Showing posts with label Natural Theology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Natural Theology. Show all posts

Friday, March 1, 2024

Sola Scriptura and "The Primacy of Revelation"

I was pleasantly surprised to hear James White use the word "Scripturalism" in his opening statement in a recent debate on sola scriptura with Trent Horn (link). He even seems to mean something pretty near to Clark's position: that Scripture is our ultimate epistemic authority - see minute mark 17:30-21:00. If more mainstream, Reformed apologists are willing to go this route, it would make more clear "the dividing line" (pardon the James White pun). [Side note: less pleasant was listening to White's final cross-examination answers from minute mark 1:42:00-1:46:20.]

A comment on my recent post on Eastern Orthodoxy noted a few, anecdotal examples of nominally Reformed Christian moving to Eastern Orthodoxy due to issues they took with the doctrine sola scriptura. That Protestants would be more aware of the centrality of sola scriptura (if not the nuances) does not surprise me. Most - if not all - heresies are traceable to a faulty understanding or doctrine of Scripture. After all, it is a rare person who would claim to understand a biblical doctrine as true, claim to accept it as true, and later reject said doctrine despite still regarding it as true. 

I noted in the above link and elsewhere that Eastern Orthodox apologists appear quite willing to borrow concepts or appropriate arguments made by Reformed theologians - far more so than Roman Catholics (at least in my experience). Even in the case of sola scriptura, you are unlikely to hear a Roman Catholic make a statement such as this, for example: 

Though I think much of Dr. Svendsen’s critique of Roman theology can often be polemical and bitter because he sees as a corrupt institution, he is undoubtedly right about his insistence on the primacy of revelation as this is probably the main point that also divides Orthodoxy from Rome... Svendsen’s approach to the question at hand and insistence that divine revelation be the paradigm is far more acceptable of how an Orthodox approach these questions.

This is not an isolated observation. I'm aware of other proponents of Eastern Orthodoxy who would likewise state acceptance of something along the lines of "a primacy of revelation." Similarly, Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to disapprove of "natural theology" (example). Is it any wonder that upon hearing these sorts of things, nominally Reformed or Protestant individuals - particularly, certain presuppositionalists who deny any and all epistemic or apologetic utility in natural theology - might find themselves more receptive to apologists whose positions are seemingly similar to their own? 

Again, what is often missing is nuance. For one thing, Michael Sudduth has argued fairly persuasively in The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology that some kind of natural theology was accepted among virtually all Reformed theologians until the 19th century (see most of chapter 1, here and here) . I hope to do a further post on this book in particular, as its distinctions and explanation of the functions of natural theology are helpful. In brief, though, I agree with finding a proper place for natural theology within one's worldview, as Gordon Clark also accepted (link). This may come as a surprise to some.

Another missing nuance in deconversion stories related to sola scriptura is that to state agreement on "the primacy of revelation" does not outline what the content of divine revelation is. For those who are mistakenly dissuaded of sola scriptura, it makes sense that Eastern Orthodoxy is viewed as a leading alternative (despite problems I've mentioned elsewhere) in light of the mess that is contemporary Roman Catholic apologetics. Just have a look at the comments here or the numerous examples of Roman Catholic cognitive dissonance here (particularly on the question of private judgment; cf. link). Talk about buyer's remorse!

But in turn, does Eastern Orthodoxy stand in any better position relative to Protestantism? Take the Synod of Jerusalem. Most Eastern Orthodox apologists would say the synod was not ecumenical. In this case, then, one would think that an Eastern Orthodox believer should agree that it may err and therefore is not to be made the rule of faith, or practice (cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 31.4). 

Nevertheless, some Eastern Orthodox apologists would appeal to it as an external confirmation of the canon of Scripture (link), whereas others would disagree and hold to a different canon of Scripture (link). How is this to be explained? What would motivate an Eastern Orthodox apologist to appeal to a fallible synod? 

1) Is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is infallible after all? If so, then there is disagreement among Eastern Orthodox believers regarding the canon of "divine revelation" vis-a-vis what counts as an ecumenical council. Many apologetic arguments one finds against Protestantism would thereby cut against Eastern Orthodoxy. [Side note: that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy disagree on which councils were ecumenical already begs this question.] 

2) Or is the idea that the Synod of Jerusalem is fallible but supports a particular understanding of the canon of Scripture? If so, one can understand why Eastern Orthodox believers who take seriously "the primacy of revelation" and have a different canon of Scripture than this synod would not gainsay the epistemic weight of what they regard as infallible in favor of the determinations of a fallible synod. 

3) If an Eastern Orthodox believer doesn't wish to appeal to the Synod of Jerusalem at all, how then does he know the canon of Scripture? So-called ecumenical councils never listed the books of Scripture. In fact, who is to say that one's opinion of the canon of Scripture won't differ from a future, allegedly infallible ecumenical council?

In each case, how is disagreement about the content of divine revelation supposed to be resolved? There is no infallible table of contents for the Eastern Orthodox believer any more than there is for the Protestant. The Protestant is simply more honest about this and, if nuanced, able to argue that such a fact is really irrelevant (link). 

Sola scriptura is a species of sola revelation. If the Eastern Orthodox apologists I've referenced are representative of the whole, then the principle difference between Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy is not so much "the primacy of revelation" but the content of it. In that case, though, one who deconverts from Protestantism due to perceived issues with sola scriptura but then goes ahead to accept another form of sola revelation has simply exchanged one set of presuppositions for another without meaningfully considering 1) whether what he thought were issues actually are, and 2) whether said issues would also apply to his newfound beliefs. The issue of "private judgment" never disappears, nor the need for self-authenticity. Protestantism just turns out to be more defensible because Protestants self-consistently accept as God-breathed only the sort of content that is described as God-breathed: holy writ (2 Timothy 3:16-17).

WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 10)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's ninth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

The Bible and Other Sources of Knowledge

To briefly reiterate a point made in my last review, "sense knowledge" - by which I gather Mr. Lazar means a propositional belief that is epistemically justified, in accordance with externalism, in virtue of the manner in which the belief was caused (e.g. a divinely ordained and "reliable" process of which we are not consciously aware) - is not "a Biblical axiom." It would a biblical inference: from certain passages of Scripture, one infers that people can or have acquired some "knowledge" due, in part, to their senses or sense organs instead of special, divine revelation; therefore, "sense knowledge" is possible. No proposition of Scripture overtly references "sense knowledge" or the like - at least that I am aware of - so "sense knowledge" must be an inference or deduction one makes from Scripture.

Further, Scripture is not used to infer or deduce particular instances of sense knowledge that we have. From all appearances, Mr. Lazar would not argue that we can know when we have sense knowledge, only that it is hypothetically possible that we have such knowledge given that there are biblical examples of persons who have had it whether they themselves were aware such beliefs counted as knowledge (in some sense) or not. Because it is only possible that we have such knowledge, one might alternatively hypothesize that whatever external justificatory factor that must be present for sense knowledge has never been present in any of our sensory experiences. Perhaps we don't have sense knowledge after all, even if others, like those in the Bible, do.

To argue we indeed can be aware that we have sense knowledge seems to assume we can be aware of when we have had sense knowledge. But for us to be aware of when we have sense knowledge would be to suggest that the are no external justificatory factors on which us having sense knowledge would depend. In turn, that would be to affirm an internalist understanding of sense knowledge, a proposal of a sort of empirical epistemology that Mr. Lazar has assured us is not on offer and would invite all the objections to empiricism that Clark wrote in his numerous publications (objections with which Mr. Lazar says he accepts). Thus, I have argued that when it comes to a basic epistemology, sense knowledge (or other kinds of "knowledge" that are justified in an externalist sense) may be important - and it may be that we have it without being aware of the fact - but ought to be regarded as subordinate in fundamentality to knowledge that is justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense, knowledge of which we can be aware.

To also reiterate points I've made in other reviews (link), Scripture is not the only source of truth, nor do many Scripturalists claim that it is - including Clark. Rather, it "is in the Scripture alone we find truth" (link). Scripture is one's epistemic source of "knowledge" in a certain sense (cf. link). We may talk of other "sources" of "knowledge," and this is indeed the focus of Mr. Lazar's ninth [and tenth] chapter[s], but it must not be forgotten throughout this discussion that divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in Scripture - is the foundation, first principle, axiom, or presupposition of our basic epistemology, from which all other propositional "knowledge" of the fundamental kind mentioned above is deduced.

