Prelapsarian Emotions and Gordon Clark's Change in Thought Over Time

It's rare when I get the opportunity to discuss the thought of Gordon Clark with other people. On Puritanboard, someone recently made use of Gordon Clark's definition of emotion to argue that emotions are a consequence of the fall of mankind. What follows is a conversation in which I think I was both able to take advantage of my recent research efforts to show how Clark's view of emotions changed over time and to explain why I thought there is good reason to think that prelapsarian Adam experienced emotions (even given Clark's definition). I'll indent the interlocutor's comments (his name is Jeffrey) as well as the Clark quotes near the bottom. I'll leave my own comments unindented:

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Jeffrey

https://biblicalogic.blogspot.com/2023/04/thoughts-on-emotions-this-article-is.html?m=1I wrote an article on my blog about emotions. I believe that emotion is not a faculty of the soul and it is the consequence of the fall of man, though a controlled emotional reaction is not necessarily sinful in itself. Biblical virtues such as love, joy, peace, and so on are not emotions, but they are volition. What do you think?

Me

Hello. Fellow Clark aficiando here. I have also written about Gordon Clark and emotions. While I don't necessarily have an issue with the definition you or Clark have for emotions, I would suggest that your argument does not follow.

You say, "Jesus, in His human nature, wept and yet He never once sinned, including in the realm of His emotions." If that is true, why could it not also have been true of Adam in the garden? Are emotions only possible in response to negative events? Are there no emotions associated with positive events? When Eve was formed from Adam's rib, could not his ordinarily "calm state of the mind" have involuntarily "fluctuated" in a good way?

Another scenario: Jesus was righteously angry (emotional?) with money-changers. Could not it have been possible (theoretically) for Adam to have been righteously angry with Satan?

Another question: Do you not think that it is possible that Satan's temptation disturbed Adam's or Eve's ordinarily calm state of mind?

I encourage you to keep blogging and critically thinking through these sorts of issues!

Edit: I will add that in my mind, a metaphysical explanation for how humans can experience emotions requires nothing more than that we are mutable creatures who are capable of being affected and changed by our surroundings.

Jeffrey

I wish Clark had written more on emotions. But your questions are legitimate, and I have no answers currently. But I have one question to ask: is emotion one of the faculties of the soul? Or do you agree with Clark that it’s only the intellect and the will? 

And what do you think of Clark’s view that emotions is the consequence of the fall?

Me

Reread the definition of emotion that you provide: "Emotion is defined as a sudden disruption, disturbance or fluctuation of the ordinary calm state of the mind." A fluctuation of the mind would imply that an emotion is intellectual, no?

I think that the argument is an overreach. I can easily imagine that Adam experienced all sorts of emotions prior to the fall. You said, "Adam and Eve could not be emotional because everything was good in Eden." I replied, "When Eve was formed from Adam's rib, could not his ordinarily "calm state of the mind" have involuntarily "fluctuated" in a good way?" Experiencing surprise, for example, would seemingly qualify as an emotion. Well, I can imagine that Adam was surprised to see Eve... but in a good way!

Jeffrey

Emotion can be considered a thought of course. To be more exact, it is an irrational thought that disturbs the rational thought.

I can understand where you are coming from. But I think there is a misconception that joy, love, happiness, etc must involve the emotions or a fluctuated state of the mind. It's hard to imagine, I understand, how these things can be without emotions. As a person filled with many emotions, it was hard to imagine for me as well. Even Gordon Clark shed a little bit of tears when his wife died. But what I know is the Bible tells us to be controlled in our mind be it in the midst of sadness (lest depression or thoughts of suicide comes) or joy (lest the evil of pride comes in).

Me

Where does Clark say that? Or are you making an original claim? Either way, the point is that if you consider emotion to be a thought, then it would pertain to the intellect.

I didn't say anything about joy, love, or happiness. I mentioned surprise. Isn't surprise indicative of a fluctuation of the mind? Can't surprise be a good thing, like a surprise party or a surprise wife (Eve)?

Jeffrey

It's my own original claim. Let's see if i can state it better. Emotion originates from the flesh which causes the mind to think irrationally, hence emotion can be considered an irrational thought. But it is not part of the original faculty of the soul.

