Showing posts with label Empiricism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Empiricism. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 5, 2025

More Thoughts on Necessitarianism

Many years ago, I noted in passing that I had rethought my position on necessitarianism (link), the view that everything that happens [or is] could not have happened [or be] otherwise: the way all things are is the only way all things could have been. The catalyst for my reconsideration was wondering whether what flaws I had discovered in certain aspects of Gordon Clark's metaphysics extended to this position as well, for while Clark rejected necessitarianism earlier in his life - as seen, for example, in the following quote - he accepted it later (link):
Christian theologians have commonly pointed out that creation as a voluntary act is incompatible with Hegelian philosophy. Hegel can very sincerely say that the world depends on God or the Absolute, and to this extent he sounds like a Christian, but Hegel continues as no Christian can and adds that the Absolute conversely depends on the world. This mutual dependence is essentially pantheism. No single thing by itself, the Sun, the Moon, or John Doe, is God but the whole, not in its plurality but in its unity, is God. God and the universe are one reality. Barth’s rejection of this mutual dependence, of this reciprocity between whole and part, is clear cut: “God would be none the less God if he had not created a world and man. The world’s existence and our existence is no wise essentially necessary to God, even as the object of his love” (I, 1, 158) (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 36 – original date of publication: 1963)

[As an aside, Clark's early acceptance of ethical and perhaps even alethic voluntarism (link) - on which God's justice and truth are defined by what God indeterminatively does - are totally irreconcilable with necessitarianism].

Formerly, I could not see how necessitarianism leads to pantheism. It seemed to me that a necessitarian could relatively consistently hold that "creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not... have willed to] communicate His nature to creation" (link). That is, while a necessitated creation might share some attributes with God, it wouldn't share others (omniscience, for example) and, therefore, wouldn't be consubstantial. 

As I see it now, the question of whether theistic necessitarianism entails pantheism seems to turn on to what extent individuation is possible if all things are, as necessitarianism seemingly entails, internally related. Does necessitarianism entail monism, as Amy Karofsky argues? Gordon Clark agrees:

Now, first, the brief intellectual biography at the beginning noted that Russell early renounced Hegelianism and became an empiricist. This change started with an attack on Bradley’s, and Hegel’s, theory of internal relations and the substitution of an atomic theory of external relations. The former, holding that everything is implicated in everything, results in an absolute monism. The definition of cat, for example, is part of the definition of dog, and also of Betelgeuse. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, pg. 174)

As Karofsky puts it, "The essence of one thing contains the essence of every other" (The Case for Necessitarianismpg. 143). If Karofsky is right, the arguments I make here would require her to be omniscient to know anything. 

Upon further reflection, though, even if she did claim to be omniscient, due to the sort of monism for which she argues, her position reduces to skepticism anyways for the simple fact that do not claim to be omniscient. Further, if "her" mind "contains" "my" mind - if there is even a meaningful way, on such a reductionistic monism, to individuate between the two - that would suggest quite the solipsistic cognitive dissonance!

Further, if monism results from necessitarianism such that there is only one truth or essence, whence the appearance of change or plurality? Clark:
Now I don’t want to bore you by reading what you can read yourself but this is very important and it would be well to read it over several times because there have been, since Parmenides’ day, types of monism, where being is one, but I guess there has never been such an absolute monism as that of Parmenides. From this point on, those who had been monists had always tried to smuggle in a little plurality and we shall see that later on. (link)
On a Parmenidean monism, there is neither time nor change: not even a non-directional C theory. There is no distinction between contingentarians and necessitarians: they are one. There is no such thing as arguments: premises and conclusions are the same. 

Now let's compare Parmenides to Karofsky, who says that 
Although I do think that contingentarians should change their view and alter their contingentarian beliefs, I do not take that to mean that the future is open and not necessitated. The claim that one ought to change and alter their beliefs does not entail that there are two possible futures; instead, when a person changes a belief, that merely means that they held it at some earlier time and rejected it later. Change is consistent with necessitarianism; all change occurs necessarily (pg. 152)
Here is the smuggle. At least Wittgenstein acknowledged he threw away the ladder he climbed. Karofsky uses concepts of time, change, distinctions between contingentarians and necessitarians, etc. - this is not reconcilable with her claim at the end of the book, viz. "I will continue to follow Parmenides' route on which it is..." (pg. 159). And again, see here:
....given the monism that I defend, there are neither individual moments nor individual causes and events; instead, there is a singular, continuous flow of movement and change, and we merely posit “moments,” “causes,” and “events” as a way of articulating and communicating certain ways that we perceive the world to be working. (pg. 154)
Can Karofsky define define "time" without there being individual events? No. Can she define "change" or "flow of movement" consistent with Parmenides' route? No. How Karofsky seems to think of "change" is purely epistemic, a way "we" order the working of the world. But on monism, there is no "we." There is no distinction between us and the world. That is, our (i.e. Karofsky's) articulations and communications and posits are false:
I take it that necessitarianism probably does entail monism and all of the aforementioned monist theses. But it also seems to me that monism can be shown to be plausible, especially in comparison to the difficulties faced by pluralistic theories... The monist account that I have in mind seems to be similar to the ontological monism and blobjectivism that Horgan and Potrč defend. I take it that there is only one reality that is the whole universe, a universe that does not have any genuine parts. And, as I articulated in this section, I believe that there is just one true proposition that is the statement of the entire universe that is the combination of all of the statements that are true. But it also seems to me that there are simple expressions of the one statement, like: there is one reality that is the universe, X =X, and it is. Such expressions are complete and true, but they are not distinct statements; rather they are different ways of expressing the one true proposition, the truthmaker for which is the ultimate existence fact, namely the way that the one reality—the universe—is, where, the is in that claim indicates that the universe: exists, is in fact the case, is real, is such as it is, and that propositions that correspond to it are true (pgs. 139, 144) 
"One reality" "that does not have any genuine parts," "difficulties faced by pluralistic theories," and the like are the closest Karofsky comes to admitting the fully orbed nature of Parmenidean monism. But these are precisely what makes the Parmenidean "route" of "it is" entail no change. For what "flow of movement" can there be other than "from-to"? But there is not really a "genuine" distinction between "from" and "to" given the monism described above. Likewise with change: there can be no "genuine" distinction between and "earlier" or "later" time. The smuggle has been busted.

Now, even if a theistic necessitarian could avoid monism and pantheism, I've argued here that they would nevertheless be caught on the other horn of a dilemma, and a horn which still involves, as Clark mentions above, the problem of mutual dependency. If divine sufficiency is an essential distinction between the Creator and creature (Acts 17:24-25; John 5:26; 2 Corinthians 2:14-16, 3:4-6, 9:8, 12:8-10), then any position which involves mutual dependency between Creator and creation would be problematic.

This is a presuppositionalist reply to necessitarianism. Other arguments - such as those which might be found in contemporary literature - may be less well-founded. For example, I don't have much issue with Amy Karofsky's first chapter on bad arguments for contingentarianism. I agree with her "that there cannot be any empirical evidence in support of contingentarianism because there cannot be any experience of what is never-actual" (The Case For Necessitarianism, pg. 31). 

We only experience the world as it actually is, so it does not make sense to use our experience as grounds for a world that could be otherwise. That is, a posteriori knowledge cannot suffice to rule out necessitarianism, and philosophers who argue to this effect are wrong for doing so. 

Other arguments she mentions in the same chapter - those grounded in "probability," "intuition," "majority opinion," and "contingency-talk" or the way we use language - are also rather weak. I think philosophers who use these arguments tend to conflate metaphysics with epistemology, overly inflate the value of opinion, or trade on our epistemic limitations. To what extent these sorts of fallacious reasonings represent how contemporary philosophers defend contingentarianism, I don't know. Karofsky's work appears well-documented, at least. Nonetheless, I found none of the arguments presented in the entire chapter for contingentarianism to be persuasive.

I think this illustrates one way in which a presuppositionalist or foundationalist can argue a priori knowledge is foundational for a posteriori knowledge. I imagine that many empiricists or scientists would balk at the suggestion that the world could not have been otherwise. If so, however, could they provide reasonable pushback against Karofsky with purely empiricist reasoning? If they can't, might this not persuade them to re-examine their epistemic presuppositions?

There aren't too many other arguments which need addressing. Foremost would be the two mentioned at the end of this post which deal with time and immutability. These topics being so complicated in themselves (and anyone can read my posts with the "Time" tag to see that I've wrestled with this), I can only be brief: 

The "succession" and time argument - "Making God's knowledge contingent on a 'free' choice... requires a succession of ideas in His mind" - depends on Clark's definition of time and can probably be dealt with just by defining time a different way, such as "the chain of secondary effects from secondary causes." This would protect eternal generation as well as timeless divine omniscience, for example. Most debates about time seem to turn on how one defines it, and this seems as satisfying a definition as I've seen. It might still requires some nuance for cases such as justification depending on saving faith but not being temporally subsequent to it, but I don't think such a point requires pause concerning the whether the definition is felicitous.

The immutability argument - "God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability" - conflates God's being and activity (see my discussion of divine knowledge as divine activity under the Horton subsection here). God's ability to do or know otherwise does not entail that He would be otherwise. There is also the question of divine immutability within a broader scope, especially given the incarnation (link).

Sunday, November 19, 2023

Discriminating Presuppositionalism

A few days ago, a friend asked me for my thoughts on this video

At the outset, the author, David Pallmann, asks, 

Just what is presuppositional apologetics? It is a school of apologetics which tries to show that Christianity is true via a transcendental argument (minute 1).

