I noted in this post that I believed Language is a precondition for knowledge. I say Language with an upper-case "L" to distinguish it from alleged, particular languages like English, Hebrew, Greek, etc. This is a helpful article which distinguishes Language (or linguistics) from languages as well as makes some other acute observations.
For Language to be a precondition for knowledge is just for it to be necessary in order to know. Why do I consider language to be a precondition for knowledge? This becomes clear when it is explained what knowledge (at least, "philosophical" knowledge) necessarily entails: belief in propositions.
But given this, I do not find that I can agree with Clark that "words are arbitrary signs" which "tag thoughts" (cf. here, especially the quotes under the subsection "Meaning and Symbols"). Clark's Language and Theology is an excellent book, but at the very least, I find this assertion to be an over-generalization. The rest of this post will explain why. Firstly:
P1) Language is a precondition for knowledge.P2) God's [self-]knowledge is eternal.C) Language is eternal.
It is at least the case God's knowledge of Himself is necessary. So Language is necessary and natural to God. That is, what God knows about Himself must be non-arbitrary, so Language - and by extension, some particular language or languages, as that is something propositions require - must be necessary.
Unless we are prepared to concede that the meaning of the object of knowledge is not propositional but rather supra-linguistic or beyond expression - in which case we seem to be left with some kind of Plotinic, transcendent experience - the words or signs or symbols in the propositions God necessarily knows must also be necessary. Simply put, if there are necessary, known propositions, there are also necessary words, signs, or symbols.
This is not to say that people cannot perhaps create arbitrary words, signs, and symbols and designate them to be univocal with some set of necessary propositions (although see the last paragraph). But there still remains the necessary fact of eternal, non-arbitrary words and propositions.
The question then is, in what way is or are eternal language(s) necessary? I see two options:
1) it is inherently meaningful.2) it symbolizes something not reducible to linguistics similar to operalization of so-called "physical objects."
As I believe the majority of Scripturalists hold to the idealistic idea that all things are a congeries, set, or complex of propositions (with the possible exception of the physical world), it would seemingly follow that Scripturalists should opt for 1); otherwise, we are back to a correspondence theory of truth bereft of univocality, which is pretty much the primary reason Clark rejects empirical "knowledge."
Thus, to assent to truth could simply be to assent to the eternal, linguistic expressions of God's knowledge (or arbitrarily designated equivalents thereof). [It is hard for me to grasp the idea that propositions act and will; alternatives, however, seem to be worse.]
To clarify, for example, Greek and Hebrew are spoken by God, so we know that either:
1) both particular languages are arbitrarily created but valid equivalents of the language of God's eternal knowledge, as they both are comprised of words, signs, or symbols which can be univocally designated as equivalent in meaning to the eternal, propositional language(s) of God's [self-]knowledge, or2) one (or both) of them is (are) actually the language of God's eternal knowledge.
Or perhaps there are no arbitrary words, signs, or symbols. If I write a truth in English, God knows it. But does that really mean I created truth? Instead, we might consider that there aren't really any "particular" languages except in a geographic sense. Just as you can learn an "English" word which is synonymous with another "English" word, you can learn an "Arabic" word which is synonymous with an "English" word. What I mean is that "English" and "Arabic" may not modify the words but rather describe the people who usually use the words. In this case, all "languages" are in some sense necessary. There would simply be different expressions of knowledge, like two sentences being interchangeable (the same proposition). This would actually make more sense to me as I continue to work to understand the philosophy of language.
15 comments:
"Simply put, if there are necessary, known propositions, there are also necessary words, signs, or symbols."
>>>This necessity is it a necesiity of the eternality of its use, that de facto, those are the signs and symbols that God chose to think, or is it a necessity of nature, that those particular signs and symbols that God uses to think are inherently representative of the klnowledge they are expressing (representation vs. arbitrary tag)? Myself, I have to go with the former and if that is the case Clark's assertion that all language is arbitrary would still stand.
What are the referents of those arbitrary signs and symbols, then? Other propositions comprised of arbitrary signs and symbols? Or something supra-linguistic? I think either case is problematic.
