Modern Philosophy 15

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections nine through twelve of Hume’s “Dialogues.” The following is my submission:

In section IX, Demea, having listened to Philo’s explanation of the limitations of a posteriori argumentation, suggests that a priori argumentation – specifically, the cosmological argument – is a more than adequate substitute when attempting to discern the nature of God. Cleanthes replies that a proposition is true only if the contrary is impossible to conceptualize and that conceptualizing reality without the existence of any single being, including God, is possible, as the material universe, for example, may be eternally existent. Philo, who believes that a priori arguments are unpersuasive, adds that mathematics display uncreated characteristics.

Demea replies in section X by opining that a reason many may find a priori arguments unconvincing because there are people who will use any means of argumentation to validate their intuitive beliefs. Philo agrees, also providing an answer as to why he believes natural religion is plausible, viz. the wickedness of men. This observation leads to a brief dialogue which leads Demea to remark that this could stem from the idea that man’s worst enemy is himself in the form of diseases of the mind and Philo to impute this wickedness to externals and claim that if man’s complaints and despair in all ages were absolutely sincere, more people would have committed suicide. Philo then asks how God can be anthropomorphic without being evil, introducing Epicurus’ postulation of the “problem of evil” into the discussion, to which Demea replies that evil functions as a means to future good and Cleanthes to argue that men are not absolutely miserable. Cleanthes, after calling Demea’s speculation groundless, defends his position by refusing to allow that Demea’s and Philo’s previous dialogue on the wickedness of man accurately depicts reality. Philo retorts that Cleanthes’ answer is as weak as it is doubtful, since evil still exists and is more potent, if less frequent, than good. Philo essentially rests his case for cautious skepticism with regard to the nature of God on this argument.

To begin section XI, Cleanthes posits that God may be finitely perfect, thus denying one of the premises of Epicurus to solve the problem. In rejoinder, Philo questions the know-ability of such a deity and insists that even a finitely perfect God would be capable of preventing some extant evils. He then outlines four evils which he believes cause most evil actions and may not be unavoidable: instinctual self-preservation, laws of nature, limitations in genetics to that which is necessary, and the brutality of nature. A posteriori arguments would be, in the face of these arguments, hard-pressed to demonstrate an anthropomorphic God who is good, and Philo even mentions that deism or an impersonal God – one who is neither good nor bad – would be a consistent alternative. At this, Demea and Cleanthes expresses amazement that Philo would propound such overtly skepticistic and unconventional theological beliefs, and some time thereafter Demea parted the company.

The final section consists of a conversation between the two remaining men, which begins by Philo remarking that despite his skepticism, the harmony he perceives in the sciences at every point presses upon his mind the belief in the existence of a divine being. That he finds this to be a strong indication of the existence of a sentient God’s is ironic, since this he had criticized Cleanthes’ teleological argument earlier. Cleanthes and Philo also agree that many disputes within natural theology are due to impreciseness in use of terms or exaggeration of opposite themes of similar conclusions. They furthermore agree that man’s moral capacities are defective and that evil should be ascribed to that cause rather than to God. Men even use religion, which ought to civilize, to justify evils. Superstition is too often allowed to infringe upon rational religion. The discussion proceeds in like manner, and concludes with Philo assenting to the idea that God bears an analogous intelligence to humanity but asserts that the surest way to Christianity is cautious skepticism. Pamphilus concludes the narrative declaring his instructor, Cleanthes, to have presented the strongest arguments, followed by Philo.

The criticisms of the superficial cosmological argument provided by Demea do show it is insufficient to substantiate his opinion of a priori reasoning and God’s demonstrability. Demea did seem to have argued weakly. Hume’s characters didn’t, however, note that morality within an empirical world-view is question-begging, as brute observations of physical occurrences would not logically imply how one ought to act. Finally, the argument from design which Philo eventually forwards and with which Cleanthes agrees is subjectively based, which, given Philo’s and Cleanthes’ earlier arguments against the cosmological argument, is interesting. Neither appears to recognize this confliction, however. In conclusion, then, natural theology does not seem to provide any rational reasons to believe in the existence of “God.”

Modern Philosophy 14

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections one through five of Hume’s “Dialogues.” The following is my submission

:The subject of Hume’s Dialogues, natural religion, is one which Hume remarks is an example par excellance of a subject which is difficult because it is simultaneously important, ostensively obvious, and gives occasion for many abstruse questions. Primarily for these reasons, then, consideration of it is presented in the form of a dialogue between fictional characters (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes).