Now, this is quite a narrow view of presuppositionalism, especially in light of my own criticisms (as a presuppositionalist) of other presuppositionalists who thought transcendental argumentation could conceivably enable one to reason to God (link). His classification of versions of presuppositionalism which might differ from that of Greg Bahnsen as "deviant" (minute 8) is rather restrictive. If nothing else, I hope this post illustrates that one ought to discriminate the varieties of presuppositionalist perspectives. 

Mine bears an affinity with that of Gordon Clark and does not attempt to "show" (prove?) that Christianity is true via argumentation. Any arguments Clark might have made function as a defense of Christianity; but the arguments are not meant to function as "proofs," as if God's word (Clark's foundation or axiom) could have somehow been the conclusion to a (circular?) argument. 

Many flawed criticisms of Clark by fellow believers rest on a conflation between apologetics and epistemology. See my distinction between the two here. In short, apologetics or arguments presuppose epistemology or knowledge [of the most basic premise]. The two must be kept distinct. Apologetics is subordinate to epistemology. 

Another mistake is to think Clark was a traditional coherentist. Even people who claim to follow Clark's view sometimes make this mistake. He was a foundationalist. See point 5 here. A reason people make this mistake is because Clark accepted a coherence theory of truth; while I disagree with Clark on this, the point is that a coherence theory of truth (i.e. a definition of truth) is different than coherentism in epistemology (i.e. how we come to know the truth). See here.  

At minute mark 5, David says: 

In this video, I want to explore a response that has been periodically hinted at in the literature but is never, to my knowledge, been fully developed. I intend to defend the thesis that human reasoning is autonomous.

Given that his final quote in the video is from a chapter on autonomous human reason in a book written as a challenge to presuppositionalism (free on Kindle Unlimited here, by the way), I found this quote confusing. Does he think that his video or channel fully develops a thesis Joe Depoe does not?

Regarding the idea of autonomous human reason, in 1943, Clark anticipated the idea that this might be a problem for presuppositionalists in an article he wrote for The Presbyterian Guardian (link). Clark says: 

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision. 

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority? 

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority. 

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant. 

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason. 

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a, world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe.

Around minute 10, David says: 

By assumptions and presuppositions, I mean beliefs that are taken to be true apart from independent non-circular justification. In other words, I reject the idea that there are any beliefs that must be accepted without a justifying reason

I found this confusing too, since David elsewhere claims to be a foundationalist. The above quote appears to be a form of infinitism (link), not foundationalism. Unless I am misunderstanding him, his statement is not consistent with the rest of his video. 

At minute 12:20, David cites Timothy and Lydia McGrew: 

...to claim that there can be genuine epistemic principles that although rationally dubitable cannot be defended against someone who is skeptical about them is to allow an indefensible proposition to have epistemic weight. 

I had to read my own copy of that book for some context. The context is this: "Regardless of whether... a proposition is true, if it really is indefensible, it cannot be used as a premise to justify belief in anything else. If it is indefensible, it is epistemically irrelevant" (Internalism and Epistemology, pg. 80).

The question seems to be whether indefensible propositions can have epistemic weight (positive epistemic status). David blows by this question very quickly - too quickly (at this point) to allow for the nuance necessary to address the question. 

For instance, let's start with this: do axioms/foundations have positive epistemic weight? Well, a foundationalist had better say that in certain cases (i.e. God's word), "Yes, we can know axioms without having to defend them." There is positive epistemic weight regardless of whether we attempt to defend them. If God's word is our axiom and we can't know our axiom, then we are in trouble (this position is known as positism; link). 

Now, does the above mean that it is impossible to defend axioms/foundations? In one sense, yes; in another no. The epistemic justification of an axiom/foundation is not determined by a prior reason, premise, etc. For a foundationalist - as was alluded to above - the positive epistemic status must be intrinsic to the truth of the axiom/foundation itself. I interact with contemporary epistemologists on this very point here and here

On the other hand, it is possible to "apologetically" defend one's axiom/foundation. What does this mean? It means that in everyday conversations with others, one can point out that his axiom/foundation coheres with that which is derivable from it, that it answers important questions, etc. It is in this sense that we can understand Clark's affirmation that: "by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged." 

A self-defeating axiom cannot be defended (or known), whereas a self-consistent axiom can be defended insofar as the claims of its adherent can be harmonious, although we should not say we know said axiom by means of this or any other such defense. 

In other words, I agree with his denial around minute 13 of any attempt to circularly justify a knowledge-claim. I (and Clark) reject traditional coherentism, since it would be impossible to discriminate between circles without a foundational principle (like John Frame's foundational principle about the different between "narrow" and "broad" circles at minute 14; how could Frame say one is better than the other without assuming axiomatically that there is a difference in desirability?). 

As an aside, it's a bit funny that if Van Tilians defend traditional coherentism, then Clark's presuppositionalism is somehow "deviant." One would think that the very name of "presupposition"alism would more closely associate with foundationalism, not coherentism. 

Anyways, the point is that apologetic defenses of axioms/foundations are practical and persuasive, not epistemic. I put it this way in a post I have elsewhere said (link) I am planning to write in response to an article by Dan Kemp (link), whom David cites at minute 14:40:

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

Apologetics or defenses of our axioms can be useful in terms of being means by which the Spirit convicts the hearts of others without thereby becoming premises or reasons by which we somehow circularly know the axioms/foundations. Indeed, our methods for apologetic defenses ought themselves to be derivable from our axiom/foundation (e.g. 1 Peter 3, Acts 17, etc.). 

One final point. A phrase that David cites which caught my eye is "rationally dubitable." If David is talking about principles that are open to rational doubt and whether these can be defended in the face of a skeptic, he seems to suggest that if the answer is no, there is a problem. But if I am understanding him correctly, I don't see the problem? If something is "open to doubt" (dubitable), of course it is possible a skeptic is going to doubt it. In fact, some skeptics will even claim to doubt even those things which are indubitable, such as the revelation or promises of God. Just because we can't prove to the skeptic that God's word is God's word (or would David claim to be able to do this?) does not mean there is a problem - nor does it mean that our axiom/foundation is "rationally dubitable" after all. On this point, the problem with the skeptic is ethical. He refuses to submit to the self-justifying truth of God's word. 

Maybe I am misunderstanding what David means by a "defense" - or maybe I am misunderstanding something else But this is why it is important to provide some nuance to statements and quotes of other authors. Instead, David skips quickly to the claim that he sees no other way forward than to vindicate deduction and induction. That is much too fast a conclusion. If it isn't a non sequitur, then at the very least, I couldn't follow his reasoning. 

At around 18:30, David distinguishes between "self-justifying" beliefs and "immediately justified" beliefs. He thinks the former implies justificatory circularity (traditional coherentism) and the latter implies foundationalism. I disagree with his definitions, and so do contemporary epistemologists - see here, where Jeremy Fantl refers to "self-justifying" reasons or beliefs in the context of foundationalism. But to be clear, I also reject justificatory circularity. 

I've read Fumerton's work. I actually quite like him. I gave a former student his introductory book on epistemology. At the same time, I don't agree with everything Fumerton says (link). And I suspect that the idea of "direct acquaintance" (which David gets from Fumerton) might be another area of disagreement. He says: 

Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so... Direct acquaintance is not itself a belief but it relates a subject to a fact in such a way that the subject is aware of the correspondence between his thought and the fact that makes it true. 

Notice what is being argued: justification for beliefs depends on "acquaintance." But "acquaintance" is not itself a belief. Well, if "acquaintance" is not a belief, can "acquaintance" be a truth-bearer? If it can't, then how is it that "acquaintance" can "ensure" the justification of beliefs? Can that which does not bear a truth-value function as a justification for that which does? 

In other words, what does it even mean to say that direct acquaintance can "ensure" justification? That sounds suspiciously like saying that acquaintance is itself a logically distinct and preceding justificatory condition for one's belief(s) - a reason. But this would undermine the David's claim to be a foundationalist. 

Relatedly, a topic in contemporary epistemology is how something without that is neither true nor false - say, a sensory experience qua experience - could function as a justification for the truth or falsity of a proposition[al belief]. This seems to be a directly relevant question, for David goes on to say: "...one can be immediately justified through direct perceptual awareness..." 

Notice the word "perceptual" (and see his headache example at minute 21 and his direct reference to sensation at 21:30). Recall every Clarkian argument against empirical knowledge (link). He even admits that one's sensations may not correspond to external states of affairs (but attempts to suggest that our beliefs regarding our private experiences are not open to question - this move doesn't work insofar as David later admits to holding to fallibilism, contrary to his above statement that direct acquaintance can ensure "infallible" justification, on which see below). 

In short, his reply to possible objections at minute 22 is dismissive and avoidant. He responds to an easy objection while failing to address more difficult ones (how is "direct acquaintance" able to function as justification). This is a meta-epistemic concern, but meta-epistemology has direct relevance to normative epistemology. Analogously, infinitism is a meta-epistemic position on the structure of epistemic justification. If infinitism is inherently problematic, an infinitist does not actually know anything by the structure he claims is correct. If "direct acquaintance" is inherently problematic, a direct acquantaincist does not actually know anything by "direct acquaintance" (so-called).

This gets a little deep, but here is another question David fails to entertain: while I agree that there is a correspondence between truths and other realities - I reject the idea that everything is metaphysically reducible to [sets of] propositions - does that mean non-propositional realities (like my body) are truth-makers (like propositions about my body)? 

