The Meaning to Finding Meaning

I finished up my essay on Objectivism this past week, so I should have more time to blog. While finishing that essay, I took some time to reflect on what could have been Rand's point in writing dozens of books dedicated to portraying the "ideal man."

Theists constantly make the point that secularism implies purposelessness, but modern culture seems to sweep this away with the reply that individuals make their own meanings for living. I think this backfires on secularism.

Think about it. If men make their own reasons for living, what a sorry choice secularists have made. If Rand's worldview was correct, she has nothing to show for defending it. Most importantly, if secularism were true, truth itself would be overrated; I would have no non-arbitrary reason for accepting truth. Or, at least, I could have my own reasons, purposes, or created meanings for the selective acceptance of truth. I would only accept what I would want to be true - in other words, not secularism.

Maybe this selectivity would be self-defeating, but if secularism is true, so what? Does secularism imply some sort of obligation to defending truth? No.

So when you mention this to a secularist and the reply is condescension, just point out that his condescension follows from his and only his reason[s] for living. Since that secularist would agree - at least, he would if he were as "logical" as his condescension would imply - with the more fundamental principle that his reason for living is no less subjective than mine, he has no basis for refusing me my reasons for rejecting certain truths.

Logical Positivism

I encountered a couple internet logical positivists recently. It's unusual that someone will know what "logical positivism" is and still adhere to it, as some of its primary adherents have all but pronounced it dead. It refers to a movement in the 1920s and 30s which emphasized syntax and empiricism. In any case, these particular logical positivists were emphasizing one of the primary tenets of logical positivism: metaphysics is semantically meaningless. It was interesting how quickly these logical positivists were able to get those to whom they were replying to assume with them that some of the more foundational concepts of logical positivism were true, and given that I've been reviewing logical positivism in my philosophy class over the past few weeks, I thought I'd share some thoughts on it so that one can anticipate these subtle tactics and effectively counter them. As the more insightful critiques of a given philosophy usually come from those who used to believe it, for those who wish to skip the text and just listen to the problems inherent in logical positivism, this interview of A. J. Ayer (begin at 6:28) gives a nice, short summary, although Ayer seems a little reluctant to say logical positivism is a wholly unsatisfying philosophy.

Language

Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics all pertain to linguistics. Syntax refers to the rules or structure of a theory of language, semantics refers to the meaning of words, and pragmatics designates that field of study whereby one utilizes the usefulness of language. A development in logical positivism that allowed men in the Vienna Circle (the original logical positivists) such as Carnap to bridge what was thought to be a metaphysical gap between syntax and semantics/pragmatics was the following postulation: “a sentence ‘S’ is true if and only if S.” Meta-language, whose subjects are sentences (“S”), became connected to object-language, whose subjects are real world referents (S). Example: "The snow is white" is true if and only if it is really the case the snow is white.

Problems: an immediately perceivable problem with logical positivism here is that it is basically susceptible to all the problems of empiricism. Examples: the reliability of sensation must be unreasonably presupposed; "snow" and "white" are ostensibly, arbitrarily defined such that knowledge of communication between persons is, as Augustine anticipated some 1600 years prior to logical positivism, impossible - that is to say, empiricism is solipsistic; etc. But as a matter of fact, logical positivism was radically empirical, as shall be seen in the below.

Verificationism and the Verification Criterion of Meaningfulness

Verificationism is the position that a proposition must be able to be determined to be true or false in order to be meaningful. So, for example, propositions in the future tense are apparently not meaningful. The verificationism of logical positivism and its extreme emphasis on empiricism led to the verification criterion of meaningfulness, the principle to which logical positivists (such as the ones I met recently) refer when asked why they believed metaphysics is nonsensical. The verification criterion of meaningfulness refers to the following: propositions which are not analytic (i.e. tautologous) must be empirically verifiable or else they are meaningless. Such being the case, metaphysics would by definition be meaningless.

