Lane Tipton on Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til

Recently, I wrote on the importance of history (link). An example of this stems from a dialogue on Lane Tipton's book, The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til. I have since purchased the book, and below, I'll link to a video lecture by Tipton that covers much of the same content. Of initial interest to me was pg. 79 of Tipton's book:

...when we realize that Van Til speaks of God as "one person" in a manner synonymous with Bavinck's speaking of God as "absolute personality," we can discern that Van Til intends to add nothing beyond what Bavinck has already expressed. It is highly likely that Van Til uses such language to polemically sharpen his critique of Gordon Clark's conception of the divine unity as "mute substance." Clark's rationalistic notion of "mute substance" supplies part of the polemical context for Van Til's insistence that there is no impersonal dimension to God's unity as an absolute personality... (Tipton, The Trinitarian Theology of Cornelius Van Til, pg. 79)

Further, on pg. 85, Tipton writes:

...we fail to do justice to Van Til’s concerns if we do not factor in his theological disagreements with the theological rationalism of his day, particularly the rationalism of the neo-evangelical Gordon H. Clark. Van Til’s comments on the incomprehensibility of God, especially in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, arise immediately from the context of the Clark–Van Til controversy. As a result, Van Til’s understanding of the Trinity and divine incomprehensibility is designed partly to correct the rationalistic distortions he detected in the formulations of Clark. What will prove instructive for our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of the Trinity is the appearance, years after the controversy itself, of a motif in Clark’s theology that denies personality to God’s unity. While definitively dissenting from the personalists, Clark devised formulations that amount to the opposite error of the Boston Personalists in that he can affirm tripersonality only by describing the essence of God as mute or unconscious. The personalists deny personality with respect to God’s diversity, while Clark denies personality with reference to God’s unity. 

It is out of this matrix of Trinitarian reflection that Van Til deemed it appropriate to utilize the language that God is “one person” or “absolute personality,” while not allowing that affirmation to subvert the complementary truth that God exists as three persons or a tripersonal being. In Van Til’s mind, the formulations of both the Boston Personalists and Gordon Clark proved inadequate to convey the absolutely personal and incomprehensible character of God’s Trinitarian existence.

This has led other people to follow Tipton's conclusions. For example, Christopher Smith reviews of Tipton's book by stating (link):

This absolute personality means, contra Gordon Clark (1902–85), that self-consciousness can be found in the Triune God even while there is a self-differentiated existence as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, thus guarding against the tritheistic notion of three centers of self-consciousness. Van Til was reacting to Clark’s notion that in God there are three “distinct bundles of thoughts,” i.e. self-consciousness. Van Til’s opponents were broader than merely Gordon Clark, however. Indeed, his primary opponent was a school of thought Tipton identifies as “theistic personalism,” and Van Til’s thought was, in large part, a reaction to these views.

So, how accurate is Tipton's assessment of Clark's influence on Van Til? Despite other areas in which I enjoy Tipton's work, my answer will be: not at all. 

For starters, Van Til's language of "absolute personality" is found in works as early as his An Introduction to Systematic Theology. In the 1971 preface to this book, Van Til writes:

The first ‘‘edition’’ of this syllabus appeared some thirty-five years ago. Its title then was: An Introduction to Systematic Theology. Since then much has happened in theology. Yet the old syllabus is now made available again in a practically unaltered form. The author has dealt with the main developments of recent theology in other writings.

That means Van Til's syllabus was originally made available in 1936. Access to this original would aid in answering which topics were impacted by later theological developments and which topics were "practically unaltered" (although having such access will turn out to be unnecessary to answer whether Tipton's analysis is accurate). 

For example, Clark's work in the 1940s is referenced in the 1971 edition; specifically, Clark's "The Primacy of the Intellect," "The Answer," and "A Christian Philosophy of Education"). Obviously, these works would not have been discussed in the original 1936 syllabus. If the language that God is "one person" or absolute personality" appeared in the original, such would seem to antedate any mention of Clark. 

Also, are there even any contexts in the 1971 edition in which Clark merits so much as a mention while Van Til uses the language that God is "one person" or "absolute personality"? No - one can read Van Til's book himself to verify that this is the case.

Further, Clark's rhetorical question of whether a person is "to be considered unconscious, mute substance?" comes from The Trinity (1985), 3 months prior to his death. The most thorough bibliography on Van Til (of which I am aware) states that his last published article came at the age of 87. How is it possible that Tipton thinks Van Til critiqued a 1985 statement by Clark if Van Til's last published work was in 1982? I could very well end this post with the simple observation that it is impossible for Van Til to have been reacting to a thought by Clark in 1985.

[To be more precise, while Clark's The Trinity was originally published in 1985, Clark had finished the manuscript as early as 1977 as part of a larger project: a systematic theology (link). Because The Trinity was not published until 1985, however, I will continue to refer to that as the earliest date Van Til might have read Clark use the phrase "mute substance" unless evidence is shown to the contrary.]

There are more points to be made, so I'll come back to Clark's actual remarks found in The Trinity later. Let's turn to Tipton's book. If we set aside Tipton's tangent on paradox, human freedom, and divine sovereignty (pgs. 96-98), the only reference Tipton makes to any of Clark's works is The Trinity. Thus, it doesn't appear that Tipton has in mind any other statements by Clark that were made during the 1920s-1970s that might have impacted Van Til's language in question. 

I have already intimated that Clark's works in the 1940s do not appear to relevantly bear on Van Til's language that God is "one person" or "absolute personality," at least so can as I can discern from the 1971 edition of Van Til's Introduction to Systematic Theology itself. On the contrary, take the following statement by Clark written before 1936:

1935. Revised edition of Readings in Ethics. Gordon H. Clark and T.V. Smith, eds. New York: F.S. Crofts and Company. 

But one must learn that when a philosopher says God, he may not mean God. Both Jew and Christian regard God as an Almighty Personal Being who chose to create the world. Two Christians, Descartes and Leibniz, may have disagreed on the question whether God made this world good by choosing it, or whether God chose this world because it was good. But all agree He chose and created. But for Spinoza, on the contrary, there was neither choice nor creation, for his God is not a personal being.

Additionally, consider other statements Clark made in the 1940s:

1949. Authority in Religion. The Witness Jul: 5-6.

The Christian as well as the modernist believes that God has revealed himself in nature. But if this is the only revelation, if this is the most definite revelation there is, men soon begin to see in the marvels of nature, nature and only nature. A real, living, personal God recedes into the dim, unnecessary background.

Pre 1950. Language is Beautiful - and Deceitful. The Home Evangel

The other day a Jewish community house, to raise funds for their unfortunate brothers, invited a philosopher to give a lecture. The philosopher was a Christian, in the original, orthodox, Biblical sense of the word. He chose to speak on the reality of a personal God, and tried to show that only by trusting a personal God could man face the world and solve its problems. A gentleman in the audience said that he did not believe all the stuff this philosopher propounded. “I don’t believe in any personal God,” he insisted, “I am a Unitarian.” 

