Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Modern Philosophy 15
In section IX, Demea, having listened to Philo’s explanation of the limitations of a posteriori argumentation, suggests that a priori argumentation – specifically, the cosmological argument – is a more than adequate substitute when attempting to discern the nature of God. Cleanthes replies that a proposition is true only if the contrary is impossible to conceptualize and that conceptualizing reality without the existence of any single being, including God, is possible, as the material universe, for example, may be eternally existent. Philo, who believes that a priori arguments are unpersuasive, adds that mathematics display uncreated characteristics.
Demea replies in section X by opining that a reason many may find a priori arguments unconvincing because there are people who will use any means of argumentation to validate their intuitive beliefs. Philo agrees, also providing an answer as to why he believes natural religion is plausible, viz. the wickedness of men. This observation leads to a brief dialogue which leads Demea to remark that this could stem from the idea that man’s worst enemy is himself in the form of diseases of the mind and Philo to impute this wickedness to externals and claim that if man’s complaints and despair in all ages were absolutely sincere, more people would have committed suicide. Philo then asks how God can be anthropomorphic without being evil, introducing Epicurus’ postulation of the “problem of evil” into the discussion, to which Demea replies that evil functions as a means to future good and Cleanthes to argue that men are not absolutely miserable. Cleanthes, after calling Demea’s speculation groundless, defends his position by refusing to allow that Demea’s and Philo’s previous dialogue on the wickedness of man accurately depicts reality. Philo retorts that Cleanthes’ answer is as weak as it is doubtful, since evil still exists and is more potent, if less frequent, than good. Philo essentially rests his case for cautious skepticism with regard to the nature of God on this argument.
To begin section XI, Cleanthes posits that God may be finitely perfect, thus denying one of the premises of Epicurus to solve the problem. In rejoinder, Philo questions the know-ability of such a deity and insists that even a finitely perfect God would be capable of preventing some extant evils. He then outlines four evils which he believes cause most evil actions and may not be unavoidable: instinctual self-preservation, laws of nature, limitations in genetics to that which is necessary, and the brutality of nature. A posteriori arguments would be, in the face of these arguments, hard-pressed to demonstrate an anthropomorphic God who is good, and Philo even mentions that deism or an impersonal God – one who is neither good nor bad – would be a consistent alternative. At this, Demea and Cleanthes expresses amazement that Philo would propound such overtly skepticistic and unconventional theological beliefs, and some time thereafter Demea parted the company.
The final section consists of a conversation between the two remaining men, which begins by Philo remarking that despite his skepticism, the harmony he perceives in the sciences at every point presses upon his mind the belief in the existence of a divine being. That he finds this to be a strong indication of the existence of a sentient God’s is ironic, since this he had criticized Cleanthes’ teleological argument earlier. Cleanthes and Philo also agree that many disputes within natural theology are due to impreciseness in use of terms or exaggeration of opposite themes of similar conclusions. They furthermore agree that man’s moral capacities are defective and that evil should be ascribed to that cause rather than to God. Men even use religion, which ought to civilize, to justify evils. Superstition is too often allowed to infringe upon rational religion. The discussion proceeds in like manner, and concludes with Philo assenting to the idea that God bears an analogous intelligence to humanity but asserts that the surest way to Christianity is cautious skepticism. Pamphilus concludes the narrative declaring his instructor, Cleanthes, to have presented the strongest arguments, followed by Philo.
The criticisms of the superficial cosmological argument provided by Demea do show it is insufficient to substantiate his opinion of a priori reasoning and God’s demonstrability. Demea did seem to have argued weakly. Hume’s characters didn’t, however, note that morality within an empirical world-view is question-begging, as brute observations of physical occurrences would not logically imply how one ought to act. Finally, the argument from design which Philo eventually forwards and with which Cleanthes agrees is subjectively based, which, given Philo’s and Cleanthes’ earlier arguments against the cosmological argument, is interesting. Neither appears to recognize this confliction, however. In conclusion, then, natural theology does not seem to provide any rational reasons to believe in the existence of “God.”
Monday, April 26, 2010
Modern Philosophy 14
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections one through five of Hume’s “Dialogues.” The following is my submission
Part 1 begins with a discussion between Philo and Demea. Philo, observing that Demea believed scientifically studying natural religion should begin only after one has been educated in other abstract philosophies such as ethics or logic, remarked that the idea man can learn of such things apart from religious instruction is destructive to natural religion itself. Cleanthes interposes that grounding religious beliefs on philosophical skepticism is, if serious, cognitive dissonance. At this point, Philo’s relatively long defense of the value of cautiousness and common sense seems to imply that his position is near to Hume’s own as described in his “Enquiry.” If this is the case, Hume must believe that all consideration of an immaterial being or realm is speculatory. Regardless, Cleanthes retorts that, given the self-defeating nature of epistemological skepticism, and given that empiricism must allow that we do not know how or why certain events cohere, the same may be said of religion; furthermore, such seems to have historic precedence prior to Lockean philosophy. Philo protests that those who do not believe in God are fools, but that such is only sensible if it is indeed the case that reason is sufficient principle by which one can become intimate with religion.
Following Cleanthes’ opinion that men are disposed to defend their dogmas by whatever means possible, Part II begins with Demea expressing surprise at Cleanthes’ argumentation thus far, which he perceives imply that the nature of God cannot be known. Upon citing Malebranche as an example of a way in which we can come to [intelligibly] know God, Philo, agreeing that the alleged soundness of the cosmological argument hinges the nature of the debate on the know-ability of God, repeats that one can only progress so far in such a manner – or in empirical investigations, for that matter – before one must give way to caution. Cleanthes replies to Philo by appealing to a teleological argument, intending to show that God is anthropomorphic. Both Demea and Philo disapprove of this argument: Demea, because the proof is hinged on empiricism, which implies that God’s existence, let alone nature, is not necessarily true; Philo, because the a posteriori, intuitively causal, analogical, and inductive inferences are fallacious (further suggesting Philo represents Hume). Demea and Philo then converse about a priori reasoning and experience. Philo claims that all a priori reasoning is founded upon experiential knowledge; for instance, we infer the universe is not eternal because we repeatedly note that matter does not form itself into perceived designs and then reason a priori that matter generally does not form itself. Of course, this common sense philosophy predicates the cosmological argument upon experience; hence, the disagreement with Cleanthes, argues Philo, should be due simply to the fact God’s nature is not strictly demonstrable. The narrator writes that Philo seems to have been jesting, and Cleanthes, not persuaded that Philo is being serious, queries whether or not we should apply such skepticism to the Copernican system. Philo replies that the analogy is not apropos, as one can compare planets but cannot compare the generation of the universe to anything.
In Part III, Cleanthes accuses Philo of not seriously considering his criticisms of analogous reasoning, as practically all inferences – inferring a voice in the dark is a man – depend upon it. Cleanthes argues that the appearance of intelligence and beauty are appropriate counterpoints to Philo’s belief that one cannot compare analogous reasoning in science to analogous reasoning pertaining to the origin of the physical world, and that if Philo were to consistently apply his arguments thus far to all things without his own prejudice, he would be left with extreme skepticism. Demea, rejoining the conversation, remarks that as forceful as Cleanthes’ arguments may be, to infer that such a designer is a deity is a non sequitur.