I would also suggest that it is a misconception that a surprise must involve emotion or a fluctuation of the mind. Hard to imagine even for me. Furthermore, there wasn't any mention about Adam's surprise, though I think it's a good educated guess.

Another question is would it be valid to say that Adam was surprised despite God's clear direct revelation to him? I think it's more like Adam was expectant or anticipative of God fulfilling His revelation.

Me

An original claim should come with an original argument. Also, do you think that it is impossible for angels to experience emotion?

You don't think that surprise involves a fluctuation of the mind? Then please define surprise.

Yes, I am only giving a hypothetical. I said as much in my first post. But that's all I need to do. I only need to give an example of the possibility of Adam experiencing an emotion prior to the fall for your claim that emotions are a product of the fall to be undercut.

Divine revelation is often progressive, which leaves open the possibility for surprise in the manner in which an anticipation is fulfilled.

Jeffrey

1. If surprise is an emotion, Adam would not have it.
2. If surprise is not an emotion, Adam could have it. I would probably define it as a volition to assent to the proposition that all things will work together for good for the elect (Rom. 8:28), which is a kind of expectation.

I am undecided. Have to think about it more.

Yes i think it's impossible

Me

By all means, take your time. But as I said, you will, at some point, have to provide an original argument for your original claim. I see no Scriptural nor experiential reason to think that emotions are only possible in response to negative events and only cause the mind to think irrationally.To that end, I just would like to point out that your #1 is, at present, an assertion without argument. As it stands, it begs the question by presupposing your unargued claim that emotions are only a postlapsarian experience. It should be the other way around: you should be presenting an argument for your claim that emotions can only be a postlapsarian experience as well as explaining how my hypotheticals are either impossible or compatible with your claim.

With regard to #2, that definition does not strike me as fitting with the Scriptural usage of the term. For example, one can be surprised and respond in a negative way. The wicked are often "surprised when you do not join them in the same flood of debauchery, and they malign you" (1 Peter 4:4). Further, volitional assent to the proposition you mention does not seem to be a good example of surprise. We can expect God works all things together for our good is something. Surprise, I think, is caused by something unexpected.

I see no reason why angels cannot be surprised in this sense, by the way. I can imagine that the protoevangelium to Adam and Eve in Genesis 3 may have come as an unexpected surprise, for the good news contains revelation of which angels are said to "long to look" (1 Peter 1:12). Again, if this is even possible, then the definition of emotions you provide would not be sufficient.

By the way, you don't cite it in your blog post, so I'm wondering if you have Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? You can find that book in What is the Christian Life? Clark writes a lot about the emotions in that book.

Not including the number of references in his books, my own research shows that he mentions the emotions 600+ times in various articles, personal notes, letters, etc.

Jeffrey

 
Great. I have the old individual books before TF combined some books, but I haven’t got chance to read it. Thanks for sharing.

Me

No problem. I will mention that Clark seems to have changed his opinion on the subject of emotion over the course of his life. For instance:

1944. Examination in Theology. Orthodox Presbyterian Church. July 7.

DR. WELMERS: I believe it is a good illustration, and I don't want to get into odious comparisons here. It is my feeling that the intellect and emotion and will are equally fundamental as aspects of the Human Soul, yet, there is in the calling and serving faith, there is an economic precedent of the intellect, that is that. And, the intellectual grasp of the way of salvation, first requires the saving of faith to both.

Clark: I am willing to admit the intellect and volition and emotion are equally essential to a human being. Now, if that is all you mean, that is that. But - they have different functions and I hold that the intellect is a supreme function. 

Another example:

1952. Review of Art and Society, by Catherine Rau. The Philosophical Review 61, No. 2 Apr.

Clark: The chief aim of this small but interesting treatise on Plato's theory of art is to defend him from the charge of committing the "moralistic fallacy" in aesthetics. To do this the author not only examines Plato's words, but tries to understand them in the light of the new developments in art that Plato had in mind; and further by an independent aesthetic experience she finds the Platonic position to be commendable in general, if not in every particular. The description of the art which Plato opposed is enough but barely enough to serve the author's purpose. References to other studies are given, and with these the reader must be satisfied. Her support of the Platonic position by independent aesthetic experience will seem particularly good to one who, like the reviewer, finds himself in substantial agreement. For example: squalid slums and hideous factories depress one's personality; harmonious and noble sights pass through the soul as health-giving breezes; art always influences our emotions; aesthetic experiences affect our morals and our morals affect our taste; the moral effects of art do not end with childhood; and, further, the moral personality of the artist is one of the determinants of the total aesthetic quality of a work of art.

