History, Epistemology, and Divine Simplicity

A year and a half ago, I wrote a post outlining Clark's take on divine simplicity. I concluded that despite very obvious incompatibilities with other beliefs he held, Clark came to accept the doctrine, at some point in his life, that God is identical to each of His attributes revealed in Scripture. 

A quick point before moving on: is there a reason numerous theologians find it so surprising that Clark would render John 1:1 as meaning "the Logic was God"? Doesn't this follow from divine simplicity? It's not as if divine simplicity is a fringe doctrine, plenty of Reformed theologians have held it. But in that case, how is it any stranger to say "Logic is God" than "God is logical"? On above definition of divine simplicity, the subject and predicate are identical, neither being subordinate to the other. God is love, so love is God. God is eternal, so eternal is God. If God and His individual attributes really are identical, these other seemingly odd subject-predicate reversals are just as true. So is the objection that God isn't logical? Is it really solely a matter of exegetical warrant, when Clark basically wrote a whole book about it? This is just something I've been wondering.

Moving on, in the process of reviewing a few critiques of Clark given by his contemporaries - Robert Reymond's The Justification of Knowledge, Gordon R. Lewis' Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, and Ronald Nash's contribution in Clark and His Critics - I expanded my reading a bit and was somewhat surprised to read that each of these men, all of whom Clark respected, rejected the theory of divine simplicity as stated above. Consider the following statements:

…the temptation to distinguish between God’s “metaphysical essence” and his “nonmetaphysical nature,” and to make the former more primary than the latter, should be resisted. 

On the other hand, it is equally necessary, when we declare that God’s being is identical to his attributes, to resist the error of some medieval nominalists, who held that God’s attributes are nothing more than words (Lat. nomina), so that the distinctions which they suggest are not really present in the one divine essence. For surely God’s eternality is no more identical with his knowledge, his knowledge no more identical with his power, his power no more identical with his omnipresence, and his omnipresence no more identical with his holiness than is our knowledge identical with our power or our goodness identical with our finite extension in space. God’s attributes are real, distinguishable characteristics of his divine being. (Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 1998, pgs. 162-163) 

The divine unity revealed in Scripture is not like a mystical Neo-Platonic “One” beyond all categories of human thought. The biblical oneness does not rule out distinguishable attributes and persons. 

Church tradition sometimes made matters more difficult than necessary by claiming that, as simple, God can really include no distinctions at all – not between essence and existence, act and potential, person and essence, or anything else… 

Those who deny any propositional information about God either inconsistently claim to hold that God is ontologically one or, more consistently, find themselves tending toward the new polytheism (discussed below). (Gordon R. Lewis, Integrative Theology, 2010, link) 

The doctrine of simplicity is the belief that God is identical with His nature or His properties. Another aspect of the theory teaches that God’s essence is indivisible in the sense that God’s properties are not parts of God’s nature… 

Once we state that God’s essence has no parts, however, a problem arises. Human beings could never have knowledge of an absolutely simple essence… 

If human beings necessarily conceive God differently than He really is, is there conception of God not therefore false? 

…equating God with each of His properties entails that each of God’s properties is identical with His other properties. If A is identical with B and if B is identical with C, then A is identical with C. Clearly, then, if God is identical with His property of knowledge and also identical with His property of goodness, it then follows that the property of knowledge is identical with the property of perfect goodness. If each of God’s properties is identical with all of God’s other properties, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that God has only one property. But this is mystifying, to say the least. While obviously there are many things about God that human beings may be incapable of comprehending, one of the things we do seem to know very clearly is that power and love and knowledge and mercy are not identical properties (Ronald Nash, The Concept of God, 1983, pgs. 85. 86. 94)

Apropos this last paragraph by Nash, I would like to highlight and expand on something I wrote in my previous post:

...if a simple God's essence is identical to His attributes, His attributes would be identical. In that case, none of those attributes could be univocally predicated of us, as we are not God. Further, we would not be able to know God, analogically or otherwise, as He knows Himself.

Note the impact of the impossibility of univocal predication on the subject of God and ourselves as knowers. We aren't, for example, eternal. But if, as divine simplicity entails, God's eternality is identical to God's knowing, knowledge, or being a knower of [any given] truth, then we couldn't univocally know what God knows without ourselves being eternal [et al.], i.e. God. I don't even really need to mention other epistemic difficulties divine simplicity faces, let alone more general theological problems. So I won't bother. 

But I do want to note that in reading through Van Til's A Survey of Christian Epistemology (link), I've found that for him, like for Aquinas, analogical knowledge is rooted - at least in part, as I still think an acceptance of Hegelian internal relations played a significant role in Van Til's acceptance of analogical knowledge - in divine simplicity:

If the theistic position is true, the that or existence of any finite “fact” depends upon the what or connotation. God has given that fact. If theism is true, connotation and denotation are identical in the case of the personality of God. The what of God is the that of God. It is this that furnishes the foundation for and is the ground of the necessity of analogical reasoning... 

And it is exactly because of our deep conviction that God is one and truth is therefore one, that we hold that there is only one type of argument for all men.

So God's existence is His essence and vice versa, and God is so simple that any truth He knows must be simple. Note too Van Til's replies to Buswell at the end of the book, in which he conflates 1) God having the possibility or potential to know and will in ways other than He has with 2) the idea God is incomplete in regards to His being. This implies Van Til subscribed to the idea God's will and knowledge are identical to God's being. These are all classic features of divine simplicity. 

Is it any wonder why such a metaphysic led Van Til to voice the complaint against Clark which he did? Divine simplicity naturally leads to the rejection of univocal knowledge between God and man. Again, Clark's metaphysical views need to be reexamined.

Gordon Clark on the Precondition of an Omniscient Communicator

My efforts to compile a near comprehensive transcription of the positive epistemological views of Gordon Clark were recently completed - at least as far as what materials I am at present able to cover, anyway, including all of his books and, to my knowledge, most of his shorter articles - and this project has been paying off quite nicely.

