Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Conclusion

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Concluding Statement

Since Robert has decided to abandon the debate, this will function more as a commentary on Robert’s logical and exegetical fallacies in his thirty page second rebuttal, most of which I could not have otherwise hoped to address, given its inordinate length and the number of mistakes it contains. A careful reader will observe that many objections Robert makes in his second rebuttal are the same one’s I either refuted or anticipated in my opening statement and two rebuttals:

- Choice isn’t incompatible with Calvinism, contrary to Robert’s opening “joke.” (see: my opening statement).
- Robert’s implicit understanding of Ezekiel 18 would suggest that God works out things which are not according to His good pleasure (see: my first rebuttal and Robert’s evasive answer to my first and seventh cross-examination question).
- One’s will is not forced if one acts according to desires determined by God (see: opening statement). That these desires are determined by God are irrelevant to the point in question, viz. whether or not God actually does determine our desires. Robert assumes the answer is no and uses this to pit man’s will against God’s determinative decree, as though man possesses autonomous desires which God negates. That, obviously, is question-begging.
- Robert’s opinion of the potter-clay motif is utterly without exegetical support (see: my first rebuttal).
- I wrote “God cannot do certain things like rape, murder, lie, deceive, et al.,” and Robert replied that this is contradictory [essentially] because a God who predestines people to Hell cannot love them. Firstly, that a red herring. It has nothing to do with my statement. Secondly, it is unfortunate Robert did not stick around to explain my ninth cross-examination question. That God has a special love for a particular, unconditionally chosen group of people does not imply God is deceitful. Would Robert love another’s child as much as his own?
- Throughout the debate, Robert consistently exhibited no idea what it biblically means to be a respecter of persons (see: my second rebuttal). Furthermore, Robert constantly conflated the distinction between the unconditional nature of decrees like election and reprobation as opposed to conditional decrees like justification and condemnation (see: my second rebuttal).
- Robert could offer no solution to the question of God’s eternal omniscience (see: first rebuttal). In fact, Robert’s analogy of the parent who predicts his child’s behavior works against Robert, because in it he writes that “but the parent’s knowledge of the child does not [cause] or force the child to fulfil the prediction, because the child might do something quite alternative with which the parent does also equally know.” If that’s the case – if God’s knowledge is not a function of His “prediction” – the only remaining conclusion is that, like Arminius, Robert believes God’s knowledge is a function of His foresight of “free will” (as defined in my opening statement) choices. God’s knowledge, if it is contingent on temporal creatures, is necessarily not eternal. Hence, Robert logically must admit God learns. The alternative is that the parent knows the child because he created (caused) the child to be as he is.
- Robert attempts to interact with Romans 8:32 but ignores my rhetorical questions: “Did Paul not write that those for whom Christ died will freely be given all things (Romans 8:32)? Would “all things” not include the desire to come to and remain in Christ? If Christ died for all men, then, would Robert not have to purport the false doctrine of universalism?”
- Robert never seemed to grasp that I believed that Christ’s atonement was sufficient for all but made only for the elect. Despite his illegitimate appeals to passages which say “whoever does believe will be saved” – as though that implies all could be saved if all believed – I wrote in my opening statement “it is counter-factually true that “if the Father desired to save all men without exception, Christ’s sacrifice was such that all men without exception could have been saved.”” Robert’s misunderstanding and refusal to give me the benefit of the doubt until further clarification was, in this case among others, the cause of straw man argumentation.
- John 1:11-13 distinguishes between adoption and regeneration, and Romans 1:16 is a reference to justification, not regeneration. Robert needs to study different soteriological terms. I can’t simplify the arguments I’m making any further than that.
- Robert ignored my exegesis of 1 John 2:2 and 2 Peter 2:1. It is almost as if he didn’t read it at all. My parallel of 1 John 2:2 to John 11:51-52 was seemingly for naught (“What if [I was] one of the scattered children?” is an irrelevant question), and my explanation of the meaning of “agorazo” was likewise ignored.
- Robert ignored my argument from Romans 8:29-30 concerning predication of predestination and the fact unconditional election and reprobation aren’t arbitrary (see: my second rebuttal).

Examining arguments (particularly exegetical) Robert made in his second rebuttal which I had not space to address:

- Robert cites 2 Peter 3:9 and John 3:16 as passages which state God does not wish any should perish. Aside from the tangential biblical problems with this (again, see my first and seventh cross-examination questions), 2 Peter 3:9 is written to the elect and about the elect (to whom has God made promises in verse 9? to whom is God patient in verse 15?) and John 3:16 only states that God loves the world (which has a multiplicity of meanings in Johannine literature; cf. 1:29, 6:33, 17:9, &c.) and that those who do (not “can”) believe will not perish.
- 1 John 2:15-17 is not relevant to Romans 8:7-9. Obedience per the former presupposes regeneration per the latter. And, even when we are commanded to follow a certain precept, it is as Luther observed: “Even grammarians and schoolboys on street corners know that nothing more is signified by verbs in the imperative mood than what ought to be done, and that what is done or can be done should be expressed by words in the indicative. How is it that you theologians are twice as stupid as schoolboys, in that as soon as you get hold of a single imperative verb you infer an indicative meaning, as though the moment a thing is commanded it is done, or can be done?” God commands what we cannot do so that such may be the occasion by which we learn we must absolutely depend upon God.
- Robert cites Genesis 3:9-10 and asks how, if Adam was totally depraved, he could hear God’s voice. Of course, no consistent Calvinist denies men can understand the gospel; we just deny men can believe it. Men are not neutral to the gospel, they are negative, unable to respond positively prior to regeneration. As for why God asked Adam what He was doing (almost as if Robert thinks God didn’t know!), the answer is simple: God often uses questions to prompt a certain line of thought. Example: when God asked Job whether he knew the intricacies of creation, he was indirectly rebuking Job by reminding him of the Creator-creature distinction. Similarly, asking Adam what he did required Adam to address his sin.
- Robert states all men possess “the image of God and his law resides in [all] of mankind’s hearts.” Since mankind’s image is corrupted (hence, we must be conformed to Christ’s image) and only believers with whom God has covenanted have God’s laws written on their hearts (Jeremiah 31:31-34, Hebrews 10:16), Robert is simply wrong.
- That Robert says he would defect to Luciferianism or Gnosticism if he believed Scripture affirms what I believe (which he falsely alleged to be HyperCalvinism) is representative of the fallacies Robert must insert into what is supposed a rational discussion to score emotional points with those who agree with him, thus begging the question as to whether or not he realizes that apostates are never truly saved.
- Robert completely misses the point when I asked him to explain how the fact that faith is pleasing is harmonious with that fact that, prior to regeneration, one cannot please God (Romans 8:8-11).
- Proof-texting (e.g. Robert’s use of Matthew 23:37) is not equivalent to exegesis.
- No explanation was provided as to how I took Arminius “out of context.” Arminius clearly taught one only “might” be saved by Christ’s death, clearly showing the uncertain, unintentional nature of the Arminian’s conception of the atonement.
- All men without distinction (1 Timothy 2:4) is not equivalent to all men without exception.
- I am aware Arminians teach prevenient grace. What Robert never established is how such grace can enable us to choose good with an unchanged, unregenerate nature. I wonder, given Roberts allusion to Acts 21:4-14, if Robert is aware “irresistible grace” only pertains to regeneration.
- Robert’s explanation of imputed guilt is convoluted. Romans 5:18 explicitly teaches men (plural) are condemned for one (singular) transgression. How Robert imagines this to mean men’s guilt is erased is not comprehensible. In context, the free gift of grace lies in the fact Christ merits the justification of the believer, not in some idea that all men without exception are cleansed of the guilt of Adam’s sin. That is opposite the point Paul is making.
- Instead of explaining the meanings of the majority of the passages I cite (e.g. Job 23:13-14), Robert relies on an unsubstantiated assumption (Calvinists deny men can choose) to explain what the text can’t mean rather than explain what it does.
- Robert replies to Lamentations 3:37 as though God passively predestines, i.e. allows. But that concept nowhere appears in the text (nor in Psalm 33:9, for that matter). Also, 3:38 does refer to moral evil, per 39. Sins are moral evil, not natural disaster. Isaiah 10:15 (a context Robert references) indicates God is active, and Robert never responded to that fact Isaiah 45:7 says God creates wickedness.
- Robert anachronistically applies his “multiple wills of God” thesis to Ephesians 1 without further ado.
- Obviously, I could not exegete Romans 9 within the short space I am allowed, but I actually agree with most of what Robert says: chapters 9-11 (the whole of Romans, really) serve to vindicate God’s righteousness per 9:6, God is attempting to display His freedom to sovereignly harden and mercy when He exercises His power over Pharaoh, men who question God’s blameworthiness do overstep their bounds as creation, &c. These points Robert makes are points any Calvinist would agree with. However: Paul does not say men are hardened because they are lost, nor that God actually “makes” and “molds” (certainly not “allows” or “permits”) reprobates like Pharaoh to be as they are (Romans 9:19-20); the idea that Paul’s primary concerns is “national election” in light of (9:6, 24-10:21) is absurd; that Paul uses the middle voice in 9:22 (true enough) is irrelevant, since it is God ho is doing the demonstrating, not man, effectively reversing the point Robert is trying to make; it is unfortunate Robert is so flippant in his referencing of which verb is in the passive voice in verse 23. I don’t know what he is referring to, as both verbs are in the active voice.
- That men are able to choose and that God accordingly responds does not imply man’s wills are autonomous of that God did not decree such should be the case from eternity; likewise, responsibility does not presuppose a “free will.”
- Rejecting universalism does not mean that the logical end of Robert’s position does not lead to universalism. He didn’t seem to understand that, especially with regards to John 6 and the fact that if God draws all and gives all to Christ, all will come and be raised the last day.
- Calvinists don’t deny one can know one is elect; if one believes, one knows he is saved and will remain saved. John wrote so that men would know they possess eternal life. But to know that means one knows he will never perish. Robert’s assertion is vacuous.
- Calvinists teach the need of a general call because no man knows who are among the elect. This should be obvious.
- Robert argues Matt 25:41 proves Hell was not made for men. That hell is said to have been prepared for a particular group does not imply it was prepared for them exclusively. Using the same type of argument, I could say John 10 shows Jesus was died for the elect exclusively (cf. Jude 4).