Cleanthes’ replies to Demea in Part IV by asking whether or not “God” is an empty word and if natural religion can be meaningful, to which Demea replies that he merely rejects Demea’s anthropomorphizing. Demea then lists several “perfections” of God, to which Cleanthes replies that such cannot be known if they are not in some sense relative to us. Philo answers that the variance of thought within humankind is enough to question how one can reasonably regard an immaterial being – a being who would possess an infinity of differences from a human mind – as anthropomorphic. Moreover, when one considers the mind of such a God and discovers that its thoughts have no origin, Philo wonders why Cleanthes does not allow this to be the case for men. Cleanthes replies that Philo’s own argument can be used against him, as the cause of a thought must at some final point be attributed to an intelligent being, and that the harmony of nature confirms this to be true.
Philo insists that he will remain cautiously skeptical, and responds to Cleanthes’ attempted rebuttal by asserting that the argument assumes perceived effects must be produced by similar causes (i.e. intelligence from intelligence); if Cleanthes is to be consistent, he must admit God is not perfect, immortal, or infinite, as man is not perfect, immortal nor infinite. Thus, Philo remarks that the idea that the “beauty” to which Cleanthes had earlier referred could be attributed to such a being is dubious. In order to avoid the import of these arguments, Philo anticipates that Cleanthes will have to complicate his argument or arbitrarily dismiss sections of his rebuttal, and Part 5 ends with Cleanthes exclaiming that he believes none of these arguments and that Philo must presuppose the teleological argument in order for his arguments to be sensible.
Briefly analyzing the dialogue so far, each character’s arguments have there own strengths and weaknesses. Philo is correct to proportion belief with evidence, but, given his criticisms of Cleanthes and his empiricism, it is not apparent for what reason he believes in God. Cleanthes is correct that Philo and Demea do not seem to be speaking about “God” with any intelligible meaning, yet he himself utilizes subjective argumentation which he cannot validly dogmatize. Demea speaks soundly when he affirms that only a priori reasoning can substantiate certainty that God exists, yet how he has discovered God’s nature is questionable. Each character must either admit he cannot know God by natural religion or explain more precisely how he can within the bounds of his own beliefs.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Modern Philosophy 13
Hume reasoned that his arguments from preceding sections would be more authoritative it could be demonstrated that other “reasonable” animals act similarly to mankind; hence, section nine is devoted to this purpose. Hume concedes that men reason superior to animals because men have greater focus, acuter memory, a higher capacity for observation, and possess a priori instincts which are better suited to the task. Otherwise, however, Hume argues the inferences animals make are remarkably similar to men: dogs, for example, do not respond to certain tones a certain way by means of abstruse reasoning – their responses are predicated on custom alone. The difference between men and other reasonable animals, then, lies only in the degree to which each are able to form connections from perceptions.
Hume begins his tenth section by arguing that miraculous events – events which “violate the laws of nature” – should not be believed on the basis of testimony alone. The veracity of human testimony is often taken for granted, yet the possibility of contrary testimony refutes the absolute reliability of testimony. Furthermore, the relativity of experience also implies that miracles cannot be witnessed, as what one regards as miraculous may be commonplace to another; differences in technology, topology, etc. corroborate this. Finally, the suspect character of those who have purported to have seen a miracle is such that one ought to reject future claims, regardless of how many people confirm it.
Much of Hume’s arguments in these two sections seem to utilize cause-effect and necessary connection argumentation, both of which Hume criticized in his earlier sections. References to a priori instincts, the character of those who claim to have witnessed miracles, etc. indicate inferences which, because they are at best only grounded in perceived correlations, are not justified. Also, Hume’s argument against miracles is circular, as the “laws of nature” to which Hume alleges miracles would violate (by definition) are defined in such a way that one must ignore the fact that events have been perceived which men regard as miraculous; in other words, Hume constructs his opinion of “laws of nature” without regard for miraculous experience and then uses this to invalidate miraculous experience.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
Modern Philosophy 12.5
Section V, Part I
n Problem: human predispositions, bias, and selfishness
n Origin: custom
n Unreasonable
n Practical
n Foundationalism: theory of epistemology
n Axioms are necessary
n Experience is the ground of knowledge
Section V, Part II
n Real existence vs. figments:
n “the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure.”
n Association of ideas
n pragmatic
n instinctual
n “Common sense” philosophy
Section VI
n “Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.”
n Die example analogous to probability of causes
n More correlations => higher probability
n Custom established by means already explained
n Fewer correlations => less probability
n Custom is self-evident in stubbornness
Section VII, Part I
n Problem of Metaphysics
n ambiguity
n abstruseness
n Further problem
n we can’t produce a sensation to clarify “necessary connection”
n arguments against knowledge of necessary connection
Section VII, Part II
n Problem of Metaphysics
n ambiguity
n abstruseness
n Further problem
n we can’t produce a sensation to clarify “necessary connection”
n arguments against knowledge of necessary connection
Section VIII, Part I
n Historically: big misunderstanding
n Compatibilism:
n necessity: the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other
n freedom/liberty: a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.
n No liberty without necessity
Section VIII, Part II
n Responsibility: man’s will must be necessitated
n “Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil.”
n An objection considered
n Our ideas, character, &c. is predicated on experience which God has preordained for us. How, then, can we be responsible? Is God the author of sin?
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Modern Philosophy 12
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the first three sections of Hume’s “Enquiry.” The following is my submission:
Interestingly, Hume seemed to have been as concerned with one’s mental and physical welfare as with his philosophical contributions. He noted that man too often considers himself solely as a being born to fulfill his desires in his experience or solely as a being who should be interested in discerning the origins and soundness of abstract concepts by means of reason. A balance between each is preferable, as it is often the case that the intentions of each “species” can be met with greater satisfaction when actuated relatively equally. Abstruse philosophy, for example, may inspire better technologies or the like and thereby excite heightened experiences; on the other hand, relaxation and society may provide the occasion for one’s thoughts to be solidified in posterity.
Hume warned, however, that one must recognize his cognitive limitations, especially reflexive reflection. It may be that successive generations will succeed to breach points at which one may presently fail, but it is noble to admit such is the case while at the same time strive to overcome his barriers. Thus, said Hume, his epistemic position was not skeptical – or, at least, he does not believe skepticism is necessary – rather, he believed one should be pragmatic, weighing realism with optimism. Whether or not this first section was written in false modesty or sincerity cannot be immediately determined.
In sections two and three, the origin and correlation between ideas predominates Hume’s writing. Although section three consists simply in Hume’s listing a variety of association between ideas – resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect – and admitting that his list may be incomplete, section two contains much more controversial assertions.
Hume began section two by distinguishing between sensation and memory of sensation and using this as an example of the difference “impressions” and “thoughts,” respectively. Briefly expounding upon each, Hume noted that while one’s thoughts or imagination may superficially seem to be virtually unbounded – which would contradict what he had stated in his first section – it is actually the case that the imagination is simply an appropriation of one’s sensations; that is, thought originates due to sensation. This becomes Hume’s thesis in this section.