I can hardly think of a more pleasant description of a positive emotion than a "health-giving breeze." Compare this to statements he makes 30 years later:

1983. Knowledge and Persons (44:26) (The Sangre de Cristo Lectures on the Holy Spirit, 2)

Audience: Do you feel that emotions are good or bad?

Clark: Bad. Doesn’t the Apostle Paul say “suppress your emotions”?

Audience: Then we should all be Stoic?

Clark: Huh? Well, not Stoics, no.

Audience: I don’t think emotions are bad.

Clark: You don’t? Well if you ever become the pastor of a church I think you may conclude that. Nearly all the church fights arise out of emotions.

Notice Clark essentially commits the fallacy of asserting the consequent:

[Nearly] all church fights are due to emotions.
Fights are bad.
Therefore, emotions are bad.

Further, the audience member's question about Stoicism is well-taken. Consider the following statement Clark makes:

1950. Hellenistic and Roman Schools of Philosophy. In A History of Philosophical Systems Vergilius Ferm, ed. New York: The Philosophical Library.

Clark: That the Stoic temper differs radically from the Epicurean, giving rise to the English connotations of those adjectives, may be seen first in some of the detailed advice for everyday living. For example, the Stoic wise man will take part in politics (in fact, Stoicism both directly and indirectly contributed to Roman law); he will marry and raise a family; he will not groan under torture, and in general he will suppress emotion as irrational, neither showing pity nor as a magistrate relaxing the penalties fixed by law; and, since one falsehood is just as false as any other, it follows that all sins are equally great, and all men who are not perfectly wise are arrant knaves. However, if life grows too burdensome, he may commit suicide.

Of course, Clark might reply that both Stoics and Christians can seek to suppress emotions without collapsing into one system. In any case, the comparison is noteworthy, and I don't find his subsequent exegesis of Colossians 3:5 to be convincing.

Jeffrey

Thanks for the resources.

Divine Impassibility

I was recently asked if I had any thoughts on divine impassibility. I haven't studied the doctrine that much. Here is a quote from Clark on the subject:

Does the Bible indicate that God is subject to sudden, involuntary, non-intellectual upheavals in his usually calm state of mind? Well, hardly. The Westminster Confession, the best summary of the contents of the Bible, says that God is without parts or passions. Parts refers to bodily organs. Bodies have parts, minds do not. But God is also without passions. The word passion, in more modern terminology affection, is wider than the term emotion but includes the latter. A passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force. A dog is affected by a whipping; a student is affected, sometimes, by the possibility of a good grade. There are modern psychology books written about “the affective consciousness.” But God is not affected by anything. Of, in another translation of the Greek term, God does not “suffer” anything. 

On the contrary, not only the Westminster Confession, but all or nearly all the historic creeds says that God is immutable. He does not change. Emotion, however, is a sudden, involuntary change. To have emotions would be inconsistent with God’s eternal state of blessedness. 

Now, someone may say that God loves and that love is an emotion. But with respect to love, two points must be made. First, God’s love is eternal, therefore not a sudden change, therefore not an emotion. Second, God commands us to love him. A command requires voluntary obedience. Therefore the love God commands is volitional, not emotional. Doubtless God commands the impossible. He commands us to keep his law perfectly. This we cannot do because of sin. The impossibility arises from us; it does not arise from any irrationality in the commands. God commands the impossible, but he does not command the absurd. (Gordon Clark, Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine?)

A few scattered thoughts:

1. Given that emotions are involuntary, I don't think emotions can be intrinsically sinful, although their presence in a particular context could serve as an indication of sin. Jesus was sinless yet, at times, angry, happy, and sad. If we suppose someone else was happy when Jesus would have been angry (with money changers) or sad (at Lazarus' death), or if we suppose someone else was angry or sad when Jesus was happy, then it would seem emotions are a kind of contextually indicative reflection of one's current state of sanctification. Either way, any argument for the impassibility of God couldn't proceed along these lines.