Final observations:

- Regarding the cross-examination, I think it speaks for itself.
- Quoting apocryphal literature, pagan philosophers, Christian opinions, and writing more than the agreed upon restrictions is not a sufficient substitute for actual exegesis and logical argumentation.
- Copying and pasting the Greek text into a debate doesn’t mean you made a good point (speaking of, it is remarkable that Robert questions the canonicity of Proverbs 16:4, but not Mark 16:16?).
- Compare these two statements Robert made in the debate:

“…TULIP is completely non-biblical, despite apparent scriptures to back up the five points, however the five points associated with Arminianism is completely biblical.”

“It is this final point (the P in TULIP, or as Ryan would name it to be “Eternal Security”) with which I must contend that the Calvinist [may] indeed have a point of truth here.”

Is it not unfortunate that Robert left before he could be fully persuaded of the error of Arminianism? But God works out all things in due time according to His pleasure, even this.
- I truly believe this debate has evinced God as sovereign as Reformed theologians have taught and as deserving of glory as He has declared.

(Word count: 2,280)

An example of Providence in my life

I twisted my ankle today, trying to catch the red bus. It wasn’t too bad. At the time, I just hoped nobody saw me trip. On the way back, I also just missed the blue bus; I had to walk 10 minutes in light rain to get back to the dorm. So as I was heading up the North Avenue stairs, a man called to me and asked if I could help him. So I went over, seemingly to his surprise, and asked what I could do. Most of the time someone asks me something in downtown, I ignore them. Why I didn’t do the same thing, God only knows – literally.

I thought he was going to ask me for directions. He asked if I knew the area well, and I told him I knew it fairly well. He told me that I was the first person who had acknowledged him today, which explained the surprised expression on his face. The turn of the conversation surprised me too, as I thought that on any other day I would probably have been one of those people who ignored him. I just replied that it didn’t really make sense nobody would talk to him for a minute.

He then asked if I was in Christ. At first, I thought I misheard him. Actually, I asked him to repeat himself. So doing, I answered that I was. It sort of shocked me to hear him just ask me outright. I had imagined this kind of situation numerous times – someone witnesses to me, I reply that I’m a Christian, we go talk about theology somewhere, and leave feeling in good spirits. The other possibility running through my head was that he wanted to learn about Christ, and that I would have to witness to him. That is a hypothetical which I’ve also thought about several times. What would I say? What would I do?

The look on his face at my reply was one of confused disbelief. He actually asked me if I was really telling the truth. Understandable, I guess. If I were an atheist and I thought I someone was about to witness to me in a public area, I might feel uncomfortable enough to lie. But, as I’m not, and as I wrote notes on Christian epistemology throughout the previous class period (a class which I now only have to attend to get an A, so don’t judge me!), I unpacked my notes and showed him some of the subjects I was reading. I told him I was going through the concept of the Christian canon. Amazed, he looked up and told me he was going to commit suicide before I talked to him.

I imagine I had a sort of deer-in-the-headlights look on my face. What was I supposed to say? The guy was obviously going through some deep emotional trial, and I’m not exactly the kind of guy who deals in emotions. So I did what any person like me would do: I let the guy do all the talking. He said that the bridge overlooking highway-85 had a hole somewhere in it he had thought about jumping through. He kept looking back at the various notes I had written and saying (more to himself than to me): “this is deep stuff.”

I suggested that we should go somewhere to get something to eat or sit down and talk, to which he agreed. This was nearly as much to buy some time to figure out how in the world I would proceed as it was in genuine concern for his safety. As we were walking toward Wingnuts, he said what I was thinking: “I’m not really hungry, can we just sit in here and talk?” (I actually despise Wingnuts, so that suited me.)

I left the man at a table while I went, to the chagrin of the cashier, to order two waters. Sitting down, the man started to open up a bit more about why he was considering suicide. He said that although he had a beautiful wife and nine month old daughter, things were becoming stressful for him. He said that he was an orphan as a child, and never was adopted even though he had asked God for foster parents. He lost his job, and as he committed a crime when he was 22, he said that getting a decent job had been tough. He’d been told he was about to be evicted… on Thanksgiving. He told me that on Thanksgiving – which he did say was a cozy meal – he asked God to reveal Himself, something for which he had apparently been praying for a while. He couldn’t understand why he was suffering. He wasn’t asking for the luxuries that he sometimes sees others endowed with. He was only asking for God to provide for his family. He also didn’t understand why God would allow people to suffer in general. This observation seemed more whimsically philosophical, as though he didn’t expect an answer.

I think at this point he apologized for what he thought was dumping his problems on me. I stopped him quickly and told him that this was a discussion I probably needed as much as he did. Given that I’m not very experienced in relating my own testimony to God’s Providence, I though I should tell him about a recent event in my life that was evidence of God’s plan for me (see here). In response to his question about why bad things seemed to be happening to him, I cited Romans 8:28, which he recalled, as finished the quote with me. I also told him that, since Romans is one of my favorite books, he should also read 9:22-23. Having read about the common objection against Christianity grounded on human suffering, I felt pretty comfortable telling him what I had learned: some people are put in situations of trial for the benefit of others. For example, those who are vessels of wrath enable vessels of mercy to see God’s grace and mercy in a way they could not were there no vessels of wrath. And, while that may be of little comfort to one who is in the situation of trial, when I asked if we deserved the blessings of, say, a good wife and daughter, all he could say was “word.”

When he said that the churches he had been going to weren’t helping him, I figured that since the money I had won for the essay wasn’t really mine anyways, the $80 I gave him for diapers and food (so he said) was the least I could do. He called his wife on my phone to tell her that he got the money, and I heard him say “Thank you? Why are you thanking me?” When he hung up, he said that he realized that she should have been thanking God. It was pretty cool. He’s supposed to call later to find out the information about my church, so please pray that goes well. He kept falling over himself thanking me even as we were getting up to leave, and asking (i.e. defying) me to tell Him that this wasn’t God’s working. Just as my experience writing the essay for the TF contest, there were too many coincidental "might as wells" and "ifs" for me to not recognize that this was God's work. If I hadn't twisted my ankle, I'd have gotten off the bus at a different location than the way which I walked back to the dorm. If I hadn't decided to actually help a guy who asked for it, someone might have died today. If he hadn't gotten discouraged enough to just follow through on his dark thought, he would have never seen God's working. Too many ifs, if you ask me.

The Problem of Laziness

The "problem of evil" is one of the more puzzling objections to Christianity. It rests on solely on emotions, and yet for some reason, it is usually one of the first tricks atheists try to pull when justifyng their disbelief. Take this atheist, Marcus. Despite his youth and seeming lack of knowledge regarding a sound, Christian retort to the "problem," he apparently regards it as death knell to Christianity, or at least one reason why he is an apostate. He states the "problem" as follows:

"The amount of human suffering in the natural world is incompatible with a kind, caring, omnipotent father/creator God."

Marcus obviously has the inside scoop. If only he would have shared how he could possibly know such a thing, perhaps he might have made a point. Surely as an "ex-Christian" he knows full well that his sin deserves no mercy or grace, and surely he understands - if not agrees with - the concepts of discipline and justice. As it is, the argument is just a string of smuggled assumptions. Just one more example:

"The Bible says flat out that Yahweh made evil in the first place!"

So what? I would say determinism is the solution to the problem of evil, as it implies God has a purpose in causing it. As for the "contradictions" Marcus goes on to tick off, several questions should be asked:

Would determinism imply God has broken His law? Which law? If not, how can one ascribe evil to God's character? Is the discussion not assuming the truth of all Christian doctrines and definitions, including morality (cf. 1 John 3:4)?