For instance, I have long argued that in order for me to philosophically know anything, one precondition for this is communication from one who is omniscient (example). While the inspiration for this argument originally stemmed from a book Robert Reymond called The Justification of Knowledge, it turns out that Gordon Clark made much more explicitly relevant statements which lead to this conclusion. To share just a few of these:

Ancient Philosophy (1997), pg. 145:

Now, where the Ideas are important, everything is related to everything else. To use a crude example, the explanation of a desk lamp would require explanations of desks and lamps. The desks would then lead us into carpentry, labor troubles, kinds of wood, forestry, and governmental conservation. An explanation of lamps would include the laws of electricity, and so on forever. In fact, before one could understand a desk lamp, one would have to understand the universe. 

This stress on the interrelations of everything with everything can be developed in two directions. One may argue: Since we know this one thing, we can deduce everything else; or one may argue: Since we do not know everything else, neither do we know this. The first direction has appealed to Hegel, to Bonaventure, Augustine, and Plato.

Historiography: Secular and Religious (1971), pg. 334:

What follows if it is true that psychological analysis presupposes a “complete knowledge of the psychological possibilities of life”? It would follow, would it not, that historical analysis also presupposes a complete knowledge of historical possibilities. In short, it would be impossible to know anything without knowing everything. 

Such a Platonic or Hegelian requirement of omniscience is a serious philosophical problem. It is not to be dismissed thoughtlessly. The meticulous scholar, J. H. Hexter, in his Reappraisals of History, castigates historical relativism as a fad and insists on the “rudimentary distinction” between knowing something and knowing everything. But he omits all philosophic justification for this distinction. 

Undoubtedly this distinction must be maintained, if a human being is able to know anything at all. Make omniscience the prerequisite of partial knowledge, and partial knowledge vanishes. But Bultmann, like Hexter, offers no help: less help, in fact, for Bultmann lets the requirements of omniscience stand.

Baker’s Dictionary of Theology (1991), pgs. 245-246:

Plato and Hegel constructed theories of knowledge which, if pressed to their logical extreme, imply that man must be either omniscient or completely ignorant. If every item of knowledge is so intimately connected with every other that its true nature cannot be seen except in its relation to all, then either we know all or we know nothing. Plato and Hegel both had a hard time escaping this dilemma. 

Now Moses said, “The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever” (Deut. 29:29). The Bible, therefore, both here and everywhere, assumes that we can know some truths without knowing all truths. Accordingly it is incumbent upon us to develop an epistemology in which the relationships are not such as to limit us to the disjunction of total ignorance or omniscience. 

This epistemology may follow Augustine’s view that Christ is the light of every man: that is, mankind possesses as an a priori endowment at least the rudiments of knowledge, so that whenever anyone knows anything he is in contact with God. Or, the epistemology required may be more skeptical as to geometry and science and simply insist that God, being omnipotent, can be a verbal revelation make his truths understandable to me.

Readers can consider this just a teaser. I actually already have in mind an outline for a more comprehensive article that would more fully utilize Clark's writings to show how this argument provides a really powerful motive for accepting many of his epistemic views, but I would like to see if I could get something like that published first.

A Van Tilian Essay on Reymond and Clark

A friend of mine looking at online apologetics courses brought to my attention this paper by a student, and I'm going to comment on the remarks he makes on Clark's epistemology:

In chapter four of his systematic theology, “The Fact of Divine Revelation”, Reymond makes clear that he holds to the epistemology put forth by Gordon Clark in the twentieth century.

Chapter 4 in the second edition of Reymond's New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (NSTotCF) is The Nature of Biblical Truth, not The Fact of Divine Revelation. Clark isn't mentioned in the latter chapter at all, so I think he just missed that. As will be seen momentarily, however, it appears that the author did not read Reymond's book very closely.

Also, I would note that Reymond sympathized with Clark, but he certainly wasn't completely “Clarkian.” See, for example, pgs. 66-74 in his book The Justification of Knowledge. If Reymond held to Clark's view, Clark would have had no reason to respond to him in Language and Theology as well as Clark Speaks from the Grave.

...man's knowledge is totally dependent upon God's and is consequently qualitatively different from God's... This statement makes clear what Van Til means by the qualitative difference between God's knowledge and man's. Van Til simply means that we can never know anything originally as God does because he alone is omniscient.

How does man's epistemic dependency imply his knowledge is qualitatively different from God's? Of course we can't know anything "as" God does, but this is not a difference in content of knowledge but in the mode in which one knows. Our knowledge is derivative and dependent. God's knowledge is intuitive and independent. This isn't the question. The question is whether the content of what man knows differs from the content of what God knows.

While we may not be able to know comprehensively what a "cow" is - as that would indeed require knowledge of it's relations to everything else and, hence, omniscience - it does not follow that what we do know about a cow (i.e. what He who is omniscient has revealed about such) is qualitatively different from God's knowledge. Yet that is what Van Til contended: "we dare not maintain that [God's] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point... [the knowledge of the creature] can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition" (cf. pg. 5, column 3 here). I discuss all of these points more fully in this post, the primary points being as follows:

God is omniscient. What we know, then, must be what God knows. Self-defeating skepticism... is the alternative.

...God can univocally communicate His eternal thoughts to man by divine illumination pertaining to what He has revealed in His word. This is the method by which a man comes to univocally know both the truth of propositions and, hence, the infima species of the subjects of propositions by which one subject is individuated from another. The issue then simply becomes a comparison of the extent of our knowledge [about a subject] to God's, and no Clarkian thinks he is omniscient.