Memory

The first "extra-biblical" source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is memory. Mr. Lazar begins this section by stating, "the Bible assumes people have memories." This is true, and Clark would have agreed: 

These objects of knowledge are not trivialities such as blues and sweets. They are truths or propositions. An example, one of these realities, a constituent of the noumenal world, is the proposition that God justified sinners on the basis of Christ’s imputed righteousness. This is not only a thought to which I may return time and time again. It is also a thought you and I can have simultaneously. Thus communication as well as memory is possible. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 91)

Clark no more denied that people have memories than he denied that people experienced sensation. One's "ability to remember," then, is not at issue. Instead, the question, as outlined by Mr. Lazar himself, ought to be whether the "Biblical evidence" indicates that memories are sources of "extra-Biblical knowledge" [of a certain kind]. 

None of the verses Mr. Lazar mentions or evidences a scenario in which the people who experienced memories knew them to be true. A problem that runs throughout this chapter is that Mr. Lazar's examples of allegedly extra-biblical knowledge in this chapter assume the point in question, conflate "knowledge" with useful opinions (link) or do not specify, let alone defend, what sort of "knowledge" Mr. Lazar has in mind. 

Moreover, even if persons could know things they remember, that doesn't mean that memory itself is the source of knowledge. Let's say that I both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God." Does that make my memory qua memory the source of knowledge? Could it not be that I remember something that I had already come to know, and that I know my memory on the same basis by which I originally came to know? I may both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God," but my knowledge could - or perhaps even must be, if it is "knowledge" of the sort in which Clark was interested - be due to Scriptural inference, not the mere fact that it is a memory of a proposition I had previously known, believed, or thought.

My own thinking is that we can know some memories. I have argued elsewhere:

...how is it that our reasoning and memory could be, in every case, fallible? I can see how we could have two different sense experiences, or how we could have a different sense experience from someone else, which yield contradictory beliefs and therefore leave us unable to ascertain which of the two beliefs is true.

But I don’t see how this could apply to reason or memory across the board. If any beliefs we have are in some sense memorial insofar as our thoughts either reference memories or themselves occur over a span of time rather than an instant, and if our thoughts in every case depend on our implicitly, if not explicitly, following certain logical structures, then I think there is a path to internally and infallibly justified beliefs which isn’t logically founded on sense knowledge. (link)

The above was an argument intended to parallel Clark's reference to an Augustinian critique of empiricism. Compare the bold in the quote to the line of reasoning that follows:

… one should note that no one can ever hear a piece of music or a line of poetry. Our opponents, who insist on sensation as the origin of knowledge, cannot well object to an instance taken from experience. Augustine pointed out that to “hear” music or poetry, one must at least “perceive” the rhythm. But there is no rhythm in a single sensation. Even beyond perception it is necessary to have memory before a line of poetry can be recognized as poetry. A single sound has no rhythm or meter. The first sounds of a line must be remembered until the last sound occurs; note also that the first sound longer exists when the last sound sounds. Therefore no one ever senses music or poetry. This Augustinian remark should satisfy any empiricist; but it is not exegesis. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, Pg. 270)

If music and poetry presuppose memory, so too - it seems to me - does [propositional] thought, for there is no meaning in a single concept... it is necessary to have memory before a proposition can be recognized as subject-verb-object. A single concept has no meaning. The first concept in a proposition must be remembered until the last concept is thought. This would appeal to Augustine's and Clark's theory of time as to why memory is critical to the possibility of knowledge. 

Perhaps one might counterargue that a proposition can be thought of in an instant or without temporal duration - in other words, in the causal chain of events which establish temporal sequence, perhaps I am able to think about the whole of propositional content without an intervening event. Now, this hypothesis would be difficult for me to accept - even regarding a short proposition such as "Jesus wept," it seems the thought occurs over a span of time, with intervening events in the objective causal chain of events (e.g. a movement my body makes) occurring as I begin the consideration of the proposition with the concept of "Jesus" and end it with the concept of "wept." If a known thought like that must occur over time, memory must be presupposed.

However, even if it were possible for men to think propositions instantaneously, I would further argue memorial knowledge seems implicitly presupposed insofar as when I think "Jesus wept" or "Jesus is the Son of God," I am thinking about a specific Jesus of whom I must have memory. In other words, concepts appear to tag propositions similar to the manner in which words do (link). As Clark says:

One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 66)

So, regarding memorial "knowledge," apologists could certainly refine defense of its reality, constraints (i.e. what is the scope of our memorial "knowledge," what is axiomatically deducible), and necessity (i.e. man is a temporal and limited creature, cf. mode of knowledge or background or tacit knowledge). But I do think the above establishes a beginning for that within a Scripturalist framework. I think certain instances of memorial knowledge can be argued to be preconditions for the sort of "knowledge" in which Clark was interested and, thus, would, like the laws of logic, not be "extra-biblical" but rather subsidiary to our sufficient condition for knowledge (link). More could, should, and hopefully will be said on this point another time.

Dreams

Another extra-biblical source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is dreams. But the examples he mentions are dreams that function as mediums through which divine revelation is communicated. The "Lord said" or "an angel of the Lord... said" or God "warned" or God "revealed to Pharaoh" all refer to times during which the canon of special divine revelation was open. The question of the mode of communication (dreams, visions, etc.) is actually just a subset of whether there are any new sources of special divine revelation. Clark doesn't deny that God spoke to individuals in history apart from what was revealed in Scripture. Adam was not given a Bible in the garden. The real question is whether Mr. Lazar believes it is possible that God still speaks to us [in dreams] today. 

That itself would suffice as a reply, but another worthy point is that it appears some, if not all, of these and other biblical dreams did not ipso facto communicate knowledge. In the examples of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, for example, both required their dreams to be interpreted by prophets of the Lord, Joseph and Daniel to even understand what they meant. Other magicians or wise men around these kings admitted they could not interpret the dreams even after being told about it. Take the first example Mr. Lazar mentions: Pharaoh's dream. Joseph himself corrects Pharaoh that “It is not in me; God will give Pharaoh a favorable answer” (Genesis 41:16). That is, the epistemic as well as metaphysical source of [the interpretation of] the dream is God, not Joseph. 

Any dreams that involved symbolism in need of interpretation were dreams whose interpretations themselves relied on further divine revelation (cf. Daniel 2:18ff.). This follows along the lines of my argument that "Scripturalists ought to regard our epistemic foundation, not as a physical and non-propositional texts, but rather as the [propositional] contents which the texts codify." (link). Knowledge of that to which images or symbols refer presupposes propositional communication, for literal knowledge is propositional. 

Now, God uses the physical writ of Scripture, dreams, etc. as causal means by which He communicates propositional content. In one sense, then, we can regard these as "sources" of knowledge, and Mr. Lazar's next chapter does seem to intend to address the "epistemic status" of beliefs derived from such sources. He might have been better doing so in this chapter, in my opinion, but I gather that he intends here to demonstrate that there is "knowledge" from other sources than the Bible and later elaborate on what kind of "knowledge" this is. If that is the case, then as already mentioned, neither Clark nor subsequent Scripturalists would have an issue with a distinction between contexts in which "knowledge" means something other than that in which he was interested, so perhaps Mr. Lazar's "Neo"-Scripturalism largely resolves - allowing certain (maybe even useful) emphases - into ordinary Scripturalism. 

Regardless, I will note that causation is fundamentally a metaphysical category. It is an epistemic category only insofar as one might argue certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. of the externalist variety) depend on whether causation has metaphysically taken place in a particular way. As has already been argued in the introductory remarks, this is not the kind of knowledge which is epistemically fundamental. So as I see it, in what sense dreams et al. are regarded as "sources" of extra-biblical knowledge stands in need of some clarification.

Self-Knowledge

Mr. Lazar argues that self-knowledge is biblically affirmed. While I agree, I think the references to the gospel of John were ill-chosen. Those passages he cites speak of belief, not knowledge. 1 Corinthians 2:11 makes for a much better argument, as I too have argued elsewhere on this blog (link). In a previous review, I also alluded to why I believe a denial of self-knowledge to be inconsistent with [Clark's] revelational epistemology, and I have pointed out that Clark accepted self-knowledge at certain points in his life while rejecting it at others (link; follow the links in that review for more thorough analysis). 

In short, I think Mr. Lazar needed to say much more to establish that self-knowledge qualifies as "extra-biblical" knowledge. As with memorial knowledge, is self-knowledge really "extra-biblical" if understood as a precondition for knowledge? This is a line of argument Mr. Lazar does not attempt or dispute, so it is hard to tell how he would respond, but so long as it is kept in mind that divine revelation is the necessary and sufficient precondition for knowledge which accounts for these and other necessary, subsidiary conditions, I think not. I would at least need to see an argument to the contrary before feeling the need to say much more. 

Natural Theology and Moral Law

Two final and interrelated sources of extra-biblical knowledge Mr. Lazar believes the Bible itself mentions are knowledge due to natural theology and the moral law. I'll treat these together, as Mr. Lazar only quotes a few verses from Romans 1-2 as the basis for his arguments. That being the case, I wish Mr. Lazar had interacted with Clark's exegesis or thoughts on those passages (and on any of the other subjects in this chapter). Because he did not, I will. While this will make my response to this section of Mr. Lazar's chapter disproportionately long, I think it is will be helpful to readers who may be confused how Scripturalists can affirm "natural knowledge." Clark's answer is one possibility, and it does not depend on an externalist theory of epistemic justification (which is another possibility worthy of consideration in its own right).