Also, to whom is God allegedly responsible for His actions? Has he ever read Romans 9:19-23?

Until Marcus or any other atheist can answer these questions, the "problem of evil" rather appears to be a problem of intellectual laziness.

God... author of sin?

Knee jerk reaction - what was yours? If you feel in any way similar to how I did several months ago, you're probably thinking that I'd be a radical "Christian" for even suggesting it as possible (let alone asserting it as fact). But before we go there, let's at least define our terms and take as a working definition "the ultimate cause of sin."

We must consider what would be a valid and sound objection to God being the author of sin. Only an objection grounded in a sound epistemology can even attempt answer whether or not God is the author of sin. For the purposes of this discussion, I will bypass the tangential topic [for example: obviously, the objection cannot be grounded in subjective intuition, as in doing so you implicitly admit I may do the same; one of us is intuiting via our sinful nature - i.e. illogically - and intuition in no way resolves this dilemma] of epistemology (although I do at some point hope to address this) and assume that the people who are reading this note are the people I have consistently spoken to about the subject matter of this note, i.e. people who affirm Sola Scriptura.

So then, in order for one to validly and soundly object to God as the author of sin, he must demonstrate that it is inconsistent with what God Himself has revealed. This is what I intend to demonstrate is not only impossible, but also it is contradictory to the content of Scripture. Scripture is not simply silent on the issue: it decidedly affirms that God indeed authors sin.

Let's first set up some elementary, relevant definitions which I believe Scripture, our authority, establishes:

sin - a transgression of God's law
author - first [or ultimate] cause; source of origin

We know that sin is a transgression of the law since we know that it is by the law that knowledge of sin comes about (Romans 7, 3:9-23) as well as explicit testimony of Scripture (James 2:9, 1 John 3:4).

We know that author is the first [or ultimate] cause or source of origin by passages like Hebrews 12:2 and colloquial references to God as the "author of Scripture." When we say these things, it is not as though God has faith for us or God physically picked up a pen and wrote His Word; rather, He is the cause or origin of our:

- faith, in that it is only by His regenerating us through our preaching of His Word, His Spirit, and preserving us unto perseverance that we can come to and stay in faith.

- Scripture, in that He breathed out the speech and writing of the prophets and apostles.

So we see that firstly, the objection that God as author of sin ipso facto makes Him a sinner is false. Secondly, we see that as the author, God can use intermediate means (such as His creation) to accomplish His purpose. Romans 10 and the Great Commission make it quite clear preachers are the means by which God brings His people to faith. Using "secondary causes" does not mean God's will is any less divinely efficient, as it is His will which directly causes our inclinations to do good (Philippians 2:13) by preaching et. al. which lays the ground work for His application of redemption. Nonetheless, He is using secondary causes as the author of our faith; hence, an argument predicated on James 1:13-14 is either a straw man or misunderstanding of the relation between what the passage is, in context, speaking about, and what it means for God to be the author of sin.

What we can learn from this is that, dealing with the question at hand negatively (Why being the author of sin does not necessarily contradict Scripture), a valid and sound objection must demonstrate that in God's willing sin through means of secondary causes (creation, dispositions) is sinful, i.e. in willing sin through means of secondary causes, God transgresses His own law. I contend no one can do this.

I will go further, however, and address the question positively (why God is, in fact, the author of sin), not only because it's absurd to imply one can expect anyone to accept such a speculation (especially given the seeming controversial nature) on the basis of absence to the contrary but also because I do think that Scripture addresses the issue. To stay silent, then, is to deny God His full revelation.

Romans 9:18 Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens.
19 You will say to me then, “Why does He still find fault? For who has resisted His will?”
20 But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed say to him who formed it, “Why have you made me like this?”
21 Does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?
22 What if God, wanting to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction,
23 and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He had prepared beforehand for glory

Some of you probably expected this passage. Oh well, I'll go over it anyways. Notice that the context of verse 18 (in which I had several people suggesting the hardening was rather passive) is verse 19-20, in which Paul props up an objector who asks God why He finds fault for Him **making** him a certain way. Regardless of how one wants to perceive verse 18, the fact is that a person is a sinner or is righteous by their determined actions (for which they are responsible due to the relationship between a pot and the Potter, the creation and the Creator). Paul doesn't evade the argument, he throws it back in the objectors face, putting him in his rightful place: one of submission to God and His purposes, whatever they may be. Paul even goes on to provide an explanation for God's purposing some pots to dishonor (wrath unto destruction): to make known the riches of His glory to the elect. Amazing!

Proverbs 16:9 A man’s heart plans his way, But the LORD determines his steps.
Proverbs 20:24 A man’s steps are of the LORD; How then can a man understand his own way?
Proverbs 21:1 The king’s heart is in the hand of the LORD, Like the rivers of water; He turns it wherever He wishes.

By a show of hands: who is willing to suggest that God controls only the steps that are good? How is man able to take "bad" steps apart from God anyways? I deal with this more fully below.

Lamentations 3:37 Who is he who speaks and it comes to pass, when the Lord has not commanded it?
38 Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that woe and well-being proceed?

Isaiah 45:7 I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create calamity; I, the LORD, do all these things.’

Does peace only refer to "natural" peace over against "moral" peace? If not, then how shall we deny "calamity" a parallel meaning?

2 Samuel 24:1 Again the anger of the LORD was aroused against Israel, and He moved David against them to say, “Go, number Israel and Judah.”
2 Chronicles 21:1 Now Satan stood up against Israel, and moved David to number Israel.

Referring to the same census, we read that Satan tempted David into taking a census... by what means? God's movement. Take the time to read 2 Samuel 24:10-14 and ask yourself: "is that how I am responding right now?"

Answers to questions and comments I've received:

"If God is the positive author of good and evil then good and evil are meaningless."

On the contrary, if God is NOT the author of good and evil, God is reactionary and consequently has NO purpose for either. Not only this, but it undermines the very sovereignty of God. How exactly does evil come about? Permission? Nonsense. As though our very being is not dependent upon God, let alone our inherent dispositions! What exactly does the objector purport is the object of God's "permitting," and how exactly has the occasion arisen apart from the will of God? Only when we recognize that it is God who has decreed evil for His purposes - to His praise and glory - can we understand why and how evil exists.

"Historic Calvinism explains that calamity and hardening come from God's negative positive attributes, like the absence of His blessing, NOT because the positive presence of His negative qualities like evil.

It is not to historic Calvinism that our pledge is due. Also, as historic Calvinism teaches that it is in fact God who has decreed the Fall of man such that everyone's nature is - and always will be, apart from grace and mercy - totally corrupted, what exactly does the objector believe he escapes from in suggesting that the hardening of one's heart is merely a withdrawal of the grace and mercy necessary to overcome the corrupt nature that God Himself decreed should be imputed to him???

"1 Kings 22:19-23 proves exactly the opposite of Cheung's point. Read it again, God allows an evil spirit to do the evil work. *nowhere* does it say that God directly caused the evil. God is only ever the permissive author of evil."

The passage in question reads:

19 Then Micaiah said, “Therefore hear the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on His throne, and all the host of heaven standing by, on His right hand and on His left.
20 And the LORD said, ‘Who will persuade Ahab to go up, that he may fall at Ramoth Gilead?’ So one spoke in this manner, and another spoke in that manner.
21 Then a spirit came forward and stood before the LORD, and said, ‘I will persuade him.’
22 The LORD said to him, ‘In what way?’ So he said, ‘I will go out and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And the LORD said, ‘You shall persuade him, and also prevail. Go out and do so.’
23 Therefore look! The LORD has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these prophets of yours, and the LORD has declared disaster against you.”

Where exactly does the word "allow" appear in the text? It is God who brings up the question as to who will persuade Ahab to go up THAT HE MAY FALL. Notice that there appears to be an unbiblical view of God's sovereignty smuggled into the answer, as though the spirit somehow self-determined (is autonomous, as it were) this solution. This of course raises a point I might have brought up above: how is God omniscient from eternity if He has to "permit" certain occasions to happen? That is, how have these occasions arisen in the mind of God apart from His causality? It smells like middle knowledge. In any case, none of this lessens the fact that God has not only permitted evil but given His full consent as to the secondary causes for the achieving thereof!

It is not as though this is the only passage in which God uses spirits to effect evil (cf. Judges 9:23, 1 Samuel 16:14-23, 18:10, 19:9). There are no such equivocations in these passages as to who is the one doing the decreeing (not mere permitting).

"I just dislike the terminology of calling God the author of sin"

Call it what you wish. God is the ultimate and efficient cause of sin. That which He purposes, He does. He works all things according to the counsel of His will. He has even, for His purposes, made the wicked for the day of destruction.

"I don't know if we have enough information to be able to define his relationship to evil in the sense of resolving the ontology and origin of evil. Specific calamities I am willing to grant..."

