Theistic Conceptual Realism, Absolute Creationism, and Plotinus

I often think and write about epistemology. Recently, though, I have been trying to focus more on metaphysics. As a point of departure, I've been reading about God and abstract objects (link), and one position on the relationship between the two (assuming there is one) is that of Greg Welty and James Anderson, a position alternatively labeled as Theistic Conceptual Realism or Divine Conceptualism (link, link, link, link).

There are some objections or areas of critical engagement with this position (link, link) that seem to imply it is (at least) in need of some refinement, but my remarks in this post will have more to say about how strikingly similar the position seems to be, in some respects, to that of Plotinus. Consider the following statement by Anderson (emphases his): 

But here’s the key point: none of this requires that divine thoughts have content distinct from those thoughts. The considerations that drive us to distinguish human thoughts from their propositional content simply do not apply to God’s thoughts (although presumably they would apply to other creaturely thoughts, e.g., angelic thoughts). Indeed, in the case of God’s thoughts, we deny that there is any such distinction, because we argue for identity between propositions and divine thoughts. In other words, the propositions that serve as the content of human thoughts (such as the proposition that 2+2=4) just are divine thoughts, precisely because only divine thoughts would have the kind of features (objectivity, necessity, intrinsic intentionality, and so forth) that propositions must have in order to play the roles that we take them to play. (link)

Compare this to a summary of Plotinus' philosophy by Gordon Clark (emphases mine):

The potential never becomes actual by chance; there must always precede an effective principle to induce actualization. Therefore, above soul one must posit the Divine Mind or, what is the same thing, the world of Ideas. To appreciate the identification of the mind and the objects of thought is difficult for the untutored in any age; to those who are tutored in modern idealism it may be confusing. One should particularly guard against using one’s own mind as an illustration of the Divine Mind and a sense object as an illustration of an object of thought. In Neo-Platonism the objects of mind are not sense objects but concepts, and since the essence of mind is thought, since the Divine Mind is always actual, there cannot be, as in the case of a human mind and a sense object, any separation of the mind from the objects which completely characterize it. Or conversely, suppose that the mind and its objects were not the same, and that the essence of the mind were separable from its thought. On such a supposition the mind would be only potentially intellectual, while in itself it would be unintellectual. Therefore the Divine Mind and its objects, the Ideas, are inseparable. In modern idealism the mind alone is ultimate and its ideas are its creations. But Plotinus writes, “Not by its thinking movement does movement arise. Hence it is an error to call the Ideas intellections in the sense that, upon an intellectual act in this principle one such Idea or another is made to exist.” It is true that the thoughts of the mind are Ideas, but it is untrue that the Ideas exist because the mind thinks them. (Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy, 1940, pg. 228)

A few points: 

1) The part is bold seems to be similarly motivated as Theistic Conceptual Realism... with the ironic twist that looks as though Plotinus has "concepts" as the objects of the divine mind, not Anderson and Welty. Perhaps rebranding the position of the latter would be too little, too late - but labelling their view as Theistic Propositional Realism or Divine Propositionalism would be, I think, more appropriate. 

2) Can one categorize Anderson's and Welty's position "an Anti-Platonist Alternative" as, for example, Craig does (link)? Is agreement with a Neo-Platonist "Anti-Platonic"? In response to this sort of question, one point is that the Theistic Conceptual Realist has resources (assuming the view itself is coherent and otherwise consistent with Christian theism) to defend a particular view of divine aseity that a strict follower of Plato simpliciter does not. Another point would be that it is not as though Anderson and Welty have the same view of the relationship between God and abstract objects as Plotinus does - their views about God are completely different, as the continuation of Clark's exposition of Plotinus proceeded to demonstrate. For instance, Welty and Anderson would not, I think, identify God with His own mind.

