Divine Determinism: Engaging Eastern Orthodox Criticisms

In a few posts, I've mentioned Eastern Orthodox apologist Russ Manion. Since numerous Eastern Orthodox apologists and philosophers seem to have been influenced by his [rather scantily available] work, I've found it useful to read him myself. Elsewhere, I've outlined how he borrowed from Reformed presuppositionalists in ways current Eastern Orthodox apologists have either failed to grasp or follow (link, link). 

I've also acknowledged that it is of course the case that I would find areas of disagreement with him. I'm not Eastern Orthodox, after all. This post will engage one such area. In the course of an hypothetical dialog on metaphysical naturalism, Manion writes (link):

“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature?” I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth. He was doing it again. It was obvious where he was going. I did not want to go there. But, I did not know how to stop it. His logic was seamless. Yet, I knew he must be wrong. After all, here I was reasoning with him, wasn’t I? I answered, “of course it is. As you have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I would not be a naturalist.” “Then they must all be determined, aren’t they?” He affirmed. And there it was. It was to easy. The point was succinct. There are few terms. There was very little room for error. But, I wasn’t about to help him. If he wanted the point, he would have to make it. “So, they are determined.” I said. “What has that to do with reason?” “I would think that is quite clear.” He began. “If all your beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn’t it?” “Now you’re stating the obvious.” I replied. “You’re taking awfully small steps aren’t you?” “Would you prefer I skip a step?” he countered smiling, “Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to believe it. It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it is the consequent of antecedent causes. You do not choose your beliefs. You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not.”

Objections were finally coming to me. I asked, “What if the antecedent causes are the reasons. Wouldn’t it be the case then that we are caused to believe something because it is true?” He didn’t even flinch. He simply responded, “That makes no difference. If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in naturalism. There are a couple of problems here. First, it does no good to cite your reasons for holding a position. If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid. Remember, as a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but every notion, justification, and thought you have. “The second problem has to do with the fact that there are those who disagree with you. As a naturalist you believe that the beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined. In fact, they are determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your naturalistic belief is. How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate between the two beliefs? If all caused beliefs are true, and all beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is not the case that all beliefs are true.”

Note again that the context of this dialog is between a metaphysical naturalist and a Socratic figure - the latter of whom also turns out to be a metaphysical naturalist (albeit a more "consistent" one in that he follows their premises to the absurd entailments). As we will see below, by the end of the conversation, the roles reverse, and the former protagonist for metaphysical naturalism will turn the tables on his Socratic interlocutor by abandoning the position.

Now, what I've highlighted above must be disambiguated from this context in order to assess whether the stated problem with the determinism of the protagonist is 1) in virtue of his "metaphysical naturalism" or 2) is a problem with determinism as such. I think Manion just has the former in mind - here, at least. If so, perhaps I wouldn't disagree with Manion after all. 

In fact, a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion's points if he indeed restricts the problem to the domain of "metaphysical naturalism," the definition of which can be hard to pin down (link) but seems to be associated by Perry Robinson - the author of the Eastern Orthodox blog in which this conversation was posted - with some form of materialism. In his final comment on the post, Robinson writes:

As for logic and the universe, the reason why the naturalist has a hard time with this is manifold. Presumably the laws of logic aren’t material things or reducible to material things.

If logic is immaterial and "good reason" presupposes logic, then it would indeed be impossible for a materialist to have determined beliefs which are held "on the basis of good reason."

A further reason a Reformed Christian could agree with Manion here is that unlike the metaphysical naturalists in his dialog, a Reformed Christian would say that effects are always determined by the "antecedent state of the universe." After all, unlike the metaphysical naturalist, the Reformed Christian will regard the "universe" itself is an effect - of God's free, non-necessitated choice. Just so, God's free choice may effect our beliefs by supernatural means (as well as by ordinary, second causes). An obvious example would be that Reformed Christians argue regeneration leads to belief in the gospel. I'll speak more on this below.

Another reason to think he only has metaphysical naturalism in mind is that his following statement seems to entail fatalism or necessitarianism, which a Reformed Christian is quite capable of denying (link, link, link): 

If the position you hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons given. Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify. Thus, you would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.

To spell out a reply in a little more detail, while the Reformed Christian does indeed believe our positions are determined, we might not have held them were God to have decreed otherwise. Indeed, I think this argument in italics is quite weak, as the very next line concedes that "the reasons you give are every bit as determined as the belief they are intended to justify." That being the case, it cannot be that even a metaphysical naturalist would hold a position "regardless of the reasons given" except insofar as naturalism is incompatible with logic (in which case my response would be the same as what I mentioned earlier) or is necessitarian (unlike Reformed theology). On the contrary, one's position is held precisely because of the reasons given - in other words, only certain means lead to certain ends, which is anti-fatalistic. 

Further, if one is determined to offer invalid reasons for a position, does that mean it is impossible for anyone whose discernments are determined to discern said invalid reasoning? Not for a Reformed Christian. God can determine that people hold [right] beliefs for right reasons or to discern when people (or, upon self-reflection, even oneself) hold beliefs for wrong reasons. Again, then, a charitable understanding of Manion would be that he is specifically arguing against metaphysical naturalism. The context of the above quote and later ones like it seem to confirm this interpretation: 

I sat around for weeks in an epistemic frump. I spent my time flipping through magazines and popularized treatments on modern physics. You know, Schrodinger cat stuff. Every once in a while I would get a surge of confidence and blurt, “Of course I know some things.” Then I would remember that as the chemical tide of my brain ebbs and flows, I would think such things whether they are true or not. Tide in, “I believe such and such to be the case because I have good reason to believe it.” Tide out, “I believe the universe is acting out in me the belief that such and such is the case and that I have good reasons to believe it, whether or not such and such is true.”

Now, it is often true that one might mistakenly believe that he has good reasons for a position. But this is true irrespective of whether one's belief [as well as his reasons] are determined. The point, then, is that apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminianism, et al. cannot misapply these arguments to the context of Reformed theology. 

A while later in Manion's dialog, we read:

"...Would it be fair to say I believe nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?” “Yes I think that would be an accurate statement,” I replied. “I don’t think it’s accurate at all.” He surprised me. “The language is not naturalistic. It originates from a time when the predominant metaphysical position was dualism. People thought reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed reality consisted of mind. They believed man was essentially transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material world. Man himself was not determined. But as a naturalist you have already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all phenomena of nature haven’t you?” I thought a moment, “Sure,” I said. He continued, “It would follow then, that we do not do anything. We do not act on nature. We are actions of nature. Our thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to us. My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is an idea that nature has in me. The “idea” is an event in nature that occurs in association with the event in nature called “me.” Do you agree with this?"

“I suppose I would have to. I do not believe we transcend nature.” I answered. “But this is in keeping with my robot paradigm. Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put into them. Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive. Obviously, they knew something the others didn’t.” He countered, “The robots know nothing. Simply, the ones set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don’t, don’t. Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the way? Does water that finds its’ way to the ocean know something that other water doesn’t? You see, water simply does what nature would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory apparatus, and programs would have them do. Their actions are caused. They cause nothing. In like manner we believe what nature would have us believe. We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature.”