Of what are these "calamities" comprised? Might they include, say, the "predestining" of men to crucify Jesus? Surely sin is involved. Or Assyrian wars committed, perhaps, for sinful reasons? What about specific events, like individual murders and rapes?

It's not obviously not a topic people like to talk about. I get it. But if it's true, it's true. It's better to be up front about it and glory all the more in God's mercy and grace to ourselves.

"...how does this work epistemologically? How are we in any sense different from the atheist who calls Auschwitz bad, but in reality is (in his worldview) merely describing his preference. Does good and evil not have any objective basis, or are we stuck in a kind of monotheistic dualism - Allah, in a sense, who is so transcendent he transcends categories of good and evil? I don't disagree that God is sovereign over evil, but it seems to me to bring up more problems than it solves to define it so glibly as I feel Cheung has done. He 'proves' his point as far as semantics go, but I am left wondering how this translates into actually helping us conceive of God."

As I understand it, Cheung, a Clarkian, would use Clark's (and Calvin's; cf. link) argument, i.e.

//...the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what He wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because He wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, because He would. But if you go further, and ask why He so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found.//

Epistemologically (more so objectively than subjectively), we know this because it is what the Bible teaches: God swears by whom? Himself. There is no higher law.

Experientially (more so subjectively than objectively), God has proved it in Himself: Jesus.

Epistemologically, the atheist and Islamist has no ground upon which to base a definition of good/bad, because both of their epistemic foundations are flawed. Hence, while they might THINK they have experiential ground, they don't even have that. You'll find, especially with atheists, that moral relativism is a virtual necessity (by their own admission, I might add). Many have no problem accepting the logical consequence of their position, that good and evil in their world view cannot exist, even if they subsequently act inconsistently by trying to impose their subjective principles.

"Obviously God uses means, but in a sense by withholding blessing and protection he is still *authoring* evil because he intentionally withholds his blessing in order to achieve his intended end. Do you think that part of the problem might be a too-wide usage of the word 'evil'?"

I have for purposes of this discussion narrowed the definition to refer to moral evil (sin), so you'll have to let me know. I addressed the issue of God's hardening "passively" above.

One final note. Berkhof writes:

"By His decree God rendered the sinful actions of man infallibly certain without deciding to effectuate them by acting immediately upon and in the finite will. This means that God does not positively work in man "both to will and to do," when man goes contrary to His revealed will. It should be carefully noted, however, that this permissive decree does not imply a passive permission of something which is not under the control of the divine will. It is a decree which renders the future sinful act absolutely certain, but in which God determines (a) not to hinder the sinful self-determination of the finite will; and (b) to regulate and control the result of this sinful self-determination. Ps. 78:29; 106:15; Acts 14:16; 17:30."

I want to make it clear that I am not asserting God HIMSELF tempts us. Instead, He has decreed to use secondary causes. In what way? Sending evil spirits of delusion (2 Thess. 2:11), treachery (Judges 9:23), terror (1 Samuel 16:14), and deceit (1 Kings 22:19-23). Berkhof seems to regard efficiency in terms of God tempting, whereas I qualify God's being the author of sin by effecting the hardening of our hearts (and subsequent sin) through the aforementioned intermediate causes (among others, possibly).

I am also not suggesting our will is coerced - that is a contradiction in terms. I happen to agree with a) and b) above (if understood in a certain sense, which, unfortunately, I doubt is the sense which Berkhof means to convey). Instead, I affirm that we, of necessity, sin because God has decreed for us to sin (Acts 4:27-28). I reject the idea, however, of a "passive" decree, if by that Berkhof means to attempt to "extract" God from having effected sin by decreeing the secondary causes by which we come to desire sin. One wonders exactly how God is, from eternity, aware of the object of His "permission" if He is not the ultimate cause and, more importantly, how sinful desire ever arose in the first place with such an understanding of God's decree in relation to sin. I can only conclude that it is in this sense Berkhof intends to portray a "passive" decree, as he goes on to say God's relation to sin is an "insoluble mystery." Would he say this if he had an answer to my questions? I don't know. Berkhof's conciseness, though to be treasured in general, is unhelpful here.

Augustine on Unconditional Election, Part 3 of 3

The Gift of Perseverance

““It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,” who both comes to the help of such infants as He will, although they neither will nor run, since He chose them in Christ before the foundation of the world as those to whom He intended to give His grace freely – that is, with no merits of theirs, either of faith or of works, preceding; and does not come to the help of those who are more mature, although He foresaw that they would believe His miracles if they should be done among them, because He wills not to come to their help, since in His predestination He, secretly indeed, but yet righteously, has otherwise determined concerning them.” (Chapter 25)

Several interesting points Augustine makes above are that infants are a great case for unconditional election, as their salvation cannot be contingent on their immature wills, that both man’s faith and his works would constitute as merits if either were a basis for God’s election, and that God will must alone be that on which election is predicated, for God counterfactually knew that some would believe if He had chosen to act miracles and yet He ordained that contrary events should occur, i.e. men’s belief is contingent on God’s will rather than vice versa.

Treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelagians

In Book 2 of his Treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Augustine makes many excellent points, especially relating to election. It contains one of my favorite passages, consisting of an exegesis of Romans 9:22-23 and 1 Corinthians 4:7.

“He makes known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, because what the justice of a punisher requires from the vessels of wrath, the grace of the Deliverer remits to the vessels of mercy. Nor would the kindness which is bestowed on some freely appear, unless to other equally guilty and from the same mass God showed what was really due to both, and condemned them with a righteous judgment. “For who maketh thee to differ?” says the same apostle to a man as it were boasting concerning himself and his own benefits. “For who maketh thee to differ” from the vessels of wrath; of course, from the mass of perdition which has sent all by one into damnation? “Who maketh thee to differ?” And as if he had answered, “My faith maketh me to differ – my purpose, my merit,” – he says, “For what hast thou which thou hast not received? But if thou hast received it, why dost thou boast as if thou receivedst it not?” – that is, as if that by which thou art made to differ were of thine own. Therefore He maketh thee to differ who bestows that whence thou art made to differ, by removing the penalty that is due, by conferring the grace which is not due.He maketh to differ, who, when the darkness was upon the face of the abyss, said, “Let there be light; and there was light, and divided” – that is, made to differ – “between the light and the darkness.” For when there was only darkness, He did not find what He should make to differ; but by making the light, He made to differ; so that it may be said to the justified wicked, “For ye were sometime darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord.” And thus he who glories must glory not in himself, but in the Lord. He makes to differ who – of those who are not yet born, and who have not yet done any good or evil, that His purpose, according to the election, might stand not of works, but of Himself that calleth – said, The older shall serve the younger, and commending that very purpose afterwards by the mouth of the prophet, said, “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” Because he said “the election,” and in this God does not find made by another what He may choose, but Himself makes what He may find; just as it is written of the remnant of Israel: “There is made a remnant by the election of grace; but if by grace, then it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace.” On which account you are certainly foolish who, when the Truth declares, “Not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said,” say that Jacob was loved on account of future works which God foreknew that he would do, and thus contradict the apostle when he says, “Not of works;” as if he could not have said, “Not of present, but of future works.” But he says, “Not of works,” that He might commend grace; “but if of grace, now is it no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace.” For grace, not due, but free, precedes, that by it good works may be done; but if good works should precede, grace should be repaid, as it were, to works, and thus grace should be no more grace.” (Chapter 15)

To have understood Romans 9 at so early a period of the church age shows how clear the doctrine of election really is. The comment that “in [the election] God does not find made by another what He may choose, but Himself makes what He may find” rebukes one who would condition election on anything other than God’s will. Augustine explicitly mentions faith and works, but in those two lines he also implicitly excludes any creaturely will or thing as having had any say in who God chooses to save.

