Modern Philosophy 10

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Leibniz's prefatory response Locke's Essays. The following is my submission:

While Leibniz regularly praised Locke and at times noted that he and Locke did not disagree – examples: God can do things which men do not comprehend; reliance on divine revelation alone is epistemologically unnecessary; etc. – in his prefatory response to Locke’s “Essays Concerning Human Understanding,” Leibniz’s goal was to clearly distinguish, in general terms, his Platonic philosophy from Locke’s Aristotelian philosophy. Several acute criticisms Leibniz advanced against Locke’s system are as follows:

Locke’s assertion that our mind is a blank slate clearly did not sit well with Leibniz. If all truth is derived extrinsically, Leibniz wrote, it would be impossible to validly generalize necessary truths (such as logic, metaphysic, and ethics) from a finite number of experiences. Anticipation of a repeated event based on memory of what one perceives to be a similar precursor is certainly not irrational, but it is also not, as Leibniz pointed out, an infallible expectation. While sensation can provide the occasion for the reflection and confirmation of these truths – some of which Locke must presuppose in his own argumentation – it cannot be the ground for them. In fact, Leibniz believed that Locke was conflicted about this issue, as he cited that Locke admitted some ideas originate in reflection rather than sensation. Whether Locke realized it or not, to state reflection is an attention to something within oneself which has not been produced by sensation undermines the idea all truth is learned experientially.

The relation between one’s soul and body was another disagreement Leibniz had with Locke. As a self-professed Cartesian – at least in this matter – Leibniz believed in the doctrine of concomitance. He thought that all men’s souls naturally possesses a body. Several of Locke’s beliefs clashed with this. For example, when Locke wrote that matter can think, Leibniz objected that such would require continuous miraculous intervention, as such would unnatural. Leibniz argued that the fact God can do things which men do not comprehend does not in turn imply we can’t recognize impossibilities, and speaking of God, Leibniz used His [immaterial] existence to further support his argument that matter is not a precondition of thought. Another example of a way in which Locke’s anthropological views varied from Leibniz’s stems from Locke’s belief that souls can cease to think in an analogous manner bodies which cease to move. Leibniz accused Locke of question-begging on two accounts: firstly, in that bodies do not, in fact, cease to move, for just because we do not necessarily perceive a rope lengthen past its breaking point does not mean it is not logically necessary that such be the case; secondly, that even if the idea bodies could cease to move were true, there would be a disanalogy – after all, one who is awakes from sleep would not do so if he were not continually perceiving and sensing externals.

One final example of a fundamental disagreement between Locke and Leibniz may be attributable to Leibniz’s seeming stress on the importance of theodicy. Leibniz disdained what he perceived to be a logical extension of Locke’s philosophy, viz. “that simple substances influence one another, replacing influence by mere correlation.” Leibniz thought Locke did not sufficiently address the reason men perceive secondary qualities, for the seeming arbitrariness was obviously at odds with Leibniz’s philosophical belief that the universe is made up of simple substances in perfect harmony with one another according to the eternal, purposeful will of God.

Modern Philosophy 8

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Leibniz's Monadology. The following is my submission:

In Monadology, Leibniz progressed in his philosophy to describe the ontological ground of all things: monads. Monads are simple substances of which bodies are compromised. Although all monads must possess some differentiae such that a monad is recognizable as such, Leibniz also maintained that the concept must compatible with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles he established in his prior works. The qualities inherent to monads are not “parts,” per se; when a monad changes, it changes with respect to itself. Leibniz clarifies this by stating perception alone comprises the “internal activity” of simple substances, and the object of perception can obviously contain a multiplicity of characteristics such that variation in the objects can cause change in the monads. Leibniz also wrote about different qualities of these monads: the soul, for instance, is a simple substance whose perception includes feeling and memory. The soul also correlates to the senses of the body to which it is united (per concomitance), although the soul and body are “governed” in distinct ways. It seems to be the case, then, that Leibniz believed animals have souls, for he believed that the only difference between men and animals is that men are capable of reflecting upon eternal, necessary truths. Also, because men alone are rational animals, they alone can be called spirits, animals created in the image of God.

Another progression in Leibniz’s philosophy was that from his belief in the “laws of logic” and principle of sufficient reason to that of a definition of God; viz. God is the single, independent, and necessary substance who functions as the preserver, telos, and – in some sense – epistemic foundation for all things. Leibniz ascribes perfection to God because God is limitless insofar as He can actuate was is possible; it is thus the case that although we are ontologically dependent upon God, the immediate cause of imperfection is found in the nature of he who is necessarily limited. Furthermore, God’s limitless nature implies His own existence, as no contradiction is implied in His existence. God alone must necessarily exist, because He alone is not limited by possibilities, including the possibility that a limitless substance exists.

