Showing posts with label Total Depravity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Total Depravity. Show all posts

Friday, April 5, 2024

The Clark Debate, The Calvin Forum, and the Intellect of Man

I recently read a few references to Gordon Clark in The Calvin Forum, a periodical which ran from 1935-1956. One such instance is the following which was written by Richard W. Gray, a member of five-person committee that was commissioned by the twelfth general assembly "TO CONSIDER THE DOCTRINAL PORTION OF THE COMPLAINT OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE PRESBYTERY OF PHILADELPHIA." Gray writes: 

A caucus of leaders had met prior to the First General Assembly. Those leaders included Dr. Machen and certain men involved in the present controversy. These men were zealous for a pure Calvinistic church as is manifest by the series of articles to which Mr. Heerema referred, "The Reformed Faith and Modern Substitutes." This caucus picked Dr. Gordon H. Clark to nominate Dr. Machen. At that time his differences with Dr. Cornelius Van Til were well known, as those who were students at Westminster Seminary at that time can testify. Prior to that time his article, "Determinism and Responsibility," which is the basis for one of the four parts of the Complaint lodged against him, had been printed in The Evangelical Quarterly (January, 1932). That those views which were then looked upon as differences within the orbit of the Reformed Faith should today be Complained against as opposed to "some of the most central doctrines of the Christian faith" is, I repeat, strange.

If that can be explained on the basis of the impossibility of bringing to light the views of all the men in the place of leadership in the early days, here are some more recent facts which the average observer of the controversy in the OPC finds difficult to reconcile. 
In May of 1941, Dr. Clark at the invitation of the faculty of Westminster Seminary delivered the Commencement Address. Anyone who knows the care with which the Reformed testimony of that institution is jealously guarded is confused by the fact that less than three years later some of his views are challenged because it is alleged they vitiate some of the central doctrines of the Christian faith. 
Finally, in November, 1943, less than a year before the views of Dr. Clark were challenged, his article, "On the Primacy of the Intellect," appeared in the Westminster Theological Journal, a periodical edited for the faculty of Westminster Seminary. Strange indeed did it sound to hear Dr. Van Til charge on the floor of the General Assembly that this article of Dr. Clark's assumed a Greek rather than a Christian view of the position of man's intellect. This article, which formed part of the basis for another fourth of the Complaint, appeared in a journal dedicated to the purpose of promoting the interests of the Reformed Faith and edited on behalf of several of the Complainants. 
For these paradoxes I am offering no solution. I am simply stating that they are part of the historical record which is the background of the present controversy. And I think it is safe to add that they have contributed to the perplexity of the situation in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.  

I had never heard that differences between Van Til and Clark were well-known as early as 1936. That would indeed beg the question as to why Clark was invited to speak at WTS commencements and write in the WTJ. Given the similarity in origin of WTS and the OPC, it would be hard to understand an argument that the first 15 years of WTS had a lower bar for Reformed input than those standards by which prospective OPC ministers were measured.

I was also unaware that a caucus of men voted for Clark to nominate Machen as the first OPC GA moderator. From the records of The Presbyterian Guardian, it appears John Murray was one of the men in said caucus, as it is he who authored numerous articles by the title of "The Reformed Faith and Modern Substitutes" (and, as Gray says, was also a complainant). This is interesting in that John Muether writes that Arthur Kuschke told him the 1940s ordeal is "better described as the Clark-Murray debate" as opposed to Clark-Van Til (Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, pg. 107).

The statement by Gray is from just one from a series of exchanges between he and Edward Heerema in The Calvin Forum during 1946-1947. The back-and-forth covers several topics, one of which is (in contemporary times) a relatively undiscussed portion of The Complaint:
Dr. Clark does not deny the necessity or the fact of regeneration but he makes no absolute qualitative distinction between the knowledge of the unregenerate man and the knowledge of the regenerate man. With the same ease, the same “common sense”, the unregenerate and the regenerate man can understand propositions revealed to man (p. 20; 28:13-16; 31:13-17; 34:13-35:2).

The clear implication is that the complainants believed that unregenerates cannot "understand propositions revealed to man." Here is Clark's own response to this charge in The Answer:

If the complainants had quoted these passages from the transcript instead of merely referring to them, everyone could have seen that all but the last have nothing to do with the matter of regeneration, and that the last is contradictory to their assertion. The discussion had entered on the proposition “two times two equals four.” Dr. Clark had asserted that any man who knows this proposition knows it by means of the definitions of the numbers and by the laws of logic. Then the transcript continues: “Q. Where do we get those laws of logic? A. ‘Every man that cometh into the world.’ (Obviously the transcript omits part of the quotation.) Q. Is it possible that by the effective sin, man will not be able to deduce by the propositions concerning God? A. That is often the case.” In other words, the complainants imply that Dr. Clark holds that regeneration does not renew the mind or that sin has not affected it; whereas Dr. Clark said specifically that sin often causes men to commit logical fallacies. Thus the complainants cite evidence that is not only irrelevant, but also evidence that contradicts their charge. Some further study of the knowledge of a regenerate man and of an unregenerate man might prove profitable, but the subject can be accorded only the briefest mention. Both the regenerate and the unregenerate can with the same ease understand the proposition, Christ died for sinners. Regeneration, in spite of the theory of the Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these words. The difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate lies in the fact that the former believes the proposition and the latter does not. The regenerate acknowledges Christ as Lord; the other does not. The one is a willing subject; the other is a rebel. Regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding propositions. An unregenerate man may understand the proposition “Christ died for sinners,” but far from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be false. Strictly speaking he knows only that “the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners.” When he is regenerated, his understanding of the proposition may undergo no change at all; what happens is that he now accepts as true what previously he merely understood. He no longer knows merely “the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners”; he now knows “Christ died for sinners.”

While that may suffice as a refutation, at the same time, it may also be of help to provide more information on the subsequent historical events with an aim to set a fuller context for just what was important about the 1940s OPC debate. Last year, I wrote quite a long post on the question of intellectual "understanding" as well as the distinct question of whether unregenerates can "know" truth (link). 

Since then, I've come across further details. Something of a side note the The Calvin Forum is that Fled Klooster's 1951 dissertation on The Incomprehensibility of God in the Orthodox Presbyterian Conflict makes an elementary blunder on this subject. Klooster writes:

Clark holds that the proposition and the knowledge of the proposition are identical. Therefore since the proposition as an object of knowledge is the same for both God and man, their knowledge of that particular proposition in its minimal significance is also identical. The knowledge a regenerate man has of the proposition, "Christ died for our sins’, is also the same as that which an unregenerate may have. The only difference is that the regenerate believes it and appropriates it. Therefore even the knowledge an unregenerate man has of the proposition, Christ died for our sins, can be identical with God's knowledge of that proposition.

Notice that Clark never held that “Christ died for our sins” is something that unregenerates can know. One only has to read "The Answer" carefully to see that Clark held, "unregenerate man may understand the proposition “Christ died for sinners,” but far from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be false."

Thus, Klooster makes a double mistake in 1) conflating Christ's dying for "our sins" (about which Clark never spoke in the context of unregenerates) with Christ's dying for "sinners" and 2) supposing Clark believed that unregenerates know the proposition "Christ died for sinners" (because unregenerates do not believe said proposition, Clark points out they cannot "know" it).

Returning to Gray's reference to a speech in which Clark silenced his critics, more information would be possible were it not for the unfortunate pragmatism that the minutes of church assemblies can be only so detailed. For example, the Thirteenth General Assembly of the OPC does not contain any record of Gray's following account which took place during said assembly: 

While much of the discussion has been too abstruse for the average person, one statement of Dr. Clark's has been widely quoted as. a simple and clear evidence of his "error." I refer to the words, "regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding propositions" (such as "Christ died for sinners"). On the floor of the assembly Dr. Clark silenced the criticism of this statement by quoting from Berkhof's formulation of historical faith and James Buchanan's work on the Holy Spirit.  

It would be helpful to have the references Gray had in mind, and I'll return to this question below. 

Now, as I mentioned above, Gray was corresponding (sparring might be a better adjective) with Edward Heerema, a minister and son-in-law of R. B. Kuiper, an original signer of "The Complaint." Here is how Heerema replied to Gray's statement:

At one point Prof. R. B. Kuiper declared that a vote favoring Dr. Clark would not end the "Clark case'', as some had indicated in their remarks, but would rather for him be only the beginning, as he would fight for these "precious" doctrines to his dying breath... 
In his letter Mr. Gray asserts that on a particular point Dr. Clark "silenced" the criticism by quoting from two well-known authors. Whether Dr. Clark actually "silenced" his critics on this important point still remains to be seen, of course. 
It seems Heerema himself was not content to remain silent, for while there is no record (of which I'm aware) of an engagement with Clark's sources, he wrote a book called Whither the Orthodox Presbyterian Church? which, as reported by John Muether, "contained the absurd claim that Clark was an Arminian" (Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, pg. 107). While I don't have access to Heerema's book, it seems he explains his reasoning in the April 1947 edition of The Calvin Forum: 

Men who take such a faulty and weak attitude toward the autonomous will of man that lies at the heart of Arminianism can be expected to have little trouble with Dr. Clark's notion of the autonomous intellect of man. The careful biblical theologian has always looked upon any concession to the autonomy of man as the theological poison. Views such as. those described above are quite out of harmony with Reformed theology's unqualified attitude on this fundamental and cardinal point. 
That Dr. Clark's theology has at its heart the conception of the autonomous intellect of man seems quite clear to the undersigned. He freely admits that he gets his definition of truth, not from exegetical considerations, but from "common sense." He has written that "regeneration ... is not a change in the understanding of these words (Christ died for sinners)." The same notion is imbedded in his article "On the Primacy of the Intellect" appearing in The Westminster Theological Journal of May, 1943. One of Dr. Clark's most ardent supporters is constantly stressing at every available opportunity that regenerate and unregenerate man have the knowing element (notitia) of saving faith in common, without distinction. 
It must be punctually observed that by no means all who voted in favor of Dr. Clark at the 1946 assembly subscribe to the views on Arminianism discussed above. Also, it must be noted that the above discussion must not be interpreted to indicate that Dr. Clark holds these views. Furthermore, I would not be understood as questioning the sincerity of the above-mentioned men in their profession of the Reformed faith. But that their views on the important matter in question are erroneous appears to the undersigned to admit of no serious doubt. 

This non sequitur by Heerema led to a response from Floyd Hamilton and Clark himself in the following issue. Clark's response to Heerema was terse:

Who these men are who hold to the autonomy of the will, I do not know. None of my friends hold such a view. But let them speak for themselves. 

What I wish particularly to make clear is that I do not and never have held to the autonomy of the intellect. Mr. Heerema's statement of my opinions is as far from the truth as it can possibly be. 

