Modern Philosophy 11

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Berkeley's Treatise . The following is my submission:

Berkley’s purpose for writing Treatise was to refute skepticism and demonstrate the immateriality of God and immortality of the soul. To these ends, Berkeley, who observed valid deduction from true first principles should always yield consistency, purposed to examine how various beliefs about first principles like logic and metaphysics can lead to error.

One mistaken belief pertains to the notion of abstract ideas. Berkeley argued that Locke did not extend the scope of the impossibility to abstract far enough when he wrote that brutes cannot, for men too, said Berkeley, are unable to abstract: abstraction requires perception of particulars, particulars which, upon reflection, have unique predicates. To ignore these predicates, which one must necessarily do when abstracting from particulars, may lead to unforeseen difficulties such as relativity, arbitrariness, or abstracting from infinite particulars. An example which represents many of these difficulties is numbers: numbers can represent arbitrarily derived, relatively used measurements (for instance, feet and inches) and are also relevant to the concept of infinity. One can only think about and communicate the particulars (or amalgamations of particulars) which one has perceived, perhaps for the purpose of disposing oneself to a certain frame of mind.

The origin of ideas is another point on which Berkeley believed one may easily stumble. Sensation, substance, and reflection are the only means of conceptualization. But while Locke was concerned with one end of the epistemological spectrum – those who deny to necessity of the senses – Berkeley seemed to focus his polemical attention on materialism. God is one example of an immaterial substance who is discerned by recognizing nature is orderly and harmonious. Obviously, to recognize such implies perception, which Berkeley defined as an essential property – along with the will – of a spirit or mind. Furthermore, Berkeley noted that what one senses is not necessarily corporeal. He reasoned that one cannot observe an external object without perceiving it, and to suggest that one’s perception of an external object implies corporeality begs the very point in question. We could suppose an immaterial being (like God) could affect our senses. What knowledge we gain, then, is of our senses, not the object of sensation per se. This is perhaps better understood when one recognizes that what Locke called primary qualities – qualities which are allegedly not dependent upon perception – cannot be known to exist apart from perception. Primary qualities, then, are indistinct from secondary qualities: shape, extension, &c. can be distorted or relative to distance or medium of perception just as color.

Berkeley’s Treatise seems to be a sounder, if less common, variant of empiricism. However, while Berkeley resolved some tension amongst Locke’s beliefs, Berkeley left several fundamental, epistemological questions unanswered, such as an explanation for the way in which a sensation causes a perception. The way in which Berkeley uses sensation against materialism is difficult to understand; if Berkeley means to suggest that an intelligent being can possibly cause us to “sense” apart from physical external bodies, what does he mean? The only rational interpretation in light of his argument against materialism seems to be that it is unreasonable to suppose an immaterial, intelligent being cannot use external bodies as occasional causes to produce sensation. The subjectivity of sensation and human fallibility are, in any case, points which imply needed access to a source which is unconditioned and omniscient, something which Berkeley does not address.

Modern Philosophy 10

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Leibniz's prefatory response Locke's Essays. The following is my submission:

While Leibniz regularly praised Locke and at times noted that he and Locke did not disagree – examples: God can do things which men do not comprehend; reliance on divine revelation alone is epistemologically unnecessary; etc. – in his prefatory response to Locke’s “Essays Concerning Human Understanding,” Leibniz’s goal was to clearly distinguish, in general terms, his Platonic philosophy from Locke’s Aristotelian philosophy. Several acute criticisms Leibniz advanced against Locke’s system are as follows:

Locke’s assertion that our mind is a blank slate clearly did not sit well with Leibniz. If all truth is derived extrinsically, Leibniz wrote, it would be impossible to validly generalize necessary truths (such as logic, metaphysic, and ethics) from a finite number of experiences. Anticipation of a repeated event based on memory of what one perceives to be a similar precursor is certainly not irrational, but it is also not, as Leibniz pointed out, an infallible expectation. While sensation can provide the occasion for the reflection and confirmation of these truths – some of which Locke must presuppose in his own argumentation – it cannot be the ground for them. In fact, Leibniz believed that Locke was conflicted about this issue, as he cited that Locke admitted some ideas originate in reflection rather than sensation. Whether Locke realized it or not, to state reflection is an attention to something within oneself which has not been produced by sensation undermines the idea all truth is learned experientially.

