Showing posts with label Art. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Art. Show all posts

Thursday, December 19, 2024

Unapologetica

There is a part of me that has considered this blog as primarily a medium through which I can work out my own thoughts. But I do recognize that other people read it from time to time. I hope what I write strengthens those readers. 

Every so often, I try to remind myself why I gave this blog its title: while I frequently reflect on apologetic matters, 2 Corinthians 12:19 intimates that defenses I offer are not supposed to be of myself per se. So if - as a husband, father, son, brother, friend, or stranger - I've lost sight that my speech ought to be consciously performed in the sight of God as a Christian being conformed to Christ, the sort of apologetic in which I'm engaging is a failure that will build neither myself nor others up. This happens all too frequently. What can help?

Concrete imagery can ground us. We are meant to be the light of the world (Matthew 5:14-16). This is only possible because the Word is the redeeming light in whose image Christians are progressively conformed (Hebrews 1:3, John 1:9ff., 2 Corinthians 4:5-6, Romans 8:29, Ephesians 1:8-9). The word of the Word is a lamp unto our feet and light unto our path (Psalm 119:105). To the extent that we live our lives according to God's word, we ourselves are enlightened (Ephesians 1:17-18, 5:8-17). Thinking of light should almost trigger an automatic response of that on which we are already disposed to meditate. The same can be said of other imagery (link, link, link, link). The following passage is rich in wisdom:

2 Corinthians 2:17-3:5 ...we are not, like so many, peddlers of God's word, but as men of sincerity, as commissioned by God, in the sight of God we speak in Christ. Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? Or do we need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you, or from you? You yourselves are our letter of recommendation, written on our hearts, to be known and read by all. And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts. Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. Not that we are sufficient in ourselves to claim anything as coming from us, but our sufficiency is from God.

There is a clear connection to 2 Corinthians 12:19 here. Paul, speaking against in the sight of God as those in Christ, wishes to redirect focus from justifying himself to his love for God and His people. To do that, he uses an illustration in which he calls the Corinthians letters whose writ has been engraved in their hearts by the same Spirit working through Paul. In claiming not to peddle God's word, one might say that Paul indirectly objects to peddling the Corinthians themselves. He wishes for the words of God to be known and read by all that the sufficiency of the Author might be made manifest. Paul's writing etches a picture of the etching of the Spirit they share - indeed, the Spirit who initially worked through the word of God Paul preached to them. Do we consider ourselves to be letters of recommendation for our fellow Christians (not that we divine new truths or revelations but that we manifest, testify, and witness to God's sufficient word, as a mirror reflects light)?

Internalizing certain Scriptures also can keep us oriented in certain ways. For example, Romans 8:28 has kept me rooted in the knowledge of the goodness and power of God. If I ever even begin to doubt or experience a trial of the moment, this verse reminds me of the good telos God has planned for me and works on my behalf. That's an example which pertains more to individual assurance, but the same principle applies to internalizing the second (and first, of course) greatest commandment(s). The question is: are we trying to correctly orient ourselves in these ways?

Finally, there is also some measure of comfort we can take in God's word when it seems all our efforts to help others go unrecognized or do not bear fruit. We know that just as we have been etched by the Spirit, we too etch our markings in history. What goes unnoticed for a time doesn't always remain that way. A proper perspective of history should keep up from impatience and despair (link, cf. 1 Corinthians 1:27-29).

A Review of "The Bible, Verification, and First Principles of Reason" (Without Excuse)

Last year, I posted a few extended comments on a footnote that referenced Gordon Clark in chapter 11 of Without Excuse (link). In this post, I plan to focus attention on chapter one. It's the essay I found to be the most interesting, contains the only other mentions of Clark in the book, and can also be read for free (link).

The author, M. Dan Kemp, proposes the following thesis: “…if the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge, attempts to verify the Christian Scriptures are not epistemically profitable” (pg. 1). When I read this for the first time, it sounded like Mr. Kemp was suggesting that a Christian foundationalist who accepts Scripture as his epistemic foundation cannot know his epistemic foundation by inferential reasoning. Therefore, any further attempts made towards that end - knowing the Christian Scriptures are true - would not be profitable. 

I would have agreed with Mr. Kemp to the extent that the sort of "human knowledge" in question are true beliefs humans have that are epistemically justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense. That is, in some contexts, while I think "knowledge" might legitimately refer to something other than this (e.g. mere true beliefs; true beliefs that are justified in an externalist sense), there are ways in which internalist and infallibilist "knowledge" is distinctively important. I think the latter knowledge alone can provide grounds for full assurance of salvation or a defense of one's beliefs. With these qualifications in mind - and the importance of these qualification will become more apparent later on - Mr. Kemp's thesis seems sound.

Immediately following this thesis, however, Mr. Kemp says:

This result is particularly acute in readings of Scripture passages that seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God. I argue that the position put forward by Clark, Van Til, and Frame entails a reading of these passages that renders them useless as criteria of verification, even though, on the contrary, the passages present themselves as such. In short, the popular reply to critics of the Clark and Van Til school mentioned above does not succeed. (Without Excuse, pgs. 1-2)

As I initially read this, the first question I had was what Mr. Kemp thinks "verification" means. More on this below.

The second question I had was why Mr. Kemp seems to suggest that Clark, Van Til, and Frame had a singular "position" on this topic. From what follows in the rest of the chapter, Clark would have certainly disagreed with Frame et al. if, as Mr. Kemp thinks, these authors really were "insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means" (pg. 10). By at least the time he wrote "How Firm a Foundation?" in 1943 (also see below), there can be no question about how Clark viewed Scripture for the rest of his life. 

Clark did not think exactly as Frame and Van Til did. This fact is actually indicated by the only time Clark is even quoted in the entire chapter (in a section Mr. Kemp entitles, “Justification and Circularity,” no less!):

How do we know if a purported first principle is correct? Consider again the exchange about my birth city. If the Christian Scriptures are the first principle of reason, then it will not do for me to end the conversation by asserting that reliable witnesses, sensory experience, and memory ought to be believed. Even these principles require rational justification. Gordon Clark says,

Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically…Since therefore every philosophy must have its first indemonstrable axiom, the secularist cannot deny the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom. Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures. This is the Reformation principle sola scriptura. (Without Excuse, pg. 7)

Take another example of Clark's thought on this subject:

A recent book on Classical Apologetics tries to prove the divine origin and infallibility of the Bible on the premise that the Bible contains accounts of God’s miracles. This is circular reasoning: How do you know the Bible is God’s Word? Because it contains accounts of God’s miracles. How do you know that the accounts are true? Because they are in God’s inerrant Scripture! If anyone wish to prove that the Bible is a divine revelation, his premise cannot be the Bible itself. One does not prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis that the squares of the other two sides equal the square of the hypotenuse. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pg. 314 [originally published in 1986 in his book, First & Second Thessalonians])

Is it not clear that Clark's position is different from any position which suggests that "first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means"? To my knowledge, there are only a few places one might try to find some indication that Clark approved of circular reasoning. The first comes from an article Clark wrote on "Apologetics" in 1957. In providing his understanding of Van Til's apologetic, Clark wrote:

In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought. 
But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.

In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry, it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry. 

At least three observations mitigate against interpreting the above as evidence that Clark's accepted the epistemic legitimacy of circular reasoning. Firstly, Clark is expositing Van Til's thought, not expressing his own. As the rest of the article shows, Clark's "grasp" of Van Til of Van Til's thought cannot be equated with his acceptance of Van Til's thought. 

Secondly, anyone who believes that the above summary implies some measure of agreement between Clark and Van Til must first acknowledge Clark's own qualifications: axioms "control" theorems, circular reasoning is only "loosely" allowed as a referent to the geometric analogy (in particular), etc. This is not the language of traditional coherentism.

Finally, the above context is not only about Van Til's thought in general, it's specific to Van Til's thought on apologetics. The title of the article itself makes that obvious. This is important, as epistemology (the focus of Mr. Kemp's essay) is a distinct discipline. Apologetics is a discipline which itself presupposes epistemology. An allowance for self-reference or circular reasoning in a context in which one is defending his faith (see below) is entirely different from allowing self-reference or circular reasoning in a context of epistemic justification (see the above quotes from Clark). 