The unfortunate controversy about which Mr. Heerema writes would lose one of its unfortunate characteristics, if Mr. Heerema would determine what the truth is before he publishes his opinions. 

Hamilton's response is more extensive and covers a wider variety of issues than the subject of the regenerate or unregenerate intellect. I invite readers to peruse that on there own, but one valuable piece of information - which functions a something of a tangent to the foregoing - should not be missed: 

...this "program of action" was first conceived by four ministers in consultation on April 18th, a month after Clark had been passed for licensure by a large majority of presbytery. After sending out the first section in mimeographed form to a number of other ministers, suggestions were received, and it was put into final form, as quoted above, with the Specific Objectives added, on May 12th, 1944. Dr. Clark was licensed on July 7, 1944, and it was voted to ordain him, at that meeting. He was ordained shortly afterward. 

Mr. Heerema has put the cart before the horse in this matter. One of the factors that led to the formulation of the "program for action" was the determined opposition to Dr. Clark of the men who afterwards became the Complainants, at the March 20th, 1944, presbytery meeting. 

That is, Hamilton refutes something mentioned by Heerema in a previous issue: "that the 'program of action' to which Mr. Heerema refers (p. 196) was antecedent to the Clark Case." Hamilton's historical chronology helps correct a false caricature by Heerema regarding ulterior motives for Clark's ordination. 

It also serves to rectify the repetition of Heerema's mistake (and, frankly, glaring omission of Hamilton's correction) by Michael Hakkenburg in "The Battle over the Ordination of Gordon H. Clark, 1943-1948" (Pressing Toward the Mark, pgs. 343ff.), which John Muether once called "the best treatment of the Clark controversy" (link). Heerema backpedaled rather quickly in the next issue:
In this connection I wish to make a correction. In a previous letter (November 1946) I stated that "there were those who sought the ordination of Dr. Clark for the express purpose of gaining his ability and prestige to further a particular program of action in the church." In private correspondence some of Dr. Clark's most persistent supporters have disavowed such a motivation. I must recognize this disavowal, and am therefore glad to withdraw this particular statement regarding the attitude expressed in the "program for action" and accompanying correspondence. 
Sadly, Hakkenburg also fails to recognize this withdrawal. While the article is relatively nuanced, these exclusions lead him to a framing of the events of the 1940s that does not include important and relevant facts.
 
Heerema further responded to Hamilton and Clark with a blatant obfuscation: "I was not saying that any man in the O.P.C. held to 'the autonomy of the will'." I suppose an apology would have been too much to ask for? On the contrary, Heerema doubled-down and contradicted himself within the span of two paragraphs!

...both Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Clark reject my statements attributing to Dr. Clark a "notion of the autonomous intellect of man". Permit me to present one quotation from the Answer (to the original Complaint), and I shall let the reader decide the issue for himself. This is the quotation: "Both the regenerate and the unregenerate can with the same ease understand the proposition, Christ died for sinners. Regeneration, in spite of the theory of the Complaint, is not a change in the understanding of these words. The difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate lies in the fact that the former believes the proposition and the latter does not. The regenerate acknowledges Christ as Lord, the other does not. The one is a willing subject, the other is a rebel. Regeneration is not necessarily a change in understanding propositions. An unregenerate man may understand the proposition 'Christ died for sinners', but far from knowing it to be true, he thinks it to be false. Strictly speaking he knows only that 'the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners'. When he is regenerated, his understanding of the proposition may undergo no change at all; what happens is that he now accepts as true what previously he merely understood. He no longer knows merely 'the Scriptures teach Christ died for sinners'; he now knows 'Christ died for sinners'." (p. 32f.), (By an autonomous intellect the undersigned means an intellect which, as intellect, can function in the process of salvation without being affected in that function either by total depravity or regeneration. In either state the intellect can understand propositions of saving truth. It is autonomous, then, in that it functions under its own power, without needing the enabling power of divine grace to function as intellect in the process of salvation.)

It is as if Heerema et al. - for Heerema reports that John Murray "made it plain at the assembly that the O.P.C. cannot tolerate the views of Clark, Hamilton, et alii, on the question of the effects of sin and regeneration on the intellect of man" - were oblivious to James 2:19. To affirm one understands (or even believes!) true (and theological!) propositions is an entirely distinct issue from total depravity and salvation. Merely understanding a true proposition is clearly insufficient for ethical good and salvation. "Autonomy" is a red herring.

That Heerema reports Hamilton was not sent to Korea because "he had left doubt in the minds of those on the committee as to the accuracy of his views on the influence of sin and regeneration on the human intellect" is a shameful admission. It is yet another fact which Hakkenburg fails to report.

Finally, to return to the aforementioned curiosity regarding which references Gray alluded to in Clark's speech during the OPC's thirteenth general assembly, I wondered whether it might be possible to find what Clark quoted. The following are my guesses. From James Buchanan's The Office and Work of the Holy Spirit:

Being an appropriate means, adapted to the faculties of the human mind, there can be no reason to doubt that the Bible, like any other book, may convey much instruction to an unrenewed man. When it is affirmed that a natural man cannot know the things of the Spirit of God, it is not implied that the Bible is unintelligibly written, or that he cannot understand the sense and meaning of scriptural propositions, so as to be able to give a rational account of them; for he may investigate the literal meaning of Scripture, and, in doing so, may attach a definite idea to many of its statements - may be able to see their mutual relations - to reason upon them, and even to expound them; and yet, in the scriptural sense, he may be in darkness notwithstanding. There are truths in the Bible which admit of being recognized, and even proved by natural reason, 'for the things of a man may be known by the spirit of man which is in him;' and even 'the things of the Spirit,' when revealed, may be so far understood as to affect and impress the mind which is nevertheless unconverted... 
The natural man is capable of acquiring, by the use of his rational faculties, such an acquaintance with the truths of God's Word as is sufficient to make him responsible for his treatment of it. Not to enlarge upon other points, let us take the doctrine which affirms the darkness of the human understanding, and the necessity of the enlightening grace of the Holy Spirit, which is often supposed to destroy the grounds of human responsibility in this respect; unless he be taught of God, he cannot have such an experimental knowledge of that doctrine as belongs to the exercised believer, and probably he will not submit to it; but it is stated, nevertheless, in plain intelligible language. He cannot read his Bible without being made aware that it contains this truth, nor can he exercise his understanding upon it, without acquiring some general knowledge of its import; and that knowledge, although neither spiritual nor saving, is amply sufficient as a ground of moral obligation. And farther, he may also learn from the same source, and in the same way, how it is that the enlightening grace of the Spirit is obtained, for he cannot read such passages as these: 'If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him;' and, 'If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more will your Father in heaven give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him? - he cannot read such passages as these without forming some notion of prayer as the means by which his natural darkness may be dispelled; and if, notwithstanding his clear natural perception of such doctrines, he either refuses to believe them, or persists in neglecting prayer for the Holy Spirit, he must be dealt with hereafter on a very different principle, and tried by a very different rule of judgment from that which alone is applicable to those who have no Bible to teach them, or no rational mind to be taught. You cannot have sat under a Gospel ministry for years without acquiring such knowledge as is abundantly sufficient to lay you under the most weighty responsibilities... 

In Berkhof's The History of Christian Doctrines, my best guess is that Clark may have cited the following:

It asserted the doctrine of original sin in the strict sense of the word. Since Adam was the legal representative of all his descendants, the guilt of his first sin is imputed to them, and in consequence the corruption of human nature is also propagated to them. They are totally corrupt, that is, corrupt in every part of their being and so corrupt that they cannot do any spiritual good and cannot make a single effort to restore the broken relationship with God. At the same time the Canons also say: "There remain, however, in man since the fall, the glimmerings of natural light, whereby he retains some knowledge of God, of natural things, and of the difference between good and evil, and discovers some regard for virtue, good order in society, and for maintaining an orderly external deportment. But so far is this light of nature from being sufficient to bring him to a saving knowledge of God, that he is incapable of using it aright even in things natural and civil." III and IV, Art 4. 

Regeneration is regarded as strictly monergistic, and not at all as the work of God and man. Without regenerating grace no one can turn to God, and none can accept the offer of salvation apart from an efficient act of God founded on election. Yet salvation is offered in all seriousness to all who hear the Gospel on condition of faith and repentance. They who are lost will have only themselves to blame.

For readers who find this time period as fascinating as I do, I've recently written some thoughts on the alethiology of Clark and the complainants as well as on the seeming irrelevance of an "archetype-ectype" distinction to the 1940s debate here. Several of my posts include references to some as-yet unpublished material written by Clark. 

Sunday, December 31, 2023

Monkey See, Monkey Don't

I recently talked to someone who observed that Eastern Orthodox apologists have, in the past decade or so, been more apt to try appropriating Reformed apologetics. I've witnessed the same tendency in the likes of Jay Dyer, Joshua Schooping (before he became disillusioned regarding Eastern Orthodoxy), and others I've happened across now and then.

Truth is attractive; hence, many of these Eastern Orthodox apologists once nominally identified as Reformed Christians. As for what reason those who identify as formerly Reformed fall away from the truth, I give some possible reasons here. Regardless, on one level, that such persons retain some truths they learned even after public deconversion is unsurprising. On another level, it is surprising that such apologists have not, by and large, critically self-reflected on whether a fundamentally Reformed apologetic can makes sense within the context of a non-Reformed faith. 

For example, I was recently linked to this article by an Eastern Orthodox philosopher name Erik Sorem. A glaring omission in it - and in Eastern Orthodox apologetics in general - is the connection between apologetics and anthropology. For the Reformed presuppositionalist, one practical purpose for apologetics may be to undermine the false confidence of unbelievers. However, the Reformed Christian acknowledges that man's sinful rebelliousness to God cannot solely be overcome by argumentation. Because of the extent of man's sinfulness, the Holy Spirit must graciously change the mind of the rebellious apart from the help of the rebellious. There is no synergy in regeneration.

By comparison, the author of this article rightly denies the concept of epistemic neutrality but fails to situate the explanation for his denial within the context of a Reformed anthropology, particularly the doctrine of original sin. Thus, the Eastern Orthodox apologist may try to borrow from Reformed apologetics, but their denial of the need for monergistic regeneration both understates man's sinfulness and thereby undercuts any nominal agreement that an "autonomous" epistemology will be false. Gordon Clark didn't write about Eastern Orthodoxy very much, but here's one reference that brings with it a useful reminder:
Eastern orthodoxy stresses the rational nature of man and insists that man remains man after the fall. So far, so good. But the value of this sound position is vitiated by the Eastern churches' failure to recognize the extent of the fall and therefore their inability to see the full need of grace. Some of their theologians toy with a verbally pleasing analogy: as God became man, so man will become God. This is similar to the Gnostic notion that salvation is deification. Partly because of this, some very conservative Protestants have reacted against the identification of the image as reason, believing that this identification implies a superficial view of sin. The implication, however, is fallacious and the reaction extreme. (link)
Speaking of Clark, in my experience, most Eastern Orthodox apologists find their roots in other presuppositionalists such as Bahnsen, Frame, or Van Til (cf. Sorem's article above). Thus, some Eastern Orthodox apologists are unaware that grounding one's justification for belief in the Trinity in Scripture makes more sense than grounding one's justification for belief in Scripture in the Trinity (link; cf. my discussion of transcendental argumentation here and here). 