...the point is that one doesn't need to know the biblical meaning “in the context of all other propositions” in order to know what God knows. It is sufficient to know the infima species of the biblical subject “Jesus,” i.e. a minimal, finite number of propositions which would individuate “Jesus of Nazareth” from “Jesus of Strauss” et. al. Omniscience is not required. In fact, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that for a Scripturalist, the “context of propositions” in which the biblical meaning of the statement “Jesus is Lord” is properly understood is found in the very context of Scripture.

Continuing:

We might say that Van Til understood that truths must be logically related because they are revealed, where for Clark and Reymond we can acknowledge that something is revealed only if we can see its logical relationship.

I disagree with the implicit assertion that Clark and Reymond subordinate divine revelation to one's perceptions of what is logical. For instance:

If it be suggested that angels also have rational knowledge, they too must have been created in God's image and therefore must have been created in God's image and therefore man is not the only image of God. This is plausible since the Psalms say that man was created a little lower than the angels. But it does not militate against man's being the image of God. And further, while the Bible distinctly asserts the image in man, it does not make this assertion of angels. The creation of angels is left in obscurity, and so we too must leave it there. (Clark, The Biblical Doctrine of Man, pg. 15)

So long as there is a possible answer to an objection, there is no problem. The problem Clarkians have with Van Tilian appeals to paradoxes is that they are often made when there is no such possible answer to a logical objection, e.g. analogical knowledge leads to skepticism. This appears especially ridiculous when Van Tilians cite Scripture to chastise their opponents, as if the opponents cannot retort that because they only know Scripture analogically, then on their own grounds Van Tilians must admit the possibility that in the broader context of what can be known, truth could be compatible with what their opponents believe.

...consider the three friends of Job. When one reads the book of Job and notices the chain of reasoning that these men employed, it becomes apparent that they, on a practical level, believed that logic was a sufficient tool to explain the revelation of God. In this sense Job's friends were proto-Clarkian in their epistemology. A syllogistic summary of their argument might look like this:

• God judges sin, not righteousness.
• God is judging you, Job.
• Therefore, you must have sinned.

Here we have a logically sound piece of argument, and yet how flawed was the conclusion!

Firstly, the argument in question is valid, not sound. And frankly, this sort of accusation evidences ineptitude. "God is judging you, Job" was never divinely revealed explicitly nor implicitly - "by good and necessary consequence," a phrase in the WCF with which Clarkians heartily agree - so no consistent Clarkian would assent to it.

In this context, the author takes the opportunity to reference the so-called "presumptions" of Clark and Reymond, which is ironic because no corresponding example is provided. No instance is given of Clark or Reymond actually making unnecessary inferences; rather, they are injudiciously and presumptuously lumped in with Job's accusers. Instead, the author continues to pontificate as to what Reymond would have replied to a divine command to kill his son, as though he thinks there is no possible answer to the objection that such would have contradicted Genesis 9:5-6. On the one hand, if there is a possible answer, why wouldn't the author be charitable enough to allow that Reymond could appeal to it? On the other hand, if there is no possible answer, then that shows just how meaningful is his claim that he is not advocating irrationality.

I suspect it is the former, as the author is elsewhere uncharitable towards Reymond by either dismissing Reymond's arguments or imputing false positions to him. For example:

It is important to remember that we are not advocating “irrationality” as Reymond implies must be the case.

What Reymond actually says is devastating to any notion of "paradox" in which no possible answer can be provided to an objection:

...once one asserts that a truth may legitimately assume the form of an irreconcilable contradiction, he has given up all possibility of ever detecting a real falsehood. (NSTotCF, pg. 106)

The author doesn't address this, which must be remembered when he later chides Reymond for remarking that the giving up of this possibility leads to "the death of all rational faith," which is quite true. Continuing, the author writes:

Reymond avers that it is merely the “erring exegete” who understands the facts of revelation in such a way that they are apparent contradictories though reconciled to the mind of God.

No, what Reymond actually says on pg. 108 is:

Certainly it is possible for an erring exegete so to interpret two statements of Scripture that he thinks that they teach contradictory propositions. But either he has misinterpreted one statement (maybe both), or he has attempted to relate two statements that were never intended to be related to one another.

Reymond doesn't mention apparent contradictions at all, let alone that such could be reconciled in the mind of God. Continuing:

Reymond, in marked contrast to this position, insists that the facts of revelation must not only come as the self-attesting correspondents of God's knowledge, free of all true contradiction, but must be reconcilable “before the bar of human reason.”

Nowhere on the page the author cites (NSTofCF, pg. 109) does Reymond say such a thing. Continuing:

Reymond, not content to “take all the factors of Scripture and bind them together into systematic relations with one another as far as we can”...

Reymond never says this. The author assumes Reymond disagrees with this statement because it was made in the context of a quotation of Van Til with which Reymond disagreed. Actually, Reymond only expressed disagreement with the idea that "the Bible will often (always, according to Van Til) set forth its truth in irreconcilable terms..."

The author essentially makes the following mistake: suppose I say "Clark was smart and Van Til was smart," and suppose the author disagreed with that statement. I could assume that if he disagrees with one part of the statement he disagrees with all of it, but that would be rather "presumptuous," wouldn't it? I could assume he thinks neither Clark nor Van Til were smart, but actually, he may have thought Van Til was smart though Clark was dumb. Now, I really shouldn't have to explain this, because it's pretty obvious. But it does illustrate that one should always check the source material to see if an author is honestly and faithfully portraying its views.

I might add that even if Reymond was "not content" with this, it would mean he disagrees with Clarkian epistemology. So what was the author's point?

Other examples of sloppy reading could be cited, but I think the one's mentioned are sufficient to the purpose.

In the last section of his paper, he mentions that:

Historically, the expository case for a Clarkian epistemology has been largely made from a certain translation of the Johannine logos...