So much for this example. The only other location I could find that might afford reason for thinking Clark advocated circular reasoning is from an article he wrote in 1963 entitled, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" He writes:

The first reason for believing the Bible is inspired is that the Bible claims to be inspired. When this reason is offered to an unbeliever, almost always his immediate reaction is derision. To him it is very much like putting a liar on the witness stand and having him swear to tell the truth. But why a liar? Do not honest witnesses also swear to tell the truth? Yet even a Christian with a smattering of logic may object to this procedure because it seems to beg the question. It is circular. We believe the Bible to be inspired because it makes the claim, and we believe the claim because it is inspired and therefore true. This does not seem to be the right way to argue.

It must be granted that not every claim is ipso facto true. There have been false witnesses in court, there have been false Messiahs, and there have been fraudulent so-called revelations. But to ignore the claim of the Bible, or of witnesses generally, is both an oversimplification and a mistake. For example, suppose the Bible actually says that it is not inspired. Or suppose merely that the Bible is completely silent on the subject – that it makes no more claim to divine inspiration than did Churchill. In such a case, if the Christian asserts that the book is inspired, the unbeliever would be sure to reply that he is going far beyond the evidence.

This reply is certainly just. There is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible. But because this reply is so just, it follows that the unbeliever’s derision at our first remark was groundless. What the Bible claims is an essential part of the argument. The Christian is well within the boundaries of logic to insist that the first reason for believing in the inspiration of the Bible is that it makes this claim. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 2-3)

It may initially appear as if Clark is admitting as legitimate a circular "procedure." But even here, Clark admits that self-attestation simpliciter does not constitute a proof - as he puts it, "not every claim is ipso facto true." For example, the Bible claims to be God's word and the Quran claims to be God's word. Yet because the Bible contradicts the Quran, both claims cannot be true. An argument regarding the self-attesting nature of a source does not "prove" either is what it claims to be. 

But Clark does acknowledge that self-attestation is apologetically legitimate. A Christian can at least begin his defense of his faith by noting that the Bible claims to be God's word. But, for Clark, a "reason for believing the Bible" is not a suggestion that one's belief in the Bible is founded upon some more basic epistemic truth. Anyone who thinks that failed to read the rest of the article, let alone the rest of Clark's works. Clark clarifies:

Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so. But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry. Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21)

Note that for Clark, self-attestation is not purported to be a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Rather, he emphasizes that an objection Christians face regarding circular reasoning can be applied tu quoque to the objectors. Clark agrees with Mr. Kemp that “If Scriptures forms the basis of all knowledge, then all arguments for the trustworthiness of Scripture are circular” (pg. 2) - and then he extends this point to other worldviews with stated first principles. An apologetic which uses circular reasoning (e.g. self-attestation), as a means of converting unbelievers is not deficient; after all, how can anyone who would attempt defend his own, primary, indemonstrable premises do so without first knowing such premises? 

Again, apologetics presupposes epistemology. Thus, Clark is not suggesting that one's own, primary, indemonstrable premises are epistemically grounded in or demonstrated by prior reasons. This would be incoherent. For those interested, I've written more on coherentism, foundationalism, and self-attestation here and here.

Bringing the conversation back to Mr. Kemp's article: however Mr. Kemp responds to Frame et. al., his reply to Clark ought to be somewhat different. Here is the extent of Mr. Kemp's reply to the first Clark quote he referenced above:

According to this view, God’s revelation is the only ultimate principle. This claim has vexed many who hear it. If God’s revelation is the ultimate basis of all reason and knowledge, arguing with self-proclaimed nonbelievers becomes very complicated. On the one hand, the aim is to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures. On the other hand, on this view, reason presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures.

According to many who have espoused this view, the necessity of always and everywhere presupposing a proposition does not preclude the possibility of providing evidence for that proposition. Advocates of this view often emphatically tell us that evidence can be best, and indeed only, given for the existence of God when those evidences are put forth and interpreted according to “theistic standards,” which presuppose the existence of God. (Without Excuse, pgs. 7-8) 

We return to the crux of the issue: apologetics vs. epistemology. One can defend the faith by attacking another's first principles. Does such a procedure proceed from one's own first principles? Yes. And is the presuppositionalist suggesting that reason is only intelligible within the Christian worldview? Yes. But does that make the matter "very complicated," as Mr. Kemp suggests? I think not. It is legitimate and may be persuasive insofar as two people may share beliefs in common through which only one system can provide legitimate justification. I could just say that "the Bible is the basis for all knowledge; therefore, whatever basis you have can't be known." But an apologetic doesn't have to be that. 

I've spoken on this before (link, link), but let's ask anyway: "Why not? Can't the Spirit work to convict the minds of sinners, no matter what? If the root of the problem unbelievers have with Scripture is an ethical rebellion to it, isn’t proclaiming the simple truth sufficient opportunity by which the Spirit may work to remove an unbeliever’s rebellious spirit?" Sure - but the Spirit also works through ordinary means, and such may also involve removing barriers to belief. Stopping the mouths of unbelievers might involve explaining why their worldview does not account for knowledge. This could be persuasive even though it is an apologetic which proceeds from one's own, unproved first principle. That has uses.

If I ask someone who is blindfolded which picture I've drawn represents a person, they won’t be able to determine what I am drawing before their blindfold is removed. On the other hand, a picture must nevertheless be present so that if the blindfold is removed, they can determine what has been drawn. Now, I might draw a simple stick figure. If a drawing must be present for the blindfold to be removed, a simple picture would indeed suffice. The person whose blindfold is removed might even be able to pick out my drawing of a stick figure amongst other pictures that are not of persons. On the other hand, it wouldn’t hurt for me to erase some pictures beforehand so that a person is more apt to focus on my person picture – simply conceived or more well-drawn – in the case the blindfold is removed.

The blindfold is ethical rebellion, and only the Spirit can remove it. But the Spirit does so only when the truth is set before someone. It is often the case that the Spirit works when we do and rewards extra effort we put in. Part of this process can include erasing false pictures or worldviews. That removes barriers to aid in focusing on the truth, which has rational motivation and yet does not require an epistemology on which the truth of the Christian Scriptures are known by inference or verification. 

Also, apologetics is not just a rational enterprise. There is not only value in a defense of the faith along rational lines. If we are created by God, may we not suppose beauty, behavior, etc. have a role in persuasion (link)? Aesthetics matter - drawing on the above illustration, for example, there are better and worse pictorial representations of persons (and better and worse representations of Christianity), even if all the representations truly are of persons (and Christianity). 

While Mr. Kemp may find it vexing that God's revelation ought to be regarded as the "basis" of human reason, Clark simplifies what Mr. Kemp views as a complicated apologetic situation in the following article Clark wrote in 1943, which I quote at length: 

But the large majority of people who call themselves Christian in this twentieth century regard the Bible as a very infirm foundation. The appeal today is to experience and reason. It is even stated that it is of no use to talk with those who believe the Bible because talking itself is an appeal to reason. One must choose either reason or authority; one cannot have his Bible and his reason too.

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision.

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority?

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority.

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant.

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason.

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe. (link, 1943. "How Firm a Foundation?" The Presbyterian Guardian Sep. 10, Vol. 12, No. 16, 252.)

Mr. Kemp's vexation with Clark's presuppositionalism was whether "self-proclaimed nonbelievers" can be "rationally motivate[d to] belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures." Clark's above reply demonstrates that such apologetic persuasion is possible but dependent on the work of the Spirit: properly grounded human reason indeed "presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures," the very thing nonbelievers reject. Yet because the Spirit operates through the witness of believers, a believer may "aim... to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures" while prayerfully relying on the Spirit to remove any kind of barrier to the apologist's rational argumentation.

Does anyone deny that grace is necessary for unbelievers to accept [the premises of] Christianity? I would think Mr. Kemp would also admit this. Neither the presuppositionalist nor Mr, Kemp can ipso facto cause a change of mind by argumentation. To be fair, Mr. Kemp is not the only person who has struggled to understand the importance of the Spirit in Clark's apologetic. Even church historians such as Alan D. Strange have a false understanding:

One might argue that mysticism and pietism emphasize the Spirit without the Word and rationalism and orthodoxism the Word without the Spirit. The OPC has consciously sought to avoid both of these errors, the former in something like the Peniel movement and the latter in something like the Clark case... (Confident of Better Things, pg. 74)

Mr. Strange must be ignorant of articles such as "How Firm a Foundation?" For historians to perpetuate errors such as these illustrates the need for further research about what Clark actually thought. 