Of course, there is no question that the Trinity ontologically precede the Scriptures, but I have never witnessed one who takes the Trinity as his epistemic foundation be able to deduce, say, the canon of Scripture. On the other hand, one who takes Scripture as his epistemic foundation may be able to deduce the doctrine of the Trinity. The upshot of this is that presuppositionalism is tied to the doctrines of sola scriptura, perspicuity, self-authenticity, etc. As with the anthropological objection, this epistemic foundations objection is fatal to Eastern Orthodox apologetics and the epistemology its apologists try to defend. 

Such are the general problems with Eastern Orthodox persons who attempt to co-opt presuppositionalism. There are more particular problems I've observed, ones which stem from attempting to follow the Van Tilian brand of presuppositionalism (as all the Eastern Orthodox apologists I have in mind tend to do). 

For instance, I don't know to what extent Eastern Orthodox apologists are familiar with contemporary epistemology - in some cases, self-admittedly not (see Jay Dyer at minute mark 2:03:00 here, for example) - but what I tend to read or hear basic mistakes such as what the meaning of classical foundationalism even is! 

Classical foundationalism is a theory regarding the structure of epistemic justification. In contrast to Sorem's apparent misunderstanding (in which he writes, "Presuppositional apologetics, first and foremost rejected...  classical foundationalism"; see pg. 12ff of his article), foundationalism as such says nothing about whether such justificatory foundations are or must be "autonomous" or "theonomous." Sorem uses the guilt by association fallacy and/or genetic fallacy when he dismisses classical foundationalism seemingly for no other reason than that Aristotle accepted natural theology, that empiricism is flawed, etc. It is painfully apparent Sorem is unaware of theistic foundationalists such as Gordon Clark. 

Ironically, the sort of coherentism Sorem goes on to espouse (see footnote 28) itself collapses into foundationalism, as epistemologists such as Peter Klein have noted: 
The function of the type of reasoning we are considering is to enhance the epistemic status of our belief-states with their propositional contents, and circular reasoning cannot do that. It might appear that some progress has been made when a reason for y, namely x, is offered, but when it turns out that the reason for x is nothing other than y, it is pyrrhic progress.

The second, more plausible form of coherentism - emergent of holistic coherentism - holds that when our reasons have a reciprocal structure they are all at least prima facie justified. The epistemic status of all members of the coherent set is determined by the degree to which the propositions in the set are R-related plus, perhaps, some other properties obtaining. If x and y are members of the coherent set {x, y, ...} and xRy and yRx, it is not x that makes y justified and it is not y that makes x justified, rather what contributes to making each of them justified is that they are members of a coherent set. Being a member of such a set makes them prima facie justified, or, at least contributes significantly to each being prima facie justified (see BonJour 1989). I will not contest that in this paper. What is important to see here is that emergent coherentism, as Ernest Sosa has shown, is a form of foundationalism (Sosa, 1980). The foundational property is being a member of a coherent set of propositions. This form of coherentism is just as much a foundationalist account as, say, an account that takes all believed propositions which represent my conscious mental states as (at least) prima facie justified. Thus, any rapprochement with foundationalism is applicable to emergent coherentism as well." (Klein, Ad Infinitum, pgs. 110-111)
Likewise, Jay Dyer also misunderstands this (see ~minute mark 1:43:00 in the aforementioned video). This is especially inexcusable in that both Dyer and Sorem are aware of and have approvingly cited a paper that makes the same point Klein does above! Both of the apologists recommend Russell Manion's "The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism," in which he writes:
Circularity is also not satisfactory, but it is much more interesting. Advocates of a philosophical position called coherentism think they have beaten the foundation dilemma. They point out that beliefs do not neatly divide into the categories of foundational beliefs and justified beliefs. All our beliefs are related to one another in the form of a coherent web. Some subset of our beliefs may be more important and juridical than other beliefs, but all beliefs hang on all other beliefs, and nothing is foundational. 
But as Michael Depaul in his article “Coherentism” points out, coherentism really doesn’t escape the foundational problem at all. It is simply another “version of foundationalism that holds all beliefs to be foundational.” (link)
Further, Dyer and Sorem also miss the important difference between one's having noninferential knowledge and one's defending said knowledge (link, link, link). The structure of one's knowledge - assuming one has "knowledge" (and here I am speaking of "knowledge" about which one may have infallible assurance) - must be founded on divine revelation. 

Now, any defense of our knowledge will of course presuppose that we do indeed have knowledge, but this just means that our defenses or articulations of of our epistemology will ultimately derive from our said foundation, our belief in which is intrinsically justified and meaningful.

So even if circularity appears in one's apologetic argumentation - as Clark might put it, axioms leads to certain theorems, and theorems can help inform whether an axiom has confirmatory evidence or is disconfirmed (e.g. Clark and His Critics, 2007, pg. 53) - it is nevertheless true that we can know the epistemic foundation of revelation without requiring an argument for it. As I suggested earlier, Eastern Orthodox confusion on these points may stem from that they generally follow Van Tilian presuppositionalism, apologists who have discussed epistemic justification in terms of coherence or circularity (e.g. link). 

A side point: contemporary epistemologists such as Richard Fumerton also make use of what are called "conceptual regress arguments" (which are distinct from justificatory regress arguments) to illustrate that the meaning of terms must be intrinsic:
Consider an analogy. One of the earliest distinctions made in ethics is the distinction between different ways in which something can be good. Some things, like taking blood-pressure medication, are good only as a means to something else that is good (perhaps health of the happiness that comes from being in good health). But, one might argue, it can't be the case the everything that is good is good only as means to something else that is good. While we can (partially) define being good as a means in terms of having good outcomes, we cannot complete our definition of goodness this way. To find, even in thought, the source of goodness, we need to form the thought of something that is good in itself (intrinsically good, good just in virtue of what it is).

The suggestion here is that inferential justification stands to noninferential justification as being good as a means stands to being good in itself. (Foundationalism, Cambridge Elements in Epistemology, pg. 8)
Now, Clark and I might nuance where meaning is to be found (e.g. propositions vs. concepts) - and Fumerton in particular might not quarrel with this - but in any case, anyone who has read Clark's book on John Dewey (1963) will recognize Clark's critique of Instrumentalism to be essentially the same as what Fumerton here states. Fumerton also gives the helpful example on the same page of the above work of what it means to be a "descendant": it is to be a child of someone, or a child of a child of someone, or a child of a child of a child of someone, etc. At some point, the ancestor has to make an appearance for it to be meaningful to call a person a "descendant." Recursion eventually bottoms out in foundations.

I'll add to what Fumerton says against an implicitly infinitist view of meaning. When we ask someone to explain what they mean by something like "goodness," we tend to have the expectation that the definiendum won't occur in any attempted definition. If I ask, "what is free choice?" and an Arminian responds, "the ability to choose" (which happened quite often when I used to dialogue with Arminians), I would have to point out that they are repeating what I am asking for them to define (the definiendum) in their attempted definition. That is, such an Arminian has not made any clearer what they mean by "free choice." Of course, I would not childishly ask them to define "free choice" ad infinitum, but the goal was, at some point, to consider a stated definition as symbolizing an intrinsically meaningful proposition... and this is a strike against a circularist view of meaning which, by analogy, helps argue a case for epistemic foundationalism over against epistemic coherentism.

Finally, suppose an Eastern Orthodox apologist were to attempt to reformulate presuppositionalism to be more in line with Clark's view. If they're willing to copy one Reformed view, why not a better one? If one monkey sees another swinging like an Olympic gymnast from one branch of philosophy, he might think to try to graft that branch onto his own tree. Well, because philosophy is interconnected, the monkey's attempt to graft the good branch onto a rotten tree won't take. How much less successful the subsequent mental gymnastics will be as the monkey tries and fails to swing from that branch!

That is, I've already outlined tensions regarding the anthropology and the doctrine of Scripture of Eastern orthodoxy and its presuppositionalist embezzelment. But an Eastern Orthodox apologist has further problems given their theology proper, some of which I've already outlined here and will continue to build a case against now. For instance, take a look at what Eastern Orthodox apologist Perry Robinson admits:
For my part, I affirm rather that God is more than his revelation to put it in biblical terms. Contrary to the Reformed (and the Lutherans) and Rome, metaphysics applies to everything except God ad intra, which is why for them theology is a science and for us it is about the spiritual life in Christ. (link)
This is quite similar to what Eduard Borysov says in "The Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Pavel Florensky and John Meyendorff: A Critical Examination" (Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 2011):
Palamas's theology of energies, according to Meyendorff, has no philosophical rationale behind it. However, one should not forget that the philosophical notions of hypostasis, nature, and energies played a key role in the Christological controversies and had become the basic principles for Palamas's theology proper as well as his soteriology. God is, by definition, unrelated to and above any essence, hence he is unknown by any essence. (Gregory Palamas, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, § 3.2.24, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), 95)
Borysov extends the logic of Robinson's statement: insofar as metaphysics and epistemology are intertwined, to say that there can be no divine metaphysics means there can be no knowledge of God. Now compare these statements to what Eastern Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky says:
All the Fathers of the Church, both of East and of West, are agreed in seeing a certain co-ordination, a primordial correspondence between the being of man and the being of God in the fact of the creation of man in the image and likeness of God. (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pg. 114)
Robinson and Borysov's statements on metaphysics and epistemology logically extend to anthropology. If metaphysics don't apply to God such that He is unrelated to and above mankind, then there is no "correspondence," "image," or "likeness" of God in man. Considering the emphases Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to put on the early church fathers, it is almost as if the Eastern Orthodox position doesn't cohere at all! Now, where does this finally lead? Palamas says:
...God is not only beyond knowledge, but also beyond unknowing; His revelation itself is also truly a mystery of a most divine and extraordinary kind, since the divine manifestations, even if symbolic, remain unknowable by reason of their transcendence. They appear, in fact, according to a law which is not appropriate to either human or divine nature - being, as it were, for us yet beyond us - so that no name can properly describe them. (The Triads, pg. 32)
Following the logic all the way down, the doctrine of Scripture (and divine revelation) is also destructed. The disharmony of Eastern Orthodoxy leads its apologists to defend they know not what. What one needs for a coherent worldview is not Neo-Orthodoxy or Eastern Orthodoxy but Scriptural orthodoxy:
In reaction against the optimistic modernism of the nineteenth century, contemporary neo-orthodoxy (q.v.) has insisted on the transcendence of God. But it has distorted the biblical concept of transcendence to the degree of making God completely unknowable. Some of their phraseology may be repeated as examples. God has been called the Wholly-Other. Brunner writes, “God can, when he wants to, speak his word even through false doctrine.” Another author denies that a proposition can have the same meaning for man as it does for God. Several theologians collaborated to say that “we dare not maintain that his (God’s) knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point.”