As a Reformed Christian, I rather think that God is the truth-maker of all propositions. In particular, it is He who determined the truth-values of contingent propositions in accordance with His eternal decree. As such, it's possible that the truths God has eternally decreed may, in some way, actually be means by which non-propositions (like my body, which is not eternal) are made. For a probably clearer idea of what I'm getting at, read this article by Clark in which he writes: "when compared with verses in the Pentateuch the words strongly suggest that the visible world came from a suprasensible, ideal world."

Moving ahead to minute 26: "Knowledge does not require certainty." Three questions: 

1) Is David certain of this? If not, wouldn't such an admission be problematic in the possible case that certainty actually is required for one's beliefs to count as knowledge (a possibility which I don't understand how he could rule out non-arbitrarily)? 

2) I thought that David earlier said, "Direct acquaintance with correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker ensures that the belief is justified and infallibly so..." What happened? When is and is not infallibility applicable to one's beliefs? 

3) If knowledge does not require certainty, then what does it mean to say that any beliefs are "justified"? 

Around 30:30, David shows the three potential responses to Aristotle's transcendental argument for the laws of logic. They are ones I've encountered and thought about before. In response, I will offer three counters: 

1. David basically says that "Aristotle might be right that one must think in accordance with the laws of logic, but that this doesn't establish anything is true." In response, two questions: 1) What is the David's alethiology (theory of truth)? Perhaps one's alethiology (which might entail consistency amongst true propositions) would entail that in accordance with said theory, the laws of logic cannot be false. He somewhat gets around to this at minute 37. 2) If David acknowledges that one cannot speak without first assuming the laws of logic, then his own response admittedly presupposes the laws of logic. But in that case, is it legitimate to use that which he might purport to reject? Is it legitimate to admit that a hilltop (truth) can only be reached by climbing a ladder (the laws of logic) and then from said hilltop deny that he ever used a ladder? Ironically, in another video David makes against presuppositionalists, he cites a "magic 8-ball" illustration that it seems he himself falls prey to here. 

2. David's response to Aristotle certainly isn't a persuasive response. But that's how I interpret a correctly oriented defense of the laws of logic in the first place: again, a defense or apologetic needn't be interpreted as a circular justification. 

3. David's reference to dialetheism returns us to the question of alethiology. This is probably the strongest counter he raises (then again, he addresses his own concerns by providing a very good quote at 38:55 which undercuts dialetheim). I needn't say much more, since David denies dialetheism himself (44:45ff.).

Nevertheless, I will offer a few more thoughts. In particular, are there some cases in which the law of noncontradiction do not hold? Typically, a dialetheist will not be a trivialist; he will not suggest that every pair of contradictories can be or are true (which is subject to the principle of explosion). 

Underlying this theory, then, seems the assumption of alethic particularism: rather than start with a broad, theory of truth (e.g. consistency among propositions which may correspond to kinds of realities), we might start with what we consider are intuitive and particular examples of truths - some of which might consist of contradictories which can both be "true" - and attempt to form a resultant theory of truth (such as dialetheism) with these examples in mind. 

While I would like to flesh an argument against dialetheism further than I am able at present, given the above, one possible line of argument against it and its implicit alethic particularism could perhaps be made along the same lines as I have made against epistemic particularism (in isolation from epistemic methodism) here.  

This is probably a more important point than I can emphasize here, for repeatedly in the video, David often uses paradigm cases to defend his position. For example, at minute 36:10, he uses an particular example that he assumes his audience will agree is justified to defend a broader methodological principle. That is, in appealing to his audience's intuitions, he appears to be a particularist, and if he is not, he does not sufficiently distance himself from particularism; a quote around minute 52 might obliquely allude to it, but even there, not enough context in the quote is provided to even understand its purpose. 

With the above in mind, can logic justify logic? No. Again, circularity is not the structure of epistemic justification. In other words, we do not know anything by reasoning in a circle. As I've mentioned before, though, we can still make arguments for propositions we know non-inferentially or foundationally. These arguments do not justify said foundations but can function to persuade others [especially that alternatives to our view are non-viable]. 

The laws of logic in particular are embedded within the Scripturalist's foundation as a subsidiary, ontological precondition for knowledge, as I argue here and here. Thus, our knowing them is, in conjunction with our knowledge of God's revelation, immediate or non-inferential.  

I don't have much further to say about his discussion on analyticity, except to note that he doesn't think he needs to explain how we have them "so long as we do" (minute 26:30). Well, does he have concepts? If the answer is potentially "no," that is a serious problem. 

But as I said in an earlier post, God's word is not rationally dubitable. The problem the skeptic has is one of ethical rebellion (which affects his ability to reason soundly, not his ability to reason validly per se a la Clark). 

David's part of the video on induction was extremely weak. He did not address the question of what number of observable cases would suffice for epistemic justification. He does not address what constitutes a "large sample." The concept of "large" is finite and therefore relative. As one might approach infinitely many observations, any concrete number of observations is infinitesimally small by comparison... in which case, is not an inductivist's epistemic justification (and "confidence" therein) virtually (as well as really) non-existent? This is a much more difficult issue than David intimates. 

In my opinion, the best one can expect on this topic is doxastic defendability. A Scripturalist (and only a Scripturalist, insofar as any kind of "defenses" are parasitic upon internalist and infallibilist "knowledge") might be able to defend his extra-Scriptural beliefs to the extent that they conform to his alleged experiences (this would be inductive), but he must also be open to revising such beliefs in the case of alleged defeaters, e.g. experiences which do not conform to what he has experienced previously. This theory only would apply to extra-Scriptural information, and it would not qualify as strict epistemic justification (although we might also colloquially refer to any such beliefs as "known"). 

Another reason the response to the problem of induction was weak was because David only went so far as to address Hume's skepticism. Clark's concerns regarding induction - as an anti-empiricist - deserved more attention than Hume's. 

My friend mentioned that he thought David is an evidentialist. In his last part of the video, I can see why: he says as much. In particular, at 1:00:50, he cites an author who says, "the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief." Again, I am confused how such a view can be consistent with foundationalism. If foundations do not rely on evidence, then one's justification for one's foundational beliefs cannot fall within the realm of an evidentialist theory. David appears plainly inconsistent on several points. 

David concludes, "...the Christian [presuppositional] apologist tries to gerrymander the rules of epistemology..." 

I had a good chuckle at this! Still, I enjoyed the video insofar as I'm glad to see professed Christians engaging in contemporary epistemological issues. I agreed with him regarding foundationalism, the resolvability of paradoxes, and some other points. I wouldn't want my above responses to be taken as suggesting his videos are valueless, only that, as with anyone (Clark and myself included), one must wisely apply discrimination where appropriate.

Sunday, April 23, 2023

Gordon Clark and Anthony Flood (Part 1)

I've made something of a habit of interacting with books that review the philosophy of Gordon Clark (e.g. link, link). Most recently, I came across one such book by Anthony Flood called Philosophy after Christ: Thinking God's Thoughts after Him. The author spends chapters 9 ("Gordon's Clark's Problematic Rationalism") and 10 ("What Are We Doing When We're Reading? Questions about Gordon Clark's Occasionalism") outlining and critiquing Clark's view on certain topics.

The author describes himself as having been a Clarkian in the 1980s and as having debated with John Robbins. It is hard to recall, but I think I came across a few articles of his involving Brand Blanshard and Joseph P. Farrell in the early 2010s. In any case, what follows will be a review of his ninth chapter, entitled, "Gordon's Clark's Problematic Rationalism."

The ostensible purpose of chapter 9 is to contrast Clark's apologetic to that of Van Til, Bahnsen, et al. Mr. Flood states that the "first [apologetic?] question" for Clark was, "how do you know?" Mr. Flood cites an article on John Robbins at this point, but a better background would be Clark's own thoughts on the subject. Take two examples: 

1975, In Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible. Merrill C. Tenney, ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House. Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY (φιλοσοφια, etymologically, love of wisdom). Traditionally the study of logic, the basic principles of science, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. In a wider sense, the general principles of any subject can be called its philosophy. Approaching a misuse of the word, the philosophy or education means merely the policy of school administration; and a “philosophy of life” designates any individual's preferences, no matter how poorly systematized. Inspired though it be, Ecclesiastes (q.v.) is an example of this popular meaning and has little to do with the subject matter of professional technical philosophy. 
The reason for these shades of meaning is that philosophizing is generalizing, and no authority can fix the degree of generalizing necessary to merit the name. 
The meaning of the word in Colossians 2:8 is hard to determine. It could possibly refer to Gnosticism or, perhaps, mean only ethics, for in the 1st cent., the Gr. Schools had sunk to their nadir and discussed little else. 
The common element in all generalizations is a claim to knowledge. Therefore the crucial question of philosophy is—How is knowledge possible? Attempts to justify knowledge are called epistemology. 
Metaphysics, the theory of being (not the beings of plants or botany, not the being of animals or zoology, no even the being of inanimate matter, but of being without qualification—being as such), is sometimes said to be the basic subject; but even Thomism, which makes such a claim, stands or falls with its theory of learning. The answer to the question—What do you know?—provokes the further question—How do you know? Beyond this, no question can be asked. Therefore, epistemology is the basis of philosophy.
1981. What is Apologetics? The Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics.
The foundation of a strategy to meet all objections against Christianity is definitely technical. It is not a matter of ordinary, everyday conversation. Let me illustrate. 