Part 1 begins with a discussion between Philo and Demea. Philo, observing that Demea believed scientifically studying natural religion should begin only after one has been educated in other abstract philosophies such as ethics or logic, remarked that the idea man can learn of such things apart from religious instruction is destructive to natural religion itself. Cleanthes interposes that grounding religious beliefs on philosophical skepticism is, if serious, cognitive dissonance. At this point, Philo’s relatively long defense of the value of cautiousness and common sense seems to imply that his position is near to Hume’s own as described in his “Enquiry.” If this is the case, Hume must believe that all consideration of an immaterial being or realm is speculatory. Regardless, Cleanthes retorts that, given the self-defeating nature of epistemological skepticism, and given that empiricism must allow that we do not know how or why certain events cohere, the same may be said of religion; furthermore, such seems to have historic precedence prior to Lockean philosophy. Philo protests that those who do not believe in God are fools, but that such is only sensible if it is indeed the case that reason is sufficient principle by which one can become intimate with religion.

Following Cleanthes’ opinion that men are disposed to defend their dogmas by whatever means possible, Part II begins with Demea expressing surprise at Cleanthes’ argumentation thus far, which he perceives imply that the nature of God cannot be known. Upon citing Malebranche as an example of a way in which we can come to [intelligibly] know God, Philo, agreeing that the alleged soundness of the cosmological argument hinges the nature of the debate on the know-ability of God, repeats that one can only progress so far in such a manner – or in empirical investigations, for that matter – before one must give way to caution. Cleanthes replies to Philo by appealing to a teleological argument, intending to show that God is anthropomorphic. Both Demea and Philo disapprove of this argument: Demea, because the proof is hinged on empiricism, which implies that God’s existence, let alone nature, is not necessarily true; Philo, because the a posteriori, intuitively causal, analogical, and inductive inferences are fallacious (further suggesting Philo represents Hume). Demea and Philo then converse about a priori reasoning and experience. Philo claims that all a priori reasoning is founded upon experiential knowledge; for instance, we infer the universe is not eternal because we repeatedly note that matter does not form itself into perceived designs and then reason a priori that matter generally does not form itself. Of course, this common sense philosophy predicates the cosmological argument upon experience; hence, the disagreement with Cleanthes, argues Philo, should be due simply to the fact God’s nature is not strictly demonstrable. The narrator writes that Philo seems to have been jesting, and Cleanthes, not persuaded that Philo is being serious, queries whether or not we should apply such skepticism to the Copernican system. Philo replies that the analogy is not apropos, as one can compare planets but cannot compare the generation of the universe to anything.

In Part III, Cleanthes accuses Philo of not seriously considering his criticisms of analogous reasoning, as practically all inferences – inferring a voice in the dark is a man – depend upon it. Cleanthes argues that the appearance of intelligence and beauty are appropriate counterpoints to Philo’s belief that one cannot compare analogous reasoning in science to analogous reasoning pertaining to the origin of the physical world, and that if Philo were to consistently apply his arguments thus far to all things without his own prejudice, he would be left with extreme skepticism. Demea, rejoining the conversation, remarks that as forceful as Cleanthes’ arguments may be, to infer that such a designer is a deity is a non sequitur.

Cleanthes’ replies to Demea in Part IV by asking whether or not “God” is an empty word and if natural religion can be meaningful, to which Demea replies that he merely rejects Demea’s anthropomorphizing. Demea then lists several “perfections” of God, to which Cleanthes replies that such cannot be known if they are not in some sense relative to us. Philo answers that the variance of thought within humankind is enough to question how one can reasonably regard an immaterial being – a being who would possess an infinity of differences from a human mind – as anthropomorphic. Moreover, when one considers the mind of such a God and discovers that its thoughts have no origin, Philo wonders why Cleanthes does not allow this to be the case for men. Cleanthes replies that Philo’s own argument can be used against him, as the cause of a thought must at some final point be attributed to an intelligent being, and that the harmony of nature confirms this to be true.

Philo insists that he will remain cautiously skeptical, and responds to Cleanthes’ attempted rebuttal by asserting that the argument assumes perceived effects must be produced by similar causes (i.e. intelligence from intelligence); if Cleanthes is to be consistent, he must admit God is not perfect, immortal, or infinite, as man is not perfect, immortal nor infinite. Thus, Philo remarks that the idea that the “beauty” to which Cleanthes had earlier referred could be attributed to such a being is dubious. In order to avoid the import of these arguments, Philo anticipates that Cleanthes will have to complicate his argument or arbitrarily dismiss sections of his rebuttal, and Part 5 ends with Cleanthes exclaiming that he believes none of these arguments and that Philo must presuppose the teleological argument in order for his arguments to be sensible.

Briefly analyzing the dialogue so far, each character’s arguments have there own strengths and weaknesses. Philo is correct to proportion belief with evidence, but, given his criticisms of Cleanthes and his empiricism, it is not apparent for what reason he believes in God. Cleanthes is correct that Philo and Demea do not seem to be speaking about “God” with any intelligible meaning, yet he himself utilizes subjective argumentation which he cannot validly dogmatize. Demea speaks soundly when he affirms that only a priori reasoning can substantiate certainty that God exists, yet how he has discovered God’s nature is questionable. Each character must either admit he cannot know God by natural religion or explain more precisely how he can within the bounds of his own beliefs.