Problem: the most obvious problem - one which caused Ayer to step back from logical positivism - was that the verification criterion of meaningfulness is a proposition which cannot itself be verified on its own grounds. It's a self-defeating principle. This is, in my estimation, the crushing blow to logical positivism. Popper was another individual who saw this flaw and attempted to replace verificationism with falsificationism as the demarcation criterion of science. This has its own problems, but at least Popper didn't reject metaphysics outright. Even with these problems, one final subject related to logical positivism merits note.

Ethics

Ayer, consistent with verificationism and Positivism, taught that ethical posits are neither true nor false. “Ought” and “should” statements are rather emotive. This is the ethical theory known as emotivism. Stevenson, another logical positivist, contributed to this theory by explaining that emotivism does not preclude a means of ethical dialogue. By distinguishing between beliefs (eg. “this actor is in the movie”) and attributes (eg. “I prefer tennis to movies”), Stevenson made significant strides in an attempt to resolve disagreements of this nature. He noted that increasing one another’s awareness of facts can only stimulate beneficial conversation, although he realized differences in attributes are irresolvable.

Feigl, on the other hand, thought emotivists missed the point. Forwarding the concepts of validation and vindication, analogous to internal and external questions, Feigl believed he came the closest to resolving ethical disputes. Validation refers to the idea that if two disputants share the same belief in a general ethical principle, this shared belief can function as a means by which they can seek to resolve differences on a specific point. And even in there are no shared principles, according to vindication, the persons can nevertheless compare their respective systems in hopes one will persuade the other. It is only when disagreement on this level persists that one can claim there is no means of resolution on Positivistic grounds.

Problem: I would agree that each of these contributions takes Positivism to its logical end. But that's precisely the problem. One can describe ethical beliefs but not account for them. Ethical discourse is possible, although ultimately, it may certainly be the case conflicts are irresolvable. In fact, it seems to me the emotivists frame the issue in a different manner than does Feigl, but they don’t differ significantly in that both agree insofar as ethical statements are unjustifiable and ethical dialogue can only go so far.

Many logical positivists bite the bullet and accept moral nihilism, in which case one can always appeal to one of the plethora of intrinsically insoluble difficulties, some of which are mentioned above, but given that one will usually hear arguments from incredulity from logical positivists regarding the idea metaphysical statements can be meaningful, it doesn't hurt to be able to throw incredulity back in their face when you ask if they can seriously believe there is nothing objectively objectionable about rape, murder, et. al.

Craig/Harris Debate

William Lane Craig and Sam Harris debated yesterday on the topic "Is Good from God?" You can listen to it here. I have a few criticisms of both sides, mostly with respect to Harris' statements.

Craig

Opening Statement

Contrary to Craig, "ought" does not imply "can." Craig uses this an analogy to attempt to show otherwise: "if somebody shoves you into another person, you're not responsible for bumping into him. You had no choice." This presupposes determinism is incompatible with choice. That does not follow. Determinism is incompatible with free will - the ability to choose apart from antecedent, extrinsic causation - but it is compatible with choice. Choice is volitional, but it is an actual exercise of one's will. Hence, it does not imply one's will has the capacity to have been exercised contrarily. One's choice can be volitional yet necessitated. Religious philosophers as far back as Augustine and as recent as Gordon Clark have noted this. Craig has repeated this false dichotomy for a while now, and he even threw in the robot/puppet caricature one will sometimes hear in these contexts. As I have written elsewhere:

//Neither God’s revelation of what is good nor His decree that men are responsible for obeying His precepts is arbitrary, for in the same way God’s declaration of what is good reflects His own eternal nature, God’s declaration that men are responsible for obeying His law reflects their created natures. That God sovereignly made men for His own ends and glory functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates, in Romans, his claim that men are responsible (Romans 9:19-21). In the absence of a Creator-creation distinction, moral dogmatism is irrational. A dictator may desire to heedlessly enforce his ideas, but he can never possess the divine prerogative. Only a sovereign Creator can universalize His moral precepts to those whom He has created for that purpose, and this God has done by the full, sovereign, and authoritative disclosure of His holy nature and law in Scripture...