2. If a "passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force," then God could not be necessarily be affected by anything external to the Trinity, for there is nothing external to the Trinity which was not created. So if divine passibility could be true, it would have to be a contingent property like divine creator-ship.

[I am assuming here that the relationships among the members of the Trinity are necessary, eternal, and, thus, not of the sort intended to be included by a doctrine of divine impassibility. The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct, eternal generation and spiration are true, and so some might be tempted to say that the members of the Trinity "affect" one another, for example - whether in respect of person or merely personhood is a matter of dispute between eastern and western Trinitarian models - but I would assume that necessary condition for passibility is change, which obviously does not take place given that the Trinity and their relationships are eternal, at least apart from consideration of a contingent creation (i.e. the ontological vs. economic Trinity)].

3. I believe creation is contingent so as to avoid, roughly, the consequence that the Trinity depends on creation in the same sense the Father depends on the Son. However, I think that most proponents of divine impassibility do not think that the fact that we can affirm contingent truths about God like "God is our creator," "God is our savior," etc. would count as a mark against divine impassibility - they may not even count as a mark against divine immutability. At the very least, those contingencies are true in virtue of God's own initiative.

Furthermore, as a Calvinist, I believe God determines all things. God initiates and determines changes, so only in a proximate sense could I say that something external to God has affected Him (not that I would say that). It may affect Him, but only insofar as God had taken the initiative in determining to create something external to Him for that express purpose. So one question is whether God created with a purpose, in part, that His creation would affect Him - change Him, in some way. It may be that God did not create with this intention and so did not determine that creation would affect Him - obviously, this would be in favor of divine impassibility.

But suppose He did create and determine all things with that intention. Another question is, given that any alleged affectation would ultimately derive from God's own initiative and determination, whether that alleged affectation can really by ascribed to something external to God, or if it is really God who is changing Himself. The latter might be the more accurate expression of the state of affairs. This could constitute an argument for divine impassibility, but it would be controversial.

Suppose I intend and determine to hit myself with a hammer and that nothing could stop me from doing so. Was the hammer instrumental to the change in pain I feel? Yes. But the hammer can has no instrumentality apart from my will. So was it the hammer that really affected me, or was it my will, or was it both? If the first or last option, that cuts against divine impassibility. If the second, that works in its favor. An answer to this could depend on the semantics and technical nuances of a particular expression of divine impassability. I'm not sure.

Of course, this all assumes the speculative point about whether God intended that creation would lead to some kind of internal change or affectation in the first place. But to my mind, the Incarnation seems to correspond to the hammer illustration: who and what I am allows me to be able to assume a hammer in my hand by which I can hurt myself. Indeed, the Incarnation is even stronger than this analogy, for whereas I cannot in fact create a hammer, the assumption of a hammer is not an assumption of a nature or capacities, and other things can prevent me from hurting myself with it, the Son in fact initiated and infallibly determined His own Incarnation and assumption of a nature or capacities precisely so as to be hurt through the crucifixion. So the questions about whether I am being really affected by the hammer, if I am affecting myself, or both would have analogous correspondents to the situation of the Incarnation.

4. Direct arguments for divine impassibility could be made from other alleged divine attributes. Divine simplicity would entail divine impassibility. Given that there would be no real distinction between impassibility and simplicity, then it is trivially true that any argument for divine simplicity would be an argument for divine impassibility. I have numerous reasons for disagreeing with divine simplicity, however, so to the extent that I agree with divine impassibility, I wouldn't look here.

Another direct argument for divine impassibility is to argue for divine immutability. Divine impassibility may not require divine immutability per point 3 above, but if God doesn't change, then obviously nothing external to Him could be said to change Him. Ultimately, what grounds our belief in something about God ought to be divine revelation, but our support can be either explicit or implicit. I'm sure others are more aware of relevant biblical passages than I am.

Currently, I am sympathetic towards divine immutability and, to that extent, sympathetic towards divine impassibility as well. I am undecided, however. Obviously, an adherent of divine immutability must consider the relevancy of the Incarnation. Unless I were to encounter incontrovertible, unambiguous biblical support for a specific theory and expression of immutability or impassibility - I may have done so and just don't remember, or I may have and just think (correctly or not) that those texts are prima facie consistent with varying positions - I would need to develop my views on the Incarnation and a theory of time before I could answer decisively.