Now, it seems obvious that if a man knows any truth at all, he must know a truth that God knows, for God knows all truths. A sentence must mean to a man who knows its meaning precisely what it means to God; for if the man does not know God’s meaning, he does not know the meaning of the sentence. Hence, if man is to know anything, it cannot be denied that there are points of coincidence between human and divine knowledge. Similarly God cannot be Wholly-Other, for this would deny that man was created in the image of God. (link)
For those interested in further reading, I recommend Steve Hays's interactions with EO apologists; e.g. on the issue of divine transcendence, see here.

Saturday, July 16, 2011

Vos on the Development of the Noachian Epoch

A few posts ago, I noted a few different organizing principles one might use when studying Scripture. Because I have been reading Vos' Biblical Theology, that approach has recently been at the forefront of my mind. Vos makes some insightful points on the big picture of Genesis 4:1-6:7 which prompted me to think about and make connections in redemptive history in a way that I would probably not have thought to do had I, like I am often inclined to do, broken down the passage analytically. Here is what Vos has to say:

Two features characterize the revelation of [the development of the Noachian] period. In the first place, its significance lies not in the sphere of redemption, but in the sphere of the natural development of the race, although it has ultimately an important bearing on the subsequent progress of redemption. Secondly, revelation here bears on the whole a negative rather than positive character. It contents itself with bestowing a minimum of grace. A minimum could not be avoided either in the sphere of nature or of redemption, because in the former sphere, without at least some degree of divine interposition, collapse of the world-fabric would have resulted, and in the latter the continuity of fulfilment of the promise [cf. Genesis 3:15] would have been broken off, had special grace been entirely withdrawn. These two features find their explanation in the purpose of the period in general. It was intended to bring out the consequences of sin when left so far as possible to itself. Had God permitted grace freely to flow out into the world and to gather great strength within a short period, then the true nature and consequences of sin would have been very imperfectly disclosed. Man would have ascribed to his own relative goodness what was in reality a product of the grace of God. Hence, before the work of redemption is further carried out, the downward tendency of sin is clearly illustrated, in order that subsequently in the light of this downgrade movement the true divine cause of the upward course of redemption might be appreciated. This constitutes the indirect bearing of the period under review on redemption.
...We have here a story of rapid degeneration, so guided by God as to bring out the inherent tendency of sin to lead to ruin, and its power to corrupt and debase whatever of good might still develop. So far as this circle of humanity is concerned, the facts bear out the interpretation above put upon the period. (pgs. 45-46)

Vos proceeds to specify the points in the narrative which support his thesis that, aside from the parenthetical 4:25-5:32 - which is important insofar as it shows the promise of Genesis 3:15 has not been forgotten - the period immediately following the exile from Eden is designed to show the full effects of sin. In short, generations became increasingly utterly depraved from Cain to Lamech and from Lamech to mankind in general:

In the strongest terms the extreme wickedness reached at the end of the [Noachian] period is described. The points brought out are firstly: the intensity and extent of evil ('great in the earth'); secondly: its inwardness ('every imagination of the thoughts of his heart'); thirdly: the absoluteness of the sway of evil excluding everything good ('only evil'); fourthly: the habitual, continuous working of evil ('all the day'). The same judgment or irremediable wickedness is even more emphatically affirmed in the words: 'It repented Jehovah that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart.' In anthropomorphic fashion this expresses the idea that the development of mankind frustrated the end for which God had placed man on the earth. (pgs. 50-51)

This reminded me that the pre-Noahic moral declension in which there existed a vastly outnumbered elect remnant typifies the eschatological tribulation period just prior to Christ's second coming (cf. Matthew 24:21-22, 37-44; Luke 17:26-37; 2 Peter 3:5-7, 10-13). It's one thing to look at those New Testament passages and see that fact stated, but to actually think about it in terms similar to how Vos put it provides the perspective I suspect Jesus and Peter meant for their audiences. In other words, it's one thing to read Scripture, it's another to study it. And given the various methods by which Scripture can be studied, I'm realizing how much more I have to learn.

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Conclusion

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Concluding Statement

Since Robert has decided to abandon the debate, this will function more as a commentary on Robert’s logical and exegetical fallacies in his thirty page second rebuttal, most of which I could not have otherwise hoped to address, given its inordinate length and the number of mistakes it contains. A careful reader will observe that many objections Robert makes in his second rebuttal are the same one’s I either refuted or anticipated in my opening statement and two rebuttals:

- Choice isn’t incompatible with Calvinism, contrary to Robert’s opening “joke.” (see: my opening statement).
- Robert’s implicit understanding of Ezekiel 18 would suggest that God works out things which are not according to His good pleasure (see: my first rebuttal and Robert’s evasive answer to my first and seventh cross-examination question).
- One’s will is not forced if one acts according to desires determined by God (see: opening statement). That these desires are determined by God are irrelevant to the point in question, viz. whether or not God actually does determine our desires. Robert assumes the answer is no and uses this to pit man’s will against God’s determinative decree, as though man possesses autonomous desires which God negates. That, obviously, is question-begging.
- Robert’s opinion of the potter-clay motif is utterly without exegetical support (see: my first rebuttal).
- I wrote “God cannot do certain things like rape, murder, lie, deceive, et al.,” and Robert replied that this is contradictory [essentially] because a God who predestines people to Hell cannot love them. Firstly, that a red herring. It has nothing to do with my statement. Secondly, it is unfortunate Robert did not stick around to explain my ninth cross-examination question. That God has a special love for a particular, unconditionally chosen group of people does not imply God is deceitful. Would Robert love another’s child as much as his own?
- Throughout the debate, Robert consistently exhibited no idea what it biblically means to be a respecter of persons (see: my second rebuttal). Furthermore, Robert constantly conflated the distinction between the unconditional nature of decrees like election and reprobation as opposed to conditional decrees like justification and condemnation (see: my second rebuttal).
- Robert could offer no solution to the question of God’s eternal omniscience (see: first rebuttal). In fact, Robert’s analogy of the parent who predicts his child’s behavior works against Robert, because in it he writes that “but the parent’s knowledge of the child does not [cause] or force the child to fulfil the prediction, because the child might do something quite alternative with which the parent does also equally know.” If that’s the case – if God’s knowledge is not a function of His “prediction” – the only remaining conclusion is that, like Arminius, Robert believes God’s knowledge is a function of His foresight of “free will” (as defined in my opening statement) choices. God’s knowledge, if it is contingent on temporal creatures, is necessarily not eternal. Hence, Robert logically must admit God learns. The alternative is that the parent knows the child because he created (caused) the child to be as he is.
- Robert attempts to interact with Romans 8:32 but ignores my rhetorical questions: “Did Paul not write that those for whom Christ died will freely be given all things (Romans 8:32)? Would “all things” not include the desire to come to and remain in Christ? If Christ died for all men, then, would Robert not have to purport the false doctrine of universalism?”
- Robert never seemed to grasp that I believed that Christ’s atonement was sufficient for all but made only for the elect. Despite his illegitimate appeals to passages which say “whoever does believe will be saved” – as though that implies all could be saved if all believed – I wrote in my opening statement “it is counter-factually true that “if the Father desired to save all men without exception, Christ’s sacrifice was such that all men without exception could have been saved.”” Robert’s misunderstanding and refusal to give me the benefit of the doubt until further clarification was, in this case among others, the cause of straw man argumentation.
- John 1:11-13 distinguishes between adoption and regeneration, and Romans 1:16 is a reference to justification, not regeneration. Robert needs to study different soteriological terms. I can’t simplify the arguments I’m making any further than that.
- Robert ignored my exegesis of 1 John 2:2 and 2 Peter 2:1. It is almost as if he didn’t read it at all. My parallel of 1 John 2:2 to John 11:51-52 was seemingly for naught (“What if [I was] one of the scattered children?” is an irrelevant question), and my explanation of the meaning of “agorazo” was likewise ignored.
- Robert ignored my argument from Romans 8:29-30 concerning predication of predestination and the fact unconditional election and reprobation aren’t arbitrary (see: my second rebuttal).

Examining arguments (particularly exegetical) Robert made in his second rebuttal which I had not space to address:

- Robert cites 2 Peter 3:9 and John 3:16 as passages which state God does not wish any should perish. Aside from the tangential biblical problems with this (again, see my first and seventh cross-examination questions), 2 Peter 3:9 is written to the elect and about the elect (to whom has God made promises in verse 9? to whom is God patient in verse 15?) and John 3:16 only states that God loves the world (which has a multiplicity of meanings in Johannine literature; cf. 1:29, 6:33, 17:9, &c.) and that those who do (not “can”) believe will not perish.
- 1 John 2:15-17 is not relevant to Romans 8:7-9. Obedience per the former presupposes regeneration per the latter. And, even when we are commanded to follow a certain precept, it is as Luther observed: “Even grammarians and schoolboys on street corners know that nothing more is signified by verbs in the imperative mood than what ought to be done, and that what is done or can be done should be expressed by words in the indicative. How is it that you theologians are twice as stupid as schoolboys, in that as soon as you get hold of a single imperative verb you infer an indicative meaning, as though the moment a thing is commanded it is done, or can be done?” God commands what we cannot do so that such may be the occasion by which we learn we must absolutely depend upon God.
- Robert cites Genesis 3:9-10 and asks how, if Adam was totally depraved, he could hear God’s voice. Of course, no consistent Calvinist denies men can understand the gospel; we just deny men can believe it. Men are not neutral to the gospel, they are negative, unable to respond positively prior to regeneration. As for why God asked Adam what He was doing (almost as if Robert thinks God didn’t know!), the answer is simple: God often uses questions to prompt a certain line of thought. Example: when God asked Job whether he knew the intricacies of creation, he was indirectly rebuking Job by reminding him of the Creator-creature distinction. Similarly, asking Adam what he did required Adam to address his sin.
- Robert states all men possess “the image of God and his law resides in [all] of mankind’s hearts.” Since mankind’s image is corrupted (hence, we must be conformed to Christ’s image) and only believers with whom God has covenanted have God’s laws written on their hearts (Jeremiah 31:31-34, Hebrews 10:16), Robert is simply wrong.
- That Robert says he would defect to Luciferianism or Gnosticism if he believed Scripture affirms what I believe (which he falsely alleged to be HyperCalvinism) is representative of the fallacies Robert must insert into what is supposed a rational discussion to score emotional points with those who agree with him, thus begging the question as to whether or not he realizes that apostates are never truly saved.
- Robert completely misses the point when I asked him to explain how the fact that faith is pleasing is harmonious with that fact that, prior to regeneration, one cannot please God (Romans 8:8-11).
- Proof-texting (e.g. Robert’s use of Matthew 23:37) is not equivalent to exegesis.
- No explanation was provided as to how I took Arminius “out of context.” Arminius clearly taught one only “might” be saved by Christ’s death, clearly showing the uncertain, unintentional nature of the Arminian’s conception of the atonement.
- All men without distinction (1 Timothy 2:4) is not equivalent to all men without exception.
- I am aware Arminians teach prevenient grace. What Robert never established is how such grace can enable us to choose good with an unchanged, unregenerate nature. I wonder, given Roberts allusion to Acts 21:4-14, if Robert is aware “irresistible grace” only pertains to regeneration.
- Robert’s explanation of imputed guilt is convoluted. Romans 5:18 explicitly teaches men (plural) are condemned for one (singular) transgression. How Robert imagines this to mean men’s guilt is erased is not comprehensible. In context, the free gift of grace lies in the fact Christ merits the justification of the believer, not in some idea that all men without exception are cleansed of the guilt of Adam’s sin. That is opposite the point Paul is making.
- Instead of explaining the meanings of the majority of the passages I cite (e.g. Job 23:13-14), Robert relies on an unsubstantiated assumption (Calvinists deny men can choose) to explain what the text can’t mean rather than explain what it does.
- Robert replies to Lamentations 3:37 as though God passively predestines, i.e. allows. But that concept nowhere appears in the text (nor in Psalm 33:9, for that matter). Also, 3:38 does refer to moral evil, per 39. Sins are moral evil, not natural disaster. Isaiah 10:15 (a context Robert references) indicates God is active, and Robert never responded to that fact Isaiah 45:7 says God creates wickedness.
- Robert anachronistically applies his “multiple wills of God” thesis to Ephesians 1 without further ado.
- Obviously, I could not exegete Romans 9 within the short space I am allowed, but I actually agree with most of what Robert says: chapters 9-11 (the whole of Romans, really) serve to vindicate God’s righteousness per 9:6, God is attempting to display His freedom to sovereignly harden and mercy when He exercises His power over Pharaoh, men who question God’s blameworthiness do overstep their bounds as creation, &c. These points Robert makes are points any Calvinist would agree with. However: Paul does not say men are hardened because they are lost, nor that God actually “makes” and “molds” (certainly not “allows” or “permits”) reprobates like Pharaoh to be as they are (Romans 9:19-20); the idea that Paul’s primary concerns is “national election” in light of (9:6, 24-10:21) is absurd; that Paul uses the middle voice in 9:22 (true enough) is irrelevant, since it is God ho is doing the demonstrating, not man, effectively reversing the point Robert is trying to make; it is unfortunate Robert is so flippant in his referencing of which verb is in the passive voice in verse 23. I don’t know what he is referring to, as both verbs are in the active voice.
- That men are able to choose and that God accordingly responds does not imply man’s wills are autonomous of that God did not decree such should be the case from eternity; likewise, responsibility does not presuppose a “free will.”
- Rejecting universalism does not mean that the logical end of Robert’s position does not lead to universalism. He didn’t seem to understand that, especially with regards to John 6 and the fact that if God draws all and gives all to Christ, all will come and be raised the last day.
- Calvinists don’t deny one can know one is elect; if one believes, one knows he is saved and will remain saved. John wrote so that men would know they possess eternal life. But to know that means one knows he will never perish. Robert’s assertion is vacuous.
- Calvinists teach the need of a general call because no man knows who are among the elect. This should be obvious.
- Robert argues Matt 25:41 proves Hell was not made for men. That hell is said to have been prepared for a particular group does not imply it was prepared for them exclusively. Using the same type of argument, I could say John 10 shows Jesus was died for the elect exclusively (cf. Jude 4).

Final observations:

- Regarding the cross-examination, I think it speaks for itself.
- Quoting apocryphal literature, pagan philosophers, Christian opinions, and writing more than the agreed upon restrictions is not a sufficient substitute for actual exegesis and logical argumentation.
- Copying and pasting the Greek text into a debate doesn’t mean you made a good point (speaking of, it is remarkable that Robert questions the canonicity of Proverbs 16:4, but not Mark 16:16?).
- Compare these two statements Robert made in the debate:

“…TULIP is completely non-biblical, despite apparent scriptures to back up the five points, however the five points associated with Arminianism is completely biblical.”

“It is this final point (the P in TULIP, or as Ryan would name it to be “Eternal Security”) with which I must contend that the Calvinist [may] indeed have a point of truth here.”

Is it not unfortunate that Robert left before he could be fully persuaded of the error of Arminianism? But God works out all things in due time according to His pleasure, even this.
- I truly believe this debate has evinced God as sovereign as Reformed theologians have taught and as deserving of glory as He has declared.

(Word count: 2,280)

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Cross-ex part 4 of 4

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Cross-examination


Question 7 (me): Reply to the following arguments:

1. Those for whom Christ died are freely given all things (Romans 8:32). Reprobates are not freely given all things (e.g. sufficient desire to believe). Therefore, Christ did not die for reprobates.

2. All who are given to Christ by the Father come to Christ (John 6:37). Not all men without exception come to Christ. Therefore, not all men without exception were given to Christ.

3. God does as He pleases (Psalm 115:3). Not all men without exception are saved. Therefore, God was not pleased to save all men without exception.

(Word count: 100)

Answer 7 (Arminian): Let us take the Calvinist’s lens off our eyes when we read your question. Starting with part 1 of your question you declare, “[Those] for whom Christ died...” are you declaring an elect few preordained afore-time, or those elect few that have [decided] through God’s constant calls to our hearts and in his Word, to come to the knowledge of Christ and Salvation? As how I regard myself coming from an extreme depraved state, and thus thereafter, it was [me] who made the choice of wanting Christ in my heart!

Proverbs 1:23
(23) Turn you at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you.

This is why I do not understand God suddenly ‘zapping’ me with some form of irresistible grace, to spark a ‘regeneration’ in me, and thus for me to have faith. Quite the opposite and thus I am thankful to Yeshua for being patient with me while I slowly removed the ignorant mindset during my depraved state. Any Christian here, reading this, will agree with me on the same testimonial basis on how awesome it is when they, through research and a will to search for the truth, stumbled across a wonderful truth in the Gospel.

Even Satanists “look for the truth” but they have yet to find it. Why haven’t they found it yet? First of all, what every human being needs to do is to remove his presuppositions and preconceived or indoctrinated ideologies on religion and start afresh. That is what I did, comparing every religion out there. What have I come to understand now? Proverbs 9:10 so dearly is the answer. As far as the Satanists go, because of their ignorant narrow mindedness to cling onto Luciferianic ideologies even if they honestly declare, “we read the bible also”, Paul gives an answer as to what happens if this is the case, 2 Corinthians 4:4
(4) In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them.

Was I a depraved person during my adventure? Oh yes! Am I as much of a sinner as I was after declaring, “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God”? No! Why? Because this is one of the glorious obvious truths to [know] that Yeshua does exist, and he does mean what he promises, that if I have faith and I lovingly come to understand in all awe and reverent fear of who he really is – he gives me life, truth and a passage unto eternal righteousness (regeneration), John 14:6
(6) Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.

John 11:25-26
(25) Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live:
(26) And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this?

Galatians 6:15
(15) For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.

Don’t equate this line of thought with synergism either. Didn’t Christ do it all on the cross (τετελεσται)? Therefore, how can you (Ryan) declare that the non-elect in whom make [their] own choice on coming to the saving faith of Christ (according to what the Arminianist would say) have personal equal merit within salvation (hence synergism)?

This is ridiculous because he/she who is receiving this awesome [free] gift – cannot be doing any form of merited work! They are simply [receiving] that which is completely undeserved at all! But because God so loved the world – thus he died for all, in this truth, he cries that all should theoretically be in his eternal glory.

Does it mean that God failed if Anton LaVey is not saved? No! Why? Because how can God be blamed conditionally on the choices that Anton LaVey makes; in regards to whether he makes the choice to adhere to Luciferanistic stupidity or the saving Gospel / relationship with Christ?

“All are not saved by Christ’s death, but all which are saved, are saved by Christ’s death: His death is sufficient to save all, as the sun is sufficient to lighten all; but if any man wink, the sun will not give him light.” – Henry Smith

“That mystical Sun of Righteousness (saith St. Ambrose) is risen to all, come to all, did suffer and rise again for all—but if any one doth not believe in Christ, he defrauds himself of the general benefit. As if one shutting the windows should exclude the beams of the sun, the sun is not therefore not risen to all.” - Isaac Barrow

Therefore, “freely given all things” can be seen in the lens of, Revelation 21:7
(7) He that overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will be his God, and he shall be my son.

I did [make] the choice by the way. Anton LaVey likewise had that choice to repent and be saved, until his death of course.

Oh, and let us define “given all things” – because that does not equate, “sufficient desire to believe”.

Are you declaring that since we are automata (as understood by TULIP), that God gives his special ‘elect’ a peculiar cryptograph in their hearts / mind, to [make] them believe!?

Thus if this was the case, obviously Christ would not die for [other] reprobates – because it all comes to an absolute understanding of a [fixed] predestinational / fatalistic ideology that God has already planned even before creation (when he actually planned the Mashiach sacrifice from Genesis 3:15 onwards), who will be saved and who will be damned.

The ridiculous irony that no Calvinist seems to understand is that Ryan Hedrich is as much of a sinner as Anton LaVey was, so why did God choose to regenerate Ryan (towards saving faith; according to TULIP, regeneration precedes faith) over Anton LaVey?

Yes, Anton LaVey would have been saved and would have inherited the fruits of the Spirit, if he so desired to fully understand, 1 John 4:15
(15) Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God.

Part 2 of your question, you summarise, “Therefore, not all men without exception were given to Christ”. This then implies limited atonement, correct?

I differ because Christ was the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.

By a willingness to reject the Gospel of Christ – the person stays depraved in his/her state. This does not mean God has “given up” on them.

For those that have accepted the Gospel, that is where John 6 comes into mind. Notice, John 6:35-40
(35) And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.
(36) But I said unto you, That ye also have seen me, and believe not.
(37) All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
(38) For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.
(39) And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
(40) And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.

And thus, this is only possible, because Christ died for all – in whom if they make the choice to accept this free gift, they will be indeed raised up on the last day. Hebrews 2:9
(9) But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man.