And so it seems that “Unitarian” has come to mean “atheist.” And “Christian” has come to mean one who denies the Bible and rejects the blood atonement of Christ. All this leads a thoughtful person to believe the more in the inherent depravity of man, out of which comes the modem depravity of words. Respectable authors must long for a regeneration of language; but this can only occur by a regeneration of the human heart that is at enmity with God.

Now, I really did try to do some legwork on Tipton's behalf. I had to scour my notes to find anything by Clark that Tipton could have remotely included in the alleged "matrix" of reflection out of which Van Til opted to use the language of "one person" or "absolute personality." The closest I could find was a letter from Clark to J. Oliver Buswell on April 3, 1937, to which Van Til probably did not have access and which I doubt is the sort of thing Tipton had in mind anyways (since Clark is just attempting to summarize Shedd):

Question: Is the being of the second Person of the Trinity derived from the Father according to Vos?

Answer: I doubt it. On p. 216 of The Self Disclosure, Vos says that the glory of the Son comes from the Father, and on pg. 221 Vos says that Jn. 5:26 and 6:57 teach that the Son's life is derived from the Father. He further seems to accept the doctrine of eternal generation.

The question therefore becomes, what historically is the doctrine of eternal generation, and what does the word 'being' mean?

Hodge, Vol I. on the eternal generation quotes Turretin as opposing the eternal generation of the essence of Christ and as therefore opposing the Nicene fathers. Having read Hodge hurriedly I may be mistaken on the 'therefore' in the last sentence, for I do not think the Nicene father taught what Turretin attacks.

Shaff, Creed of Christendom, Vol I, p. 37, says that the Athanasian creed excludes every kind of subordination of essence. It states clearly that absolute unity of the divine being or essence.

Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I p.316, speaks of the essence as that which is one, the personality three. Thus persons may be generated but not the essence. Shedd also, p. 317, remarks that the eternal generation is necessary but creation depends entirely upon arbitrary will. Apparently this denial ofthe generation of essence is compatible with the expression: the Father communicates the one eternal essence to the Son. By 'communicate' I guess is meant Platonic participation (though there is something queer here) and raises the question whether Gregory of Nyssa was correct in saying that the relation of persons to the Godhead was the same as that of individuals to their Idea.

The generation therefore is of a Person by a Person. As Calvin I xiii 19 says: “we justly represent him as originating from the Father.”

Shedd, op. cit. p. 323: “Hence the Nicene theologians harmonized the doctrine of eternal generation with that of unity of essence by teaching the necessity of this generation.”

CONCLUSION. Since the Nicene fathers maintained eternal generation in their repudiation of Arianism, it seems to me first that there is no ground for saying that Vos implies the generation of essence, being, reality (ousia); and second that the doctrine instead of being dangerous is an excellent method of defending trinitarianism against Arianism.

May I also add that Vos may not have the “unified perspective” of Machen and Warfield because he approaches his problems exegetically rather than systematically.

It is also difficult for me to imagine that Van Til himself would have nitpicked Shedd. That in mind, here is the full context of Clark's rhetorical question cited by Tipton. From pgs. 129-130 in The Trinity (2010 edition):

Several romantically inclined students, and a few professors as well, have complained that “this makes your wife merely a set of propositions.” Well, so it does. This suits me, for I am a set of propositions too. And those who complain are as they think. Is a person to be considered unconscious, mute substance? Why is he not conscious thoughts? Of course, one may just say “thoughts,” for thoughts cannot be unconscious.

Naturally, human beings are mutable: Their thoughts or minds change. The three Persons of the Godhead are immutable because their thoughts never change. They never forget what they now know, they never learn something new, in fact they have never learned anything. Their thought is eternal. Since also the three Persons do not have precisely the same set of thoughts, they are not one Person, but three. If substance were the principle of individuation – for we have seen that space-time cannot be – then there could not be three Persons. Identity of substance would mean identity of person. If then substance, for this and other reasons, is not the principle of individuation, the theologians referred to should explain what their principle is.

One may disagree with Clark's metaphysical reductionism of persons to sets of propositions (as I do and have argued against). A few points, though:

1. The immediate context of the quote is in reference to human persons and substances, not divine. 

2. The point of the bold is obviously meant by Clark to be a denial that persons are unconscious, mute substances... but one would think Tipton and Van Til would agree with this? If so, then what is the issue? Is Tipton inferring something more, e.g. that Clark thinks all substances are unconscious and mute? If so, his inference is by no means obvious to me, and I think he would need to give more evidence of this.

3. In fact, this inference would be false. In the same book on The Trinity, Clark says (pg. 67):

In VII, ii, 3 Augustine makes substance and essence synonyms, and in VII, iv, 7 he twice, and maybe a third time, includes nature. This may help some readers to escape from Aristotelian matter and Locke’s two substances, but the term essence today is also vague. If, however, these terms were replaced by the word definition, several difficulties could be avoided. The definition of the Triune God is not the definition of the Son.

Obviously, Clark thinks the Son is a person who is neither mute nor unconscious. If the Son is a definition (= substance), then even in 1985, Clark thought that there is at least one "substance" that is neither mute nor unconscious. Of course, there are numerous problems with this construction, but the point is that Tipton seems to be reading into Clark's rhetorical question things that are not entailed. 

For those who don't have access to Tipton's book, Tipton's lecture on Gordon Clark: Theological Rationalism and Trinitarianism support what I have argued: that Tipton inaccurately interprets a rhetorical question by Clark from 1985 and anachronistically refers to it as part of the polemical context out of which Van Til's distinctive Trinitarian theology was formed. For example, between minutes 21-25, Tipton says:

To clarify a bit the relationship of the hypotheses to the essence of God - the relationship of the persons to the essence - what distinguishes the persons from the godhead or the essence is self-consciousness. Mute substance is not what characterizes the persons - that is collections of thought collections of thoughts. Personhood is not what characterizes the substance - it's unconscious and mute.

And so look at what you start to find in the polemical context that Van Til faced: whether it's the personalists at the early turn of the 20th century moving into the 20s and 30s or whether it's the developing neo-evangelical trinitarianism of Gordon Clark in the 30s, 40s, and into the 50s, what do you find?

You find an affirmation of unipersonality that calls into question the integrity and personality of the individual hypotheses in personalism, or you find an affirmation of personhood as bundles of thoughts - a novelty in the history of the reformed tradition, but that's how personhood is defined - but in a way that makes the essence of God unconscious, mute substance. 

And so there's an affirmation of one Consciousness (a denial of three Consciousness) in the personalists there's an affirmation of three Consciousness and a denial of one Consciousness in the neo-evangelical rationalists...