Leibniz also gives a brief account of his theodicy. As the principle of sufficient reason applies to all things, Leibniz notes that God must have reason for actualizing this world instead of all other possible worlds, and that God’s reason for having chosen to actuate this world is because it is the best of all possible worlds, reflected in the fact that this world exhibits a “universal harmony which causes every substance to express exactly all others through the relation which it has with them.” This harmony is such that each body represents its soul and each substance represents its ultimate cause (God) and the universe (as all things relate to one another in some fashion). Leibniz used this line of reasoning to support his contention that bodies and souls are [holistically] indestructible, that efficient and final causes are perfectly harmonious, and that God perfectly governs the physical realm as well as the spiritual. He concludes the Monadology assuring his readers that God will justly punish evil and reward good, that all things will work out according to God’s good will, and that men should be exhorted to make our goal that of the goal of He upon whom we depend in every intelligible sense.

Leibniz’s argumentation suffers primarily because it is suspect to the same criticism inherent to every rationalistic system: the contingency of knowledge. Unless one either is infinitely knowledgeable and omniscient or can justify that his means of acquiring knowledge has come from one who is infinitely knowledgeable and omniscient, to assert that any proposition x (e.g. “God possibly exists”) is true implies one knows that the ontological reality of x is not contingent on the ontological reality of propositions y, z, ad infinitum. Presupposing that man is able to reason functions insufficiently as a grounds upon or means by which one can construct a sound philosophical system.

Modern Philosophy 7

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about select passages in Leibniz's Letters to Arnauld and his Primary Truths. The following is my submission:

Leibniz wrote Primary Truths as a brief explanation of the foundation and reasons for his philosophical beliefs. Beginning with the idea that truth is a proposition whose predicate is contained in the subject, Leibniz inferred that nothing is without reason – not even eternal truths – as nothing can be validly resolved apart from the law of identity or non-contradiction.

Leibniz used the idea that predicates are contained in a subject to support his definitions of man’s essence and [compatibilistic] free will. Man is his predicates, said Leibniz, insomuch as all predicates are contained in the subject (man). Leibniz, who was a determinist, also believed that nothing corporeal could necessitate a metaphysical action on man’s will; man, then, is said to be free insofar as his actions pertain to intrinsic reasoning or desires. These are certainly determined, however, by God, who chose to create particular men from an infinitely many possible men. Moreover, as man’s essence or substance would be indeterminate if only regarded as a finite conglomeration of [past or present] predicates – for one could conceptualize infinitely many future counterfactual situations in which such men make different choices – man’s substance must contain all future predicates. Essence, then, is unchanging.

This in turn led Leibniz to affirm that all things correspond perfectly, since all relations between substances are determined by the essence of said substances. Each substance expresses in varying manner the cause of them all: God. Leibniz appeals to this cohesion to substantiate his qualification of Occasionalism in concert with his affirmation of concomitance. Leibniz believed that a true union exists between the soul and body such that when, for example, the body becomes afflicted, the soul naturally experiences pain or grief. The mind, on the other hand, can move the body as a real cause, but only so far as God created the mind with such a capacity and certainly determined that the mind would act in such a manner. In this latter sense, Occasionalism is true. Leibniz uses this qualification to purport miracles as acts of God in which God moves a substance to do more than the capacity with which God bestowed upon it in its first state.

A final important point Leibniz makes is that all corporeal bodies can be divided. Leibniz uses a block of marble as a simple example of his meaning: the block may actually be considered only a mass of stones, and these mass of stones only a mass of atoms, ad infinitum, such that any substance is actually a collection of many substances. This bears relevance to the way in which we perceive bodies as substances and seems to validate Leibniz’s claim that “with the exception of men there is nothing substantial in the visible world.” Any such designation would arbitrary.

This argument seems to be incompatible with Leibniz’s insistence that bodies may be true causes. If any body is composed of infinitely many subdivisions, for one body to affect another body, infinitely many reactions must occur in time, which is impossible. Another possible criticism of Leibniz’s philosophy is that his understanding of man’s essence is such that man cannot comprehend himself. Man does not know his future predicates, so God literally knows us better than we know ourselves. It does seem that Leibniz attempts to explain we can have an apprehensive knowledge of ourselves such that we can rationally hypothesize how we would act in any given circumstance, but such hypothesizing could not possibly account for the infinite number of possible variables which could affect the way in which we perceive ourselves. Leibniz may bite the proverbial bullet and maintain the cohesion of his affirmations, however.