So rational motivation is possible. Clark thought unbelievers could reason validly insofar as they can accept conclusions which logically follow from certain premises - and they can do this even apart from presupposing the truth of Christian Scriptures. Unbelievers are still images of God, and they can follow valid arguments Christians make, so Christians have a point of contact with unbelievers in that they can show the reasoning of unbelievers to be unsound or false. That is, while unbelievers can reason validly, such reasoning will not be sound and cannot count as knowledge in an internalist, infallibilist sense, for the premises of unbelievers will necessarily either be false or unknowable (given the worldview of the unbeliever). 

Again, this all deals in apologetics. We aren't proving Christianity by arguing against others' worldviews, but we are implicitly defending it. Practically speaking (which is what apologetics is concerned with, insofar as the apologetic used is also true), an unbeliever won't have an infinite number of alternative worldviews in mind when you're discussing with him. 

Mr. Kemp can't categorize Clark with those who think that Scripture could be epistemically evidenced. All this points to a failure by Mr. Kemp to make good on his statement that Clark's "school" of thought doesn’t “succeed.” In fact, Clark's school of thought is barely engaged!

This ends Mr. Kemp's explicit reference to Clark, but I'll address what other parts of the chapter I think are relevant to his thought - not necessarily in page order - beginning with the question of what Mr. Kemp meant when he suggested that "Scripture passages... seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God." 

What Mr. Kemp means may involve an implicit critique of Clark even if we distinguish Clark's view from that of Frame, Van Til, and others. What, then, does Mr. Kemp mean by "verification"? It appears he means something like "infer[ential reasoning]." 

First principles are known indemonstrably. They are not known by inference from some other proposition. No argument can be given for first principles, but the Bible seems to assume that arguments for divine revelation can be given. Thus, Frame has not shown us why we should not read Scripture as prima facie evidence against the view that Scripture is the first principle of all knowledge. In fact, he makes matters worse by suggesting we “broaden the circle.” Increasing the distance between, say, “God exists” in the conclusion and “God exists” in the premises only gives the appearance of demonstrative knowledge. But in fact, insofar as such arguments are subjectively persuasive, they present a first principle as if it were something else. This is telling since it does not necessarily count against a belief to be put forward as self-justifying. But they should be asserted in their naked glory so that they can be known by themselves (per se) or their lack of self-evidence acknowledged. This constant inclination to regard Christianity as demonstrable may, I suggest, be the result of the operative but unacknowledged belief that it does not form the basic principle of all knowledge. 
Scripture provides examples of God’s Word being tested. Further, these instances of verification are not plausibly explained as broadly circular arguments, that is, circular arguments that incorporate several premises. Broadly circular arguments include premises and sub-arguments that do not provide evidence for the conclusion. They do not make the conclusion more credible than otherwise. Thus, they are not useful as arguments. They are psychologically useful or persuasive, as my argument notes, but this is the very problematic thing about them. Their usefulness is not in any rational element in them, and thus they are deceptive as arguments. It is therefore not flattering to Scripture to understand it as putting forth broadly circular arguments when alternative interpretations are available.  
This result prompts us to consider that there may be multiple first principles of knowledge rather than just one. Knowledge is not a system neatly worked out from a single indemonstrable axiom. Rather, there are many sources of knowledge—sensory experience, testimony, memory, conscience, and divine revelation—working together to inform our judgments. I leave the task of working out these various faculties of knowledge for another day. (Without Excuse, pg. 30) 

I'll return to "verification" in a moment. Mr. Kemp says he leaves the defense of his own position for another day, so I would normally absent myself from feeling the need to critique his view except where his attacks against my position provide occasion for it. That will largely be the case since I've talked about the topics he mentions in other posts. But Mr. Kemp does provide a few remarks about his own position that I'll address. 

One must first question what is Mr. Kemp's working definition of "knowledge." He writes, "A source of knowledge can be without a foundation and fallible" (pg. 6). Firstly, this is not the sort of "knowledge" presuppositionalists like Clark primarily are interested in, so if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that the presuppositionalist's claim that God's word is the basis for "all knowledge" includes "fallible knowledge," his entire chapter sadly rests on an equivocation and false assumption. He has smuggled into the definition of "knowledge" something with which the presuppositionalist is unconcerned. That is, I'm not aware of any presuppositionalist who would suggest that the Bible is the source of all ranges of meaning of "knowledge." Secondly, while Mr. Kemp says his "next few paragraphs will show" that his claim is true, I must be missing where he did that (or else I would have replied). Closest I can find actually is on pg. 4, which comes earlier: 

...imagine that you ask me why it is that I believe that I was born in Nuremburg. I reply that my parents told me I was. If you ask me why I believe my parents, I will tell you that they have been generally reliable in the past. Now here you can ask me at least two questions: (a) how I know that my parents have been reliable, and (b) why reliable witnesses ought to be believed. There appears to be no answer to (b), which asks for a reason to believe a self-evidently true proposition. Under normal conditions, and absent defeaters, reliable witnesses ought to be believed. My answer to (a) might be that my senses and memory tell me that many things my parents told me were in fact true. You might then ask me why I ought to trust my senses and why I ought to trust my memory. To that, again, I need not give an answer. I do not draw an inference from some more basic principle to my trust in my senses and memory. I just find myself doing so, and it seems right to do so.

It "seems right"? Is this really enough to "rationally motivate" anyone to accept Mr. Kemp's view? There's a seeming double standard at play. Now, I actually think Mr. Kemp's position could be tweaked to fit within the presuppositionalist system. But if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that he can "know" he was born in Nuremburg apart from a worldview grounded in divine revelation, I think he is mistaken. Clark made the point that children can be switched at birth - unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible. And if Mr. Kemp isn't talking about infallible knowledge, we must again point out to Mr. Kemp that Clark's presuppositionalism (at least) is concerned with full assurance or infallibilist justification. Admitting we could be "defeated" is precisely what we want to avoid when we defend Christianity.

Also, we could discuss what counts as a "reliable witness." Scripture itself is a "reliable" witness - an infallible witness - so there is a sense in which one can agree that "reliable" witnesses ought to be trusted. But short of infallibility, what counts as "reliable"? Now, if Scripture legitimizes certain, fallible witnesses, we have an answer to this question. But this again grounds our worldview in divine revelation, precisely what Mr. Kemp wants to deny. Instead, he doesn’t find anything "more basic" (trustworthy?) than his memory or senses. He says these are all something like conjoint first principles, “ultimate” in that each cannot “be reasonably questioned.” Can’t they? Didn't I just do that in the last few paragraphs?  

It is interesting that while Mr. Kemp says he can't find anything more basic that his memory or senses, he advocates for the idea that Scripture is "absolutely ultimate" in that it can "override" anything contradictory and cannot be overridden. So at least Mr. Kemp agrees that Scripture can't be defeated. But that admission concedes that "knowledge" had by divine revelation is in a different category altogether. As I said, Mr. Kemp pushes a multi-source theory of "knowledge" but equivocates on the meaning of the word. This undermines his thesis.

Returning to Mr. Kemp's comments on pg. 30 (see above), an attempt to epistemically "verify” (or "infer") that something is true would seem to fall into one of four different structural proposals by which a person might try to justify his beliefs: 1) an infinite chain of verification/justification (infinitism), 2) circular verification/justification (traditional coherentism), 3) verification/justification from a basis that is itself unjustified (positism), or 4) verification/justification from a basis that is itself justified (foundationalism).

If the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge - as presuppositionalists whom Kemp intends to engage believe - then infinitism is not a live option. If Scripture itself can be known - as Christians should affirm - then neither is positism. I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. I further discuss why I disagree with these proposals regarding the structure of epistemic justification here, here, and here. That leaves foundationalism. 

Given the above, let's run through the rest of what Mr. Kemp says: does accepting foundationalism mean "No argument can be given for first principles"? As discussed already, no: apologetic arguments can be given. Is there a "rational" element in this argumentation? Yes: while the argumentation does not increase the epistemic justification for belief in God's word, removing intellectual barriers is rational. Displaying (to what extent is possible for us) the internal consistency of God's word is rational. Drawing better pictures is rational.