In the final four chapters of Book 2, Augustine expounds upon man’s depravity, efficacious grace, and election:

“…the “blessing of sweetness” is God’s grace, by which is caused in us that what He prescribes to us delights us, and we desire it – that is, we love it; in which if God does not precede us, not only is it not perfected, but it is not even begun, from us. For, if without Him we are able to do nothing actually, we are able neither to begin nor to perfect – because to begin, it is said “His mercy shall prevent me;” to finish, it is said, “His mercy shall follow me.”” (Chapter 21)

Obviously, God does not cause all men without exception to desire or love His grace. On what principle could He possibly choose one to grace one and not another, then, as it is the grace itself which is causative, if not His will alone? Augustine concludes that very thing in the next chapter, citing Romans 8:28-30, Matthew 22:14, Ephesians 1:4, Romans 9:13, 2 Timothy 1:9-10, and 2 Corinthians 8:16 as support for this interpretation:

“They think, perchance, that the apostle thus said, “For we know that He worketh all things for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to the purpose,” so as to wish the purpose of man to be understood, which purpose, as a good merit, the mercy of the God that calleth might follow; being ignorant that it is said, “Who are called according to the purpose,” so that there may be understood the purpose of God, not man, whereby those whom He foreknew and predestinated as conformed to the image of His Son, He elected before the foundation of the world. For not all the called are called according to purpose, since “many are called, few are chosen.” They, therefore, are called according to the purpose, who were elected before the foundation of the world. Of this purpose of God, that also was said which I have already mentioned concerning the twins Esau and Jacob, “That according to the election the purpose of God might remain, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said, that the elder shall serve the younger.” This purpose of God is also mentioned in that place where, writing to Timothy, he says, “Labour with the gospel according to the power of God, who saves us and calls us with this holy calling; not according to our works, but according to His purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before the eternal ages, but is now made manifest by the coming of our Saviour Jesus Christ.” This, then, is the purpose of God, whereof it is said, “He worketh together all things for good for those who are called according to the purpose.” But subsequent grace indeed assists man’s good purpose, but the purpose would not itself exist if grace did not precede. The desire of man, also, which is called good, although in beginning to exist it is aided by grace, yet does not begin without grace, but is inspired by Him of whom the apostle says, “But thanks be to God, who has given the same desire for you in the heart of Titus.” If God gives desire that every one may have it for others, who else will give it that a man may have it for himself?” (Chapter 22)

On Grace and Free Will

As 1 Corinthians 4:7 is one of Augustine’s favorite passages – it is actually the testimony which“chiefly convinced… that in some small works, written before his episcopate, he was in error, as in that exposition [of Romans]” (The Predestination of the Saints) – so it comes as little surprise that he quotes it multiple times in his different letters:

“Lest, however, the carnal man in his foolish pride should, on hearing the question, “Who maketh thee to differ from another?” either in thought or in word answer and say: My faith, or my prayer, or my righteousness makes me to differ from other men, the apostle at once adds these words to the question, and so meets all such notions, saying, “What hast thou that thou didst not receive? now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou didst not receive it?” (First Letter)

Chapter 38.—We Would Not Love God Unless He First Loved Us. The Apostles Chose Christ Because They Were Chosen; They Were Not Chosen Because They Chose Christ.

“Let no one, then, deceive you, my brethren, for we should not love God unless He first loved us. John again gives us the plainest proof of this when he says, “We love Him because He first loved us.” Grace makes us lovers of the law; but the law itself, without grace, makes us nothing but breakers of the law. And nothing else than this is shown us by the words of our Lord when He says to His disciples, Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” For if we first loved Him, in order that by this merit He might love us, then we first chose Him that we might deserve to be chosen by Him. He, however, who is the Truth says otherwise, and flatly contradicts this vain conceit of men. “You have not chosen me,” He says. If, therefore, you have not chosen me, undoubtedly you have not loved me (for how could they choose one whom they did not love?). “But I,” says He, “have chosen you.” And then could they possibly help choosing Him afterwards, and preferring Him to all the blessings of this world? But it was because they had been chosen, that they chose Him; not because they chose Him that they were chosen. There could be no merit in men’s choice of Christ, if it were not that God’s grace was prevenient in His choosing them. Whence the Apostle Paul pronounces in the Thessalonians this benediction: “The Lord make you to increase and abound in love one toward another, and toward all men.” This benediction to love one another He gave us, who had also given us a law that we should love each other. Then, in another passage addressed to the same church, seeing that there now existed in some of its members the disposition which he had wished them to cultivate, he says, “We are bound to thank God always for you, brethren, as it is meet, because that your faith groweth exceedingly, and the charity of every one of you all toward each other aboundeth.” This he said lest they should make a boast of the great good which they were enjoying from God, as if they had it of their own mere selves. Because, then, your faith has so great a growth (this is the purport of his words), and the love of every one of you all toward each other so greatly abounds, we ought to thank God concerning you, but not to praise you, as if you possessed these gifts of yourselves.”

In another clear argument against conditional election, Augustine argues that to suggest God chose men for any other reason than gratuity is to reject the propositions made in 1 John 4:19 and John 15:16, and he further uses that 2 Thessalonians 1:3 to show that God should be thanked for our faith and perseverance (!) because it is by God alone, apart from any merit of our own, that we have faith and persevere.

Rebuke and Grace

In Rebuke and Grace, several implications of the doctrine of unconditional election are extrapolated upon and affirmed. For instance:

“God is able, even when no man rebukes, to correct whom He will, and to lead him on to the wholesome mortification of repentance by the most hidden and mighty power of His medicine.” (Chapter 8)

Repentance as well as faith is effected by God’s will alone, so naturally, God is able to effect repentance apart from an instrumental cause (such as creaturely rebuke). God is unconditioned in matters related to sanctification just as He is in matters relating to election, as he again writes in Chapter 9:

“…for rebuke by the agency of man to avail, whether it be of love or not, depends only upon God.”

Also, that the elect are saved by grace alone should lead one to logically conclude that the elect are secure and will never perish, for election is unto an ends – namely, His kingdom. He also addresses what is today a common argument against unconditional election (Judas):

“Those, then, are elected, as has often been said, who are called according to the purpose, who also are predestinated and foreknown. If any one of these perishes, God is mistaken; but none of them perishes, because God is not mistaken. If any one of these perish, God is overcome by human sin; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by nothing. Moreover, they are elected to reign with Christ, not as Judas was elected, to a work for which he was fitted. Because he was chosen by Him who well knew how to make use even of wicked men, so that even by his damnable deed that venerable work, for the sake of which He Himself had come, might be accomplished. When, therefore, we hear, “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?” we ought to understand that the rest were elected by mercy, but he by judgment; those to obtain His kingdom, he to shed His blood!” (Chapter 13)

Finally, as our will is contingent on God’s will, if the hypothesis that God’s will could ever be overcome by our will were true, theology would be nonsense. It is not that we attain grace through a free will, but rather a free will [to do right and “not fail”] through “a most free, strong, invincible, persevering” grace:

“Will you dare to say that even when Christ prayed that Peter’s faith might not fail, it would still have failed if Peter had willed it to fail; that is, if he had been unwilling that it should continue even to the end? As if Peter could in any measure will otherwise than Christ had asked for him that he might will. For who does not know that Peter’s faith would then have perished if that will by which he was faithful should fail, and that it would have continued if that same will should abide? But because “the will is prepared by the Lord,” therefore Christ’s petition on his behalf could not be a vain petition. When, then, He prayed that his faith should not fail, what was it that he asked for, but that in his faith he should have a most free, strong, invincible, persevering will! Behold to what an extent the freedom of the will is defended in accordance with the grace of God, not in opposition to it; because the human will does not attain grace by freedom, but rather attains freedom by grace, and a delightful constancy, and an insuperable fortitude that it may persevere.”(Chapter 17)

Summary

Augustine believed:

1. “[God] chose [the elect] in Christ before the foundation of the world as those to whom He intended to give His grace freely – that is, with no merits of theirs, either of faith or of works, preceding…”

2. “…the kindness which is bestowed on some freely [would not] appear, unless to other equally guilty and from the same mass God showed what was really due to both, and condemned them with a righteous judgment.”

3. “…in [election] God does not find made by another what He may choose, but Himself makes what He may find.”

4. “…[some think] the apostle thus said, “For we know that He worketh all things for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to the purpose,” so as to wish the purpose of man to be understood, which purpose, as a good merit, the mercy of the God that calleth might follow; being ignorant that it is said, “Who are called according to the purpose,” so that there may be understood the purpose of God, not man, whereby those whom He foreknew and predestinated as conformed to the image of His Son, He elected before the foundation of the world."

5. “…[lest] the carnal man in his foolish pride should, on hearing the question, “Who maketh thee to differ from another?” either in thought or in word answer and say: My faith, or my prayer, or my righteousness makes me to differ from other men, the apostle at once adds these words to the question, and so meets all such notions, saying, “What hast thou that thou didst not receive? now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou didst not receive it?”

6. “…if we first loved Him, in order that by this merit He might love us, then we first chose Him that we might deserve to be chosen by Him… He, however, who is the Truth says otherwise, and flatly contradicts this vain conceit of men.”

7. “… it was because they had been chosen, that they chose Him; not because they chose Him that they were chosen... [for] there could be no merit in men’s choice of Christ, if it were not that God’s grace was prevenient in His choosing them.”

8. “…for rebuke by the agency of man to avail, whether it be of love or not, depends only upon God.”

9. “…none of [the elect] perishes, because God is overcome by nothing.”

10. “Peter’s faith would then have perished if that will by which he was faithful should fail, and that it would have continued if that same will should abide…When, then, He prayed that his faith should not fail, what was it that he asked for, but that in his faith he should have a most free, strong, invincible, persevering will!”