“OK,” I said. “I already agreed everything is determined, and I’ll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in it. But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is what I am. I can live with that, and that is not nihilism.” “Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural world?” he asked. “Certainly,” I answered, “No one would question that.” “Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you than it does for me?” he asked. “No, of course not,” I replied. “Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that causes my beliefs?” he asked. “No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. Please stop trying to lead me,” I responded. “Then,” he asked, “how is it that you and I disagree?” I believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. Yet, both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the antecedent state of the universe. Granted, we differ in our spatial and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which relationship is privileged to know the truth? I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid. I can think you are wrong only by assuming that my relationship is privileged, that it has caused in me truth and caused in you error. But, since you believe as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same assumption of privilege. And everyone who thinks, must make this assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold. In the end we must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on every subject. And on every subject all contrary opinions but one must be wrong. If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism.”

I felt as though the last door were closing. I didn’t have much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still had. “How can you be a nihilist then? You obviously believe in naturalism and reason.” “I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism. I said I use reason. I did not say I knew them to be true. More accurately, I would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and nihilism. It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can never know it. As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs in God and in truth. They cannot believe otherwise.”

There is quite a lot here to untangle. Once again, it seems as though Manion targets a specific kind of determinism: one in which our actions do not "transcend nature," in which our actions are "of nature," "naturalistic," etc. Does nihilism follow from this sort of determinism? Yes. If "nature" is all that is, then "nature" itself is meaningless; there are neither communicable, shareable, immaterial propositions nor corresponding metaphysical realities. 

Essential persistence and contingent change presuppose metaphysical grounding for a distinction between the two. If nature is all that is, there can be no distinction and you either have hyper-necessity or hyper-contingency. Eleatic monism is unintelligible due to its reductivity, and that which is unintelligible is meaningless; Hyper-Heraclitianism - on which the "man" changes as much as the "river" - is unintelligible for the opposite extreme of rejecting any commonalities. Hope for "meaning" utterly impossible, for "hope" is impersistent! There is no other option for the metaphysical naturalist, though, so nihilism follows. 

But Reformed theology is not subject to these criticisms (link). Man in particular transcends the rest of creation in being images of God. But our freedom is analogical to that of God. We will never be as God Himself is, so we don't function as the final, decisive factors who determine between contingent alternatives. God already did that according to His wisdom and good pleasure. Now, our freedom is genuine - we genuinely are free to desire, feel, think, choose. These have been determined - our freedom is a freedom "to," not a freedom "from" (especially not freedom "from" God's sovereign and eternal decree) - but these determinations could have been otherwise, and there is no resistance from us to that which we already [are determined to] want, do, believe, think, feel, etc. 

Criticisms such as that man must have an indeterministic freedom for it to be genuine really intend to suggest we must conceive of man's freedom as equivalent to God's freedom. Man is put too on par with God. It's idolatry. And raising man to equivalency with God will always, by the same token, lower God to the position of man. In this case, such is evident in that if man's freedom is indeterministic, God cannot be eternally omniscient. His knowledge would (per impossibile) depend on the temporal decisions of men. 

Men have all sorts of inventive ways to try to circumvent this inconvenient, simple truth. As I recall, in this case, Robinson's own preference is to advocate for what is called "suppositionalism," a pedantic position defended by philosopher Jonathan Kvanvig, particularly in chapter 8 of his Destiny and Deliberation. I read this chapter with all the sense of a man (who has realized his former position of Molinism is no good) trying to do his best to push and keep together two repelling magnets. I do not recommend anyone waste his or her time on the book. Bruce Langstry has given a good summary and then critique of Kvanvig here, the latter of which I quote:

Does the theory fulfill its restrained but important aims? Suppose that in the actual world God constructs, at some time t0, a complete suppositional story that specifies the occurrence, at time t10, of such-and-such undetermined events including free human actions. Suppose that God then, at time t1, resolves to bring about all and only the states of affairs that the complete suppositional story says he directly brings about, and that at time t2 he starts implementing his resolution. There is no room in the story for anything to occur which defeats the suppositional justification either for the chronicle of events or for the epistemic conditionals which undergird it. But even assuming that God in fact strongly actualizes all the states of affairs which the story says he strongly actualizes, there is room in the actual world for events to occur which defeat the justification God has at t2 for believing that what in fact happens will not deviate from the story.

Bearing this point in mind, consider the propositions (P) The specified undetermined events will occur at t10 and (Q) There will be no defeaters for the justification of (P). Assume that at t2 God has adequate reasons for believing P. These very same reasons also constitute adequate reasons for his then also believing Q. But neither the truth of Q nor God’s having adequate reasons for believing it establishes that God’s adequate reasons for believing P are indefeasible. According to Kvanvig, ‘grounds are defeasible when it is possible for these grounds to fully justify a given belief and yet that justification be overturned by further learning’ (p.157); presumably he means epistemically possible. For any agent who is aware that adequate reasons for belief are sometimes defeated, the mere possession of adequate reasons for a specific belief does not exclude the epistemic possibility that the belief is false. I can see no way that Kvanvig can rule out its being epistemically possible, relative to the adequate reasons God has at t2 for believing Q, that P is false and that God will, at least by t10 and afterwards, have learned that P is false.

It might be replied: If, in the circumstances under discussion, God’s belief P is false, God has at t2 no way of obtaining evidence that this is so; but this contradicts Kvanvig’s general premise that no truths are inscrutable, a premise which implies that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can in principle become aware and which would thereby undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth.

The reply is mistaken. The general premise does not imply that if a person’s belief is justified and yet false then there is some truth of which rational inquirers can here and now in principle become aware and whose use as a premise would undermine the person’s adequate evidence for the belief’s truth. After all, if scientists are currently justified in believing that no humans will exist 10 billion years from now, and their belief is in fact false, then defeaters for their current reasoning might not become cognitively available in principle until a million years from now. Hence if in the circumstances under discussion, God’s beliefs P and Q are false, the general premise is compatible with the proposition that God at t2 has no way obtaining evidence that P and Q are false.

See also a sort consideration offered by Hugh McCann (link):

...it is hard to intuitively reconcile Kvanvig’s solution here with the reality that all of this reasoning is merely suppositional and each step on its own is fallible; couldn’t it turn out to be mistaken at some point once the suppositions are made reality and the divine fallible reasoning collides with what actually happens?

In short, the moment one starts talking about the possibility of God having false beliefs (and how could this not be possible if God has prior beliefs about man's future, indeterministic decisions?), one has abandoned the sovereignty of God.

Certain statements made in what Manion says above might have been intended only to apply in the context of metaphysical naturalism. But if an analogy by parity of reasoning might be attempted, let's look at the result. Take the following statement from the dialog: "I have only those beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me. I can not get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my reasons, and find out if they are valid." 