Did Bavinck confirm absolute personality as an entailment of numerical unity and divine simplicity? Yes. Did Hodge affirm that there is one will, one mind, one consciousness in a way that peacefully and sweetly complies in mystery with tri-personality? Yes. Did Van Til follow both? Yes.

But according to Clark, personality requires only those things not common to the three and he draws the implication from that that the essence of God is unconscious, mute substance that is antithetically related to personality. See, a necessary condition for Clark for the possibility of personality is the presence of propositions not common to the three. So what Clark lacks is a theological principle that can account for the absolute personality of God. 

I see no evidence that Clark said anything in "the 30s, 40s, and into the 50s" which could be labeled "neo-evangelical trinitarianism," and I have already quoted several statements by Clark during this time period which cut against it. A 1985 quote which may not even be correctly interpreted is insufficient evidence for the idea that Van Til owed his distinctive Trinitarian language or views to anything Clark wrote. 

Conclusion: my theory is that Tipton is unaware of Clark's gradual, metaphysical synthesis I have posited elsewhere (link). This is understandable in the absence of an historical chronology such as that which I have been putting together. Tipton might assume Clark's earlier Trinitarian views were more or less consistent with what Clark expressed in 1985. But this is an assumption which cannot be maintained. History matters (with this, Tipton would surely agree).

[Parenthetically, if I were pressed to pinpoint when Clark's understanding of "persons" changed, I would suggest Reason, Religion, and Revelation (1961, "Trust in a person is a knowledge of a person; it is a matter of assenting to certain propositions") illustrates an outworking of Clark's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. 

By the time of The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark (1968), it is explicit ("persons are propositions"). Interestingly, Clark's definition of persons is given in reply to Ronald Nash, who in that book suggested "certain affinities" between Clark's metaphysic and "the Boston Personalism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman and Process Philosophy." I wonder if Tipton took Nash's thesis and ran with it.]

Moreover, Tipton simply misreads Clark. His whole argument seems to be tenuously premised on one rhetorical question (!) that in context does not lend even the least bit of credence to Tipton's inferences.

I am no scholar of Van Til, but if I had to make a suggestion, it would be that Van Til drew inspiration from his interaction with Hegelians. See the following remarks from his 1927 dissertation, God and the Absolute:

...in as much as the Absolute is often spoken of as revealing Himself or itself,—being regarded either as personal or as impersonal,—and in as much as this revelation is spoken of as inexplicable 18 , the Absolute is very clearly looked upon as Beyond... 

For McTaggart God is the logical universal immanent in all particulars or else he becomes one of the particulars Himself. Now on this basis it is not possible to maintain that the Absolute has any meaning except that which finds realization in the particulars. It is again quite true that Idealism does not wish to go that far with its emphasis on immanence. It continues to speak of the Absolute as “selfconscious” and “personal.” But is Idealism entitled to such an Absolute? It seems not; a logical universal has meaning only because of and for the particulars in which it is manifested.

Right or wrong, Van Til's thesis (so it seems to me) is that in contradistinction to Idealism, Christianity is entitled to "such an Absolute." 

Perhaps Tipton's other arguments in his book are worthwhile, but I hope the above sets the record straight regarding Clark. As an addendum, I don't find Tipton's following line of argument convincing:

The theology of Gordon Clark finds affinity with the personalists in that it is motivated by a strong form of theological rationalism. However, the result of Clark’s rationalism for his doctrine of the Trinity amounts to a virtual denial of a personal essence or ousia in the Godhead – a point that has received little to no attention. Clark’s commitment to theological rationalism, together with his attempt to formulate a principle of individuation within the Godhead, yield a conception of the Godhead that granted self-consciousness only to the hypostases. If the rationalism of the personalists ascribed personality only to the unity of the Godhead, Clark’s rationalism relegated personality only to the diversity within the Godhead. This appeared most clearly in Clark’s argument that self-consciousness applies not to God as a self-identical subject, but only to the distinct hypostases understood as unique combinations of thoughts.

I do not find anywhere in the book that Tipton engages with Clark's points in his later works (flawed as they are) such as one can read in Clark's last letter to John Robbins (February, 1985):

Dear Dr. Robbins, The sheet from the Elders Handbook, which you sent me and Van Til also, held that God is both one Person and three Persons. This seems to be to be a form of Modalism, or Patripassionism as the early Church called it. The three names are names of three activities. When God creates, he is called Father, when he redeems he is called Son. In spite of the fact that Dr. Kuyper and Van Til speak of Three Persons, there is not much personality left, or perhaps I should say individuality. Look again at the seven lines you checked. I don’t know what these people do with “Only Begotten” or the “Procession” of the Spirit, or one of them speaking to another. In the study I am writing on the Incarnation, I preserve the distinction among the three Persons by arguing that although each is omniscient, they do not know, i.e. they cannot assent, the same set of propositions. The Second Person can know and say, “I became incarnate.” The Father cannot say this. The Father can say, “I begot the Son.” The Son begot nothing. What these modalists say on these points, I do not know. But it seems to me that the One Person would have to assert all these propositions, and to my mind that is plain nonsense.

For those interested in pursuing the doctrinal aspect of this debate further, I highly recommend Doug Douma's book The Grand Old Doc, in which he engages Tipton on this point (particularly, pgs. 115-117 and an apropos citation of John Murray).

The Justice of God and the Imputation of Adam's Sin: A Realist Apologetic

Last year, I wrote a post in which I said I would like to write more on the topic of original sin (link). In that post, I provided an introduction to some resources for Reformed readers who want to gain a sound perspective on what theologians have historically argued that original sin entails. I also briefly alluded to why I think that traducianism and a realistic view (a la Samuel Baird) of our participation in Adam's sin is biblical and vindicates the justice of God in imputing Adam's sin to us, his progeny.

As mentioned in the aforementioned link, what original sin entails has been debated by Presbyterians, a most notable account of which is contained in George P. Hutchinson's excellent book, The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterian Theology. This debate continues even today.

For example, at the invite of a friend, I had the opportunity to discuss and defend the realist position outlined in Hutchinson's book in a recent conversation with Dr. Lane Tipton and others on the Reformed Forum discord. 

With the exception of my friend, Ken Hamrick, and I, most (if not all) of the other interlocutors explicitly rejected or leaned against the view that Adam's federal headship is grounded in his natural headship. That is, they reject a realist view of original sin. 