Now, in all of the posts I've written defending Scripturalism, I've mentioned that verse a grand total of once, and that only in conjunction with John 14:6, which I assume the author would agree asserts that Christ is the truth. I got the impression that his haggling over Clark's rendering of John 1:1 - and honestly, it doesn't take a Greek scholar to see that he logic is a legitimate rendering of logos - is minutiae meant to obscure the real arguments for Scripturalism. For this reason, I was a bit amused when the author said:

Perhaps aware of these difficulties, Reymond does not emphasize Clark's understanding of the Johannine logos in his argument for a Clarkian epistemology.

Or, perhaps aware of its relative insignificance, Reymond focused on those aspects of Clark's understanding which are more fundamental to Clarkian epistemology.

The author then goes in to another tangent, i.e. whether Paul's gospel was derived from one or multiple revelations. It's really bizarre. Of course, examples of "logical extension" can be found in Scripture. Jesus accused the Sadducees for failing to draw out the implication that God is a God of the living, not the dead (Matthew 22:23-33). And the author himself makes logical extensions when speaking about the Trinity, a word not found in Scripture. So I don't see what the fuss is about.

The author does get one thing right:

At the heart of Reymond‟s epistemology is a denial of the Creator/creature distinction in the realm of knowledge.

Well done, Reymond.

Omniscience: Eternal or Bust

I was thinking about this post today as I was reviewing both Robert Reymond's version of the argument from which that post received its inspiration (cf. The Justification of Knowledge, pgs. 36-37) and some books on Open Theism, and I had an interesting thought. First, for convenience, here is the argument:

//For a being to claim to know a proposition is true presupposes that he knows it's truth is not contingent or, if it is, said being knows that upon which the veracity of the proposition is contingent. Let's call this being Ryan. This implies two things:

1. Ryan is omniscient or has acquired his knowledge from a being who is omniscient, as Ryan would be required to know the relation between a proposition and anything upon which the veracity of the proposition might be predicated (which in turn implies knowledge of everything, including respective contingencies).
2. Ryan's knowledge is infinite or has acquired his knowledge from a being whose knowledge is infinite, as there are infinitely many possible relations one might posit between the proposition in question and everything imaginable.//

The thought that occurred to me was that not only is man's knowledge dependent upon an omniscient, infinitely knowledgeable being, but said being cannot have become omniscient or infinitely knowledgeable through a process; that is, it is necessary that the being in question is eternally omniscient. For simplicity, let's call this being God and let "eternal omniscience" encompass the notion of infinite knowledge.

Now God, if He is not eternally omniscient, must, if one is to allege that He has or can become omniscient, have at some point learned that which He did not know. In other words, God was not omniscient prior to having learned that which He did not know. So far, so obvious.

But if this is so, it would not have been possible for God to know the relation between that which, prior to His learning, God did not know and everything else imaginable. Given this, however, God would have been in the same boat as man! Again, from the aforementioned post:

//Or we may consider these questions: how does Ryan know the proposition he claims is true isn't contingent on x, y, or z? If Ryan doesn't know, can he justifiably claim to know the proposition is true? No.//

Or: how would God have known any proposition He claimed is true isn't contingent on that which He did not know? He couldn't, precisely because He can't know any relation between that which He does not know and everything else imaginable until He actually knows the unknown proposition. This in turn implies God either wouldn't know anything unless He knows everything from eternity or that He has, like men, acquired His knowledge from one who is (but in this case, He from whom God would have acquired His knowledge would actually be "God" in the traditional sense).

The implications of this thought appear deep: for instance, predicating God's knowledge on that which is extrinsic to God would, since God alone is eternal, not only destroy God's omniscience, it destroys God's knowledge, period. It refutes Open Theism outright, and it is yet another weapon in the Christian's arsenal of elenctic arguments for which secular philosophy cannot answer.

[I've tried to make this post as short as possible even though I think I could make the thought contained herein clearer, because I wanted to put the point as simply as possible before I forgot it.]

P. S. Should anyone ask how I know that this argument is self-affirming, I'd point him to the Bible..

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Cross-ex part 3 of 5

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Cross examination

Question 5 (me): I have argued that “if God's knowledge is contingent on the wills of temporal creatures, God cannot be eternally omniscient.” In response, you have referenced “Messianic Jewish” perspectives (1), God’s predictive power (2), and Matthew Henry (3), yet I respectively find these references vague (1), an indication of a misunderstanding that God’s predictive power would be proportional to man’s allegedly free will (2), or irrelevant (3). My question, then, is not whether God is eternally omniscient or whether we have free will, but rather how God can possibly know from eternity our [allegedly] antecedently uncaused choices.

(Word count: 100)

Answer 5 (Arminian): The Father is omniscient in Jeremiah 17:10, The Son is omniscient in John 21:17 and the Holy Spirit is omniscient in 1 Corinthians 2:10-11.

Let’s go through some philosophy. ‘Determinism’ is the belief that all events, including human choices, are determined or caused by another (in this case, Theistic Determinism means that God directly or indirectly has caused me to write this verse paragraph). Proponents of this view believe that human choices are the result of antecedent causes, which in turn were caused by prior causes.

Conceptions of the nature of human choice (as well as free will choices) fall within three categories,

1. Determinism,
2. Indeterminism
3. Self-determinism.

A deterministic ideology looks to actions caused by another, an indeterminist to uncaused actions, and a self-determinist to self-caused actions. I will only look at Determinism (because Ryan holds to that view, and Self-determinism, because ultimately that is what the Arminian believes in. Indeterminism is ridiculous due to the fact that such reasoning would make the world we live in to be irrational and it abuses the Heisenberg principle)

Determinism (5-Point Calvinism): There are two basic kinds of determinism, naturalistic and theistic. Naturalistic determinism is Humans who simply act according to what has been programmed into them – B. F. Skinner, “Beyond Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity”

As you can see, Ryan who holds a very strong Calvinistic theology believes to some degree of theistic determinism.