Romans 1-2 is an oft-cited passage in Clark's publications, so much so that I had trouble deciding what to include and what not to include in this review. This article is Clark's longest exegetical reflection on Romans 1 of which I am aware. In it, he provides at least two possible arguments against natural theology, one of which will also apply to Romans 2 and moral knowledge, as we shall see below. The following highlights the first argument against the idea that Romans 1 teaches natural theology:

That which is known of God, later referred to as his eternal power and deity, includes his wrath, for verse 18 says so; and Nygren is correct, I believe, in making the last clause in verse 20 a purpose clause. God revealed himself for the purpose of making men inexcusable. Power and deity therefore include wrath. This wrath is revealed from heaven, but we must ask, what form of wrath and what form of revelation? 
...Now, if the wrath of God is revealed because it is known – its being known is the proof of its having been revealed – what is known is evident because God made it evident to them. And how do we know that God made it evident? The reason is that God’s invisible attributes, eternal power and deity, are clearly seen and understood by man’s observation [?] of created objects, in order that men may be held inexcusable.

The text does not explicitly attribute this knowledge to all mankind. At the minimum infants are excluded. What would be the maximum permitted by the text? Could it be that all who have not heard the gospel are excluded? Do Paul’s words apply only to those who have heard the proclamation? In verse 17 the righteousness of God is said to be revealed in the gospel. Of course it does not follow by the strict laws of validity that God’s righteousness is not revealed elsewhere also. The reign of Pericles is revealed in Grote’s History of Greece but this does not prevent Bury from mentioning it also. Cannot righteousness be revealed both in the gospel and in nature? Nevertheless the Bible as a whole teaches that the righteousness here envisaged is revealed only in the gospel. Hence no one ignorant of the gospel – and the “gospel” includes the book of Habakkuk – can have learned about this righteousness. If now this is true of righteousness, it may also be true of wrath. That is to say, Paul is addressing the Roman Christians, who had already heard the gospel. Other Romans had heard the gospel, had received the revelation, from the mouth of Peter or other disciples, and had clearly understood the preaching, for God made it clear to them; but they refused to believe and so continued in the sins described in the remainder of the chapter. This would successfully exclude all notions of natural theology from this passage, for on this view Paul has in mind only people who have heard the gospel. Let it be clearly admitted that this interpretation is not a necessary conclusion from the text. But is its falsity a necessary conclusion? Is it not a possibility to be considered? 

Note that Clark only mentions this as an exegetical possibility. A few paragraphs later, he refers back to this interpretation as "possible though suspicious." In 1963, Clark summarized and criticized Barth's position on Romans 1, which was substantially the same as the above:

…[the heathen's] refusal to accept this knowledge, their suppression of it in unrighteousness, must therefore have occurred after and not before the ministry of the Apostle. The idolatry and immorality described in the chapter can therefore be only that of the first century of our era, and only that of the people to whom Paul himself preached. No doubt the heathen had always so lived, but Barth implies that the sin intended in the chapter is only sin A.D., and no reference to sin B.C. is intended. This is an unusual exegesis…

The main thought is prima facie improbable. Paul’s words rather clearly suggest a statement about the heathen as such and a revelation which they possess. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 118)

He outright rejected Barth's exegesis in 1969, but notice that he also, in the same breath, affirms "natural knowledge": 

Though dim and restricted, this natural knowledge of God is not to be denied. Romans 1:20 may not guarantee the validity of the theistic proofs, but it plainly asserts some knowledge of God derived from “the things that are made.” Romans 2:15 shows a minimal a priori knowledge of moral principles. On such natural knowledge human responsibility depends. When Karl Barth argues that the heathen which Paul has in view are not the heathen generally but only those to whom he had preached the Gospel, so that all the others have no knowledge of God at all, we regret that his exegetical powers failed him (compare Church Dogmatics, II:1:119ff ). Yet this natural knowledge is minimal in extent and practically useless in communicating the way of salvation. Who can deny that the savage tribes of the jungles know very little about God? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 92-93)

There is a refreshing honesty in reading a theologian who can see the attractiveness of an interpretation of Scripture - in that it would fit well with his other beliefs - yet reject it if he does not find it to do justice to the real meaning of God's word. But such honesty does beg certain questions for those who hold to a Scripturalist theory of knowledge. 

As mentioned in a previous review and in my foregoing remarks on this chapter by Mr. Lazar, what counts as "knowledge" is a question determined by the context in which the concept is found. While Clark does indeed affirm "natural knowledge," he qualifies his affirmation in the long article (referenced above) on Romans 1:

“whether or not [Paul] speaks of such a natural knowledge of God” is a question that ought to be answered, yes or no. There need be no “misunderstanding of Paul, whether the answer be yes or no.” What is needed are clear cut definitions. If Thomas’ definition of natural theology is used, the present writer would answer, No. But if a vague religious sense be meant, if natural religion were conceived as a set of rites and beliefs impressed by the customs of the tribe, or something else still more vague, the answer would be a vague yes. (link)

"Clear cut definitions" are needed. This quote is also a rare instance in Clark's thought in which he entertains the possibility of a sort of natural theology that can be affirmed: one which, as Clark does, affirms "natural knowledge" while also distancing itself from wrong methods of accounting for that "knowledge" (wrong methods I think he usually has in mind when referring to "natural theology"). For there is no question that Clark is consistent in his rejection of empirical knowledge even when he affirms natural knowledge:

Again, the Hebrew-Christian view that “the heavens declare the glory of God” does not, in my opinion, mean that the existence of God can be formally deduced from an empirical examination of the universe. If on some other grounds we believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, we can see that the heavens declare his glory; but this is not to say that a person who did not believe in God could demonstrate his existence from nature. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pg. 66)

In what sense, then, is "natural knowledge" possible on a Scripturalist epistemology? As already mentioned, there is a second argument against natural theology in the long discussion of Romans 1-2 in "Nooumena Kathoratai." In this argument, Clark pivots from a dismissal of Barth's position and critique of an empirical understanding of Romans 1 to an alternative idea of how the "knowledge" of heathens in Romans 1 coincides with or is similar to the "knowledge" of Gentiles without the law in Romans 2:

One must compare interpretation with interpretation. There are numerous verses and passages whose exact meaning is difficult to determine. Before rejecting, the above out of hand, let us examine a more widely held view. It is that all men – we shall not press the case of infants – by observing stars and stones have a clear understanding of God’s wrath, omnipotence, and deity. There is a modification of this view that better survives analysis, but one may take this form first. This first form means that an observation of stones gives us knowledge of divine omnipotence, and an observation of the lamentable results of drug addiction gives us a knowledge of God’s wrath. But no one has ever shown how this could be possible. ‘Stones are heavy, therefore God will punish sin’ is already an invalid inference.

The second form of appeal to the ‘things that are made’ makes a normative conclusion more plausible. The expressions mostly used up to this point have designated visible objects, stones, and stars, as examples of the things that are made. Many commentaries take this for granted. But Godet, and with greater clarity Shedd, mention an internal as well as an external revelation. That is to say, the human mind is one of the things that God made; and while Godet and Shedd do not quite say so, this mind may turn out to be of such greater importance that stars and stones can be disregarded. Godet mentions man’s “conscience and understanding,” even though he puts the emphasis on physical nature; and Shedd speaks of “conscience … consciousness … rational not sensuous perception, intuitive and not deductive.” Perhaps if we submerge the empirical elements these commentators retain, their more or less defective apriorism may lead to a better understanding of Paul’s meaning...

In other words, we discover the divine attributes by introspection of the constitution of the mind. The a priori forms of logic presuppose the power, wrath, and deity of their maker...

In conformity with this, one may note that nobody can recognize a flower as God’s handiwork, unless he has a prior knowledge of God. As Calvin said, the knowledge of God is the first knowledge a person has. It is innate; not derived from experience.

Hence the passage in Romans should be taken as similar to those phrases in the Psalms, such as, the heavens declare the glory of God. There is no valid argument. Only his works are visible. (link) 

The third paragraph is key, and we will return to it momentarily. As already pointed out, Clark rejects: 1) the "Barthian" restriction of "natural knowledge" only to heathens who have heard the gospel as well as 2) an empirical interpretation of heathen "knowledge." The heavens may declare and function as a witness to God's handiwork, but one who has not been converted by the gospel will not "recognize" such as God's handiwork. Unregenerate men suppress the truth rather than confess it. On the other hand, any attempt to suppress truth cannot "altogether succeed" in its desired effect:

Wrath, guilt, and liability to punishment are appropriate because men know the truth and yet suppress it. What is known of God has been made clear to them (Acts 14:17). The eternal attributes of omnipotence and deity, though invisible, are clearly seen in the created universe, rendering it inexcusable for a man not to worship God. The race, refusing to glorify and thank God, became stupid, so stupid as to fall to the level of idolatry. They worshipped birds, beasts, and even reptiles.