 

Augustine on Unconditional Election, Part 2 of 3

The Predestination of the Saints

““Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ not only to believe on Him, but also to suffer for His sake.” [Paul] shows that both are the gifts of God, because he said that both were given. And he does not say, “to believe on Him more fully and perfectly,” but, “to believe on Him.” Neither does he say that he himself had obtained mercy to be more faithful, but “to be faithful,” because he knew that he had not first given the beginning of his faith to God, and had its increase given back to him again by Him; but that he had been made faithful by God, who also had made him an apostle.” (Chapter 4)

Throughout The Predestination of the Saints, Augustine’s designed to show that there is no binding principle on the will of God in His election of men. God did not choose men because they believed nor God did not choose men because they are holy, for the simple reason that it is by God’s predestining grace itself that men become believers and holy.

So, when in the above excerpt Augustine writes that Paul understood the beginning of belief to have been given to him, he is not merely saying that Paul was given the capacity to believe, he is not implying that such a hypothetical capacity is given to all men, and he is not further implying that Paul himself determined the fact that he was elected for his use of such a hypothetical capacity. Several obvious reasons this cannot be the case is that Augustine believed no fallen man is born with the capacity to do anything spiritually good, he believed soteric grace was effectual, and he believed that such grace was not given to all men. Paul couldn’t believe until he was regenerated, at which point he necessarily believed. The fact Paul was regenerated and others were not itself implies that election is unconditioned, for the regenerative grace is not predicated upon one’s response to it but rather determines one’s response (viz. belief). A paraphrase of this can be found a little later in the same book:

““Why,” say they, “does He not teach all men?” If we should say that they whom He does not teach are unwilling to learn, we shall be met with the answer: And what becomes of what is said to Him, “O God, Thou wilt turn us again, and quicken us”? Orif God does not make men willing who were not willing, on what principle does the Church pray, according to the Lord’s commandment, for her persecutors?” (Chapter 15)

If God regenerated only those whom He knew would respond positively to regeneration – leaving aside the problem regarding how one could know an autonomous choice prior to the actuation of said choice – Augustine points out that biblically based prayers for God to convert men would be ridiculous, for the power to convert would not be in God’s control but in man’s.

Thus, Augustine concludes that election is not conditioned on faith, but that faith is conditioned on election:

“…when it is said, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” if any one dare to say, “I have faith of myself, I did not, therefore, receive it,” he directly contradicts this most manifest truth, not because it is not in the choice of man’s will to believe or not to believe, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord. Thus, moreover, the passage, “For who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou receivedst not?” refers to that very faith which is in the will of man.” (Chapter 10)

Election not only makes faith possible, but actual, so that it is evident that not all men can have been elected:

“God indeed calls many predestinated children of His, to make them members of His only predestinated Son, not with that calling with which they were called who would not come to the marriage, since with that calling were called also the Jews, to whom Christ crucified is an offence, and the Gentiles, to whom Christ crucified is foolishness; but with that calling He calls the predestinated which the apostle distinguished when he said that he preached Christ, the wisdom of God and the power of God, to them that were called, Jews as well as Greeks. For thus he says “But unto them which are called,” in order to show that there were some who were not called; knowing that there is a certain sure calling of those who are called according to God’s purpose, whom He has foreknown and predestinated before to be conformed to the image of His Son. And it was this calling he meant when he said, “Not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said unto her, That the elder shall serve the younger.” Did he say, “Not of works, but of him that believeth”? Rather, he actually took this away from man, that he might give the whole to God. Therefore he said, “But of Him that calleth,” not with any sort of calling whatever, but with that calling wherewith a man is made a believer.” (Chapter 32)

And again:

“He chose us, not because we believed, but that we might believe, lest we should be said first to have chosen Him, and so His word be false (which be it far from us to think possible), “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” Neither are we called because we believed, but that we may believe; and by that calling which is without repentance it is effected and carried through that we should believe.” (Chapter 38)

Election is gracious and unmerited, so it cannot be conditioned on belief, nor can it be conditioned on foreseen belief:

“Let us, then, understand the calling whereby they become elected, not those who are elected because they have believed, but who are elected that they may believe. For the Lord Himself also sufficiently explains this calling when He says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” For if they had been elected because they had believed, they themselves would certainly have first chosen Him by believing in Him, so that they should deserve to be elected. But He takes away this supposition altogether when He says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” And yet they themselves, beyond a doubt, chose Him when they believed on Him. Whence it is not for any other reason that He says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,” than because they did not choose Him that He should choose them, but He chose them that they might choose Him; because His mercy preceded them according to grace, not according to debt. Therefore He chose them out of the world while He was wearing flesh, but as those who were already chosen in Himself before the foundation of the world. This is the changeless truth concerning predestination and grace. For what is it that the apostle says, “As He hath chosen us in Himself before the foundation of the world”? And assuredly, if this were said because God foreknew that they would believe, not because He Himself would make them believers, the Son is speaking against such a foreknowledge as that when He says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you;” when God should rather have foreknown this very thing, that they themselves would have chosen Him, so that they might deserve to be chosen by Him. Therefore they were elected before the foundation of the world with that predestination in which God foreknew what He Himself would do; but they were elected out of the world with that calling whereby God fulfilled that which He predestinated. For whom He predestinated, them He also called, with that calling, to wit, which is according to the purpose. Not others, therefore, but those whom He predestinated, them He also called; nor others, but those whom He so called, them He also justified; nor others, but those whom He predestinated, called, and justified, them He also glorified; assuredly to that end which has no end. Therefore God elected believers; but He chose them that they might be so, not because they were already so. The Apostle James says: “Has not God chosen the poor in this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which God hath promised to them that love Him?” By choosing them, therefore; He makes them rich in faith, as He makes them heirs of the kingdom; because He is rightly said to choose that in them, in order to make which in them He chose them. I ask, who can hear the Lord saying, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,” and can dare to say that men believe in order to be elected, when they are rather elected to believe; lest against the judgment of truth they be found to have first chosen Christ to whom Christ says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you”?” (Chapter 34)

Similarly, election is not conditioned on holiness, but rather holiness on election:

“God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, predestinating us to the adoption of children, not because we were going to be of ourselves holy and immaculate, but He chose and predestinated us that we might be so.” (Chapter 37)

What left is there to say? If election is not conditioned on man’s belief or man’s holiness, then on what is it conditioned except that sovereignty of God by which He turns both the wills of the righteous and the wicked whithersoever He desires? If it is not this alone that determines how God’s soteric, effectual grace is dispensed, but some will of man, what is it?

Enchiridion

In chapters 98-99 of Enchiridion, Augustine exegetes Romans 9:13-18:

“…who would be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn the evil wills of men – as he willeth, when he willeth, and where he willeth – toward the good? But, when he acteth, he acteth through mercy; when he doth not act, it is through justice. For, "he hath mercy on whom he willeth; and whom he willeth, he hardeneth." 
Now when the apostle said this, he was commending grace, of which he had just spoken in connection with the twin children in Rebecca's womb: "Before they had yet been born, or had done anything good or bad, in order that the electing purpose of God might continue – not through works but through the divine calling – it was said of them, 'The elder shall serve the younger.' "Accordingly, he refers to another prophetic witness, where it is written, "Jacob I loved, but Esau have I hated." Then, realizing how what he said could disturb those whose understanding could not penetrate to this depth of grace, he adds: "What therefore shall we say to this? Is there unrighteousness in God? God forbid!" Yet it does seem unfair that, without any merit derived from good works or bad, God should love the one and hate the other. Now, if the apostle had wished us to understand that there were future good deeds of the one, and evil deeds of the other – which God, of course, foreknew – he would never have said "not of good works" but rather "of future works." Thus he would have solved the difficulty; or, rather, he would have left no difficulty to be solved. As it is, however, when he went on to exclaim, "God forbid!" – that is, "God forbid that there should be unfairness in God" – he proceeds immediately to add (to prove that no unfairness in God is involved here), "For he says to Moses, 'I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show pity to whom I will show pity.'" Now, who but a fool would think God unfair either when he imposes penal judgment on the deserving or when he shows mercy to the undeserving? Finally, the apostle concludes and says, "Therefore, it is not a question of him who wills nor of him who runs but of God's showing mercy." 
Thus, both the twins were "by nature children of wrath," not because of any works of their own, but because they were both bound in the fetters of damnation originally forged by Adam. But He who said, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," loved Jacob in unmerited mercy, yet hated Esau with merited justice. Since this judgment [of wrath] was due them both, the former learned from what happened to the other that the fact that he had not, with equal merit, incurred the same penalty gave him no ground to boast of his own distinctive merits – but, instead, that he should glory in the abundance of divine grace, because "it is not a question of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God's showing mercy." And, indeed, the whole visage of Scripture and, if I may speak so, the lineaments of its countenance, are found to exhibit a mystery, most profound and salutary, to admonish all who carefully look thereupon "that he who glories, should glory in the Lord."
Now, after the apostle had commended God's mercy in saying, "So then, there is no question of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God's showing mercy," next in order he intends to speak also of his judgment—for where his mercy is not shown, it is not unfairness but justice. For with God there is no injustice. Thus, he immediately added, "For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, 'For this very purpose I raised you up, that I may show through you my power, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth." Then, having said this, he draws a conclusion that looks both ways, that is, toward mercy and toward judgment: "Therefore," he says, "he hath mercy on whom he willeth, and whom he willeth he hardeneth." He showeth mercy out of his great goodness; he hardeneth out of no unfairness at all. In this way, neither does he who is saved have a basis for glorying in any merit of his own; nor does the man who is damned have a basis for complaining of anything except what he has fully merited. For grace alone separates the redeemed from the lost, all having been mingled together in the one mass of perdition, arising from a common cause which leads back to their common origin.”