Those who are interested in what the realist view is but don't have as much time or whose interest has yet to be piqued enough to read the resources in the above link might find the following conversation enlightening. I believe the comments by Ken and I show the strength of the realist position in its ability to answer tough questions that other positions seemingly can't. I'll indent the comments of others and leave my own comments without indent. All italics and bold emphases are each authors' own. At the end, I'll venture a few further thoughts that were not included in the conversation:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tyler 

The organic unity that exists between Adam and his posterity is not the ground but the means for the transmission of Adam’s sin to us. Now it can certainly be said that Adam must have one nature with us if he were to be our covenant head and his sin were to be imputed to us. An angel, for example, could not represent us federally. But, conversely, it does not follow that Adam, because he possesses our nature, now must represent us. The unity of the nature is only a conditio sine qua non. It is in no way the ground that excludes the possibility of the opposite. The actual relationship is such that God, with an eye to the covenant unity for which He intended humanity, also created it as a natural unity. As being reckoned in Christ by election entails that in God’s time one is born again of Christ through the Spirit, so being reckoned in Adam by the covenant of works entails that in God’s time one is born of Adam.

-Vos, R.D. II, pg. 32

 

Ken Hamrick

@Tyler Thanks! I now have this book, so I'll have to study it...

 

Ken Hamrick

@Tyler I would say that not only could an angel not represent us federally, but also, no angel could represent other angels federally. Having a nature with the same characteristics misses the point of representation. Only when the nature of the representative head contains within it all those who are to be represented can the defining act of the head be justly seen as having been participated in by the members. There must be a genealogical principle involved in which the organic unity transcends the merely physical. As to the supposed necessity of representation resulting from such an organic unity, we need to look at the special act of Providence in God condescending to make a covenant with Adam. By nature, Adam owed perfect obedience; but that would never of its own attain to the eternal reward that God graciously offered in His covenant. Adam’s disobedience was simultaneously natural and Covenantal, since obedience by both was owed. So then, the organic unity would of necessity result in his representation of us according to that natural obedience that was owed and the natural results of disobedience; but it would not result of its own in a necessary representation for Covenantal rewards. The rewards offered to Adam by covenant exceeded what was naturally due for obedience; but the penalties incurred were exactly what was naturally due for his sin. It is true that we are naturally born in God’s time; but naturally, we cannot be born other than to be born of Adam, since that is the origin of our nature. We were not “reckoned in Christ by election.” We were “chosen in Him” by election. It is a matter of the decree and not a matter of union in Him according to His righteousness. In God’s time, one is born again in Christ according to God’s plan and decree. Only when He is put in us are we put in Him and given a proprietary title to His human actions and counted as crucified and risen with Him. 

 

Tyler 

Decree 

(WLC 14) "God executes his decrees in the works of creation and providence, according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will." 

Creation 

(WLC 17) "After God had made all other creatures, he created man male and female; formed the body of the man of the dust of the ground, and the woman of the rib of the man, endued them with living, reasonable, and immortal souls; made them after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it, and dominion over the creatures; yet subject to fall." 

Providence 

(WLC 20) "The providence of God toward man in the estate in which he was created, was the placing him in paradise, appointing him to dress it, giving him liberty to eat of the fruit of the earth; putting the creatures under his dominion, and ordaining marriage for his help; affording him communion with himself; instituting the Sabbath; entering into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of personal, perfect, and perpetual obedience, of which the tree of life was a pledge; and forbidding to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, upon the pain of death." 

Creation (image) = means of imputation 

Providence (covenant) = grounds of imputation

 

Tyler 

At least how I understand it...Vos does note prior to the quote provided earlier that the distinction between natural relationship and the covenant of works is logically and judicially distinguished but not temporally distinguished. 

Such that "even when the covenant of works has served its purpose, the natural relationship remains in force in all circumstances, and also all the demands that stem from it still apply to man." Of course this is a must - https://reformedforum.org/courses/union-with-christ-the-benefits-of-his-suffering-and-glory/ (youtube links coming soon??)

Reformed Forum

Lane Tipton

Union with Christ: The Benefits of His Suffering and Glory

This course aims to build up the saints in their understanding of two basic features of Reformed theology: 1) redemption accomplished by Christ for the church in his humiliation and exaltation, suffering and glory; and 2) how that redemption accomplished by Christ is applied by Christ’s Spirit, work.

 

Ken Hamrick 

To what do we mean by the ground of imputation but the ground of justice for imputing? And what is just about God imputing sin to those who did not yet exist, due only to His choice to view all future men in a "moral union" with Adam? Covenant alone cannot be the ground of justice, because even covenants must morally conform to the greater framework of God's moral law. If a covenant stipulated that its members must blaspheme God daily, then it would be immoral to keep that covenant. Covenants are only moral insofar as they comply with God's moral law, and that law does not abdicate its authority in the presence of a covenant, as if anything specified by covenant is justly grounded in that covenant, regardless of whether it would be just in the greater moral framework of God's law. Specifically, if it is unjust in the greater moral framework of God's law to hold as guilty those who had no part in the crime other than to be--years or millennia in the future--physically propagated from the criminal, then it cannot be claimed to be just based only on the fact that a covenant was made which specified that they would share the legal standing of the progenitor who happened to be the covenant representative. If it is immoral outside of the covenant, then it is immoral regardless of any covenant.

 

Ken Hamrick 

@Tyler God, in wanting a covenantal union of men in Adam, created mankind in such a way that all men are propagated out of the substance of Adam--both the material and immaterial natures--such that all men had a germinal, spiritual existence in Adam and a participation in his sin. In this way, the justice of imputation is grounded in the creation, while the grace of covenantal reward would have been strictly a matter of special providence. However, even if God had not condescended to covenant with Adam, if Adam had remained righteous then his righteous state would have been passed on to his progeny in the same way that his sin was passed on. Often it's said that one cannot object to the imputed sin of Adam unless one also objects to the imputed righteousness of Christ. But notice that God was not content to reckon us with Christ's righteousness and leave it at that: rather, God also spiritually joins us to Christ by putting His Spirit within us in a union so intimate as to call us one new man in Him, so that we are crucified with Him and seated in heavenly places in Him. God's ways in this are very realistic, but we tend to ignore the realism and emphasize that God imputes based only on His will. And in the Trinity, we also ignore the realism and focus instead on the representation. But without realism, there could be no understanding of the Trinity. Three Persons in one substance is realism. Three Persons reckoned and treated as one substance would be nominalism. Although Vos appeals to the representation involved in the Trinity as archetypical of the representation involved in covenantal representation, it can only serve as archetype for realistic union.

 

Ken Hamrick 

The covenant union worked with the natural union as created. It could have stood without the natural union in the event that Adam passed the test, but it could not justly stand without it in the event that Adam failed. Gratuitous benefits, such as imputed righteousness or eternal life, are grace; but gratuitous condemnation can be nothing other than injustice. We do not earn God's salvation, but we did earn our condemnation as a race while, as Augustine said, "We all were that one man." Not only did we earn the condemnation, we also earned the depravity and spiritual death with which we are conceived.