...All sorts of evils followed: maliciousness, murder, deceit, backbiting, cruelty, and so forth. Yet, though they wish to exclude all knowledge of God from their minds, they could not altogether succeed. They still knew that just judgment of God, namely, that people who practice such things are worthy of death; nonetheless they continued in their wicked way and entirely approved of those who did such things. (link) 

How can unregenerate men who suppress truth nevertheless know the "just judgment of God"? Their own conscience will accuse them, for the [Mosaic] law is written in their hearts. Romans 1 and Romans 2 dovetail:

In addition to particular cases, general statements occur in Luke 12:45-48 and John 15:22; but particularly in Romans 1:32, “Knowing the ordinance of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but approve of those that do them.”

This last reference meets the objection that the heathen are not responsible because they have never heard the gospel. They are responsible because they know the law. “When the Gentiles, who do not have the [Mosaic] law, act lawfully by nature, they are, without the [Mosaic] law, a law to [or for] themselves: They show the work of the law written in their hearts” (Romans 2:14-15). Thus responsibility is both established and limited by knowledge. (Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1992, pg. 181)

[Parenthetical: as a self-professing traducian and realist, I think Clark would have done well, in such contexts as these, to mention our real unity with and participation in Adam's sin as the basis for our responsibility to God's law (particularly, our culpability in having broken God's law). This is a subject which merits a separate post, although I will briefly return to it below.]

That is, I believe the crux of Clark's argument is that anthropology matters. Man is the image of God, so God's law is written is written in his heart (i.e. mind). Man's mind itself is a reflection of his Creator's mind. Instead of rejecting "natural knowledge" altogether, then, for those whose minds are developed to the extent that "introspection" is possible, Clark references "a priori forms" as a means by which we can understand how the conscience or mind that God created enables man to "discover the divine attributes." Clark similarly argues elsewhere:

Various Christian philosophers believe that one can see philosophical principles presupposed by the text. The Thomists, for example, think that Romans 1:20 requires empiricism and justifies the cosmological argument. Calvinists have historically made the knowledge of God—not the knowledge of sensory objects—basic, and hold that Genesis 1:26 and Romans 2:15 presuppose innate ideas, or a priori forms. (link)

When Clark says there are philosophical principles presupposed by the text, he is not arguing that Scripture ought not to be considered one's first principle. Rather, it seems that he is getting at an argument I made in an earlier review regarding ontological preconditions for knowledge and their relationship to sufficient condition epistemic while Scripture:

I want to reflect more upon the idea the the necessary preconditions for knowledge I describe above and the various tests that Mr. Lazar, Clark, and I have mention are perhaps better labelled ontological preconditions for knowledge.

This seems right and, with further elaboration, would communicate what I am trying to get at more clearly: they characterize what the knower, knowledge, known, etc. must ontologically be or [possibly] possess in order for knowledge to occur. This is how the knower can know his first principle or sufficient condition for knowledge without necessarily knowing necessary, subsidiary preconditions that his worldview must have, in principle, the power to explain.

Scripture is the sufficient and foundational epistemic justification for what ontologically must be the case to even know Scripture. Ontologically, man must be like God to possess knowledge, and this Scripture affirms. Nevertheless, knowledge of God through the revelation of Himself is epistemologically "basic":

In spite of the RC claim that Paul the apostle put his stamp of approval on Aristotle and Aquinas in Romans 1:19-20, it is clear that the Bible offers no argument to prove God’s existence. The heavens indeed display the glory of God; but a modern scientist who had no prior conviction of God could see there only a display of nuclear energy.

It is noteworthy that Luther (an Occamist) and Calvin, who seems to have held both Plato and Aristotle in low esteem, had no natural theology. Calvin at the beginning of his Institutes denied that we first know ourselves and secondly infer God’s existence. God for Calvin is the first object of knowledge, and this knowledge comes, not from nature, but by revelation. When the zeal of Protestantism began to cool in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, natural theology revived. This was particularly true with the Lutherans, but it is also true of the Reformed Church. Is there ground for hope that the late twentieth century will see a renaissance of Calvinism, a rejection of natural theology, and an adherence to Scriptural revelation? (link)

Thus, the "discovery" of the divine attributes by introspection, reflection on ontological presuppositions of the text, etc. do not imply Clark subscribed to a rationalist epistemology. But then how, for example, can heathen who reject divine revelation nevertheless be said to "know" the law? Yes, their being images of God means that they are ontologically capable of "knowledge." It also explains why their consciences might be pricked to consider divine truths such as are mentioned in Romans 1 and 2. But in particular, what is the "epistemic status" (as Mr. Lazar might put it) of heathen "knowledge," since they suppress divine revelation? In a return to Barth, I think Clark addresses both ontology and natural knowledge in what follows before segueing into an answer:

In Reformed theology the defaced but not annihilated image of God is sinful man was never conceived as being an axiom common to two systems of thought. The image is a psychological, mental, ontological reality. It is an existing part of human nature. Let us assure Barth that from this element an unregenerate man cannot somehow manufacture faith. The present criticism proceeds always along the line that Barth’s most cherished theses can be maintained, and maintained more thoroughly than he himself maintains them. Here he is worried by a non-existent danger. Without falling into modernism or into Romanism one may hold that there is a sense in which man has a capacity for faith not shared by a tree or stone. When God gives the gift of faith, he is not miraculously raising up sons to Abraham out of the stones on the roadway. Faith is a mental activity and by definition presupposes a rational subject. Reason therefore can be considered to be an element common to believer and unbeliever; and if “apprehension” of the Word of God is the understanding of a divine message, then the image of God preserved from creation and the fall is a prerequisite thereto.

Note that, to this point, that Clark has emphasized the ontological prerequisite or presupposition: man is God's image, someone with whom one can reason. Clark immediately continues to address the epistemic status of the "knowledge" of heathens with whom a believer might reason:

Man’s logical capacity is not the only constituent of God’s image. In addition there are a few simple theological and moral beliefs. In the section last quoted (I, 1, 272) Barth wishes to do justice to these facts; “peccator non capax” must bow to actual faith. But there are other facts also. Unless everybody is to be included as a believer in the church, we must admit the existence of unbelievers who actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths. Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge. Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of contact for the Gospel. What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans. Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of heathen responsibility.

Now, because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 117-118)

That Christianity and heathenism have no epistemic overlap as contradictory worldviews does not thereby entail that a Christian and a heathen have no epistemic overlap, for persons can be inconsistent. The epistemic overlap here is not one in which two people in God's image begin with the same epistemic foundation and [reason to] possess[ion of] the same "knowledge." That kind of "knowledge" would be the ideal, the sort in which Clark is interested in apologetically defending (notice too the connection and distinction between apologetics and epistemology that I have emphasized as fundamental to understanding Scripturalism, link).

Rather, heathen "knowledge" is their "accepting... a divine truth." They can "actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths." They "agree on a given proposition" with a believer. But this belief, acceptance, or agreement is not systematically derived. If it were, it would have to derive from divine revelation, the only epistemic source which allows for consistency. No, the epistemic status of "knowledge" in view here is not so rigid as it is in other works by Clark, as can be seen in how Clark defined knowledge in the same book:

"How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology." (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169)

Now, no Scripturalist would deny that unbelievers can believe or accept a true proposition. Typically, they will just apologetically argue that the unbeliever is inconsistent in doing so. Likewise, a Scripturalist might reason with a believer who endorses a Thomistic or empirical epistemology that they are using a wrong method for accounting for a right, divine truth they both believe. If that is the sense of "natural knowledge" Clark is promoting, there is no issue, and one can agree with Clark when he concludes: 

Now Paul indeed bases responsibility on knowledge, but he asserts that the heathen had knowledge, some knowledge at any rate; they tried to suppress it, but could not quite succeed. And even if it were Paul who “awakened” this knowledge in them, the implication would be that some remnant or potential knowledge had been lying dormant in their minds to be awakened. And, finally, to repeat, it is indubitable that the heathen and the unbeliever have this knowledge in common. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 120)

[Parenthetical: while the reference to "remnant or potential knowledge" "lying dormant in their minds" is probably a reference to Barth's thought that only heathen to whom the gospel was preached had "knowledge," Clark's a fortiori response can be applied to infants who, Clark elsewhere argues, have the "innate idea of God" due to possessing the same "a priori equipment" as adults:

The Logos is the rational light that lights every man. Since man was created in the image of God, he has an innate idea of God. It is not necessary, indeed it is not possible, for a blank mind to abstract a concept of God from sensory experience or to lift sensory language by its bootstraps to a spiritual level. The theories of Empiricism, of Aristotle, of Aquinas, of Locke, are to be rejected. 