Hume believed “innateness” to be an ambiguous term, but he did write that impressions, unlike ideas, may be “original or copied from no precedent perception.” Using an example to clarify his position, Hume argued that the concept of “God” is merely an augmentation of anthropomorphic qualities. Those who disagree bear the burden of explaining what alternate source (aside from sensation) has provided one with his thoughts about God. Hume further argued that thoughts logically depend upon sensation because it is evident that persons who exist without various senses (e.g. sight, hearing) are without corresponding ideas which are garnered from those senses.
Not only does Hume beg the question – as he obviously did not observe all the blind or deaf, let alone know what they thought – Hume himself confessed a perception which does not fit his basic, general assumption that all thoughts are inspired by sensation, viz. it is possible that one may conceptualize distinct shades of colors without having experienced them, per se. Contradictorily, Hume said this one instance is not enough to overthrow common experience, a precursor to Hume’s faith in the fallacy of induction.
Monday, April 5, 2010
Modern Philosophy 11
One mistaken belief pertains to the notion of abstract ideas.
The origin of ideas is another point on which
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Modern Philosophy 10
While Leibniz regularly praised Locke and at times noted that he and Locke did not disagree – examples: God can do things which men do not comprehend; reliance on divine revelation alone is epistemologically unnecessary; etc. – in his prefatory response to Locke’s “Essays Concerning Human Understanding,” Leibniz’s goal was to clearly distinguish, in general terms, his Platonic philosophy from Locke’s Aristotelian philosophy. Several acute criticisms Leibniz advanced against Locke’s system are as follows:
Locke’s assertion that our mind is a blank slate clearly did not sit well with Leibniz. If all truth is derived extrinsically, Leibniz wrote, it would be impossible to validly generalize necessary truths (such as logic, metaphysic, and ethics) from a finite number of experiences. Anticipation of a repeated event based on memory of what one perceives to be a similar precursor is certainly not irrational, but it is also not, as Leibniz pointed out, an infallible expectation. While sensation can provide the occasion for the reflection and confirmation of these truths – some of which Locke must presuppose in his own argumentation – it cannot be the ground for them. In fact, Leibniz believed that Locke was conflicted about this issue, as he cited that Locke admitted some ideas originate in reflection rather than sensation. Whether Locke realized it or not, to state reflection is an attention to something within oneself which has not been produced by sensation undermines the idea all truth is learned experientially.
The relation between one’s soul and body was another disagreement Leibniz had with Locke. As a self-professed Cartesian – at least in this matter – Leibniz believed in the doctrine of concomitance. He thought that all men’s souls naturally possesses a body. Several of Locke’s beliefs clashed with this. For example, when Locke wrote that matter can think, Leibniz objected that such would require continuous miraculous intervention, as such would unnatural. Leibniz argued that the fact God can do things which men do not comprehend does not in turn imply we can’t recognize impossibilities, and speaking of God, Leibniz used His [immaterial] existence to further support his argument that matter is not a precondition of thought. Another example of a way in which Locke’s anthropological views varied from Leibniz’s stems from Locke’s belief that souls can cease to think in an analogous manner bodies which cease to move. Leibniz accused Locke of question-begging on two accounts: firstly, in that bodies do not, in fact, cease to move, for just because we do not necessarily perceive a rope lengthen past its breaking point does not mean it is not logically necessary that such be the case; secondly, that even if the idea bodies could cease to move were true, there would be a disanalogy – after all, one who is awakes from sleep would not do so if he were not continually perceiving and sensing externals.
One final example of a fundamental disagreement between Locke and Leibniz may be attributable to Leibniz’s seeming stress on the importance of theodicy. Leibniz disdained what he perceived to be a logical extension of Locke’s philosophy, viz. “that simple substances influence one another, replacing influence by mere correlation.” Leibniz thought Locke did not sufficiently address the reason men perceive secondary qualities, for the seeming arbitrariness was obviously at odds with Leibniz’s philosophical belief that the universe is made up of simple substances in perfect harmony with one another according to the eternal, purposeful will of God.
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Modern Philosophy 9
Locke’s fourth book is primarily concerned with explaining and defending categories of knowledge. Knowledge, which Locke defines as “the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas,” may allegedly be of several forms, some capable of being subsumed under others: identity, relation, co-existence, or real existence. The form “identity” is equivalent to one’s realization of the law of identity and non-contradiction, “relation” bespeaks of the minds correlation of idea, “co-existence” refers to that which is necessarily implied by a known proposition, and “real existence” means one’s ideas are more than figments of one’s mind
Locke derives from some relevant points from his discrimination, such as:
- demonstrative knowledge is, to avoid an infinite regression, necessarily dependent upon intuitive knowledge;
- propositions which one knows demonstratively are, antecedent to demonstration, doubtable and unclear;
- any known quality which has no “certain standard” against which one can judge whether or not his perception of that quality is such (e.g. color) must be intuitive;
- while ideas are always clear, knowledge is clear only insofar as the relations of ideas are unconfused.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Modern Philosophy 8
In Monadology, Leibniz progressed in his philosophy to describe the ontological ground of all things: monads. Monads are simple substances of which bodies are compromised. Although all monads must possess some differentiae such that a monad is recognizable as such, Leibniz also maintained that the concept must compatible with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles he established in his prior works. The qualities inherent to monads are not “parts,” per se; when a monad changes, it changes with respect to itself. Leibniz clarifies this by stating perception alone comprises the “internal activity” of simple substances, and the object of perception can obviously contain a multiplicity of characteristics such that variation in the objects can cause change in the monads. Leibniz also wrote about different qualities of these monads: the soul, for instance, is a simple substance whose perception includes feeling and memory. The soul also correlates to the senses of the body to which it is united (per concomitance), although the soul and body are “governed” in distinct ways. It seems to be the case, then, that Leibniz believed animals have souls, for he believed that the only difference between men and animals is that men are capable of reflecting upon eternal, necessary truths. Also, because men alone are rational animals, they alone can be called spirits, animals created in the image of God.
Another progression in Leibniz’s philosophy was that from his belief in the “laws of logic” and principle of sufficient reason to that of a definition of God; viz. God is the single, independent, and necessary substance who functions as the preserver, telos, and – in some sense – epistemic foundation for all things. Leibniz ascribes perfection to God because God is limitless insofar as He can actuate was is possible; it is thus the case that although we are ontologically dependent upon God, the immediate cause of imperfection is found in the nature of he who is necessarily limited. Furthermore, God’s limitless nature implies His own existence, as no contradiction is implied in His existence. God alone must necessarily exist, because He alone is not limited by possibilities, including the possibility that a limitless substance exists.