"What are the referents of those arbitrary signs and symbols, then? Other propositions comprised of arbitrary signs and symbols? Or something supra-linguistic? I think either case is problematic."
Meanings of declarative statements: propositions. A propositions is the meaning of a declarative statement. Language is the arbitrary transport of that meaning.
"Other propositions comprised of arbitrary signs and symbols?"
This is where I am not following you. You seem to be equating a meaning with its carrier.
"A propositions is the meaning of a declarative statement. Language is the arbitrary transport of that meaning."
If there are eternal and necessary propositions - and as God's knowledge of Himself is both, there is - then there are eternal and necessary words. You can't have the former without the latter.
"You seem to be equating a meaning with its carrier."
From your perspective, that would be true, whereas you seem to be saying that words can be arbitrary but that propositions can be necessary. That doesn't make sense.
Ryan,
"If there are eternal and necessary propositions - and as God's knowledge of Himself is both, there is - then there are eternal and necessary words. You can't have the former without the latter."
We have already had this discussion. Eternality does not imply a necessity of nature.
But even on your view, is not God's knowledge of Himself both eternal and necessary?
Drake,
"But even on your view, is not God's knowledge of Himself both eternal and necessary?"
By "knowledge if himself" what do you mean exactly, because nature and will are both aspects "of himself"?
Then I mean knowledge of His nature.
So if God thinks to Himself "I am just" in English, are you saying that he could not have thought that in Hebrew; that the English language is not simply an eternal choice but a necessity of nature that emanates from his nature?
If you read the post all the way through, I say in the last paragraph that I think it would make more sense to consider all particular language"s" as necessary because we can consider them only to be geographically distinct.
To put it another way, we agree that different sentences may convey the same information, right? "John hit the ball" and "the ball was hit by John" mean the same thing. Just because the sentences are different doesn't mean we should consider the sentences to be different languages. But then, why consider a so-called English sentence to be a different language than a Hebrew sentence which means the same thing? It seems to me the only reason to think of them as different languages is convention; one group predominately uses one set of words and sentences whereas another group uses another. It's a matter of geography.
God knows propositions about His nature necessarily. To ask in what language he knows them would, given the above, be as faulty as asking which of the two sentences about John does God know. God knows all valid linguistic conveyances of the same meaning. He knows all language"s."
I did read the article in its full. I am challenging your ambiguous use of the word "necessary".
"To ask in what language he knows them would, given the above, be as faulty as asking which of the two sentences about John does God know. God knows all valid linguistic conveyances of the same meaning"
Sounds like you have made a great argument on why language is then arbitrary. Given the above,would it not be equally meaningless to say that if there are necessary propositions, there are also necessary words, signs, or symbols?
In what way is it ambiguous?
P1. God knows some propositions - namely, propositions about His nature - necessarily. [He couldn't not know about His own nature.]
P2. Propositions are comprised of words. [There are no propositions not comprised of words.]
C. To know any proposition necessarily presupposes that at least some words are necessary. [If the words aren't necessary, then either the proposition known isn't necessary or there are some propositions not composed of words.]
"Given the above,would it not be equally meaningless to say that if there are necessary propositions, there are also necessary words, signs, or symbols?"
Equally to what? I don't follow. Could you expand?
"In what way is it ambiguous?"
Well we have touched on these issues before. Divine necessity could mean a necessity of nature or it could mean the eternality of a divine volition.
That God eternally thinks in a certain language I will not deny, but is that language a necessity of nature, or an eternal volition?
I think the latter. If the latter then the words he thinks with are not necessities of nature but simply agreeable volitions to nature. In that case, God's nature could allow to have thought in a different language and still be the same God.
That's probably all I'm going to say Ryan. I think we may be getting too deep into hidden things.
Maybe so. As a final point, then, if language - and since language is a precondition for knowledge, knowledge itself - extends from God's will, all of God's knowledge is accidental/non-necessary (on your view). I would be very uncomfortable with that.
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