Modern Philosophy 13

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the sections nine through eleven of Hume’s “Enquiry.” The following is my submission:

Hume reasoned that his arguments from preceding sections would be more authoritative it could be demonstrated that other “reasonable” animals act similarly to mankind; hence, section nine is devoted to this purpose. Hume concedes that men reason superior to animals because men have greater focus, acuter memory, a higher capacity for observation, and possess a priori instincts which are better suited to the task. Otherwise, however, Hume argues the inferences animals make are remarkably similar to men: dogs, for example, do not respond to certain tones a certain way by means of abstruse reasoning – their responses are predicated on custom alone. The difference between men and other reasonable animals, then, lies only in the degree to which each are able to form connections from perceptions.

Hume begins his tenth section by arguing that miraculous events – events which “violate the laws of nature” – should not be believed on the basis of testimony alone. The veracity of human testimony is often taken for granted, yet the possibility of contrary testimony refutes the absolute reliability of testimony. Furthermore, the relativity of experience also implies that miracles cannot be witnessed, as what one regards as miraculous may be commonplace to another; differences in technology, topology, etc. corroborate this. Finally, the suspect character of those who have purported to have seen a miracle is such that one ought to reject future claims, regardless of how many people confirm it.

Much of Hume’s arguments in these two sections seem to utilize cause-effect and necessary connection argumentation, both of which Hume criticized in his earlier sections. References to a priori instincts, the character of those who claim to have witnessed miracles, etc. indicate inferences which, because they are at best only grounded in perceived correlations, are not justified. Also, Hume’s argument against miracles is circular, as the “laws of nature” to which Hume alleges miracles would violate (by definition) are defined in such a way that one must ignore the fact that events have been perceived which men regard as miraculous; in other words, Hume constructs his opinion of “laws of nature” without regard for miraculous experience and then uses this to invalidate miraculous experience.

In the eleventh section, Hume considers the arguments of a friend pertaining to natural theology. His friend argues that, even if it were true that a teleological argument were a good proof of the existence of a “higher” being (god), many superstitious persons further ascribe unwarranted effects from this being in an effort at anthropomorphization. Most who mean to prove the existence of God on the basis of natural theology are wont to prove more than they are able. Hume’s friend particularly criticizes these men for irrationally reasoning Hell (an effect) from a god (the cause) whose existence was purportedly established teleologically (effects). The transition from considering God as the conclusion of the observation of the world to using the same God as the premise by which one justifies a notion of Hell is a leap in logic. Hume summarizes this argument when he writes: “where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause.” While Hume reiterates his doubt that a cause can be reasoned from observation of effects, he in general agrees with his friend that one ought not to speculate on matters which are beyond the limitations of reason. The reasoning in this section is, assuming the validity of previous sections, sound.

Modern Philosophy 12.5

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, I have to do a verbal presentation on sections five through eight of Hume’s “Enquiry.” The following is my outline:

Section V, Part I

n      Problem:  human predispositions, bias, and selfishness 

n      Origin: custom

n      Unreasonable

n      Practical 

n      Foundationalism: theory of epistemology

n      Axioms are necessary

n      Experience is the ground of knowledge

Section V, Part II

n      Real existence vs. figments:

n      “the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure.” 

n      Association of ideas

n      pragmatic

n      instinctual 

n      “Common sense” philosophy

Section VI

n      “Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.”

n      Die example analogous to probability of causes

n      More correlations => higher probability

n      Custom established by means already explained

n      Fewer correlations => less probability

n      Custom is self-evident in stubbornness

Section VII, Part I

n      Problem of Metaphysics

n      ambiguity

n      abstruseness

n      Further problem

n      we can’t produce a sensation to clarify “necessary connection”

n      arguments against knowledge of necessary connection

Section VII, Part II

n      Problem of Metaphysics

n      ambiguity

n      abstruseness

n      Further problem

n      we can’t produce a sensation to clarify “necessary connection”

n      arguments against knowledge of necessary connection

Section VIII, Part I

n      Historically: big misunderstanding

n      Compatibilism:

n      necessity: the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other

n      freedom/liberty: a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will. 

n      No liberty without necessity

Section VIII, Part II

n      Responsibility: man’s will must be necessitated

n      “Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil.” 

n      An objection considered

n      Our ideas, character, &c. is predicated on experience which God has preordained for us. How, then, can we be responsible? Is God the author of sin?