Leibniz also gives a brief account of his theodicy. As the principle of sufficient reason applies to all things, Leibniz notes that God must have reason for actualizing this world instead of all other possible worlds, and that God’s reason for having chosen to actuate this world is because it is the best of all possible worlds, reflected in the fact that this world exhibits a “universal harmony which causes every substance to express exactly all others through the relation which it has with them.” This harmony is such that each body represents its soul and each substance represents its ultimate cause (God) and the universe (as all things relate to one another in some fashion). Leibniz used this line of reasoning to support his contention that bodies and souls are [holistically] indestructible, that efficient and final causes are perfectly harmonious, and that God perfectly governs the physical realm as well as the spiritual. He concludes the Monadology assuring his readers that God will justly punish evil and reward good, that all things will work out according to God’s good will, and that men should be exhorted to make our goal that of the goal of He upon whom we depend in every intelligible sense.
Leibniz’s argumentation suffers primarily because it is suspect to the same criticism inherent to every rationalistic system: the contingency of knowledge. Unless one either is infinitely knowledgeable and omniscient or can justify that his means of acquiring knowledge has come from one who is infinitely knowledgeable and omniscient, to assert that any proposition x (e.g. “God possibly exists”) is true implies one knows that the ontological reality of x is not contingent on the ontological reality of propositions y, z, ad infinitum. Presupposing that man is able to reason functions insufficiently as a grounds upon or means by which one can construct a sound philosophical system.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Modern Philosophy 7
Leibniz wrote Primary Truths as a brief explanation of the foundation and reasons for his philosophical beliefs. Beginning with the idea that truth is a proposition whose predicate is contained in the subject, Leibniz inferred that nothing is without reason – not even eternal truths – as nothing can be validly resolved apart from the law of identity or non-contradiction.
Leibniz used the idea that predicates are contained in a subject to support his definitions of man’s essence and [compatibilistic] free will. Man is his predicates, said Leibniz, insomuch as all predicates are contained in the subject (man). Leibniz, who was a determinist, also believed that nothing corporeal could necessitate a metaphysical action on man’s will; man, then, is said to be free insofar as his actions pertain to intrinsic reasoning or desires. These are certainly determined, however, by God, who chose to create particular men from an infinitely many possible men. Moreover, as man’s essence or substance would be indeterminate if only regarded as a finite conglomeration of [past or present] predicates – for one could conceptualize infinitely many future counterfactual situations in which such men make different choices – man’s substance must contain all future predicates. Essence, then, is unchanging.
This in turn led Leibniz to affirm that all things correspond perfectly, since all relations between substances are determined by the essence of said substances. Each substance expresses in varying manner the cause of them all: God. Leibniz appeals to this cohesion to substantiate his qualification of Occasionalism in concert with his affirmation of concomitance. Leibniz believed that a true union exists between the soul and body such that when, for example, the body becomes afflicted, the soul naturally experiences pain or grief. The mind, on the other hand, can move the body as a real cause, but only so far as God created the mind with such a capacity and certainly determined that the mind would act in such a manner. In this latter sense, Occasionalism is true. Leibniz uses this qualification to purport miracles as acts of God in which God moves a substance to do more than the capacity with which God bestowed upon it in its first state.
A final important point Leibniz makes is that all corporeal bodies can be divided. Leibniz uses a block of marble as a simple example of his meaning: the block may actually be considered only a mass of stones, and these mass of stones only a mass of atoms, ad infinitum, such that any substance is actually a collection of many substances. This bears relevance to the way in which we perceive bodies as substances and seems to validate Leibniz’s claim that “with the exception of men there is nothing substantial in the visible world.” Any such designation would arbitrary.
This argument seems to be incompatible with Leibniz’s insistence that bodies may be true causes. If any body is composed of infinitely many subdivisions, for one body to affect another body, infinitely many reactions must occur in time, which is impossible. Another possible criticism of Leibniz’s philosophy is that his understanding of man’s essence is such that man cannot comprehend himself. Man does not know his future predicates, so God literally knows us better than we know ourselves. It does seem that Leibniz attempts to explain we can have an apprehensive knowledge of ourselves such that we can rationally hypothesize how we would act in any given circumstance, but such hypothesizing could not possibly account for the infinite number of possible variables which could affect the way in which we perceive ourselves. Leibniz may bite the proverbial bullet and maintain the cohesion of his affirmations, however.
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Modern Philosophy 6
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about select passages in Malebranche’s Search After Truth. The following is my submission:
Malebranche’s Search After Truth is an ostensive synthesis of Descartes’ philosophy, Augustinianism, Occasionalism, and the Westminster Confession of Faith.
In his third book, Malebranche sought to explain the fact of and means by which an idea – viz. the affectation or modification of the soul due to perception of an object – is produced in the mind. Prefatorily, Malebranche criticized those who prejudiciously believe that an idea implies its referent materially exists. One may, for instance, experience spiritual externals apart from an intermediary. Implicit in his argumentation was the possibility of a Kantian distinction between that which is a noumenon and that which is a phenomenon. Malebranche’s central thesis upon which he elaborates was that it is only by recognizing the [Christian] God as epistemologically authoritative that what we can intelligibly justify what we believe, systematically deconstructing philosophies which hinge the origin of ideas upon something other than God’s efficient causation.
One such alternative philosophy proposed that physical objects imprint their likeness onto one’s senses. Malebranche dismissed this modernized Aristotelianism as assumptive, since objects would by definition be impenetrable. Another criticism he offered was that, given that there is no apparent point at which the likeness of two bodies should not meet, distinguishing between bodies would be impossible. This objection carries more force when one realizes that space is unobservable and yet alleged by many to be a body which is more active than most others.
Other contemporaries of Malebranche suggested the soul is independently capable of producing ideas. Contrarily, Malebranche argued that one cannot form an idea of an object prior to some understanding of the object itself. However, such would presuppose knowledge of the object, meaning it would be unnecessary for one to form the idea afresh. Our ideas, then, are only as perfect as the reflected or perceived referents. The primary fallacy in the reasoning of these people, said Malebranche, stems from the fact they are ignorant of or unduly prejudiced against the possibility an external cause of their ideas. Providing a brief foreshadowing of his own philosophy, Malebranche wrote that one should not confuse correlation with causation; rather, one should depict the interaction of objects whose motion subsequently changes as merely the occasion upon which God, the true cause of all things, executes His will.
Before elaborating upon this, however, Malebranche considered the belief of those who say all ideas were innately as opposed to potentially created within us. Malebranche contended that, due to the limitations of the mind, one cannot conceive of, say, the infinite number of possible triangles, nor would one be able to explain the way in which one non-arbitrarily chose a single triangle as a representation of the concept. Malebranche added that it is not clear how this complete, innate knowledge harmonizes with a God who, in the interest of communicability, regularly works in the simplest of ways for the good of his creatures.
Because these systems are untenable, Malebranche concluded that the only remaining possibility is that man absolutely depends on God for all his thoughts; that is, as we are united to God and as God contains in Himself the ideas of all created things, in Him we live, move and have our being. Whatever we perceive, then, is what God has presented to our minds.
To substantiate this – at least in part – Malebranche utilized Descartes’ argument: certain abstract ideas and truths, such as infinitude and perfection, exceed and thus cannot have been produced by the mind. Only God can relate these to His own being, so only God can be argued to have impressed the apprehensions upon his mind. Because these ideas are presupposed, as one must, for instance, have some apprehension of infinity from which he is able to distinguish what is and is not finite, Malebranche claimed this argument was generalizable. Finally, Malebranche noted that the end or purpose of God’s actions pertains, necessarily, to God Himself: that Malebranche discerned these things to be true was natural, for God created with the purpose that certain men come to know Him by His works.