Now change "nature" to "God" and ask yourself if Manion might have made the same argument to a theological determinist. If not, well and good. If so, the desire to get "behind" God - as if! - is the same idolatry I mention above. And if what Manion says in here might have been analogized by him (or might be by other EOs) to the context of theological determinism, Manion's (or their) epistemology is flawed. To say that neither of two contradicting determinists could "know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given" presupposes that indeterministic freedom is a necessary criterion for knowledge. But what possible relevance could being able to indeterministically choose to have bad beliefs or reasons have to being able to know that one's current beliefs or reasons are true? 

In fact, we can't always "compare" beliefs and "evaluate" reasons. Everyone has to make an assumption for reasoning to even get off the ground. I've argued for foundationalism elsewhere numerous times. One can have immediate, non-inferential justification for at least one belief. So if I don't need indeterministic freedom there - if I don't need to "get behind" anything to compare the foundational belief to x, y, or z in order to know it - then why would I need it anywhere else?

I can imagine one final analogization from Manion's foregoing dialog: "“Is your reason, your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part of nature? ...We do nothing. We are the repository of certain thoughts. I do not create my beliefs. I am simply a repository of belief. All of it, my beliefs, my thoughts, my reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are simply acts of nature." Again, for the sake of argument, exchange "God" for "nature." 

Obviously, a Reformed Christian will hold to a Creator-creature distinction and deny that we are a part of God. As I said above, we have our own thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions. That these are caused does not make them any less ours. When God created the earth, His causing its existence does not imply that the earth was a part of God.  

Nor are we passive creations, mere vessels or repositories. We move. It's just that our movement is not by way of self-origination. Sometimes, only God moves, such as when He first gives us the regenerative grace necessary and sufficient for us to only then have the possibility - indeed, it determines us - to move back toward God. To use an illustration opposite to one I mentioned earlier, in regeneration, God, as He brings Himself near to us, changes our magnetic pole to such that we become drawn and move to Him. God is the originator of His and our movement, yet it is still we who move. And in our movement back to God, we are shown why indeterministic freedom is not needed to explain how co-operation or synergy with God is possible. 

Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:

What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us? 

Now, these reflections leave off the table the possibility that supernaturalism and some form of determinism are compatible. This is short-sighted unless Manion really does think - contrary to the way in which I have tried to charitably interpret his arguments thus far - that all forms of determinism are problematic.

Before I address what seem to be Manion's counters to all varieties of determinism, notice that he alludes to an "eternal being" with a "character" and "attributes." This cannot be the god of Eastern Orthodoxy, though: the god of Eastern Orthodoxy is supposed to utterly transcend metaphysics and epistemology (cf. here, here, Robinson's comment 181 here). Revealed religion indeed!

Manion's two arguments against all varieties determinism seem to be as follows: 1) we ought to say that "something is true for reasons rather than causes," and determinism doesn't allow for that; 2) "freedom make[s] us morally accountable," and determinism doesn't allow for that. 

To the first argument: why can't a determinist say something is true for reasons? Reasons can be caused and causes. Manion seems to have conflated epistemology with metaphysics and presented us with a false dilemma. I also already discussed earlier why our reasons being caused by God is unproblematic.

The answer to the second argument is particularly simple, one which I was able to answer in my early 20s (link). 

Manion's criticisms of determinism are as weak as any other I've read. His criticisms of metaphysical naturalism and the like are well-founded only to the extent they agree with the 20th century Reformed theologians and determinists whose thoughts on worldview formation and critique he consciously borrowed.

Before concluding this post, there are two other points I wish to make since they often make the rounds in EO apologetics (of which I'm aware). The first is Christological: if that which the Trinity has decided is not necessitated (although grounded in the divine nature such that certain, imaginings - like that God could have made a world in which He lies - are impossible), then must the Son also be indeterministically free in his humanity? This does not follow, no. 

It's not much different than asking, "could or would Christ have ever sinned in His humanity?" The answer is no. Is it not obvious why this is the case? Christ is the singular subject of His divine and human wills. For the same reason, the Son sent could and would never have abandoned his mission to save humanity - not even in the garden of Gethsemene can we say this was a possibility. Christ is and was not schizophrenic, and Nestorianism is false.

This is admitted by Robinson (link): "The cardinal text is Christ is Gesthemane. “Not my will but thy will be done.” Could Christ have botched it and disobeyed the Father? Obviously not. But how then being God and it being impossible for him to sin can he have free will?" 

Note that Robinson has just admitted what I said earlier: determinism is compatible with genuine, human willing. Christ genuinely chose to obey His Father, even if He could not do otherwise. Robinson goes on to say that He thinks Christ can be indeterministically free because there are a plurality of goods - while Christ is not free, He can still, then, indeterministically choose from among these goods. 

The problem with this is that the death of Christ was necessary for salvation from sin. Since it was the good pleasure of God for man to be saved from sin, Christ's human will must have necessarily acted in co-operation with His divine will to accomplish the single end (man's salvation) by the single means to that end (His own death). Synergy between God and men, then, does not presuppose indeterministic freedom. This disarms a few EO objections against determinism.

Robinson continues to say that "“Not my will but Your will” expresses that Christ initially wills two good things." These are said to be self preservation and the salvation of humanity. But he fails to be clear: was Christ's preservation of Himself a "genuine alternative possibilit[y]" (as Robinson puts it)? Would not Christ's choosing to preserve Himself from death meant He "botched it"? This is supposed to be a "good" Christ could have chosen? The very idea is self-refuting (note Robinson does not really answer JohnD in the comments on just this point here). This closes comments on the first point I wished to make.

The last point I wish to make concerns an argument regarding the alleged "dialectic" of Augustine, the person many EOs take as the forerunner of determinism. The argument comes from Joseph Farrell's Chapter 9 (and the rest of the book) here as well as his God, History, and Dialectic. 

One might introduce the argument with a question: in the eschaton, are there multiple goods from which we can choose? If not, then how can we have indeterministic, free will? Indeterministic, free will would seem to instead be a dialectic of oppositions: a choice between good and evil. EOs use the doctrine of divine energies to get around this: we can participate in one of any number of "good" divine energies, so indeterministic, free choice in the eschaton is possible after all. But those who hold to a certain, strong view of divine simplicity (e.g. Augustine, Aquinas), have hamstrung themselves - since they don't have access to a doctrine of divine energies, their predestinarian theologies are driven by a dialectic of opposition. Origen and Plotinus are other key figures.

Farrell is a creative thinker. One unfamiliar with his reasoning will need to read him to process his arguments. Nevertheless, he is not above criticism, as I've shown here, and his criticisms mentioned above has the following shortcoming: they will only go so far as one is fully Augustinian (or an Origenist or a Plotinist or so forth). One can accept determinism without also accepting certain lines in the thought of Augustine et al. that give rise to the dialectic Farrell mentions. Further, it is an EO assumption that Reformed Christians implicitly (if not explicitly) depend on Augustine rather than divine revelation for their views on determinism. The framing is biased from the outset and can only be convincing to those who are already EO, not those who aren't.

