The Tortoise Is Unfair

I was asked about this video in which the justification for deductive reasoning is put in question. The person who asked me to comment on it mentioned that followers of Van Til's brand of apologetics had forwarded him the video. 

Now, it is unclear to me what the purpose of that could be. Do these persons reject deductive reasoning despite Jesus Himself using it (Matthew 22:23-33)? Or are they perhaps suggesting that circular reasoning is acceptable (if so, see here)? Or perhaps they intended to use parity of reasoning to compare the way in which inductive reasoning is justifiable to the way in which deductive reasoning is possible? In this last case, I think "counter induction" (mentioned by the presenter around the 8 minute mark) provides a relevant problem for inductive reasoning that does not appear for deductive reasoning (see below).

Of course, one point of the video seems to be to question whether there is a problem for deduction relevantly similar to the problem of induction. One point made can be summarized as follows: if one can't use inductive reasoning to circularly justify inductive reasoning, it would seem one can't use deductive reasoning to circularly justify deductive reasoning. 

Well, I agree with this. But around the 13 minute mark, the presenter mentions that a form of deductive reasoning he calls "modus morons" (affirming the consequent). Now, if "modus morons" is alleged to be a problem for the justifiability of modus ponens similar to how counter induction is a problem for the justifiability of induction, I think point made around minute 25 illustrates a relevant disanalogy: "modus morons" leads to the principle of explosion and trivialism. 

If anything is derivable on "modus morons," this just means "modus morons" is self-admittedly self-defeating, unjustified, etc. This is not the case for the principle of counter induction (even though it might be counter-intuitive). Why, then, should anyone entertain that "modus morons" could be "justified"? What would that mean? The presenter says towards the end of the video that he still thinks "modus morons" could be meaningful but fails to expand on whether he thinks meaningfulness is a sufficient condition for justification.

Likewise, if one who accepts inductive reasoning as "justified" goes on to say that conclusions of inductive arguments could be false, I have to wonder what sort of "justification" is being advocated. And this should be considered the central takeaway of the video: regarding the "justification" of anything (deduction or otherwise), one must define what he means for something to be "justified"! Whether or not this invokes a problem of the criterion, without clarity regarding the sort of justification one is after, it will remain unclear when exactly one is justified in believing a certain form of reasoning.

For example, is the sort of "justification" in which one is interested infallibilistic? If so, then as mentioned above, that would constitute a relevant distinction between inductive (fallibilistic) and deductive reasoning (infallibilistic) in terms of self-consistency: inductive reasoning does not always lead to true beliefs, so use of inductive reasoning to justify inductive reasoning does not necessarily lead to a true belief. By contrast, use of deductive reasoning does always lead to true beliefs if one's premises are true.

In turn, this leads us to ask what structure of justification one accepts: foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, or positism? The presenter fails to mention that it just may be the case that deductive reasoning is itself [or legitimated by something which is itself] noninferentially, intrinsically, or foundationally justified.

Now, I say that less as a criticism of the presenter himself (since I'm sure he had his own reasons for the video) than I do as a criticism of those (perhaps certain Van Tilian apologists) who suggest deduction and induction are in the same justificatory boat. Nevertheless, I do wonder whether the presenter (since he styles himself as a skeptic, although to what extent is unclear) believes in epistemic neutrality, as if all positions are on equal epistemic footing and we are all capable of completely criterionless judgments. This would be silly.

Finally, I've read Lewis Carroll's tortoise story before (link). It is amusing, but it has never particularly bothered me. For starters, just because the tortoise doesn't accept the conclusion of a deductive argument doesn't mean Achilles is obliged to indulge him. If one presents a necessary truth and another rejects said truth, we can't compel that person to believe it. Our engagement may provide an occasion for the Holy Spirit to work, but how much effort one expends to persuade another who initially balks at truth is a matter of conscience, not obligation.

Supposing one rejects the reasoning in this post, for example, I might attempt a few further remarks to persuade him, but at some point, I will simply recognize that I am not dealing with a fair individual. The root of the problem in such people is ethical, not rational (Romans 1, cf. Hebrews 10:26, etc.). They may reason validly, but they reason in vain because they would rather avow false premises and rebelliously refuse to submit their consciences to the foundational truth of God's word than to admit that valid reasoning is impossible apart from a Christian worldview.

Discriminating Presuppositionalism

A few days ago, a friend asked me for my thoughts on this video. 

At the outset, the author, David Pallmann, asks, 

Just what is presuppositional apologetics? It is a school of apologetics which tries to show that Christianity is true via a transcendental argument (minute 1).

Now, this is quite a narrow view of presuppositionalism, especially in light of my own criticisms (as a presuppositionalist) of other presuppositionalists who thought transcendental argumentation could conceivably enable one to reason to God (link). His classification of versions of presuppositionalism which might differ from that of Greg Bahnsen as "deviant" (minute 8) is rather restrictive. If nothing else, I hope this post illustrates that one ought to discriminate the varieties of presuppositionalist perspectives. 

Mine bears an affinity with that of Gordon Clark and does not attempt to "show" (prove?) that Christianity is true via argumentation. Any arguments Clark might have made function as a defense of Christianity; but the arguments are not meant to function as "proofs," as if God's word (Clark's foundation or axiom) could have somehow been the conclusion to a (circular?) argument. 

Many flawed criticisms of Clark by fellow believers rest on a conflation between apologetics and epistemology. See my distinction between the two here. In short, apologetics or arguments presuppose epistemology or knowledge [of the most basic premise]. The two must be kept distinct. Apologetics is subordinate to epistemology. 

Another mistake is to think Clark was a traditional coherentist. Even people who claim to follow Clark's view sometimes make this mistake. He was a foundationalist. See point 5 here. A reason people make this mistake is because Clark accepted a coherence theory of truth; while I disagree with Clark on this, the point is that a coherence theory of truth (i.e. a definition of truth) is different than coherentism in epistemology (i.e. how we come to know the truth). See here.  

At minute mark 5, David says: 

In this video, I want to explore a response that has been periodically hinted at in the literature but is never, to my knowledge, been fully developed. I intend to defend the thesis that human reasoning is autonomous.

Given that his final quote in the video is from a chapter on autonomous human reason in a book written as a challenge to presuppositionalism (free on Kindle Unlimited here, by the way), I found this quote confusing. Does he think that his video or channel fully develops a thesis Joe Depoe does not?