Jonathan Edwards in his, “The Freedom of the Will”, related all actions ultimately to God as First Cause. “Free choice” for Edwards is doing what one desires, and God is the Author of the heart’s desires (and it is clear that Ryan in the unofficial thread – made adherence to such a declaration).

God is sovereign, in control of all and so ultimately the cause of all. Fallen humanity is totally without freedom of the affections, so they can do whatever they want, but what they want will forever be in the control of their corrupt, world-directed heart. God’s grace controls actions as God controls desires and their attendant thoughts and actions.

Non-determinists respond that a self-caused action is not impossible, and all actions need not be attributed to the First Cause (God). Some actions can be caused by human beings to whom God gave free moral agency. Free choice is not, as Ryan contends, doing what one desires (with God giving the desires). Rather, it is doing what one decides, which is not always the same thing. One need not reject God’s sovereign control to deny determinism. God can control by omniscience as well as by causal power.

A hard determinist believes all acts are caused by God, that God is the only efficient Cause. A soft determinist holds that God as the Primary Cause is compatible with human free choice as the secondary Cause. I am more lenient on the latter.

Self-Determinism (Arminian): According to this view, a person’s moral acts are not caused by another or uncaused, but are caused by oneself. It is important to know at the outset precisely what is meant by self-determinism or free choice. Negatively, it means that a moral action is not uncaused or caused by another (God). It is neither indeterminate nor determined by another (God). Positively, it is morally self-determined, an act freely chosen, without compulsion, in which one could have done otherwise (Yourself).

Either moral actions are uncaused (indeterminism), caused by another (determinism), or caused by oneself (self-determinism / soft determinism). However, no action can be uncaused, since this violates the fundamental rational principle that every event has a cause (as stated briefly above). Neither can a person’s actions be caused by others, for in that case they would not be personal actions. Further, if one’s acts are caused by another, then how can he or she be held responsible for them?

But Ryan declares that he has responded to such in his “Anticipated Objections”, and with this, let’s see what Ryan said (ultimately) about Man's free will, "It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose."

He further states, "A fallback objection I have sometimes faced is that “even if the above argument is invalid, man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose.” This is an example of the fallacy of begging-the-question"

And he finalises this by saying, "The fact that we are subject to God’s law despite how He has made us should not be surprising, for it the fact that He made us for His own ends functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates his claim that God is sovereign and man is responsible."

How can Charles Caldwell Ryrie (for example in my first rebuttal) beg the question when he clearly demonstrates in his philosophical reasoning that, "Thus, the biblical doctrine gives proper place to human responsibility. What’s going to be is going to be through certain means and procedures and responsible human actions. Ephesians 1:11 spotlights all things, not solely ends."

He does not beg the question when he gives a logical [realistic] illustration of two persons having a discussion. I cannot see how that illustration is begging the question / circular reasoning because go back to my Luciferianistic motive ideology.

When Ryan writes, "it is in fact God’s sovereignty which responsibility presupposes." - that is one of two things.

1. A complete contradiction in terms of the TULIP doctrine in proportion with our daily life.

2. God is Xerxes I.

The denial that some actions can be free is self-defeating. A complete determinist insists that both determinists and non-determinists are determined to believe what they believe. However, determinists believe self-determinists are wrong and ought to change their view. But “ought to change” implies freedom to change, which is contrary to determinism. If God is the cause of all human actions, then human beings are not morally responsible. And it makes no sense to praise human beings for doing good or to blame them for doing evil.

If human beings are free, are they outside God’s sovereignty? Either God determines all, or else he is not sovereign. And if he determines all, then there are no self-determined acts. However it is sufficient to note that God sovereignly delegated free choice to some of his creatures. There was no necessity for him to do so; he exercised his free will. So human freedom is a sovereignly given power to make moral choices.

Only absolute freedom would be contrary to God’s absolute sovereignty. But human freedom is a limited freedom. Humans are not free to become God themselves! A contingent being cannot become a Necessary Being. For a Necessary Being cannot come to be. It must always be what it is.
It is objected that either free, good acts spring from God’s grace, or else from our own initiative. But if the latter, they are not the result of God’s grace as seen in Ephesians 2:8–9. However, this does not necessarily follow. Free will itself is a gracious gift. Further, special grace is not forced coercively onto the person. Rather, grace works persuasively. The hard determinist’s position confuses the nature of faith. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver, rather than to the Giver.

Others objections as seen in this debate by Ryan; that self-determinism are contrary to God’s predestination. But self-determinists respond that God can predetermine in several ways.

He can determine,
1. Contrary to free choice (forcing the person to do what he or she does not choose to do);
2. Based on free choices already made (waiting to see what the person will do);
3. Knowing omnisciently what the person will do.

1 Peter 1:2
(2) Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied.

Romans 8:29
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.

Positions 2 or 3 insist that God can determine the future by free choice, since he omnisciently knows for sure how they will freely act. So, it is determined from the standpoint of God’s infallible knowledge but free from the vantage point of human choice.

Connected with the argument from strong determinism is that, while Adam had free choice (Romans 5:12), fallen human beings are in bondage to sin and not free to respond to God. But this view is contrary to both God’s consistent call on people to repent (Luke 13:3; Acts 2:38) and believe (John 3:16; 3:36; Acts 16:31), as well as to direct statements that even unbelievers have the ability to respond to God’s grace, John 7:17
(17) If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

Romans 7:18
(18) For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not.

1 Corinthians 9:17
(17) For if I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: but if against my will, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.

1 Peter 5:2
(2) Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind;

This argument continues that if humans have the ability to respond, then salvation is not of grace (Ephesians 2:8–9) but by human effort. However, this is confusion about the nature of faith – with which I have tirelessly tried to explain throughout this entire rebuttal. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver rather than to the Giver who graciously gave it for [all] to receive.