3) Finally, I italicized the last several sentences to show that Plotinus not only anticipates Theistic Conceptual Realism; he also anticipates (and then argues against) Absolute Creationism, a position which holds that God creates abstract objects (such as His own thoughts, link). Plotinus' argument is aimed against TCR as well.

It is interesting that just as Plotinus seemingly formulated his views with this opposing position in mind, so too did Welty formulate "Theistic Conceptual Realism" as a response to "Absolute Creationism." Only, I gather that Welty and Anderson stop short of Plotinus' identification of the divine mind and divine thoughts. Either way, one may hope too that this contemporary reprise of historico-philosophical progression gives leads to another, better Augustine.

Molinism and The "Publisher" of Evil

A friend forwarded me a recent James White and William Lane Craig discussion (link). I listened to the opening remarks (through 18 minutes) and had a few observations of and reflections on what Craig said.

The way Craig frames his position in his opening remarks about Scrooge is important. The spirit of Christmas future shows Scrooge what would (emphasis Craig) happen, given certain conditions. The critical point is at the 14 minute mark: Craig says God knows what "people would freely choose" in any circumstance "in which they might be placed" logically prior to decreeing in what circumstances people are placed.

This is the essence of Molinism. It's almost like God runs a simulation of what "I" would "freely" choose in scenario x, y, and z. God then determines to create the conditions for scenario y so that the simulation plays out in reality. In this way, the Molinist maintains that God is in control of all things. After all, God could have run scenario z if He wanted to, so He is "in control." Yet the Molinist will also claim that people are free in a libertarian sense, since "my" choice in scenario y was (allegedly) free. God's knowledge of what my choice would be in scenario y is not dependent on His decree that scenario y actually happens - just the opposite.

The problem with this is referred to as the grounding objection, and as I understand it, it can be explained in various ways:

If God's decree is "logically posterior" to His knowledge of what I would freely choose in a given scenario, the question is begged as to what "grounds" God's knowledge of what I would freely choose. God allegedly has middle knowledge, but how? It can't be grounded in God's natural (necessary) knowledge, because we aren't talking about necessary truths or realities. It can't be grounded in God's decretal knowledge, since God's decree is (allegedly) logically posterior to God's so-called "middle" knowledge of what I "would" "freely" choose in a given scenario.

So on what basis does God know what I would choose in a given scenario? A simulation? A simulation is never the reality. The question is how God can know, if I am free in a libertarian sense, that I would choose a definitively certain way given scenario y. For until the scenario is "run" (played out in reality such that I am able to make a choice in that scenario), I haven't actually made a choice (I am not the same as a simulated version of myself).

A Molinist will likely demure and say that the basis for God's knowledge is not a simulation. But since middle knowledge cannot be something tied to God's own nature (i.e. things dealing with necessary truths or reality) nor God's decree (i.e. things dealing with God's free choice), then it seems all that is left is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on a quasi-real version of myself. Perhaps a more neutral way to frame the point is by asking how I can be really free (in a libertarian sense) if God knows that I would act a certain way logically before I actually do.

Even if the Molinist continues to protest against these representations, the main point (that even the Molinist would seem to admit) is that God's "middle" knowledge depends on something external to Himself. Even Craig admits this when he elsewhere says, God "has to play with the hand He has been dealt" (link). This statement that Craig made in the past gives away his and the Molinist's position: it seems that someone else has dealt the cards and, therefore 1) God is not in control of all things (e.g. the dealt hand), and 2) God's knowledge is dependent upon whoever or whatever dealt these cards.

This is severely problematic. If God's knowledge is eternal (as I think and have argued it must be) yet dependent, then what is the nature of that on which His knowledge is dependent? Is that something else co-eternal with God? And aside from this question, is it possible for God to be eternally omniscient if His knowledge is dependent upon an extrinsic source (I would and have argued in the above link is not)?

