Gordon Clark and Anthony Flood (Part 2)

In a recent post, I reviewed chapter 9 of Anthony Flood's book, Philosophy after Christ: Thinking God's Thoughts after Him (link). The following post will cover chapter 10 - "What Are We Doing When We're Reading? Questions about Gordon Clark's Occasionalism" - and conclude my review. As a precursor to this post, I wrote another one in which I argued that late in his life, it appears Clark did, in fact, espouse occasionalism (link). I want to say at the outset that I always appreciate reading other people's thoughts on Gordon Clark. In a way, it helps me understand how I myself have been impacted by Clark's influence and how I can hope to impact the thoughts of others in a helpful way.

In this chapter, Mr. Flood takes aim at late Clark's occasionalism. With Mr. Flood, I would agree that accepting occasionalism is problematic (link and link). His most insistent criticism of late Clark's occasionalism seems to concern the philosophy of language. For instance, consider the following statements:

One wonders how Clark's epistemology accounts for how one learns a language...

Now, how did Gordon Clark access the propositions of Scripture? He was adamant that ink marks on a Bible's white paper pages (or pixels on a computer monitor) convey nothing to the mind. The Holy Spirit, however, uses those marks to 'stimulate' or occasion the divinely intended proposition in the believer's mind...

It was Clark's distinctive position that only the propositions of the Bible conveyed by the Holy Spirit to a human mind counts as knowledge; all other beliefs, however justified and true they may be, are not more than opinions. Clark did not register an opinion as to whether English letters of Chinese characters played any role in that conveyance...

Clark's occasionalism implicitly denies that our sensory organs receive data into which verifiable and falsifiable insights are possible, insights that accumulate into viewpoints. But did not such insights occur whenever Clark read a sentence in a language in which he enjoyed competency? The road to competency, however, was paved with his progressive attainment of rudimentary, intermediate, and advanced insights into that language...

Mr. Flood overstates the case when he intimates that Clark might have counted some beliefs as both "justified" and, at the same time, "not more than opinions." For instance, there is no suggestion in any of Clark's works that he would have accepted Gettier cases as involving justified beliefs.

Otherwise, we can agree that late Clark's occasionalism begs the question as to how Clark would be able to know that he had learned a language. Should Clark have attempted to disconnect his philosophy of language from his philosophy of knowledge - e.g. by suggesting that physical words or ink marks (i.e. the objects of language) are not immaterial propositions (i.e. the objects of knowledge) and, therefore, that one does not need to learn a language in order to know - one might question why Clark phrased his own axiom in the following way (written within one year of his death):

The first principle cannot be demonstrated because there is nothing prior from which to deduce it. Call it presuppositionalism, call it fideism, names do not matter. But I know no better presupposition than “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the word of God written, and therefore inerrant in the autographs.” (link) 

To speak of writings and autographs is to allude to inscripturation, the idea that God's revealed, propositional word is, as Steve Hays once put it, encoded in physical media (link). To suggest, as Clark here did (whether he realized it or not), that his axiomatic propositions are encoded in physical media implies such propositions should be decodable. To be be clear, when I talk about propositions that are "decoded" by or from physical media, I don't mean to suggest that an internalist, empirical epistemology is in view. Rather, our knowledge of propositions is mediately caused. The is a point of metaphysics, and in this sense, we even learn (but not justify) our epistemic axioms. For example, nobody is conceived with knowledge of the gospel.

For emphasis, when I talk about "learning" in this post, I am referring to a metaphysical process, not the process of epistemic justification. I am not suggesting we can somehow use our sense experience as a kind of premise by which we can infer or consciously attempt to justify (in an internalist sense) our propositional knowledge claims. What I am suggesting is that sense experience can function as a secondary, proximate cause of our propositional knowledge claims.

As I said, Clark's statement about inscripturation suggests that God's word is encoded. In turn, this suggests that we can learn, can decode, or can be caused to know the propositions God intends to reveal to us by or from the physical media in which God's word is encoded. We may not even be aware that this metaphysical process has happened.

If Clark could not learn or decode his own axioms from the physical media in which he asserts they were encoded, this would either mean that 1) his own epistemology is self-defeating - if the metaphysical process of learning about his epistemic axioms depends on the ability to decode them from physical media - or 2) that the process of inscripturation to which his axiom alludes was superfluous for our knowledge of God's word - if the metaphysical process of learning about his epistemic axioms does not and cannot have any relevance to the encoding of propositions in physical media.

Clark seemed to opt for the latter option - cf. his rejection of the correspondence theory of knowledge (discussed here and here) - which is why I have elsewhere rhetorically asked what was the purpose of inscripturation if occasionalism is true. There seems to be none, nor does there seem to be a relevant reason why Clark should have mentioned that God's word was "written" and "inerrant in the autographs" in his own epistemic axiom. 

For that matter, how is an autograph "inerrant" if not by metonymy? As early as 1944 and as late as 1982, Clark insisted that "only propositions are true," "only propositions can be true" (cf. Clark's marginal notes on his Examination in Theology, 1944, July 7; Art and the Gospel, 1982, March - April). How, then, can ink marks be inerrant unless we admit that propositions are encoded in the physical writ?

I've made plenty of other criticisms in the aforementioned links, so I suppose there is no need to belabor the point - mainly, I wanted to point out that the face value of Clark's own axiom contains an allusion to the idea that physical media can encode propositions. Despite what critics have objected, however, the remedy to late Clark's faulty metaphysics does not entail a problem for Clark's epistemology. Actually, I agree with the spirit of Clark's first principle; it could be stated more precisely, but I don't think his reference to "written... autographs" is inherently problematic for his epistemology.

To summarize: there is a difference between the way in which we became or were caused to be aware of that which we take to be our epistemic axioms (a point of metaphysics) as compared to the function of the epistemic axioms themselves (the ground our knowledge, including our knowledge of the metaphysics process by which we learned our epistemic axioms). There is a difference between the order of being and the order of knowing. I've written more about how I think a Scripturalist can synthesize  his epistemology with a metaphysic which in turn allows for a subordinate, extra-biblical knowledge of the external world under the subsection on textual criticism here (and its included links). 

Thus, the common objection to Scripturalism - "Don't you have to read your Bible?" - is either irrelevant (if it is a question about metaphysics; a Scripturalist can agree that one can be caused to think about propositions by reading) or begs the question (if it is a question about epistemology, in which case first principles need to be discussed). To use chess terminology Clark himself might find amusing, it seems to me that late Clark's occasionalism was an unnecessary, prophylactic overprotection. He answered an objection he considered to fraught with epistemological intent by changing his view of metaphysics... a misguided enterprise. 

Mr. Flood has a point, then, that late Clark's occasionalism is wrong. But whether Mr. Flood's own views are right also requires evaluation. Take the following quote as a point of departure:

Sometimes it's incontrovertible that efficient causality is not inferred (fallaciously or validly), but felt, directly and infallibly intuited. Not the cause, mind you, but causality itself... Causation can therefore be given in experience, but acknowledging this datum doesn't make one an empiricist. When David affirmed that knowledge of divine causality is given with the creature's experience of creation (Psalm 119:1), he wasn't promoting a fallacious inference.

I think Mr. Flood meant to cite Psalm 19. Incidentally, this passage further supports my contention that [propositional] truth[s] are embedded in physical creation. 

However, what does it mean to say that something "felt" is "infallibly intuited"? Like inerrancy, infallibility pertains to truth. But feelings are not beliefs. It does not appear that Mr. Flood is suggesting that the object of the feeling is a proposition, so is he indirectly suggesting that something other than propositions can be literally true? At first sight, none of these alternatives appear attractive. There needed to be more said on this point. The same can be said for Mr. Flood's following remark:

"Clark's occasionalism implicitly denies that our sensory organs receive data into which verifiable and falsifiable insights are possible, insights that accumulate into viewpoints."

Passing over late Clark's occasionalism, which I already have talked about, it is not clear whether Mr. Flood is an epistemic internalist or externalist. To my knowledge, this matter is not touched on in the book. By default, I tend to assume that people who support an empirical theory of knowledge are internalists. Perhaps my intuition is, in this case, incorrect. If so, this demonstrates all the more that Mr. Flood could have elaborated on his epistemology. If my intuition is correct, however, it would have been helpful if Mr. Flood addressed Clark's criticisms of [internalist] empirical epistemology, for as it stands, I am left without reason to think he is able to do so.