The final observations we can make from this exegesis is that foresight of future works – just like foresight of future faith – is not the basis upon which God elects, for works – like faith – are that unto which we are elected. Thus, grace is unmerited. If election were merited (conditional on man’s will), then there would be no reason for Paul to ask whether or not God is unrighteous for loving Jacob and hating Esau. The meaning of “it is not of Him who wills or Him who runs but God who shows mercy,” then, is that God alone can and does turn the wills of fallen men to Him, so it is truly God’s unconditional, electing grace which separates the redeemed from the lost.

Summary

Augustine believed:

1. “[Paul] knew that he had not first given the beginning of his faith to God, and had its increase given back to him again by Him; but that he had been made faithful by God, who also had made him an apostle.”

2. “if any one dare to say, “I have faith of myself, I did not, therefore, receive it,” he directly contradicts this most manifest truth, not because it is not in the choice of man’s will to believe or not to believe, but because in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord.”

3. “God indeed calls many predestinated children of His, to make them members of His only predestinated Son, not with that calling with which they were called who would not come to the marriage, since with that calling were called also the Jews, to whom Christ crucified is an offence, and the Gentiles, to whom Christ crucified is foolishness; but with that calling He calls the predestinated which the apostle distinguished when he said that he preached Christ, the wisdom of God and the power of God, to them that were called, Jews as well as Greeks… [that is,] with that calling wherewith a man is made a believer.”

4. “...we [are not] called because we believed… [or because] we were going to be of ourselves holy and immaculate, but He chose and predestinated us that we might be so.”

5. “...if they had been elected because they had believed, they themselves would certainly have first chosen Him by believing in Him, so that they should deserve to be elected.”

6. “...if [‘He hath chosen us in Himself before the foundation of the world’] were said because God foreknew that they would believe, not because He Himself would make them believers, the Son is speaking against such a foreknowledge as that when He says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you;” when God should rather have foreknown this very thing, that they themselves would have chosen Him, so that they might deserve to be chosen by Him.”

7. “…who can hear the Lord saying, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,” and can dare to say that men believe in order to be elected, when they are rather elected to believe; lest against the judgment of truth they be found to have first chosen Christ to whom Christ says, “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you”?”

8. “...if the apostle had wished us to understand that there were future good deeds of the one, and evil deeds of the other – which God, of course, foreknew – he would never have said "not of good works" but rather "of future works."”

9. “Since this judgment [of wrath] was due them both, [Jacob] learned from what happened [Esau] that the fact that he had not, with equal merit, incurred the same penalty gave him no ground to boast of his own distinctive merits – but, instead, that he should glory in the abundance of divine grace, because "it is not a question of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God's showing mercy."“

10. “…grace alone separates the redeemed from the lost, all having been mingled together in the one mass of perdition, arising from a common cause which leads back to their common origin.”

Augustine on Efficacious Grace, Part 1 of 3

It is indisputable that Augustine believed that prior to regeneration effected solely by God’s will, man is unable to act in obedience to God, for man’s free will avails only for sinning while subjected to the devil. What is as yet unclear is whether or not Augustine believed all men without exception are regenerated and whether or not those who are regenerated are merely put in a position in which they can accept or reject the gospel. The first question is one related to the intention and choice of God; the second question is related to the efficacy of grace. The latter will be considered in what follows.

In Book 2 of his Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Augustine, who has by this juncture in his treatise established the complete extensiveness of the depravity of fallen men’s wills, links this fact with how one can come to desire what is good: 

“God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does none which God does not cause man to do. Accordingly, there would be no desire of good in man from the Lord if it were not a good; but if it is a good, we have it not save from Him who is supremely and incommunicably good.” (Chapter 21)

In an effort to contravene the obvious import of this passage, one might contrive the last sentence to mean: “the use of what capacity we have to do good is in what sense any good desire comes from God alone, for God alone provided us with that capacity.” This Pelagianistic explanation, however, is not consistent with Augustine’s premise; to wit, God “causes” us to do good. Such a statement relates to [will and] action. God does not only enable us to will; He causes us to will. 

Augustine supports this thesis in various ways. In Book 4, Chapter 15 – “Grace is Proved to Be Gratuitous and Effectual” – Augustine’s disbelief of Pelagian presumption is practically palpable:

“Nothing so overturns the presumption of men who say, “We do it, that we may deserve those things with which God may do it.” It is not Pelagius that answers you, but the Lord Himself, “I do it and not for your sakes, but for my own holy name’s sake.” For what good can ye do out of a heart which is not good? But that you may have a good heart, He says, “I will give you a new heart, and I will put a new Spirit within you.” Can you say, We will first walk in His righteousness, and will observe His judgment, and will do so that we may be worthy, such as He should give His grace to? But what good would ye evil men do, and how should you do those good things, unless you were yourselves good? But who causes that men should be good save Him who said, “And I will visit them to make them good”? and who said “I will put my Spirit within you, and will cause you to walk in my righteousness, and to observe my judgments, and do them”? Are ye thus not yet awake? Do ye not yet hear, “I will cause you to walk, I will make you to observe,” lastly, “I will make you to do”? What! are you still puffing yourselves up? We indeed walk, it is true; we observe; we do; but He makes us to walk, to observe, to do.”

He argues the point in many other books as well. In On Grace and Free Will, he provides at least two such arguments:

“For Paul’s… conversion [was] by that great and most effectual call, God’s grace was alone, because his merits, though great, were yet evil.” (Chapter 12)

“Now if faith is simply of free will, and is not given by God, why do we pray for those who will not believe, that they may believe? This it would be absolutely useless to do, unless we believe, with perfect propriety, that Almighty God is able to turn to belief wills that are perverse and opposed to faith.” (Chapter 29)

The reasons for believing efficacious grace is necessary are many: biblical precedent; allusion to man’s inability to will or do good prior to such grace; absurdities that must be maintained if one believes man is not given belief by God (among which would include the uselessness of prayer and total disregard of Scripture). This is not to say that Augustine denied man’s participation in his own salvation. Many who misunderstand the doctrines of grace believe that if a will is determined, the will itself is rendered passive. This is not at all the case nor is it what Augustine taught.

The Predestination of the Saints

One of his latest works, The Predestination of the Saints, was written against semi-Pelagians, those who, among other heresies, ascribed the beginning of faith (and hence, salvation) to man. One would expect, then, that Augustine would be chiefly concerned with the God-ward side of salvation. In reading the whole book, one can see that this is evidently the case. But in several chapters, Augustine highlights the man-ward side of salvation as well:

““Wherefore is it preached and prescribed to us that we should turn away from evil and do good, if it is not we that do this, but ‘God who worketh in us to will and to do it’?” But let them rather understand that if they are the children of God, they are led by the Spirit of God to do that which should be done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to Him by whom they act. For they are acted upon that they may act, not that they may themselves do nothing.” (Chapter 4)

“…faith is the gift of God, although when it is said, “If thou believest, thou shalt be saved,” faith is required of us, and salvation is proposed to us as a reward. For [faith and mortifying the deeds of the flesh] are both commanded us, and are shown to be God’s gifts, in order that we may understand both that we do them, and that God makes us to do them, as He most plainly says by the prophet Ezekiel. For what is plainer than when He says, “I will cause you to do”? Give heed to that passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that He will make them to do those things which He commands to be done.” (Chapter 22)

Conditional salvation is approved by synergists and monergists. The difference lies in the distinction between a necessary and sufficient condition. Synergists (the semi-Pelagians, here) believe God’s grace is necessary to be saved but is intrinsically insufficient to effect that which it was purposed to produce: our repentance, faith, and perseverance. Monergists like Augustine not only believe that grace is necessary to procure the conditions of salvation but also believe that grace is sufficient to effect one’s will to achieve the conditions; thus, Christians are said to have been “made” to will the conditions, even though the Christian was not passive in the willing.