Regarding the idea of autonomous human reason, in 1943, Clark anticipated the idea that this might be a problem for presuppositionalists in an article he wrote for The Presbyterian Guardian (link). Clark says: 

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision. 

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority? 

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority. 

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant. 

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason. 

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a, world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe.

Around minute 10, David says: 

By assumptions and presuppositions, I mean beliefs that are taken to be true apart from independent non-circular justification. In other words, I reject the idea that there are any beliefs that must be accepted without a justifying reason. 

I found this confusing too, since David elsewhere claims to be a foundationalist. The above quote appears to be a form of infinitism (link), not foundationalism. Unless I am misunderstanding him, his statement is not consistent with the rest of his video. 

At minute 12:20, David cites Timothy and Lydia McGrew: 

...to claim that there can be genuine epistemic principles that although rationally dubitable cannot be defended against someone who is skeptical about them is to allow an indefensible proposition to have epistemic weight. 

I had to read my own copy of that book for some context. The context is this: "Regardless of whether... a proposition is true, if it really is indefensible, it cannot be used as a premise to justify belief in anything else. If it is indefensible, it is epistemically irrelevant" (Internalism and Epistemology, pg. 80).

The question seems to be whether indefensible propositions can have epistemic weight (positive epistemic status). David blows by this question very quickly - too quickly (at this point) to allow for the nuance necessary to address the question. 

For instance, let's start with this: do axioms/foundations have positive epistemic weight? Well, a foundationalist had better say that in certain cases (i.e. God's word), "Yes, we can know axioms without having to defend them." There is positive epistemic weight regardless of whether we attempt to defend them. If God's word is our axiom and we can't know our axiom, then we are in trouble (this position is known as positism; link). 

Now, does the above mean that it is impossible to defend axioms/foundations? In one sense, yes; in another no. The epistemic justification of an axiom/foundation is not determined by a prior reason, premise, etc. For a foundationalist - as was alluded to above - the positive epistemic status must be intrinsic to the truth of the axiom/foundation itself. I interact with contemporary epistemologists on this very point here and here. 

On the other hand, it is possible to "apologetically" defend one's axiom/foundation. What does this mean? It means that in everyday conversations with others, one can point out that his axiom/foundation coheres with that which is derivable from it, that it answers important questions, etc. It is in this sense that we can understand Clark's affirmation that: "by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged." 

A self-defeating axiom cannot be defended (or known), whereas a self-consistent axiom can be defended insofar as the claims of its adherent can be harmonious, although we should not say we know said axiom by means of this or any other such defense. 

In other words, I agree with his denial around minute 13 of any attempt to circularly justify a knowledge-claim. I (and Clark) reject traditional coherentism, since it would be impossible to discriminate between circles without a foundational principle (like John Frame's foundational principle about the different between "narrow" and "broad" circles at minute 14; how could Frame say one is better than the other without assuming axiomatically that there is a difference in desirability?). 

As an aside, it's a bit funny that if Van Tilians defend traditional coherentism, then Clark's presuppositionalism is somehow "deviant." One would think that the very name of "presupposition"alism would more closely associate with foundationalism, not coherentism. 

Anyways, the point is that apologetic defenses of axioms/foundations are practical and persuasive, not epistemic. I put it this way in a post I have elsewhere said (link) I am planning to write in response to an article by Dan Kemp (link), whom David cites at minute 14:40:

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

Apologetics or defenses of our axioms can be useful in terms of being means by which the Spirit convicts the hearts of others without thereby becoming premises or reasons by which we somehow circularly know the axioms/foundations. Indeed, our methods for apologetic defenses ought themselves to be derivable from our axiom/foundation (e.g. 1 Peter 3, Acts 17, etc.). 

One final point. A phrase that David cites which caught my eye is "rationally dubitable." If David is talking about principles that are open to rational doubt and whether these can be defended in the face of a skeptic, he seems to suggest that if the answer is no, there is a problem. But if I am understanding him correctly, I don't see the problem? If something is "open to doubt" (dubitable), of course it is possible a skeptic is going to doubt it. In fact, some skeptics will even claim to doubt even those things which are indubitable, such as the revelation or promises of God. Just because we can't prove to the skeptic that God's word is God's word (or would David claim to be able to do this?) does not mean there is a problem - nor does it mean that our axiom/foundation is "rationally dubitable" after all. On this point, the problem with the skeptic is ethical. He refuses to submit to the self-justifying truth of God's word. 

Maybe I am misunderstanding what David means by a "defense" - or maybe I am misunderstanding something else But this is why it is important to provide some nuance to statements and quotes of other authors. Instead, David skips quickly to the claim that he sees no other way forward than to vindicate deduction and induction. That is much too fast a conclusion. If it isn't a non sequitur, then at the very least, I couldn't follow his reasoning. 

At around 18:30, David distinguishes between "self-justifying" beliefs and "immediately justified" beliefs. He thinks the former implies justificatory circularity (traditional coherentism) and the latter implies foundationalism. I disagree with his definitions, and so do contemporary epistemologists - see here, where Jeremy Fantl refers to "self-justifying" reasons or beliefs in the context of foundationalism. But to be clear, I also reject justificatory circularity. 

I've read Fumerton's work. I actually quite like him. I gave a former student his introductory book on epistemology. At the same time, I don't agree with everything Fumerton says (link). And I suspect that the idea of "direct acquaintance" (which David gets from Fumerton) might be another area of disagreement. He says: 

Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so... Direct acquaintance is not itself a belief but it relates a subject to a fact in such a way that the subject is aware of the correspondence between his thought and the fact that makes it true. 

Notice what is being argued: justification for beliefs depends on "acquaintance." But "acquaintance" is not itself a belief. Well, if "acquaintance" is not a belief, can "acquaintance" be a truth-bearer? If it can't, then how is it that "acquaintance" can "ensure" the justification of beliefs? Can that which does not bear a truth-value function as a justification for that which does? 

In other words, what does it even mean to say that direct acquaintance can "ensure" justification? That sounds suspiciously like saying that acquaintance is itself a logically distinct and preceding justificatory condition for one's belief(s) - a reason. But this would undermine the David's claim to be a foundationalist. 