But further, is it "deceptive" to make arguments that are non-rational, psychological, or persuasive? How does that follow? I've given the following illustration several times before that shows just how nonsensical is Mr. Kemp's assertion (link): 

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

How is it deceptive for a mother to identify herself when she thinks such might cause a correction in her child's behavior? 

Similarly, experiencing what we already know is valuable. We can have full assurance of our complete salvation while we yet look forward to experiencing our great reward. We can have full assurance that God's word is true without having experienced said truth in certain ways: divine providence, historical confirmations, prayerful effectuality, etc. But when we do experience these things, it isn't deceptive to bring them up to those who would attempt to undermine our foundation. 

That ties in to another dimension of our Christian life: to behave like a Christian. Do we not defend our faith to remain faithful in the face of persecution, even to the point of martyrdom? How about when we sacrifice to help others? I suppose Mr. Kemp could reply that such behavioral apologetics are really rational in that we suffer unto glory and are humiliated unto exaltation (like our Savior), but I don't think something like rational anticipation of future reward is often (let alone always) in the minds of believers and unbelievers in these cases.

Arguments for divine revelation can be given, then. No one denies that. The question is whether such are of "epistemic profit." Mr. Kemp thinks so, citing a few Scriptures. He claims, “…no complicated exegesis is required for my argument” (pg. 3). Well, whether that is so or not is irrelevant. What matters is if his exegesis is sound, and I will argue it is not. 

The first passage cited is Exodus 4. But when one reads this passage, all that is indicated is that if one sign does not persuade the Israelites, another might. This is language of causation: certain signs might cause them to believe. Nowhere is it suggested that miracles are epistemically more basic than or on par with divine revelation, as if the word of God through Moses was itself insufficient. So if "verification" refers to epistemic inference, it isn’t unintelligible to deny Mr. Kemp's assertion that “Moses’ authority as a speaker of God’s word is verified by miraculous events” (pg. 13). At most, we can say that what is happening is that gracious Yahweh is drawing the Israelites fuller, better pictures. But even this is apologetic, not epistemic.

The second passage Mr. Kemp mentions is Deuteronomy 18. Mr. Kemp says, “Deuteronomy anticipates that some would claim to receive a prophecy from God, and that such claims will need to be tested” (pg. 13). Well, tested, yes. Verified, no; rather, falsified. Read verse 21 closely: "How may we know the word that the Lord has not spoken?"

Now, we could delve into what meaning of "know" might here be in use. The crux, though, is that this passage primarily deal with how to falsify false prophets. In fact, any two people can predict contradictories ("It will rain tomorrow;" "It will not rain tomorrow"), both claim divine prophecy, and one will be falsified. And while the other will be right, does that mean the Mr. Kemp thinks said person has been verified as a divine prophet? I doubt it. As a species of divine revelation, the Bible does not require external, epistemic authentication. 

[Side note: our foundational principle ought to be more broad than that Scripture is the sole source or basis of all knowledge (link). Something like, "special divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in the Scriptures - is the premise with which one must begin in order to intentionally defend his beliefs with full assurance." This indicates acceptance of infallible, internalist, and propositional knowledge and takes God's word to be the sufficient condition (which accounts for all subsidiary, necessary conditions for knowledge, cf. link) for said knowledge.]

To summarize the response to Mr. Kemp's citations, then, the biblical contexts he mentions do not say that inspired revelations “appeal to something other than themselves… in order to be known as Scripture” (pg. 15). In fact, in one context, "knowledge" isn’t even mentioned, and in the other, the only "knowledge" given is of who is not a prophet. Further, Deuteronomy 18 is only applicable if one even thinks to ask the question in the first place. 

I'll also offer some pushback against statements like, “God does not deliver the Word and then remain silent, expecting the recipients to take it on a sheer leap of blind faith” (pg. 14). What does Mr. Kemp make of Abraham's ordeal in Genesis 22 (cf. Hebrews 11)? And was Abraham's faith "blind," or did he not have every reason to suppose Isaac would return with him? Either way, God's word was itself sufficient for Abraham to know to obey.

I've been critical of Mr. Kemp throughout this post, but I will end on a positive note. I said earlier that I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. After citing Greg Bahnsen and John Frame on pgs. 9-10, I'll repeat an earlier quote: “The thought pushed by Bahnsen and Frame in these passages departs with this school by insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means” (pg. 10).

Now, I'll leave it to Van Tilian apologists to make their own case on behalf of Bahnsen and Frame. My initial impression is that Mr. Kemp has a point against Frame and makes a good case for it in the rest of his chapter. The Bahnsen citation could instead be a reference to a sort of coherentism that actually is meta-justificatory foundationalism (link). If I'm right, while I would disagree with Bahnsen, I don't know if he can be called a traditional coherentist (i.e. circularist). In any case, Clark cannot be associated with these views, and I hope we see more future engagement with his actual thought from theologians and philosophers.

Saturday, October 27, 2012

A Systematic Refutation of Objectivism


Introduction

Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, author of Karl Marx and the Close of His System, was, in his lifetime, met with responses from prominent Marxists such as Rudolf Hilferding and Louis B. Boudin. It has been nearly four decades since John Robbins wrote Answer to Ayn Rand, one of the earliest exhaustive critiques of Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism, yet despite the enduring popularity of Ayn Rand’s literature, no Objectivist publication has even acknowledged it or its updated version, Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System.[1]
Unfortunately, any reply to Robbins now could not be endorsed by Rand. Therefore, the canon comprising “the only authentic sources of information on Objectivism” is closed.[2] Still, one would think the conclusion that Objectivism is a flawed philosophy would elicit a reaction from its adherents. Perhaps Robbins’ criticisms are not thought to be parallel in quality to Böhm-Bawerk’s criticisms of Marxism.[3] If this were true, one would not expect Robbins to be so often cited by non-Objectivists.[4] Hopefully, the following will serve to clarify this mystery.

Objectivism Summarized

Philosophy is the science that studies the fundamental aspects of the nature of existence. The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life. This view serves as a base, a frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential. This view tells him the nature of the universe with which he has to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics) – and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is given to him by esthetics.[5]
What was Ayn Rand’s comprehensive view of life? “The essentials are: in metaphysics, the Law of Identity – in epistemology, the supremacy of reason – in ethics, rational egoism – in politics, individual rights (i.e. capitalism) – in esthetics, metaphysical values.”[6] In dozens of books and hundreds of articles, Rand aimed to integrate these principles into a coherent worldview and model for action. A rational assessment of Objectivism must interact with Rand’s defense of it, chiefly consisting in surveying whether her specific understandings of the various branches of philosophy are internally consistent and, if they are not, whether slight or considerable modifications must be made. The conclusion to such an investigation will be as much an appraisal of Robbins’ exposition of Rand’s philosophy as it will be of Rand’s philosophy itself.

Prefatory Remarks

Matters are complicated by Rand’s tendency to ascribe uncommon meanings to words, link prejudicial language with alternatives to Objectivism, and bypass quoting or referencing a philosopher when leveling accusations against him.
For instance, Rand emphasized that “Man’s senses are his only direct cognitive contact with reality and, therefore, his only source of information,”[7] but because of her antipathy for identifying with groups, she rejected empiricism, groundlessly asserting that empiricists think “man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts…”[8]
To adduce one more example, Rand defined “sacrifice” as “the surrender of a greater value for a lesser one or a nonvalue.”[9] While Christianity does have a doctrine of sacrifice, it is not related to Rand’s altruistic sentiments. Lamentably, because she failed to distinguish her own understanding of sacrifice from that of Christianity, Rand blundered in referring to the Protestant ethic as “a popular make-shift, a bootleg set of rules for “practical” action – and, from the start, it was fighting a losing war against the official morality of the Judaic-Christian tradition: the morality of altruism, mysticism, and self-immolation to the welfare of others.”[10] As Robbins cleverly remarked, “Rand should have gone to more baseball games.”[11]
A major downside to Rand’s rhetoric is that it doubles the task of the critical reader. Not only must he consider the merits of Rand’s arguments, he must first ask whether they were even directed against accurate representations of others’ positions. To give Objectivism the just trial which Rand at times failed to give her opponents, it will be necessary to avoid her apologetic methodology by ensuring that the reader has means of verifying whether Rand is being given fair treatment. In this context, that means dealing with Rand on and with her own terms or, when appropriate, pointing out cases in which Rand’s terms were original.

