off learning their own faith instead of pontificating straw men about other confessions. I remember someone telling me about the "Latin view" of original sin. The Catechism of the Catholic Church didn't even teach what that person was saying. It makes Orthodoxy look really bad when erroneous polemical statements are made. 

With regard to your questions, I don't know enough about the Protestant confessions (especially the Reformed position) to give positive or negative answers to your questions.

The question isn't really about confessions. It's about how we must judge between higher and lower authorities when they disagree. We both would say to always side with the higher authority, right? 

Let me encourage you to address error where you see it (like the Irenai video). It can be tempting to take the easy route and just walk away - and sometimes the demands of life does require that of us - but if you can push back, do. 

Looking back over my notes, I realize I have one last question. Compare the following: 

We should also know that when baptized infants die, they enjoy the Paradise of delight, whereas those not illumined by Baptism and those born of pagans go neither to Paradise nor to Gehenna. (Synaxarion Saturday Before Meatfare Sunday) 

Mogila's Confession 20. What is original sin? 

Original sin is the transgression of that law of God which was given to Adam, the Father of all men, in these words (Gen. 2.17), Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. This original sin spreadeth over all human nature; forinasmuch as we were all then contained in Adam. Wherefore by one Adam sin hath passed into us all. And we are conceived and born with this blemish, as the Scripture teacheth us (Rom. 5.12), By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. This hereditary sin cannot be rooted out or abolished by any repentance whatever, but only by the grace of God, through the work of redemption, wrought by our Lord Jesus Christ, in taking upon him our flesh and pouring out his precious blood. And this is done in the mystery of holy Baptism; and whosoever is not a partaker thereof, such a one remains unabsolved from his sin, and continueth in his guilt, and is liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath: As it is said (John 3.5), Verily, verily, I say unto you, that except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. 

Mogila's Confession 63. What are we to think concerning those who depart hence under the wrath of God? 

Of these, some, after the last Judgment, will be punished with greater, some with lesser Torments; but both will be without end. As the Scripture declareth (Luke 12.47), That servant that knew his Lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. 

Mogila's Confession 68. Where is the place of those souls who leave their bodies under the displeasure of God? 

Many names are given to that place: it is called “Hell”, into which the Devil, when thrust out of heaven, was driven; as the Prophet testifies (Isa. 14.14), I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High, saith Satan. Yet thou shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit. Again, it is called “Everlasting fire”, as the Scripture saith (Matt. 25.41), Depart from me, ye cursed, into Everlasting Fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels. Likewise it is named Outer Darkness (v. 30), Cast ye the unprofitable Servant into Outer Darkness; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. It is called by many other names, all of which mean a place of condemnation and the wrath of God. To this place go down the souls of all those who die at enmity with God, and under his wrath; and here are they damned. This, then, is to be believed by the Faithful, that as the souls of the righteous, although received into heaven, do not receive the full and perfect crown of glory before the last judgment, so neither do the souls of the damned feel and suffer the full measure and weight of the punishments before that time. But after that final and decisive judgment, the souls of all, rejoined to their bodies, will be crowned with glory or overwhelmed with torments. 

Confession of Dositheus, Decree 16. 

We believe Holy Baptism, which was instituted by the Lord, and is conferred in the name of the Holy Trinity, to be of the highest necessity. For without it none is able to be saved, as the Lord saith, “Whosoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens” (John 3.5). And, therefore, it is necessary even for infants, since they also are subject to original sin, and without Baptism are not able to obtain its remission. Which the Lord showed when he said, not of some only, but simply and absolutely, “Whosoever is not born [again]”, which is the same as saying, “All that after the coming of Christ the Saviour would enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens must be regenerated.” And forasmuch as infants are men, and as such need salvation; needing salvation, they need also Baptism. And those that are not regenerated, since they have not received the remission of hereditary sin, are, of necessity, subject to eternal punishment, and consequently cannot without Baptism be saved; so that even infants ought, of necessity, to be baptised. Moreover, infants are saved, as is said in Matthew (Matt. 19.12); but he that is not baptised is not saved. And consequently even infants must of necessity be baptised. 

How do you resolve what Dositheus (unbaptized infants are not saved, subject to eternal punishment, and cannot enter heaven) and Mogila says (infants are "liable to the eternal punishment of the divine wrath," explained in 63 and 68) with what is said in the Synaxarion Saturday Before Meatfare Sunday?

EO #4: For your question regarding unbaptized infants, I refer you to the owner of this channel's work on the subject entitled "The Damnation of Unbaptized Children and Possible Exceptions" since he knows more about the subject than I. The translation I have for Meatfare Saturday also says "Hades" instead of "Gehenna", which might imply the particular judgement and not the last judgment. Regardless, I refer you to Craig's article. 

It was a pleasure having a discussion with you on the other points. Have a great rest of your day!

I have read that article before. He doesn't mention Mogila (I forgot to cite Mogila's Confession 64, which appears even clearer). Thanks for the conversation.

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This conversation appears to have wrapped up. Final points:

For Reformed Christians trying to wrap their minds around how to approach apologetics with EO, I've tried to show why I think that original sin is a good entry point. It also provides smoother access to processing Christology (why isn't Christ sinful if He is human?), anthropology (what is it to be human?), metaphysics (what is [human] nature?), and other areas on which that EOs like to think they have the high ground but don't.

Truglia exited this conversation quickly, which didn't surprise me. I've critiqued Truglia's videos on original sin elsewhere (link). 