Relatedly, a topic in contemporary epistemology is how something without that is neither true nor false - say, a sensory experience qua experience - could function as a justification for the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]. This seems to be a directly relevant question, for David goes on to say: "...one can be immediately justified through direct perceptual awareness..." 

Notice the word "perceptual" (and see his headache example at minute 21 and his direct reference to sensation at 21:30). Recall every Clarkian argument against empirical knowledge (link). He even admits that one's sensations may not correspond to external states of affairs (but attempts to suggest that our beliefs regarding our private experiences are not open to question - this move doesn't work insofar as David later admits to holding to fallibilism, contrary to his above statement that direct acquaintance can ensure "infallible" justification, on which see below). 

In short, his reply to possible objections at minute 22 is dismissive and avoidant. He responds to an easy objection while failing to address more difficult ones (how is "direct acquaintance" able to function as justification). This is a meta-epistemic concern, but meta-epistemology has direct relevance to normative epistemology. Analogously, infinitism is a meta-epistemic position on the structure of epistemic justification. If infinitism is inherently problematic, an infinitist does not actually know anything by the structure he claims is correct. If "direct acquaintance" is inherently problematic, a direct acquantaincist does not actually know anything by "direct acquaintance" (so-called).

This gets a little deep, but here is another question David fails to entertain: while I agree that there is a correspondence between truths and other realities - I reject the idea that everything is metaphysically reducible to [sets of] propositions - does that mean non-propositional realities (like my body) are truth-makers (like propositions about my body)? 

As a Reformed Christian, I rather think that God is the truth-maker of all propositions. In particular, it is He who determined the truth-values of contingent propositions in accordance with His eternal decree. As such, it's possible that the truths God has eternally decreed may, in some way, actually be means by which non-propositions (like my body, which is not eternal) are made. For a probably clearer idea of what I'm getting at, read this article by Clark in which he writes: "when compared with verses in the Pentateuch the words strongly suggest that the visible world came from a suprasensible, ideal world."

Moving ahead to minute 26: "Knowledge does not require certainty." Three questions: 

1) Is David certain of this? If not, wouldn't such an admission be problematic in the possible case that certainty actually is required for one's beliefs to count as knowledge (a possibility which I don't understand how he could rule out non-arbitrarily)? 

2) I thought that David earlier said, "Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so..." What happened? When is and is not infallibility applicable to one's beliefs? 

3) If knowledge does not require certainty, then what does it mean to say that any beliefs are "justified"? 

Around 30:30, David shows the three potential responses to Aristotle's transcendental argument for the laws of logic. They are ones I've encountered and thought about before. In response, I will offer three counters: 

1. David basically says that "Aristotle might be right that one must think in accordance with the laws of logic, but that this doesn't establish anything is true." In response, two questions: 1) What is the David's alethiology (theory of truth)? Perhaps one's alethiology (which might entail consistency amongst true propositions) would entail that in accordance with said theory, the laws of logic cannot be false. He somewhat gets around to this at minute 37. 2) If David acknowledges that one cannot speak without first assuming the laws of logic, then his own response admittedly presupposes the laws of logic. But in that case, is it legitimate to use that which he might purport to reject? Is it legitimate to admit that a hilltop (truth) can only be reached by climbing a ladder (the laws of logic) and then from said hilltop deny that he ever used a ladder? Ironically, in another video David makes against presuppositionalists, he cites a "magic 8-ball" illustration that it seems he himself falls prey to here. 

2. David's response to Aristotle certainly isn't a persuasive response. But that's how I interpret a correctly oriented defense of the laws of logic in the first place: again, a defense or apologetic needn't be interpreted as a circular justification. 

3. David's reference to dialetheism returns us to the question of alethiology. This is probably the strongest counter he raises (then again, he addresses his own concerns by providing a very good quote at 38:55 which undercuts dialetheim). I needn't say much more, since David denies dialetheism himself (44:45ff.).

Nevertheless, I will offer a few more thoughts. In particular, are there some cases in which the law of noncontradiction do not hold? Typically, a dialetheist will not be a trivialist; he will not suggest that every pair of contradictories can be or are true (which is subject to the principle of explosion). 

Underlying this theory, then, seems the assumption of alethic particularism: rather than start with a broad, theory of truth (e.g. consistency among propositions which may correspond to kinds of realities), we might start with what we consider are intuitive and particular examples of truths - some of which might consist of contradictories which can both be "true" - and attempt to form a resultant theory of truth (such as dialetheism) with these examples in mind. 

While I would like to flesh an argument against dialetheism further than I am able at present, given the above, one possible line of argument against it and its implicit alethic particularism could perhaps be made along the same lines as I have made against epistemic particularism (in isolation from epistemic methodism) here.  

This is probably a more important point than I can emphasize here, for repeatedly in the video, David often uses paradigm cases to defend his position. For example, at minute 36:10, he uses an particular example that he assumes his audience will agree is justified to defend a broader methodological principle. That is, in appealing to his audience's intuitions, he appears to be a particularist, and if he is not, he does not sufficiently distance himself from particularism; a quote around minute 52 might obliquely allude to it, but even there, not enough context in the quote is provided to even understand its purpose. 

With the above in mind, can logic justify logic? No. Again, circularity is not the structure of epistemic justification. In other words, we do not know anything by reasoning in a circle. As I've mentioned before, though, we can still make arguments for propositions we know non-inferentially or foundationally. These arguments do not justify said foundations but can function to persuade others [especially that alternatives to our view are non-viable]. 

The laws of logic in particular are embedded within the Scripturalist's foundation as a subsidiary, ontological precondition for knowledge, as I argue here and here. Thus, our knowing them is, in conjunction with our knowledge of God's revelation, immediate or non-inferential.  

I don't have much further to say about his discussion on analyticity, except to note that he doesn't think he needs to explain how we have them "so long as we do" (minute 26:30). Well, does he have concepts? If the answer is potentially "no," that is a serious problem. 

But as I said in an earlier post, God's word is not rationally dubitable. The problem the skeptic has is one of ethical rebellion (which affects his ability to reason soundly, not his ability to reason validly per se a la Clark). 

David's part of the video on induction was extremely weak. He did not address the question of what number of observable cases would suffice for epistemic justification. He does not address what constitutes a "large sample." The concept of "large" is finite and therefore relative. As one might approach infinitely many observations, any concrete number of observations is infinitesimally small by comparison... in which case, is not an inductivist's epistemic justification (and "confidence" therein) virtually (as well as really) non-existent? This is a much more difficult issue than David intimates. 