The positing of innate ideas or a priori equipment does not entail the absurdity of infants’ discoursing learnedly on God and logic. To all appearances their minds are blank, but the blankness is similar to that of a paper with a message written in invisible ink. When the heat of experience is applied, the message becomes visible. Whatever else be added, the important words refer to non-sensuous realities. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 203)

Whether coincidental or intentional, the "invisible ink" analogy nicely ties into the writing of God's law on their minds. With experience, infants will become able to introspectively examine the message inscribed in their ontological makeup: an image of God who have already sinned in Adam. That this knowledge is dormant, so to speak, until the infant has enough cognitive development for introspection is little different than an adult whose knowledge of the same is dormant while he sleeps. At this point, however, I could be somewhat deviating from exposition of Clark's thought to development of it.]

So: on the one hand, Clark can affirm "natural knowledge" and that heathens can "know" divine truths in the sense that they - inconsistent with whatever non-revelatory epistemic axiom to which they [implicitly] hold - believe them. On the other hand, Clark can say, in a different context and [clearly] with a different conception of "knowledge" in mind:

First, Moses said that revelation was the greatest event that ever happened. Second, there is no knowledge of God apart from revelation, and therefore no knowledge of how a church and its activities should be conducted except in the Scriptures. Now, third, and a point that needs emphasis, God's revelation is clear, objective, and intelligible. And it is authoritative, whether or not we accept it. (April, 1959, Reformed Presbyterian Advocate, Volume 93, Number 4)

To conclude my reflections on this chapter, I think a definition or discussion of "source" or "knowledge" (like what I provided in an earlier review) would have helped clarify in what particular respect Mr. Lazar believed his epistemology is in contrast with Clark's and would have helped the reader evaluate Mr. Lazar's chapter, for Mr. Lazar may have found himself to be in larger agreement with Clark than he realized. In particular, mention of whether different kinds of "knowledge" are under discussion would have framed Mr. Lazar's argument in a clearer way. To this end, interaction with Clark's writings on these subjects would have been helpful. 

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 10, which Mr. Lazar calls The Epistemic Status of Extra-Biblical Beliefs.

Monday, May 30, 2011

Science and the Importance of Opinion

I've noted before that opinion is important because it can, for instance, function as a means by which "problems with various epistemologies or one's own epistemology may be introduced [to oneself]." As it so happens, opinion also very nearly plays as important a role in practical theology as does knowledge.

Gordon Clark and Scripturalists in general are more well-known for refutations of false views of the role of science than for a positive presentation of what the role of science in a Christian world-view really is. To be fair, Clark promoted what he called Operationalism in his Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, in which he wrote that science ought to be regarded as "an attempt to utilize nature for our needs and wants" rather than "a way to any knowledge."

In my latest post, I in part tried to establish that whether or not a work is good hinges upon one's intentions. Intentions with respect to what? What one opines - not necessarily knows - is the case. How does one come to opine what is the case? By God's ultimate, determinative purpose, to be sure, but the means through which ideas are mediated may vary.


Example: to know the meaning of a sign of the covenant we must know Scripture, but the point at which the application of the sign enters into the equation, it is at that point that we must simply believe that it is being administered properly. That is something we opine, not know. I think I saw water and felt sprinkled on me by an ordained minister according to the Trinitarian forumla, but I would not water down the philosophical definition of knowledge as I would have to just so I could say I know such was the case. Regardless, that we do not know it does not mean our belief in the idea it was validly administered can be an instance of disobedience.


As we think, so we are. God has determined our thoughts - our opinions and our knowledge; our responsibility is to intentionally act on those thoughts in a godly manner, and such does not depend on the possibility of empirical knowledge. I may by science come to believe something upon which I must accordingly choose. What is important in the realm of practical theology is the intention of the choice [made on the basis of my belief], not whether or not my belief is true.

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Epistemology and the Nature of Revelation

Lane Keister over at Green Baggins has posted a very good argument by Owen defending the Protestant belief (against RC) about the way in which the canon is discerned. Naturally, we could extend this a fortiori defense to encompass the perspicuity of Scripture and other doctrines relates to sola scriptura. I think, however, one can push the natural/supernatural analogy further and use it to internally critique what generally passes for RC epistemology. Matthew Schultz at BeggarsAll touches on this point in final paragraph of his most recent post on Whitaker's "Dispuations."

RCs predicate the justification of the canon on an allegedly infallible church. Allowing this, by what means do RCs justify their knowledge of an infallible church? If the Magisterium requires no external justification, then we can, like Matthew, ask what distinguishes Scripture from the Magisterium such that the former cannot be afforded the same presuppositional privilege as the latter. [We might also ask what differentiates Scripture from, say, God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son of promise; Abraham did not need to think about whether or not some omnipotent demon was attempting to trick him. Why? Because God's word is self-authenticating, self-verifying.]

However, I can't recall the last time I asked a RC by what means they claim to know the Magisterium is infallible and received a response which didn't in some way appeal to history. Disregarding the fact many of these responses commit the appeal to antiquity fallacy (not to mention that they are only probabilistic arguments), these are, at the very least, responses which implicitly appeal to natural revelation to justify a belief in an infallible authority. We could modify Owen's argument, then, to read: "if Protestant presuppositional epistemology, grounded on supernatural revelation, is unsound, how much more so is RC epistemology, grounded on natural revelation."

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Modern Philosophy 15

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections nine through twelve of Hume’s “Dialogues.” The following is my submission:

In section IX, Demea, having listened to Philo’s explanation of the limitations of a posteriori argumentation, suggests that a priori argumentation – specifically, the cosmological argument – is a more than adequate substitute when attempting to discern the nature of God. Cleanthes replies that a proposition is true only if the contrary is impossible to conceptualize and that conceptualizing reality without the existence of any single being, including God, is possible, as the material universe, for example, may be eternally existent. Philo, who believes that a priori arguments are unpersuasive, adds that mathematics display uncreated characteristics.

Demea replies in section X by opining that a reason many may find a priori arguments unconvincing because there are people who will use any means of argumentation to validate their intuitive beliefs. Philo agrees, also providing an answer as to why he believes natural religion is plausible, viz. the wickedness of men. This observation leads to a brief dialogue which leads Demea to remark that this could stem from the idea that man’s worst enemy is himself in the form of diseases of the mind and Philo to impute this wickedness to externals and claim that if man’s complaints and despair in all ages were absolutely sincere, more people would have committed suicide. Philo then asks how God can be anthropomorphic without being evil, introducing Epicurus’ postulation of the “problem of evil” into the discussion, to which Demea replies that evil functions as a means to future good and Cleanthes to argue that men are not absolutely miserable. Cleanthes, after calling Demea’s speculation groundless, defends his position by refusing to allow that Demea’s and Philo’s previous dialogue on the wickedness of man accurately depicts reality. Philo retorts that Cleanthes’ answer is as weak as it is doubtful, since evil still exists and is more potent, if less frequent, than good. Philo essentially rests his case for cautious skepticism with regard to the nature of God on this argument.

To begin section XI, Cleanthes posits that God may be finitely perfect, thus denying one of the premises of Epicurus to solve the problem. In rejoinder, Philo questions the know-ability of such a deity and insists that even a finitely perfect God would be capable of preventing some extant evils. He then outlines four evils which he believes cause most evil actions and may not be unavoidable: instinctual self-preservation, laws of nature, limitations in genetics to that which is necessary, and the brutality of nature. A posteriori arguments would be, in the face of these arguments, hard-pressed to demonstrate an anthropomorphic God who is good, and Philo even mentions that deism or an impersonal God – one who is neither good nor bad – would be a consistent alternative. At this, Demea and Cleanthes expresses amazement that Philo would propound such overtly skepticistic and unconventional theological beliefs, and some time thereafter Demea parted the company.

The final section consists of a conversation between the two remaining men, which begins by Philo remarking that despite his skepticism, the harmony he perceives in the sciences at every point presses upon his mind the belief in the existence of a divine being. That he finds this to be a strong indication of the existence of a sentient God’s is ironic, since this he had criticized Cleanthes’ teleological argument earlier. Cleanthes and Philo also agree that many disputes within natural theology are due to impreciseness in use of terms or exaggeration of opposite themes of similar conclusions. They furthermore agree that man’s moral capacities are defective and that evil should be ascribed to that cause rather than to God. Men even use religion, which ought to civilize, to justify evils. Superstition is too often allowed to infringe upon rational religion. The discussion proceeds in like manner, and concludes with Philo assenting to the idea that God bears an analogous intelligence to humanity but asserts that the surest way to Christianity is cautious skepticism. Pamphilus concludes the narrative declaring his instructor, Cleanthes, to have presented the strongest arguments, followed by Philo.