Summarizing his statements and the implications of book three, Malebranche wrote: it is only by God directly mediating thoughts to us that we can immediately perceive the corporeal (an argument which he seems to have derived from Augustine’s De Magistro, since Malebranche’s philosophy of language as it relates to one’s interaction with the physical world is similar), our soul is not corporeal, as one’s thoughts constitutes the essence of one’s soul, and one can as yet only conjecture as to the existence of other minds due to mortal limitations.
In book six, Malebranche laid out more clearly the philosophy of Occasionalism. Essentially, God is the only thing capable of directing or acting upon one’s soul in a causal manner. As God is omnipotent, and as omnipotence is, by definition, an non-transferable trait, what God wills necessarily happens according to His will. His will is thusly said to be the efficient, true cause of all things. An occasional cause, on the other hand, is simply the aforementioned correlation, that which God uses to effect what He wishes; the occasional cause is not to be regarded as the true cause, because it is not the condition upon which the fulfillment of any thing depends. Hence, Malebranche, agreeing with Augustine, believed even knowledge is contingent on God. Also, despite what the senses may imply, locomotion is caused by God. He cites as an example that although the movement of one’s arm may correlate to one’s will, it must be caused by God, for the soul cannot possibly conceive of the allegedly innumerable movements which must take place to effect the movement of the whole arm.
In his fifteenth elucidation, Malebranche briefly refuted objections purported against his philosophy. The first objection, that if secondary causes are not intrinsically efficacious, one could not differentiate between living and dead objects, Malebranche noted was question-begging, as the objector has not shown that something apart from themselves is alive, nor have they even explained clearly what it means to say something is alive. To the second objection, that if Occasionalism were true, it could be the case that fire could cool and water could burn, Malebranche simply replied that, because God is constant and orderly, what we see is normatively constant and orderly. The third objection leveled against Occasionalism was that it absolves one of responsibility, as God could put to naught man’s intentions. Malebranche retorted that God acts in the simplest ways and holds us responsible for how we act, so to try to excuse one’s actions on the grounds that God can will such that our efforts are for naught (insofar as our efforts pertain to our “own” intentions) is irrelevant and misses the fact God is orderly and constant. Furthermore, miracles are and abnormalities are by definition unusual and only produced when necessary to fulfill God’s will. Another accusation was that since God would cause his creatures to act contrarily, God is acting against Himself. Malebranche countered that the objection is spurious because creatures are the immediate actors by which God achieves whatever He wishes; if God wishes “bulls and lions” should fight, He causes them to fight. The final objection Malebranche answered in this section concerned how man can be free and how God can avoid the title of “author of sin” if Occasionalism is true. In accordance with the Westminster Confession and Augustine, Malebranche believed man’s will is free insofar as he wills according to his desires. This volition, however, is necessitated by the desires which God in turn effects according to His will, so our will is not the true cause of any thing: God is. God generally disposes minds toward the good, but Malebranche maintained that even natural impulses are from God. Regardless, one is responsible for his actions because sin implies the actualization of one’s will against God’s precepts, not the potential to choose contraries.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Modern Philosophy 5
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Pascal’s Wager. The following is my submission:
Pascal began his discourse by rhetorically complaining that one is born with a soul contained in a body in which finitude is intuited as natural such that one often finds that he need not believe anything more. To counter this apathy, Pascal mentioned infinity as a concept which we supposedly know exists, even though we are ignorant of its nature. Pascal used numbers as an example. There are an infinity of numbers, yet an infinity in number is not even nor odd, for it is unbounded; adding a number to infinity does not change its nature. Similarly, Pascal asserted we may know God exists – by faith, given that God is allegedly dissimilar to the “number” infinity insofar as He has no extension – without knowing what He is, per se. In fact, as a fideist, Pascal believed that God is, when attempted to be understood through reason, incomprehensible to men, as He by His infinite nature can have no point of similarity with us.
Christianity, claimed Pascal, claims its truth is beyond reason. Why, then, should one believe God exists? Firstly, Pascal chastised those who despise those who are upfront about having made a public profession one way or the other, for everyone – whether they admit to it or not – “wagers.” Everyone gambles – whether conscientiously or not – his life according to how he lives. Secondly, Pascal claimed that because reason has no stake in the wager, one’s gain or loss is weighted solely upon the maximal potential for happiness in one’s choice.
Having established the groundwork for his argument, Pascal proceeded to examine what one gains and loses in each respective case so as to determine how one should choose to wager – or, more precisely, what one should choose to believe regarding God’s existence. One’s gain if one chooses to believe God exists and act upon that belief is the potential of everlasting life and happiness, whereas one’s gain if one choose to disbelieve God exists is merely the potential to actualize whatever finite pleasures one desires. Hence, Pascal argued that, faced with this obligatory choice, one should choose to risk one’s finite life in order to gain at death infinite glory, an outcome which is as likely as the annihilation of the soul.
Pascal then particularly sought to rebut the idea that “because the state of the soul at death is uncertain, we should choose according to what is certain, viz. the certainty of pleasures we may only have if we disbelieve God.” Pascal noted that everyone risks a certainty – one’s life – to gain an uncertainty. The idea that the pleasures of this life are certainly within our grasp is illusionary, as one may die at any moment. Hence, one should stake his certain risk upon the best of all uncertainties, and that entails belief in God’s existence.
In order to believe, then, Pascal exhorted that one should learn how to believe from others who already do: by restraining passions rather than demand knowledge of proofs, by generally following their lifestyle, &c. All the while, one should continually remind himself that there is nothing of which he should be afraid, because he risks relatively nothing (which he mustn’t already risk) by following the wager, and, in return, he potentially gains something infinite in worth. Indeed, the only obstacles are one’s passions. No other “harm” can come from choosing to accede to “Pascal’s Wager,” and one even does seeming good works and avoids that which is commonly disdained.
“Pascal’s Wager” itself is an valid argument, but is predicated upon presuppositions with which many could find reason to argue. Because the “Wager” is not an epistemological argument, Pascal’s beginning remarks seem to function as an necessary prerequisite to his “Wager.” In other words, Pascal tried to show that one must be agnostic regarding God’s existence, for otherwise one could dissolve the force of the “Wager” by claiming that truth takes precedence to selfish motivations. While Pascal’s method is sound in theory, in practice it does not seem to work. For instance, if we know the nature of infinity doesn’t change – as Pascal writes – doesn’t that mean we’re not completely ignorant about the nature of infinity? Extrapolating, it seems Pascal confounded or misunderstood the difference between apprehensive and comprehensive knowledge. If one can apprehend God’s existence, the necessity of the “Wager” can only be necessarily persuasive to one who is, epistemologically speaking, a skeptic. Interestingly, one wonders how Pascal himself could have subscribed to theological skepticism, given that he in the same paper pointed to the Bible as a means of knowledge.