Mr. Flood seems to affirm Aristotle's claim that "forms are grasped by mind in images." Aside from the fact that no defense is given as to why one ought to accept this, to repeat a thought from the first part of the review of this book:

I wonder whether Mr. Flood believes that humans can learn anything in the intermediate state between death and the parousia. The above would indicate that this is impossible. This would make Abraham's conversation with the rich man in Luke 16 either unintelligible or parabolic, for example.

I might also ask whether Mr. Flood thinks angels need to grasp forms in images. If Aristotle is meant to be set as a foil against Clark's occasionalism, the presentation was relatively weak. 

Unfortunately, in terms of Mr. Flood's own, original thought, I didn't find much else of note in this chapter. He mentions two philosophers I had not heard much of before reading this chapter: Alfred Whitehead and Bernard Lonergan. Mr. Flood cites the latter as writing:

If the real is the “out there” and knowing it is taking a look, then the ideal of interpretation has to be as close an approximation as possible to a reconstruction of the cinema of what was done, of the sound-track of what was said . . . . [T]he ideal of the cinema and the sound-track is the ideal not of historical science but of historical fiction. There is no verifiable cinema of the past nor any verifiable sound-track of its speech. The available evidence lies in spatially ordered marks in documents and on monuments, and the interpreter’s business is not to create nonexistent evidence but to understand that evidence that exists . . . .

If objectivity is a matter of elementary extroversion, then the objective interpreter has to have more to look at than spatially ordered marks on paper; not only the marks but also the meanings have to be “out there,” while the merely subjective interpreter “reads” his own ideas “into” statements that obviously possess quite a different meaning. But the plain fact is that there is nothing “out there” except spatially ordered marks; to appeal to dictionaries and to grammars, to linguistic and stylistic studies, is to appeal to more marks . . . . If the criterion of objectivity is the “obviously out there,” then there is no objective interpretation whatever; there is only gaping at ordered marks, and the only order is spatial. But if the criterion of objectivity lies in intelligent inquiry, critical reflection, and grasp of the virtually unconditioned, then the humbug about the “out there” and the simulated indignation about “reading into” are rather convincing evidence that one has very little notion of what objectivity is. (Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, and New York: Philosophical Library, 582-83.)

I may well be misunderstanding Mr. Flood's intention in citing Lonergan, but I think he is attempting to establish a comparison between Lonergan and Clark in that the epistemologies of both men are empirically pessimistic. If "the ideal of interpretation has to be as close an approximation as possible to a reconstruction of the cinema of what was done, of the sound-track of what was said" yet "[T]he ideal of the cinema and the sound-track is the ideal not of historical science but of historical fiction," it sounds as though Lonergan has no qualms arguing that to attempt to gain knowledge by empirical means [of the internalist variety] is to chase alethic ghosts. If I am interpreting Mr. Flood's intentions correctly, I am again left wondering why he does not attempt to show how and why he thinks Lonergan's views are false.

As for Alfred Whitehead, I tried to read some summaries of his thought (link). Honestly, I found the going tough. One thing that stuck out was his acceptance of some sort of theory of internal relations, so I tried to look into that a little more. I found a helpful article (link), and I would be interested in Mr. Flood's thoughts on it. In particular:

Whitehead puts forth the notion of internal relations, which he introduces when discussing Einstein's relativity. Space-time relationships have been generally understood as external relationships. Whitehead denies that. He resembles Leibniz when he states that the relations that an event has are all internal relations: “This internal relatedness is the reason why an event can be found only just where it is and how it is, that is to say, in just one definite set of relationships. For each relationship enters into the essence of the event; so that, apart from that relationship, the event would not be itself. This is what is meant by the very notion of internal relations. It has been usual, indeed, universal, to hold that spatio-temporal relationships are external. This doctrine is what is here denied” (Whitehead, 1925, pp. 122–123). Put plainly, an internal relation is a relation between entities such that it is not possible for them to exist without each other. Thus, from the stance of the doctrine of internal-relations, inter-actions are “add-ons” to substances; a glue between “things” which, in turn, do not need the glue for their being.

The above caught my eye, for it initially looked to me as though Whitehead ought to have accepted necessitarianism (link). Yet when I followed up on this intuition, it seems Whitehead opposed necessitarianism (link). Is this because Whitehead thinks that the theory of internal relations only applies to creation?

Continuing, the article further outlines what internal relations are and then critiques Whitehead's metaphysic:

Internal relations determine the identity of the related entities. For the purpose of gaining some intuition about this notion, let us provide some examples within a somewhat heterogeneous list of cases. A mother and her baby (specially a fetus) can be said to be internally related because their mode of relation implies that one could not properly speak about the latter if one would leave the former out. In other words, they owe to each other what they are...

Going back to the notion of internal relations, once more the question is not settled by emphasizing the processual nature of whirlpools (or, to that matter, the processual nature of the toilet in which whirlpools form when we flush it). In any dynamical system there is always a final level of internal relationship below which basal elements (entities or variables) are defined independently of their relations. Such mathematical theories of dynamical behavior, operating under the implicit assumption that basal elements have a fixed essence, presuppose the externality of the relations of the basal elements. Even if one claims that interactions are more important than their constituents, this claim holds only for the behavior of the system, not for the constituents themselves. “It is arguably this inseparable connection between processuality and internal relationship that also creates the biggest difficulty in Whitehead ontology: The process which gives rise to relations of experience exists prior to them neither logically nor temporally. The processual subject only comes into being through its relations with other subjects.” (Koutroufinis, 2014a, p. 16). In a word, no internal relations, no process. 

In other words, I think the problem for Whitehead is how, given his processual metaphysic, individuation is possible in the first place. For example, how would Whitehead individuate the mother and baby such that he could relate them? Obviously, one could reframe the question for whatever Whitehead takes as ontologically basic and argues are internally related. 

Did Gordon Clark Ever Espouse Occasionalism?

I have reviewed one of the chapters in which Gordon Clark is highlighted in Anthony Flood's book, Philosophy after Christ: Thinking God's Thoughts after Him (link). I also plan to review Mr. Flood's other chapter on Clark: "What Are We Doing When We're Reading? Questions about Gordon Clark's Occasionalism." As such a title suggests, Mr. Flood takes aim at Gordon Clark's alleged occasionalism. 

Before reviewing said chapter, a useful question at the outset - deserving of this separate post - is whether Gordon Clark ever even espoused occasionalism. I have stated my opinion on the matter here and here. I think that late in his life, Clark espoused occasionalism. While there is more to say, I don't plan to repeat the points I made in those posts; on the whole, I think they stand. 

One qualification, however: in the course of his life, I believe Clark's thought regarding certain topics developed or changed over time. In the future, I will try to keep in mind how I frame Clark's views when referring to such instances. To take an example: early in his life, Clark rejected necessitarianism; later in his life, he accepted necessitarianism (link). What, then, should we say? Was Clark a necessitarian or not? Rather than accepting the framing of the question as appropriate, it would seem more precise to reframe the question to ask whether or when Clark ever espoused necessitarianism. The title of this post reflects this same intention.

Now, in 2018, Doug Douma wrote on this subject and concluded that "neither occasionalism nor concurrentism are entirely adequate labels for Clark’s view" (link). Mr. Flood recognizes and "appreciate[s]" Doug's "scholarly efforts" in his book - sentiments I echo. Therefore, it is too bad that Mr. Flood did not interact with Doug's post on this question, particularly since in 2021, Doug commented on Mr. Flood's website prior to the book's publication (link):

Doug: Mr. Flood, My friend Dave Lull linked me to this post. You might be interested in this post I wrote a few years ago where I concluded that Gordon Clark isn’t exactly an Occasionalist. Since then, I’ve had some doubts about my own conclusion, but have not written anything to overturn it, nor do I know that I could write such. 

Mr. Flood: Grateful to Dave and honored to have your input, Doug. Thanks for that post of yours. I’ll give it my full attention as soon as I can, after which maybe there’ll be a “Part 3.” For now I’m less concerned that the International Society of Occasionalists would not have admitted Clark as a member than whether his all-but-occasionalist epistemology is what Scripture (as distinct from the WCF) implies. 

For reasons which will be outlined below, Doug's hesitation to dogmatically reaffirm his original conclusion is understandable - as were most of his thoughts conveyed in his original post. For separate reasons, too, Mr. Flood's focus on Clark's "all-but-occasionalist epistemology" is also understandable. Nevertheless, a substantial engagement with Doug's post is missing. The following will attempt to fill in the motivational gaps I perceive in these authors as well as what Scripturalists should consider in future conversations on the subject of Clark and occasionalism.