On a very superficial level, yet indeed a lively, contemporary controversy among professing Christians, is the question of speaking in tongues. One side says that those who have never had the experience cannot judge of the matter. The other side says that experience is not the criterion; we must rather judge experience by the Bible. Beyond the range of professing Christians, David Hume rejected miracles and, in particular, Christ’s resurrection on the basis of experience. Schleiermacher, early last century, initiated modernism by insisting that all doctrines must be tested by experience. 

This raises the fundamental problem of apologetics. When one says, “I believe in the resurrection” or “I believe in tongues” or even “I believe in God,” the non­-Christian will ask “how do you know?” This is true in physics and geology also. If someone asserts a law of physics or proposes a geological explanation of Yosemite, his colleagues will ask “how do you know?” They want to examine his methods. They want to see his criteria for knowledge. Theories concerning the criteria for knowledge are, in technical language, called epistemology. When a scientist or an historian asserts that he knows something, his statement is not acceptable unless he explains how he came to know it. “How do you know?” is the last question to be asked and epistemology is the first subject to be established.
With this background in mind, these examples preemptively answer a few later questions by Mr. Flood:
Clark scholar and biographer Douglas Douma writes that Clark's 'apologetic methodology flowed from his theory of knowledge.' But is that the right order? Does Scripture indicate it? One's apologetic methodology ought to comport with one's anthropology. In the Bible, I do not find and affirmation of the primacy or priority of epistemology. Insistence on the latter betrays a philosophy according to the rudiments of this world (Colossians 2:8).
Firstly, the above is a false dichotomy. One can hold that apologetics flows from one's epistemology and one's metaphysic (anthropology). Second, it is quite ironic that Mr. Flood's second question - "...is that the right order? Does Scripture indicate it?" - is precisely what Clark, a Scripturalist, would have wanted him to ask! By basically asking whether Clark can know his apologetic is "Scriptural," Mr. Flood's own apologetic against Clark unwittingly follows Clark's own procedure of grounding apologetics in epistemology. 

Mr. Flood also seems to suggest that Clark's belief that epistemology undergirds apologetics falls into the category of the sort of philosophy Paul alludes to in Colossians 2:8. But this appears to be no more than an assertion. Compare this to Clark's exegesis of Colossians 2:8 in his commentary on the book:
Note that the phrase “according to the elements of the cosmos” – better, the first principles of the cosmos – is about instruction, philosophy, traditions, and persuasive paralogisms. Later in the chapter, 2:20-23, he is more specific. These verses concern the “rudiments” – the same word “elements” – of the world. Verse 21 identifies one. It is a maxim or precept. Therefore it is better to understand these worldly elements as being the axioms, presuppositions, or even the main theorems of false religions. Paul doubtless had Judaism in mind, but the exhortation is completely general. (Colossians, 1979)
For my own part, I've explained why I believe apologetics is grounded in epistemology (link). With all of this in mind, Mr. Flood continues to describe how his views have changed over time:
I had naively assumed that it's always appropriate to ask, 'How do you know?' I now hold that 'How do you know?' presupposes answers to more basic questions, such as, 'What kind of world is it such that the quest for knowledge of the truth makes sense to an English-speaker above a certain age with the leisure and interest to ask it?'
Here, Mr. Flood is correct. Questions per se cannot be foundational to a worldview, and everyone has a worldview. That is, everyone has an actual view of the world, not just questions about the world. 

For example, people who identify as global skeptics may think they do nothing but question, but their very acts of questioning presuppose a view of the world; that is, they view the world in such a way as to be open to the legitimacy of questioning. This fact enables a Christian apologist to question, for example, how such persons know their view is legitimate. But the Christian apologist is only able to ask this question because his own worldview is able to legitimate the act of questioning the global skeptic. 

Clark too recognized that the question "How do you know?" can neither be asked nor answered ad infinitum. Implicit theorization logically precedes questioning. Hence, Clark was a foundationalist about epistemic justification (not, as some have held, a coherentist; link).

These points again show the fundamental priority epistemology has over apologetics. It also shows - in contrast to Clark - how epistemology and metaphysics are, for an apologist, mutually dependent (link). In order for one to know something, there must be some thing to know. On the other hand, an apologist will be unable to defend his metaphysic if he doesn't know anything.

Moving on, perhaps Mr. Flood's most blatant disagreement with Clark is found in the following lines:

The figures we meet in Scripture no more fret about epistemology than they do about eating or sleeping.

Knowing, like walking, eating, sleeping, and praying, is something we do spontaneously. We can reflect critically on our knowing, asking what exactly we're doing when we're doing that. To play the skeptic, however, about the deliverances of our senses risks evading responsibility for what we know.
I had to reread these lines a few times. I don't want to misrepresent Mr. Flood, but to the idea that "knowing... is something we do spontaneously" or that Scriptural figures don't "fret about epistemology," I would ask what Mr. Flood makes of the following passages:
Hosea 4:6, 6:6 My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge: because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee, that thou shalt be no priest to me: seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, I will also forget thy children... For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.

John 17:3 And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.

2 Peter 3:18 But grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. To him be glory both now and for ever. Amen.

Colossians 1:9-10 For this cause we also, since the day we heard it, do not cease to pray for you, and to desire that ye might be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding; That ye might walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God;
Do none of these statements by Hosea, John, Jesus, Peter, Paul, etc. indicate epistemic concerns? If "Human knowledge does not have to meet the standard of episteme (ἐπιστήμη) as Clark held," surely there must nevertheless be a standard higher than "Adam's knowing Eve"? Do the exhortations and warnings to the audiences of these letters or prayers and desires for them express a hope for spontaneous or conscious, deliberate growth in knowledge? Or take the following passages:
Colossians 2:2-3 That their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgement of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ; In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

2 Timothy 3:14-17 But continue thou in the things which thou hast learned and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them; And that from a child thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: That the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.

Hebrews 6:11 And we desire that every one of you do shew the same diligence to the full assurance of hope unto the end:
Is full assurance possible if one does not know that of which one claims to be assured? Can one continue in, show diligence towards, or attain full assurance of understanding without knowing? Do these not suggest believers bear an epistemic responsibility? Indeed, I think a strong case can be made (link) that believers can do more than "inductively derive an epistemology from Scripture," as Mr. Flood puts it.

These texts also mitigate against Mr. Flood's claim that "the quest for certainty is not biblical" but rather "a thoroughly modern enterprise." This is like claiming that the quest for righteousness is not biblical but rather a Pelagian enterprise. Others may try false paths towards becoming certain or righteous. Such should not discourage believers from the true path towards good things.

Now, Clark himself was aware of a range of biblical meanings of the word "knowledge." I've quoted the following several times in other posts: 
The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. Of course, omniscience is a bit hard to come by, but the first and absolutely indispensable step is the definition of terms. (The Pastoral Epistles, 1983, pg. 166)
Was, then, Clark suspect to a "rationalist paradigm of knowledge," as Mr. Flood alleges? Well, I would agree that on some topics, Clark does indeed seem to succumb to rationalistic tendencies. I believe this happened more so in the case of metaphysical subjects than epistemological ones, but as I have said that the two disciplines are mutually dependent, it is unsurprising that a rationalistic tendency on one's views in one subject would impact one's views on the other. Clark's occasionalism is a case in point.

But I can't imagine that Clark would side with the rationalists about whom Mr. Flood writes, "One problem for rationalists (but not only them) is that self-contradiction is problematic only in a completely intelligible universe - which only the believer in the God of the Bible has a warrant for affirming." On the contrary, I think Clark would have pushed Mr. Flood to consider that the believer in the God of the Bible only knows God through the Bible. This shows Clark's anti-rationalism.

Now, one might rightly criticize Clark for having missed a meaning of "knowledge" that falls within the biblical, semantic domain of the word. For example, Mr. Flood, citing Matthew 16:2-3 and Luke 12:54-56, argues that Jesus affirms one's ability to make discernments or know on the basis of inductive inference (if derived by inference, can such knowledge be said to be "spontaneous," though?). Consider the following by Clark:

1983. A Debate between Gordon H. Clark and David Hoover on epistemology (1:51:06). April 9.
...it is a truism that a inductive argument cannot yield a conclusion whose truth is formally guaranteed. That is to say there is nothing in the form of the inductive argument whereby it is logically impossible for the conclusions be false if the premises are true. Rather if the inductive arguments can be confidenced at all, they are said to contain premises which support rather than entail their validities.
I can't find a fault in Clark's reasoning here. At the same time, I allow that there is room for discussion about whether beliefs based on induction might count as "knowledge," especially if Scriptural statements give space for such an interpretation. Certain beliefs might be able to be classified as knowledge without being grounded in argumentation which formally guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 

Clark's emphasis on a "basic epistemology" is not misplaced, however, for I would and have argued that fallibilist accounts of knowledge can only be defended (apologetically) if grounded in a more "basic epistemology" - like in Scripture itself, to which Mr. Flood himself has been appealing to make his case for other kinds of knowledge (e.g. link, link).

Less relevant to the discussion, I think, is the question of whether people who follow Clark lock-step might play the skeptic to excuse their own sin. Even when I lock-step adhered to most (if not all) of what Clark wrote, I recognized that an inability to infallibly justify every belief one holds could not serve as an excuse for sin (link).