Modern Philosophy 12

For the class in Modern Philosophy I'm taking this semester, we have to write 15 two-paged papers (minimum) on philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Leibnitz. In this essay, I wrote about the first three sections of Hume’s “Enquiry.” The following is my submission:

The purpose of the first section in Hume’s Enquiry is to recommend that philosophers “unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy” – by which he means aesthetics, ethics, reason, &c. – “…by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty,” to the purpose of undermining “…the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error.”

Interestingly, Hume seemed to have been as concerned with one’s mental and physical welfare as with his philosophical contributions. He noted that man too often considers himself solely as a being born to fulfill his desires in his experience or solely as a being who should be interested in discerning the origins and soundness of abstract concepts by means of reason. A balance between each is preferable, as it is often the case that the intentions of each “species” can be met with greater satisfaction when actuated relatively equally. Abstruse philosophy, for example, may inspire better technologies or the like and thereby excite heightened experiences; on the other hand, relaxation and society may provide the occasion for one’s thoughts to be solidified in posterity.

Hume warned, however, that one must recognize his cognitive limitations, especially reflexive reflection. It may be that successive generations will succeed to breach points at which one may presently fail, but it is noble to admit such is the case while at the same time strive to overcome his barriers. Thus, said Hume, his epistemic position was not skeptical – or, at least, he does not believe skepticism is necessary – rather, he believed one should be pragmatic, weighing realism with optimism. Whether or not this first section was written in false modesty or sincerity cannot be immediately determined.

In sections two and three, the origin and correlation between ideas predominates Hume’s writing. Although section three consists simply in Hume’s listing a variety of association between ideas – resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect – and admitting that his list may be incomplete, section two contains much more controversial assertions.

Hume began section two by distinguishing between sensation and memory of sensation and using this as an example of the difference “impressions” and “thoughts,” respectively. Briefly expounding upon each, Hume noted that while one’s thoughts or imagination may superficially seem to be virtually unbounded – which would contradict what he had stated in his first section – it is actually the case that the imagination is simply an appropriation of one’s sensations; that is, thought originates due to sensation. This becomes Hume’s thesis in this section.

Hume believed “innateness” to be an ambiguous term, but he did write that impressions, unlike ideas, may be “original or copied from no precedent perception.” Using an example to clarify his position, Hume argued that the concept of “God” is merely an augmentation of anthropomorphic qualities. Those who disagree bear the burden of explaining what alternate source (aside from sensation) has provided one with his thoughts about God. Hume further argued that thoughts logically depend upon sensation because it is evident that persons who exist without various senses (e.g. sight, hearing) are without corresponding ideas which are garnered from those senses.

Not only does Hume beg the question – as he obviously did not observe all the blind or deaf, let alone know what they thought – Hume himself confessed a perception which does not fit his basic, general assumption that all thoughts are inspired by sensation, viz. it is possible that one may conceptualize distinct shades of colors without having experienced them, per se. Contradictorily, Hume said this one instance is not enough to overthrow common experience, a precursor to Hume’s faith in the fallacy of induction.

Shoulda was a good dog

Morality is a problem for non-morally-nihilistic, secular philosophies. Example: Richard Dawkins, author of The God Delusion, wrote therein:

“The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.”

In the midst of his rhetoric, notice the claim God is "unjust." While I have dealt with such an issue here and here, one wonders upon what ground Dawkins alleges God is unjust and, furthermore, why - even if we concede his vitriolic caricatures accurately depict God's character - he should give two hoots. Is there a particular reason Dawkins or any other atheist should find God morally repulsive? Such an answer requires a logical account of one's own moral perception. But this is an insoluble problem for Dawkins, for, as Hume notes in his A Treatise of Human Nature:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not , I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

Dawkins must answer in what manner one may come to believe a given action should or should not be committed. The problem Dawkins faces is that if his secular world-view is correct, he cannot traverse from "is" to "ought" logically.

A common Darwinian reply to the question "from whence did moral perceptions derive?" is that historically, some group of people learned that through altruism or reciprocity, they acheived a certain, desireable goal: e.g. survival. This is an is answer. One person's (or, by extrapolation, muliple people's) likes and dislikes, however, does not constitute as a logical reason for the universalizing of those likes and dislikes. That one person enjoys his life does not suffice as a logical  reason that all people should live. In fact, why should an individual himself do what he desires? It becomes quickly evident that the historical, Darwinian is answer, even if it were true, fails to account for how moral perceptions are rational. And this is generalizable for other secular philosophies as well.

Providentially, as Scripture is the ground of knowledge, Christians are equipped with an answer to the is-ought dilemma. Because the Bible is true, the should statements found in the Bible are also true. It is quite logical, then, for a Christian to affirm shoulds, and it is quite logical, without putting forth any further effort, to require men like Dawkins to furnish the proof with which they are burdened when they make such absurd statements as seen above.