In the course of his post, Doug alludes to a definition of occasionalism given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP):

For the occasionalist, divine causal activity is the only type of genuine causality. Creatures provide at most an occasion for God’s activity, which is uniquely direct and immediate in bringing about all effects in nature. (link)

Doug compares Clark's expressed thought from several books, letters, and articles to this definition. He argues, "If occasionalism has exclusively immediate causation, then clearly Clark was not an occasionalist." The evidence that Doug cites, primarily consisting of quotes of Clark from the 1960s, is quite strong. Clark was in his sixties at the time of such writing. In fact, Clark was around 75 when he completed the following article on "Traducianism" (a chapter contained in Clark's posthumously published book, The Atonement, which was, in turn, a chapter in the systematic theology Clark completed by 1977; link):

Perhaps the reader will permit a paragraph on Charles Hodge also. In Volume II of his Systematic Theology, 68ff., he discusses traducianism and creationism. Most of the section on the former depends on the alleged silence of Scripture on the subject: The various passages that traducianists use, he claims, are inconclusive. He even asserts, “The more enlightened and candid advocates of traducianism admit that the Scriptures are silent on the subject” (68). This means, of course, that Shedd, who used Scripture passages, was either not enlightened or not candid. Hodge understands the word flesh, in those passages already cited, to mean precisely the body in contrast with the soul.

Then when he comes to the transmission of inborn depravity, and the difficulty of thinking that God immediately creates sinful souls, he appeals to secondary and mediate causes, thus abandoning the idea of immediate creation: “We do not know how the agency of God is connected with the operation of second causes, how far that agency is mediate, and how far it is immediate” (69). Certainly this is a surrender of creationism. Traducianists are willing to say that the souls of men are “created” mediately, i.e., by the mediation of parents, just as we may also speak of trees and animals as created objects. But these created objects on my front lawn were mediately created through the seeds or slips from earlier plants...

Berkhof says, “(3) It proceeds on the assumption that, after the original creation, God works only mediately” (198). This, however, is not precisely an assumption: It is an exegesis of Scripture.

Berkhof also argues that God in regeneration does not act mediately but immediately creates a new soul. Now, it is true that the apostle speaks about a new man and even a “new creature” (2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15). But if the Greek word in these two verses be understood as bara as used in Genesis, there would have come into being, ex nihilo, another person; and in such a case the sinner himself would not be that person. One must remember that regeneration, in the epistles, is usually called a resurrection. Resurrection allows the individual sinner to remain himself. Well, re-generation does so too. Creation ex nihilo produces someone else.

Note well that Clark says the idea that "after the original creation, God works only mediately... is not precisely an assumption: It is an exegesis of Scripture." As stated, this is not only a repudiation of the SEP definition of thoroughgoing occasionalism but also is a rejection that "God's activity... is uniquely direct and immediate in bringing about" [any] "effects in nature." One who truly accepts such a statement seems to be as far removed from the acceptance of the SEP definition of occasionalist philosophy as can be! At first glance, Doug appears safely justified in his conclusions.

However, before we too hastily conclude the matter, three considerations prevent me from agreeing with this:

1. Was Clark consistent?

2. Did Clark change his mind?

3. What is occasionalism?

Before proceeding, the primary point of this post is to answer - so far as is possible - a historical question: did Gordon Clark ever espouse occasionalism? That is, in this post, I am less concerned to correct what I perceive to be mistakes in Clark's theology, although I will touch on such things towards the end.

Was Clark consistent?

"God works only mediately." Did Clark really believe that? Perhaps. It is not easy to show that other positions he held were consistent with this, however. 

For example, I would agree with Clark's point in his article on "Traducianism" that regeneration does not require God to immediately cause a new person. But what about new knowledge a regenerate comes to possess? Does Clark think God ever immediately causes such knowledge? Even as early as 1963, there were hints of such an idea in Clark's writings:

Conclusions follow automatically, but what makes a man accept an initial proposition? Calvin’s answer is plain: Belief in the Scripture “cannot be produced but by a revelation from heaven.” And on this most important point the possibility of misunderstanding is greatest. 

What is a revelation from Heaven? It could be a message delivered by angels, such as Abraham received. It could be the finger of God writing on tablets of stone or on the wall of a palace. It could be a vision, such as John had on Patmos. And such things, unfortunately, are what most people think of when they hear of the testimony of the Spirit. Unwise Christian workers, careless of their language, sometimes describe their experience in glowing terms and embroider it beyond reality. When younger Christians do not see such visions or dream such dreams, they suffer disillusionment. 

But there are other forms of revelation. Jesus once asked, “But who do you say that I am?” and Peter replied, “You are the Christ.” Then Jesus said, “Flesh and blood have not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in Heaven” (Matthew 16:15-17). Peter had had neither trance nor vision, nor had he heard an audible voice. In modern American slang we would say, it just “dawned” on him. What happened was that the Spirit produced this conviction in Peter’s mind. I should judge that Peter was not at all conscious of the Spirit’s working. Of course, Peter was conscious of having heard Christ’s sermons and of having seen his miracles. But the significance of all this just came to him at that moment. So too when any one accepts the Bible as the Word of God, he is not conscious of any break in the psychological process. He has probably been reading the Bible for some time, or as a child he had listened to Sunday school lessons, and one day he realizes that he believes the Bible was given by God. 

The phrase “it dawned on him” is about as good a phrase as can be found in ordinary use. Many of the theologians compare the experience with sensation and perception. A high school student reasons out his geometry problem, but he simply sees the pencil and paper. Sight therefore makes a quick contrast with reasoning. Nevertheless, when one studies theories of sensation and learns the several ways in which it is explained, and when sensation is distinguished from perception, this metaphorical use of sensation to illustrate the work of the Spirit is more confusing than enlightening. It is better (so it seems to me) to say simply that God produced the belief in the mind. (link)

By contrasting the Spirit's work to "forms of revelation" in which a medium is used, is it not obvious Clark means that the God immediately caused Peter's belief? Consider also the more explicit statement Clark made in 1977:

There are lots of things we cannot fully explain. One may ask whether there is anything at all we can fully explain. But the case of Absalom, even if the text does not explain how, shows that God causes men to think as they do. God caused Absalom to think that Hushai’s bad military advice was good. 

One may also note that men cannot explain how God created the world. The reason is that there was no how. Creation was not a process to be described. God spoke, and it was done. The initial creation was instantaneous. Inspiration too, though not instantaneous, is nonetheless direct. Various ideas pass through the mind of the prophet, and God directly causes him to write down some and not others. (link)

Clark analogizes creation to inspiration. In both cases, Clark argues, God is the direct cause, and the effect is produced instantaneously. That is, no creation mediated God's word to the authors of Scripture. Again, at this juncture, I am not assessing whether or not Clark is right or wrong. The point, however, is that these cases are in tension with Clark's aforementioned claim that "after the original creation, God works only mediately." 

Did Clark Change His Mind?

The foregoing also demonstrates that there is precedence for understanding Clark's views in Lord God of Truth as an affirmation of occasionalism. As I said earlier, Clark completed his piece on "Traducianism" around the age of 75. Well, Clark lived 7 to 8 years after that. Suppose Clark changed his mind. Nothing I've read mitigates against this possibility. Lord God of Truth was published posthumously (originally in the book, Ambitious to be Well-Pleasing, 1986), suggesting he wrote the contribution quite late in his life. 

At the beginning of this post, I said I would not repeat points I made elsewhere. One exception will be to again quote Clark's following use of Jonathan Edwards (italics his):

More surprisingly Jonathan Edwards, of all people, provides some support for Malebranche’s views. This is not to say that the great Puritan agreed with Malebranche in great detail. He does, however, provide some Scriptural support for the doctrine of divine illumination. The general Christian public, then, will be somewhat disabused of their anti-philosophical, pragmatic prejudices, and the apologetes will be warned not to strain out a Plato and swallow an Aristotle.