Advocates of the free will defense may object that man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose. They also sometimes caricature men in a deterministic world-view as puppets. This method of argument is question-begging and poisoning-the-well. There is no self-evident reason that one who has broken a law is excused from law-breaking because he was unable to do otherwise. Additionally, Scripture teaches that men, in relation to God, are pots, axes, and other instruments God may use as He pleases. What, then, besides emotion, could be the underlying objection laced in the puppet analogy? In fact, God is actually much more sovereign over mankind than a puppeteer is over his puppet. God controls everything men do, whereas a puppeteer is confined by strings and joints. God made men as they are: creatures with minds, wills, emotions, intellects, feelings, and other privileges to which puppets are not privy. Even so, men are not “forced” to will, as that would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary. It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose. “For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory forever! Amen” (Romans 11:36).//

To be fair, Craig does add the addendum that compatibilism is a position which avoid his criticism, but given his statement that" ought implies can," something with which Calvinists disagree, it is not clear whether or not he would include Calvinism in this group.

Harris

Opening Statement

Even if it were allowed "good is well-being," as Harris states, Harris seems to miss the point that providing a demarcation of what is good does not explain why one ought to do good. As I point out in a different post, goodness and oughtness are not synonyms. So when Harris says "if we should do anything in this universe, if we ought to do anything, if we have a moral duty to do anything, it's to avoid the worst possible misery for everyone," again, even if this is true, Harris must substantiate the "if." He doesn't show that the "if" is the case. He doesn't show we should or ought to do anything. He doesn't show we have moral duties. He defines good but provides no objective reason we should do good.

Now, it is true Harris appeals to common sense, but if I were to point out that what Harris considers to be common sense can be thought by another - like myself - to be emotive stupidity, what can be his response? Argumentum ad populum? Harris is an unusual Positivist (he strikes me as one, anyways) in that he argues morality is objective. Most Positivists thought ethical discourse was possible (to a certain point) but that ethical claims themselves are unverifiable.

When Harris says one's values can be objectively wrong with respect to deeper values one holds, this is what Feigl would call "validation" and is analogous to an internal question. But Harris forgets to explain how one can verify these deeper values are objective. Feigl at least admitted that if one cannot "vindicate" his ethical system against another - an external question - there remain root disagreements for which there is no recourse for resolution, at least on Positivistic grounds. At this point, it seems Harris wishes to pass off his own system as objective, but that is clearly not the case. To illustrate how unintelligible Harris becomes at this juncture, he says that those who disagree with him are wrong with respect to values they would hold if they were "deeper persons." What does that even mean? How does Harris know counter-factuals?

A still more fundamental criticism of Harris would simply be to attack the idea his naive utilitarianism can be verified. Suppose - and this is quite a stretch, given the above - that Harris' definition of good is true and that one ought to do good. Criticisms nevertheless remain:

//Utilitarianism is an ethical theory which defines good along a spectrum. A choice which causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest good, and a choice which causes the greatest pain to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest evil. This understanding of good and evil leads to arbitrariness and irrationality. As a form of consequentialism, choices made by Utilitarians are, incredibly, prospectively a-moral; since one cannot know the future consequences of his choice, the choice must be made arbitrarily. Possibilities of future consequences also suggest that the moral value of any choice is subject to change at any instant. Even [relatively] simple knowledge of all the ways in which a past choice has affected present reality is itself a problem, because one would need to be omniscient to know his calculations are both accurate and exhaustive. Yet another problem with Utilitarianism is that in order to judge the comparative “goodness” of one’s choice, one would need to know counter-factuals; ironically, such is only possible by divine revelation. There are still more complications when one considers, within a Utilitarian framework, whether or not one individual’s pleasure could qualitatively exceed the sum pleasure of many, whether or not it is proper to state minorities possess rights, and whether or not utilitarianism can escape the demerits of empiricism, inductivism, and subjectivism. Given the extremely relativistic and flawed nature of Utilitarianism, one may well believe the demise of Utilitarianism would maximize the pleasure of those who sincerely desire to be moral.//

1st rebuttal

Harris takes an intellectually lazy route in his argument against the divine command theory when he references the problem of evil. Not much needs to be said in reply to Harris here:

//The problem of evil is purportedly an internal critique of Christianity. If the Christian God does not harmonize with the atheist's arbitrary and subjective moral perception, why should the Christian suppose that to be a problem? Smuggling non-Christian concepts into the argument – concepts which they use to profane God’s character – can lead nothing more than an inept attack on a straw man. Confusion can only be avoided by providing clear definitions of key terms.//

Harris has provided definition of the key term - good - and it does not square with Christianity. Why Harris would think any Christian would find his argument meaningful, then, is mystifying.