This is the main counterargument against Molinism. Now, as for what Craig says about Molinists and Calvinists being like-minded in agreeing God has overriding purposes for moral evil yet there being a significant distinction in that for the Molinist, God can "will" in given circumstances that one choose good whereas a Calvinist cannot, his argument is equivocal. Calvinists can maintain the same distinction Craig would between God's moral or prescriptively will vs. His decretal will. In a given circumstance, a Calvinist can maintain God commands other than He had decreed.

Furthermore, for the Molinist, God does not merely permit moral evil, He decrees it. The Molinist would agree God could have not created at all. So the decree for God to create this world means that the Molinist must agree God wants moral evil to occur. Whatever reasons He might have for decreeing a world in which creatures freely choose evil, He wanted this world.

So much, I think, is the standard Calvinist reply to Molinism. I think the following illustration, however, highlights the point. In contexts involving the problem of evil and the Reformed response, I tend to hear a lot about God as the "author of evil." But consider two publishers:

1) Publisher 1 publishes a book he wrote, and the book he wrote includes characters that choose moral evil.

2) Publisher 2 has drafts of books handed to him (by whom? who knows!), and he chooses to publish one in which characters choose moral evil over any drafts of books in which no one chooses moral evil.

Is there a significant moral difference between the two publishers? I fail to see one. One might argue that because publisher 1 was also the author of the book, he is morally "responsible" for causing the characters who choose moral evil in a way that publisher 2 was not.

Now, a publisher who is also the author has more direct, intentional impact on why characters act a certain way. But his reasons for writing them the way he does need not differ from the reasons a mere publisher perusing the same book might choose it involving the same characters. If it is morally acceptable for the second publisher to publish the same book as the first publisher (who also authored the book), the burden is on the one who argues that the first publisher acted in a morally unacceptable way to pinpoint why the first publisher's more direct and intentional connection is morally unacceptable. Simply stating that the first publisher was also the author is not an argument against the moral acceptability of his actions.

In fact and on the contrary, I would argue that an author who intentionally writes characters a certain way is, if anything, in a better position to know why the book is worth publishing in contrast to a publisher who has been handed several drafts ("dealt" a hand) and left to divine - pun intended - which one tells the best story!

So while Molinists like Craig may charge Reformed Christians with believing God is the author of sin - and I have argued elsewhere that whether or not this is accurate or even problematic depends on what the person making the charge means by "author" - Molinists like Craig believe God is the publisher of sin. For the same reasons Craig would not view his position as problematic, Reformed Christians have analogous appeals as to why their view is not problematic. A book that is worth publishing was a book worth authoring.

McTaggart's Paradox and Time

I recently read John McTaggart’s The Unreality of Time (link), a paper true to its name in that the author argues time is unreal. While very few philosophers agree with his conclusion, McTaggart’s arguments are not so easy to refute. He is exceptionally clear – clearer than most of his expositors, in my experience – and his influence on the metaphysics of time can be compared to and perhaps even surpasses that of Zeno’s influence on the metaphysics of motion. Even philosophers who disagree with McTaggart usually accept his basic distinctions and definitions between different ways in which people often attempt to relate events:

A-series: Past, present, future (tensed)

B-series: earlier than, simultaneous with, later than (tenseless)

C-series: an ordered set of events without direction (atemporal)

McTaggart summarizes the most obvious difference between the A-series from the B-series:

Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in two ways. Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past.

Thus, B-series accounts of temporal facts don’t change. A-series accounts of temporal facts change. “Event X is earlier than (later than/simultaneous with) event Y” can, if it is a fact, be truly said by anyone at any time. On the other hand, the truth value of “event X is in the future” allegedly changes, if ‘future’ be taken as an irreducibly tensed fact. I say “allegedly” because McTaggart doesn’t believe there is a way one can consistently state such a change, which I will get to in a moment.

For McTaggart, the essential feature of time is unidirectional change. The C-series implies change, but not unidirectional change:

If the C series runs M, N, O, P, then the B series from earlier to later cannot run M, O, N, P, or M, P, O, N, or in any way but two. But it can run either M, N, O, P (so that M is earliest and P latest) or else P, O, N, M (so that P is earliest and M latest). And there is nothing either in the C series or in the fact of change to determine which it will be.