Though there is enough in Malebranche that Edwards would not like, nevertheless in his sermon on A Divine and Supernatural Light Immediately Imparted to the Soul, Section three, he goes further than one might anticipate. Note the word Immediately in the title. The subhead to Section III refers to a “spiritual light that has been… immediately let into the mind by God.” Hence sensation cannot be the means. This he supports by a number of Scripture verses: 1 John 3:6, negatively, “Whoever sins has neither seen him nor known him.” John 17:3, not obviously pertinent, “And this is eternal life, that they may know you.” More clearly pertinent is his comment, “This light and knowledge is always spoken of as immediately given of God.” Of Matthew 11:25-27 he writes, “This effect is ascribed exclusively to the arbitrary operation and gift of God.” I have italicized immediately and exclusively because apologetes, confronted with the Scriptures, make a last ditch stand and argue that God uses other and necessary means. Edwards continues with 2 Corinthians 4:6, “For it is the God who commanded light to shine out of darkness who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God….” Again he comments that this light is “immediately from God… the immediate effect of his power and will.” There is also Psalm 119:18, “Open my eyes, that I may see wondrous things from your law.”

In paragraph 2 of his Secondly (pg. 18) he repeats: “It is rational to suppose that this knowledge should be given immediately by God, and not be obtained by natural means.” He then continues to stress its immediacy, using the word several times on this one page, and negatively adding, “it should not be left in the power of second causes…. Immediately by himself, as a thing too great for second causes to be concerned in…. immediately by himself, according to his own sovereign will” (18, 19).

The empiricists, as hinted at above, will no doubt remark that the reference to beholding wondrous things in the Law shows that sensations of black on white are necessary second causes, so that our knowledge of divine truth is obtained by “natural means.” For the moment, and not to repeat or anticipate all the arguments against empiricism, it will suffice to say that Jonathan Edwards denies it. The empiricists may find some solace in Abraham Kuyper and Guido de Brès, who had some idea of divine illumination, but who did not go so far as Malebranche and Edwards. However, I neither assert that Edwards totally agrees with Malebranche, nor that the latter is infallible. But both men show that Christianity cannot be empirical.

Clark holds that Edwards provides Scriptural support for the doctrine of divine illumination. He uses the word "immediate" (or some variation thereof) no fewer than 10 times - himself drawing attention to its use - to describe how we obtain "knowledge of divine truth." Edwards even explicitly denies that this knowledge is obtained by second causes. 

If someone will dispute that Clark knowingly came to accept that God is the immediate cause of our knowledge, he must address this quote. Doug did not do so in his original post - I gather, however, that he does not do so because he only wished to show that Clark is not a thoroughgoing occasionalist. Admittedly, this remains to be shown. At this point, though, one may at least acknowledge that Mr. Flood is well within his rights to restrict the scope of his interest to Clark's acceptance of an "all-but-occasionalist epistemology."

I cited this particular quote from Lord God of Truth for another reason, though. I think it serves as helpful background to another line of evidence that Clark changed his mind over time. Specifically, I think Clark's article on "Classical Apologetics" - consisting of a review of a book authored by R. C. Spoul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley - suggests a deepened sympathy towards the occasionalist metaphysic of Jonathan Edwards. Clark references this article in a letter to Robbins in January of 1985, a mere three months prior to his death: "what happened to my criticisms of Classical Apologetics? I worked hard to have a review made public quickly." In the article, Clark says:

On page 82 they bluntly say, “Causal thinking is an integral part of all scientific examination.” This statement must be branded as utterly false. It is such a blunder that although one instance would refute it, a number of instances may be necessary to convince a reluctant reader. And the point is so fundamental to the authors’ positions that no loopholes should be left.

In 1893, almost a century ago, C. S. Peirce wrote, “We still talk about ‘cause and effect,’ although in a mechanical world, the opinion this phrase was meant to express has been shelved long ago” (Philosophical Works, 17).¹

In addition to Peirce, Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical World, chapter XIV, tries to salvage causation at the expense of causality. He calls the law of gravitation “a mere truism” (299). Exploring the Universe, contributions of numerous authors, edited by Louise B. Young, McGraw Hill, 1963, on page 200 has this to say: “Before the quantum theory appeared, the principle of the uniformity of nature... had been accepted as a universal and indisputable fact of science. As soon as the atomicity of radiation became established, this principle had to be discarded.”

Finally, to clinch the matter, two more quotations will be made: one by the three authors, the other by one of the best known and most highly regarded scientists of the very recent past. The authors assert, “There is no science ...which is not heavily involved with causal thinking.” This statement is false. The evidence is conclusive.

Erwin Schroedinger, of world renown, asserts that no scientific model can ever be true, one reason for which is the impossibility of identifying a particle as the same one the scientist saw or thought he saw a tenth of a second before. “We must not admit the possibility of continuous observation.”²

Now comes a most startling bit of information: Jonathan Edwards anticipated Schroedinger and completed the explanation, as Schroedinger could not! Our three authors list Jonathan Edwards as one who exemplifies their notion of classical apologetics. Since today few people know much about Edwards, it is not too surprising that these three authors do not mention the matter. They are not deliberately trying to deceive the public by omission: They simply do not know what Edwards said on this point. The section is in the treatise On Original Sin (Baines edition, 1807, Vol. II, 350ff). At the beginning of these several pages, one too quickly concludes that Edwards and the authors agree. But very soon, speaking first of the moon, Edwards says, “In point of time [italics his] what is past [italics his] entirely [italics mine] ceases when present [his] existence begins.... The present existence ... of ... any other created substance cannot be an effect of its past existence.... Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the immediate [Edwards’ own italics] agency, will, and power of God.” This view is commonly called continuous creation, though discontinuous creation would be a better name because there are temporal gaps between what sensation takes as different positions of the same thing.

Admittedly Edwards, because of the originality of his idea, continued with phraseology to which our three authors would not object. But yet he speaks of “God’s ...causing [a thing’s] existence in each successive moment [as] altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing [italics his] .... God produces as much from nothing [italics his] as if there had been nothing before” (355). They should study his footnote on the moon and images in a mirror.

There is a better, more easily understood, and almost universally known example in this twentieth century. At the movies we see, we really see a man or an airplane in motion. But there is nothing on the screen that moves. The man appears at a given spot; then he vanishes from the screen so quickly that the audience is unaware of it; then another picture flashes on at nearly the same spot. This produces the illusion of motion. But nothing moves, and second picture is not the same thing as the first. In the case of motion at least, sensation is always mistaken. Indeed, even when the gentleman on the screen seems to stand still, it is not the same gentleman who was on the screen a moment before.

Our three authors acknowledge that sensation is at least sometimes mistaken, but they put their faith-they are fideists-in a “basic or rudimentary reliability of sense perception” (87). But they certainly do not give the reader any criterion by which to distinguish a truthful sensation from a false one. And of course they steer clear of the motion picture illustration that all sensations are deceptive, or that they are discontinuous, or that Schroedinger is a good scientist.

Quai cum ita sint, they arbitrarily choose which sensations they prefer to believe and discard the others.

As any drowsy reader can guess, the critic believes that these arguments have completely demolished the theory under scrutiny.

Among his arguments against Sproul et al., Clark numbers Edwards' theory of [dis]continuous creation as one on which account he (the critic) believes their thesis that “Causal thinking is an integral part of all scientific examination” is "demolished." 

What is Edwards' theory of [dis]continuous creation? The "existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the immediate agency, will, and power of God.” "God’s ...causing [a thing’s] existence in each successive moment [as] altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing [italics his] .... God produces as much from nothing [italics his] as if there had been nothing before”." I am not the only one to connect these ideas to occasionalism. David Vander Laan, professor of philosophy at Westmont College, cites the same passage Clark does and then notes (link):

It is easy to produce arguments for continuous creation theory that also support occasionalism. In particular, the arguments that are driven by the inability of created things to affect the future (such as those by Descartes and Edwards, above, and similar arguments by Malebranche) appear to have occasionalism as a corollary. If no cause can have an effect at a time at which it does not exist, then created things do not bring about their future states, nor those of other created things. The changes in the world can only be caused by God. Malebranche and Edwards would have happily accepted this result...

This is quite interesting, for Doug says that a particular statement in Lord God of Truth entails a denial of [dis]continuous creationism. Doug calls attention to the last line in the below statement Clark makes on page 27 in Lord God of Truth:

We now concur with the Islamic anti-aristotelian Al Gazali: God and God alone is the cause, for only God can guarantee the occurrence of Y, and indeed of X as well. Even the Westminster Divines timidly agree, for after asserting that God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass, and that ‘no purpose of yours can be withheld from you’ (Job 42:2), they add, ‘Although … all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes…’ What they called second causes, Malebranche had called occasions. But an occasion is neither a fiat lux nor a differential equation.