Objectivist Epistemology and Metaphysics

An appropriate place to start an examination of Objectivism as such is in an examination of Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology, for these compose “the theoretical foundation of philosophy.”[12] Indeed, when one makes a knowledge claim, there is both a metaphysical and epistemological aspect to the assertion. The former pertains to [the nature of] what is said to be known whereas the latter pertains to how one knows his assertion is true. Epistemology cannot be completely divorced from metaphysics.
Rand’s rejection of “the claim to a non-sensory means of knowledge”[13] confirms her to have been a classical empiricist. Knowledge is described as having been “reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation) and omitting the particular fact(s) involved.”[14] The suggestion is that Rand’s metaphysic should have been, if consistent with her epistemology, a form of physicalism, for Rand’s claim that groups of sensations are preconditions for knowledge acquisition would be metaphysically groundless if that which can be known is not ultimately derived from sensations.
Though physicalism is what one might anticipate, Rand actually distinguished matter from volitional consciousness, equating to the latter to man’s soul or spirit.[15] This raises an interesting question: how is one able to sense his conscious, free will? Even if “the validity of the senses must be taken for granted,”[16] unless a volitional consciousness can be tasted, touched, heard, seen, or smelled – not merely unnecessarily inferred from the alleged effects thereof – self-knowledge would apparently be impossible. Then again, if Rand had accepted physicalism, she would have had to redefine volitional consciousness and knowledge since the physical qua physical is not mental.
Her philosophy of knowledge must likewise have affected her philosophy of language, which involves “a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts.”[17] One ramification is that no observation of the physical world can warrant belief in the following precondition for knowledge: “propositions may be true.”[18] Moreover, if truth, knowledge, and language are creations of man, they must have been the creations of a particular man who Rand would have argued was born with a blank mind.[19] This would make communication impossible, as no two individuals could ever verify that the differences in their experiences and sensations are negligible to the meanings each attaches to some word[s]. Of course, as Rand’s was not even able to demonstrate how she could know herself, she certainly could not have known any other consciousnesses.
One of the primary epistemological debates Objectivism was supposed to solve is how concepts are formed. All concepts are universals or abstractions.[20] Interestingly, however, Rand denied the existence of abstractions.[21] How can abstractions be formed yet be said not to exist? “To exist is to possess identity,”[22] and as abstractions certainly possess identity, it is unclear what reason can be offered as to why Rand would have rejected the “existence” of abstractions apart from the fact her empirical epistemology could not account for them.
There is also quite a bit of irony in the idea Objectivists do not think abstractions exist. There can be no more fundamental or well-known Objectivist axiomatic concept than Rand’s mantra that “existence exists.” But as a concept, “existence” is an abstraction, and Rand said abstractions as such do not exist. So, after all, existence as such does not exist.
Regardless, it is not clear in what way the concept “existence” could even be formed, since “Cognitive abstractions are formed by the criterion of: what is essential? (epistemologically essential to distinguish one class of existents from all others).”[23] Existence does not distinguish any class of existents from any other class of existents,[24] which is why Rand wrote, “Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible primaries, the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive definition—e.g., to define “existence,” one would have to sweep one’s arm around and say: “I mean this.””[25] But in her dichotomization of the primacy of existence from the primacy of consciousness, she gave several conceptual equivalents to it:
The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists – and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primary of consciousness – the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelation it receives from another, superior consciousness).[26]
In what is an otherwise able summary of contrasting positions, Rand defines existence as “reality” or “the universe.” Elsewhere, she equated the universe to nature: “To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence.”[27] Finally, comparing this statement to the following gives credence to the idea existence is nothing other than matter: “Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist.”[28]
The point is that the affirmation of the primacy of existence over against the primacy of consciousness is really the affirmation of the primacy of the physical or material realm over against the spiritual or mental realm. It is here that the root of these most basic problems with Objectivism is to be found. Rand was clearly aware of but unwilling to accept the alternative to the primacy of existence. There are many other particular inconsistencies in Rand’s epistemology and metaphysic which could be mentioned, but it would take a book like Without a Prayer to list them all and is unnecessary for the purposes of showing how systemic the errors of Objectivism are.

Objectivism and Ethics

When confronted with any secular philosophy, one of the more basic questions is whether or how it purports to account for morality. As Rand defined morality as “a code of values to guide man’s choices and actions,”[29] the next natural question may seem to be whether there are choices or actions men should or are obligated to make and, if so, why. But because Objectivism’s concept of “man” is loaded, it is more appropriate in this circumstance to first inquire as to Rand’s understanding of the nature of man.
Rand believed that man is a volitional consciousness; that is, a man is a man he is because he has chosen to be a man.[30] He was born with the potential to be human or subhuman. Free will is not only a precondition for responsibility[31] but also for becoming man. In a way, Rand was an existentialist: existence precedes essence. What may be said in reply to this?
Firstly, Robbins correctly notes that “Just as a tabula rasa consciousness is a contradiction in terms, so is a tabula rasa moral nature. A being of self-made soul is a contradiction, because nothing can cause itself.”[32] Secondly, even if it were possible for existence to precede essence, that would undermine Rand’s attempted solution to the is-ought dilemma,[33] viz. “The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do.”[34] However, if existence precedes essence, there is no necessary reason to choose to be human, in which case Rand’s particular code of morality would not apply. In fact, Rand openly agreed that suicide can be a value[35] or right[36] and that “Reality confronts man with a great many “musts,” but all of them are conditional.””[37] This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Objectivist morality is subjective. As Rand said, “‘Value’ presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what?”[38] It is hard to overstate the implications of these meta-ethical points.
There are also a few difficulties inherent to Rand’s ethical theory, which is comprehended in John Galt’s oath: “I swear-by my life and my love of it-that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine.”[39] While Rand defined good and evil in various ways,[40] the import of each is essentially the same: the “good” is that which enhances life in some sense, whereas the “evil” is that which negates it. Quite aside from the question of why it is irrational to pursue death as a goal, Rand did not explain how a man who does not know when or how he will die can see “his interests in terms of a lifetime and selects his goals accordingly.”[41] Nor did she convincingly elaborate on why it would be immoral to extend one’s own life by force.[42] And given Objectivist epistemology and metaphysics, the cause of a proper furtherance of life is unknowable. In short, the troubles of Objectivism are pervasive, not minor, correctable inconsistencies.

Objectivism and Politics

While politics in general and capitalism specifically are said to be based upon more fundamental branches of philosophy,[43] some of what Rand wrote can give a reader the impression that her motivation for speaking at length about these fundamental branches is ad hoc.[44] When it comes to actually examining whether capitalism is necessary on Objectivist premises, the answer is not so evident. It is at least clear that some men do not need society because they do not seek a quality of life gained by knowledge and trade,[45] and because she regarded such men as free, Rand accepted the Lockean principle that “The source of the government’s authority is “the consent of the governed.””[46]
What makes this interesting is that it is opposed to Rand’s insistence that government must hold “a legal monopoly on the use of physical force.”[47] For if unanimity does not exist, then government, defined as “an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area,”[48] is unjustified in imposing these rules on everyone who owns property in a given area. Instead, the principle of unanimous consent seems to make the relationship between a government and its constituents little – if at all – different from the relationship between an employee and an employer.[49] But a market analogy would open the door to the possibility of competing governments rather than a natural monopoly.
A government is justified in using physical force only in retaliation to the infringement of individual rights.[50] In an ideal society, what reason does a sovereign individual have to submit to a governmental authority? Anarchism as well as competing governments appears to be a live alternative to Rand’s conception of capitalism. Interestingly, Rand’s description of Galt’s Gulch was anarchistic,[51] and what arguments Rand elsewhere presented against anarchism were either pragmatic or straw men.[52]
Even if it turns out the capitalist system Rand proposed deserves attention, it too is rife with questions. For instance, it has already been pointed out that on Objectivism, man is not man by nature but by choice. This means his rights are not inalienable. One who chooses to act irrationally is no longer a man and thus no longer has the rights of a man. Far more horrific is the realization that “Rights do not pertain to a potential, only to an actual being”[53] means that the rights of a man do not apply to beings that have not yet developed the opportunity to choose to be men. This would include infants. Is infanticide a holdover from Aristotelian common sense?[54] Speaking of “actual beings,” what about the plants or animals which supposedly have knowledge, values, and codes of action?[55] Rand expressed no repugnance at the fact men kill the lives of these actual beings all the time. What of their rights? Rand provided no criterion for distinguishing who or what possesses what rights and why. A super-race may come along and squash men like the relative ants they would be; what could Rand have said about that?
It is true that Rand could have avoided several of these moral and political inconsistencies and begged questions by biting the secularist bullet and denying normative statements are meaningful.[56] In turn, ethical and political nihilism would have allowed her to remain consistent relative to the confines of her flawed epistemology and metaphysic. The point in addressing Rand’s moral and political inconsistencies, however, is not the same as the point in addressing Rand’s epistemic and metaphysical inconsistencies. The latter are sufficient to disarm whatever intellectual ground Objectivism lays claim, whereas the former are primarily meant to disarm the rhetoric which prevents people from noticing this.