A series which is not temporal has no direction of its own, though it has an order. If we keep to the series of the natural numbers, we cannot put 17 between 21 and 26. But we keep to the series, whether we go from 17, through 21, to 26, or whether we go from 26, through 21, to 17. The first direction seems the more natural to us, because this series has only one end, and it is generally more convenient to have that end as a beginning than as a termination. But we equally keep to the series in counting backward.

In order to account for the possibility of real, unidirectional change (i.e. time), then, McTaggart argues the C-series must be combined with the A-series. Why not the B-series? Only A-series facts change, so only an A-theorist can account for change. This point is disputed by B-theorists, a point I may address in a future post since I would consider myself a B-theorist, but for now it is sufficient to note that McTaggart believed the A-series to be more fundamental than the B-series in that while we require the ability to temporally relate events by mean of both series (assuming time is real), the combination of the A-series and C-series can give us the B-series whereas a combination of a B-series and a C-series wouldn’t be able to give us the A-series.

With this groundwork, McTaggart has set up all the elements needed in order to prove that time is unreal: time is unidirectional change, and the A-series in which events objectively flow from the future to the present to the past is necessary in order for time to be real rather than a fictional creation of consciousness. Enter McTaggart’s Paradox:

Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. This is essential to the meaning of the terms. And, if it were not so, the A series would be insufficient to give us, in combination with the C series, the result of time. For time, as we have seen, involves change, and the only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past.

The characteristics, therefore, are incompatible. But every event has them all. If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three incompatible terms are predicable of each event which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and inconsistent with their producing change.

It may seem that this can easily be explained. Indeed it has been impossible to state the difficulty without almost giving the explanation, since our language has verb-forms for the past, present, and future, but no form that is common to all three. It is never true, the answer will run, that M is present, past and future. It is present, will be past, and has been future. Or it is past, and has been future and present, or again is future and will be present and past. The characteristics are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all of them successively.

But this explanation involves a vicious circle. For it assumes the existence of time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present and future. Time then must be pre-supposed to account for the A series. But we have already seen that the A series has to be assumed in order to account for time. Accordingly the A series has to be pre-supposed in order to account for the A series. And this is clearly a vicious circle.

What we have done is this -- to meet the difficulty that my writing of this article has the characteristics of past, present and future, we say that it is present, has been future, and will be past. But "has been" is only distinguished from "is" by being existence in the past and not in the present, and "will be" is only distinguished from both by being existence in the future. Thus our statement comes to this -- that the event in question is present in the present, future in the past, past in the future. And it is clear that there is a vicious circle if we endeavour to assign the characteristics of present, future and past by the criterion of the characteristics of present, past and future.

The difficulty may be put in another way, in which the fallacy will exhibit itself rather as a vicious infinite series than as a vicious circle. If we avoid the incompatibility of the three characteristics by asserting that M is present, has been future, and will be past, we are constructing a second A series, within which the first falls, in the same way in which events fall within the first. It may be doubted whether any intelligible meaning can be given to the assertion that time is in time. But, in any case, the second A series will suffer from the same difficulty as the first, which can only be removed by placing it inside a third A series. The same principle will place the third inside a fourth, and so on without end. You can never get rid of the contradiction, for, by the act of removing it from what is to be explained, you produce it over again in the explanation. And so the explanation is invalid.

Thus a contradiction arises if the A series is asserted of reality when the A series is taken as a series of relations. Could it be taken as a series of qualities, and would this give us a better result? Are there three qualities -- futurity, presentness, and pastness, and are events continually changing the first for the second, and the second for the third?