A few more comments Mr. Flood makes are worthy of response:
In human knowing, the physical and the intellectual don't happen to 'come together': they're never apart. They're seamlessly connected. We can distinguish them notionally, but why decouple them? Human insight or intellectual grasp is always into what is given in sensation or the imagination, both of which are brain functions. 
This holds for logic and mathematics as for sensory perception. We symbolically express our syllogisms and equations after conjuring them in our imagination (i.e., in our brains). 

I wonder whether Mr. Flood believes that humans can learn anything in the intermediate state between death and the parousia. The above would indicate that this is impossible. This would make Abraham's conversation with the rich man in Luke 16 either unintelligible or parabolic, for example. 

Of course, I think that when writing the above, Mr. Flood is imagining a more relatable scenario, i.e. embodied human experience. Even so, for some time now, I haven't quite understood in what sense the above or the following are supposed to pose a problem to Clark's basic epistemology (if they are meant to do so): 

...when I read the Bible, I get the clear impression that God created us to communicate linguistically, which means interacting and grappling with the world using our bodies' central nervous system and sensory organs...

...the Bible is a body of divine thoughts communicated through symbols, themselves rendered and conveyed physically and therefore temporally... 

These sorts of comments anticipate the ever common objection to Scripturalism: don't you have to read your Bible? In accepting occasionalism, I think Clark felt the force of this objection more than he would have cared to admit, tailoring his metaphysical view of causation - occasionalism, at least by the time he wrote Lord God of Truth - to support his anti-empiricism. In my mind, this illustrates Clark behaved as if metaphysics and epistemology were interdependent, even if he insisted the latter was more philosophically basic. 

I have already detailed why I think Clark should not have felt pressured by the consideration that sensation might function as secondary causes of our beliefs, for I don't see how such would have affected his "basic epistemology" that knowledge of God's word is foundational for the defense of any other beliefs:
To say some belief can’t be internally justified for no other reason than that it is caused in a certain way is a genetic fallacy. Scripturalists are (or, in my opinion, ought to be) doxastic foundationalists: in short, a belief is philosophically known only if appropriately inferred from other [internally] justified beliefs or if the belief in question is self-justified or self-evident, in which case it is foundational, a first principle, axiom, presupposition, etc. But it doesn’t matter whether such a belief was the result of secondary causation or directly mediated to our minds via divine causation. Ultimately, everything is caused by God. On internalism, the causal origin of the belief doesn’t feature into whether the axiomatic belief itself is self-justified, especially if the resultant epistemic system can provide an account of the means by which we know. (link)

Epistemology has to do with what we think is true - specifically, which thoughts do we say we know are true, and how do we know them? Now, if thoughts are immaterial, mental, or spiritual, to argue against Clark that a material, physical, or sensory process undermines his epistemology begs the question. One must, in providing such an external critique, specify his grounds for regarding a physical process as integral to epistemic justification. That is not Clark's burden of proof to discharge here. In response to, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" Clark is well within his rights to reply, "Well, do you? If so, how, and to what end?" (link)

Note that these points are only meant to pertain to Clark's "basic epistemology," not to extra-biblical beliefs which may be fallibly (and/or externally) justified (even if Clark would not have accepted the possibility of this). 

Finally, a fitting close to the review of this chapter will return to the first paragraph, in which Mr. Flood states that "one of the most instructive contrasts [when it comes to defending the Christian faith] is between the apologetical method of Cornelius Van Til... and that of Gordon Clark..." While I have not read the entirety of Mr. Flood's book, we get a sense of his view of the contrast in the following statements:
Van Til suggested discerning "the impossibility of the contrary," that is, the inability of the non-Christian to make sense of sense-making. The issue is the ground of intelligible predication, one Clark never took up. The Van Tilian transcendental argument (TA) attempts to show the exclusive power of the Christian worldview to ground intelligible predication (including that of the TA itself). It requires showing that the God-Men-World relationship in Scripture is alone adequate to that task...

Christian as such are not required to 'explain the reductio' or show how secular axioms generate self-contradiction of demonstrate that the Christian system is internally consistent. Even if justified, such a task would be reserved for above-average apologetes confronting above-average unbelievers.
I gather the first paragraph outlines Van Til's apologetic, whereas the second alludes to Clark's. I found it interesting that Mr. Flood seems to consider the first paragraph to be an apologetic methodology for the common man, as if most people know what "intelligible predication" even means. Surely we are far afield of "spontaneous" knowledge mentioned earlier in the chapter! Not that I think is wrong. Apologetic depth is a strength.

Regardless, I have yet to encounter an expression of Van Til's TAG which does not itself presuppose Clark's Scripturalism (link, link). I have never seen a proof, for example, that "the God-Men-World relationship in Scripture is alone adequate" without an appeal to Scripture. All this is to say that while I myself am in favor of transcendental argumentation, I agree with Clark that apologetics is grounded in epistemology - a Scripturalist epistemology, albeit with some modifications to Clark's own views.

I'll plan to review chapter 10 in a separate post.

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Book Review: Scripturalism and the Senses (Part 10)

Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's ninth chapter in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.

The Bible and Other Sources of Knowledge

To briefly reiterate a point made in my last review, "sense knowledge" - by which I gather Mr. Lazar means a propositional belief that is epistemically justified, in accordance with externalism, in virtue of the manner in which the belief was caused (e.g. a divinely ordained and "reliable" process of which we are not consciously aware) - is not "a Biblical axiom." It would a biblical inference: from certain passages of Scripture, one infers that people can or have acquired some "knowledge" due, in part, to their senses or sense organs instead of special, divine revelation; therefore, "sense knowledge" is possible. No proposition of Scripture overtly references "sense knowledge" or the like - at least that I am aware of - so "sense knowledge" must be an inference or deduction one makes from Scripture.

Further, Scripture is not used to infer or deduce particular instances of sense knowledge that we have. From all appearances, Mr. Lazar would not argue that we can know when we have sense knowledge, only that it is hypothetically possible that we have such knowledge given that there are biblical examples of persons who have had it whether they themselves were aware such beliefs counted as knowledge (in some sense) or not. Because it is only possible that we have such knowledge, one might alternatively hypothesize that whatever external justificatory factor that must be present for sense knowledge has never been present in any of our sensory experiences. Perhaps we don't have sense knowledge after all, even if others, like those in the Bible, do.

To argue we indeed can be aware that we have sense knowledge seems to assume we can be aware of when we have had sense knowledge. But for us to be aware of when we have sense knowledge would be to suggest that the are no external justificatory factors on which us having sense knowledge would depend. In turn, that would be to affirm an internalist understanding of sense knowledge, a proposal of a sort of empirical epistemology that Mr. Lazar has assured us is not on offer and would invite all the objections to empiricism that Clark wrote in his numerous publications (objections with which Mr. Lazar says he accepts). Thus, I have argued that when it comes to a basic epistemology, sense knowledge (or other kinds of "knowledge" that are justified in an externalist sense) may be important - and it may be that we have it without being aware of the fact - but ought to be regarded as subordinate in fundamentality to knowledge that is justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense, knowledge of which we can be aware.

To also reiterate points I've made in other reviews (link), Scripture is not the only source of truth, nor do many Scripturalists claim that it is - including Clark. Rather, it "is in the Scripture alone we find truth" (link). Scripture is one's epistemic source of "knowledge" in a certain sense (cf. link). We may talk of other "sources" of "knowledge," and this is indeed the focus of Mr. Lazar's ninth [and tenth] chapter[s], but it must not be forgotten throughout this discussion that divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in Scripture - is the foundation, first principle, axiom, or presupposition of our basic epistemology, from which all other propositional "knowledge" of the fundamental kind mentioned above is deduced.

Memory

The first "extra-biblical" source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is memory. Mr. Lazar begins this section by stating, "the Bible assumes people have memories." This is true, and Clark would have agreed: 

These objects of knowledge are not trivialities such as blues and sweets. They are truths or propositions. An example, one of these realities, a constituent of the noumenal world, is the proposition that God justified sinners on the basis of Christ’s imputed righteousness. This is not only a thought to which I may return time and time again. It is also a thought you and I can have simultaneously. Thus communication as well as memory is possible. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 91)

Clark no more denied that people have memories than he denied that people experienced sensation. One's "ability to remember," then, is not at issue. Instead, the question, as outlined by Mr. Lazar himself, ought to be whether the "Biblical evidence" indicates that memories are sources of "extra-Biblical knowledge" [of a certain kind]. 

None of the verses Mr. Lazar mentions or evidences a scenario in which the people who experienced memories knew them to be true. A problem that runs throughout this chapter is that Mr. Lazar's examples of allegedly extra-biblical knowledge in this chapter assume the point in question, conflate "knowledge" with useful opinions (link) or do not specify, let alone defend, what sort of "knowledge" Mr. Lazar has in mind. 

Moreover, even if persons could know things they remember, that doesn't mean that memory itself is the source of knowledge. Let's say that I both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God." Does that make my memory qua memory the source of knowledge? Could it not be that I remember something that I had already come to know, and that I know my memory on the same basis by which I originally came to know? I may both remember and know that "Jesus is the Son of God," but my knowledge could - or perhaps even must be, if it is "knowledge" of the sort in which Clark was interested - be due to Scriptural inference, not the mere fact that it is a memory of a proposition I had previously known, believed, or thought.

My own thinking is that we can know some memories. I have argued elsewhere:

...how is it that our reasoning and memory could be, in every case, fallible? I can see how we could have two different sense experiences, or how we could have a different sense experience from someone else, which yield contradictory beliefs and therefore leave us unable to ascertain which of the two beliefs is true.