Objectivism and Esthetics

Despite Rand’s protestations to the contrary,[57] Objectivism entails a pessimistic view of life. Rand believed that “Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process of self-sustaining action. The goal of that action, the ultimate value which, to be kept, must be gained through its every moment, is the organism’s life.”[58] But Rand is dead. Aristotle, her greatest influence, is dead. It is difficult to be optimistic when it appears impossible for even the most rational animal to keep his or her ultimate value. And, after all, the limitations of and external impediments to the matter which constitutes a man are not the only obstacles he must overcome in his never-ending quest to live. Rand repeatedly complained about the lack of intellectual integrity in every aspect of modern culture.[59]
Does the cynicism which follows from Objectivism imply that Objectivism is false? Not by itself. It does, however, have significance with respect to Objectivist esthetics:
Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical value-judgments. Man’s profound need of art lies in the fact that his cognitive faculty is conceptual, i.e. that he acquires knowledge by means of abstractions, and needs the power to bring his widest metaphysical abstractions into his immediate, perceptual awareness. Art fulfills this need: by means of a selective re-creation, it concretizes man’s fundamental view of himself and of existence. It tells man, in effect, which aspects of his experience are to be regarded as essential, significant, important. In this sense, art teaches man how to use his consciousness.[60]
A man has various metaphysical value-judgments which “represent his implicit view of reality,” and an important one is his answer to the question of “whether he can achieve his goals in life or not.”[61] Can a man, according to Objectivism, achieve his goals in life? Can a “constant process of self-sustaining action” be unfailingly maintained? If Rand really considered the validity of scientific induction to have been proved,[62] it seems she would have had to answer negatively. Against nature and evil, men are rather impotent.
Curiously, however, man’s glory as a rational animal and end unto himself is a central motif in Rand’s writings.[63] An individualistic culture naturally finds that to be attractive, which would explain why her novels have sold well. Howard Roark, John Galt, and Prometheus are a few of the fictitious abstractions that were supposed to accomplish the goal of Rand’s writings: “the projection of an ideal man.”[64]
Her less than ideal philosophy prevents them from that consideration. It would be superfluous to list all the ways in which Rand’s esthetic theory is uprooted by its dependence on her mistaken philosophical convictions, but it is ironic that her exaltation of man was predicated on a philosophy in which matter, not [volitional] consciousness, is unconditional, indestructible, and primary.[65] What is man’s distinction to that? Just as Rand’s choice to value life rather than non-existence was arbitrary, so too her choice of which values to regard as important and thus select for artistic recreation were arbitrary. [66]

Ideal Philosophy: The Alternative

These drawbacks of Objectivism convincingly vindicate Robbins’ conclusion that Objectivism is a contradictory philosophy. But a critique – even an internal one – presupposes a worldview of one’s own; that is, in order for Robbins to have known he undercut Objectivist principles, he must have been able to provide an alternative to them. This he attempted, both in the latter half of Without a Prayer and in numerous other books and articles, by presenting Scripturalism as his philosophy of choice. What, then, does Scripturalism propose? Robbins provided the following summary:
1. Epistemology: Propositional Revelation
2. Soteriology: Faith Alone 
3. Metaphysics: Theism
4. Ethics: Divine Law
5. Politics: Constitutional Republic[67] 
To know what these positions mean and whether they are true, it is first necessary to explain what knowledge and truth are. Rand’s notion of knowledge, for example, permitted error.[68] Robbins, on the other hand, accurately identified the nature of truth and knowledge:
Truth and error are opposites. Truth, by definition, neither contains error, nor is uncertain, nor is liable to error. Knowledge, by definition, is apprehension of what is true. One cannot be said to know what is false. One can have false information, but one cannot have false knowledge. “False knowledge is a contradiction in terms.” What is true cannot be in error. What is known cannot be false. Therefore, knowledge is infallible.[69]
However, it must once again be pointed out that showing Rand’s position to be self-defeating is not equivalent to a demonstration that his own position is accurate. Thus, a brief exposition as to how Robbins was able to know what knowledge and truth are is necessary.
Rand described an axiom as “a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.”[70] Among other “axioms,” Scripturalism teaches that one must implicitly assume the laws of logic, adequacy of language, and a self-authenticating and omniscient epistemic source in order to convey one’s rejection of them. “I deny the epistemic adequacy of logic and language,” for example, is an assertion which must presuppose the epistemic adequacy of both logic and language in order to be intelligible. Skepticism, therefore, is self-defeating.
The last axiom may seem a little less intuitive than the first two, but it follows just the same. One who is not omniscient must acquire his knowledge from some source. If the source from whom or which one ultimately learns is not omniscient, it begs the question: how does one know that the truth value of any given knowledge-claim is not predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition? This is a problem, because the claim to know that not all propositions are related to one another itself presupposes omniscience.[71] Hence, an omniscient source of knowledge is necessary, and the nature of this source must be self-authenticating for those who are not omniscient to be able to know that the source is what it claims to be.
Nevertheless, one cannot validly infer from the collection of a few necessary preconditions for knowledge that one possesses a sufficient condition for knowledge.[72] Hence, Scripturalists appeal to a top-down epistemic approach, beginning with a presupposition which is the sufficient condition for knowledge and accounts for all subsidiary, necessary preconditions for knowledge: divine revelation. Men do not need to be omniscient to know truth, but men are only able to know that because Scripture is the sole, extant extent of God's self-authenticating, self-attesting, and rational revelation which communicates this. One who by grace is enlightened about the epistemic sufficiency of divine revelation is able to avoid the infinite regress of perpetual external validation of beliefs. From this source of knowledge, knowledge pertaining to every other branch of philosophy follows.
Metaphysically, Scripturalism does not necessarily promote a purely mental realm. Propositional truth, however, maintains a logical primacy over a “physical” realm insofar as the latter is a creation patterned after the former. The physical qua physical cannot be “known” by definition;[73] knowledge is propositional belief in which the possibility of error is precluded. In other words, this is a sort of opposite to the correspondence theory of truth; it is a correspondence theory of corporeality in which the physical provides a sensible representation of eternal truth.
            Ethically, God created man to be accountable to His law. That is simple justification for normative statements. Rand would not have denied that creator has the right to dispose of a creation as he sees fit, and though the chief end of man is to glorify God, this too is not contradictory to a type of rational self-interest.[74] Undoubtedly, a theocentric worldview will not be as persuasive to an immoral culture as declaring man to be the crown jewel of the universe. Perhaps more persuasive is the fact that Christianity, not secularism, can provide a principled reason for opposing suicide, infanticide, etc. Anyway, persuasiveness is superfluous to truth.
            Politically, the law can function to restrain sin only when penalties may be imposed on those who violate it. Governments are divinely ordained subordinate authorities designed to mete out punishment to criminals. As such, government is a function of sin; when there will be no more sin, there will be no need for such a hierarchy among men. There is no mythical Atlantis in this life, so citizens can and should use what opportunities arise to influence government towards a Christian worldview.[75] The extent to which governments – that is, men who claim governmental positions – abuse power determines under what circumstances civil disobedience is justified.
            Esthetically, “The purpose of art is expression,”[76] and the subject matter and skill in execution are the criteria according to which it is to be judged. So, if “God created man as essentially a rational being,” that “implies that man’s most valuable expressions are rational and intellectual.”[77] One’s epistemology, metaphysic, and ethic delimit the bounds of legitimate artistry. “For a Christian, art is subordinate to a higher purpose, and only insofar as it serves that purpose is it justified.”[78]
All of these philosophical ideas can be or have been developed. But is it enough? People cannot be forced to assent to the truth. Both Rand and Robbins believed that. Readers must judge for themselves whether Robbins’ analyses definitively cripple Objectivism, just as they must judge whether Robbins’ own philosophical system suffices as an alternative. Though those who closely follow Robbins’ arguments ought to find them sound, some may refuse to listen. But it is not the responsibility of the philosopher to change minds. If a productive Atlas should shrug off the materialistic looters of society,[79] how much more should a philosopher shrug off the intellectually indifferent?