Now, I don't accept something like Thomistic divine simplicity but rather that the divine attributes are formally distinct (see here and Richard Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3, pgs. 284ff. for more). I lean away from acceptance of the filioque. And I don't have an issue with distinguishing between God's necessary character or attributes (for which EOs cannot account) and His indeterministically free operations or actions or energies, the latter with which we can co-operate or act in synergy. I believe there are multiple goods from which we can choose even in this life (e.g. what to eat in the morning). These truths are indeed contingent, not necessitated. Yet this does not entail indeterministic, free will, and EOs will have to do better in their future apologetics.

Eastern Orthodoxy, Original Sin, Normative Authority, and Epistemology

I'm struck by how incautious authorities within Eastern Orthodoxy can be regarding the significance of original sin. As one example, in a video posted recently, Eastern Orthodox bishop Irenei of London & Western Europe said (link): 

We are born spotless. There is no human ever ever born sinful, as if he were already a sinner by virtue of his constitution. God does not create like this, and every human being is born pure as Adam was fashioned pure. Yet we are touched by sin from the very beginning. By the time we open our eyes to the world, the sinfulness of the world is already having an impact on us.

He borders on suggesting that original sin merely refers to Adam's progeny having to be born into a corrupted, external world. Agreements and disagreements with this very sentiment emerged in the comments. Now, as I already noted in a recent post that there appears to be an intramural debate within Eastern Orthodoxy on this point (link), I'm not surprised. 

But given their commitments to conciliarism - I'll return to this point later - the most "consistent" of Eastern Orthodox apologists will verbally state some kind of acceptance of original sin. But because they reject original guilt, I infer that laymen and even bishops will sometimes mistakenly reject any version of original sin. In a note in Michael Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, we read:

Some Orthodox Christians have mistakenly defended the Augustinian notion of "original guilt" — that is, that all men have inherited the guilt of Adam's sin — and others, going to the opposite extreme, have denied altogether the inheritance of sinfulness from Adam. Fr. Michael rightly points out, in his balanced presentation, that from Adam we have indeed inherited our tendency towards sin, together with the death and corruption that are now part of our sinful nature, but we have not inherited the guilt of Adam's personal sin.

My own explanation for this is alluded to in an earlier post and more clearly outlined on pages 125ff. of Andrew Louth's defense of EO in Original Sin and the Fall: Five Views, which reads as follows:

The doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary is not accepted by the Orthodox Church. Yet, as Meyendorff has observed, “the Mariological piety of the Byzantines would probably have led them to accept the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary as it was defined in 1854, if only they had shared the Western doctrine of original sin.” But exempting the Virgin Mary from original sin must mean exempting her from the effects of the fall; in some way she is separated from the rest of the human race, who experience the fallen state through participating in (being guilty of) original sin. Paintings of the immaculate conception, depicting the Virgin Mary raised up, on the moon, or borne up by putti, seem to emphasize her separation from the rest of humanity. In contrast, the Byzantine liturgical texts (though plundered for the Latin feast of the immaculate conception) see Mary as part of humanity, in particular the crowning glory of the Old Testament church, emphasizing that she belongs to the Jewish race: “the beauty of Jacob,” as she is called in one of the liturgical hymns. Although confessed as sinless, the Virgin is not regarded as exempt from the consequences of sin. She lived in a sinful world and suffered temptation as we all do. For if her Son was “tested as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4:15), she can hardly have been exempt. Maybe here original sin meets its reductio ad adsurdum, if it means that the Savior and his mother must be considered free from original sin, for they were not exempt from the struggle against temptation that is part of the fallen human lot.

Louth is rejecting the Augustinian understanding of original sin insofar as it entails original guilt, not original sin as such (he prefers the terminology of "ancestral" sin, as do some others within Eastern Orthodoxy). Now, I believe Louth is mistaken insofar as it is my understanding that Eastern Orthodoxy exempts Christ from the effects of original sin. 

Leaving that aside, though, he is correct about Mary: original guilt would mean that Mary was guilty. So when someone like Michael Pomazansky says, "The Most Holy Virgin was born as subject to the sin of Adam together with all mankind, and with him she shared the need for redemption," what he means is not that Mary was guilty before God - on Eastern Orthodoxy, that would only be the case if her own actions were sinful - but that Adam's sins have conveyed negative consequences (e.g. mortality, passions) to all Adam's progeny except Christ and from which they are in need of "salvation."

Eastern Orthodox apologists whom I have read or listened to who try to accept original guilt within their larger framework - and I've seen a few try it - all fail to engage this point on Mary. For just one example, see here for an unsuccessful attempt to interact with Augustine's use of particular, Latin terms with which at least one interlocutor, host Craig Truglia, was admittedly (and obviously) unfamiliar. Both apologists seemed unaware of Augustine's acceptance of reatus culpa when they tried to suggest he agreed with their view, which would be odd except that the apologist who noted this terminology admitted he failed to read the whole article from which he learned of it in the first place (see below)! This is a textbook example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. They also reference Pomazansky, but they made no mention of what I quote from him above, let alone show awareness of the implications any of this has for their Mariology. 

Now, I've argued other grounds why I think rejection of original guilt (particularly, reatus culpa) is problematic, some of which I'll touch on again momentarily. These problems are not only for Eastern Orthodoxy (example) but certainly include it.

But I'll also use this occasion to discuss "normative authority," a concept Eastern Orthodox apologists sometimes argue is an advantage they have over against Protestantism. In this context, Orthodox apologists usually emphasize church councils and synods. Commonly, this is framed in terms such as who decides interpretations of Scripture that are "binding."

For starters, it seems obvious enough that even a bishop can make mistakes. Many Eastern Orthodox believers seem comfortable enough to admit this is the case with Irenei and to thereby reject that any authority he possesses is sufficient to "bind" them to his teaching in the above video. So let's look at a confession produced by the Synod of Jerusalem (1672). Here is what the Confession of Dositheus says on the topic of original sin:

We believe Holy Baptism, which was instituted by the Lord, and is conferred in the name of the Holy Trinity, to be of the highest necessity. For without it none is able to be saved, as the Lord says, “Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, shall in no way enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens.” {John 3:5} And, therefore, baptism is necessary even for infants, since they also are subject to original sin, and without Baptism are not able to obtain its remission. Which the Lord showed when he said, not of some only, but simply and absolutely, “Whoever is not born [again],” which is the same as saying, “All that after the coming of Christ the Savior would enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens must be regenerated.” And since infants are men, and as such need salvation, needing salvation they need also Baptism. And those that are not regenerated, since they have not received the remission of hereditary sin, are, of necessity, subject to eternal punishment, and consequently cannot without Baptism be saved. So that even infants should, of necessity, be baptized. Moreover, infants are saved, as is said in Matthew;{Matthew 19:12} but he that is not baptized is not saved. And consequently even infants must of necessity be baptized. (The Confession of Dositheus, Decree 16)

Perry Robinson, a prominent Orthodox apologist, has written that this synodical document is one to which Eastern Orthodox believers "must adhere" (link):

Next Hank talks of the Confession of Dositheus as an “Orthodox writing.” Well, its more than just a “writing.” It is a synodally affirmed document and one that anathematizes Protestantism, to which Hank must adhere. So here it seems Hank is trying to play down its significance. Maybe he missed its synodal standing when he read Bp. Ware’s book, The Orthodox Church?