Emotions and Propositional Correspondence

A few posts ago, in the course of rejecting any sort of metaphysical monism, whether mental or propositional (idealism) or corporeal or physical (physicalism), I mentioned that things-in-themselves can correspond to propositions:

I think a better definition would be that a person is an ego, the possessor of a mind or minds capable of reflexive indexation. These words could each be defined and each definition could be true without its being the case that some “real” Ding-an-sich can’t correspond to them. I think the so-called empirical representational theory of truth in which truth images the physical reality to which it merely corresponds scared Clark away from any type of correspondence – hence the seeming propositional monism.

See here as well:

Metaphysically, Scripturalism does not necessarily promote a purely mental realm. Propositional truth, however, maintains a logical primacy over a “physical” realm insofar as the latter is a creation patterned after the former. The physical qua physical cannot be “known” by definition; knowledge is propositional belief in which the possibility of error is precluded. In other words, this is a sort of opposite to the correspondence theory of truth; it is a correspondence theory of corporeality in which the physical provides a sensible representation of eternal truth. 

While the priority of the correspondence is a question worth exploring - are [some] propositions true because they correspond to some metaphysical thing-in-itself, or are some [and especially physical] things-in-themselves “real” because they correspond to some truth? - these questions about theories of truth and the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics are obviously quite intricate. A little too intricate for this post. I’ve stated some thoughts on the former elsewhere (here and here, for example). For now, I’ll content myself with yet another shot at the idea Christianity is compatible with propositional monism. Given the necessity of knowledge (see here and here), it seems clear that it would be the only type of monism which would’t prima facie be necessarily self-defeating. 

But take emotions. What are they? Gordon Clark defined an emotion as “something unusual, sudden, exceptional...some kind of upheaval...involuntary...has no intellectual content...not volition” (cf. Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine, pgs. 18-19). Obviously, in the course of defining an emotion, Clark uses propositions. But equally apparent is his belief that emotions are not propositional. He says “knowledge and the emotion are different.” 

Now, how compatible this is with his statement on pg. 15 that these non-intellectual, non-voluntary “are not always good. Sometimes they are sinful” is a matter of debate. If the command to emote would indeed be irrational as Clark says on pg. 21, then it would seem emotions themselves cannot be sinful. But if Clark’s definition is acceptable, then I see plenty of room for discussion about correspondence between propositions and things-in-themselves. Metaphysics wouldn’t collapse into epistemology, at least not in toto. On the other hand, if emotions are taken to be propositional, I think that in addition to the question of whether emotions could be commanded and obeyed, such would make it much harder to defend anthropopathic language in Scripture and, by extension, divine impassibility.

Clark's Lectures 3

Here are a few quotes I found to be interesting from Clark's Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? Though some of the points are particularly well argued, because I don't necessarily agree with everything written, so I've refrained from commenting on anything.

Commands, Emotions, Faith, and Volition

Pages 20-21: “Does the Bible indicate that God is subject to sudden, involuntary, non-intellectual upheavals in his usually calm state of mind? Well, hardly. The Westminster Confession, the best summary of the contents of the Bible, says that God is without parts or passions. Parts refers to bodily organs. Bodies have parts, minds do not. But God is also without passions. The word passion, in more modern terminology affection, is wider than the term emotion but includes the latter. A passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force. A dog is affected by a whipping; a student is affected, sometimes, by the possibility of a good grade. There are modern psychology books written about “the affective consciousness.” But God is not affected by anything. Of, in another translation of the Greek term, God does not “suffer” anything.

On the contrary, not only the Westminster Confession, but all or nearly all the historic creeds says that God is immutable. He does not change. Emotion, however, is a sudden, involuntary change. To have emotions would be inconsistent with God’s eternal state of blessedness.

Now, someone may say that God loves and that love is an emotion. But with respect to love, two points must be made. First, God’s love is eternal, therefore not a sudden change, therefore not an emotion. Second, God commands us to love him. A command requires voluntary obedience. Therefore the love God commands is volitional, not emotional. Doubtless God commands the impossible. He commands us to keep his law perfectly. This we cannot do because of sin. The impossibility arises from us; it does not arise from any irrationality in the commands. God commands the impossible, but he does not command the absurd.”