[1] A few short articles have been written in rejoinder, but none are by Objectivists; cf. Roy A. Childs Jr., “Answer to Ayn Rand, by John W. Robbins,” The Libertarian Review (November, 1976); David Gordon, “Crank vs. Crank,” The Mises Review (Winter, 1997). Disagreements notwithstanding, the former remarked that Answer to Ayn Rand is “the best critique of Objectivism which has yet seen print in book form,” and the latter, if less effusive in praise, grants that Robbins constructs “a devastating analysis of Rand’s position on abstraction and knowledge.”
[2] cf. Ayn Rand, The Objectivist (June, 1968). If neither Rand nor those whose writings she supported have provided a coherent philosophical system, it may be suspected that present philosophers who affiliate with Objectivism can do little better. For corroboration, see Appendices A, B, and C in John Robbins’ Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System (2006) for his reviews of treatises by modern Objectivists.
[3] In his capacity as an Austrian economist, Böhm-Bawerk might be surpassed in importance only by his student, Ludwig von Mises, who, incidentally, was a friend of Ayn Rand. Rand herself owned that she was not an economist; cf. Ayn Rand, The Voice of Reason (1990), pg. 4. For Robbins’ view of secular economic theories in general and Mises’ in particular, read “The Failure of Secular Economics,” The Trinity Review (February-March 2000) and “The Promise of Christian Economics,” The Trinity Review (August-September 2000).
[4] Of the recent book-length evaluations of Objectivism, two authors in particular acknowledge their indebtedness to Robbins: Scott Ryan, Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality (2003), pg. xii; Michael B. Yang, Reconsidering Ayn Rand (2000), pg. 155. Others who recognize Robbins’ proficiency in highlighting discrepancies in Rand’s philosophy include Mimi Gladstein, The New Ayn Rand Companion, Revised and Expanded Edition (1999), pg. 101; Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (1995), pgs. 278-279; Clarence Carson, Swimming Against the Tide (1998), pg. 122.
[5] Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive (1999), pg. 45.
[6] Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It (1982), pg. 22; cf. The Voice of Reason, pg. 4.
[7] Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 90.
[8] Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (1963), pg. 27. The Encyclopedia Britannica correctly states that empiricism entails “the view that all concepts originate in experience, that all concepts are about or applicable to things that can be experienced, or that all rationally acceptable beliefs or propositions are justifiable or knowable only through experience,” none of which are tenets Rand would have disputed.
[9] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (1964), pg. 50.
[10] Ayn Rand, Why Businessmen Need Philosophy (2011), pg. 305.
[11] John Robbins, Without a Prayer, pg. 179. Sacrifice bunts or sacrifice fly-outs are not cases in which greater values are exchanged for lesser ones. So too Christ’s death [and resurrection] for the life His people was not a forfeiture of value.
[12] Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 3.
[13] Ibid., pg. 63; cf. “Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only means to gain it. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses” (Atlas Shrugged (1957), pg. 942) where perception refers to “a group of sensations” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 20).
[14] Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (1990), pg. 35.
[15] Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto (1971), pg. 29; Atlas Shrugged, pgs. 943, 945. Although she never provided a solution, Rand did seem quite aware of the difficulty in explaining how man as a consciousness who possesses free will could have evolved from inanimate, determinate matter; cf. Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 45.
[16] Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 3. Just what it means for sensations to be “valid” isn’t specified. Rand said: “No one can perceive literally and indiscriminately every accidental, inconsequential detail of every apple he happens to see; everyone perceives and remembers only some aspects, which are not necessarily essential ones; most people carry in mind a vaguely approximate image of an apple’s appearance.” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 48). Presumably, the axiom of the validity of sensations was meant to excuse Rand from showing how she knew that those details of an “apple” which are not perceived are inconsequential.
[17] Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive, pg. 195. Rand often wrote about “conceptual knowledge,” so the following statements by Rand will hopefully save the reader some trouble in having to explain to Objectivists that knowledge is always propositional: “Every concept stands for a number of propositions.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 48); “Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate sounds.” (Ibid., pg. 11).
[18] According to Rand, “Truth is the recognition of reality” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 943). One recognizes reality when he assents to a proposition which corresponds to it; cf. Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 14. But on the assumption of empiricism, to what physical event could “propositions may be true” correspond? If truth as recognition of reality and reality itself do not overlap at any point, the correspondence theory of truth is question-begging.
[19] cf. Ayn Rand, Return of the Primitive, pg. 54. Rand explained the Lockean theory of tabula rasa by using the following metaphor to describe a newborn: “…he has a camera with an extremely sensitive, unexposed film (his conscious mind), and an extremely complex computer waiting to be programmed (his subconscious). Both are blank.” Other statements by Rand herself show the faultiness of this theory: “A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something.” Atlas Shrugged, pg. 942.
[20] cf. Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 1.
[21] “Remember that abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man’s epistemological method of perceiving that which exists – and that which exists is concrete.” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 23). Under what conditions could an abstract proposition be true, given that truth is recognition of reality and abstractions do not exist in reality?
[22] Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 960; cf. Ibid., pg. 942.
[23] Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 41. Ostensive definition, which is the attempt to communicate by pointing at something physical, simply repeats the error of assuming that two individuals could share sensations, identified above in the discussion of the Objectivist philosophy of language.
[24] This process would have been arbitrary anyway if one is, like Rand was, an ontological nominalist whose consciousness creates abstractions ex nihilo.
[25] Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 36.
[26] Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 24. Obviously, there is no way that she could have known whether the “universe” can have existence or identity independent of a consciousness.
[27] Ibid., pg. 25. 
[28] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 16.
[29] Ibid., pg. 13.
[30] “No, you do not have to live as a man; it is an act of moral choice. But you cannot live as anything else-and the alternative is that state of living death which you now see within you and around you, the state of a thing unfit for existence, no longer human and less than animal, a thing that knows nothing but pain and drags itself through its span of years in the agony of unthinking self-destruction” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 941). Why, given a secular worldview, are false beliefs necessarily maladaptive? Blankout.
[31] cf. Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 154.
[32] John Robbins, Without a Prayer, pg. 176.
[33] The “is-ought dilemma” refers to the question of how a normative statement can follow from a descriptive statement.
[34] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 17.
[35] “Death is the standard of your values, death is your chosen goal” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 1025). “It is not mere death that the morality of sacrifice holds out to you as an ideal, but death by slow torture. Do not remind me that it pertains only to this life on earth. I am concerned with no other. Neither are you” (pg. 954). The reader should keep these sorts of statements in mind when he reads Rand describe the Argument from Intimidation as an “appeal to the moral self-doubt and its reliance on the fear, guilt, or ignorance of the victim” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 163). Intriguingly, John Galt contemplated suicide. He said that if Dagny Taggart were to be threatened, he would kill himself because there would have been “no values for me to seek after that” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 1013). But Dagny switched lovers regularly, each of whom matched her values. Why would Galt choose suicide over the possibility of finding another woman with the same values? Was this really Rand’s ideal and rational man?
[36] “It is only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the men who starts its use. No, I don’t share his evil or sink to his concept of morality. I merely grant him his choice, destruction, the only destruction he had the right to choose: his own.” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 1024).
[37] Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 99.
[38] Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 939. “Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 15).
[39] Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 993. Rand was consistent with this principle in stating that “The small minority of adults who are unable rather than unwilling to work have to rely on voluntary charity” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (1986), pg. 19). She was not consistent when she writes that adults have a “moral obligation toward a child” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 149). Why are there obligations toward children who have not made the choice to be human when there are no obligations toward adults who are invalid and have chosen to be human?
[40] “An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 17). “All that which proceeds from man’s independent ego is good. All that which proceeds from man’s dependence on men is evil” (The Fountainhead (1994), pg. 681). “All that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; all that which destroys it is the evil” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 940).