It seems to me that there is very little to be said for the view that the changes of the A series are changes of qualities. No doubt my anticipation of an experience M, the experience itself, and the memory of the experience are three states which have different qualities. But it is not the future M, the present M, and the past M, which have these three different qualities. The qualities are possessed by three distinct events -- the anticipation of M, the experience M itself, and the memory of M, each of which is in turn future, present, and past. Thus this gives no support to the view that the changes of the A series are changes of qualities.

But we need not go further into this question. If the characteristics of the A series were qualities, the same difficulty would arise as if they were relations. For, as before, they are not compatible, and, as before, every event has all of them. This can only be explained, as before, by saying that each event has them successively. And thus the same fallacy would have been committed as in the previous case.

We have come then to the conclusion that the application of the A series to reality involves a contradiction, and that consequently the A series cannot be true of reality. And, since time involves the A series, it follows that time cannot be true of reality. Whenever we judge anything to exist in time, we are in error. And whenever we perceive anything as existing in time -- which is the only way in which we ever do perceive things -- we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not.

Andrew Turner summarizes McTaggart’s reasons for stating the A-theorist cannot consistently parry the charge that any event which has one temporal property like “past,” “present,” or “future” must have the other two (unless that event is the first or last moment in time, in which case it would still have two incompatible properties):

The ‘vicious circle’ argument: time is assumed to explain why ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future’ do not apply simultaneously.

The vicious series argument: a second time series has been introduced to separate these terms; but to separate these terms within this second series we need to introduce a third time series and so on. (link)

I found vicious circle argument is easier to follow than the vicious series argument (see McTaggart’s paragraphs 3-4 above). Recall that the A-series is supposed to explain how time is possible. But when the A-theorist is accused of saying that events are past, present, and future – which is inconsistent – he resorts to saying that no event is past, present, and future at the same time. The problem is that one cannot benignly appeal to time in order to account for the alleged A-series inconsistency if A-series is itself what is supposed to account for time.

I think the vicious series objection to the A-series is best presented by Michael Dummett (link). If we suppose that every event has more complex A-times than ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future’ which supposedly resolve the paradox, because each phase of complex A-times has two or more mutually exclusive properties which are applicable to the event, there is no stage at which the A-theorist can escape the paradox. For example, if we say that an event ‘will be past,’ ‘is present,’ and ‘was future,’ there is no contradiction. Here we have constructed a sort of second-level A-series. But this complex A-series implies other complex A-times such as ‘has been past,’ ‘has been present,’ ‘is past,’ ‘is future,’ ‘will be present,’ and ‘will be future.’ And McTaggart will argue that as in the first level, any event that has one of these properties has all of them. That is, any event is {past, present, future} in the {past, present, future}. Instead of three A-times, there are now nine; but some of these A-times are contradictory, so that these are predicated of events does not resolve the paradox but just pushes it to another stage. Obviously, an event cannot consistently be referred to as, for example, ‘is [now] present,’ ‘is [now] past,’ and ‘is [now] future.’ The A-theorist will say these are not properties possessed at the same time. But in so doing, he will merely be generating 27 complex A-times instead of 9 or 3. And since at no stage will the paradox be resolved – since several of these A-times would be contradictory if predicated of any single event – a vicious infinite regress is the result.

Prominent A-theorists have recognized that this paradox presents a real challenge and responded accordingly; viz. by denying that the past and future are real. William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, among others, have accepted presentism in part to attempt to block the thrust of McTaggart’s Paradox. Presentism denies the reality or existence of the ‘past’ and ‘future.’ A-theorists like Craig find experiences of an objective ‘present’ to be plausible and intuitive, warranting the defense of the A-series to such a purist extremity. But sometimes our intuitions, upon more rigorous examination, contradict one another. Paul Helm, in Time and time again: two volumes by William Lane Craig, finds this to be the case with the implications of accepting the “purist” A-theorist’s account of time:

By contrast Craig believes that A-theory presentism can handle change, since it takes the notion of having a property to be a present-tense notion. Any object only exists in the present, so the question of its possessing different properties at different times does not arise. Lewis claims that this proposed solution rejects the very idea of persistence (B, 192), but Craig, in responding that on the A-theory an object can be said to exist at times other than the present, appears to concede what is distinctive about presentism. If the A-theorist affirms chronal realism, it concedes its position. If it does not, where is persistence through time? On responsibility, one might ask about the reasonableness of holding someone responsible for what a person who no longer exists did. Is this not counterintuitive too? Why should I be responsible for the debts arising from spendthrift actions which no longer exist, whether these are the actions of my great-grandfather or of an earlier present me?

Furthermore, B-theorists have argued that presentist ontology either fails to provide truthmakers for past and future tense events or wind up caught in McTaggart’s paradox (link, pg. 101ff. and 160ff.); link, pg. 66ff.). Essentially, if the past and future aren’t real, how can we truly speak about them? Or if we can truly speak about them and in light of the idea that temporal becoming requires something other than the present from which a thing has become, how is it that they aren’t real and thus can avoid McTaggart’s Paradox? Especially in Craig’s case, these questions seem similar to those presented in the grounding objection to Molinism.

As for the theistic implications of a B-theory of time, which I would not push has been demonstrated in this modest post – though I believe it does at least put the onus on the A-theorist to explain how his position could be consistent – what it would do is establish that God’s knowledge is unchanging. It would not mean that God is Himself necessarily outside time. A B-theoretic would be a necessary but insufficient condition for divine timelessness. For instance, several B-theorists like Helm and Mellor believe causation is what can account for uni-directional change along the B-series. Causes are earlier than effects. But God is a cause of all things, in which case God could be in time – He or His creative activity would be the earliest of all events – unless further qualified in some respect such as by distinguishing between ultimate and secondary causation (cf. here).

While I haven’t satisfactorily related the philosophy of time to issues of divine timelessness, eternal generation and procession, the incarnation, and our own experience, then, I believe I’ve made some headway in understanding what time itself is and how it can accurately be modeled.

A tentative philosophy of time

The philosophy of time is a very complex subject. I've put further study of it on hold since I started preparing for a few essay contests on Ayn Rand's philosophy, but a friend recently asked me some questions about it, and I think the following summary I provided is a good indication of where I stand.

While I'm still open to the idea that God is not timeless, the primary problem I have with it is that it seems to be incompatible with even a weak understanding of divine immutability, a doctrine I think is Scripturally supported.

If God is temporal, then an A-series theory of time - which I will explain shortly - is true, and His knowledge literally changes. For example, the proposition "x will occur" would be true until x occurs in time, after which it would be false - so God would know "x will occur" at one point in time but not another. If God's knowledge changes, God changes.

I've tried to construct an argument that God could not be omniscient unless He is timeless, but to be honest, I haven't thought of one which holds. Of course, the meaning of "omniscience" would have to be qualified if God is temporal - it would have to mean something like "knowledge of all propositions which are now true" rather than simply "knowledge of all true propositions[, each of which are unchangingly true]" - but so long as one accepts determinism, God could control under what conditions His knowledge changes.

That's one reason I didn't really like the TF article on time. Parkinson didn't discuss an A-series vs. a B-series view of time, eternal creation, the meaning of omniscience, etc. The discussion is more complicated than "if God's knowledge changes then God is not omniscient," for why couldn't it be the case that God's knowledge changes in accordance with divinely predetermined changes?

Parkinson also doesn't seem to realize omnitemporality traditionally refers to the view that God has an infinitely extended past and future, or at least that He is at all times (contrary to atemporality). He can define omnitemporality in a certain way to make it compatible with Calvinism if he likes, but to me it seems like trying to define free will similarly - it's more likely to confuse than help.