As I have argued elsewhere, the tenor of the above reads (to me) as a straightforward affirmation of occasionalism. I don't necessarily have a different opinion that Doug on what Clark means by his reference to "a differential equation." 

On the other hand, Doug says, "“Neither a fiat lux” is opposition to “continuous creationism.”" This might be true if "neither a fiat lux" were being predicated of divine causation. But Clark is rather saying that occasional or second causes are not instances of a "fiat lux." To deny that these "causes" have power to create does not speak to whether God [dis]continuously creates. 

In fact, as we will see below, Clark was aware that Malebranche himself denies that occasional causes are efficient causes precisely because Malebranche thinks that "God cannot give us a causal power anymore than he can give us the power to create...." In short, I think Clark's reference to a "fiat lux" is intended to be an exposition or defense of Malebranche's views, not a hedging of them.

Did Clark himself ever explicitly connect continuous creation to occasionalism? Actually, yes he did. A few months ago, I had the opportunity to view a lot of unpublished Clark material in the archives of the J. Oliver Buswell library at Covenant Seminary in St. Louis (link). Included in this material are 28 pages of unpublished notes he wrote on the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (link; cf. Box 312, folder 92, 94, or 95 - although I believe the boxes are being renumbered).

Malebranche is a paradigm proponent of occasionalism, once writing:

...it is necessary clearly to establish that... there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes... (link)

While I don't intend to reproduce 28 pages of notes here, I will share some of Clark wrote that relates to occasionalism. Anything underlined is Clark's own doing. The notes are undated, and there are two sets of them. The first set of notes covers some of Clark's reading of Malebranche's The Search for Truth (in French, Recherche de la Verite):

Malebranche

Libre VI Partie II

Chapitre III

The old philosophers supposed that there was an immaterial entity – substantial form – in a material thing, and that this entity was the cause of the observed effects, This is like putting little gods in things. If such entities could really cause us pain and pleasure – we ought to fear and love them. The cause is always superior to the object which it affects, and inferior objects are the servants of superior. St. Augustine asserted that bodies can not act on the soul. 

In the Scripture, the chief reason given to the Israelites for serving God, is that He can reward and punish them. They were forbidden to worship pagan gods because these could not affect them. God is the true cause of all. cf. Amos 3:6 Will evil befall a city, and Jehovah hath not done it? Natural things are not the true causes. Soli Deo gloria. To believe that things are true causes is purely pagan and polytheistic: some honor to an onion, more to the lightning. 

There is but one God and one Cause. Natural causes are merely occasionally causes = no body, great or small, has the power to move itself. Finite spirit can not move bodies because we see no necessary connection between finite wills and any motion whatsoever. Indeed we see that there can be no connection between motion and consciousness. Only omnipotent God can cause motion. One ball cannot move another because it cannot move itself – it has no power and hence cannot communicate it – Human spirits can know nothing without God’s light. They can sense nothing except God affect them. They can will nothing without God’s moving them to the good in general. The can direct this indeterminate love to something particular. But since this involves the possibility of sin, it is hardly a power, for God has no such “power.” 

But at any rate, volition can not cause body to move. Our arm moves when we will [but not because of.] the will is just the occasional cause. The will can not be the cause because we do not know how the nerves etc. act. A man can know how to overthrow a tower and yet not be able: but in this case we do not even know how. 

Again. Between cause and effect there is a necessary connection. But the only necessary antecedent of a motion is the will of God. God alone is the true cause. God cannot give us a causal power anymore than he can give us the power to create and annihilate. 

Strictly, to give the power of causation to man means merely that God wills a body to move when the man wills to move, say, his arm. The human will is the occasion. 

Even if God desires to the contrary of what someone [a devil] wishes, still the devil’s will is the natural or occasional cause – on when the devil wishes to move the body to the left, God moves it to the right – in the occasion of the devil’s volition. 

If anyone assert that an occasional cause is a real cause – then other occasions are real causes: God will to create something at a given time. Then the time is a real cause. 

The little pagan gods and the little philosophic causes are just the means of the devil to destroy souls. By them the Devil diverts our minds from God. Descartes is the liberator of Christianity to the pagan shackles of Aristotle. But original sin inclines men away from God.

The other set of notes on Malebranche is taken from Morris Ginsberg's translation of Malebranche's Dialogue on Metaphysics (which can be read here - in particular, compare Clark's notes to pages 21ff., 51ff.). I have included a [?] next to four words I have found difficult to interpret, although none of them affect the sense of the contexts in which they appear:

Ginsberg’s Introduction to Malebranche

Epistemology

A. The Vision of all things in God.

Malebranche starts with the Cartesian principle[?] that soul and body are substances whose positive attributes are mutually exclusive, extension vs. thought. Introspection testifies to feeling, will, doubting, which are mode of the soul. As matter can receive figure and can move so the soul can receive ideas and can will. Hence, understanding and will are not separate entities and as matter does not move itself, so neither has mind any power of its own. God is the cause both of motion and of will.

The mind is essentially passive; will is a secondary affair, not included in the mind’s essence[?] and our knowledge of will is so obscure that we can not deduce its properties. The real nature of mind consists in receiving ideas.

Three modes of knowing. 1) pure understanding because we know spiritual things, universals, common notions, the idea of perfection and infinitude 2) Imagination because we know material things by means of traces in the brain when the material things are absent. 3) Sensation, because we know things through stimulation of sense organs. [Despite this unity of sense and thought, there is a tendency to contrast them sharply] Judgment is the will’s acquiescence in what the understanding presents to it, hence the source of error is the will.

Descartes had not fully worked out the results of his distinction between mind and body. For him perception requires 1) a power in bodies to act on the mind and cause it to produce ideas [or to call for the ideas potentially in the mind] and 2) a power in the mind to give rise to the ideas.

To wit: impressions = corporeal species, and are not themselves known to the mind but they are the conditions or occasions of knowledge. These impressions call up in the soul ideas corresponding to the thing. Many passages in Descartes speak of the action of bodies on the sense organs as merely an occasion for the actuality of innate ideas.

Malebranche denies the two propositions above, viz. 1) bodies have a power to act on the mind and produce ideas 2) there is a power in the mind to give rise to ideas.

Belief in these 2 propositions is due to blind reliance on the senses. Motion and mind are disparate and can not act on each other. All activity is divine, God is the real cause. Finite causes are occasions. So too the real cause of our ideas can not be in us. Man cannot be a light to himself...

C. Occasionalism

On this point Malebranche develops hints left by Descartes. For particular things depend on the will of God, and exist because of a continuous creation [Principles Pt I xxi] This makes time a discrete quantity, and requires a continuous cause. Further, matter is entirely passive, its motion comes from without. We must distinguish between motion and force. The cause of motion is God. But God works through particular causes “by which it happens that each of the parts of matter acquires the motion that is had not before.” This leads to the view that God is the only force and things are instrumental.

There is another and more important line of argument which developed through[?] Occasionalism. Descartes noted the difficulty of having the mind move the body. How can one affect the other? This became an outstanding problem[?] for Cartesians.

De la Forge who influenced Malebranche taught: -

1) In the sphere of extension all real efficacy and power reside in God. Corporeal things are only secondary or occasional causes which determine the activity of the first cause in accordance with certain laws.

2) The apparent action of mind on matter and vice versa is explained by an intervention of God. It does not imply interaction but merely a parallelism due to the will of God. Leibniz continued with prearranged harmony.

3) Voluntary ideas and actions are cause by the soul itself, because we must maintain the freedom of man.

Malebranche argues the idea of force in finite things is unintelligible. Because God is omnipotent, his volition is necessarily followed by the effect; but there is no contradiction in the action of a finite thing not being followed by an effect. Causation is really equivalent to creation. Regularity of success does not prove that things have a power of causation. To attribute force to body is anthropomorphism of the worst variety. It would make things sensitive. We can not even assume a necessary connection between our volitions and our motions.

A thing's motion from one place to another implies that it is first created in this and then in that, and then in that etc. Motion is the existence of a body in several places at different times, and this requires continuous creation.

Neither can soul and body affect each other. There is no real connection. God simply produces a correspondence between their modifications.

Later interpreters profess to see here an analogy with Hume. Malebranche and Hume are said to agree on 1) the notion of causality rests on our expression of sequence and 2) there is no necessary connection between cause and effect [or one event on the next.] They further claim that despite these agreements, Malebranche escaped Hume’s skepticism because he made God the ground of change. His use of force with respect to God is supposed to be only a protest against the occult forces ascribed to things.