[41] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 59.
[42] What she did say is that “To force a man to drop his own mind and to accept your will as a substitute, with a gun in place of a syllogism, with terror in place of proof, and death as the final argument-is to attempt to exist in defiance of reality. Reality demands of man that he act for his own rational interest; your gun demands of him that he act against it” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 949). However, it is unclear how demanding another to act against his rational interest implies that the one making the demand is himself defying reality.
[43] “Politics is based on three other philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics – on a theory of man’s nature and man’s relationship to existence.” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. vii.). “The moral justification of capitalism is man’s right to exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself; it is the recognition that man – every man – is an end in himself, not a means to the ends of others, not a sacrificial animal serving anyone’s need.” (Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 67).
[44] cf. footnote 66. “If you want to save capitalism, there is only one type of argument that you should adopt, the only one that has ever won in any moral issue: the argument from self-esteem. (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 279). Is totalitarianism necessarily opposed to self-esteem and rational egoism? The production, management, and maintenance of slave-labor is a sort of skill which could, given secularism, be in one’s self-interest.
[45] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 35.
[46] Ibid., pg. 129.
[47] Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 43.
[48] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 125. Is this geographical range non-arbitrarily determined? How do governments interact? It is strange that Rand would not have considered these questions, yet no answer can be found to them in her books.
[49] Some of what Rand asserted can be interpreted this way as well: “In order fully to translate into practice the American concept of the government as a servant of the citizens, one has to regard the government as a paid servant” (The Virtue of Selfishness, 138). “In a fully free society, taxation – or, to be exact, the payment for government services – would be voluntary. Since the proper services of a government – the police, the armed forces, the law courts – are demonstrably needed by individual citizens and affect their interests directly, the citizens would (and should) be willing to pay for such services, as they pay for insurance.” (Ibid., pg. 135).
[50] “It is only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the man who starts its use” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 950). In fact, “the protection of individual rights is the only proper purpose of government” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 128). “Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.” (Ibid., pg. 108)  Rand’s dependence on Lockean political philosophy seemingly extended to the idea physical force encompasses any type crime which costs a man his life force; cf. Ibid., pg. 106.
[51] “Miss, Taggart, we have no laws in this valley, no rules, no formal organization of any kind” (Atlas Shrugged, pg. 664). “We are not a state here, not a society of any kind – we’re just a voluntary association of men held together by nothing but every man’s self-interest” (Ibid., pg. 695).
[52] In one place, she describes anarchism as “a naïve floating abstraction: for all the reasons discussed above a society without an organized government would be at the mercy of the first criminal who came alone and who would precipitate it into the chaos of gang warfare” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 131). But pragmatic arguments can cut both ways. Just as there has never existed “A system of pure, unregulated laissez-faire” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 45), so too there has never existed an ideal, anarchistic Atlantis. If capitalism can get credit for success in America when a mixed economy was actually in place, why not anarchism? One other time Rand mentioned anarchism, she novelized it to unilaterally oppose private property, which is not the case for some individualist anarchists: “The chaos of the airways was an example, not of free enterprise, but of anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their absence.” (Ibid., pg. 135).
[53] Ayn Rand, The Voice of Reason, pg. 58.
[54] “That which today is called “common sense” is the remnant of an Aristotelian influence” (For the New Intellectual, pg. 39).
[55] cf. Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 939.
[56] Clearly, if she had done this, Objectivism would not be Objectivism. Furthermore, it would have rendered pointless and purposeless any actions she took. If “one should assent to truth” is false, anything goes.
[57] cf. Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pgs. 56, 134; The Voice of Reason, pg. 39; Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 159; Atlas Shrugged, pg. 950. Of course, men can act rationally. But it is not the norm, as Rand herself seemed to admit; cf. footnote 60.
[58] Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 17.
[59] cf. Ayn Rand, The Voice of Reason, pgs. 114, 138, 150, 160, 182, 247; Philosophy: Who Needs It, pgs. 118, 156; The Romantic Manifesto, pgs. 97, 102-103, 128; Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pgs. 24, 238.
[60] Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 45.
[61] Ibid., pg. 28.
[62] Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (1963), pg. 26. It is noteworthy that in none of her published works did she actually attempt to prove the validity of [scientific] induction. This not only evidences an obvious epistemological predicament but also poses an esthetic difficulty, for Rand said the interpretation of an artist’s work “resembles a process of induction” (The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 35). If inductive reasoning is fallacious, then art qua art cannot necessarily communicate an artist’s metaphysical value-judgments. But this would mean, contrary to Rand, that art cannot be an “indispensable medium for the communication of a moral ideal” (Ibid., pg. 21).
[63] cf. Ayn Rand, Anthem (1964), pg. 105; We the Living (1959), pgs. 40-41; The Fountainhead, pg. xi; Atlas Shrugged, pg. 947; The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 172.
[64] Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 162.
[65] cf. Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 939; Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 24.
[66] “Artists may inconsistently be humanists, but a humanistic, atheistic, purposeless universe provides no basis for art” (Gordon Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, pg. 51).
[67] John Robbins, Without a Prayer, pg. 336. For all of her mischaracterizations of others, even Rand realized that “extremism” is a smear word designed to avoid engagement; cf. Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 191ff. Let no one dismiss Scripturalism on such weak grounds.
[68] “Errors of knowledge are no breaches in morality; no proper moral code can demand infallibility or omniscience.” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 88). “It is the epistemological obligation of every individual to know what
his mental file contains in regard to any concept he uses, to keep it integrated with his other mental files, and to seek further information when he needs to check, correct or expand his knowledge” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 67). Was Rand claiming that only an omniscient individual could have inerrant beliefs? Was that claim inerrant? And if knowledge can be erroneous, can certainty be possible? These would be strange qualifications for someone who wrote that “in epistemology, the cult of uncertainty is a revolt against reason” (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 90).
[69] John Robbins, Without a Prayer, pgs. 255-256.
[70] Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 965.
[71] cf. Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (2005), pg. 22. Since Rand admitted she was not omniscient yet rejected the idea of divine revelation as mystical, she was guilty of the so-called “stolen-concept” fallacy; cf. Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 9.
[72] Even if sensations were a means to knowledge, Robbins pointed out that Rand made this mistake: “Empiricism does not follow from the absurdity of skepticism. Both Rand and Branden begged the question” Without a Prayer: Ayn Rand and the Close of Her System, pg. 33.
[73] This does not mean Scriptualists act on “the belief that reality is an illusion” (Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, pg. 16). Opinions about what proposition[s] the physical – Rand’s “reality” – is meant to image are well within the bounds of Scripturalist philosophy: “Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true?” (Gordon Clark, Karl Barth’s Theological Method (1997), pg. 146). If nothing else, the physical world serves a pragmatic purpose in causing opinions according to which men can to put into practice ethical beliefs.
[74] “The Bible appeals directly to fear and self-interest; it teaches that absolute destruction awaits him who rejects Christ; and it also teaches that although the Christian may have temporary tribulation, he ultimately loses nothing but gains everything in accepting Christ.” (Gordon Clark, Without a Prayer, pg. 307).
[75] Rand’s representation of the implications of the doctrine of total depravity on political theory is astonishingly pejorative: “The cynical, man-hating advocates of this theory sneer at all ideals, scoff at all human aspirations and deride all attempts to improve men’s existence” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pg. 222).
[76] Gordon Clark, “Christian Aesthetics,” The Trinity Review (May, June 1989).
[77] Ibid. “A work of art is an integrated whole; it is not a disjointed aggregation of unrelated things; and knowledge and appreciation depend on an understanding of the plan according to which it was formed.” (Gordon Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, pg. 19).
[78] Gordon Clark, “Christian Aesthetics,” The Trinity Review (May, June 1989).
[79] cf. Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, pg. 429.