On the other hand, Robinson also intimates this synod itself was not infallible and that is not as authoritative as others synods or councils (link):

If the council were ecumenical then it would be infallible. I would think that Catholics would agree that local synods aren’t necessarily infallible. I would also think that Catholics would agree that there are degrees of authority and means for expressing them. While it is true that councils a step down from ecumenical councils hold authority, it doesn’t follow that they bind equally. This is uncontroversial for Catholics so I don’t know on what grounds you are pressing it as some kind of problem for Orthodox ecclesiology.

This is difficult to decipher. Does Robinson think one "must adhere" to a document which contains errors? Or is Robinson suggesting that the document is a fallible yet true and [subordinately?] authoritative product? Or is Robinson suggesting we can filter out false statements from true ones within this [subordinately?] authoritative product, or that only the true statements are [subordinately?] authoritative? These are questions any Eastern Orthodox apologist will need to answer. 

If Decree 16 of the Confession of Dositheus is binding, then Eastern Orthodox believers are bound to believe that infants are subject to eternal punishment. But if they reject original guilt - that infants are guilty of sin - such punishment is unjust. It would be most amusing if the charges of nominalism and voluntarism one often hears Eastern Orthodox apologists level against Reformed theology are actually applicable to their views.

If Decree 16 of the Confession of Dositheus is not binding, how is an Eastern Orthodox believer able to determine:

i) which synods or councils (or decrees, canons, or products thereof) are binding and which are not (e.g. Palamite synods)?; 

ii) what is the meaning and/or to what "degree" is a synod or council "binding" (which seems to suggest lower and higher rules of faith)?; 

iii) answers to i) and ii) in such a way that Protestants cannot make an analogous case for sola scriptura?

Take another example. The recent Council of Crete (2016) might lead one to think that the Synod of Jerusalem and Confession of Dositheus is binding:

3. The Orthodox Church, in her unity and catholicity, is the Church of Councils, from the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem (Acts 15.5-29) to the present day. The Church in herself is a Council, established by Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit, in accord with the apostolic words: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” (Acts 15.28). Through the Ecumenical and Local councils, the Church has proclaimed and continues to proclaim the mystery of the Holy Trinity, revealed through the incarnation of the Son and Word of God. The Conciliar work continues uninterrupted in history through the later councils of universal authority, such as, for example, the Great Council (879-880) convened at the time of St. Photios the Great, Patriarch of Constantinople, and also the Great Councils convened at the time of St. Gregory Palamas (1341, 1351, 1368), through which the same truth of faith was confirmed, most especially as concerns the procession of the Holy Spirit and as concerns the participation of human beings in the uncreated divine energies, and furthermore through the Holy and Great Councils convened in Constantinople, in 1484 to refute the unionist Council of Florence (1438-1439), in 1638, 1642, 1672 and 1691 to refute Protestant beliefs, and in 1872 to condemn ethno-phyletism as an ecclesiological heresy.

Note also that the Council of Crete declares itself to have been given by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit:

With a hymn of thanksgiving, we praise and worship God in Trinity, who has enabled us to gather together during the days of the feast of Pentecost here on the island of Crete, which has been sanctified by St. Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, and his disciple Titus, his “true son in the common faith” (Tit 1.4), and, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to conclude the sessions of this Holy and Great Council of our Orthodox Church – convened by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, by the common will of Their Beatitudes the Primates of the most holy Orthodox Churches – for the glory of His most holy Name and for the great blessing of His people and of the whole world, confessing with the divine Paul: “Let people then regard us thus: as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor 4.1).

Through a spokesman, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople further declared that the Council of Crete is "binding" (link). Is this, then, an open and shut case that the Synod of Jerusalem (and Confession of Dositheus) is binding? 

Not quite! Four Eastern Orthodox churches - representing a significant percentage of the worldwide population of Eastern Orthodoxy - declined to participate in the Council of Crete. Several of these churches (e.g. Antioch) convened synods in which they stated that the Council of Crete is not binding. But since then, the ecumenical patriarch wrote a letter of admonishment (link) in which he reaffirmed "the binding nature of its documents for all the Orthodox faithful, clergy and lay..."

If I'm Eastern Orthodox, who am I supposed to believe, and why am I supposed to believe them? Are Eastern Orthodox apologists left with "private judgment" as they themselves have constructed the concept when straw-manning Protestantism (regarding which I've always found this post by Steve Hays to be helpful - see more below)? If not, what criteria are supposed to be applied, and - just as importantly - on what normative and/or epistemic grounds in said criteria used? 

Robinson's once theorized answer of pentarchical ratification was critiqued long ago by Steve Hays (link, link, link, link, link). There's no need for me to repeat Hays' points, especially as it seems quite a few other Eastern Orthodox apologists have shied away from Robinson's theory (example; example, example) in favor of different forms of the very "receptionism" view that Robinson suspects is due to a reliance on "pop-Orthodox" works. 

Several of these other apologists explicitly embrace circularity. If this sounds Van Tilian, it's because they have either implicitly or even explicitly borrowed from him and, therefore, are susceptible to points a foundationalist - such as myself - make (link).

These apologists also tend to conflate performative contradictions (e.g. you can't perform an apologetic against language or logic without using language and logic) with the structure of epistemic justification, as if apologetic circularity somehow entails justificatory circularity. 

Further, these apologists attempt to leverage this bait-and-switch by begging the question, analogizing an internal contradiction inherent in concrete examples of performative contradictions to an alleged internal contradiction if one rejects their particular "paradigm" of circularity. When it is pointed out to them that anyone can make an assertion such as "my circle is good and yours isn't" (do they think that claim is also "justified" circularly?) they completely fail to recognize that the way in which they typically respond to it - which is to admit the point and pivot to apologetics - is equally available to foundationalists who encounter objections on the grounds that anyone can assert their foundation is self-justifying. They further fail to address problems with a coherentist structure of justification, which I've critiqued elsewhere (link).

Now, all Eastern Orthodox receptionists will need to answer whether there are any authorities in any situations in which one may instantly know they are speaking infallibly. 

1a. If so, which and why? In one example I link to above, an Eastern Orthodox apologist appeals to the remarks of a fallible bishop to prop up his entire receptionist criteria. Talk about a fallible list of infallible "books"!