 

Ken Hamrick 

Adam wasn't merely the representative of mankind, he was the root of mankind. And his sin was not conveyed merely by imputation, but his sin was conveyed by natural propagation. Adam wasn't merely a representative. He was a public person--a person who contained the whole public within him. What I'm advocating isn't something foreign to Reformed thinking. It's the root of Reformed thinking.

vantil101 

What is so helpful here by from Vos and from the WSC 12 is the distinction between nature and covenant. The covenant--and with it Adam's federal representation--accrues by virtue of an act of special providence. The covenantal probation and reward come by way of special revelation in the covenant of works. So also does representation. The terms of the covenant enshrine the ex pacto justice of God, so that the relation is not nominal or arbitrary. The natural relation is necessary for the representation; the covenantal relation is sufficient for representation. Thus, the "organic" or natural relation between Adam and his descendants is not the ground but the means to federal representation. Everything within the confessionally Reformed view hinges on that distinction and its outworking. To deny this is to fold the entirety of covenantal representation into creation and then either to deny the act of special providence altogether or to make it redundant in accounting for Adam's federal headship.

 

Me:

Vos: “Now it can certainly be said that Adam must have one nature with us if he were to be our covenant head and his sin were to be imputed to us. An angel, for example, could not represent us federally.”

Does Vos explain why would it be unjust for God to impute the sin of an angel to men?

vantil101 

Yes. Earlier on in the same section he engages in extensive discussion of that precise fact. The natural image of God (Gen. 1:27; 2:7) is the necessary condition for representation. Angels lack just that psycho-somatic image endowment.

 

Me:

Do you have a reference? I only have the kindle version.

vantil101 

My best advice for you is to read about 20 pages on either side of your own quotation. It will give you the context.

 

Me:

I don't see where Vos says anything about the image of God being the necessary condition for representation.

vantil101 

Image = natural relationship in the quotations above. 

 

Ken Hamrick 

I’ve read all of it. It seems circular. Man was made in God’s image. It is man’s nature to be in God’s image. Representation requires the natural relationship insofar as we are related to each other by our common nature in which we all are in the image of God.

 

Me:

Does Vos argue that angels have no natural relationship to God, though? The following statements suggest that they do have a natural relationship to God: 

Pg 290: 

"a) Adam by nature was obliged to obey God, without thereby having any right to a reward. 

b) God had created him mutable, and he also possessed no right to an immutable state. 

c) His natural relationship to God already included that he, if sinning, must be punished by God. 

d) All this was a natural relationship in which Adam stood." 

Pg. 592: …one must distinguish three kinds of relationships in which man stands to the law: 

"1. The natural relationship of a rational being. No due possession can be earned from God by this relationship. Even if a person in this relationship does all that is demanded from him, he is still an unprofitable servant [Luke 17:10]." 

Pg 1053: 

"[Good works] are also required by the natural relationship in which he, as a moral creature, stands toward God’s law."

Angels are rational beings, moral creatures, by nature obliged to obey God, punishable by sin, mutable, required to do good, etc. Do they not, then, stand in a natural relationship to Him?

Ken Hamrick 

“The terms of the covenant enshrine the ex pacto justice of God, so that the relation is not nominal or arbitrary.” If the union between Adam and mankind existed only in God’s mind, and not substantively within Adam himself, then the relation is nominal—regardless of assertions to the contrary. Is God’s justice according to truth? Truth is necessarily in accordance with reality. That which exists in God’s mind alone does not exist in reality. And if all men are reckoned by God as if all sinned when Adam sinned, but yet it is admitted that the souls of these men did not in any way exist in Adam or participate in his sin, then the so-called ex pacto justice is indeed an arbitrary act of sovereignty and not an act of justice—unless it is a justice “in name only” (nominal).

 

Ken Hamrick 

They don’t stand in a natural relationship to us, though.

 

Me:

Right. To be clear, I, like Vos, believe that: 

"…it can certainly be said that Adam must have one nature with us if he were to be our covenant head and his sin were to be imputed to us. An angel, for example, could not represent us federally." 

The reason I believe this, however, is because I think God’s only justly charges persons of sin if they participate in sin. Did we participate in angelic sin? No. In fact, we could not have participated in angelic sin for the reason you just mentioned and Vos (in the quote above) mentions. Therefore, it would be unjust to impute angelic sin to man. On the other hand, it was just of God to impute Adam’s sin to his posterity. Why? Because we can and did participate said sin. 

Our participation was not grounded in an arbitrary or nominal representative, as you say. In such a case, the question would be begged as to “why would it be unjust for God to impute the sin of an angel to men?” In fact, I think the foregoing conversation did beg this question… which is why I asked it! 

As it stands, then, the following answer to my question appears insufficient: “The natural image of God (Gen. 1:27; 2:7) is the necessary condition for representation.”

 

Ken Hamrick 

@vantil101 “The covenantal probation and reward come by way of special revelation in the covenant of works. So also does representation… The natural relation is necessary for the representation; the covenantal relation is sufficient for representation. Thus, the ‘organic’ or natural relation between Adam and his descendants is not the ground but the means to federal representation… To deny this is to fold the entirety of covenantal representation into creation and then either to deny the act of special providence altogether or to make it redundant in accounting for Adam's federal headship.” Is it true that the special act of providence added the Covenantal reward for obedience but added nothing to the penalty for disobedience? Ah! You will likely contend that the covenant alone caused the progeny to be included in the penalty. So the real bone of contention on this point is that traducianism & realism would make special providence “redundant in accounting for Adam’s federal headship.” But can’t you see how they work together? You know, when Covenant Theology first gained acceptance among Reformed, it was seen as complementary to the popular view of an Augustinian-Realistic participation of all men in Adam’s sin. They were seen as two sides of the same coin. When pressed about the justice of imputing only Adam’s first sin, they pleaded federal headship; and when pressed about the justification imputing Adam’s sin to those who supposedly had no part in it, they pleaded a realistic participation. And I think you will find if you look into it that even those who produced the WCF held that the imputed sin of Adam was to us a sin of participation rather than an alien sin.

 

vantil101 

The covenant of works includes dual sanctions of blessing and curse. Those sanctions are conveyed not by nature or natural revelation but by covenant or by special revelation. The sanctions are not concreated and natural to Adam by virtue of creation but specially revealed to him by virtue of an act of special providence. That is the interior logic of what WSC 12 and Vos are after. The natural relation established by special creation and the covenantal relation established by special providence--distinct yet simultaneous--are not two sides of the same coin but distinct aspects of God's creational relation to Adam in covenant. The natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for the terms of probation, the advancement of Adam's estate, the sanctions of blessing or curse, or the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption. The revelation of God's ex pacto justice in covenant that brings blessing or curse to Adam and his posterity is not a bare "different side" of the same natural coin. The federalism of WSC 12/WCF 7.1 and Vos is simply not the realism for which you advocate. 