Much more amusing is Harris' attempt to analogize the Bible to The Lord of the Rings. He states that to call Scriptural passages evidence for Hell is like stating passages in LOTR which reference Valinor are evidence for Valinor. He makes the same analogy to Hell in the Qur'an later. Well, if Harris thinks he can show that LOTR or Islam can produce a sound, epistemic system, then he is by all means invited to do so. He didn't, however, so this too is another evidence of intellectual laziness.

After listening to Harris' rebuttal, I almost doubt Harris has read the Bible beyond snippets of quotations provided by fellow new atheists. He accuses Christianity of lacking moral accountability, given that a person can live in sin and nevertheless repent and believe in the gospel unto salvation just prior to his death. His argument suggests unfamiliarity with penal substitution and justification, although he in fact alludes to this view (derogatorily) 5 minutes later. Moreover, Harris accuses God of cruel behavior towards innocent people. Has Harris never heard of the doctrine of original sin? Harris never critiques Christianity on its own grounds. He assumes his view is true and projects it onto other world-views in order to disprove them, which is a faulty methodology.

In any case, Harris imperceptibly shifts from attempting to answer "what are the preconditions necessary for sound moral dogmatism?" to "is Christianity moral?" If Craig is right, evil presupposes theism and every attack Harris makes against Christianity would be an admission his own view is inadequate. Harris doesn't seem to understand that.

2nd rebuttal

Harris here attempts to clarify his position, but I think he really only muddied the waters (perhaps unintentionally). It wasn't clear to me whether he was trying to justify moral statements on the basis of science or if he accepted morality as axiomatic such that aim of science is thereby determined. He said in one part of the rebuttal that axioms are necessary and later states one doesn't need to accept anything on faith. Very confusing. He also tried to distinguish between the way in which he and Craig were using the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity," and here again I didn't really follow what he was trying to say. In his closing statement, Craig noted that he had consistently defined objectivity as that which is independent of human opinion since his opening statement.

Needless to say, none of this was relevant to Craig's criticisms. Harris continued to fallaciously equate preferences with oughtness. Instead of answering the fundamental questions like "how do you know utilitarianism is true," Harris would call such questions stupid and his view objective in a thinly veiled attempt to intimidate opponents into silence. I thought Harris was rather disrespectful throughout the debate.

Concluding Statement

Harris compares morality to mathematics and physics and claims that since the latter don't presuppose God, neither does the former. Actually, the latter do presuppose God, and in any case, "ought" is not synonymous with "is." Harris never addressed the is-ought dilemma Craig mentioned several times.

Conclusion

Craig makes similar points to ones I made or might have made with a few mistakes and omissions.

Harris is neither a logician nor a theologian.

Good and Oughtness

Reflecting on the fine distinction between defining good and explaining why one ought to do that which is good prompted me to consider how a secularist might defend moral dogmatism (and even moral subjectivism, given the following). I think that a lack of precision when questioning a secularist about the nature of good contributes to the question-begging statements which the secularist inevitably proceeds to make. There is a simple method which would avoid this confusion: simply ask at the beginning of the conversation for the secularist to define the nature of good