1b. Or if the Eastern Orthodox apologists will attempt to borrow still more from, say, a presuppositionalist such as myself and claim that one can know such foundationally, these apologists will have abandoned receptionism as meaningfully distinct from the Protestant doctrine of the self-authenticity of divine revelation, the usual arguments one encounters against sola scriptura, and any pretense that their position is advantageous with respect to Protestantism. In fact, they will have the harder responsibility of reconciling conciliar promulgations with their larger "paradigm," on which see more below. These apologists would also need to answer whether one may know that the eighth "ecumenical" council and Palamite councils are infallible, on which I believe there is some question within Eastern Orthodoxy.

2. If not - if "reception" is a condition for knowledge which takes time - then not only will these apologists face questions regarding what "reception" entails (what are the criteria and why?) but also the following question: for one who hears the words of a council before such time as it may be "received," is the hearer obligated to accept the promulgations of said council at the time he heard it or not? If he is not obligated, then it would appear that normative authority actually rests in whatever are the criteria for "reception." If he is obligated, then one is obligated to accept that which might be damnably false. And for those apologists who would argue ad hoc that a hearer is only obliged if the council is true and will be received (despite the fact the hearer doesn't know it at the time), they will be placing hearer of Councils in an epistemic dilemma: if they accept the council, they risk believing damnable error; if they reject or refrain from belief in the council, they risk rejecting or refraining from belief in that which is obligatory. Take, for example, the so-called "robber" council of Ephesus.

The Orthodox view of "normative authority" is not as perspicuous as their apologists project, let alone their claim that it advantages them in contrast to Protestantism. The reverse seems to be the case.

[Side note before proceeding: keeping in mind these criticisms, given that Eastern Orthodoxy would seem to view the second council of Nicaea in 787 as ecumenical and infallible, at the very least, Eastern Orthodoxy seems committed to accepting a doctrine of original sin. To understand why this is the case, take Canon 110 of the Council of Carthage (419), which states:

Likewise it seemed good that whosoever denies that infants newly from their mother's wombs should be baptized, or says that baptism is for remission of sins, but that they derive from Adam no original sin, which needs to be removed by the laver of regeneration, from whence the conclusion follows, that in them the form of baptism for the remission of sins, is to be understood as false and not true, let him be anathema.

For no otherwise can be understood what the Apostle says, By one man sin has come into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed upon all men in that all have sinned, than the Catholic Church everywhere diffused has always understood it. For on account of this rule of faith (regulam fidei) even infants, who could have committed as yet no sins themselves, therefore are truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that what in them is the result of generation may be cleansed by regeneration.

This council was accepted by the Council of Trullo (Canon 2). In turn, the Council of Trullo (otherwise known as the Quinisext Council) was ratified at the second council of Nicaea - the so-called seventh "ecumenical" council - as having been adopted at the sixth "ecumenical" council:

[After a number of other quotations, was read the Canon of the Council in Trullo as a canon of the Sixth Synod (col. 233).]

Tarasius, the most holy Patriarch said: There are certain affected with the sickness of ignorance who are scandalized by these canons [viz. of the Trullan Synod] and say, And do you really think they were adopted at the Sixth Synod? Now let all such know that the holy great Sixth Synod was assembled at Constantinople concerning those who said that there was but one energy and will in Christ. These anathematized the heretics, and having expounded the orthodox faith, they went to their homes in the fourteenth year of Constantine. But after four or five years the same fathers came together under Justinian, the son of Constantine, and set forth the before-mentioned canons. And let no one doubt concerning them. For they who subscribed under Constantine were the same as they who under Justinian signed the present chart, as can manifestly be established from the unchangeable similarity of their own handwriting. For it was right that they who had appeared at an ecumenical synod should also set forth ecclesiastical canons. They said that we should be led as (by the hand) by the venerable images to the recollection of the incarnation of Christ and of his saving death, and if by them we are led to the realization of the incarnation of Christ our God, what sort of an opinion shall we have of them who break down the venerable images? (link)

See also the part in bold from Canon 1 of this council which indirectly references the Council of Trullo:

Seeing these things are so, being thus well-testified unto us, we rejoice over them as he that has found great spoil, and press to our bosom with gladness the divine canons, holding fast all the precepts of the same, complete and without change, whether they have been set forth by the holy trumpets of the Spirit, the renowned Apostles, or by the Six Ecumenical Councils, or by Councils locally assembled for promulgating the decrees of the said Ecumenical Councils, or by our holy Fathers. For all these, being illumined by the same Spirit, defined such things as were expedient. Accordingly those whom they placed under anathema, we likewise anathematize; those whom they deposed, we also depose; those whom they excommunicated, we also excommunicate; and those whom they delivered over to punishment, we subject to the same penalty. (link)

I'm approaching this topic from the perspective of a Protestant who aims to provide an internal critique. Roman Catholics might object to Eastern Orthodoxy on external grounds, as they reject the Council of Trullo. Interested readers can see here for more on that question.

But even granting Eastern Orthodox assumptions, irrespective of their view of the Confession of Dositheus, the foregoing appears to show that Eastern Orthodox apologists ought to accept that infants have sin in need of remission.

On this note, quoting Against Julian (link), Daniel Castellano - a Roman Catholic who is referenced by the pair of apologists I mentioned above who tried to harmonize original guilt with Eastern Orthodoxy - renders a convincing case that Augustine, who was present at the Council of Carthage in 419 and whose theology would seem to provide context to the meaning of "remission" in Canon 110, grounded liability to punishment in culpability:

In this life, even the baptized are subjected to evils, so one can hardly avoid the fact that humans are born under a yoke of affliction. Yet if God is just, there must be in infants guilt (culpam) deserving such punishment (poenam) (Ibid., VI, x, 31) Here, for the first time, St. Augustine clearly says there is culpa in infants, as opposed to mere reatus. He does this on the basis that justice demands there be some culpa for every poena. Yet the culpa that is in infants, we have just seen, is not their own by action, but Adam’s. It is theirs only by contagion. It is only after making this distinction that St. Augustine dares to ascribe culpa rather than reatus to the descendants of Adam.

The Apostle unequivocally teaches that we are all condemned in our nature: We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. [Eph. 2:3] (Ibid., VI, x, 33) This indicates that the reatus is in our nature, and at least suggests that the culpa may be in there also.

St. Augustine finally offers an explanation of how we are all culpable for Adam’s sin toward the end of Contra Iulianum. While expounding in whom all have sinned, he notes that Julian, who accepted the Latin rendering, interpreted it differently as because of whom all have sinned. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 75) St. Augustine counters that a man does not commit personal sin because of Adam’s sin, but for some immediate cause; e.g., a murderer kills because he wants gold; Cain killed because he envied his brother. Rather, the Apostle means that all men have sinned by way of origin in one man, as it were in common, in the oneness of the mass. (Loc. cit.)

This is a sufficiently important expression that we should parse the Latin. In context, Julian denies the verse should be understood thus, so we discard the negative and the main clause, leaving: in uno homine omnes homines peccasse… originaliter, et tamquam in massae unione communiter. The first unusual word is originaliter, an adverbial form of ‘origin,’ so it modifies the verb. Thus we sinned by our origin. In other words, we have sinned by virtue of our descent from Adam. How can this be so? A second adverb is added, communiter. That is to say, we sinned jointly in the unity of the mass.