Modern Philosophy 4
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Descartes' Meditations (fifth and sixth). The following is my submission:
In his fifth and sixth meditations, Descartes seeks to apply his epistemological framework to questions relating to the existence of material objects, the contingency of knowledge upon the existence of God, erroneous judgments which originate from sensation, and the various differences between mind and body.
Among that which Descartes perceived as true included mathematics. Descartes wrote that various theorems he had formerly intuited as true were, in fact, necessarily true, not due to his limited imagination, but because the nature of that to which the theorems pertain imposed upon his mind their eternality and immutability. A corollary Descartes constructed yielded a second argument for the existence of God: viz. Descartes could not conceive of a non-existent God because existence is a perfection, a truth imposed onto his mind. God’s essence – a perfect being – must therefore entail His existence and, as such, must exist. Since Descartes’ epistemological foundation is essentially grounded in the concept that God mediates this and all other knowledge to His creation, Descartes observed that all knowledge – including mathematical – is dependent upon God’s existence.
Because a perfect – omnipotent – God exists, Descartes claimed to know that, if nothing else, material objects possibly exist. But as Descartes believed that “all that we clearly and distinctly perceive is true,” in order to adequately justify the actual existence of material objects, he also believed that one must first examine ideas in one’s own consciousness in order to discover which are clear and which are confused. The imagination, writes Descartes, is the special exertion of the cognitive faculty whereby one contemplates some object. Because he claimed to be unaware of a means of contemplation of an object aside from sensation, Descartes asserted that the objects themselves probably exist materially.
Descartes then proceeds to reflect on whether or not the existence of material objects can be known with certainty. Reviewing his former reasons for accepting their existence, he explains that the vividness of sensation impressed upon him the idea that he could not have produced such thoughts and that he could not account for the seeming correlation between his body and feelings (e.g. hunger and stomach pains). But when he considered that he could simply be dreaming, could be deceived, or could even possess a subconscious sixth sense such that these imaginations were factitious, Descartes came to doubt the reliability of sensation. Upon constructing his philosophy, however, Descartes began to reexamine the validity of acquiring knowledge by sensation, and he claimed that God – who is by definition not deceptive – would indeed be deceptive if external objects did not exist, as Descartes claimed to clearly perceive that material objects exist. Moreover, as he was able to clearly differentiate one thing from another, although he knew he possessed a body, he also knew he was, in essence, simply a thinking thing. Still, he claimed that the conjoined nature of the mind-body relation is such that he should not doubt that there is some truth in the various perceived correlations between the mind and body. These are things Descartes claimed to be taught “by nature,” or by impulsive reactions to sensations for the purposes of self-preservation. Due to the finiteness of man and misuse of free will, however, these stimuli can actually hinder self-preservation, for upon further consideration the mind may understand that to follow the inclination is hasty or dangerous.
The question with which Descartes wrestles is: given His existence, why doesn’t a perfect God stop this? In order to answer this question, Descartes briefly compares and contrasts the mind and body. The mind – which is indivisible or unanalyzable – receives impressions from the body – which is divisible – via sensation. God could stop us from feeling pain et. al. by stopping certain sensations, but Descartes notes self-preservation would be hindered, as one wouldn’t know what could harm his person. Descartes observed, however, that the senses are more often reliable than not, and that his memory, understanding, and all other faculties are, when in agreement, able to discover the causes of judgment errors as well as means of prevention: because God does not deceive, what is clear is true, and what can, after careful consideration, be doubted should not be regarded as knowledge. This is Descartes’ epistemic criterion for knowledge.
The primary problem with Descartes’ reasoning is that his epistemic criterion is predicated on his own, fallible thoughts. He writes, for instance:
“I frequently considered many things to be true and certain which other reasons afterward constrained me to reckon as wholly false…will it be that I formerly deemed things to be true and certain which I afterward discovered to be false? But I had no clear and distinct knowledge of any of those things, and, being as yet ignorant of the rule by which I am assured of the truth of a judgment, I was led to give my assent to them on grounds which I afterward discovered were less strong than at the time I imagined them to be.”
If the only way Descartes can know that his perception is not clear is by a modus tollens argument – that is, “because this perception was wrong, I did not actually perceive with clarity” – then he has no grounds upon which to be assured that at some future point in time he will not perceive that his past perceptions were unclear. At best, he can know that his clear perceptions are possibly contradictory, which undermines his entire position.
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Modern Philosophy 3
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Descartes' Meditations (third and fourth). The following is my submission:
Having believed that – through natural reason alone – he had established the certainty of his existence, Descartes begins his third meditation with the intention to show, if possible, what besides one’s own existence is indubitable. In his prefatory comments, Descartes mentions that the purpose of his third meditation is to demonstrate the existence of a perfect being – God – which avoids objections predicated on sensation.
While one may imagine or be deceived into believing in the existence of an external world, consciousness dictates that the particulars of one’s perceptions at least exist in the mind. Descartes uses this to argue that, given his classification of thought as pertaining to images, volitions, or judgments, judgment of ideas as innate, adventitious, or factitious is the point at which most, if not all, errors of the mind can be attributed. For instance, Descartes described his perception of heat as a spontaneous, external stimulus, but notes that he could possess a subconscious sixth sense whereby he produces such perceptions of heat “without the aid of external objects.” Such a hypothetical is representative of the difficulties which forced Descartes to admit he formerly – fallaciously – judged that other entities exist by “blind impulse.”
To circumvent these difficulties, Descartes, to demonstrate the existence of God, argued that ideas are effects which cannot be the product of an idea or existent whose capacity is not equal or superior to the idea itself, and that, since a chain of ideas cannot regress infinitely, a first idea must function as an ontological ground and “archetype” of all other, derivative ideas. Listing several ideas which may indeed be self-induced, Descartes arrives at the idea of a “substance [which is] infinite, [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, [trustworthy], and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created.” This idea, Descartes writes, is too perfect to have originated within his own mind, for, as he perceives that he is not infinite et. al., his apprehension of infinity et. al. must have been caused extrinsically. Moreover, given that any source from which this idea was caused would necessarily have to possess infinitude et. al. in order to be the first cause, God (the being which, by definition, possesses these – and possibly other – perfect attributes) must actually and objectively exist and have innately implanted this idea – or at least the potential for it – within Descartes, whom He conserves. Such an answer explains what perfection entails, how Descartes came to conceptualize it, and how Descartes knows his conception isn’t the result of deception. He ends his third meditation resolved to grow acquainted to reflecting only upon that which he certainly knows, viz. himself in relation to God.
The purpose of fourth meditation was to show that “all which we clearly and distinctly perceive is true” and to discern more clearly the nature of error in reason. So doing, Descartes believed he could validly universalize the clear perceptions of his third meditations so as to refute any who object to his system.
In the beginning of his meditation, Descartes asserts that God has given him a mind which cannot be led to error if utilized correctly – that is, when Descartes keeps at the forefront of his thoughts himself in relation to God. Notwithstanding this assertion, Descartes affirms that he has indeed fallen into error, which seems to imply an impious conclusion: God has bestowed upon him an imperfect mind. Given that Descartes has declared omnipotence to be a perfect attribute – which God must, therefore, possess – Descartes considers why God did not grant him a mind incapable of being deceived or why God allows circumstances to be such as they are, knowing – as God is omniscient – Descartes will be deceived. In essence, Descartes is pondering theodicy.