The criticisms of the superficial cosmological argument provided by Demea do show it is insufficient to substantiate his opinion of a priori reasoning and God’s demonstrability. Demea did seem to have argued weakly. Hume’s characters didn’t, however, note that morality within an empirical world-view is question-begging, as brute observations of physical occurrences would not logically imply how one ought to act. Finally, the argument from design which Philo eventually forwards and with which Cleanthes agrees is subjectively based, which, given Philo’s and Cleanthes’ earlier arguments against the cosmological argument, is interesting. Neither appears to recognize this confliction, however. In conclusion, then, natural theology does not seem to provide any rational reasons to believe in the existence of “God.”

Monday, April 26, 2010

Modern Philosophy 14

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections one through five of Hume’s “Dialogues.” The following is my submission

:The subject of Hume’s Dialogues, natural religion, is one which Hume remarks is an example par excellance of a subject which is difficult because it is simultaneously important, ostensively obvious, and gives occasion for many abstruse questions. Primarily for these reasons, then, consideration of it is presented in the form of a dialogue between fictional characters (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes).

Part 1 begins with a discussion between Philo and Demea. Philo, observing that Demea believed scientifically studying natural religion should begin only after one has been educated in other abstract philosophies such as ethics or logic, remarked that the idea man can learn of such things apart from religious instruction is destructive to natural religion itself. Cleanthes interposes that grounding religious beliefs on philosophical skepticism is, if serious, cognitive dissonance. At this point, Philo’s relatively long defense of the value of cautiousness and common sense seems to imply that his position is near to Hume’s own as described in his “Enquiry.” If this is the case, Hume must believe that all consideration of an immaterial being or realm is speculatory. Regardless, Cleanthes retorts that, given the self-defeating nature of epistemological skepticism, and given that empiricism must allow that we do not know how or why certain events cohere, the same may be said of religion; furthermore, such seems to have historic precedence prior to Lockean philosophy. Philo protests that those who do not believe in God are fools, but that such is only sensible if it is indeed the case that reason is sufficient principle by which one can become intimate with religion.

Following Cleanthes’ opinion that men are disposed to defend their dogmas by whatever means possible, Part II begins with Demea expressing surprise at Cleanthes’ argumentation thus far, which he perceives imply that the nature of God cannot be known. Upon citing Malebranche as an example of a way in which we can come to [intelligibly] know God, Philo, agreeing that the alleged soundness of the cosmological argument hinges the nature of the debate on the know-ability of God, repeats that one can only progress so far in such a manner – or in empirical investigations, for that matter – before one must give way to caution. Cleanthes replies to Philo by appealing to a teleological argument, intending to show that God is anthropomorphic. Both Demea and Philo disapprove of this argument: Demea, because the proof is hinged on empiricism, which implies that God’s existence, let alone nature, is not necessarily true; Philo, because the a posteriori, intuitively causal, analogical, and inductive inferences are fallacious (further suggesting Philo represents Hume). Demea and Philo then converse about a priori reasoning and experience. Philo claims that all a priori reasoning is founded upon experiential knowledge; for instance, we infer the universe is not eternal because we repeatedly note that matter does not form itself into perceived designs and then reason a priori that matter generally does not form itself. Of course, this common sense philosophy predicates the cosmological argument upon experience; hence, the disagreement with Cleanthes, argues Philo, should be due simply to the fact God’s nature is not strictly demonstrable. The narrator writes that Philo seems to have been jesting, and Cleanthes, not persuaded that Philo is being serious, queries whether or not we should apply such skepticism to the Copernican system. Philo replies that the analogy is not apropos, as one can compare planets but cannot compare the generation of the universe to anything.

In Part III, Cleanthes accuses Philo of not seriously considering his criticisms of analogous reasoning, as practically all inferences – inferring a voice in the dark is a man – depend upon it. Cleanthes argues that the appearance of intelligence and beauty are appropriate counterpoints to Philo’s belief that one cannot compare analogous reasoning in science to analogous reasoning pertaining to the origin of the physical world, and that if Philo were to consistently apply his arguments thus far to all things without his own prejudice, he would be left with extreme skepticism. Demea, rejoining the conversation, remarks that as forceful as Cleanthes’ arguments may be, to infer that such a designer is a deity is a non sequitur.

Cleanthes’ replies to Demea in Part IV by asking whether or not “God” is an empty word and if natural religion can be meaningful, to which Demea replies that he merely rejects Demea’s anthropomorphizing. Demea then lists several “perfections” of God, to which Cleanthes replies that such cannot be known if they are not in some sense relative to us. Philo answers that the variance of thought within humankind is enough to question how one can reasonably regard an immaterial being – a being who would possess an infinity of differences from a human mind – as anthropomorphic. Moreover, when one considers the mind of such a God and discovers that its thoughts have no origin, Philo wonders why Cleanthes does not allow this to be the case for men. Cleanthes replies that Philo’s own argument can be used against him, as the cause of a thought must at some final point be attributed to an intelligent being, and that the harmony of nature confirms this to be true.

Philo insists that he will remain cautiously skeptical, and responds to Cleanthes’ attempted rebuttal by asserting that the argument assumes perceived effects must be produced by similar causes (i.e. intelligence from intelligence); if Cleanthes is to be consistent, he must admit God is not perfect, immortal, or infinite, as man is not perfect, immortal nor infinite. Thus, Philo remarks that the idea that the “beauty” to which Cleanthes had earlier referred could be attributed to such a being is dubious. In order to avoid the import of these arguments, Philo anticipates that Cleanthes will have to complicate his argument or arbitrarily dismiss sections of his rebuttal, and Part 5 ends with Cleanthes exclaiming that he believes none of these arguments and that Philo must presuppose the teleological argument in order for his arguments to be sensible.

Briefly analyzing the dialogue so far, each character’s arguments have there own strengths and weaknesses. Philo is correct to proportion belief with evidence, but, given his criticisms of Cleanthes and his empiricism, it is not apparent for what reason he believes in God. Cleanthes is correct that Philo and Demea do not seem to be speaking about “God” with any intelligible meaning, yet he himself utilizes subjective argumentation which he cannot validly dogmatize. Demea speaks soundly when he affirms that only a priori reasoning can substantiate certainty that God exists, yet how he has discovered God’s nature is questionable. Each character must either admit he cannot know God by natural religion or explain more precisely how he can within the bounds of his own beliefs.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Modern Philosophy 13

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections nine through eleven of Hume’s “Enquiry.” The following is my submission:

Hume reasoned that his arguments from preceding sections would be more authoritative it could be demonstrated that other “reasonable” animals act similarly to mankind; hence, section nine is devoted to this purpose. Hume concedes that men reason superior to animals because men have greater focus, acuter memory, a higher capacity for observation, and possess a priori instincts which are better suited to the task. Otherwise, however, Hume argues the inferences animals make are remarkably similar to men: dogs, for example, do not respond to certain tones a certain way by means of abstruse reasoning – their responses are predicated on custom alone. The difference between men and other reasonable animals, then, lies only in the degree to which each are able to form connections from perceptions.

Hume begins his tenth section by arguing that miraculous events – events which “violate the laws of nature” – should not be believed on the basis of testimony alone. The veracity of human testimony is often taken for granted, yet the possibility of contrary testimony refutes the absolute reliability of testimony. Furthermore, the relativity of experience also implies that miracles cannot be witnessed, as what one regards as miraculous may be commonplace to another; differences in technology, topology, etc. corroborate this. Finally, the suspect character of those who have purported to have seen a miracle is such that one ought to reject future claims, regardless of how many people confirm it.

Much of Hume’s arguments in these two sections seem to utilize cause-effect and necessary connection argumentation, both of which Hume criticized in his earlier sections. References to a priori instincts, the character of those who claim to have witnessed miracles, etc. indicate inferences which, because they are at best only grounded in perceived correlations, are not justified. Also, Hume’s argument against miracles is circular, as the “laws of nature” to which Hume alleges miracles would violate (by definition) are defined in such a way that one must ignore the fact that events have been perceived which men regard as miraculous; in other words, Hume constructs his opinion of “laws of nature” without regard for miraculous experience and then uses this to invalidate miraculous experience.