1 Timothy 2:6
(6) Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.

When we look at part 3 of your question, “God does as He pleases (Psalm 115:3)”

But a sovereign God cannot lie, deceive, murder, rape, et al.? Take note of these passages, Genesis 50:19-20
(19) And Joseph said unto them, Fear not: for am I in the place of God?
(20) But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.

Deuteronomy 32:4
(4) He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.

Psalms 12:6
(6) The words of the LORD are pure words: as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times.

Psalms 18:30
(30) As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the LORD is tried: he is a buckler to all those that trust in him.

Psalms 119:140
(140) Thy word is very pure: therefore thy servant loveth it.

Proverbs 30:5
(5) Every word of God is pure: he is a shield unto them that put their trust in him.

“Not all men without exception are saved.”

Because, 2 Timothy 4:2-4
(2) Preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine.
(3) For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears;
(4) And they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables.

“Therefore, God was not pleased to save all men without exception.”

Heresy.

Do you love and wished for Anton LaVey to have been saved? In fact, do you [not] have a weeping sorrow that he is indeed awaiting an eternal Hell fire?

1 John 4:8
(8) He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.

Mark 9:23-24
(23) Jesus said unto him, If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.
(24) And straightway the father of the child cried out, and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou MINE UNBELIEF.



Question 7 (Arminian): Michael Heiser, an esteemed biblical scholar specifically in Semitic languages, has released an interesting May 25th 2008 blog entry titled, “The Ends, Not Necessarily the Means (Sovereignty and Free Will Addendum)” in further response to his “Predestination and Free Will: A Summary Position” a few days prior. The reason is because not many people understood his overview that,

* God foreknows ALL events
* God foreknows events that never happen
* Therefore, the fact that God foreknows an event doesn’t require that it will come to pass.
* Therefore, there is no cause and effect relationship between foreknowledge and predestination.

“The short version of all this: All I’m really saying is that God foreknows all events, predestinates certain (but not all) events, and is not responsible for sin and evil.”

Therefore, he further declares, “When I say that I don’t believe God predestines every event, I mean that, but the way I explain it needs some work.

For one, I need to be clear that I don’t think the terms “sovereignty” and “predestination” are synonymous. I have hinted at this in Chapter 4 and some posts, but looking back I don’t think it’s clear. What I really believe is that God predestines the ends to which all things work, but not necessarily the means. He predestinates the end point, but not necessarily the path to the end point (though he can). How things end up can’t be random in that God has to be satisfied with the way it all ends and isn’t surprised or anything like that.

God’s sovereignty is shown in that he has the ability to influence and oversee the paths, paying close attention to what is happening in the course of human history. I reject deism for this reason (among others). God is intimately involved in using human and non-human free agents and his Spirit to move things along as he wishes. He of course can foresee both what humans actually will do and what they could do (Keilah). He knows what choices he’d like to see made and works to influence those choices. Humans sometimes make the desired choices, but when they don’t, God remains at work. This kind of program requires omniscience in my view.

Lastly, God has told us in Scripture that he did predestinate certain events (e.g., election of a remnant; the sacrificial death of the messiah who was incarnate deity). I don’t believe that the paths to these events was necessarily predetermined, though (see my previous reply to Phil’s comment about the crucifixion; all that prophecy required was consistency with the typology of sacrifice and Passover).

I think this position allows genuine freedom, does not impinge on God’s sovereignty (which is not predestination), and allows God to predestinate certain events. It also has God not causing sin or doing evil to accomplish things, even things that are predestinated.”

What is your take on this?

Words: 105 (excluding quotes)

Answer 7 (me): Robert’s seventh cross-ex question is puzzlingly similar to his first. The important points I made which I will not hereafter repeat are as follows:

- “knowledge beforehand” is not the only concept in the semantic domain of “foreknowledge” and “foreknow.”
- contexts determine which concept is implied.
- “proginosko” and “prognosis” are never used as referents of God’s knowledge of counter-factual conditionals.
- God’s knowledge is not predicated on created things like man’s will.
- God’s eternal knowledge is predicated on the fact He has unconditionally determined all things from eternity. That God knows counter-factual conditionals is unsurprising, then, for such suggests God knows what would have occurred had He decreed that events should unfold in a manner different than He actually decreed.

There is really only one other point from the blog entry which bears mentioning:

“All I’m really saying is that God foreknows all events, predestinates certain (but not all) events...”

The idea that God doesn’t predestine all things – or, if He does, He [sometimes] does so conditionally – can be rebutted a number of different ways. The simplest way – the one which I have repeated most often – is that such would mean God cannot be eternally omniscient. Since Robert has cited this “esteemed biblical scholar,” I will assume that his understanding of God’s eternal omniscience – or at least Robert’s inference of his understanding – is not much different from Robert’s own (expressed most explicitly in his answer to my fifth cross-ex question). Given this assumption, which, if false, Robert is free (!) to correct along with providing an explanation as to how the author explains God can be eternally omniscient apart from causing all things, I will examine Robert’s own long-winded beliefs as to how God’s eternal omniscience is compatible with human freedom. His 1,500 word reply can really be condensed to the following:

//…self-determinists respond that God can predetermine in several ways…

1. Contrary to free choice (forcing the person to do what he or she does not choose to do);
2. Based on free choices already made (waiting to see what the person will do);
3. Knowing omnisciently what the person will do.//

Let’s examine these alternatives:

1. If this is supposed to be a caricature of my beliefs, it’s a straw man. I anticipated this argument before Robert ever made it when, in my opening statement, I wrote:

//Calvinists are quick to point out that men are not “forced” to will; that is a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary.//

2. How does God know these “free choices already made”? Robert’s answer is clear: God “waits to see what the person will do.” But that’s the problem! If God’s knowledge is predicated on the wills of temporal creatures, God’s knowledge by DEFINITION cannot be eternal.

3. What does “omnisciently” mean? This is obviously a not-so-subtle tautology: “God knows because He knows.” This doesn’t answer my question: HOW does He know if not by the fact He caused? A circular argument doesn’t cut it.

Robert’s citation of Romans 8:29 and 1 Peter 1:2 in support of the latter two [bad] explanations of God’s eternal knowledge presupposes he has shown there is only one biblical definition of foreknowledge. As no indication has been given that Robert is even aware I rebutted this presupposition in my first cross-ex answer, however, one really has to wonder if Robert even understands the problem. He should reread my fifth cross-ex question.

(Word count: 600)




[Since my opponent has abandoned the debate following the eigth question, the following questions are provided only to show what I would have asked]


Question 8 (Ryan): I would like for you to respond to two arguments I’ve made:

1. For God to choose to save some men on the basis of their free will (as defined in my opening post) would contradict God’s eternal omniscience. Particularly, I wish you to interact with my remarks in my seventh cross-ex answer.

2. The paragraph in my first rebuttal which begins: “Robert also argues that predestination is not unto faith, but rather subsequent spiritual blessings…” Particularly, I wish you to show that, given my argument in that paragraph, conditioning predestination on faith is not circular.

(Word count: 100)

[No answer]



Question 9 (Ryan): I believe I have sufficiently exposed the fact you have failed to address the mutual exclusivity of eternal omniscience and free will. Let’s suppose, however, that the two doctrines are compatible. You’ve written:

“There is no problem in saying that God created men with free will so that they could return His love, even though He knows that some will not make that decision.”

How is God any more loving by creating men He knows will “freely” choose that which will damn them forever than if He had created reprobates for the sake of the elect?

(Word count: 100)

[No answer]




Question 10 (Ryan): [I would probably have asked a question relating to one of Robert’s replies to questions 8 and 9]

Monday, April 12, 2010

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Cross-ex part 3 of 5



This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:


"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)


First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)


Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)


Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"


Cross examination

Question 5 (me): I have argued that “if God's knowledge is contingent on the wills of temporal creatures, God cannot be eternally omniscient.” In response, you have referenced “Messianic Jewish” perspectives (1), God’s predictive power (2), and Matthew Henry (3), yet I respectively find these references vague (1), an indication of a misunderstanding that God’s predictive power would be proportional to man’s allegedly free will (2), or irrelevant (3). My question, then, is not whether God is eternally omniscient or whether we have free will, but rather how God can possibly know from eternity our [allegedly] antecedently uncaused choices.

(Word count: 100)


Answer 5 (Arminian): The Father is omniscient in Jeremiah 17:10, The Son is omniscient in John 21:17 and the Holy Spirit is omniscient in 1 Corinthians 2:10-11.


Let’s go through some philosophy. ‘Determinism’ is the belief that all events, including human choices, are determined or caused by another (in this case, Theistic Determinism means that God directly or indirectly has caused me to write this verse paragraph). Proponents of this view believe that human choices are the result of antecedent causes, which in turn were caused by prior causes.

Conceptions of the nature of human choice (as well as free will choices) fall within three categories,

1. Determinism,
2. Indeterminism
3. Self-determinism.

A deterministic ideology looks to actions caused by another, an indeterminist to uncaused actions, and a self-determinist to self-caused actions. I will only look at Determinism (because Ryan holds to that view, and Self-determinism, because ultimately that is what the Arminian believes in. Indeterminism is ridiculous due to the fact that such reasoning would make the world we live in to be irrational and it abuses the Heisenberg principle)

Determinism (5-Point Calvinism): There are two basic kinds of determinism, naturalistic and theistic. Naturalistic determinism is Humans who simply act according to what has been programmed into them – B. F. Skinner, “Beyond Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity”

As you can see, Ryan who holds a very strong Calvinistic theology believes to some degree of theistic determinism.

Jonathan Edwards in his, “The Freedom of the Will”, related all actions ultimately to God as First Cause. “Free choice” for Edwards is doing what one desires, and God is the Author of the heart’s desires (and it is clear that Ryan in the unofficial thread – made adherence to such a declaration).

God is sovereign, in control of all and so ultimately the cause of all. Fallen humanity is totally without freedom of the affections, so they can do whatever they want, but what they want will forever be in the control of their corrupt, world-directed heart. God’s grace controls actions as God controls desires and their attendant thoughts and actions.

Non-determinists respond that a self-caused action is not impossible, and all actions need not be attributed to the First Cause (God). Some actions can be caused by human beings to whom God gave free moral agency. Free choice is not, as Ryan contends, doing what one desires (with God giving the desires). Rather, it is doing what one decides, which is not always the same thing. One need not reject God’s sovereign control to deny determinism. God can control by omniscience as well as by causal power.

A hard determinist believes all acts are caused by God, that God is the only efficient Cause. A soft determinist holds that God as the Primary Cause is compatible with human free choice as the secondary Cause. I am more lenient on the latter.

Self-Determinism (Arminian): According to this view, a person’s moral acts are not caused by another or uncaused, but are caused by oneself. It is important to know at the outset precisely what is meant by self-determinism or free choice. Negatively, it means that a moral action is not uncaused or caused by another (God). It is neither indeterminate nor determined by another (God). Positively, it is morally self-determined, an act freely chosen, without compulsion, in which one could have done otherwise (Yourself).