We object because 1) this treats the influence of Descartes, de la Forge and others as of no importance 2) It ruins any possible sense there may be to Malebranche’s philosophy because if God is the ground of change, and not the force of chance, change should be shown to follow from its ground by pure logic. But in truth, Malebranche has enough trouble with the notion of force and creation, let alone a logical ground. If God is the ground of change, then the momenta of change are parts of the unfolding God. Then how can God be immutable as Malebranche says? 3) Malebranche does not deny a necessary connection between cause and effect. He insist that there is only one cause as opposed to the many causes of the physicists. Hume says there is no cause. 4) This view takes too lightly Malebranche’s religious expressions, especially relating to creation. These expressions were not mere concessions to the religious opinion of his time. They represent Malebranche’s own thought. Malebranche did not oppose revelation and reason. They were harmonious.

We admit that in Malebranche there are many hints of later systems, and many tendencies Malebranche himself resisted. But we note: he resisted them.

Malebranche’s trouble with freedom. The impulse towards the Good in general is impression on us by God but man is master of his will in regard to particular goods. But any real freedom from God is inconsistent with his system.

It is unfortunate that the notes are undated, although I would be shocked if Clark wrote them after Lord God of Truth (or "Classical Apologetics," for that matter). In fact, it looks as though some of these notes informed Clark's writing in Lord God of Truth. 

As is typical with Clark, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether Clark agrees with the views of whatever person he is summarizing. I do detect notes of sympathy for Malebranche just as for Edwards, though: "We admit that in Malebranche there are many hints of later systems, and many tendencies Malebranche himself resisted. But we note: he resisted them." 

If nothing else, these notes at least serve as a deterrent from underestimating Clark's awareness regarding the implications of occasionalism: "God alone is the true cause. God cannot give us a causal power anymore than he can give us the power to create and annihilate... particular things depend on the will of God, and exist because of a continuous creation... Causation is really equivalent to creation." Fiat lux indeed! 

These notes also show that Clark was not only aware that Malebranche himself used the language of "secondary causes" but also Malebranche meant by the phrase (link):

For if religion teaches us that there is only one true God, this philosophy shows us that there is only one true cause. If religion teaches us that all the divinities of paganism are merely stones and metals without life or motion, this philosophy also reveals to us that all secondary causes, or all the divinities of philosophy, are merely matter and inefficacious wills. Finally, if religion teaches us that we must not genuflect before false gods, this philosophy also teaches us that our imaginations and minds must not bow before the imaginary greatness and power of causes that are not causes at all; that we must neither love nor fear them; that we must not be concerned with them; that we must think only of God alone, see God in all things, fear and love God in all things. (Book VI, Part 2, Chapter 3)

Thus, when Doug concludes that, for Clark, "God is the only efficient cause," is this not just an admission that at some point in his life, Clark espoused occasionalism?

What is occasionalism?

Not quite. There is one final consideration which I think may help explain why Doug initially could have been motivated to reject this conclusion. Let's return to the SEP definition of occasionalism for a closer look:

For the occasionalist, divine causal activity is the only type of genuine causality. Creatures provide at most an occasion for God’s activity, which is uniquely direct and immediate in bringing about all effects in nature.

The question is this: must one accept that God is the immediate cause of all things to be an occasionalist? If so, it is possible Clark changed his mind on this too. However, on the SEP definition of occasionalism, I wonder if even Malebranche would qualify as an occasionalist. For example, Malebranche writes:

Only those sensations of thoughts in which the body has some part are the immediate cause of the passions, because only the disturbance of the brain’s fibers excites any specific disturbance in the animal spirits. Thus sensations are the only sensible proofs of our dependence on certain things for which they excite our love. (link)

The above reads as though something other than God's activity can function as an "immediate cause." If one's definition of occasionalism disqualifies Malebranche as an occasionalist, we must ask: might there be a problem with the SEP definition of occasionalism? 

Exploring this could take us through the problem of the criterion (link) and a discussion of whether a definition of occasionalism should be constructed 1) before applying the moniker to various philosophers (methodist) or 2) on the basis of what paradigm cases like Malebranche have to say about causation (particularist). In this context, that would lead to a rabbit trail which does not strike me as especially helpful.

Instead, I have emailed the author of the SEP article on occasionalism - Sukjae Lee, professor of philosophy at Seoul National University - requesting some clarification. If he has anything to offer, I will update this post. For now, I will close with how I think one might harmonize Malebranche's statement with the SEP definition of occasionalism:

1. "Malebranche was not an occasionalist": This answer strains historical credibility. I will pass over further comment on this.

2. "One can be an occasionalist without believing that God is the immediate cause of all things": In this case, I think Doug's cause for hesitancy would be removed. Clark espoused occasionalism late in life; that is, God is the sole, efficient cause, regardless of whether he is the sole, immediate cause.

3. "An occasionalist must believe that God is the immediate cause of all things, but Malebranche was an occasionalist": This is the most interesting potential response. How could it be true? 

As mentioned in earlier quotes, Malebranche uses the language of occasional, natural, or secondary causes. Yet he also denies that these are "true" causes. That is, these so-called "causes" do not have "force," "power," or "efficacy to produce anything" (link): 

There are many reasons preventing me from attributing to secondary or natural causes a force, a power, an efficacy to produce anything. But the principal one is that this opinion does not even seem conceivable to me. Whatever effort I make in order to understand it, I cannot find in me any idea representing to me what might be the force or the power they attribute to creatures. And I do not even think it a temerarious judgment to assert that those who maintain that creatures have force and power in themselves advance what they do not clearly conceive. For in short, if philosophers clearly conceived that secondary causes have a true force to act and produce things like them, then being a man as much as they and participating like them in sovereign Reason, I should clearly be able to discover the idea that represents this force to them. But whatever effort of mind I make, I can find force, efficacy, or power only in the will of the infinitely perfect Being.

Analogously, perhaps Malebranche might say that his reference to creatures as "immediate causes" does not imply that he thinks they "true" causes. A "true" cause is only one which is an efficient cause, and as the only efficient cause, there must be a sense in which divine causation is immediate. For example, if, as Clark says, "only God can guarantee the occurrence of Y, and indeed of X as well," then no one mediates God's "guarantee." 

In short, this answer would posit that God is the sole, "immediate" cause in a sense in which creatures cannot be. I would find this resolution credible. As a bonus, it would seem to underscore yet settle Doug's concerns in his initial post - Doug can speak more to that or to anything else I've written in this post, if he so wishes. Here too, the conclusion would be that Clark espoused occasionalism late in life.

Addenda: Miscellaneous Malabranche, Baird vs. Edwards, and Zeno's Paradoxes

Having discharged the burden of the post, I had a few things I thought deserved some comment but were better saved for this extended postscript. In the process of writing the above, I came across statements by or pertaining to Malebranche and Edwards worth critiquing for the sake of those who still struggle with whether or not occasionalism is true (in which case I recommend reading the links in the second paragraph at the beginning of this post).

One common question arises against Christian occasionalists: is not sin an exercise of power of which man must be regarded as the efficient cause? Malebranche admits, “If the ability to sin is a power, it will be a power that the Almighty does not have.” Just as quickly, however, he seems to deny that the ability to sin implies the exercise of a power:

Sixth Proof 

The main proof adduced by philosophers for the efficacy of secondary causes is drawn from man s will and his freedom. Man wills, he determines himself by himself; and to will and determine oneself is to act. Certainly, it is man who commits sin. God is not the author of sin any more than He is of concupiscence and error. Therefore, man acts through his own efficacy. 

Reply 

I have sufficiently explained in several passages of Search after Truth what the will is, and what man’s freedom is, especially in the first chapter of the first book, and in the first Elucidation on the same chapter; it is useless to repeat it. I grant that man wills and that he determines himself; but this is because God makes him will by constantly leading him toward the good. He determines himself; but this is because God gives him all the ideas and sensations that are the motives by which he determines himself. I also grant that man alone commits sin. But I deny that in this He does something; for sin, error, and even concupiscence are nothing. They are only lacks of something. I have sufficiently explained myself on this topic in the first Elucidation.

Man wills, but his volitions are impotent in themselves; they produce nothing; they do not preclude God’s doing everything, because God himself produces our volitions in us through the impression He gives us toward the good in general, for without this impression we would be able to will nothing. From himself man has only error and sin, which are nothing.