In the eleventh section, Hume considers the arguments of a friend pertaining to natural theology. His friend argues that, even if it were true that a teleological argument were a good proof of the existence of a “higher” being (god), many superstitious persons further ascribe unwarranted effects from this being in an effort at anthropomorphization. Most who mean to prove the existence of God on the basis of natural theology are wont to prove more than they are able. Hume’s friend particularly criticizes these men for irrationally reasoning Hell (an effect) from a god (the cause) whose existence was purportedly established teleologically (effects). The transition from considering God as the conclusion of the observation of the world to using the same God as the premise by which one justifies a notion of Hell is a leap in logic. Hume summarizes this argument when he writes: “where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause.” While Hume reiterates his doubt that a cause can be reasoned from observation of effects, he in general agrees with his friend that one ought not to speculate on matters which are beyond the limitations of reason. The reasoning in this section is, assuming the validity of previous sections, sound.

Friday, October 16, 2009

Speculations Hammered: The Word of Truth, Asserted and Vindicated

The following is an essay I submitted to the Trinity Foundation about Gordon Clark's book, God's Hammer:

It is the ground of knowledge rather than the instrumental cause of justification that the modern evangelical community must seek to defend against a post-modern world. This new enemy to the faith is no more threat to epistemic truth than were the religious sophists of the Reformation; rather, its philosophical appeal to atheistic and theistic society alike stems from egoistic seduction. Whether one is an empiricist, rationalist, or existentialist, the popularity of postmodernism lies in its common pledge to the individual: namely, the authority to “[erect] an independent criterion of what is worthy of worship” (Clark 190). Having recognized that the god of this world is focalizing his attacks upon that alone which “cannot be broken” (John 10:35), Gordon Clark compiled a series of articles to safeguard Christendom’s assurance in the inspiration, infallibility, sufficiency, perspicuous and authority of Scriptural revelation.

The Evangelical Theological Society was formed to specifically combat the rising assault on the doctrine of infallibility. The principle statement of the society is as follows: “The Bible alone and the Bible in its entirety is the Word of God written, and therefore inerrant in the autographs.” Some professing Christians and even entire denominations (cf. the United Presbyterian church) have departed from this confession, citing that it is either false or an unnecessary constriction. The society and those who agree with Scriptural infallibility should not compromise the doctrine for the sake of feigned unity, but critiques should receive careful attention. If the Bible is contradictory to truth – archaeological, literary, theological, apologetic, or otherwise – it cannot be God’s word, because the Bible claims that God cannot lie (Hebrews 6:18).

All epistemological systems are founded on various first principles; the creed of the Evangelical Theological Society is the first principle of Christendom. The purpose of a first principle is to enounce the means by which one purports to derive knowledge. This poses a unique problem: “…if two people do not accept the same axioms, they will not be convinced by the same proof” (Clark 15); hence, to censure one first principle because it contradicts another first principle would be fallacious. One must, therefore, utilize elenctic argumentation in order to invalidate a first principle. As beneficial as elenctic argumentation may be in, say, evidencing atheism as incompatible with moral justice, there are infinitely many first principles one could presume. So, to conclude that one’s first principle is true on the basis that others’ are false would be a committal of the fallacy of induction. This led Clark to deduce that “to show the Bible’s logical consistency is… the best method of defending inspiration” (Clark 15). Given the hostility to Christian fundamentalism, such a demonstration would, perhaps, be as persuasive a testimony as an evangelist could provide.

For one whose first principle is essentially that of the Evangelical Theological Society, the authors of the Bible must claim their written word to be inspired, infallible, sufficient, perspicuous, and authoritative, or else one must acknowledge the first principle is not internally consistent. This, Clark shows, is trivial. Only one who has not carefully studied Scripture could believe otherwise, for the Bible is full of instances which claim the whole canon to have been breathed out by God through the prophets and apostles: Exodus 4:11-12 “The LORD said to him, "Who gave man his mouth? Who makes him deaf or mute? Who gives him sight or makes him blind? Is it not I, the LORD? Now go; I will help you speak and will teach you what to say."” 2 Timothy 3:16-17 “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work.” 2 Peter 1:3; 20-21 “His divine power has given us everything we need for life and godliness through our knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and goodness… no prophecy of Scripture came about by the prophet's own interpretation. For prophecy never came by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.”

If common axioms such as empiricism and rationalism are not that by which the Christian contends to receive knowledge, the question is begged: how is information accumulated from Scripture? As a theory of language or communication cannot be isolated from epistemology, a Christian must turn to Scripture for this as well: John 3:27 “…a man can receive only what is given him from heaven.” 1 Corinthians 4:7 “…what do you have that you did not receive?” Matthew 16:17 “And Jesus said to him, "Blessed are you, Simon Barjona, because flesh and blood did not reveal this to you, but My Father who is in heaven.”

Language is predicated on logic, which is to say that words are symbols people use to convey thoughts. That man is created in God’s image (Genesis 1:27) equips Christians with a simple answer as to how men can communicate: God is rational, so men are too. This immediately refutes one who supposes verbal inspiration is inadequate due to an inherent inability for man to understand divine revelation. Men understand God’s words because the divinely appointed purpose of language was so that men can understand God’s words. He who believes otherwise must explain by what means he knows communication with the divine is impossible. In fact, he must also explain how communication between men is possible, and this is to demand that he present a full epistemological foundation.

Scripturalistic occasionalism, on the other hand, easily synthesizes the soteriology of Calvinism with fallen man’s repugnance to spiritual truth. Historically, God created man and revealed Himself to man in the garden. Even before sin corrupted mankind, Adam needed God to guide Him; general revelation was insufficient, as it could, at best, only provide apprehensive knowledge about God. Because man fell, the Father made a covenant with man, and had His prophets write it down so that His Spirit would have an object of revelation to which He could witness and to which the elect could, upon regeneration, believe. Christ came and fulfilled the covenant, and so it is written “the Word became flesh” (John 1:14). Christ’s apostles were likewise instructed to corroborate this fulfillment through written word. Because men are dead in sin until the Spirit regenerates them (cf. 1 John 5:1), men know what is true but suppress it (Romans 1:18-32); hence, until or unless they acknowledge Scripture as authoritative, they cannot justify what they know.

All Christians believe Scripture is authoritative. Some [professing] Christians, however, disregard the need for Scriptural infallibility as it pertains to information perceived to be unrelated to theology. For what reason do these individuals believe Scripture is authoritative if not because it is infallible? One can only assume that in the absence of any attempt to support their belief, their reasons are, like the various arguments they purport against the infallibility of Scripture, founded on emotions and unsound thinking. Allegation of contradictions within Scripture, denial that textual criticism furnishes one with a competent rebuttal to the vituperative conception that one cannot exercise historical-grammatical exegesis without the original autographs of Scripture, arguments from silence (for instance, present lack of archaeological support for a particular biblical passage) – these and other [indirect] attacks upon the doctrine of infallibility serve only to undermine an alleged belief in the authoritativeness of Scripture.

One can even make these criticisms under the guise that Christian doctrine should be taken from Scripture. Dr. James Mays is one such example. Ignoring what is written in Scripture respecting its own inspiration, infallibility, and sufficiency, Dr. Mays, who is not a Eastern or Roman Catholic, fairly represents the community of “Christian” liberalism when he attacks the perspicuity of Scripture on the grounds that it a lacks an extant, infallible interpreter. Would Dr. Mays suggest that the reason “Scripture cannot be broken” (cf. John 10:35) is because men cannot be certain what is the meaning of the content of Scripture? Has Dr. Mays read Psalm 119? Furthermore, arguing on such grounds implies that the necessity of prior, infallible interpreters extends ad infinitum. If this be the case, it is inescapably irrational for him to write any sort of objection to the doctrine of perspicuity which could [apparently] be misunderstood – for one would assume Dr. Mays thinks of his writing as no more perspicuous than that which he claims to be authoritative – as support for the doctrine of perspicuity. Or, if at some point Dr. Mays might explain what he believes is requisite for a source to be self-evidently clear, as well as his reasons for believing such, only then can one examine what justification he has in claiming Scripture needs an infallible interpreter.

Unfortunately, Dr. Mays does not follow his premises to the logical conclusion, and it is unnecessary to speculate further when the witness of the Holy Spirit and the self-attestation of Scripture grant insuperable security to the believer. What statements we can derive from Scripture about the nature of Scripture should be considered doctrinal; as all Scripture is said to God-breathed, and as God cannot lie, the perception that Scriptural information can be unrelated to theology is fallacious. Clark concludes that the authority of the Bible is necessarily predicated on whether or not it is infallible: “If the Bible is mistaken on geography, which ought to have been easy for the writers to put down correctly, it might very well be mistaken on theology, which is much more difficult than geography” (Clark, 121). Of course, one could insert any field of study for “geography” and the point would be the same. The Bible is God’s revealed word, or it is a sham. No middle ground exists.