 

Me:

I'm not sure if this response was meant to address what I wrote, what Ken wrote, or what both of us wrote. For my own clarification, may I ask if it would be unjust to impute sin to a non-participant in sin? 

“The natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for… the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption.” 

Why not? 

For example, if we can agree on that it would only be unjust to impute sin to a non-participant in sin, the only question would be: “how did we participate in Adam’s sin?” If traducianism is true, we bear a natural relationship to Adam not only biologically but also spiritually. In that case, I am struggling to see why “The natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for… the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption.”

 

Keith Hernandez 

I think the answer is, in short, because Adam is a federal/covenantal head, not an ontological head. He is the fount of humanity proceeding from him by ordinary generation. But as legal representative, his public position is federal and covenantal. As such imputation is the only proper mechanism for relating his guilt to others.

 

Me:

"Adam is a federal/covenantal head, not an ontological head." 

George P. Hutchinson discusses the question of natural and federal headship in his book, "The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterian Theology." There certainly appears to be room for debate about your assertion, especially if traducianism is true. That is, the above quote appears to 1) beg the question and 2) be a false dichotomy. 

"As such imputation is the only proper mechanism for relating his guilt to others." 

I don't think anyone is denying this, so I'm not sure what it has to do with the issue. The question is not whether sin is imputed but on what grounds it is imputed. On that note, may I ask you too if it would it be unjust to impute sin to a non-participant in sin?

 

paulhuang

If I may venture a question…if the imputation of Adam’s sin to us is based upon natural propagation, then how is it that we who are not related to Christ by natural propagation can be imputed with His righteousness?

 

Me:

Ken can answer for himself, of course, but if I may venture a relevant quote: 

"According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him… Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by ‘the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’ the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration… 

If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation. 

Samuel Baird (https://archive.org/details/rejoindertoprinc00bair/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater)

  

vantil101 

The responses Jim and I gave above keep us from the sorts of remedial departures from the federalism in the WCF and in Vos as found in Baird.

 

Brad Anderson

In our young men's group we have had many discussions about the fairness of Adam's sin being imputed to all people. But we have found consolation in the reverse flow dynamic of the imputation. The same dynamic whereupon the sins of one man transferred to all men, allows for the sins of all men to transfer to the one man Jesus. Maybe we have this wrong? But that's how I understand Romans 5. I enjoy reading these discussions and the beautiful precision that you brothers are laboring toward.

 

Me:

I believe Baird would take exception to this! Baird certainly argues that his realist position is represented by the WCF and the divines (e.g. pgs. 39-46; 463ff.; etc. in The Elohim Revealed). https://books.google.com/books?id=945HAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

vantil101 

Thanks, brother. Vos is as incisive as a dogmatic theologian as he is a biblical theologian. I think he is the best since Calvin. Blessings!

 

Me:

Thank you for the kind words! 

I think the symmetry between the two Adams and the grounds of our imputations, as presented by Baird (natural birth vs. spiritual rebirth), is not only beautiful but also accounts for how it is fair that we are charged guilty for Adam's sin. For given traducianism, we really participated in the sin, albeit in a different mode of being. 

I would also like to echo Vos as an excellent theologian, even if I differ with him on this point. I own his Biblical Theology, Pauline Eschatology, Eschatology of the Psalter, and Reformed Dogmatics and have profited tremendously from them. 

 

Keith Hernandez 

There were many in the Presbyterian church, more of the New School types, who denied the classically reformed position. The men at old Princeton, however, really did a good job defending the position.

Me:

I definitely appreciated George Hutchinson's breakdown of the various schools in his book. I too disagree with the New School. His book was quite helpful to my understanding Baird, Hodge, Murray, etc. 

The issue I have with Charles Hodge (Princeton) is his insistence that "imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed." Even John Murray seems to demur from Hodge on this point (The Imputation of Adam's Sin pg. 88). Robert Landis in particular took Hodge to task on this aberration from the view of the Westminster divines in his book, The Doctrine of Original Sin (https://books.google.com/books?id=SX4rAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false).

Keith Hernandez 

And the position of the Westminster Standards is - far as I can tell - clearly that of the Federalist kind. I dont even think that is under serious dispute. "They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed; and the same death in sin, and corrupted nature, conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation." WLC: "Q. 22. Did all mankind fall in that first transgression? The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression."

 

Me:

Absolutely. To be clear, Baird agrees with this. He just grounds federal headship in natural headship. See pages 309ff. in The Elohim Revealed: 

"Here, it is necessary to guard against overlooking the inseparable and essential relation which Adam’s natural headship sustains to his federal office; and at the same time to avoid confounding them together, in disregard of the important distinction which subsists between them… 

It is perfectly conceivable that Adam might have been so made as to be the natural head of the race, without being either its moral or federal head… 

But although it was thus possible for Adam to have been made merely the natural, or the natural and moral, head of the race, without being its federal head, - the reverse was impossible. In order that he should be their federal head, it was necessary that they should derive from him both their being and the moral attitude of their nature." 

Actually, Baird cites the language you quote as evidence for his position: "They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed..."

 

Me:

vantil101 

Jim, Strimple, Vos, and I addressed that kind of argument above. I am finished with the discussion. Just disagree fundamentally with Baird’s realism. And the arguments have been made. All the best.

 

Me:

Okay. Thank you for the conversation. If anyone else is interested in continuing to talk, I'm happy to do so. But I'll not try to monopolize the board.

 

Brad Anderson 

“If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation.” 

I have been reading the context around Baird's statement above and he strikes me as emphasizing a mystical union with Christ over and against a legal standing in Christ. That's very concerning.

 

Me:

I believe he means to emphasize both. Take the following statements he makes: 

“...the righteousness in which we are justified is extrinsic and foreign to our nature. We were so far from being natively in its author, when he wrought it, that our native positive toward him is that of alienation and antagonism. And it is only by factitious means, - by renewing influences, superimposed upon our nature, - that we are brought into a relation of membership in him. The righteousness, therefore, of which we become possessed, by union with Christ, is not ours in any such sense as though we had a part in the merit of working it; but only, as the robe wrought by Christ and bestowed by his grace, covers the nakedness of all his members.” 