The Trinity and Absolute Divine Simplicity

Page 28: “The doctrine of the Trinity is found only in the Biblical revelation. No one would ever have thought of it, no one ever did think of it, apart from the Bible. True, some philosophers had three-fold sets of principles. Plato had the world of Ideas, the Demiurge, and chaotic Space. But this is not a tri-personal divine being. Plotinus has something similar. He spoke of the One, the Ideas, and the Soul. But he also had a Logos and a lower world. The whole was continuous. There is no tri-personal supreme being. Plotinus’s One does not think and cannot know. Neo-Platonism is not at all similar to Trinitarian Christianity.”

Propitiation

Pages 49-50: “Even the covenant with Noah, which the dispensationalists try to reduce to politics, and in which they see no reference to the Atonement, speaks of placating an angry God. This idea is obscured in the King James version, and the American version as well. These translations say that God smelled a sweet odor. But the Koehler-Baumgartner lexicon (the latest lexicon at this writing) gives just one meaning to the Hebrew word transliterated niychoach: appeasement (Beschwichtigung). The “smell of appeasement” then means the placating odor. See also the verbal usage in Ezekiel 5:13, “I will appease my anger.” Hence the correct translation of Genesis 8:20-21 is, “And Noah builded an altar unto the Lord… and offered burnt offerings on the altar. And the Lord smelled the placating odor.” Thus anticipations of Christ’s sacrifice in the Old Testament and explanations of his sacrifice in the New agree that he was the propitiation for our sins. He turned aside God’s wrath and anger which we deserved.”

Scripture and Inerrancy, Science and Operationalism

Pages 57-58: “It seems to me that a misunderstanding of science at this point has led the author into a misunderstanding of the Bible. If the Bible contradicts itself, as clearly as the wave theory contradicts the corpuscular theory, we will be forced to abandon the Bible. No one in his right mind can believe contradictions. In fact, if the antinomy is as he says it is, God himself is faced with an insoluble puzzle. And if something is insoluble for God, then God cannot be trusted. Packer tells us that God has given us this antinomy and if he has given it to us, is that not enough? Cannot we trust God? The answer is that we cannot trust contradictions and insoluble antinomies, no matter who gives them to us. If someone told me to believe that the number two was both even and odd, I would conclude that this someone was not God. God, anyone I could not think of as God, does not talk nonsense, and insoluble antinomies are nonsense. They are just as much nonsense as it would be to say that the path of a point equidistant from a given point has three right angles along it.

But if we see what modern science can do with its two theories of light, and if we pay just a little attention to sovereignty and responsibility, these unfortunate consequences never arise. The laws of science should not be considered as intended descriptions of natural motions. They should not be considered as directions for operating in a physics laboratory. They are methods for producing desired results. This in brief is The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God. It is always possible to use either of two mutually exclusive methods for producing the same desired result. To cure milk fever in cows, one may use the antiseptic lugol, or one may use compressed air. Both work satisfactorily. Hence, in manipulating light, a physicist may use either one; or if for a particular purpose the two are not equally satisfactory, for lugol cannot do everything compressed air can do and vice versa, the physicist can use for one purpose and the other for another.”

Language and Internal Relations

Page 66: “There are many who in that day will say to Christ, Lord, Lord. And he will profess, I never knew you. Thus, clearly, a verbal profession of Lord is not saving faith. One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell.”

The Cause of Faith

Page 77: “How God gives a man faith is very easily explained. God gives a dead sinner faith just the way Jesus made dead Lazarus come out of the tomb. Just as God said, Let there be light, and there was light. That is all the how there is. It is an act of omnipotence: the exceeding greatness of his might power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.”

The Nature of Faith:

Choice and Assent; Volitional, Decisional, Obedient

Page 76: “Faith certainly involves an act of will. It is the decision to believe what one understands.”

Page 79:”But often evidence, witnesses, and historical documents are mistaken. Shall I believe them in this case? The evidence does not compel belief, but I may choose to believe, or I may choose not to believe.”

Page 81: “What is needed for saving faith is God’s gracious act of giving him the power to will. When God gives him this power, he will assent, believe, and exercise faith. Faith indubitably is the gift of God. It is the gift of voluntary assent. That an unregenerate man cannot believe does not contradict any of this.”