In my opinion, the best one can expect on this topic is doxastic defendability. A Scripturalist (and only a Scripturalist, insofar as any kind of "defenses" are parasitic upon internalist and infallibilist "knowledge") might be able to defend his extra-Scriptural beliefs to the extent that they conform to his alleged experiences (this would be inductive), but he must also be open to revising such beliefs in the case of alleged defeaters, e.g. experiences which do not conform to what he has experienced previously. This theory only would apply to extra-Scriptural information, and it would not qualify as strict epistemic justification (although we might also colloquially refer to any such beliefs as "known"). 

Another reason the response to the problem of induction was weak was because David only went so far as to address Hume's skepticism. Clark's concerns regarding induction - as an anti-empiricist - deserved more attention than Hume's. 

My friend mentioned that he thought David is an evidentialist. In his last part of the video, I can see why: he says as much. In particular, at 1:00:50, he cites an author who says, "the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief." Again, I am confused how such a view can be consistent with foundationalism. If foundations do not rely on evidence, then one's justification for one's foundational beliefs cannot fall within the realm of an evidentialist theory. David appears plainly inconsistent on several points. 

David concludes, "...the Christian [presuppositional] apologist tries to gerrymander the rules of epistemology..." 

I had a good chuckle at this! Still, I enjoyed the video insofar as I'm glad to see professed Christians engaging in contemporary epistemological issues. I agreed with him regarding foundationalism, the resolvability of paradoxes, and some other points. I wouldn't want my above responses to be taken as suggesting his videos are valueless, only that, as with anyone (Clark and myself included), one must wisely apply discrimination where appropriate.

David P. Hoover on Gordon Clark

As I would expect Van Tilians to be able to reply to his impressive criticisms of Van Til’s apologetic (link), I think his paper on Clark (link) is equally deserving of a reply from a Clarkian. Insofar as I do not agree with everything Clark wrote, perhaps I am ill-suited to the role, but I agree with Clark in many respects – especially epistemologically – so until someone smarter than Hoover and I comes along and sets us both straight, I will try to fill in a few gaps.

Background and Terminology

Briefly, I will point out that some terminology Hoover uses could be perceived as biased since provided without much explanation. In his introduction, for instance, he writes that “Clark is an uncompromising Idealist and Rationalist.” Now, the idea that Clark was an Idealist is debatable; Clark didn’t necessarily have a problem with it (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 209), and for that matter, nor do I if Idealism is defined as there being a significant sense in which there is no reality independent of God’s mind. Univocal [real] images, for example, are as possible as univocal [real] propositional knowledge; this will be important to remember when discussing how the coherence theory of truth could be supplemented, though it must also be acknowledged that empiricists bear a burden of proof when it comes to so-called knowledge about some allegedly corresponding image.

But given that Hoover was familiar with Clark’s book Three Types of Religious Philosophy, in which Clark differentiates his “Dogmatism” from Rationalism by denying that “all religious knowledge, can be deduced from logic alone, i.e., logic apart from both revelation and sensory experience” (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 21), why Clark is classified as a Rationalist is a bit of a mystery. Whereas “Rationalism believes that it can deduce by its own method what God can and cannot say” (Ibid., pg. 42), Clark held that divine revelation is necessarily self-authenticating. Hoover is fair in his exposition of Clark in most other respects, so it is strange that he does not explain why he considers Clark a Rationalist. He highlights their similarities - such as the acceptance of the coherence theory of truth - at the expense of individuating characteristics.

I do not mean to suggest that Hoover intentionally fails to provide all the pertinent facts. I suspect the real trouble here and elsewhere is that the scope of the article is inherently restrictive. In my opinion, Hoover was given a 10,000 word limit or so to explain and then critique the epistemology of a man who wrote several dozen books on it and dedicated his life to teaching it. Quite possibly, Hoover could have anticipated the sorts of questions I am and will be asking but felt that addressing them would be too tangential or less relevant than what he would have had to cut out. Naturally, Hoover is also not only or perhaps even chiefly writing for readers who are already familiar with Clark, so the space available to present a comprehensive rebuttal - let alone a defense of his own thoughts - is mitigated by the purpose of the article: the focus is meant to be on Clark, not Hoover (so far as this is possible), and the historical “progression” of his thought as well as an evaluation of it. Of course, none of this will prevent me from remarking on what is left unsaid that I think is important, whether or not such was deliberate.

On Induction

Hoover’s abstract reads as follows:

Gordon Clark is an uncommon presuppositionalist. Dating roughly from the publication of his “Wheaton Lectures” in 1968, he has increasingly stressed the complete impossibility of empirically acquired knowledge. According to Clark, the Bible, and only the Bible, can be known. All observation based truth-claims and all inductive arguments are logically worthless for apologetic purposes. This essay attempts to follow the progression in Clark’s thought which leads to such a thoroughgoing skepticism (with regard to a knowledge of the contemporary world). The essay looks, in turn, at Clark’s reasons for rejecting the reliability of perception, Clark’s adoption of the Bible as axiomatic, and Clark’s propositionalism. Although these subjects are treated critically, the aim of the author is to achieve clarity on what Clark holds and why.

Hoover similarly states a little later, “Valid reasoning, for Clark, is the only profitable reasoning one can engage in, and it is definitionally deductively valid reasoning. Inductive arguments whose premises merely support their conclusions are necessarily bad arguments - in fact, worthless.” These ideas warrant further explanation than I think was provided in the article. Clark did agree with Plato that “Knowledge is timeless and changeless and requires, not observation, experiment, and induction, but deduction alone” (Ancient Philosophy, 1997, pg. 141). He also said that “there is no logical place for induction in presuppositionalism. One assumes or presupposes certain axioms and from there on everything is deduction” (The Trinity, 1990, pg. 93). So, if Hoover is meaning only to refer to the fact that “unnecessary inference arrives at no truth at all” (Lord God of Truth, 1994 pg. 39) - as I suppose he could be, given his qualification that Clark argued induction is “logically” worthless - Hoover is as entirely correct in his assessment of Clark as Clark is of induction.