Surely, the legal standing of Christ is present. Baird goes on to note, however, that even Hodge grounds the legal standing in the mystical union: 

“Dr. Hodge denies any “mysterious oneness” between us and Adam, by which his sin is really and criminally ours. By parity of reasoning, a similar denial should be made in the case of Christ and his people. But, here, the professor takes the opposite position: - “To be in Christ Jesus signifies to be intimately united to him in the way in which the Scriptures teach us this union is effected, viz., by having his Spirit dwelling in us. The phrase is never expressive of a merely external or nominal union” [Hodge, a Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans]. Thus we are justified, not by Christ’s righteousness extrinsic to us and only nominally ours, but the “law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death.” – Rom. Viii. 1, 2. The power of the Spirit of Christ was the law or principle of holiness in him, the cause of the righteousness of the Mediator; and that Spirit, given to us, and uniting us to him, conveys a title in that righteousness thus wrought in him." (The Elohim Revealed, pgs. 430, 448)

 

Tyler 

The mystical union is not the basis on which I appear just before God but a gift that is extended to me from God’s justification. When one reasons otherwise, one constantly reasons secretly in a circle. If all the actions of grace following upon the mystical union become mine on the basis of this union, the question must still always be asked: On what basis do I share in the unio mystica with Christ Himself? If it is true that no grace can come to me on the basis of Christ’s merits as long as I am not in Christ, how is it ever possible that I would be implanted in Him? This implanting cannot occur on the basis of being in Christ, for it is precisely the implanting that effects being in Christ.

-Vos

 

Ken Hamrick 

The sin of Adam is actually immediately imputed to us at the moment that we all--within Adam--sinned. First, we sinned, becoming sinners in fact. Then, depravity and imputation of guilt were equal consequences. Our propagation from the substance of Adam means that we were involved and justly implicated in his sin due to a participation in his nature and being (as Baird calls it, "inbeing"). We were in Adam when he sinned, participating in it according to our mysterious, germinal (or "seminal") presence. On the Christ-side of the parallel, it is the opposite in a sense. We are guilty of Adam's sin because we were in him when he sinned, and subsequently born out him. But we are not born out of Christ; we are reborn into Him. We were not in Christ when He lived a humanly righteous life and suffered the wrath of God on the cross; but we are in Him now, and the Christ in us now brings all of His human experiences with Him when He is spiritually joined to us through the Holy Spirit. Just as the spiritual union of all of us in Adam identified us with Adam and implicated us in his sin, our new spiritual union with Christ identifies us with Him--so that it can now be said of us that we have been crucified with Him and seated in heavenly places in Him. We gain an ownership in the deeds of the Head to whom we are spiritually united as one man, whether Adam or Christ. As sinners, we stood in need of two human experiences in order to satisfy the law of God: 1) We need the experience of having lived a perfectly righteous life from cradle to grave; and 2) we need (as sinners) the experience of having endured the complete wrath of God against sin. Christ brings these two human experiences to the union when His Spirit is sent into our hearts. That's how His atoning death and righteousness are applied to us. Adam's sin was propagated to the many, but the many are being justified by union into the One. God did not merely impute righteousness--He put Christ in us! 

 

Me:

WLC Q. 66. What is that union which the elect have with Christ? 

A. The union which the elect have with Christ is the work of God’s grace, whereby they are spiritually and mystically, yet really and inseparably, joined to Christ as their head and husband; which is done in their effectual calling. 

This effectual calling logically precedes justification, not proceeds from it.

 

Ken Hamrick 

Are we saved strictly and only for our benefit? Are we not saved for the higher purpose of God's glory? Faith and regeneration are indeed needed for our salvation, but so are the atoning death of Christ and election itself; so if we cannot be saved without our faith and regeneration having first been purchased by the cross, then what purchased the benefits of Christ's atoning death and our election? God in the decree chose to save a people for Himself. He works out this decree in time by regenerating and bringing to faith whom He will. Without the cross, God could not save anyone; but with it, He is able to save anyone, since anyone who is joined to Christ will share in atoning death and in His righteousness.

 

Tyler 

The legal basis for all grace lies in being reckoned in Christ by the judgment of God. This actual relationship in the justice of God is reflected in the consciousness of the sinner when he believes, for by faith he acknowledges that there is no righteousness in himself, and that the righteousness by which he stands righteous before God is transmitted to him by imputation. Now as far as what is judicial is concerned, it could have remained at this. Without effecting a life-union between Christ and believers, God still could have transmitted His righteousness to them. Then, however, imputation would only appear in the consciousness. Grace would have only been revealed as grace to the consciousness, without its imprint having been stamped deeper into the life of the believer. Now, however, God acts otherwise. He does not stop with this acknowledgment in the consciousness that righteousness is transmitted and that, consequently, each gift of grace is given for Christ’s sake. To strengthen this impression, He also has all grace actually come from Christ and establishes a life-bond between the Mediator and believers. The legal fellowship reflects itself in a fellowship of destiny. All that the sinner receives flows from the living Christ. The result is that the sinner not only knows as an idea that he will receive everything for Christ’s sake but also experiences in life how everything comes from Christ. He is regenerated, justified, sanctified, glorified, but all this is in the closest bond with the Mediator.

 

Me:

"...the righteousness by which he stands righteous before God is transmitted to him by imputation... Without effecting a life-union between Christ and believers, God still could have transmitted His righteousness to them." 

This appears to be quite a stunning statement. Am I correct to understand that Vos thought that the God of truth could have viewed a sinner as righteous apart from life-union to Christ? 

What do you make of WLC 66 making the mystical union logically prior to justification?

Ken Hamrick 

Hodge and the men at old Princeton really did a good job of making out their position to be the only "classically reformed position." You would benefit from reading George P. Hutchinson's book, "The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterian Theology." The classically reformed position was not a Federalism scrubbed of Realism, but one that included a realistic understanding of a "sin of participation" in Adam. As Robert W. Landis, in "Original SIn," said, prior to the Princeton School's position, Adam's sin was imputed because it was ours, but Princeton saw that the sin is ours only because it was imputed.

 

Ken Hamrick 

George Fisher states, “The Augustinian and the Federal Theories of Original Sin Compared,” Discussions in History and Theology, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1880):

The fundamental idea of the Augustinian theory is that of a participation on the part of the descendants of Adam in his first sin; in consequence of which they are born both guilty and morally depraved. The fundamental idea of the federal theory is that of a vicarious representation on the part of Adam, in virtue of a covenant between God and him, whereby the legal responsibility for his first sinful act is entailed upon all his descendants; participation being excluded, but the propriety of his appointment to this vicarious office being founded on our relation to him as the common father of men. The Augustino-federal or semi-federal theory is a combination of the two, the covenant relation of Adam being prominent, but participation being also, with more or less emphasis, asserted […] […]The federal doctrine is the offspring of the seventeenth century. In fact it may also be said of it, in the form in which it is now held, that it is the offspring of the eighteenth century; since, in the preceding age, the great majority of the theologians who adopted the theory of a covenant coupled with it the Augustinian principle. That is to say, they maintained the Augustino-federal or semi-federal doctrine as above defined.

Fisher understands the modern mistake:

The mistake of the modern defenders of imputation is in ignoring and denying the capital fact of a TRUE AND REAL PARTICIPATION IN ADAM’S SIN, which still formed the groundwork of the doctrine of original sin long after the federal theory came into vogue. They mistake history likewise, by ascribing their own purely federal view to the great body of Calvinistic theologians in the seventeenth century, who were Augustinians as well as federalists, holding to the second type of doctrine which we mentioned in the beginning–the Augustino-federal.