Either moral actions are uncaused (indeterminism), caused by another (determinism), or caused by oneself (self-determinism / soft determinism). However, no action can be uncaused, since this violates the fundamental rational principle that every event has a cause (as stated briefly above). Neither can a person’s actions be caused by others, for in that case they would not be personal actions. Further, if one’s acts are caused by another, then how can he or she be held responsible for them?

But Ryan declares that he has responded to such in his “Anticipated Objections”, and with this, let’s see what Ryan said (ultimately) about Man's free will, "It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose."

He further states, "A fallback objection I have sometimes faced is that “even if the above argument is invalid, man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose.” This is an example of the fallacy of begging-the-question"

And he finalises this by saying, "The fact that we are subject to God’s law despite how He has made us should not be surprising, for it the fact that He made us for His own ends functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates his claim that God is sovereign and man is responsible."

How can Charles Caldwell Ryrie (for example in my first rebuttal) beg the question when he clearly demonstrates in his philosophical reasoning that, "Thus, the biblical doctrine gives proper place to human responsibility. What’s going to be is going to be through certain means and procedures and responsible human actions. Ephesians 1:11 spotlights all things, not solely ends."

He does not beg the question when he gives a logical [realistic] illustration of two persons having a discussion. I cannot see how that illustration is begging the question / circular reasoning because go back to my Luciferianistic motive ideology.

When Ryan writes, "it is in fact God’s sovereignty which responsibility presupposes." - that is one of two things.

1. A complete contradiction in terms of the TULIP doctrine in proportion with our daily life.

2. God is Xerxes I.

The denial that some actions can be free is self-defeating. A complete determinist insists that both determinists and non-determinists are determined to believe what they believe. However, determinists believe self-determinists are wrong and ought to change their view. But “ought to change” implies freedom to change, which is contrary to determinism. If God is the cause of all human actions, then human beings are not morally responsible. And it makes no sense to praise human beings for doing good or to blame them for doing evil.

If human beings are free, are they outside God’s sovereignty? Either God determines all, or else he is not sovereign. And if he determines all, then there are no self-determined acts. However it is sufficient to note that God sovereignly delegated free choice to some of his creatures. There was no necessity for him to do so; he exercised his free will. So human freedom is a sovereignly given power to make moral choices.

Only absolute freedom would be contrary to God’s absolute sovereignty. But human freedom is a limited freedom. Humans are not free to become God themselves! A contingent being cannot become a Necessary Being. For a Necessary Being cannot come to be. It must always be what it is.
It is objected that either free, good acts spring from God’s grace, or else from our own initiative. But if the latter, they are not the result of God’s grace as seen in Ephesians 2:8–9. However, this does not necessarily follow. Free will itself is a gracious gift. Further, special grace is not forced coercively onto the person. Rather, grace works persuasively. The hard determinist’s position confuses the nature of faith. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver, rather than to the Giver.

Others objections as seen in this debate by Ryan; that self-determinism are contrary to God’s predestination. But self-determinists respond that God can predetermine in several ways.

He can determine,
1. Contrary to free choice (forcing the person to do what he or she does not choose to do);
2. Based on free choices already made (waiting to see what the person will do);
3. Knowing omnisciently what the person will do.

1 Peter 1:2
(2) Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied.

Romans 8:29
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.

Positions 2 or 3 insist that God can determine the future by free choice, since he omnisciently knows for sure how they will freely act. So, it is determined from the standpoint of God’s infallible knowledge but free from the vantage point of human choice.

Connected with the argument from strong determinism is that, while Adam had free choice (Romans 5:12), fallen human beings are in bondage to sin and not free to respond to God. But this view is contrary to both God’s consistent call on people to repent (Luke 13:3; Acts 2:38) and believe (John 3:16; 3:36; Acts 16:31), as well as to direct statements that even unbelievers have the ability to respond to God’s grace, John 7:17
(17) If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

Romans 7:18
(18) For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not.

1 Corinthians 9:17
(17) For if I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: but if against my will, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.

1 Peter 5:2
(2) Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind;

This argument continues that if humans have the ability to respond, then salvation is not of grace (Ephesians 2:8–9) but by human effort. However, this is confusion about the nature of faith – with which I have tirelessly tried to explain throughout this entire rebuttal. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver rather than to the Giver who graciously gave it for [all] to receive.

Words: 1,500 (excluding quotes)



Question 6 (me): Notwithstanding your more Pelagianistic comments (compare “The Father will draw the person, yet he [must] come first!” to John 6:44), a number of passages in Scripture support the doctrine of irresistible grace (1 Corinthians 1:23-24, Romans 8:28-30, John 6:37-44, 10:3-5), for it is obvious to any non-universalist that not all men without exception are so called/drawn. Since conditioning God’s effectual call on faith would be circular (cf. my comments on Romans 8:29-30 in first rebuttal) and John 8:47, 10:26 explicitly state election isn’t conditioned upon faith, how do you harmonize these aforementioned passages with Arminianism?

(Words count: 100)


Answer 6 (Arminian): Let us review the passages you cite to see if there is any apparent ratification in proportion with your defence of irresistible grace.


1 Corinthians 1:23-24
(23) But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness;
(24) But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.

Adam Clarke states – “Those, both of Jews and Greeks, who were by the preaching of the Gospel called or invited to the marriage feast, and have accordingly believed in Christ Jesus; they prove this doctrine to be divinely powerful, to enlighten and convert the soul, and to be a proof of God’s infinite wisdom, which has found out such an effectual way to glorify both his justice and mercy, and save, to the uttermost, all that come to him through Christ Jesus. The called, or invited, κλητοι, is a title of genuine Christians, and is frequently used in the New Testament. Ἁγιοι, saints, is used in the same sense.”

Romans 8:28-30
(28) And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
(30) Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

Romans 8:28–30 pretty much gives us [the] run-down of the sovereign purposes of God, when Paul said those who have been justified will be glorified. He does not say only some who have truly been saved are going to persevere to the end and then make it; he does not say that only some who are justified will eventually be glorified. What is stated is that those who have been justified are also guaranteed to be glorified by God the Father.

Furthermore, Ephesians 1:4, and 11–12 states that believers have been chosen to bring glory to God. If God knew one would lose his salvation, He would not have chosen him to begin with. But this does not mean that God did predestined Anton LaVey to thus be a reprobate, or that God purposely did not seek him thereafter – especially through his saints (isn’t the whole purpose Christians to preach the bible, and to preach the Gospel to every creature true?).

John 6:37-44
(37) All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
(38) For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.
(39) And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
(40) And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.
(41) The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.
(42) And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?
(43) Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves.
(44) No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

According to John 6:37–40, the believer is a gift given by God the Father to the Son because of the Son’s obedience. And because the believer is God’s gift to the Son, Jesus is always going to keep him.

Verse 40 specifically states that, “every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day”. This included Anton LaVey – but he did not ‘see’ nor hearken to come to the glorious Gospel of Christ. Hence he died in his sins.

Matthew Henry commentates, “The discovery of their guilt, danger, and remedy, by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, makes men willing and glad to come, and to give up every thing which hinders applying to him for salvation. The Father's will is, that not one of those who were given to the Son, should be rejected or lost by him. No one will come, till Divine grace has subdued, and in part changed his heart; therefore no one who comes will ever be cast out. The gospel finds none willing to be saved in the humbling, holy manner, made known therein; but God draws with his word and the Holy Ghost; and man's duty is to hear and learn; that is to say, to receive the grace offered, and consent to the promise. None had seen the Father but his beloved Son; and the Jews must expect to be taught by his inward power upon their minds, and by his word, and the ministers whom he sent among them.”

John 10:3-5
(3) To him the porter openeth; and the sheep hear his voice: and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out.
(4) And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him: for they know his voice.
(5) And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him: for they know not the voice of strangers.

Matthew Henry commentates, “Here is a parable or similitude, taken from the customs of the East, in the management of sheep. Men, as creatures depending on their Creator, are called the sheep of his pasture. The church of God in the world is as a sheep-fold, exposed to deceivers and persecutors. The great Shepherd of the sheep knows all that are his, guards them by his providence, guides them by his Spirit and word, and goes before them, as the Eastern shepherds went before their sheep, to set them in the way of his steps. Ministers must serve the sheep in their spiritual concerns. The Spirit of Christ will set before them an open door. The sheep of Christ will observe their Shepherd, and be cautious and shy of strangers, who would draw them from faith in him to fancies about him.”

John 10:1–39, contains the discourse on the Good Shepherd as prophesied in Zechariah 13:7
(7) Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the LORD of hosts: smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered: and I will turn mine hand upon the little ones.

The prophet predicted that the rejection of the Messianic Shepherd will include His death which, in turn, will result in the scattering of the flock of Israel. The theme of the Messiah as the Good Shepherd is picked up by Jesus in John 10:1–18.

Jesus is the Good Shepherd (verses 1–6).

The Pharisees, their present shepherds, have gained rule over the flock and who climbeth up some other way like a thief and a robber (verse 1).

Jesus, however, came the right way because He came the way the Old Testament prophets predicted (verse 2).

His own sheep recognised Jesus to be the True Shepherd and they follow Him (verses 3–6). They are the poor of the flock of Zechariah 11.

Jesus then declared Himself to be the door of the sheep (verses 7–10).

Not only is He the shepherd, but He is the door of the sheepfold (verse 7).

Those who usurped authority before Him are thieves and robbers and not true shepherds (verse 8).

Those individual sheep who came through Him as the door will find salvation and spiritual food and pasture (verse 9).

The believing remnant will find this to be true. The Messianic Shepherd has come to provide the sheep with abundant life (verse 10).

Verses 7–10 likewise makes it clear that the Messiah is the door and all who can be saved, must enter by Him only. John 14:6 defends this.

Whereas earlier (verses 1–6) Jesus pictured Himself as the Good Shepherd, He now identifies Himself in that role (verses 11–18).

He is the Good Shepherd and a good shepherd will willingly lay down His life for the sheep (verse 11).

The hireling has no love for the sheep and will flee in the face of danger leaving the sheep to be destroyed (verses 12–13).

However, Jesus the Good Shepherd will lay down His life for His sheep (verses 14–15).

Furthermore, Jesus has other sheep … which are not of this fold (verse 16). The sheep of this fold are the Jewish sheep. The fold is Israel and the believing sheep of this fold are the Remnant of Israel. The other sheep are the Gentile believers. The Good Shepherd will unite together the believing Jewish and Gentile sheep to become one flock under one shepherd. This new one flock is the same as the one new man of Ephesians 2:11–16. It is the Church, the Body of Messiah with the Messiah as its Head. It is to achieve this new unity that the Messiah will die (verses 17–18).