But all of this only pertains to Clark’s own positive, [meta]epistemological views. A recurring theme throughout this post will be that Scripturalism is a philosophy which attempts to promote and supply the need for infallibilistic knowledge. Insofar as an apologetic or belief is unnecessary, it isn’t epistemically relevant - which is, I stress, not to say it is completely irrelevant. But what we need, what we must have - in short, that which is necessary - should come first, and fundamentally, this is “philosophical knowledge.” Induction, therefore, cannot be epistemically profitable, but at the same time, Clark’s philosophy is compatible with the opinion that induction can serve a pragmatic function. And even in the context of apologetics, Hoover notes elsewhere that Clark believed:

The apologete can take up archaeology only in its potential for logically embarrassing the opponent to Christianity. That is, “scientific discourse” can be taken up only ad hominem against the individual who puts credence in science.

Thus, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that the ability to refute or disconcert an opponent with his own methodology is “worthless,” even if the methodology itself can (and should) be demonstrated to be so; in fact, assuming his faulty basis in order to show it leads to [other, more overtly recognizable] undesirable beliefs seems to me to be a rather common-sense apologetic attempt to persuade an individual that it is his basis that is in need of correction. Apologetics needn’t be restricted to the providing of a defense of one’s own position, although and notwithstanding Hoover’s seeming disagreement (cf. footnote 24), that is certainly a precondition for an analysis of another’s (link).

Cognitivity and Sentience

Early on in the article, Hoover does a relatively good job of restraining himself from incredulous dismissal of the consequences of Clark’s arguments, evident, for example, in the following:

The very legitimacy of questioning the reliability of sentience (the capacity to discriminate the environment by the senses) seems to imply that there are perhaps other (non-sentient) modes of cognitive access, other methods for finding out, that might be used instead. And if sentiently gleaning content goes part and parcel with inductive method, then the question becomes whether there is a better method than observation and testing to find a cure for AIDS. But what might an alternative be like? Divination? Inspecting tea leaves? Saying the first (second, third) thing that pops into one’s head? (Observing tea leaves is, of course, ruled out.) Or perhaps there is no such disease as AIDS since its occurrence is alleged on the basis of observation! And by parity of reasoning there are no diseases afflicting anyone! But if we find that we cannot help but admit that we do have the capacity for making observations in God’s world and that sentience is inextricably tied up in the making of observations, we will find Clark’s position even startling. But it is important to state that Clark’s position cannot be put away by a string of rhetorical questions.

Still, a few points on Clark’s behalf seem to be required. In the next section of his article, Hoover correctly writes that “Clark’s ultimate concern for presupposing, it seems to me, is more nearly the philosophical one of overcoming skepticism (by exhibiting at least one logically irrefutable truth).” But in that case, what do “the reliability of sentience,” “the reliability of perception” and “cognitive access” to one’s environment entail? In particular, do any or all imply one should be able to have infallibilistic knowledge of his environment? If so, why does Hoover even think one needs to know his “environment” in the first place, assuming there even is such an environment? If not, then I do not see how any of this is relevant to the business of Clark’s epistemology given what Hoover himself acknowledges to be its primary concern: the refutation of skepticism by the establishment of infallibilistic knowledge.  Other theories of “knowledge” may ask that less stringent conditions be met, but for that very reason Clark would not be as interested in them; they would have no value in making headway toward Clark’s goal. In one of his footnotes, Hoover says: 

...the fact that informal cognition (knowledge by sentient acquaintance) is subject to well-known limitations and pitfalls does not argue that there can’t be sentient acquaintance with the world. To have a cognitive capacity does not entail the having of it to a superlative degree or the having of it without limitation with regard to the sort of capacity it is. 

But would Clark necessarily disagree? After all, Clark does at times informally refer to sensation as that which stimulates actions designed to preserve the body from [perceived] harm or an occasion on which knowledge occurs (cf. Lord God of Truth, pgs. 16, 23); at least, I am not aware that he has provided a strict definition of it, although he certainly chastised those who attempted to found their philosophy on it without defining it. So it’s not so simple as Hoover’s conclusion that “Clark simply refuses to acknowledge informal noetic capacities in man.” It’s not a question of whether we must have “faith that we inhabit a real and discriminable world of real and discriminable sinners” in order to evangelize or whatnot. Clark agreed that we should act as if all our beliefs (opinions included) are true:

Although not usually recognized as such, a certain claim to infallibility meets us in our everyday affairs. When an accountant balances his books, does he not assume that his figures are correct? When a college professor hurries to class for fear that his students will disappear if he is late, does he not make judgments as to the time of day and the proclivities of students? When a chess club challenges another to a match, does any suspicion of fallibility impede its action? Cannot this club distinguish the dogma ecclesiastica that there actually is another club from the dogma haeretica that no other club exists? Must not all people act on the assumption that their beliefs are true? (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997 pg. 146)

But it is clear that all of this is has nothing to do with whether our inferences not based on divine revelation can be infallible, let alone why they need to be (link). I am pretty sure, then, that Clark would ask Hoover if or how he infallibilistically knows he has this capacity. How does Hoover account for how Timothy could infallibilistically know he has found Paul’s cloak? Or doesn’t he? If Hoover were to demure but protest that Clark is being reductionistic - as he does in the rest of the aforementioned footnote - I think Clark would say this is all besides the point, for the refutation of skepticism requires a narrower focus as to what sort of knowledge could count as a defeater. Hoover may not care as much about skepticism as does Clark, but then it would be an “empiricist” rather than a “rationalist prejudice” that is at issue here. 

Additionally, regarding so-called “ostensive clarity,” Hoover never really explains how or if one can discriminate between conflicting claimants. This may have less to do with Hoover and more to do with whatever particular brand of empiricism he espouses, but it’s hard to tell because nearly all allusions to it are either mentioned in passing or phrased in such a way that the reader is not sure whether Hoover is committed to the idea in question. 

On the one hand, Hoover says “What is important to see is that one cannot discredit [ostensive (or inductive) demonstrability] by showing that it cannot be analyzed in terms of [discursive demonstrability].” Does that not also imply one can’t be credited over another? Epistemologically, that would be a point Clark would consider in his favor.