Words: 1,500 (excluding quotes)

Question 6 (me): Notwithstanding your more Pelagianistic comments (compare “The Father will draw the person, yet he [must] come first!” to John 6:44), a number of passages in Scripture support the doctrine of irresistible grace (1 Corinthians 1:23-24, Romans 8:28-30, John 6:37-44, 10:3-5), for it is obvious to any non-universalist that not all men without exception are so called/drawn. Since conditioning God’s effectual call on faith would be circular (cf. my comments on Romans 8:29-30 in first rebuttal) and John 8:47, 10:26 explicitly state election isn’t conditioned upon faith, how do you harmonize these aforementioned passages with Arminianism?

(Words count: 100)

Answer 6 (Arminian): Let us review the passages you cite to see if there is any apparent ratification in proportion with your defence of irresistible grace.

1 Corinthians 1:23-24
(23) But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness;
(24) But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.

Adam Clarke states – “Those, both of Jews and Greeks, who were by the preaching of the Gospel called or invited to the marriage feast, and have accordingly believed in Christ Jesus; they prove this doctrine to be divinely powerful, to enlighten and convert the soul, and to be a proof of God’s infinite wisdom, which has found out such an effectual way to glorify both his justice and mercy, and save, to the uttermost, all that come to him through Christ Jesus. The called, or invited, κλητοι, is a title of genuine Christians, and is frequently used in the New Testament. Ἁγιοι, saints, is used in the same sense.”

Romans 8:28-30
(28) And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
(30) Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

Romans 8:28–30 pretty much gives us [the] run-down of the sovereign purposes of God, when Paul said those who have been justified will be glorified. He does not say only some who have truly been saved are going to persevere to the end and then make it; he does not say that only some who are justified will eventually be glorified. What is stated is that those who have been justified are also guaranteed to be glorified by God the Father.

Furthermore, Ephesians 1:4, and 11–12 states that believers have been chosen to bring glory to God. If God knew one would lose his salvation, He would not have chosen him to begin with. But this does not mean that God did predestined Anton LaVey to thus be a reprobate, or that God purposely did not seek him thereafter – especially through his saints (isn’t the whole purpose Christians to preach the bible, and to preach the Gospel to every creature true?).

John 6:37-44
(37) All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
(38) For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.
(39) And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
(40) And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.
(41) The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.
(42) And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?
(43) Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves.
(44) No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

According to John 6:37–40, the believer is a gift given by God the Father to the Son because of the Son’s obedience. And because the believer is God’s gift to the Son, Jesus is always going to keep him.

Verse 40 specifically states that, “every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day”. This included Anton LaVey – but he did not ‘see’ nor hearken to come to the glorious Gospel of Christ. Hence he died in his sins.

Matthew Henry commentates, “The discovery of their guilt, danger, and remedy, by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, makes men willing and glad to come, and to give up every thing which hinders applying to him for salvation. The Father's will is, that not one of those who were given to the Son, should be rejected or lost by him. No one will come, till Divine grace has subdued, and in part changed his heart; therefore no one who comes will ever be cast out. The gospel finds none willing to be saved in the humbling, holy manner, made known therein; but God draws with his word and the Holy Ghost; and man's duty is to hear and learn; that is to say, to receive the grace offered, and consent to the promise. None had seen the Father but his beloved Son; and the Jews must expect to be taught by his inward power upon their minds, and by his word, and the ministers whom he sent among them.”

John 10:3-5
(3) To him the porter openeth; and the sheep hear his voice: and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out.
(4) And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him: for they know his voice.
(5) And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him: for they know not the voice of strangers.

Matthew Henry commentates, “Here is a parable or similitude, taken from the customs of the East, in the management of sheep. Men, as creatures depending on their Creator, are called the sheep of his pasture. The church of God in the world is as a sheep-fold, exposed to deceivers and persecutors. The great Shepherd of the sheep knows all that are his, guards them by his providence, guides them by his Spirit and word, and goes before them, as the Eastern shepherds went before their sheep, to set them in the way of his steps. Ministers must serve the sheep in their spiritual concerns. The Spirit of Christ will set before them an open door. The sheep of Christ will observe their Shepherd, and be cautious and shy of strangers, who would draw them from faith in him to fancies about him.”

John 10:1–39, contains the discourse on the Good Shepherd as prophesied in Zechariah 13:7
(7) Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the LORD of hosts: smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered: and I will turn mine hand upon the little ones.

The prophet predicted that the rejection of the Messianic Shepherd will include His death which, in turn, will result in the scattering of the flock of Israel. The theme of the Messiah as the Good Shepherd is picked up by Jesus in John 10:1–18.

Jesus is the Good Shepherd (verses 1–6).

The Pharisees, their present shepherds, have gained rule over the flock and who climbeth up some other way like a thief and a robber (verse 1).

Jesus, however, came the right way because He came the way the Old Testament prophets predicted (verse 2).

His own sheep recognised Jesus to be the True Shepherd and they follow Him (verses 3–6). They are the poor of the flock of Zechariah 11.

Jesus then declared Himself to be the door of the sheep (verses 7–10).

Not only is He the shepherd, but He is the door of the sheepfold (verse 7).

Those who usurped authority before Him are thieves and robbers and not true shepherds (verse 8).

Those individual sheep who came through Him as the door will find salvation and spiritual food and pasture (verse 9).

The believing remnant will find this to be true. The Messianic Shepherd has come to provide the sheep with abundant life (verse 10).

Verses 7–10 likewise makes it clear that the Messiah is the door and all who can be saved, must enter by Him only. John 14:6 defends this.

Whereas earlier (verses 1–6) Jesus pictured Himself as the Good Shepherd, He now identifies Himself in that role (verses 11–18).

He is the Good Shepherd and a good shepherd will willingly lay down His life for the sheep (verse 11).