Those who deny Bible is the word of God yet maintain it contains word of God must not regard the Bible as authoritative, for the real authority would become whatever criterion they would use to discern what is and is not God’s word. If one does not trust that He who cannot swear by anything higher (Hebrews 6:13) is capable of competently articulating His thoughts to men, what “knowledge” one does claim to derive from His word is not necessarily divine revelation. To suppose that man through reason can with more clarity understand God than God’s own self-revelation defeats the purpose of revelation. Thus, those who do not believe Scripture is infallible yet claim to accept all other orthodox doctrines are suspect. Why should other doctrines not be doubted? Again, what is the criterion by which such a person has judged which doctrines to be true and which to be false? The simple answer is: subjectivism.

One attempt to supplant infallibility with a new criterion by which we know what is true was made by a former member of the Evangelical Theological Society: whatever “spiritual need” is most pressing should be given priority (Clark 61). In that case, what could be “true” for one could be false for another. Religion becomes subjective. The decree to evangelize becomes subjective. One could live in sin and dismiss rebuke as equally viable alternative interpretations of Scripture. For what sinner knows what he spiritually needs except through conviction by a trustworthy source? Uncertainty cannot yield certainty. The skeptic, left without an infallible source for the justification of knowledge, must reason autonomously. Sadly, such subterfuge is present in the “apologetic” of many professing Christians.

Several objections to the doctrine of verbal inspiration yet remain currently in favor amongst subjectivists. For instance, in his book, The Inspiration of Scripture, Dr. Beegle criticizes the doctrine of verbal plenary inspiration on the ground it doesn’t rely on the scientific method. Notwithstanding the test of internal consistency which Dr. Beegle seems to overlook, it would seem he subjugates God’s word to an empiricist's first principle. As no attempt is made to justify empiricism, however, it is baffling for one to consider what reasons Dr. Beegle might have had for making such a statement.

The dictation theory charges that the doctrine implies God mechanically imposed His will onto men such that they became mere mediums through which His word was proclaimed. This functions as a facade to substantiate a general, underlying incrimination; to wit, that a determinative world-view is incompatible with the doctrine of the will of man. Of course, Christians reject the accusation that organic and dynamic composition of Scripture is incompatible with verbal inspiration, for verbal inspiration must itself be understood within the context of the rest of Scripture. God is sovereign: He made each and every author of Scripture and ordained circumstances such that each author acquired different styles of writing. The idea that a parallel exists between God and His prophets and a boss and his stenographer does no justice to God’s sovereignty. The former is unique in that “an inner union, an identity of purpose, [and] a cooperation of will” inheres in the relationship between God and His appointed (Clark 44).

Another accusation leveled against the doctrine of verbal inspiration essentially declares [religious] language to be entirely metaphorical. Some, such as Mr. Hamilton, believe words are originated mythically despite Scripture rejection of such a concept. Because Hamilton does not substantiate this proposition, one need not bother to respond to his conclusion, that communication between men and God is unintelligible. Most of those who believe in linguistic relativism are existentialists who wish to relieve themselves of the “burden” of defending the doctrine of Scriptural infallibility while yet avowing Scriptural authority. What actually happens is that Scripture is stripped of objective meaning and in place God is said to communicate through metaphor, image, and myth. Curiously, some such relativists think it matters which religion one chooses to follow. But, as Clark notes, “if neither myth is true literally, if both are equally symbolic, is not the one as satisfactory as the other?” (Clark 47) Religious subjectivists have ostensibly believed one myth arbitrarily, or, if based upon religious experience, cannot disallow one from choosing to be a Muslim or Mormon due to a respectively subjective religious experience. A more direct discreditation, however, is observable when one asks what the religious symbolism symbolizes. Let us suppose the crucifix symbolizes the crucifixion. But if there is no literal truth in the crucifixion, what does the crucifixion represent? The argument is self-evidently mired in an infinite regression fallacy.

A final, more radical objection to the doctrine of verbal inspiration is the positivistic idea all abstract metaphysical concepts are arbitrary. Some refer to “human logic” so as to distinguish it, somehow, from “divine logic.” Such a theory is easily defeated, as it cannot support itself without exercising the law of contradiction. To assert “the law of contradiction is arbitrary” is to presuppose the law of contradiction, or else another could consistently construe the assertion to mean “the law of contradiction is not arbitrary.” Interestingly, as it relates to language, this view is rather similar to Van Til’s concoction, analogical knowledge, which suggests that there is no rational basis for communication between God and men. Those who subscribe to the theory of analogical knowledge argue that men and God cannot know the same thing, because men’s thoughts are conditioned on He who has no conditions. This does not follow; that God’s thoughts are higher than our own such that He knows the whole plan and purpose of His will is not synonymous with a rejection of univocal knowledge. If knowledge is analogous rather than univocal, what does it mean for God or man to “know”? Does God not know all things? Why would God ordain to reveal Himself via inept means? Is He not omnipotent, capable of creating creatures who can think after His thoughts in a rational manner (cf. John 1:1-9)? At best, the theory of analogical knowledge is a gateway to subjectivism, as one could justify false conceptualizations by petitioning said concept as representative of biblical truth. Who and how could one refute such a postulation? Analogical knowledge necessarily leads to skepticism, and skepticism, which cannot account for how one knows that one cannot know, is a self-refuting first principle. Thankfully, the Bible nowhere states truth is inexpressible.

In the final article of his book, Clark distinguishes between twin biblical concepts, “time and eternity,” in order to provide a tangible example that one who rejects the infallibility and authority of Scripture is left with a world-view which cannot provide a justification for knowledge. This is a disquisition which, in keeping with Clark’s uncompromising address, requires one to define relevant terms with clarity.

It is of the utmost importance that one recognizes an answer to this obligation cannot be evaded on the ground that man cannot know God or that God cannot know what we experience, for both objections are unbiblical; the first mocks the purpose of revelation, and the second denies God’s omniscience. These objections must resultantly be predicated on reasoning which cannot account for all possible contingencies. One might wonder whether “man cannot know God” is a proposition contingent on the veracity of the proposition “ducks can swim” or “the Protestant canon is fallible.” There are infinitely many such propositions one could posit, of course, meaning that if one is to know that man cannot know God, one must be infinitely knowledgeable. Ironically, man must be God if he is to validly assert that man cannot know God or that God cannot know man. While each false epistemology is self-refuting in its own right – empiricists affirm the consequent, intuit no unknown variables have biased data, etc. – this sole argument destroys natural theology, empiricism, rationalism, existentialism, and any other first principle which shares the commonality of dependency upon man’s capabilities.

Therefore, not only must one must seek to make plain the concepts of “time” and “eternity,” but he must also do so within a context that affords him the assurance that said concepts are accurate depictions of reality. For this reason, Clark chastises scientists who purport to be able to give a definition of time apart from divine revelation. Aristotle, for example, postulated that time is a quantification of a body’s movement from point A to point B. This begs several questions: what is movement, how can movement be measured, and can we know that a given measurement is accurate? Only one who is able to account for all possible variables in an experiment can know that his perception of the results is veridical. To know that which bears influence in an experiment, one must know that which does not. As has been demonstrated, however, one must be infinitely knowledgeable to know that even one alleged fact is true. Such questions, then, are sufficiently representative to display the numerous difficulties empiricists – Aristotle, in particular – face. To this end, the reason secular scientists have not come to an agreement about the nature of time is ultimately due to the misplacement of authority.

Christendom’s failure to unambiguously communicate the concept of time as provided in Scripture is not a point devoid of interest. Clark notes that theologians such as Charles Hodge and Oscar Cullman are just two of many who in part depend upon Aristotle or other extra-biblical sources when attempting to formalize a biblical explanation of time. Providentially, repulsion to this synthesis does exist within Christendom. Augustine was one of the earliest Christians to express the biblical concept of time when he wrote: “It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times” (Confessions). Essentially, time is the changing of ideas. For instance: a second would represent an arbitrary unit measure of the interval between one’s present thought and a thought in one’s past. Because they would have been able to recall the length of a day from memory, the Israelites could have known that the sun stayed up for about a day in their victory over the Amorites (Joshua 10:12-13). God, on the other hand, experiences no temporal succession of thoughts, for God is eternal. His thoughts are immutable.

One can conclude from this the pragmatic fact that a seemingly inconspicuous doctrine can, in fact, contribute much to Christian faith. For example, the clarification in the distinction between time and eternity is such that a doctrine such as eternal progressionism is revealed to be a contradiction in terms. Mormonism is thereby refuted. Another application would be that for God to elect individuals in Christ on the basis of a foreseen faith would require one to believe that God elects in time. Such a conditional election would necessitate a succession of thoughts in the mind of God, as God's knowledge would, in this context, be contingent on the wills of contingent creatures. Additional truths could be extrapolated from this, but one is instead compelled to imagine that Clark’s intention was to show much more information can be drawn from Scripture than one might guess at first glance. For his intelligent eschewal of the idle speculations of the world and for so clearly vindicating the word of truth, Gordon Clark deserves the commendation and thanks of all those who are still running the race.