On the other hand, Hoover clearly wants to avoid arbitrarity. In one footnote, he suggests that empiricists “can maintain that there is an intimate and necessary relation between sensory stimuli and the perception facilitated thereby, but deny that stimuli and perception relate by logic. A stimulus, after all, is a stimulus a causal sort of thing.” In another, he says the possibility of “phenomenal indistinguishability... can be contested,” but instead of explaining how, he goes on to argue that our epistemological limitations don’t affect ontic statuses. Now, anyone “can maintain” any position. The real question is why he would. So wouldn’t it more be more helpful to explain what grounds an empiricist could have for these positions? Maybe he is presupposing them, though he continually seems to want to contrast presuppositionalism with his evidentialism. 

Why, then, does Hoover think sensations cause perceptions? And then how can perceptions be used to form abstract concepts or universals? I mean, there must be some point at which propositional beliefs are connected to sensation, perception, images, etc., right? I had thought that was the whole point of “empirical” knowledge. But since the predication of truth-values is propositional enterprise, then in contrast to what he states above, mustn’t there be discursive reasoning or logical relations somewhere in this empirical process? Well, where and how?

In yet another footnote - which one can probably by now sense is where most of Hoover’s positive [counter-]assertions have unfortunately been relegated - he writes: “From an aggregate of black dots which ostensibly occupy an area on a newspaper page, one cannot deduce the likeness of President Reagan. The President’s likeness is gestaltic in character, not discursive.” What does that mean? Does one have legitimate reason to infer a resemblance to President Reagan or not? Could one have legitimate reason for denying a resemblance? What suffices as a “likeness”? The reader is left guessing. If this is all purely intuitional - Hoover asserts that “there is an inherent informality in the very meaning of truth and in the human being’s mode of cognizing truth” - then I would consider empirical knowledge to be rather arbitrary and subjective.

Ironically, Hoover is so busy chiding Clark for “begging the question” against empiricists when he agrees with Blanshard in one instance or picks apart empirical particularities which Hoover doesn’t hold to in another - as if Clark were always obliged to refute all of empiricism and all empiricists universally and at once or else refrain from making any attempt at refuting individual arguments empiricists have used - that in the remaining space it seems he can do little more than make offhanded comments about or references to what he does hold to and why. But this in turn begs questions too. If Hoover’s empiricism really is so different than that of those whom Clark critiqued, I would have expected a bit more effort to distinguish his views, especially given his insistence that Clark’s opponents did not actually “fail to identify clear alternatives.” 

Anyway, when the reader recalls that this article was written in 1984, only one year before Clark’s death, it should not surprise him that the mainstream views of contemporary empiricists (like Hoover?) should have changed so quickly from what the mainstream views of the empiricists of yesteryear believed. Clark himself noted this as a recurring trend throughout the history of philosophy. When it comes to secularly approved epistemologies, the only constant is change. Then again, even if none of what he said in his books is applicable to modern empiricists - which I doubt - Clark can hardly be held responsible for not responding to empirical ideas which had not yet been invented when he originally published them. But this is an impression one can sometimes receive from Hoover’s article.

The Coherence Theory of Truth

Hoover defines the coherence theory of truth as follows:

Briefly, the coherence theory of truth holds that there is only one ultimately coherent system of truth. Truth, that is, is a system of geometrically organized propositions. If a certain proposition is true, it is logically entailed by the system—or less stringently perhaps, a true proposition is one which is simply not inconsistent with any of the other propositions in the system. On the other hand, a proposition is false if and only if it fails to be entailed by the system—or, if and only if it is inconsistent with the system. The system contains all truth and only a truth can properly be said to be a knowable.

In the case of an omniscient God, I don’t think an analogy to geometry is appropriate, but this is a bit technical. So far as a human like Clark, Hoover, or myself would be concerned, this is a fine explanation. And Clark does hold to the coherence theory of truth to the exclusion of all others (cf. Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine?, 1990, pg. 111; “The Bible Today” 42.6, March 1948). But while I think Hoover is correct to criticize Clark for holding to it exclusively, I don’t think he goes about it the right way. Hoover argues:

The telling criticism, however, is that, contrary to Clark’s belief, the coherence theory of truth does not provide a theory of the meaning of truth, but only a criterion for its recognition within a formal system. Thus, if presented with a proposition P, and I know that P is a member of a set of propositions which is consistent, then if that set is sanctioned by a true axiom, P must be true as well. The mere coherence of P is a sufficient criterion of its truth. But note that P’s content, by the coherence criterion, is irrelevant. My point is that a sure—fire criterion for the identification of a true proposition as a true proposition is not necessarily an insight into the meaning of truth. 

But for the moment, let us suppose that the coherence criterion is also the meaning of ‘true’ as predicated of propositions. Suppose that Clark is right. Take the proposition, “Jesus Christ has come in the flesh.” (I John 4:2). The recipients of John’s letter, let us assume, rejoiced in this truth as over against the docetic teaching about the incarnate Christ. But in what, exactly, could they have rejoiced given that the coherence theory of truth is true? If we are indeed given the meaning of truth by the coherence theory, then John’s proposition’s truth consists in its formal consistency with the larger set of propositions of which it is a member. They rejoiced, then, that “Jesus Christ has come in the flesh” is logically consistent with all the other propositions they held for true. Conceivably, there may have been in that early church some rather eccentric academics and logicians who had the necessary expertise to delight in the logical fittingness of John’s statement, but did not the early church rejoice rather in this statement’s content? In what this statement is about? The Apostle John’s faithful witness is that we do not serve a docetic Christ, but a Christ who became flesh. The proposition in question, if we are to make sense of being encouraged and gladdened by it, is about a non-proposition—viz., the Incarnation of Christ. Its coherence may be a criterion or sign of its truth but its truth is more plausibly construed as its faithful recounting of what had taken place in the case of Jesus of Nazareth. So unless a mere mark of truth is the meaning of truth, coherence cannot be definitional of truth.

Maybe I’m missing something, but in the second paragraph, it just seems like Hoover reverts to the string of rhetorical questions he had earlier acknowledged would be insufficient for the purposes of his article. Clark would say a proposition is “about” whatever is the subject of the proposition. Then what?

As for the first paragraph, I don’t understand why Hoover thinks that “P’s content, by the coherence criterion, is irrelevant.” How could one gauge coherence between two propositions unless he can compare their content? 