Anyways, for "now," the best argument for divine timelessness I can think of is the argument that it follows from explicit Scriptural testimony of divine immutability. There do appear to be good philosophical arguments against an A-series view of time, however (e.g. McTaggart's paradox), which could also be used as arguments for divine timelessness. I haven't studied those enough to cite them as support for divine timelessness, though.

As for a defense of divine timelessness from counter-arguments, some language used to describe God is anthropomorphic, figures of speech not literally true. This includes words such as "past," "present," "now," and "future." Temporal events are not literally related this way. The A-series view of time says they are and that there is an objective "now." A simple way of thinking about it is to say that the A-series view of time regards some language as irreducibly tensed. So, for instance, a proposition like "I am writing this post now" cannot be reduced to "I write this sentence at 10:51 pm, June 16, 2012." Both may be true, A-series theorists say, but what they each mean is different.

A B-theory view of time, on the other hand, believes events are related by means other than tensed language. Or, at least, any tensed sentence expresses a tenseless meaning (hence, tensed language is non-literal). So in place of words like "past," "present," "now," ""future," yesterday," "today," "tomorrow," "was," will," "did," "had," etc., B-series theorists substitute words like "earlier than," "simultaneous with," and "later than." These substitutes are not tensed phrases. "I write this sentence simultaneous with Jodie driving a car, you sleeping, etc." is not tensed. "I write this sentence later than my reading of your post" is not tensed. No time has a privileged status of "now" or "present" on a B-series view of time. It rather relates events in the direction of logical causation. An event is earlier than another because the earlier event causes the latter event. Events may be caused by other events without its being necessary that they could have been, at some point, modified by the word "now."

If God is timeless and omniscient, a B-series view of time must be true. Otherwise, propositions describing events would be tensed, God would have to know those propositions, and God's knowledge of tensed propositions would necessitate and A-series view of time. This would lead to divine mutability, as shown earlier, which I find problematic.

How does a B-series view of time square with creation? Paul Helm theorizes an "eternal creation." To be eternal is simply to be atemporal or timeless. What does this mean? Well, A and B-series views of time define time in terms of the tensed or tenseless relations events possess (e.g. past/present/future vs. earlier/simultaneous/later). So the point is that God does not acquire [new] relations if He is timeless. What relation[s] God has to the universe, then, must be timeless - that is, on the B-series view of time, these relations cannot be earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than any other events.

Hence, as Helm puts it, God does not will "in" time but rather "with" time; He eternally or timelessly decrees {event A at time t1, B at t2, etc.}. He does not eternally decree {to will event A at time t1, to will B at t2, etc.}. God's will is eternal - it does not occur in time. So the whole temporal order is timeless, though the events in this order are temporal because of their tenseless yet temporal relations with each other (earlier/simultaneous/later).

In my own words, I think of the whole temporal order - the entire B-series - as a set: {A, B, C...}. A is the earliest event (or events) within this order, B is the next, and so on. A causes B, B causes C, and so on. While the entire set is eternally or timelessly created - hence God stands in static relationship to it and the events of the set, none of which possesses the tensed distinction of being "the present" - the set itself is not earlier/simultaneous/later than any other event, for there is no other event to which the creation of the temporal order could stand in [temporal] relation. However, A, B, C, etc. do stand in relation to each other in such a way, which is why we can say such events occur in time. They are earlier/simultaneous/later with respect to each other.

Thus, since there is no earlier event, the creation of the temporal order (the entire B-series set of events) is eternal. The entire created order is metaphysically dependent upon God's will, however (by definition, since created), so that creation would be eternal does not empty the word of its meaning.

If anyone is finding this difficult to understand, don't feel bad. I've read Craig's Time and Eternity (which was very helpful in introducing the material and written by an A-series theorist) Helm's Eternal God, and God and Time: Four Views, and I still have a hard time keeping it straight. I would recommend reading these books. Helm's summary view presented in God and Time: Four Views is viewable on googlebooks. It seems that he updated his views in Eternal God, though (e.g. possible worlds).