This need not mean that each of us was personally present in germine when Adam sinned. Rather, when Adam sinned, the human race sinned, for he and his wife were the human race. Since all partake of the same corrupted nature, we all sin jointly, not at some moment near the dawn of creation, but throughout all history on earth. St. Augustine is asserting a continuous solidarity of the human race in its corrupted nature. Indeed, such a solidarity is presupposed by any sensible interpretation of Christ’s redemptive act. The only innovation here is using that solidarity to express how the culpa for original sin is shared by the whole human race.

To uphold the view that all have sinned by our origin from Adam, it is necessary to refute Julian’s view that the Apostle is speaking only of our personal sins:
…if the Apostle had been talking about the imitation of sin, it would have been more fitting to say that sin passed to all men because there had first been Adam’s example, and he would have added that it passed to all men in that all have sinned by imitation of that one man. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 77)

Julian complained that if the Apostle meant what Augustine says, he would have stated it more explicitly. The response above shows that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. St. Paul was not writing for Julian or Augustine, so we should not expect either doctrine to be stated explicitly. Instead we should look to his context.

The context of Romans 5:12, repeated throughout the passage, is that through one man the wrath of God fell upon human race, and through another man the reconciliation of the human race with God was achieved. St. Augustine repeatedly cites Romans (as any reader can glean for himself) to prove that all, not just many, are said to be condemned in Adam and delivered in Christ. Once this is conceded, it must be acknowledged that this includes infants without personal sin, which leaves only original sin by which we are condemned.

More generally, he shows that it is consistent with reason, revelation, and justice that we have the culpa of Adam in us. He does not prove, however, that this really must be the case. The Orthodox, among others, would object to this strange way of speaking, where we are guilty of a sin that we did not commit in act.

A fitting conclusion given that the Eastern Orthodox apologist who cited Castellano has since defected to Roman Catholicism, a predictable outcome given that Augustine's doctrine of original guilt is incompatible with Eastern Orthodoxy's Mariology - her being subject to punishment for sin for which she is "culpable."

For the fuller context of Augustine's remarks, read Against Julian here.]

Turning to Protestantism, I came across a video in which Robinson lodged objections against sola scriptura. What I found to be the most interesting part of the video is Robinson's reference to former sparring partner, Steve Hays of Triablogue - particularly, his reference to Hays' response to Robinson on the question of "sola" vs. "solo" scriptura (link). Robinson alludes to future videos in which he will interact with Steve's thought, although that was some time ago. When and if he does, I hope he does a better job of representing Hays. Robinson says:

The first thing to note is that Hays agrees with me that the sola-solo description that Mathison puts out (posits) is untenable, right. And Hays essentially admits that my argument is successful - in not so many words, but that's pretty much what it ends up being. And so he constructs an idiosyncratic position - basically a kind of solo biblicist position - and he then reduces normativity to being accurate, to being truthful. So all that matters is that an interpretation is true, and so there really are no secondary authorities. You're not obligated to follow the Westminster Confession or anything else - only insofar as you judge it to be true. So in this way, he's essentially capitulating and rejecting the traditional, Reformed position. 

Now, if your response to my argument - the only way you can get out of it - is to say "well, the Reformed position is wrong," and "I'm going to take this other position," and "hahaha you can't touch me here, the argument doesn't touch me there," well, you've admitted that my argument is successful against the Reformed position. And if you have to excise yourself out of the Reformed position, that's a win as far as I'm concerned.

Of course, people largely "follow" whatever they "judge" to be true. But that's descriptive, not prescriptive. And that description applies just as much to someone like Robinson as it does to Hays (link). 

What, then, by way of prescription? I doubt Robinson agrees with Hays' alternative to Mathison's framework (link; link) - and I missed why Robinson does not consider Hays' position to count as within the purview of the Reformed tradition - so it would have been useful for Robinson to have responded to the following question by Hays: 

Suppose Perry uses ecumenical councils as his benchmark. If so, doesn't that just push the question back a step? By what authority does Perry determine which candidates for ecumenical councils are legitimate?

Does this suggest Hays' position entails oneself as a so-called "final authority," as Robinson states in the video? No. It's a solid, internal critique of Robinson's view. To the extent Robinson pushes back that he is not acting authoritatively, such an answer will be analogously available to Protestants regarding sola scriptura. 

Further, anyone who reads Hays' article can see that Robinson's above summary misstates Hays' position. Contra Robinson, Hays did not suggest that one is [only] obligated to follow what one "judges" to be true. Steve clearly writes: "We are obligated to believe a true interpretation of Scripture, whether or not we perceive it to be true." 

We might approach the distinction between authority and epistemology from another angle. To what extent the following would intersect with Hays' position is unclear, but contrary to the existentialist philosophy which saturates contemporary American culture, humans exist relationally: family, state, and church structures are hierarchical. As such, each structure has authoritative heads (link).

What does this mean? Well, an earthly father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's father commands them to do their homework, eat their vegetables, or go to sleep, the child is bound or obligated to obey.

Likewise, a spiritual father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's spiritual father commands them to recite a confession or hymn in unison, to gather together at a certain time on the Lord's Day, or to give heed to a certain Scriptural reading, the child is bound or obligated to obey.

Note that in these examples I use, the fathers might have permissibly chosen to obligate their children to do something else. Nevertheless, commands such as these are within the scope of each authority's power. 

That said, the authority of fathers only go so far. An earthly father cannot determine my spouse; a spiritual father cannot determine my job. Further, the authority of an earthly and a spiritual father are themselves normed by truth. These authorities have God-given prescriptions as well as proscriptions. 

I doubt Hays would have disagreed with this. If, say, either father teaches something that is false - cf. Irenei - the truth revealed by our Heavenly Father overrides their subordinate authority. And adding a mother, several hundred bishops, or even an apostle or angel into the mix doesn't change anything (Galatians 1:8). God may delegate authoritative roles, but insofar as any authority (or, for that matter, subordinate) who speaks truth does so by themselves implicitly presupposing divine revelation, God is the "final authority." We can know His word just is truth. For that reason, it is epistemically foundational and our authoritative norming norm.

However, if one typically "follows" what one "judges" to be true (description), how can we ensure our judgments align with our obligations (prescription)? This dovetails with a few other comments Hays offered in his original response to Robinson:

vi) I disagree with how Perry frames the issue. It's not in the first instance a question of authority but truth and evidence. We have a duty to believe revealed truth, and the evidence for some interpretations is better than others.

vii) Apropos (vi), it's meaningless to say, in the abstract, that an individual has more authority than the church or vice versa. Those are empty generalities. They can't be true or false because it depends on the specifics. Sometimes individuals are right while collectives are wrong. Sometimes collectives are right while individuals are wrong. There's no fact-free principle that's true in general. Rather, it depends on specific claims and supporting evidence. 