Furthermore, as hard as it is to believe - which is why I say I could be missing something - it looks as though Hoover conflates the coherence theory of truth with coherentism. The former has to do with what truth is as such; the latter has to do with the “recognition” of it. These don’t refer to the same thing, though they may seem to. The latter is essentially a theory of how we can justify some knowledge-claim, and as a Scripturalist, Clark certainly didn’t think we know a proposition is true if and only if it coheres with other propositions. He acknowledged this could be possible in the case of God (cf. Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 287ff.), but he equally makes clear that he doesn’t consider coherence a “sufficient criterion” for men. “One who believes in the unity of truth may still believe that the false system entails contradictions; but to prove this is the work of omniscience” (Historiography: Secular and Religious, 1971, pg. 370). So our [justified] knowledge of what truth is as much depends on divine revelation and that which can be derived from it as anything else.

Instead, I think it is better to attack the metaphysic which undergirds an exclusive adherence to the coherence theory of truth. If there are realities other than propositions and the concepts of which they are composed, then one who [correctly] believes that everything is related will have to relate his theory of truth to that. Earlier, I noted Hoover calls Clark an Idealist and that this is not necessarily false or a bad thing. But I would argue and have argued (see here, here, here, here, and here), however, that if Idealism implies the “propositional monism” to which Hoover attributes to Clark - viz. that “the set of all real objects and the set of all knowables is the same set” - this metaphysic is inconsistent with Clark’s stated philosophy, which in the main is sound. 

Persons

While what has been said above may address the concern that “Clark’s epistemology requires a serious distortion of human nature, to that extent it is ill-suited to serve as a basis for defending the Christian faith,” Hoover also questions Clark’s metaphysical thesis of persons as a congeries of propositions [or, perhaps a little more precisely, thoughts]. Now, as Hoover says upfront that he wishes to “sketch a reductio ad absurdum argument against Clark’s insistence that persons are propositions,” the challenge will be to refute Clark while operating within Clark’s epistemological framework. Indeed, as the Bible just is a series of sentences, and the Bible alone is, on Scripturalism, the source of all [infallibilistic] knowledge, the only way to show to Clark that there are realities other than sentences is if it is shown that sentences are in some respect deficient in explaining things the Bible refers to. So it might be true that on Clark’s metaphysic of persons, propositions must be regarded as bearing capacities or properties like moral character, rights, and so forth, but Hoover’s conclusion that this is “curious” seems to dangerously imply that Hoover is begging the question. But then he says that this is not “formally decisive,” and so we are really just left with the following paragraph:

According to Clark, persons are propositions (i.e., “complex definitions”). Drawing from Leibniz, Clark affirms that a given person is precisely the set of propositions that make up his life history. And a person is all his propositions. From this it follows that personal identity, self-knowledge, is utterly problematic if not impossible. This follows for two equally sufficient reasons—the first posing a strictly epistemological problem and the second, a logical problem of individuation: (i) Epistemologically, at any point in one’s “autobiography” one has only a finite sample of a possibly infinite set of propositions that will go to constitute his identity. Recall that propositions based on sentient awareness do not count. Now if one has but a finite sample of propositions relevant for his/her identity, the probability that one has enough propositions for a correct identity judgment is either exceedingly small or zero (a finite number over infinity is zero). (ii) Logically, Clark’s theory identifies the person as a “complex definition”—or, to say the same thing in a way that will help us make the point about individuation more clearly, a person is a set of propositions. Persons, then, are individuated by propositional sets, by propositional totalities. This has the exceedingly odd consequence that persons can be told apart, so to speak, only by virtue of their entire life histories. Because no person in this life has the requisite omniscience to know total life histories, it follows that persons in this life are not the sort of thing that can be told apart. But perhaps more seriously—and this brings us around to the test question concerning the exercise of moral agency—if persons are thus individuated (by logically complete propositional sets), how is it imaginable that persons could be moral agents within their life histories? For in Clark’s sense of person, the person seems to be his life history and not a participant within it. And it does no good to invoke the omniscience of God. The fact that God can individuate the propositional sets in question still does not allow persons to be agents within history. Propositional sets are simply not the sort of entities that could commit adultery, care for the sick, or resist temptation. Thus it would appear that a propositional monism is insufficiently rich in basic categories to allow even the Biblical David to sin and repent. 

Now, I have defended the possibility of self-knowledge with a Scripturalistic framework here, among other places. I also think I’ve also pointed out a fallacy in the idea that a function in which x is some finite number and y approaches infinity equals zero when the former is divided by the latter (link). 

In response to the other arguments, that we cannot now knowingly individuate ourselves would not be to say that it cannot be done, nor that we cannot have an opinion as to how we are distinct subjects. This may remove some of the sting of the criticism, at least until it is explained why infallibilistic knowledge [of ourselves or, for that matter, extra-biblical realities in general] is necessary in order to obey God.

I do think Clark was a bit unclear as to whether a person is “what he thinks” (The Trinity, 1990, pg. 129) or, in agreement with Leibniz, whether a person is the sum of what may be predicated of him (cf. Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 148-149). Maybe he thought these two ideas can be resolved.  But I didn’t really understand the criticism that a “person seems to be his life history and not a participant within it.” On Clark’s view, how could there be the former without the latter? Perhaps Hoover’s philosophy of time or history is different from Clark’s, but if so, he never says it.

In short, Hoover seems to be attacking all the right doctrines in all the wrong ways. While I agree with his conclusion that persons cannot just be propositions, I provide other reasons for it (e.g. here).

Language

While I don’t seem to agree with many of his answers, Hoover does ask some really good questions. On the subject of language, he writes:

What it means to presuppose the truth of all this content is itself far from clear. And the question is important beyond a mere philosophical quibble. For one thing, there is the character of truth itself according to the different presuppositionalists. Does truth attach to locutions within the various literary genre in a univocal way - e.g., in poetry, didactic passages, historical narrative? How does truth qualify, and provide implication for, imperatives, interrogatives, counter-factual subjunctives? When one avows that one “presupposes Biblical truth” one does not, ipso facto, answer this sort of question.

These are all excellent, each deserving of more development than I have the present capacity to give. I have written about counter-factuals here. Regarding imperatives and interrogatives, they must mean something just as declarative sentences must mean something, and we must be able to understand them. So perhaps it is possible to reformulate these types of sentences in declarative form without a loss of meaning. For example, per Augustine, a question could normally refer to an expression of desire that a person teach him about some subject. A command could be thought of as an [assumed] authoritative declaration that one [is obligated to] perform some action. In any case, both types of sentences connote that the utterer has certain hopes or expectations of his interlocutors. As for there being various literary genres, even such being the case, one point they all must have in common is to communicate some understandable meaning, in which case historical-grammatical exegesis should be able to be indiscriminately applied.