The hireling has no love for the sheep and will flee in the face of danger leaving the sheep to be destroyed (verses 12–13).

However, Jesus the Good Shepherd will lay down His life for His sheep (verses 14–15).

Furthermore, Jesus has other sheep … which are not of this fold (verse 16). The sheep of this fold are the Jewish sheep. The fold is Israel and the believing sheep of this fold are the Remnant of Israel. The other sheep are the Gentile believers. The Good Shepherd will unite together the believing Jewish and Gentile sheep to become one flock under one shepherd. This new one flock is the same as the one new man of Ephesians 2:11–16. It is the Church, the Body of Messiah with the Messiah as its Head. It is to achieve this new unity that the Messiah will die (verses 17–18).

Some of these truths are repeated in verses 26–30, adding the aspect that the Messiah’s sheep have eternal security. In Matthew 25:31–46, the Gentile believers of the Tribulation were also pictured as sheep.

John 10:24
(24) Then came the Jews round about him, and said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.

In reviewing John 10:24ff, Yeshua answers the charge of obscurity and makes four statements.

1. Jesus had already told them clearly in two ways: by His words and by His works (verse 25).

2. The real problem is that they are not His sheep (verse 26). They have not [believed] on Him, so they are not His sheep. Because they are not His sheep, they do not understand the statements He is making.

3. He points out that His sheep, the believers, do recognise Him and do understand what He is saying and do know exactly who He claims to be (verses 27–29). His sheep recognise His voice and they do follow Him (verse 27). Because [they] have [accepted] Him, they have eternal life (verse 28). Because they have eternal life, His sheep cannot lose their salvation (verses 28–29).

4. Having pointed out that the real problem is not that He has been obscure, but their lack of [faith].

As far as irresistible grace goes, we might summarise as follows:
1) Man has no ability and, therefore, cannot believe the gospel;
2) Man is powerless to resist the Spirit;
3) God doesn’t make anybody do anything; and
4) He makes the elect believe in Christ in accordance with His sovereign plan.

Rather confusing, isn’t it?

How is it possible for someone with no ability to believe the gospel and with no ability or power to resist the Spirit’s will to be personally responsible for believing or rejecting the gospel message?

Faith (as seen in point 4 above in my John 10 exegesis) is the single biblical condition for regeneration, but the Calvinist position insists:

1) that man can’t believe and is powerless to do so.

2) that God must regenerate only those so elected for salvation because he has already elected some and He cannot fail.

That all men descend from Adam and are guilty of sin argues for man’s lost condition and the universal need for eternal life. That the gospel message is intended for the whole world of mankind not only suggests that everyone needs eternal life, but also asserts its efficiency (as well as the sufficiency) to regenerate anyone and everyone in the whole world who hears that message and believes in Christ.

The gospel message itself is indeed “whosoever will” (John 3:16). This fact in no way relegates the Holy Spirit to obscurity. The omnipresent Holy Spirit regenerates the sinner as he believes the gospel. Such regeneration is a divinely powerful act, but it is always performed in conjunction with faith in Christ. So, since the need is universal (sin), the message is universal (the gospel), and the condition for regeneration is universal (faith in Christ), it follows that the effect and efficiency of God’s plan in accord with the gospel offer to all is universal.

The Bible simply places the responsibility of belief directly on the one who hears the clear gospel message. It disallows any excuse for unbelief.

"When Jewish leaders persecuted Jesus and sought to kill Him, He got to the heart of their problem: “But you are not willing to come to Me that you may have life” ([John] 5:40). The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith in the finished work of Jesus Christ; “He who believes in the Son of God has the witness in himself; he who does not believe God has made Him a liar, because he has not believed the testimony that God has given of His Son” (1 John 5:10)." - Earl D. Radmacher, Salvation

Notice the simple and clear wording when Radmacher says, “The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith.” The difference between the general call and the effectual call of God is this: The general call is the message announced to all, i.e., the invitation. The effectual call is the message believed, the invitation received, and the correspondingly powerful work of the Holy Spirit that, at the time of faith, produces eternal life in the one who believes. The effectual call is the gospel message joined with faith, and the explanation need be no more complicated than that.

There is no necessity, either biblically, logically, or otherwise, to insist that the Holy Spirit imposes eternal life on anyone in an irresistible fashion, makes them willing, makes them willing to be willing, or gives them faith, etc., so as to fulfil God’s sovereign plan. This is so because His sovereign plan insists upon human responsibility, and thus, human freedom. And human freedom is validated when one freely believes in Christ alone.

So, can the gift of eternal life be resisted? The biblical answer is yes. The gifts of God, salvation or otherwise, are never imposed by an irresistible force, but are simply and freely received.

Does God’s sovereignty or absolute control of the universe require us to conclude that He forces selected people (the elect) to receive His gift of salvation and to enter into a holy union with Him? No, because he has made mankind an offer which cannot be exceeded.

God is not indebted to us, nor is He obligated to save us. Now, if Jesus’ death was intended to benefit only the elect, the Holy Spirit would indeed be obligated to save those for whom His death was intended. But if Jesus’ death was intended for all, God would in no way be under obligation.

Is it an affront to God to suggest that the Holy Spirit can be resisted? No, because, again, the question presupposes that rejection of the gospel offer for eternal life is the same as personal resistance to the Holy Spirit while the Holy Spirit is somehow pressing and pressuring the sinner for a decision. Rather, the rejection of Christ is indeed resistance to the message that the Holy Spirit has inspired.

Words: 1,700 (excluding quotes)

Question 5 (Arminian): Defining free choice as “doing what one desires” is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do as seen in Romans 7:15–16.

If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?

God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it. Even the Calvinistic Westminster Confession of Faith declares that “Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently” (5.2).

What are your thoughts on this?