But I don’t see how this could apply to reason or memory across the board. If any beliefs we have are in some sense memorial insofar as our thoughts either reference memories or themselves occur over a span of time rather than an instant, and if our thoughts in every case depend on our implicitly, if not explicitly, following certain logical structures, then I think there is a path to internally and infallibly justified beliefs which isn’t logically founded on sense knowledge. (link)

The above was an argument intended to parallel Clark's reference to an Augustinian critique of empiricism. Compare the bold in the quote to the line of reasoning that follows:

… one should note that no one can ever hear a piece of music or a line of poetry. Our opponents, who insist on sensation as the origin of knowledge, cannot well object to an instance taken from experience. Augustine pointed out that to “hear” music or poetry, one must at least “perceive” the rhythm. But there is no rhythm in a single sensation. Even beyond perception it is necessary to have memory before a line of poetry can be recognized as poetry. A single sound has no rhythm or meter. The first sounds of a line must be remembered until the last sound occurs; note also that the first sound longer exists when the last sound sounds. Therefore no one ever senses music or poetry. This Augustinian remark should satisfy any empiricist; but it is not exegesis. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, Pg. 270)

If music and poetry presuppose memory, so too - it seems to me - does [propositional] thought, for there is no meaning in a single concept... it is necessary to have memory before a proposition can be recognized as subject-verb-object. A single concept has no meaning. The first concept in a proposition must be remembered until the last concept is thought. This would appeal to Augustine's and Clark's theory of time as to why memory is critical to the possibility of knowledge. 

Perhaps one might counterargue that a proposition can be thought of in an instant or without temporal duration - in other words, in the causal chain of events which establish temporal sequence, perhaps I am able to think about the whole of propositional content without an intervening event. Now, this hypothesis would be difficult for me to accept - even regarding a short proposition such as "Jesus wept," it seems the thought occurs over a span of time, with intervening events in the objective causal chain of events (e.g. a movement my body makes) occurring as I begin the consideration of the proposition with the concept of "Jesus" and end it with the concept of "wept." If a known thought like that must occur over time, memory must be presupposed.

However, even if it were possible for men to think propositions instantaneously, I would further argue memorial knowledge seems implicitly presupposed insofar as when I think "Jesus wept" or "Jesus is the Son of God," I am thinking about a specific Jesus of whom I must have memory. In other words, concepts appear to tag propositions similar to the manner in which words do (link). As Clark says:

One must understand what the term Lord means. Further, as has already been pointed out, the name Jesus must be correctly apprehended. Confess that the Jesus of Strauss, Renan, or Schweitzer is Lord, and you will go to hell. (Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 66)

So, regarding memorial "knowledge," apologists could certainly refine defense of its reality, constraints (i.e. what is the scope of our memorial "knowledge," what is axiomatically deducible), and necessity (i.e. man is a temporal and limited creature, cf. mode of knowledge or background or tacit knowledge). But I do think the above establishes a beginning for that within a Scripturalist framework. I think certain instances of memorial knowledge can be argued to be preconditions for the sort of "knowledge" in which Clark was interested and, thus, would, like the laws of logic, not be "extra-biblical" but rather subsidiary to our sufficient condition for knowledge (link). More could, should, and hopefully will be said on this point another time.

Dreams

Another extra-biblical source of knowledge Mr. Lazar mentions is dreams. But the examples he mentions are dreams that function as mediums through which divine revelation is communicated. The "Lord said" or "an angel of the Lord... said" or God "warned" or God "revealed to Pharaoh" all refer to times during which the canon of special divine revelation was open. The question of the mode of communication (dreams, visions, etc.) is actually just a subset of whether there are any new sources of special divine revelation. Clark doesn't deny that God spoke to individuals in history apart from what was revealed in Scripture. Adam was not given a Bible in the garden. The real question is whether Mr. Lazar believes it is possible that God still speaks to us [in dreams] today

That itself would suffice as a reply, but another worthy point is that it appears some, if not all, of these and other biblical dreams did not ipso facto communicate knowledge. In the examples of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, for example, both required their dreams to be interpreted by prophets of the Lord, Joseph and Daniel to even understand what they meant. Other magicians or wise men around these kings admitted they could not interpret the dreams even after being told about it. Take the first example Mr. Lazar mentions: Pharaoh's dream. Joseph himself corrects Pharaoh that “It is not in me; God will give Pharaoh a favorable answer” (Genesis 41:16). That is, the epistemic as well as metaphysical source of [the interpretation of] the dream is God, not Joseph. 

Any dreams that involved symbolism in need of interpretation were dreams whose interpretations themselves relied on further divine revelation (cf. Daniel 2:18ff.). This follows along the lines of my argument that "Scripturalists ought to regard our epistemic foundation, not as a physical and non-propositional texts, but rather as the [propositional] contents which the texts codify." (link). Knowledge of that to which images or symbols refer presupposes propositional communication, for literal knowledge is propositional. 

Now, God uses the physical writ of Scripture, dreams, etc. as causal means by which He communicates propositional content. In one sense, then, we can regard these as "sources" of knowledge, and Mr. Lazar's next chapter does seem to intend to address the "epistemic status" of beliefs derived from such sources. He might have been better doing so in this chapter, in my opinion, but I gather that he intends here to demonstrate that there is "knowledge" from other sources than the Bible and later elaborate on what kind of "knowledge" this is. If that is the case, then as already mentioned, neither Clark nor subsequent Scripturalists would have an issue with a distinction between contexts in which "knowledge" means something other than that in which he was interested, so perhaps Mr. Lazar's "Neo"-Scripturalism largely resolves - allowing certain (maybe even useful) emphases - into ordinary Scripturalism. 

Regardless, I will note that causation is fundamentally a metaphysical category. It is an epistemic category only insofar as one might argue certain kinds of knowledge (e.g. of the externalist variety) depend on whether causation has metaphysically taken place in a particular way. As has already been argued in the introductory remarks, this is not the kind of knowledge which is epistemically fundamental. So as I see it, in what sense dreams et al. are regarded as "sources" of extra-biblical knowledge stands in need of some clarification.

Self-Knowledge

Mr. Lazar argues that self-knowledge is biblically affirmed. While I agree, I think the references to the gospel of John were ill-chosen. Those passages he cites speak of belief, not knowledge. 1 Corinthians 2:11 makes for a much better argument, as I too have argued elsewhere on this blog (link). In a previous review, I also alluded to why I believe a denial of self-knowledge to be inconsistent with [Clark's] revelational epistemology, and I have pointed out that Clark accepted self-knowledge at certain points in his life while rejecting it at others (link; follow the links in that review for more thorough analysis). 

In short, I think Mr. Lazar needed to say much more to establish that self-knowledge qualifies as "extra-biblical" knowledge. As with memorial knowledge, is self-knowledge really "extra-biblical" if understood as a precondition for knowledge? This is a line of argument Mr. Lazar does not attempt or dispute, so it is hard to tell how he would respond, but so long as it is kept in mind that divine revelation is the necessary and sufficient precondition for knowledge which accounts for these and other necessary, subsidiary conditions, I think not. I would at least need to see an argument to the contrary before feeling the need to say much more. 

Natural Theology and Moral Law

Two final and interrelated sources of extra-biblical knowledge Mr. Lazar believes the Bible itself mentions are knowledge due to natural theology and the moral law. I'll treat these together, as Mr. Lazar only quotes a few verses from Romans 1-2 as the basis for his arguments. That being the case, I wish Mr. Lazar had interacted with Clark's exegesis or thoughts on those passages (and on any of the other subjects in this chapter). Because he did not, I will. While this will make my response to this section of Mr. Lazar's chapter disproportionately long, I think it is will be helpful to readers who may be confused how Scripturalists can affirm "natural knowledge." Clark's answer is one possibility, and it does not depend on an externalist theory of epistemic justification (which is another possibility worthy of consideration in its own right).

Romans 1-2 is an oft-cited passage in Clark's publications, so much so that I had trouble deciding what to include and what not to include in this review. This article is Clark's longest exegetical reflection on Romans 1 of which I am aware. In it, he provides at least two possible arguments against natural theology, one of which will also apply to Romans 2 and moral knowledge, as we shall see below. The following highlights the first argument against the idea that Romans 1 teaches natural theology:

That which is known of God, later referred to as his eternal power and deity, includes his wrath, for verse 18 says so; and Nygren is correct, I believe, in making the last clause in verse 20 a purpose clause. God revealed himself for the purpose of making men inexcusable. Power and deity therefore include wrath. This wrath is revealed from heaven, but we must ask, what form of wrath and what form of revelation? 
...Now, if the wrath of God is revealed because it is known – its being known is the proof of its having been revealed – what is known is evident because God made it evident to them. And how do we know that God made it evident? The reason is that God’s invisible attributes, eternal power and deity, are clearly seen and understood by man’s observation [?] of created objects, in order that men may be held inexcusable.