But Hoover makes other, more provocative relations between language and Scripturalism, such as:

Suppose, for example, that I want to determine whether “Hoover is using the Axiom” (1) makes sense, and (2) whether it is true. Since on Clark’s assumptions knowledge is the system headed by the Axiom (as identified), the individual terms if they can be assigned content, must be defined in the Axiom, and the proposition as a whole is certifiably true only if it is either mentioned in the Axiom or deducible from the Axiom. Taking the truth of “Hoover is using the Axiom” first, we see at once that it is neither mentioned in the Bible nor is it deducible from the Bible. It follows that I, Hoover, can never know whether I am using the Axiom—whether reading, applying, or reflecting on it. More drastically, perhaps, the very proposition “Hoover is using the Axiom” contains one prominent term for which no Clarkian meaning can be assigned. On the criteria already given, no acceptable definition of “Hoover” can be acquired. Hence, it seems to me, the formula “Hoover is using the Axiom” fails to constitute an intelligible proposition. 

As for the idea that something must be explicitly defined in order for one to be able to understand what it means, I see no reason why, if every concept is “a name given to a very lengthy complex of propositions” (Modern Philosophy, 2008, pg. 273), our ability to understand what any one of them means cannot be due to meaning that is inherent or implicit in their usage. After all, if concepts are like empty receptacles into which meaning is poured, defining a concept by making it a subject of a proposition is no good, for the predicate turns out to be just another empty receptacle. See here and here for more on the ideas of necessary and intrinsic meaning.

Now, when it comes to the ontology of man, the “innate knowledge” of language and logic which is evoked upon “the heat of experience,” and so forth, there is much more that can and must be said. But given these available speculatory answers, Scripturalism doesn’t stand or fall here (link), so I will leave further thoughts for another time.

Clark's Lectures 5

I was fortunate enough to go to New York this past weekend and obviously wanted to see the public library, but I had no idea I'd discover that they had a copy of Gordon Clark's thesis for his doctorate at UPenn. Unfortunately, it was only a fragment of it, as the rest of the pages seem either to have been torn or fallen out at some point - there were perhaps 20 of the original 50 pages. Nevertheless, what I read impressed on me how much Clark must have developed his personal philosophy over time, even though it was obvious that Clark then was an able philosopher, fluent in multiple languages and ancient philosophies. At any rate, it was a pleasant surprise to find it, and I hope others will enjoy these few points he made that I transcribed:

History, Textual Criticism, and Skepticism

The opening sentence to his thesis was as follows:

Page 5: "Save us, we pray, from those who have so entombed themselves in the dark and damp of antiquity that they no longer appreciate the light of the present day; but save us all the more from those who go blithefully on their way in utter disregard of the lessons the past can teach."

The point of his poetic remark is well-taken but, if taken strictly, is stated a little imprecisely. The past doesn't teach. Its utility lies in its capacity to occasion ideas in our minds as to what is truth. I think I have addressed this issue here, but perhaps a further comment on a statement by Clark will be helpful:

Page 10: "In the case of Aristotle we are not dependent on fragments, for we have his complete works; we are perfectly familiar with the usages of his language; the only difficulty is textual and whoever bases a skepticism in textual criticism asserts that not only nearly all philosophy, but nearly all history as well, before the Renaissance, it forever unknowable. This is a reductio ad absurdem. We can with tolerable certainty ascertain the exact working of Aristotle, but to understand his thought we need also to know the arguments and discussion of previous arguments men which were the motives to his solution. Are these unknowable? My answer would be, try and see."

I thought it was ironic that Clark should have logically followed the implications of textual criticism so closely only to derive a conclusion opposite to what should be drawn from his philosophy of Scripturalism, viz. it is indeed the case that nearly all history is unknowable, since textual criticism often presupposes an empirical methodology. This is not a reductio ad absurdem to the individual who believes that man is efficiently illumined by God, though not necessarily apart from experiential stimulation. Of course, it would be silly of me to heavily criticize a man's early writings when it is that man whose theology I consider myself occasioned to be so indebted.

The Thesis

The purpose of his thesis, Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Aristotle's De Anime, was to determine how trustworthy Aristotle was in his historical interpretation of the philosophies of his forebears', with particular attention to Aristotle's treatment of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. He was well aware that his conclusions were tentative due to the focused nature of his thesis, but he believed that similar studies would solidify his generalizations:

Page 6: "What would be necessary for the final verdict on Aristotle would be a series of such theses, treating each philosopher referred to in each of Aristotle's works. Only after such an induction could generalizations be made. But how easy it is to anticipate the generalizations without going through the induction is perhaps only too well illustrated in the following pages."

Page 7: "The firm belief in the final truth of his own system led him to examine others through Aristotelian spectacles."

Page 46: "It appears, therefore, even in the little so far covered that A. is as trustworthy as any historian can be expected to be."

It is too bad that the majority of the pages between these last two statements were missing, as it is otherwise difficult to reconcile them. Perhaps he meant that although a historian cannot be trusted as an objective, unbiased source of information, he can be relatively charitable. But at least this shows Clark seemed to recognized a distinction between incomplete and complete induction and that his work falls under the former category.

Theological Statements

As much of Clark's thesis concerned itself with finding out what Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle taught, there is less of the author's own opinion than may be desired. But this is proper, and it leaves me with only a few more interesting statements:

Page 45: "Now obviously to argue from a man's theism what his psychology ought to be is rather precarious."

I do not believe Clark would have considered this idea to be so obvious later in his life. But again, Clark was only 26 or 27 when he wrote this, so it is not strange that over the next 55+ years of his life that he would change his mind on a few of his beliefs. He apparently changed his mind on the infinitude of God as well (cf. The Incarnation, pg. 62):

Page 46: "The knowledge of an infinite mind, which is not the result of a learning process peculiar to finite minds, may be compatible with impassibility. Yet the more we insist that God is unchangeable, the less we understand how he recognizes temporal events as having happened or as about to happen."

This last statement is profoundly true, reflecting my current struggle to understand God's immutability in relation to time. As Clark changed his mind, I may very well change mine. But it is good to share a God whose truthworthiness is unchangeable.