In addition to double standard apologetics, another common EO tactic is quote-mining such as the rather dishonest EO #4 tried to steamroll me with - it is ironic that it led to EO #4 agreeing with me, and I'm glad to have learned of another theologian (Symeon) who uses language of "participation" in the context of original sin, phraseology that the more consistent Reformed theologians have likewise used (link).

EO #2 here is the same as EO #2 in the debate on infallible EO content. Like EO #4, he too ignored my citation of Augustine's Against Julian which affirms infant culpability. EO #2 also ignored that Luke 12:48 - which he brought up! - speaks of culpability. Notice that at one point, EO #4 begins to realize EO #2's ignorance on this subject over time and has to distance himself from his former, stated agreement with him. Here is one speculative reason:

As I see it, EOs are used to stock arguments. They're used to feeling misunderstood, so they're used to playing whatever apologetic track they've heard on repeat. This makes them sound like a broken, useless record when I make a simple argument using their own source of dogma, Mogila (whose confession had pan-orthodox acceptance at the 1642 Synod of Jassy). My simple argument was: if you suggest God punishes those who bear no culpability for sin, you've compromised God's justice. One who deserves no blame deserves no punishment. This is Augustinian thinking. This is biblical thinking.

Yet as simple as this is, EO #2 doesn't even come close to addressing it, let alone understand deeper criticisms like the charge of voluntarism (but which they're happy to try to understand if it's a charge made, say, against Reformed Christians). It's like their robotic programming requires them to generate the same outputs as an automatic response regardless of new data inputs. When this happens, don't lose the point. Keep bringing the conversation back to where they don't want.

Sometimes, you need to test whether people even know what they're talking about. When you see someone virtually plagiarize like EO #4 did in lifting all of those quotes from one website, ask them to define a key term in their position (like "nature"). Or when you see someone reference someone else as their source, double-check them like I did when EO #2 referred to the guy Truglia made his video with that I critiqued. I caught EO #2 in a lie, which leads me to question whether he even understands the keys terms we've been discussing ("liability" and "culpability"). Forcing them to define these words should force them closer to acknowledging the force of the simple argument. But only God works the conviction for which we pray.

The trend of conversation with EO #4 was encouraging, though. His willingness to backtrack and understand me properly - because he recognized that I took the time to understand EO properly - might allow me a foot in the door to discuss other topics. I chose to pivot to the question of normative authority mentioned in my last post on this subject (link). The rift within EO on original sin makes it easy to relate the issue to private judgment and that Protestants and EOs are really in the same boat when it comes to exercising judgment in matters involving matters on which higher and lower authorities disagree. It also puts an expectation for EO #4 and his ilk to speak out against other EO apologists when they hear of these misrepresentations. If such results in a shift of EO apologetic focus even slightly away from anti-Protestant polemics more towards intra-mural debate, so much the better as a worthy goal. Leverage agreement to gain concessions. EO #4 chose to claim ignorance. While this is a cop-out (especially since I simplified the argument for him), if he claims ignorance about Protestantism, then at least he can't very well critique it. 

My final point is actually what I think is a pretty strong indication that even for EOs who bite the bullet and basically accept a Reformed view of original sin, they still have problems in terms of resolving what their sources say about the final destination of the unborn. EO #4 referred me to this article, which I've read before and does not address what Mogila says about hell.

The point is not to insist that unborn or unbaptized infants really must go to hell. On Reformed theology, divine grace is sufficient for salvation. I've written on this elsewhere (link). The point is to press a seeming inconsistency in EO. Do unbaptized infants depart from this life under the wrath of God? Then his Confession 63 and 68 applies. See also what Mogila says here:

64. Do not some die, so as to be in a medium between the blessed and the damned?

Of these there be not any; nevertheless, it is certain that many sinners are freed from the chains of Hades; not by their own repentance or confession, as the Scripture saith (Ps. 6.5), In the pit who shall give thanks unto thee? And elsewhere (Ps 115.17), The dead praise not thee, O Lord; neither all them that go down into the pit; but for the good works and alms of the living, and for the prayers of the Church, made in their behalf; but chiefly for the sake of the unbloody Sacrifice (the Liturgy) which the Church daily offers up for the living and teh dead; in like manner as Christ also died for both. But the souls of such are by no means to be delivered by their own works; as Theophylact, treating on these words of Christ, in the sixth chapter of Luke, To whom Power is given of forgiving Sins on Earth, teacheth, saying, “Observe, it is said on Earth; For so long as we continue on Earth we can wipe out our sins, but after we leave this Earth we are no more able of ourselves to cancel our sins by our confessions. The ‘Doors then are shut’.” And again, on the Words of Matthew (ch. 22.13), Bind him hand and foot, by which the active Faculties of the soul are meant, he says, In this life life we may labour and endeavour, but afterwards the active faculties of the soul are bound, nor can we any more do ought atonement for our offences. And farther, on the 25th chapter of the same Gospel, he says, There is no more time for repentance and good works after this life. From all which it is clear, that after its separation the soul can no more perform penance, nor do any other work whereby it might be freed from the chains of Hades. Therefore, only the sacrifices, the prayers and alms, which are performed by the living, for their sakes, do comfort and greatly benefit the souls, and free them from the bonds of Hades.

Even if unbaptized infants could be somehow freed by sacrifices by the living, Mogila's denies what EO #4 suggests as well as what the supposedly infallible EO liturgy teaches: "those not illumined by Baptism and those born of pagans go neither to Paradise nor to Gehenna." This is a problem no matter how the EO tries to slice it.