In most cases, I agree with Hays, and if Robinson thought Hays' position was worth mentioning, one would think he might have responded to points such as these. 

One added caveat to Hay's remarks: when it comes to foundational knowledge - where one's knowledge and obligations begin - I think Robinson's own tutor, Russ Manion, says it well: "God’s revelation is self-authenticating, because, by it, everything else is authenticated" (link). 

From what I've read of him, I quite like Manion - he seems to have derived much of his apologetic from the likes of Gordon Clark, Cornelius Van Til, and Greg Bahnsen. There are obvious disagreements I would have, but I've said before that Eastern Orthodox apologists should read him more closely (link), for as I've also said before, many Eastern Orthodox apologists appear to favor a species of sola revelation (link). Manion ironically confirms this in the most Protestant of terms. He may have even conceded this point - he appears to have been a genuine fellow.

Does Eastern Orthodoxy entail what Manion suggests? Well, on Eastern Orthodoxy, what could have been considered as one's "normative authority" between the time of the apostles and the first Council of Nicaea? Given that bishops can be wrong and sometimes were wrong, might it not be that God's revelation as propositional truth - regardless of whether the mode by which said truth was communicated was oral or written (link) - must be regarded as one's ultimate rule of faith? Everything else - councils and all - are to be measured by it, no? The only question is whether Scripture is materially and formally sufficient for knowledge; many Eastern Orthodox apologists seem to agree with the former, and their view seems to entail the latter. This would be rather Clarkian!

Regarding what "knowledge" itself means seems to be an open question amongst Eastern Orthodox apologists. Robinson himself disclaims "absolute certitude" (link) which, of course, begs the question as to how Protestantism is disadvantaged if Robinson could be wrong about that which he considers normatively authoritative. 

On the other hand, an Eastern Orthodox apologist like Jay Dyer believes Christians were able to have certitude about the faith prior to Nicaea (see the 1 hour mark here). Dyer argues that this refutes the Roman Catholic magisterium as a necessary, "epistemic principle" - well, it also undercuts any analogous suggestion that might be made regarding conciliarism (pentarchical, receptionist, etc.). After all, how else did the participants in the various councils come to their theological conclusions about Trinitarianism, Christology, etc.?

For my part, I think our knowledge of all authority - final and delegated - comes from divine revelation. Of course, we don't need to have a philosophically strict "knowledge" of who our authorities are for them to be authorities. I have authority over my newborn son without him having philosophically strict knowledge of anything, although my status as authority is knowable in principle. But I do think a philosophically strict "knowledge" is possible, as I've argued in dozens of other posts.

So if and when my son grows to the point where he is able to point towards a higher authority as a corrective to some erroneous instruction I give him, he won't be obliged to or bound by that instruction. Just so with any delegated authority. As Hays says, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right." Thus, if I teach error, my son is not obliged or bound by my instruction regardless of his epistemic status.

Does this "right" to refuse to obey delegated authorities in certain situations imply delegated authority is unreal or useless? No. Daniel was really thrown into a lion's den, and powers possessed by delegated authorities often functions to deter reckless behavior. It's just that Daniel was righteous, not reckless. Robinson seems to be aware that Presbyterians such as myself take membership vows. For instance, I myself have vowed the following:

Do you promise to participate faithfully in this church’s worship and service, to submit in the Lord to its government, and to heed its discipline, even in case you should be found delinquent in doctrine or life? (link)

In taking this vow, I joined myself to a body which has the authority to excommunicate me from it. Aside from his view of my church, would Robinson think I take that lightly? 

In short, Robinson's definition of "private judgment" seems to cloud his thinking. He defines it as follows: "Any Christian individual is ultimately obligated to adhere to belief X, if and only if they judge (determine, assess, etc.) that belief X is scriptural." But wasn't Palamas excommunicated by a Synod in 1344 for what he thought was scriptural? Would Robinson describe Palamas as exercising private judgment or right judgment in that case? 

While our epistemic status does not determine that which is authoritative, I don't see the relevance in this statement given that one's epistemic scruples are what will determine that which one regards as authoritative. Put it this way: it is just as easy for a Protestant apologist to posit that they are in an advantageous position with respect to a point of metaphysics (e.g. about what is "normatively authoritative") over against Eastern Orthodoxy as it is for an Eastern Orthodox apologist to posit the same thing in reverse. Without argumentation - which is epistemic and/or apologetic - there will be no reason (by definition!) for either side to budge. In their discussions, Hays was "right" to reject Robinson's definition, to shift focus to the proper sphere, and to hold Robinson accountable for the implications of his metaphysical claims.

Robinson himself admits he could apostatize from Eastern Orthodoxy. He could come to accept the Westminster Confession 31.3. Does Robinson think, then, that his possession of this power entails that he uses private judgment in his rejection of the Westminster Confession or in his acceptance of the ecumenical councils as scriptural? Is Robinson the "final authority" in his own situation? Surely not, but just so for Protestants who, say, reject unbiblical statements in conciliar documents.

One can read here or here for more on sola scriptura, including the following observation:

Sola scriptura is a metaphysical statement of what Scripture is - the extant extent of divine revelation and, thus, our solely ultimate, authoritative rule of faith - not an epistemological statement of how we know what Scripture is. Certainly, what Scripture metaphysically is may and does inform how we can know what it is, but I equally certainly don’t have to answer the question of how I know what Scripture is by looking through Scripture for a table of contents.

This last sentence returns us to Manion and the question of the canon of Scripture. I wonder if Robinson departs from his tutor on the self-authenticity of divine revelation. Robinson derides the Protestant understanding as ahistorical, yet his own view (which he does not outline) would seem to beg serious questions. Let's take a concrete example. Canon 2 of the Council of Trullo reads:

It has also seemed good to this holy Council, that the eighty-five canons, received and ratified by the holy and blessed Fathers before us, and also handed down to us in the name of the holy and glorious Apostles should from this time forth remain firm and unshaken for the cure of souls and the healing of disorders. (link)

The eighty-five canons referred to can be found here, the last of which lists the New Testament canon as including the epistles of Clement and as excluding Revelation. Does Robinson accept this list as binding? 

But we saw earlier that the Council of Carthage in 419 is also accepted, and that canonical list differs from those in the eighty-fifth canon above. Who [authoritatively?] decides which list is right, and why? If I disagree with another Protestant, at least I don't hold that Protestant to be infallible. 

Does Robinson not regard this council as infallible after all? Or does he take this canon of Trullo and now that "push comes to shove," will he "throw it out the window"? Or does he bite the bullet and accept the contradiction?

Further, is it not viewed as an issue that the Moscow patriarchate accepts a canon of Scripture that differs from other patriarchates? 

If one's normative authorities have different understandings of that which is binding - no matter how small the difference - then it is hard for me to take serious any claim about the superiority of Eastern Orthodoxy's concept or practice of normative authority. As an apologetic tack, it's a paper argument empty and devoid of real teeth.