Some of these truths are repeated in verses 26–30, adding the aspect that the Messiah’s sheep have eternal security. In Matthew 25:31–46, the Gentile believers of the Tribulation were also pictured as sheep.

John 10:24
(24) Then came the Jews round about him, and said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.

In reviewing John 10:24ff, Yeshua answers the charge of obscurity and makes four statements.

1. Jesus had already told them clearly in two ways: by His words and by His works (verse 25).

2. The real problem is that they are not His sheep (verse 26). They have not [believed] on Him, so they are not His sheep. Because they are not His sheep, they do not understand the statements He is making.

3. He points out that His sheep, the believers, do recognise Him and do understand what He is saying and do know exactly who He claims to be (verses 27–29). His sheep recognise His voice and they do follow Him (verse 27). Because [they] have [accepted] Him, they have eternal life (verse 28). Because they have eternal life, His sheep cannot lose their salvation (verses 28–29).

4. Having pointed out that the real problem is not that He has been obscure, but their lack of [faith].

As far as irresistible grace goes, we might summarise as follows:
1) Man has no ability and, therefore, cannot believe the gospel;
2) Man is powerless to resist the Spirit;
3) God doesn’t make anybody do anything; and
4) He makes the elect believe in Christ in accordance with His sovereign plan.

Rather confusing, isn’t it?

How is it possible for someone with no ability to believe the gospel and with no ability or power to resist the Spirit’s will to be personally responsible for believing or rejecting the gospel message?

Faith (as seen in point 4 above in my John 10 exegesis) is the single biblical condition for regeneration, but the Calvinist position insists:

1) that man can’t believe and is powerless to do so.

2) that God must regenerate only those so elected for salvation because he has already elected some and He cannot fail.

That all men descend from Adam and are guilty of sin argues for man’s lost condition and the universal need for eternal life. That the gospel message is intended for the whole world of mankind not only suggests that everyone needs eternal life, but also asserts its efficiency (as well as the sufficiency) to regenerate anyone and everyone in the whole world who hears that message and believes in Christ.

The gospel message itself is indeed “whosoever will” (John 3:16). This fact in no way relegates the Holy Spirit to obscurity. The omnipresent Holy Spirit regenerates the sinner as he believes the gospel. Such regeneration is a divinely powerful act, but it is always performed in conjunction with faith in Christ. So, since the need is universal (sin), the message is universal (the gospel), and the condition for regeneration is universal (faith in Christ), it follows that the effect and efficiency of God’s plan in accord with the gospel offer to all is universal.

The Bible simply places the responsibility of belief directly on the one who hears the clear gospel message. It disallows any excuse for unbelief.

"When Jewish leaders persecuted Jesus and sought to kill Him, He got to the heart of their problem: “But you are not willing to come to Me that you may have life” ([John] 5:40). The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith in the finished work of Jesus Christ; “He who believes in the Son of God has the witness in himself; he who does not believe God has made Him a liar, because he has not believed the testimony that God has given of His Son” (1 John 5:10)." - Earl D. Radmacher, Salvation

Notice the simple and clear wording when Radmacher says, “The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith.” The difference between the general call and the effectual call of God is this: The general call is the message announced to all, i.e., the invitation. The effectual call is the message believed, the invitation received, and the correspondingly powerful work of the Holy Spirit that, at the time of faith, produces eternal life in the one who believes. The effectual call is the gospel message joined with faith, and the explanation need be no more complicated than that.

There is no necessity, either biblically, logically, or otherwise, to insist that the Holy Spirit imposes eternal life on anyone in an irresistible fashion, makes them willing, makes them willing to be willing, or gives them faith, etc., so as to fulfil God’s sovereign plan. This is so because His sovereign plan insists upon human responsibility, and thus, human freedom. And human freedom is validated when one freely believes in Christ alone.

So, can the gift of eternal life be resisted? The biblical answer is yes. The gifts of God, salvation or otherwise, are never imposed by an irresistible force, but are simply and freely received.

Does God’s sovereignty or absolute control of the universe require us to conclude that He forces selected people (the elect) to receive His gift of salvation and to enter into a holy union with Him? No, because he has made mankind an offer which cannot be exceeded.

God is not indebted to us, nor is He obligated to save us. Now, if Jesus’ death was intended to benefit only the elect, the Holy Spirit would indeed be obligated to save those for whom His death was intended. But if Jesus’ death was intended for all, God would in no way be under obligation.

Is it an affront to God to suggest that the Holy Spirit can be resisted? No, because, again, the question presupposes that rejection of the gospel offer for eternal life is the same as personal resistance to the Holy Spirit while the Holy Spirit is somehow pressing and pressuring the sinner for a decision. Rather, the rejection of Christ is indeed resistance to the message that the Holy Spirit has inspired.

Words: 1,700 (excluding quotes)



Question 5 (Arminian): Defining free choice as “doing what one desires” is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do as seen in Romans 7:15–16.

If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?

God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it. Even the Calvinistic Westminster Confession of Faith declares that “Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently” (5.2).

What are your thoughts on this?

Words: 160


Answer 5 (me): “The will always chooses according to its strongest inclination at the moment” – Jonathan Edwards


The above is indeed regarded by Calvinists as an accurate understanding of the will. The qualification that we will what we most strongly desire avoids the pitfalls of Robert’s Romans 7 objection. Furthermore, there is no contradiction between predestination and the idea that man wills what he most strongly desires; indeed, that is the very means by which God predestines! He controls our desires directly (e.g. regeneration) or indirectly (e.g. temptation via evil spirits) and thusly controls in what manner we will.

Historically, “free will or choice” has a multiplicity of meanings. Augustine believed fallen man was free to sin but not free to do good. This is another good definition with which all Calvinists could agree. However, to avoid confusion, I explicitly defined it in my opening statement as “the doctrine that… man is said to be capable of actuating one of two or more possible courses of action.” This was for convenience sake so that Robert and I could avoid frivolous quibbling. To disassociate myself from that definition of free will, I counted it as easier to simply deny free will first and then explain, as I have done, why this does not mean men cannot actually choose or will. With all this in mind, I can proceed to Robert’s two points:

1. “God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it.”

It appears, given Robert’s distaste for what he mistakenly believed to have been the Calvinist understanding of free will/choice, he has reverted to referring to it per the definition provided in my opening statement. It makes little difference, because I already anticipated this and any other counter-factual “why” question Robert may ask when I wrote:

“…God has decreed all things to His glory. Robert can contend – but not substantiate – that a counter-factual world would more greatly manifest God’s glory.”

2. “If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?”

As Scripture is silent as to the specifics of Satan’s fall – at least as far as Robert’s question is concerned – all I have to do to rebut his charge and defend my beliefs is present a speculatory answer which may be synthesized with Scripture in general and my belief that God predestines all things in particular. I will answer Robert in part as I did a friend who asked me how God could have predestined Satan to sin apart from direct temptation (which is a concept I totally reject in line with James 1):

//I would assume [He did so] in the same manner as He has on any other occasion, i.e. by affecting Satan's inclination in such a way that his pride became that which he most strongly desired to act upon.//

Moreover, it doesn't seem impossible that, since God created Satan and other rational creatures with a capacity to be tempted and sin, He could also have created said creatures with the necessity to sin, given certain circumstances. I speak more to myself when I write this could resurrect the “passive predestination” position I recanted some time ago. This would require further reflection and far more space than I have left, however, and I judge what I’ve already written to have sufficiently satisfied the conditions I have outlined above.

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Question 6 (Arminian): In exegeting 1 John 2:1-2, Arnold G. Fruchtenbaum states, “Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation (verse 2). The word “to propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.” By propitiation, we mean that “the wrath of God against sin has been appeased; it has been propitiated; it has been satisfied.”

He points out that the Messiah is the propitiation, not just for believers but also for unbelievers; not for ours [sins] only, but for [those of] the whole world. The Messiah is the propitiation for the world.

The Messiah is the satisfaction for sins, both for us, that is, the elect; and for the world, the non-elect. This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement; the Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect. Because He died for the sins of all men, it means that the blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Whereas propitiation affects everybody, the application of salvation is only for believers; therefore, He is the Advocate for believers only. What He is in verse 1, our Advocate, is true of believers only; what He is in verse 2, the propitiation, is true of both believers and unbelievers.

However, the emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.”

Do you agree?

Words: 10 (excluding excerpts)


Answer 6 (me): There are, in general, several points Fruchtenbaum makes with which I agree as well as several with which I disagree:


Agreement

- Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation.
- “To propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.”
- The emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.

Disagreement

- This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement.
- The Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect.
- The blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Reasons for disagreement

1. My explanation of 1 John 2:2 provided in my first rebuttal, especially the parallel demonstrated between it and John 11:51-52, has not been shown to be false. Indeed, much of John’s letters are written with the intention that it be known that Christ died for all men without distinction (Revelation 5:9). Instead, I was asked whether or not I would “find God to be love” if I were reprobate. The answer is “obviously not, as reprobates suppress the truth in unrighteousness” (Romans 1). The question is not relevant to my points and seems to beg an appeal to emotions (of reprobates, no less).

2. As I have said throughout this debate, to say Christ died “for” a person is to say Christ “intended to save” Him. What sense does it make to say that Christ, by His death and resurrection, intended to save those whose destinies were already fixed by having died in wickedness? What sense does it make to say that the Son failed to fulfill the will of the Father, given that the Father desires the salvation of all men without exception and universalism is false? What sense does it make to say that the Father’s desires or will can be resisted? No sense.

3. As Spurgeon noted, while Calvinists limit the scope (intention) of the atonement, Arminians limit its power. Both the logical consequences of point 2 and passages I have elsewhere exegeted (e.g. Romans 8:32; 2 Corinthians 5:14, cf. Romans 6:8) substantiate that the intention of Christ’s sacrificial work cannot be separated from the application of it. It is true that Jesus is not only the propitiator (Advocate) but also the propitiation. Ironically, Fruchtenbaum misses the import of what he rightly recognized as the emphasis of 1 John 2:2, for as Robert Reymond wrote:

“It is highly unlikely that Christ’s high-priestly work of sacrifice and intercession, two parts of one harmonious work, would be carried out with different objects in view—the former (the sacrifice) for all mankind, the latter (the intercession) for only some people. Since Jesus expressly declared that his intercessory work is conductednot in behalf of the world but for the elect (“I am not praying for the world,” he said, “but for those you [the Father] have given me,” and later he prayed, “My prayer is not for them alone. I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message” [John 17:9, 20; see Luke 22:31–32], that is, for God’s elect [see Rom. 8:32–34]), consistency of purpose demands that his sacrificial work would be conducted in behalf of the same group for whom he carries out his intercessory work. It is difficult to believe that Christ would refuse to intercede for a portion of those for whose sin he, by his blood, made expiation!”

(Word count: 594)