Words: 160

Answer 5 (me): “The will always chooses according to its strongest inclination at the moment” – Jonathan Edwards

The above is indeed regarded by Calvinists as an accurate understanding of the will. The qualification that we will what we most strongly desire avoids the pitfalls of Robert’s Romans 7 objection. Furthermore, there is no contradiction between predestination and the idea that man wills what he most strongly desires; indeed, that is the very means by which God predestines! He controls our desires directly (e.g. regeneration) or indirectly (e.g. temptation via evil spirits) and thusly controls in what manner we will.

Historically, “free will or choice” has a multiplicity of meanings. Augustine believed fallen man was free to sin but not free to do good. This is another good definition with which all Calvinists could agree. However, to avoid confusion, I explicitly defined it in my opening statement as “the doctrine that… man is said to be capable of actuating one of two or more possible courses of action.” This was for convenience sake so that Robert and I could avoid frivolous quibbling. To disassociate myself from that definition of free will, I counted it as easier to simply deny free will first and then explain, as I have done, why this does not mean men cannot actually choose or will. With all this in mind, I can proceed to Robert’s two points:

1. “God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it.”

It appears, given Robert’s distaste for what he mistakenly believed to have been the Calvinist understanding of free will/choice, he has reverted to referring to it per the definition provided in my opening statement. It makes little difference, because I already anticipated this and any other counter-factual “why” question Robert may ask when I wrote:

“…God has decreed all things to His glory. Robert can contend – but not substantiate – that a counter-factual world would more greatly manifest God’s glory.”

2. “If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?”

As Scripture is silent as to the specifics of Satan’s fall – at least as far as Robert’s question is concerned – all I have to do to rebut his charge and defend my beliefs is present a speculatory answer which may be synthesized with Scripture in general and my belief that God predestines all things in particular. I will answer Robert in part as I did a friend who asked me how God could have predestined Satan to sin apart from direct temptation (which is a concept I totally reject in line with James 1):

//I would assume [He did so] in the same manner as He has on any other occasion, i.e. by affecting Satan's inclination in such a way that his pride became that which he most strongly desired to act upon.//

Moreover, it doesn't seem impossible that, since God created Satan and other rational creatures with a capacity to be tempted and sin, He could also have created said creatures with the necessity to sin, given certain circumstances. I speak more to myself when I write this could resurrect the “passive predestination” position I recanted some time ago. This would require further reflection and far more space than I have left, however, and I judge what I’ve already written to have sufficiently satisfied the conditions I have outlined above.

(Word count: 600)

Question 6 (Arminian): In exegeting 1 John 2:1-2, Arnold G. Fruchtenbaum states, “Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation (verse 2). The word “to propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.” By propitiation, we mean that “the wrath of God against sin has been appeased; it has been propitiated; it has been satisfied.”

He points out that the Messiah is the propitiation, not just for believers but also for unbelievers; not for ours [sins] only, but for [those of] the whole world. The Messiah is the propitiation for the world.

The Messiah is the satisfaction for sins, both for us, that is, the elect; and for the world, the non-elect. This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement; the Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect. Because He died for the sins of all men, it means that the blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Whereas propitiation affects everybody, the application of salvation is only for believers; therefore, He is the Advocate for believers only. What He is in verse 1, our Advocate, is true of believers only; what He is in verse 2, the propitiation, is true of both believers and unbelievers.

However, the emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.”

Do you agree?

Words: 10 (excluding excerpts)

Answer 6 (me): There are, in general, several points Fruchtenbaum makes with which I agree as well as several with which I disagree:

Agreement

- Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation.
- “To propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.”
- The emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.

Disagreement

- This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement.
- The Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect.
- The blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Reasons for disagreement

1. My explanation of 1 John 2:2 provided in my first rebuttal, especially the parallel demonstrated between it and John 11:51-52, has not been shown to be false. Indeed, much of John’s letters are written with the intention that it be known that Christ died for all men without distinction (Revelation 5:9). Instead, I was asked whether or not I would “find God to be love” if I were reprobate. The answer is “obviously not, as reprobates suppress the truth in unrighteousness” (Romans 1). The question is not relevant to my points and seems to beg an appeal to emotions (of reprobates, no less).

2. As I have said throughout this debate, to say Christ died “for” a person is to say Christ “intended to save” Him. What sense does it make to say that Christ, by His death and resurrection, intended to save those whose destinies were already fixed by having died in wickedness? What sense does it make to say that the Son failed to fulfill the will of the Father, given that the Father desires the salvation of all men without exception and universalism is false? What sense does it make to say that the Father’s desires or will can be resisted? No sense.

3. As Spurgeon noted, while Calvinists limit the scope (intention) of the atonement, Arminians limit its power. Both the logical consequences of point 2 and passages I have elsewhere exegeted (e.g. Romans 8:32; 2 Corinthians 5:14, cf. Romans 6:8) substantiate that the intention of Christ’s sacrificial work cannot be separated from the application of it. It is true that Jesus is not only the propitiator (Advocate) but also the propitiation. Ironically, Fruchtenbaum misses the import of what he rightly recognized as the emphasis of 1 John 2:2, for as Robert Reymond wrote:

“It is highly unlikely that Christ’s high-priestly work of sacrifice and intercession, two parts of one harmonious work, would be carried out with different objects in view—the former (the sacrifice) for all mankind, the latter (the intercession) for only some people. Since Jesus expressly declared that his intercessory work is conductednot in behalf of the world but for the elect (“I am not praying for the world,” he said, “but for those you [the Father] have given me,” and later he prayed, “My prayer is not for them alone. I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message” [John 17:9, 20; see Luke 22:31–32], that is, for God’s elect [see Rom. 8:32–34]), consistency of purpose demands that his sacrificial work would be conducted in behalf of the same group for whom he carries out his intercessory work. It is difficult to believe that Christ would refuse to intercede for a portion of those for whose sin he, by his blood, made expiation!”

(Word count: 594)