In reply to own query, Descartes strong-arms such criticisms by providing a blanket response: men are “not always capable of comprehending the reasons why God acts as he does,” nor is such an answer from God obligated. Nevertheless, Descartes offers an indulgent speculation: the idea that man possesses free will, the capacity to choose contraries, appeals to Descartes, as he claims he cannot conceive of anything else which would more capably demonstrate his existence is imprinted with the image of his creator; this might, perhaps, be an allusion to the archetypal argument for God’s existence. Regardless, Descartes uses this to argue that one’s errors stem from one’s own lack of restraint over one’s autonomous judgments. Even if this were this not the case, Descartes states that God’s sovereignty or omnipotence itself functions as the ground for His authority, presumably because God’s purpose in conserving man does not necessarily find its telos in man.
Summarizing the results of his meditation, Descartes writes: “I can never be deceived, because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something, and as such cannot owe its origin to nothing, but must of necessity have God for its author – God, I say, who, as supremely perfect, cannot, without a contradiction, be the cause of any error; consequently, it is necessary to conclude that every such conception [or judgment] is true.”
The third and fourth meditations provide significant answers to questions relating to the epistemological soundness of Descartes’ “superstructure” which I had after reading the except of his “Discourse on Method” and the beginning of his “Meditations.” If we accept the above summarization as representative of the justificatory basis upon which Descartes makes other claims, Descartes is able, by grounding his epistemology in the ontological existence of God, to purport a sound philosophy of language, a historical account of the means by which he comes to clear and distinct ideas (such as his own existence), and he avoids Hume's "is-ought dilemma" and problems which assume the reliability of memory. He is even able to rebuke the idea that a “deceptive demon has imprinted false thoughts of perfection onto his mind,” as Descartes claims to have clearly perceived a perfect, trustworthy God causes clear perceptions which cannot, by definition (due to origin), be erroneous.
That having been said, Descartes would have done better to realize the purpose of epistemological endeavors should ultimately be self-referential rather than for another’s benefit. The soundness of an epistemological foundation does not rest on the acceptance of it by one who holds an alternate first principle. The atheists who Descartes claimed would have to submit to his reasoning could very well reject Descartes’ epistemology on the basis that Descartes could be lying about what he perceives as “clear and distinct.” After all, they cannot know what Descartes truly thinks, for such reasoning already presupposes Descartes is external. Opining the rejection of his epistemology by atheists should not discourage Descartes; it should simply cause him, if he was honest, to content himself with the self-satisfaction of having demonstrated to himself that which is certainly true.
There are, however, questions Descartes leaves untouched, such as “which God is true?” Surely he opined a diversity of opinion on this matter, but he does not here proceed to a further examination. Also, with regard to his “free will defense” provided against the alleged problem of evil, if Descartes is autonomous, God’s knowledge must necessarily be contingent on actualization of Descartes’ will; as Descartes is a temporal creature, God could not be eternally omniscient. As both free will and God (who is infinite, eternal, immutable, and omniscient) are said to be “clear… conceptions,” atheists could falsify Descartes’ first principle by reducing it to absurdity; hence, Descartes should simply discard the notion of free will, as it is not indubitable.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Modern Philosophy 2
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Descartes' Meditations (first and second). The following is my submission:
“Discourse on Method” was, essentially, preparation for “Meditations,” an exposition Descartes considered to entail his philosophical superstructure. In it, Descartes purposes to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul by means of unprejudiced reason. He believed that while faith is sufficient for religious men, common, indubitable premises must be utilized against unbelievers so as to show them to be without excuse for any continuance in practicing moral relativism.
In his summarization of his meditations, Descartes, in accordance with his method, outlined – in orderly fashion – the means by which he believed he could achieve certainty. Insofar as the synopsis pertains to his first and second meditations, Descartes asserted that one should firstly cast a skeptical eye on those things one holds to be true. So doing, that which is shown to be indisputable is made evident. The allegedly indisputable proposition for which Descartes argues is that mind which doubts self-evidently exists, whereby one is able to discern what the mind is in relation to the so-called body and that it is fallacious to assert that with death comes the annihilation of the mind.
In his first meditation, Descartes laid out his particular reasons for doubting those things which he formerly believed. Firstly, he was desirous of ridding himself of opinions which are uncertain. Descartes noted that because the senses sometimes convey to us deceptive information, one cannot be sure that any proposition said to be grounded in a sensation is not instead the result of insanity or dreaming. Even so, Descartes claims that it is sensible to suggest that what one perceives itself represents something (reality, one’s own imagination, etc.). Moreover, he argues that some principles apply in both reality and one’s own imagination – for instance, mathematics – in which case we know these things are certain. Given that others are sometimes in error when they think they are not, however, Descartes rhetorically questions how he can validly avoid such a dilemma. Upon consideration, he declares that what he has considered thus far are remarks which can at best only have a probability of being true, and for that reason they cannot be trusted. He concludes the first meditation defiantly, stating that the possibility of a virtually omnipotent and deceptive demon will not force him to judge that which is doubtful to be true.
In his second meditation, Descartes continues with the hypothesis that a demon is deceiving him. Descartes states that one thing of which he will never be convinced is that so long as he is conscious, he is some existent. The next question, then, is what “he” is. He begins by describing what he formerly believed he was: a man. Upon reflection, however, Descartes admits a certain circularity in language which would be infinitely difficult to explain the meaning of words with words. Passing from this question, he proceeds to ask what is or are the attribute[s] of the soul, and on this point Descartes is optimistic that he may also make headway into the question of his essence. So long as he thinks, he exists; hence, it is that differentiae which describe what he is: a thinking thing, a thing whose reflexive consciousness is not dependent on anything else. A thinking thing is, says Descartes, a thing that by nature “doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives,” as each of these refers to capacities which cannot be disassociated from thought. Descartes proceeds to discuss the essence of allegedly physical bodies, bodies which, even if they change, remain the same in essence. The difficulty in explaining the reason for this intuition is exacerbated by the problem of language, yet Descartes believed that one who seeks true knowledge should not doubt that common speech can adequately function for these purposes; hence, Descartes concludes that what is applicable to the essence of bodies is even more applicable to his own essence (which is certain), which is to say that because the essence of the mind is immutable, it is even more certain that it is immortal and independent from the body.
Descartes obviously did not believe that everything should be doubted, for if that were the case, he would have no means by which he could escape doubt. At best, Descartes would be inconsistent with his own demands, for he presupposes his method and logical principles. While his strict adherence to high standards of what constitutes as knowledge is admirable, this qualification may be problematic, as Descartes does not explicitly show how his method or logical principles are indubitable.
In fact, that Descartes purports that propositions should be indubitable – otherwise, he would doubt them – implies that one’s first principle(s) from which he deduces his system should also be indubitable. But Descartes fails to provide a criterion according to which a first principle – a proposition which is by definition not derived – is indubitable. The other case may be that Descartes is implying that the truth of any proposition is contingent on the existence and validation of prior premises. Because premises are also propositions, however, this would imply a justificatory process which cannot be completed, yielding self-defeating skepticism.