Page 83: “I regret Calvin, a giant among pygmies, said that assent comes from the heart and not the head. This distinction is unscriptural; the Bible nowhere opposes heart to head, for it does not mention this “head.” Naturally assent comes from the heart because all psychological actions of a person come from the heart. There is nothing else for them to come from.

Aside from this unfortunate slip, Calvin proceeds to say that assent is the obedience of faith. Clearly obedience is a matter of volition. Assent then is an act of will. No pious additions are necessary, for the assent itself is already pious.”

Page 85: “Even the intellectual work of coming to understand a sentence requires assent and volition. It does not require assent to the truth of the sentence in question; but it requires a voluntary act of attention, and assent to the truth of other propositions by which its meaning is uncovered. One of the important points to keep in mind is the object of assent in different contexts. The person who does not assent to the Gospel, the persecutor Saul for example, must assent to propositions regarding the Hebrew or Greek usage of the word Lord, if he is to understand “Jesus is Lord,” and react with a persecutor’s zeal.”

Page 86: “Hodge, however, continues, “But if the question be, What is the act or state of mind which is required in the Gospel, when we are commanded to believe, the answer is very difficult.”

How can it be very different? If faith generically is intelligent assent, every species of faith must be also.”

Assurance

Page 91: “Just because a person believes that he is saved is an insufficient reason for thinking that he is saved. It may be suggested for sober consideration whether or not those who are most easily assured of salvation are least likely to be saved.

Nevertheless, in spite of all hypocrisy and self-deception, it is possible to have assurance.”

Page 94: “Without minimizing the other items in this list, it is well to emphasize knowledge. If one wishes assurance, he will try to increase his knowledge. Knowledge is mentioned trice in the section. Therefore, if one wishes assurance that he is regenerated, let him ask himself, Do I study the Scripture? How much of it do I know? Some people know so very little; some people believe so very little; some evangelists must have so very little assurance.”

The Mode of Baptism

Page 106: “In Daniel 4:33, i.e, LXX 4:30, one of the Greek words used to say that Nebuchadnezzar was wet with dew is baptizo. I can hardly think that this was immersion. Mark 7:4 says that couches were baptized. It seems to me that this means they were washed. In Hebrews 9:10, 13, 19, 21, the several baptisms (King James, washings) were done by sprinkling. In I Corinthians 10:2 the Israelites were baptized, but the Egyptians were immersed. Similarly in I Peter 3:21, Noah was baptized, but the wicked were immersed.”

Transmission

Page 108: “A scribe might make a few mistakes in copying the Word of God, but we would still have substantially the Word of God. The difference is between a correct copy of error and a slightly incorrect copy of truth. I cannot agree that the latter is useless.”

The Theological Necessity of A Priori Divine Revelation

Page 108: “I begin with a question, the basic question. Is there a God? If there is, can I know Him? My answer to this question, If there is a God, I cannot know it unless He tells me about Himself. I can study His doing, Nature; but what shall my conclusion about God be? That He is kind and benevolent? Or that Nature is vicious and careless? I think it is obvious that whatever I see in Nature, and whichever I emphasize, will be for reasons of personal experience and inclination.”

Pages 111-112: “It would seem from several things you say that there are a number of statements in the Bible that contradict your world-view. In fact, you immediately suggest that you would not accept this or that if it contradicted your total experience. Hence, in answer to my question in my last letter, How do you decide to accept some of the Bible’s statements and reject others? You answer that you test the Bible by your experience; you do not accept something as true, just because the Bible says it. But you develop a criterion from experience and measure the Bible by that criterion.

In your total experience you are reading the Bible. You say, “It tells me there is a God… It tells me God revealed himself… It tells me of a Resurrection.” But if you do not accept the truth of propositions on the basis of the Bible’s assertion, you cannot accept these points without confirmation from experience.”

Recognition of the Scope of the Canon

Page 113: “But if there is a revelation, there can be no criterion for it. God cannot swear by a greater; therefore he has sworn by himself. One cannot ask one’s own experience to judge God and determine whether God tells the truth or not. Consider Abraham. How could Abraham be sure that God commanded him to sacrifice Isaac? Maybe this suggestion was of the devil; maybe it was a queer auto-suggestion. There is no higher answer to this question than God himself. The final criterion is merely God’s statement. It cannot be tested by any superior truth.”