The text does not explicitly attribute this knowledge to all mankind. At the minimum infants are excluded. What would be the maximum permitted by the text? Could it be that all who have not heard the gospel are excluded? Do Paul’s words apply only to those who have heard the proclamation? In verse 17 the righteousness of God is said to be revealed in the gospel. Of course it does not follow by the strict laws of validity that God’s righteousness is not revealed elsewhere also. The reign of Pericles is revealed in Grote’s History of Greece but this does not prevent Bury from mentioning it also. Cannot righteousness be revealed both in the gospel and in nature? Nevertheless the Bible as a whole teaches that the righteousness here envisaged is revealed only in the gospel. Hence no one ignorant of the gospel – and the “gospel” includes the book of Habakkuk – can have learned about this righteousness. If now this is true of righteousness, it may also be true of wrath. That is to say, Paul is addressing the Roman Christians, who had already heard the gospel. Other Romans had heard the gospel, had received the revelation, from the mouth of Peter or other disciples, and had clearly understood the preaching, for God made it clear to them; but they refused to believe and so continued in the sins described in the remainder of the chapter. This would successfully exclude all notions of natural theology from this passage, for on this view Paul has in mind only people who have heard the gospel. Let it be clearly admitted that this interpretation is not a necessary conclusion from the text. But is its falsity a necessary conclusion? Is it not a possibility to be considered? 

Note that Clark only mentions this as an exegetical possibility. A few paragraphs later, he refers back to this interpretation as "possible though suspicious." In 1963, Clark summarized and criticized Barth's position on Romans 1, which was substantially the same as the above:

…[the heathen's] refusal to accept this knowledge, their suppression of it in unrighteousness, must therefore have occurred after and not before the ministry of the Apostle. The idolatry and immorality described in the chapter can therefore be only that of the first century of our era, and only that of the people to whom Paul himself preached. No doubt the heathen had always so lived, but Barth implies that the sin intended in the chapter is only sin A.D., and no reference to sin B.C. is intended. This is an unusual exegesis…

The main thought is prima facie improbable. Paul’s words rather clearly suggest a statement about the heathen as such and a revelation which they possess. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 118)

He outright rejected Barth's exegesis in 1969, but notice that he also, in the same breath, affirms "natural knowledge": 

Though dim and restricted, this natural knowledge of God is not to be denied. Romans 1:20 may not guarantee the validity of the theistic proofs, but it plainly asserts some knowledge of God derived from “the things that are made.” Romans 2:15 shows a minimal a priori knowledge of moral principles. On such natural knowledge human responsibility depends. When Karl Barth argues that the heathen which Paul has in view are not the heathen generally but only those to whom he had preached the Gospel, so that all the others have no knowledge of God at all, we regret that his exegetical powers failed him (compare Church Dogmatics, II:1:119ff ). Yet this natural knowledge is minimal in extent and practically useless in communicating the way of salvation. Who can deny that the savage tribes of the jungles know very little about God? (God's Hammer, 1995, pgs. 92-93)

There is a refreshing honesty in reading a theologian who can see the attractiveness of an interpretation of Scripture - in that it would fit well with his other beliefs - yet reject it if he does not find it to do justice to the real meaning of God's word. But such honesty does beg certain questions for those who hold to a Scripturalist theory of knowledge. 

As mentioned in a previous review and in my foregoing remarks on this chapter by Mr. Lazar, what counts as "knowledge" is a question determined by the context in which the concept is found. While Clark does indeed affirm "natural knowledge," he qualifies his affirmation in the long article (referenced above) on Romans 1:

“whether or not [Paul] speaks of such a natural knowledge of God” is a question that ought to be answered, yes or no. There need be no “misunderstanding of Paul, whether the answer be yes or no.” What is needed are clear cut definitions. If Thomas’ definition of natural theology is used, the present writer would answer, No. But if a vague religious sense be meant, if natural religion were conceived as a set of rites and beliefs impressed by the customs of the tribe, or something else still more vague, the answer would be a vague yes. (link)

"Clear cut definitions" are needed. This quote is also a rare instance in Clark's thought in which he entertains the possibility of a sort of natural theology that can be affirmed: one which, as Clark does, affirms "natural knowledge" while also distancing itself from wrong methods of accounting for that "knowledge" (wrong methods I think he usually has in mind when referring to "natural theology"). For there is no question that Clark is consistent in his rejection of empirical knowledge even when he affirms natural knowledge:

Again, the Hebrew-Christian view that “the heavens declare the glory of God” does not, in my opinion, mean that the existence of God can be formally deduced from an empirical examination of the universe. If on some other grounds we believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, we can see that the heavens declare his glory; but this is not to say that a person who did not believe in God could demonstrate his existence from nature. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pg. 66)

In what sense, then, is "natural knowledge" possible on a Scripturalist epistemology? As already mentioned, there is a second argument against natural theology in the long discussion of Romans 1-2 in "Nooumena Kathoratai." In this argument, Clark pivots from a dismissal of Barth's position and critique of an empirical understanding of Romans 1 to an alternative idea of how the "knowledge" of heathens in Romans 1 coincides with or is similar to the "knowledge" of Gentiles without the law in Romans 2:

One must compare interpretation with interpretation. There are numerous verses and passages whose exact meaning is difficult to determine. Before rejecting, the above out of hand, let us examine a more widely held view. It is that all men – we shall not press the case of infants – by observing stars and stones have a clear understanding of God’s wrath, omnipotence, and deity. There is a modification of this view that better survives analysis, but one may take this form first. This first form means that an observation of stones gives us knowledge of divine omnipotence, and an observation of the lamentable results of drug addiction gives us a knowledge of God’s wrath. But no one has ever shown how this could be possible. ‘Stones are heavy, therefore God will punish sin’ is already an invalid inference.

The second form of appeal to the ‘things that are made’ makes a normative conclusion more plausible. The expressions mostly used up to this point have designated visible objects, stones, and stars, as examples of the things that are made. Many commentaries take this for granted. But Godet, and with greater clarity Shedd, mention an internal as well as an external revelation. That is to say, the human mind is one of the things that God made; and while Godet and Shedd do not quite say so, this mind may turn out to be of such greater importance that stars and stones can be disregarded. Godet mentions man’s “conscience and understanding,” even though he puts the emphasis on physical nature; and Shedd speaks of “conscience … consciousness … rational not sensuous perception, intuitive and not deductive.” Perhaps if we submerge the empirical elements these commentators retain, their more or less defective apriorism may lead to a better understanding of Paul’s meaning...

In other words, we discover the divine attributes by introspection of the constitution of the mind. The a priori forms of logic presuppose the power, wrath, and deity of their maker...

In conformity with this, one may note that nobody can recognize a flower as God’s handiwork, unless he has a prior knowledge of God. As Calvin said, the knowledge of God is the first knowledge a person has. It is innate; not derived from experience.

Hence the passage in Romans should be taken as similar to those phrases in the Psalms, such as, the heavens declare the glory of God. There is no valid argument. Only his works are visible. (link

The third paragraph is key, and we will return to it momentarily. As already pointed out, Clark rejects: 1) the "Barthian" restriction of "natural knowledge" only to heathens who have heard the gospel as well as 2) an empirical interpretation of heathen "knowledge." The heavens may declare and function as a witness to God's handiwork, but one who has not been converted by the gospel will not "recognize" such as God's handiwork. Unregenerate men suppress the truth rather than confess it. On the other hand, any attempt to suppress truth cannot "altogether succeed" in its desired effect:

Wrath, guilt, and liability to punishment are appropriate because men know the truth and yet suppress it. What is known of God has been made clear to them (Acts 14:17). The eternal attributes of omnipotence and deity, though invisible, are clearly seen in the created universe, rendering it inexcusable for a man not to worship God. The race, refusing to glorify and thank God, became stupid, so stupid as to fall to the level of idolatry. They worshipped birds, beasts, and even reptiles.

...All sorts of evils followed: maliciousness, murder, deceit, backbiting, cruelty, and so forth. Yet, though they wish to exclude all knowledge of God from their minds, they could not altogether succeed. They still knew that just judgment of God, namely, that people who practice such things are worthy of death; nonetheless they continued in their wicked way and entirely approved of those who did such things. (link) 

How can unregenerate men who suppress truth nevertheless know the "just judgment of God"? Their own conscience will accuse them, for the [Mosaic] law is written in their hearts. Romans 1 and Romans 2 dovetail:

In addition to particular cases, general statements occur in Luke 12:45-48 and John 15:22; but particularly in Romans 1:32, “Knowing the ordinance of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but approve of those that do them.”

This last reference meets the objection that the heathen are not responsible because they have never heard the gospel. They are responsible because they know the law. “When the Gentiles, who do not have the [Mosaic] law, act lawfully by nature, they are, without the [Mosaic] law, a law to [or for] themselves: They show the work of the law written in their hearts” (Romans 2:14-15). Thus responsibility is both established and limited by knowledge. (Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1992, pg. 181)

[Parenthetical: as a self-professing traducian and realist, I think Clark would have done well, in such contexts as these, to mention our real unity with and participation in Adam's sin as the basis for our responsibility to God's law (particularly, our culpability in having broken God's law). This is a subject which merits a separate post, although I will briefly return to it below.]

That is, I believe the crux of Clark's argument is that anthropology matters. Man is the image of God, so God's law is written is written in his heart (i.e. mind). Man's mind itself is a reflection of his Creator's mind. Instead of rejecting "natural knowledge" altogether, then, for those whose minds are developed to the extent that "introspection" is possible, Clark references "a priori forms" as a means by which we can understand how the conscience or mind that God created enables man to "discover the divine attributes." Clark similarly argues elsewhere:

Various Christian philosophers believe that one can see philosophical principles presupposed by the text. The Thomists, for example, think that Romans 1:20 requires empiricism and justifies the cosmological argument. Calvinists have historically made the knowledge of God—not the knowledge of sensory objects—basic, and hold that Genesis 1:26 and Romans 2:15 presuppose innate ideas, or a priori forms. (link)

When Clark says there are philosophical principles presupposed by the text, he is not arguing that Scripture ought not to be considered one's first principle. Rather, it seems that he is getting at an argument I made in an earlier review regarding ontological preconditions for knowledge and their relationship to sufficient condition epistemic while Scripture:

I want to reflect more upon the idea the the necessary preconditions for knowledge I describe above and the various tests that Mr. Lazar, Clark, and I have mention are perhaps better labelled ontological preconditions for knowledge.