I do not find Malebranche's reasoning convincing. He appears to be equivocating on what it means to "do something." Whether or not sin is "nothing" - here, Malebranche draws on Augustine's privation theory of evil - is a red herring. The question is not what sin is; the question is whether "man acts through his own efficacy" when he sins. That is, does Malebranche mean to deny that when man sins, he acts?

If so, then man's sinning is not volitional, and Malebranche's insistence that "man wills" is empty verbiage. This cannot be what Malebranche thinks, as will be shown in a moment.

If not, the question remains whether man's act of sin is one of which God is the efficient cause. It appears Malebranche balks at this, for in the paragraph immediately following the one above, he concedes:

There is quite a difference between our minds and the bodies that surround us. Our mind wills, it acts, it determines itself; I have no doubts about this whatsoever. We are convinced of it by the inner sensation we have of ourselves. If we had no freedom, there would be no punishment or future reward, for without freedom there are no good or bad actions. As a result, religion would be an illusion and a phantom. But what we clearly do not see, what seems incomprehensible, and what we deny when we deny the efficacy of secondary causes is that bodies have the power to act.

This restriction of the scope of secondary causes looks like quite a reversal of Malebranche's earlier assertion that "all secondary causes, or all the divinities of philosophy, are merely matter and inefficacious wills"! I don't know how else to explain this other than to think Malebranche succumbed to the weight of this criticism.

What, then, is the Reformed alternative to Malebranche? Samuel Baird provides an excellent answer, one which deftly pivots to consideration of Jonathan Edwards. On page 101 in his book, The Elohim Revealed, Baird writes on "The true doctrine of second causes":

A substance is an existence which is invested with certain properties or forces. In other words, it is an efficient cause, of which the phenomena which attach to it are the effects. The word, substance, designates the being or existence of which those forces are predicated; and, cause, the forces in exercise, — the substance in action. The possession of forces is essential to the very existence of a substance; and they are thus essential, not as sustaining an outside relation to it; but they reside in the very substance itself, as elements without which its existence is not conceivable. The forces thus residing in substances are derived originally from God, sustained each instant by his power, and controlled by his sovereign will. Yet have they a real existence, which is distinct from the omnipotence of God; and an activity which is their own, and not the agency of the Creator.

He proceeds to contrast this to the view of Jonathan Edwards (pg. 103):

The theory of Edwards, on the subject of second causes, constitutes a most important and controlling feature in his system. He denies the creatures to be endowed with any properly causative forces; and attributes all effects to God, as the immediate and only cause. This theory is fully stated in his treatise on Original Sin. 

Indeed, Baird connects this to Edwards' position on continuous creationism (pg. 105), referencing the same moon illustration Clark alludes to his his article on "Classical Apologetics":

The same view, in regard to creature causation, is essentially involved in Edwards' doctrine of identity. On this subject, he undertakes to show that no real oneness is possible in things which exist in different time and place. The moon, for example, which now is, has no identity with that which existed one moment since, or with that which shall be the next instant. Each is a new and distinct creation, and identical in no sense, except that God has in sovereignty determined them to be accounted one.

Now for Baird's critique of Edwards, which is quite devastating. I am compelled to quote in its entirety (pg. 110ff.):

The scheme has an air of piety, by which Edwards was betrayed. It seems to honour God, by making things dependent on him in the most absolute and intimate manner. It, in reality, dishonours him, denying his power, his truth and his holiness. It limits his power, by assuming that he cannot create a substance endowed with true perpetuated forces. So that the doctrine is irreconcilable with the real existence of creation at all. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." What is meant by this statement? It attests the creation, "in the beginning," of the heavens and earth which now are. It asserts the production of substances, of given form, and other specific attributes. These attributes are forces, which we intuitively attribute to the substances. Such is the constitution of our minds, such the impress stamped upon them by the Creator, that we universally, necessarily and immediately refer the effects which attach to a substance, to powers which we attribute to it, as of its essence, constituting it the efficient cause of those effects. But, when we attempt to describe the heavens and earth, and in so doing enumerate these powers or properties, we are told in respect to each, "It is nothing but a continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution that he has been pleased to establish." By the time the description and the application of this principle is completed, the creation has vanished; — there remains nothing but the power of God, patting into operation — "I speak as a man" — a series of phantasmagoria, for the deception of the observer! Nay, the principle follows us still further. If its evidence is adequate to set aside all our intuitive apprehensions, so as even to overthrow the testimony of consciousness to our real existence and identity, through the successive moments of life, there is no reason that can be assigned, why we should rely on the witness of that same consciousness, to the reality of our present existence. If all effects be referred to God, as sole and immediate cause, so must the self-consciousness which we realize; and, before we are aware, the conscious soul is robbed of existence, the universe is blotted out, and nothing remains, after the juggle has wrought, but God and the phenomena of his existence. His word testifies that he has formed a creation. It declares that he has given to his creatures powers to be exercised by them, — to his intelligent creatures, powers, for the right use of which they must account to him. We are assured, that, having finished the creation, God rests from all his works. The indelible conviction of the potentiality of our own nature, and that of all the creatures, is enstamped by the hand of God on the soul of man. Upon the right or wrong use of our powers, by us and all moral agents, are suspended the destinies of eternity. The alternative is the rejection of all this evidence, or of the theory in question.

In fact, here is that form of pantheism which makes God the only real existence; of which, the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon. We know nothing of substances, except their properties or powers. No other knowledge is conceivable; and if these have God as their immediate cause, there is nothing left, of which to predicate existence or to conceive it possible.

This doctrine, again, is utterly irreconcilable with the holiness of God. If it be so that God is ''the only cause of natural effects," there can be no author of sin but he. He has declared that it is that abominable thing which he hates. He has assured us that he is angry with the wicked every day; and that, although he has no pleasure in their death, but that they turn to him and live, — although he afflicts not willingly, — yet will He visit the workers of iniquity with a fearful destruction: — ''snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest, — this shall be the portion of their cup." He has shown his abhorrence of sin, by the fearful tide of indignation which was poured on the head of his own beloved Son, when our sins were laid upon him. Yet the doctrine in question involves, immediately and unavoidably, the conclusion, that so far from sin being hateful to God, he is the efficient and only cause of every sin of all creatures. Edwards avoids this conclusion, by recourse to the distinction between a privative and a positive cause. Of this we shall take notice in another place.

Edwards' doctrine of identity stands or falls with his theory of causation. He supposes us shut up to the alternative, that the cause of the continued existence of a substance is, either the antecedent existence of the same substance, or else, the immediate agency, will and power of God. But the very idea of an effect is, something distinct from the cause and abiding after it. It is something effected, something done, and therefore remaining;— and the idea of creative causation, is that of the production of substance, — of something that exists, and has forces; and not of mere transient shadows. Such is the scriptural idea of creation: — ''He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." — Psalm xxxiii. 9. The reason, therefore, of the present existence of any creature, is not its antecedent existence; nor is it the immediate creative agency of God. But it now is, because God at the first made it, — gave it substance, and so determined its continuance; and, having thus created it, now sustains it, with that providential care in which he "upholdeth all things by the word of his power," — thus continuing to the creatures the same being and identity which he bestowed at the first. Nor does identity consist in an arbitrary relation, determined by a decretive act of God's sovereignty, at variance with the creative system, and contrary to the essential reality. But it depends upon the continuous evolution of unchanging forces; implanted once by creative power, in conformity with sovereign wisdom. It would seem, that the Scriptures so unequivocally attribute efficient causation to the creatures, that no one who has a reverence for the sacred volume could for a moment doubt it. Thus, in the narrative of the creation, what can be more explicit than the language employed? Gen. i. 11, 12. — ''And God said. Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth : and it was so. And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good." In what plainer terms could it be stated, that God bestowed upon the earth a power of fertility, which was an efficient cause of the vegetation that followed? And so, of the power of fructification, attributed to the grass, herbs and trees, after their kind. If it should be said, that the language is merely expressive of the appearance of things, let it be considered, that such expressions would convey no meaning whatever to us, but for that ineffaceable intuition of cause and effect which God has implanted in our minds; — that we are, in this place, addressed as being endowed with that intuition; — and that the language makes direct appeal to this principle, and, under its guidance, can be understood in but one way. We need not dwell on the other statements of this chapter; each one of which is subject to similar remark. A single example will be sufficient: — "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them. Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion." Is this language reconcileable with the idea that man is a mere puppet, assuming postures, and going mechanically through a set of fated actions, at the mere nod of his Creator, operating on him from behind the screen? Was there no real power conveyed, when he was told to subdue the earth, and have dominion? Is not a generative causation attributed to him, when the creative Word says, "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth''? By this language addressed to the first pair, in the instant of their creation, was indicated and confirmed a fruitful energy of nature, — a propagative force. And by virtue of it, flowing from them through the generations of the race, every human being in turn receives existence. "God rested the seventh day from all his works… The works were finished from the foundation of the world." — Heb. iv. 3, 4. How is it consistent with this, to suppose the existence of each plant, animal and man, now in turn to call into requisition the same creative power which originated the first? 