(1) If, after asking this question, the secularist answers by providing some list of choices, actions or consequences, ask why anyone ought to follow such a list. Even if, for the sake of argument, one were to grant the secularist’s definition of good, there is not, within the definition, any intrinsic justification of the authoritativeness which a command to follow such a list would presuppose. Example: ignoring other obvious problems with Utilitarianism, defining good as “that which causes the greatest pleasure to the most people” does not, without further ado, explain why one should endeavor to do what is good – in this case, cause the greatest pleasure to the most people. Here, the distinction between the what-question (“good”) and the why-question (“ought”) is clear. Another example: in my most recent essay, I noted that God’s precepts demarcate what is “good.” Yet unlike Utilitarianism and other secular ethical systems, while this definition does not precisely explain why one ought to obey God’s precepts, I, as a Christian, am able to explain the irreducible answer as to why one ought to obey God:

//…God’s declaration that men are responsible for obeying His law reflects their created natures. That God sovereignly made men for His own ends and glory functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates, in Romans, his claim that men are responsible (Romans 9:19-21). In the absence of a Creator-creation distinction, moral dogmatism is irrational. A dictator may desire to heedlessly enforce his ideas, but he can never possess the divine prerogative. Only a sovereign Creator can universalize His moral precepts to those whom He has created for that purpose, and this God has done by the full, sovereign, and authoritative disclosure of His holy nature and law in Scripture.//

(2) I imagine, however, that a secularist could define good as “that which one ought to do.” In this case, it is only necessary to reverse the above process: instead of asking why one ought to follow a list [which allegedly demarcates what is good], ask what demarcates good – i.e. what is the “that” which one ought to follow? – and how one knows such. If one pays careful attention, he will see that the secularist will doubtlessly equivocate as to the meaning of “good,” confounding the “what” with the “why.”

Kant’s categorical imperative provides, as a final example, how the secularist may provide an answer to the question of the nature of good which, at first glance, may appear not to fall under either of the above categories. The categorical imperative reads as follows: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” In actuality, this answer is, in disguised form, one of the above possible answers: (1) or (2). The question is how to discern which it is. If one should encounter such a definition of good which at once seems to include both a list of choices and an ought-statement (“[one ought to] act only according to that maxim…”), he should ask, in a manner similar to the following, whether the secularist thinks:

(1) “Choosing that which would not lead to self-contradiction if universalized” is good, so one ought to act accordingly, or

(2) “Choosing that which would not lead to self-contradiction if universalized” is subsumed under ‘that which ought not to be done.’

For the morally dogmatic secularist, defining good is less than half of a losing battle.

Shoulda was a good dog

Morality is a problem for non-morally-nihilistic, secular philosophies. Example: Richard Dawkins, author of The God Delusion, wrote therein:

“The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.”

In the midst of his rhetoric, notice the claim God is "unjust." While I have dealt with such an issue here and here, one wonders upon what ground Dawkins alleges God is unjust and, furthermore, why - even if we concede his vitriolic caricatures accurately depict God's character - he should give two hoots. Is there a particular reason Dawkins or any other atheist should find God morally repulsive? Such an answer requires a logical account of one's own moral perception. But this is an insoluble problem for Dawkins, for, as Hume notes in his A Treatise of Human Nature:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not , I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

Dawkins must answer in what manner one may come to believe a given action should or should not be committed. The problem Dawkins faces is that if his secular world-view is correct, he cannot traverse from "is" to "ought" logically.

A common Darwinian reply to the question "from whence did moral perceptions derive?" is that historically, some group of people learned that through altruism or reciprocity, they acheived a certain, desireable goal: e.g. survival. This is an is answer. One person's (or, by extrapolation, muliple people's) likes and dislikes, however, does not constitute as a logical reason for the universalizing of those likes and dislikes. That one person enjoys his life does not suffice as a logical  reason that all people should live. In fact, why should an individual himself do what he desires? It becomes quickly evident that the historical, Darwinian is answer, even if it were true, fails to account for how moral perceptions are rational. And this is generalizable for other secular philosophies as well.

Providentially, as Scripture is the ground of knowledge, Christians are equipped with an answer to the is-ought dilemma. Because the Bible is true, the should statements found in the Bible are also true. It is quite logical, then, for a Christian to affirm shoulds, and it is quite logical, without putting forth any further effort, to require men like Dawkins to furnish the proof with which they are burdened when they make such absurd statements as seen above.