This seems right and, with further elaboration, would communicate what I am trying to get at more clearly: they characterize what the knower, knowledge, known, etc. must ontologically be or [possibly] possess in order for knowledge to occur. This is how the knower can know his first principle or sufficient condition for knowledge without necessarily knowing necessary, subsidiary preconditions that his worldview must have, in principle, the power to explain.

Scripture is the sufficient and foundational epistemic justification for what ontologically must be the case to even know Scripture. Ontologically, man must be like God to possess knowledge, and this Scripture affirms. Nevertheless, knowledge of God through the revelation of Himself is epistemologically "basic":

In spite of the RC claim that Paul the apostle put his stamp of approval on Aristotle and Aquinas in Romans 1:19-20, it is clear that the Bible offers no argument to prove God’s existence. The heavens indeed display the glory of God; but a modern scientist who had no prior conviction of God could see there only a display of nuclear energy.

It is noteworthy that Luther (an Occamist) and Calvin, who seems to have held both Plato and Aristotle in low esteem, had no natural theology. Calvin at the beginning of his Institutes denied that we first know ourselves and secondly infer God’s existence. God for Calvin is the first object of knowledge, and this knowledge comes, not from nature, but by revelation. When the zeal of Protestantism began to cool in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, natural theology revived. This was particularly true with the Lutherans, but it is also true of the Reformed Church. Is there ground for hope that the late twentieth century will see a renaissance of Calvinism, a rejection of natural theology, and an adherence to Scriptural revelation? (link)

Thus, the "discovery" of the divine attributes by introspection, reflection on ontological presuppositions of the text, etc. do not imply Clark subscribed to a rationalist epistemology. But then how, for example, can heathen who reject divine revelation nevertheless be said to "know" the law? Yes, their being images of God means that they are ontologically capable of "knowledge." It also explains why their consciences might be pricked to consider divine truths such as are mentioned in Romans 1 and 2. But in particular, what is the "epistemic status" (as Mr. Lazar might put it) of heathen "knowledge," since they suppress divine revelation? In a return to Barth, I think Clark addresses both ontology and natural knowledge in what follows before segueing into an answer:

In Reformed theology the defaced but not annihilated image of God is sinful man was never conceived as being an axiom common to two systems of thought. The image is a psychological, mental, ontological reality. It is an existing part of human nature. Let us assure Barth that from this element an unregenerate man cannot somehow manufacture faith. The present criticism proceeds always along the line that Barth’s most cherished theses can be maintained, and maintained more thoroughly than he himself maintains them. Here he is worried by a non-existent danger. Without falling into modernism or into Romanism one may hold that there is a sense in which man has a capacity for faith not shared by a tree or stone. When God gives the gift of faith, he is not miraculously raising up sons to Abraham out of the stones on the roadway. Faith is a mental activity and by definition presupposes a rational subject. Reason therefore can be considered to be an element common to believer and unbeliever; and if “apprehension” of the Word of God is the understanding of a divine message, then the image of God preserved from creation and the fall is a prerequisite thereto.

Note that, to this point, that Clark has emphasized the ontological prerequisite or presupposition: man is God's image, someone with whom one can reason. Clark immediately continues to address the epistemic status of the "knowledge" of heathens with whom a believer might reason:

Man’s logical capacity is not the only constituent of God’s image. In addition there are a few simple theological and moral beliefs. In the section last quoted (I, 1, 272) Barth wishes to do justice to these facts; “peccator non capax” must bow to actual faith. But there are other facts also. Unless everybody is to be included as a believer in the church, we must admit the existence of unbelievers who actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths. Two systems of thought as such cannot contain common knowledge. Based as they are on separate sets of axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if one system is truth, the other must be false. However, living people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal systems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradictories without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a given proposition. And this point of agreement may be used as a point of contact for the Gospel. What is thus theoretically possible, the majority of exegetes have supposed to be declared actual in the first chapter of Romans. Does not Paul assert that the heathen have a knowledge of God? This knowledge may not be extensive, but its importance depends on its being the basis of heathen responsibility.

Now, because such beliefs held inconsistently, the Gospel has a point of contact, and apagogic argumentation can be extended. Not only may the apologete show the self-contradiction inherent in secular axioms, as we said above; he may now stress the inconsistency of accepting both a secular axiom and a divine truth; and he may draw out the inferences of the divine truth and show its consistency with the additional truths of revelation. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pgs. 117-118)

That Christianity and heathenism have no epistemic overlap as contradictory worldviews does not thereby entail that a Christian and a heathen have no epistemic overlap, for persons can be inconsistent. The epistemic overlap here is not one in which two people in God's image begin with the same epistemic foundation and [reason to] possess[ion of] the same "knowledge." That kind of "knowledge" would be the ideal, the sort in which Clark is interested in apologetically defending (notice too the connection and distinction between apologetics and epistemology that I have emphasized as fundamental to understanding Scripturalism, link).

Rather, heathen "knowledge" is their "accepting... a divine truth." They can "actually even if inconsistently believe a few divine truths.They "agree on a given proposition" with a believer. But this belief, acceptance, or agreement is not systematically derived. If it were, it would have to derive from divine revelation, the only epistemic source which allows for consistency. No, the epistemic status of "knowledge" in view here is not so rigid as it is in other works by Clark, as can be seen in how Clark defined knowledge in the same book:

"How can knowledge, i.e., belief in or acceptance of a true proposition, depend on giving thanks or feeling awe? This is not true in mathematics. Nor can it be true in theology." (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 169)

Now, no Scripturalist would deny that unbelievers can believe or accept a true proposition. Typically, they will just apologetically argue that the unbeliever is inconsistent in doing so. Likewise, a Scripturalist might reason with a believer who endorses a Thomistic or empirical epistemology that they are using a wrong method for accounting for a right, divine truth they both believe. If that is the sense of "natural knowledge" Clark is promoting, there is no issue, and one can agree with Clark when he concludes: 

Now Paul indeed bases responsibility on knowledge, but he asserts that the heathen had knowledge, some knowledge at any rate; they tried to suppress it, but could not quite succeed. And even if it were Paul who “awakened” this knowledge in them, the implication would be that some remnant or potential knowledge had been lying dormant in their minds to be awakened. And, finally, to repeat, it is indubitable that the heathen and the unbeliever have this knowledge in common. (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 120)

[Parenthetical: while the reference to "remnant or potential knowledge" "lying dormant in their minds" is probably a reference to Barth's thought that only heathen to whom the gospel was preached had "knowledge," Clark's a fortiori response can be applied to infants who, Clark elsewhere argues, have the "innate idea of God" due to possessing the same "a priori equipment" as adults:

The Logos is the rational light that lights every man. Since man was created in the image of God, he has an innate idea of God. It is not necessary, indeed it is not possible, for a blank mind to abstract a concept of God from sensory experience or to lift sensory language by its bootstraps to a spiritual level. The theories of Empiricism, of Aristotle, of Aquinas, of Locke, are to be rejected. 

The positing of innate ideas or a priori equipment does not entail the absurdity of infants’ discoursing learnedly on God and logic. To all appearances their minds are blank, but the blankness is similar to that of a paper with a message written in invisible ink. When the heat of experience is applied, the message becomes visible. Whatever else be added, the important words refer to non-sensuous realities. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 203)

Whether coincidental or intentional, the "invisible ink" analogy nicely ties into the writing of God's law on their minds. With experience, infants will become able to introspectively examine the message inscribed in their ontological makeup: an image of God who have already sinned in Adam. That this knowledge is dormant, so to speak, until the infant has enough cognitive development for introspection is little different than an adult whose knowledge of the same is dormant while he sleeps. At this point, however, I could be somewhat deviating from exposition of Clark's thought to development of it.]

So: on the one hand, Clark can affirm "natural knowledge" and that heathens can "know" divine truths in the sense that they - inconsistent with whatever non-revelatory epistemic axiom to which they [implicitly] hold - believe them. On the other hand, Clark can say, in a different context and [clearly] with a different conception of "knowledge" in mind:

First, Moses said that revelation was the greatest event that ever happened. Second, there is no knowledge of God apart from revelation, and therefore no knowledge of how a church and its activities should be conducted except in the Scriptures. Now, third, and a point that needs emphasis, God's revelation is clear, objective, and intelligible. And it is authoritative, whether or not we accept it. (April, 1959, Reformed Presbyterian Advocate, Volume 93, Number 4)

To conclude my reflections on this chapter, I think a definition or discussion of "source" or "knowledge" (like what I provided in an earlier review) would have helped clarify in what particular respect Mr. Lazar believed his epistemology is in contrast with Clark's and would have helped the reader evaluate Mr. Lazar's chapter, for Mr. Lazar may have found himself to be in larger agreement with Clark than he realized. In particular, mention of whether different kinds of "knowledge" are under discussion would have framed Mr. Lazar's argument in a clearer way. To this end, interaction with Clark's writings on these subjects would have been helpful. 

In the next part of my review, I will turn to chapter 10, which Mr. Lazar calls The Epistemic Status of Extra-Biblical Beliefs.