A related problem due to Descartes’ methodology is that he seemingly approaches the question of knowledge ontologically rather than epistemologically; because he has not clearly explained his first principle(s), throughout his monologue, it at least appears he begs the question by continually referring to a reflexive essence without justifying the means by which he knows such an essence exists. It is unclear as to whether Descartes’ claim regarding the existence of his essence is an indubitable resultant from a series of premises according to which the claim is supposed to be justified, or if Descartes is simply explaining the historical process by which he came to believe his first principle. If the former case is true, Descartes’ first principle(s) is or are unclear. If the latter case is true, Descartes is describing a historical process which he does not justify by his first principle.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Modern Philosophy 1
For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Francis Bacon's First Aphorisms (1-3, 11-31, 36-46), Galileo's Corpuscularianism, and Descartes' Discourse on Method (Part 1, 2, and 5). The following was my submission:
Galileo, in a letter to the Roman Catholic church, defended the idea that motion causes heat and rather than the idea heat is a quality intrinsic to an object. To bolster this assertion, Galileo argued that an analogy exists between heat and tastes, odors, colors, etc. insofar as “if the perceiving creatures were removed, all of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished from existence.” Our senses are thusly said to be subjective – as different body can be affected differently by one object – and relative to that with which we physically interact.
The problems with Galileo’s philosophy of science are vast, yet as it was not Galileo’s purpose to defend empiricism, it would be unreasonable to have expected a full explanation of his views. Still, Galileo’s fallacious argumentation at certain points in his exposition are not irrelevant to his conclusion. For example, Galileo states that he “cannot believe that there exists in external bodies anything, other than their size, shape, or motion (slow or rapid), which could excite in us our tastes, sounds, and odors.” At best, this conclusion is a result of a finite number of observations. The first problem is that the idea further observations cannot yield contrary, convincing data is question-begging. The second problem is that the very method by which Galileo purports to ascribe causation to motion is questionable, as any observation he makes would, at best, demonstrate a correlation exists between two observed events. There could, for instance, conceivably be an as yet unobserved cause for heat, just as there could be an as yet unobserved instance of heat without motion. Any protestation to the contrary encounters the third and final problem: even if Galileo stated motion causes heat within the context of specific observations, his assertion is a proposition which is predicated upon the supposition he has accounted for all possible unknown variables – such as optical illusions – which could bias his observation. As this supposition in turn implies omniscience and infinite knowledge, however, Galileo cannot state as fact any proposition unless either he is omniscient and infinitely knowledgeable or he has his account from a source which is. The burden of proof is on Galileo to demonstrate that to be the case, which he does not; hence, his contention that motion causes heat is unsound.
A generalization of this third criticism can also be applied to Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon. Bacon was, as is evident from his first aphorism, an empiricist; that is, he believed all possible knowledge is and can only be derived from one’s experience with the natural world by means of sensation of particulars. His emphasis on the novel utilization of nature stems from the concept that increase in knowledge comes only by that means. Against contemporary skeptics and rationalists, Bacon argued that one can validly establish general propositions by gradual – inductive – steps. Bacon also indirectly implies science is not a matter of opinion when, in a rejection of the subjective nature of anticipations, he contrasts science with matters of opinion. He states that he is a guide to truth rather than a judge of it, as the only way to teach or guide men to that which is true is by showing them the relevant particulars in question. In light of Bacon’s belief that certainty can be achieved, he stated four “idols” – empty dogmas – about which men should be aware. In sum, these “idols” are intended to warn the reader to check the soundness of his motives, as man’s nature, temporary preoccupations, attraction to vanity, or presuppositions can unfavorably bias his observations.
In addition to the aforementioned problem inherent to empiricism, the most obvious objection to Bacon’s epistemological understanding is that the very “idols” he cites are double edged, for, while we only read a small selection of his work, Bacon does not explain by what method he purports to avoid those “idols” such that he can validly assert to have supplied help to the “authority of the senses and understanding.” In light of his conclusions – “the spirit of man is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance,” “human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion…draws all things else to support and agree with it…though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side,” etc. – any criticisms he makes against sophists on these grounds could seemingly be applied to him in a “tu quoque” fashion.
Descartes’ apparent humility in his opening remarks – he admitted he could be wrong – can disarm critiques from reading too much into Descartes’ thoughts. Descartes went so far as to suggest those who are unlearned or easily swayed into hasty reforms shouldn’t “strip away all the opinions which one has previously absorbed.” In general, however, as Descartes believed all men possess the capacity to reason equally well, he believed that his method, which follows four, uncompromising rules, could be helpful: essentially, one should accept only what is certain, completely analyze any problems, and conduct thoughts in an orderly and thorough manner. By this method, Descartes believed that one could increase his knowledge in all sciences, whereas he had previously doubted the validity of his traditions and customs, in part due to his academic study and in part due to the fact he believed that the ridiculousness of common beliefs in other cultures could very well apply to his own.
Despite his belief almost all philosophies have been somewhere espoused, Descartes defended his method on the ground that that ad populum arguments are fallacious, so on that account one needn’t concern oneself with the validity of the idea oneself should judge what is true. Moreover, Descartes also believed careful elucidation of a philosophy by one person is often more lucid than those constructed by several, which functioned to solidify his assurance in his method. He analogized the construction of a philosophy to the building of a house: a single architect will fare better than multiple, as there is no one to dispute with except oneself. As such, the architect is free to tear down and build up whatever he chooses, and can examine the foundations such that he knows when the structure is sound. He firmly believed that by this means he “would be successful in conducting [his] life better than if he built only on the old foundations and relied only on principles which [he] had been persuaded to accept in [his] youth, without having examined whether they were true.”
In an example of an application of his method, Descartes argued that animals and machines can be distinguished from humans, because neither will never be able to communicate as we do, and neither possess the capacity to reason to the extent humans do. Both would otherwise be able to initiate interaction with us. Hence, the soul of animals is not of the same nature as our own, so cannot be used as an excuse that an afterlife is nonexistent. Our souls, which are independent of the body, are not “subject to dying along with the body,” i.e. human souls are immortal.
Aside from the aforementioned problem of omniscience and infinite knowledge, a problem with his method is that, as Descartes admits, it could be wrong. The criteria according to which he evaluates propositions is seemingly accepted as axiomatic. If this be so, Descartes does not show how these criteria are internally consistent – that is, accounted for – within his world-view. At this point, he seems to fall into the error of accepting what is commonly supposed for no other reason than it is commonly supposed. The other problem is that when it comes to the actual application of his method, Descartes’ argumentation is rather sloppy. Differentiating between particulars in the nature of human and animal souls does not necessarily imply that our souls are different in toto; that is, the fact that animals do not have minds like ours does not establish our souls are not intrinsically related to our bodies. At most, it would establish our souls are not intrinsically related to animal bodies. Or, if these propositions were meant to be disconnected, Descartes fails to substantiate his conclusion.