The relation between one’s soul and body was another disagreement Leibniz had with Locke. As a self-professed Cartesian – at least in this matter – Leibniz believed in the doctrine of concomitance. He thought that all men’s souls naturally possesses a body. Several of Locke’s beliefs clashed with this. For example, when Locke wrote that matter can think, Leibniz objected that such would require continuous miraculous intervention, as such would unnatural. Leibniz argued that the fact God can do things which men do not comprehend does not in turn imply we can’t recognize impossibilities, and speaking of God, Leibniz used His [immaterial] existence to further support his argument that matter is not a precondition of thought. Another example of a way in which Locke’s anthropological views varied from Leibniz’s stems from Locke’s belief that souls can cease to think in an analogous manner bodies which cease to move. Leibniz accused Locke of question-begging on two accounts: firstly, in that bodies do not, in fact, cease to move, for just because we do not necessarily perceive a rope lengthen past its breaking point does not mean it is not logically necessary that such be the case; secondly, that even if the idea bodies could cease to move were true, there would be a disanalogy – after all, one who is awakes from sleep would not do so if he were not continually perceiving and sensing externals.

One final example of a fundamental disagreement between Locke and Leibniz may be attributable to Leibniz’s seeming stress on the importance of theodicy. Leibniz disdained what he perceived to be a logical extension of Locke’s philosophy, viz. “that simple substances influence one another, replacing influence by mere correlation.” Leibniz thought Locke did not sufficiently address the reason men perceive secondary qualities, for the seeming arbitrariness was obviously at odds with Leibniz’s philosophical belief that the universe is made up of simple substances in perfect harmony with one another according to the eternal, purposeful will of God.

Modern Philosophy 9

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about Locke's first four chapters of book 4 of his Essays. The following is my submission:

Locke’s fourth book is primarily concerned with explaining and defending categories of knowledge. Knowledge, which Locke defines as “the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas,” may allegedly be of several forms, some capable of being subsumed under others: identity, relation, co-existence, or real existence. The form “identity” is equivalent to one’s realization of the law of identity and non-contradiction, “relation” bespeaks of the minds correlation of idea, “co-existence” refers to that which is necessarily implied by a known proposition, and “real existence” means one’s ideas are more than figments of one’s mindKnowledge, then, is said to be restricted by these forms of ideas. Locke argues one’s knowledge is either “actual” or “habitual.” Actual knowledge refers to perceptions, true or false, one’s mind contemplates when relating ideas at any given instant, whereas habitual knowledge consists of continuous, repeated assent to the clearness of the truth of [a] given proposition(s), so long as ample time is given for reflection; that is, while one may “habitually” recall that a proposition is true, it may be the case that, having forgotten the particular proof, the clearness of habitual knowledge may be questionable.

Locke also concentrates on explaining degrees of knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, the first degree mentioned, refers to those propositions which the mind perceives as true without need of external justification. Demonstrative knowledge, the second degree of knowledge, refers to propositions the mind perceives as true on the basis of prior premises. Finally, sensitive knowledge is referred to by Locke as that which we perceive and know exists, more or less certainly, by means of sensation.

Locke derives from some relevant points from his discrimination, such as:

- demonstrative knowledge is, to avoid an infinite regression, necessarily dependent upon intuitive knowledge;

- propositions which one knows demonstratively are, antecedent to demonstration, doubtable and unclear;

- any known quality which has no “certain standard” against which one can judge whether or not his perception of that quality is such (e.g. color) must be intuitive;

- while ideas are always clear, knowledge is clear only insofar as the relations of ideas are unconfused.

While Locke goes to great lengths to list as many categories of knowledge as feasible, there are several seeming flaws, all of which stem from his empiricistic epistemology. For example, Locke provides no means by which one can know that what he perceives is not subject to change; that is, he does not demonstrate the validity of habitual knowledge. The tentativeness of [tabula rasa] empiricism would imply that knowledge of immutably truth is impossible: Locke presupposes the law of non-contradiction throughout all of his arguments, and yet experience can yield only a finite number of correlative observations. Sensation cannot produce abstractions, and even if such were true, Locke provides no reasoning by which he bridged either this gap or that from sensation to perception. It may be that Locke would appeal to intuitive knowledge at this juncture, but, like Descartes, Locke would have to concede that clarity of the truthfulness of a proposition is subjective. In one example, Locke disagreed with a hypothetical skeptic who rejected the idea one’s memory of the sensation of a burning fire is clearly distinguishable from actually being burned for no other reason than he thought the difference (if indeed there is a difference) was sufficiently clear. If one can take as basic any proposition one chooses, the arbitrariness of the process undermines the meaningfulness of Locke’s definition of knowledge as an appropriate demarcation criterion by which one can differentiate between opinion and fact.