Enchiridion

“It is obvious that a man who is old enough to exercise his reason cannot believe, hope, or love unless he wills it, nor could he run for the prize of his high calling in God without a decision of his will. In what sense, therefore, is it "not a matter of human willing or running but of God's showing mercy," unless it be that "the will itself is prepared by the Lord," even as it is written? This saying, therefore, that "it is not a matter of human willing or running but of God's showing mercy," means that the action is from both, that is to say, from the will of man and from the mercy of God. Thus we accept the dictum, "It is not a matter of human willing or running but of God's showing mercy," as if it meant, "The will of man is not sufficient by itself unless there is also the mercy of God." By the same token, the mercy of God is not sufficient by itself unless there is also the will of man. But if we say rightly that "it is not a matter of human willing or running but of God's showing mercy," because the will of man alone is not enough, why, then, is not the contrary rightly said, "It is not a matter of God's showing mercy but of a man's willing," since the mercy of God by itself alone is not enough? Now, actually, no Christian would dare to say, "It is not a matter of God's showing mercy but of man's willing," lest he explicitly contradict the apostle. The conclusion remains, therefore, that this saying: "Not man's willing or running but God's showing mercy," is to be understood to mean that the whole process is credited to God, who both prepareth the will to receive divine aid and aideth the will which has been thus prepared.”(Enchiridion, Chapter 32)

As one of the more often cited monergistic passages, Augustine’s exegesis of Romans 9:16 is noteworthy, especially in that it begins by affirming the obvious role man’s will must play in his salvation and ends having explained that such a will can be caused without being negated. Regeneration changes our nature such that we more strongly desire to repent and believe than to continue fulfilling the lusts of the flesh:

On Grace and Free Will

“I offer this particular petition to God, you may understand in what sense I said, “If thou wilt, thou mayest keep the commandments.” For it is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him for such a force of will as suffices to make us act by the willing. It is certain that it is we that will when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (as he has just now expressed it), “The will is prepared by the Lord.” Of the same Lord it is said, “The steps of a man are ordered by the Lord, and his way doth He will.” Of the same Lord again it is said, “It is God who worketh in you, even to will!” It is certain that it is we that act when we act; but it is He who makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will, who has said, “I will make you to walk in my statutes, and to observe my judgments, and to do them.” When he says, “I will make you… to do them,” what else does He say in fact than, “I will take away from you your heart of stone,” from which used to arise your inability to act, “and I will give you a heart of flesh,” in order that you may act? And what does this promise amount to but this: I will remove your hard heart, out of which you did not act, and I will give you an obedient heart, out of which you shall act? It is He who causes us to act, to whom the human suppliant says, “Set a watch, O Lord, before my mouth.” That is to say: Make or enable me, O Lord, to set a watch before my mouth, a benefit which he had already obtained from God who thus described its influence: “I set a watch upon my mouth.”” (Chapter 32)

“In beginning He works in us that we may have the will, and in perfecting works with us when we have the will. On which account the apostle says, “I am confident of this very thing, that He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.” He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may will; but when we will, and so will that we may act, He co-operates with us.”(Chapter 33)

Some might jump on the phrase “co-operates” as though Augustine did not just finish explaining that until we will, God acts alone. But if read in the context, Augustine is not at all supporting a perspective of autonomy but rather aiming to show that we do not act involuntarily when we do will His precepts. In fact, Augustine makes quite clear a little later in On Grace and Free Willprecisely how sovereign God is in all matters (which will be examined in the next note).

Summary

Augustine believed soteric grace:

1. is necessary due to the fact that “…out of a heart which is not good [we can do no good].”

2. is “…gratuitous and effectual.”

3. “…makes us to walk, to observe, to do.”

4. shows “…[faith and mortifying the deeds of the flesh]… to be God’s gifts, in order that we may understand both that we do them, and that God makes us to do them.”

5. is “…able to turn to belief wills that are perverse and opposed to faith.”

6. is such “…that [men] may act, not that they may themselves do nothing.”

7. is “…sufficient by itself.”

8. is the result of a God who “…makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will.”

9. “…remove[s] your hard heart, out of which you did not act and… give[s] you an obedient heart, out of which you shall act.”

10. “operates without us.”

John Piper on Romans 9

John Piper's exegesis of Romans 9 exemplifies the Reformed understanding of God's Sovereignty, and his concluding chapter superbly summarizes his thesis. The question upon which the whole of his reflections on the chapter were predicated he expresses thusly:

"The roots of this study go back to my perplexity about how Rom 9:15 (“For God says to Moses: I will have mercy on whomever I have mercy and I will be gracious to whomever I will be gracious”) could be an argument (γαρ) for Rom 9:14 (“There is no unrighteousness with God, is there? No indeed!”). How could this quote from Ex 33:19 support Paul’s assertion of God’s righteousness? What is Paul’s justification of God?” [1]

Before he proceeds in detailing precisely how Paul’s argument follows, Piper examines the contextual background which prompted Paul to consider an imaginary objection to God’s righteousness. In Romans 9:1-5, Paul acknowledges that his kinsmen have – by and large – rejected the gospel. In 9:6-8, he anticipates an objection to the truthfulness of the gospel on the grounds that it has failed to procure Old Testament promises by purporting a distinction between the nation of Israel and the children of promise. That Paul is clearly speaking of individual salvation, then, is indisputable (cf. 9:24-10:4).

To support this contention, Paul is prompted to cite an Old Testament example of God’s freedom to distribute soteric grace in whatever manner He sees fit; that is, His election of men is unconditioned. That in its original context the prophet Malachi used Esau and Jacob to represent nations is in nowise an insuperable objection to the argument that Paul is, in the context of Romans 9, referring to a salvific election of the twins, for Paul regularly uses Old Testament passages to suit his purposes (Romans 3:9-12, cf. Psalm 14) and, as was mentioned, in the context of Romans 9 Paul is chiefly concerned with addressing the eternal destiny of the Jews.

Upon consideration of these things, Piper then phrases as follows an objection to which we may imagine Paul replies in 9:14:

“Between Rom 9:13 and 14 we may imagine an objection being raised. It apparently sounded like this: if God, in determining who will be the beneficiaries of his mercy, does not base his decisions on any human distinctives that a person may claim by birth or effort, then he is unrighteous. The assumption seems to be that divine righteousness would require that God elect persons on the basis of their real and valuable distinctives, whether racial (Jewishness) or moral (keepers of the law).” [2]

Of course, Paul denied God is unrighteous, so, upon quoting Exodus 33:19 as his premise for such a conclusion, Piper begs the question: how does this passage function as a evidence that God is righteous? The thesis of Piper’s book begins to form as he examines the context of the Old Testament citation. He notes that God’s glory is connected to His name and goodness such that, in reply to Abraham’s appeal to God to show His glory, one sees:

“…God’s glory and his name consist fundamentally in his propensity to show mercy and his sovereign freedom in its distribution. Or to put it more precisely, it is the glory of God and his essential nature mainly to dispense mercy (but also wrath, Ex 34:7) on whomever he pleases, apart from any constraint originating outside his own will. This is the essence of what it means to be God. This is his name.” [3]

Hence, the question of God’s justification in unconditional election shifts to relating in what sense God’s righteousness is connected to His glory and name. Piper’s thesis, revealed halfway through his book, is that “the righteousness of God must be his unswerving commitment always to preserve the honor of his name and display his glory.” [4] In other words, by citing Exodus 33:19 to vindicate God’s right to love Jacob and hate Esau prior to either having done any work, Paul argues that such a sovereign display of power is in accordance with God’s eternal purpose, which is to manifest the riches of His glory to those who are His vessels of mercy by means of mercy, a display only possible against a backdrop of execution of justice on vessels of wrath (cf. 9:22-23). God’s righteousness, then, consists in His upholding that which infinitely worthy (viz. His glory).

In order to assess the validity of such a thesis, Piper examines whether or not Paul indicates such an understanding of God’s righteousness elsewhere in Romans, and concluded that there is indeed precedent for this belief. One example is found in Romans 3:25-26, in which the point is made that God’s forbearance of sin is only justified due to the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. Sin, the breaking of God’s law, is a scorn of God’s glory, so only through Christ’s sacrifice can the Father be said to actually uphold the infinite worth of His glory – that is, act righteously – simultaneous to seemingly allowing sin to be performed with impunity.

Concluding the witness to the veracity of his thesis is Piper’s study of the following verses of Romans 9. He particularly notes verses 16-18, in which Paul again references Exodus:

“Here the scope of God’s freedom to show mercy and to harden was described in more detail and the reference in Rom 9:17 to God’s purposes in dealing with Pharaoh was found to cohere remarkably with our interpretation of Ex 33:19. In 9:17 Paul cites Ex 9:16: “For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: For this very thing I raised you up, that I might show in you my power and that I might proclaim my name in all the earth.” It can scarcely be overemphasized, for the sake of Paul’s justification of God, that in Rom 9:15 and 17 Paul employs Old Testament texts in which the exercise of God’s sovereign freedom, in mercy (33:19) and in hardening (Ex 9:16), is the means by which he declares the glory of his name! This is the heart of Paul’s defense: in choosing unconditionally those on whom he will have mercy and those whom he will harden God is not unrighteous, for in the “electing purpose” he is acting out of a full allegiance to his name and esteem for his glory.” [5]

1. John Piper, The Justification of God, (Baker Academic, 1993), pg. 217.

2. Ibid., pg. 218.

3. Ibid., pgs. 218-219.

4. Ibid., pg. 219.

5. Ibid., pg. 219.