 

Ken Hamrick 

To abstract legal standing from ontological involvement in the crime is to abstract justice from truth. Was it necessary for there to be a real Adam in history? If God can justly reckon us to have been in a union with Adam which itself did not exist in substantial reality but only existed in God's mind, then He can justly reckon us to have been in union with an Adam who did not exist in reality but only in God's mind. Was it necessary for Christ to die for our sin? Could not God have merely reckoned Him to have suffered and died? No, God is a God of truth and a God of reality. He is not satisfied to merely reckon things as if they comport with His justice, but instead, He brings those things into being so that reality will satisfy His justice.

 

Ken Hamrick

@vantil101 I sincerely thank you for the discussion and for your patience. You and I agree on far more than we disagree. I have enjoyed many hours of your podcasts and teaching videos, and hope to enjoy many more. May God continue to bless this ministry!

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Now, for a few comments as an addendum:

1. I still have not been able to verify that the reason why Geerhardus Vos states it would be unjust for God to impute the sin of an angel to men is, as Dr. Tipton's asserts, that Vos "extensively discusses" that the "natural image of God (Gen. 1:27; 2:7) is the necessary condition for representation. Angels lack just that psycho-somatic image endowment." 

If anyone knows where Vos discusses this, please let me know, as I am quite interested in what "psycho-somatic image endowment" angels apparently lack. From recollection, the belief angels are not images of God is not a monolithic one amongst Reformed theologians.

2. In one comment, Dr. Tipton stated:

The natural relation established by special creation and the covenantal relation established by special providence--distinct yet simultaneous--are not two sides of the same coin but distinct aspects of God's creational relation to Adam in covenant. The natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for the terms of probation, the advancement of Adam's estate, the sanctions of blessing or curse, or the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption.

Initially, I was going to give a fuller response to the entirety of this comment. What I actually did - which was, I think, the correct approach, as it avoided getting bogged down in too much detail - was to self-edit and simply ask for the justification of one particular assertion:

For my own clarification, may I ask if it would be unjust to impute sin to a non-participant in sin? "The natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for… the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption." Why not?

In my opinion, neither he nor another commenter could justify this assertion without begging the question and posing a false dichotomy. For example, the comment that "Adam is a federal/covenantal head, not an ontological head" seems to be a false dichotomy. Adam does not have to be one or the other. 

Or, if the assertion was simply that Adam actually is not an ontological head (although he could have, in principle, been one), unfortunately, no argument was given as to why he is not an "ontological head" (if, by that, we are referring to traducianism). 

Now, while I think my approach was the correct one, as it focused on the implicit assumptions of the idea of what special providence entails, on the other hand, I will say that in my initial writeup, I was actually going to agree (at least for the sake of argument) that, in my mind, "the natural simpliciter, while necessary, is not sufficient to account for the terms of probation, the advancement of Adam's estate, the sanctions of blessing or curse..." That is, my primary pushback was against the inclusion of "the imputation of guilt and transmission of corruption" as something for which Adam's nature was merely necessary and not sufficient, not the other covenantal features mentioned. 

Thus, federal headship, while grounded in natural headship, does not completely collapse into it. For I, like them, would agree that certain facets of the covenant do not appear to follow by necessity from Adam's natural headship and relationship with us. That is, there appear to be facets of the covenant contingent on God's free choice.

For example, I don't personally see any reason why the probation must have included a command not to eat from a certain tree rather than, say, not to sleep on a certain island (e.g. C. S. Lewis's excellent book, Perelandra). Of course, God's command not to eat of a tree is certainly compatible with His nature. This is unlike, say, a divine command to commit idolatry, which I think is impossible. But I can see how certain commands might be the result of God's free choice.

Thus, as Dr. Tipton states, there does appear to be a natural relation established by special creation distinct from a covenantal relation established by special providence (the latter of which could have been otherwise in some respects, such as in the specifics of the probation).

This agreement is qualified by two points, though: 1) the covenantal relation is grounded in the natural relation such that any commandments God gives, judgments He makes, or truths He reveals would be consistent with His own nature and the nature of the reality He freely chose to create; 2) to argue that the reason the imputation of Adam's sin is just or even sufficiently possible is grounded in the [contingent features] of the covenantal relation over against the natural relation begs the question (as I pointed out) and calls into question whether there is a real participation and/or union with Adam corresponding to God's imputation and knowledge.

3. One area in which I think I can improve my apologetic for a realist understanding of original sin is to better my understanding of the historic context of the WCF and its authors. As I tend to find myself in these sorts of discussions with fairly strict confessionalists, mastering the historical theological background on this subject might help to persuade others that the realist view deserves a fair hearing (even if I think it already deserves a fair hearing on the merits of the arguments for it rather than its historical pedigree). 

An open question I have is whether something like Van Dixhoorn's The Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly would have any relevant material on if, when the WCF was formulated, its authors discussed natural and federal headship, traducianism, etc. Baird and Landis themselves cite individual Reformers, the WCF, and its authors on the issue of participation in Adam's sin et al. - I would imagine that Shedd does too - but perhaps having a list of transcribed, primary source material also would be helpful in showing that the realist view deserves a fair hearing in contemporary Reformed discussions on original sin.

On the other hand, on some level, even the best Reformed theologians are fallible. All sides of the above discussion know our rule of faith is Scripture. In future discussions, then, I hope to see more interaction with questions regarding why Reformed theologians believed what they did. 

As an example, I notice that in his most recent podcast on Vos' Biblical Theology (link), Dr. Tipon and Camden Bucey make a passing allusion to the realist view of original sin, only to note that Vos rejected the position. Given that the topic of the podcast was Vos' view of the nativity of Christ - not original sin per se - I doubt that their mention of it was meant to suggest that a realist view of original sin necessarily implies that Christ would have had a sin nature passed to him. 

For example, paternal traducianism - in which the father's spirit is propagated to his offspring and through which the offspring is ultimately said to have participated in Adam's sin - is a species of realism about original sin which would avoid the suggestion that the virgin born Christ inherited a sin nature. Thus, I rather suppose the point of the passing comments by Dr. Tipton and Cameron Bucey was to disassociate someone like Vos from even having to entertain such a question as a traducian or realist about original sin might be asked about Jesus' human nature. That's fair enough. 

There are, however, other questions which someone who, as Vos indeed does, rejects the realist view should, at some point, answer. For example, I consider it unfortunate that the discord conversation seemed to fizzle out precisely at the point I was hoping to receive an answer about whether "Vos thought that the God of truth could have viewed a sinner as righteous apart from life-union to Christ." I would have found any response to this question illuminating and (potentially, depending on the answer) persuasive. I hope the cordial spirit of the discussion will enable more opportunities for such answers in the future.