That was a rather long quote, and in it, one may miss Baird's allusion to Edwards' privation theory of evil as an answer to Baird's charge that Edwards makes God out to be the author of evil. Baird pursues this line of reasoning later in his book (pg. 533):

The doctrine of Edwards, on the subject of second causes, involves him in inextricable difficulties on the whole subject of the origin, propagation and actings of sin. If, as he teaches, God be the immediate and only cause of all effects, then, evidently, he is the sole cause of sin, in every aspect of it. This conclusion, so fatal to his whole theory, Edwards attempts to evade by appeal to the distinction between a privative and a positive cause.

The above should sound familiar: it is basically the same answer Malebranche gives in his attempt to answer the same, basic question! Baird's responds to Edwards just as I responded to Malebranche (pg. 534):

Let it be observed that the question is not, whether corruption or sin is a physical thing, — a substance, material or immaterial, inhering in the soul, — but, what is the cause of sin? The view developed, by our author, on the whole subject is entirely inadequate and erroneous...

In fact, Baird goes further (pg. 535):

The wicked are lovers; but "lovers of their own selves," "lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God," lovers of sin, and therefore hateful to God. Corruption and sin, then, do not proceed from a privative cause; but from the movement of the moral powers in wrong directions. Here, evidently, we must recognise a positive force which bears the moral powers of man into devious paths, and determines him to love sin and hate holiness and the Holy One. And shall we admit that the blessed God is, in any form, the author of this depravity? Shall we for one moment tolerate the suggestion that, privative or positive, he is its cause? "Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." — James i. 13, 14…

In fact, the very language used by Edwards to state his doctrine, is a contradiction in terms. A cause is a force of some kind, by the positive action of which the contemplated effect is produced. And, therefore, to talk of a privative cause, meaning thereby the absence of a positive force, is to describe that which is no cause, and from which no manner of effect can proceed.

I have little else to add by way of a critique of occasionalism. 

I would, however, like to clarify one or two further matters regarding continuous creationism or, as Clark terms Edwards' position, discontinuous creationism. One clarification is that one who holds this view is not committed to divine temporality - in disagreement with and due apologies to the late, great Steve Hays, who makes this assertion in point 3 of this post (a post which is well worth reading). On pg. xxv in the introduction to Malebranche's Dialogue on Metaphysics translation edited by Jolley and Scott, we read:

Although his occasionalist thesis is clear in outline, it raises two problems of interpretation. The first concerns the nature of God’s causal activity. Malebranche constantly emphasizes that God acts through general laws, not through particular volitions, and even his otherwise hostile critic Arnauld cited this fact in his defense against Leibniz’s strictures. Some scholars, however, have argued that all Malebranche means by this claim is that the divine plans for the universe are regular; aside from the miracles acknowledged by the Christian faith, God does not make exceptions to the laws that he has ordained. But, according to this view, Malebranche does not mean to deny that in addition to willing physical laws, for instance, God must will that bodies behave in accordance with the laws that he has laid down; in this sense, then, God acts through particular volitions. Such a view does not entail that divine volitions themselves occur in time - a claim that would be inconsistent with God’s atemporal manner of existence; but it does imply that God (timelessly) wills particular events in time, and not just general laws. One argument for this interpretation relies on a doctrine on which, as we have seen, Malebranche lays great stress in the Dialogues: God sustains the universe by continuously creating it. (link)

In a recent post, I discussed eternal justification in the comments section. I noted:

God makes many declarations contingent on the occurrence of temporal events (e.g. 2 Kings 22:18-19). God declared His covenant to Israel on Mount Sinai. These declarations were not eternal; rather, they are declarations made as a result of God's eternal decree. They were made in temporally conditional settings. Yes, those settings were decreed by God, but that no more makes the declarations themselves eternal any more than it makes me (whose existence was also decreed by God) eternal.

Justification is a declaration of God that I am righteous in His sight, and this declaration is conditioned on temporal events; viz. the divine gift of regeneration unto faith. This declaration does not make God Himself temporal. The declaration is the execution in time of a timeless decree by a timeless God. 

Analogously, a [dis]continuous creationist could posit that God timelessly creates. Obviously, I am not advocating for [dis]continuous creationism, only attempting to fairly represent what is possible for those who do (e.g. Malebranche, Edwards, and, I think, late Clark).

On this subject, Clark is not the first to use motion pictures as illustrative of discontinuous causation. In 1911, Henri Bergson wrote "The Cinematographic View of Becoming." As Clark was aware of Bergson (link), I would believe it if Clark learned of the metaphor from him. For Bergson's article engages - of all things! - Zeno's paradoxes. 

Clark, of course, celebrated Zeno's paradoxes, often recounting them to seriously challenge people to consider the possibility that "motion is just nonsense" (link). He would have been delighted to read (and perhaps he did read) some contemporary philosophers admit that the paradoxes cannot be answered a priori. For example, in Wesley Salmon's "A Contemporary Look at Zeno's Paradoxes" (link), he says:

The first three paradoxes of motion purport to show a priori that motion, if it occurs, must be discontinuous. Indeed, Zeno's intention, as far as we can tell, seems to have been to prove a priori that motion cannot occur. With the exception of a very few metaphysicians of the stripe of F. H. Bradley, most philosophers would admit that the question of whether anything moves must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence, and that the available evidence seems overwhelmingly to support the affirmative answer. Given that motion is a fact of the physical world, it seems to me a further empirical question whether it is continuous or not. It may be a very difficult and highly theoretical question, but I do not think it can be answered a priori. Other philosophers have disagreed. Alfred North Whitehead believed that Zeno's paradoxes support the view that motion is atomistic in character, while Henri Bergson seemed to hold an a priori commitment to the continuity of motion.

Salmon also edited the fascinating book Zeno's Paradoxes, in which Bergson's aforementioned article can be found. Salmon describes Bergson's article (pg. 19):

Bergson, in contrast with James and Whitehead, admits that there is real continuity of becoming, but he takes the paradoxes of Zeno to prove that the intellect is incapable of understanding motion and change. In his celebrated "cinematographic" characterization of ordinary knowledge he maintains that the usual approach to a physical process consists in accumulating a series of static descriptions of its successive states, much as a motion picture consists of a large number of still pictures. By stringing these static representations together, Bergson argues, we can never come to grips with movement and change themselves. 

Parenthetically, from what I understand, Mr. Flood would get a kick out of Whitehead being mentioned a few times here. Anyways, I'll let Bergson himself pick up where Salmon leaves off (pg. 60):

This is what the cinematograph does. With photographs, each of which represents the regiment in a fixed attitude, it reconstitutes the mobility of the regiment marching. It is true that if we had to do with photographs alone, however much we might look at them, we should never see them animated: with immobility set beside immobility, even endlessly, we could never make movement. In order that the pictures may be animated, there must be movement somewhere. The movement does indeed exist here; it is in the apparatus. It is because the film of the cinematograph unrolls, bringing in turn the different photographs of the scene to continue each other, that each actor of the scene recovers his mobility; he strings all his successive attitudes on the invisible movement of the film. 

Earlier, I said that Clark showed sympathy to Edwards in his article on "Classical Apologetics," one of the last articles Clark probably ever wrote. From that article alone, I find it quite believable that Clark came to accept Edwards' [dis]continuous creationism as a corollary to Malebranche's occasionalism that he had also come to accept. 

Here is where I pull all the threads together: for late Clark, I theorize that his "apparatus" of movement in this allegedly cinematographic world is God, the sole, efficient cause of all things whose timeless decree to [dis]continuously create artfully solves Zeno's paradoxes in a way that, he would argue, empirical apologetes never could. Of course, the evidence in this addenda is circumstantial, but I am highly entertained by the possibilities, and I should not be surprised to learn that every bit of it is true. 

To those who may be interested in further reading on the subject of causation or occasionalism, I recommend here, here, here, and here.