Showing posts with label Augustine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Augustine. Show all posts

Monday, April 17, 2023

Representationalist Misrepresentation of the Realist View on Original Sin

Continuing a train recent thoughts on a realist apologetic of original sin (link), what is often difficult is that opponents of the view don't seem to understand it. Over time, misrepresentations that stem from this seeming misunderstanding seem to have gotten worse. 

One example can be found in the works of J. V. Fesko. Fesko is an author whom I credit with opening my eyes to biblical theology, so much so that I wrote a 10 part review of his book, Last Things First (link). I quite enjoy many things he writes about. I think he may have even been involved with my local church, at some point. I visited a lecture by him at RTS Atlanta and spoke with him in passing about infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism (which I doubt he would remember, as I barely remember it). I say this because the below is not to be taken as a slight against him personally. What it does illustrate, given his pedigree, is the extent to which a breakdown has occurred in a proper, historically grounded perception of a realistic theory of original sin.

Ken Hamrick, a fellow realist with respect to original sin, has already reviewed some misrepresentations of the realist position contained in a separate book by Fesko (e.g. link). The following quote is from Fesko's book, Adam and the Covenant of Works:

...in some sense God views all of humanity as guilty because of Adam's one transgression. And while arguing that all humanity participated in Adam's sin is an accurate conclusion, we must drill down into text to determine the precise nature of this participation. In what way have all humanity sinned (ἥμαρτον)?

Answering this question brings us to the shores of some heavily trafficked territory in the history of exegesis. There are largely four different views on the manner of humanity's participation in Adam's sin... (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pg. 293)

Fesko then outlines the four views he has in mind, critiquing the first three and defending the last one. The four views outlined are: Pelagianism, Realism, Mediate Imputation, Immediate Imputation.

To say nothing of my suspicion towards the idea that anyone besides a realist can truly believe that "all humanity participated in Adam's sin," as I initially read this, I was right away confused by Fesko's stated contrast between realism and immediate imputation in particular. He writes,

(4) Immediate Imputation

This view appears in, among others, Francis Turretin (1693-1687), the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), the Savoy Declaration (1658), Second London Baptist Confession (1689), and Charles Hodge (1797-1878). Advocates of this view maintain that God immediately (apart from any physical or real means) imputes both Adam's guilt and Christ's righteousness to those whom they represent. (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pgs. 295-296)

This is an historic redefinition of immediate imputation. A realist with respect to original sin is completely free to hold to immediate imputation. For example:

So far is it from being the fact that the dependence of the federal upon the natural headship involves the mediate imputation of Adam's sin, directly the reverse is the case. If our relation to the covenant is founded on our natural relation to Adam, - if we are, at the bar of God, held to have sinned in him because the nature that is in us flowed to us from him, - it immediately follows that the responsibilities thence derived are the same in their order in us as they were in Adam. If his nature was first guilty of apostasy and then of consequence depravity and sin, it will be so as it flows to us. This doctrine is so entirely consistent with that of immediate imputation, that De Moor, after devoting twenty-one pages to the refutation of Placaeus, plants himself, in harmony with Marck, upon our very position as the ground of defence against the objects of those who denied immediate imputation. (Samuel Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pg. 505).

Even representationalists have understood this. For instance, John Murray, an author who was not shy in his critique of the realist view, acknowledges:

"It is not necessary to discuss the question whether Edwards was a realist in his view of the Adamic union. The realist as well as the federalist holds to immediate imputation and the point at issue is not affected by the question of Edwards' affinities on that other issue." (John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pg. 56)

What Fesko has done - unwittingly, I imagine - is subtly redefine "immediate imputation" in terms only a representationalist would accept. 

Further, it is not clear that Fesko appreciates the divergence of views among the sources he cites as supporting his understanding of immediate imputation. In the first place, the idea that the Westminster Confession is anti-realist begs the question (cf. Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pg. 39ff.; W. G. T. Shedd, Discourses and Essays, pgs. 260-270; etc.). In fact, again, even representationalists would distance themselves from the views of, say, Charles Hodge, who denied that mankind were participants in the criminality of Adam's sin. John Murray writes:

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the most representative of Reformed theologians were jealous to maintain that reatus and poena and, if we will, reatus poenae, always presuppose culpa and that, therefore, our involvement in the reatus, the obligation to penalty, of Adam's sin means that we were also involved in the culpa of his sin...

Hence when Dr. Hodge says that the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to posterity does not mean the imputation of "criminality" or demerit" but only of "the judicial obligation to satisfy justice", we discover what we are compelled to regard as a divergence from the older Reformed theologians in respect of a principle which they esteemed basic in the construction of the doctrine of our relation to the first sin of Adam. It is just precisely the involvement of posterity in the culpa of Adam's sin that Hodge is jealous to deny, when these other theologians were insistent that poena and culpa are inseparable and that reatus arises from culpa and leads to poena. And it would appear that the difficulty which we found with Dr. Hodge's position from the standpoint of exegesis, specifically the exegesis of Romans 5:12, 19, lies close to this divergence on Hodge's part from the formulation of other Reformed theologians. (John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pgs. 83-85)

Again, John Murray was a federalist or representationalist who, like Hodge, was of Princeton lineage. If anyone can render an objective critique of Hodge, it is Murray. And the above makes it quite clear that Hodge's contemporaries - e.g. Samuel Baird and Robert Landis, both of whom debated him - were correct about the Reformed tradition on this point. 

Now, Fesko does tepidly acknowledge this in his book, Death in Adam, Life in Christ. There, he admits that Hodge's "penalty-only imputation view may represent a minority within the tradition." Firstly, it is a minority position; there is no maybe. Secondly, Fesko should not anachronistically lump the Westminster Confession, Savoy Declaration, Francis Turretin, etc. as holding to Hodge's view of what immediate imputation entails. 

Perhaps Fesko does not intend to do that. But if not - if Fesko is not trying to suggest that all these sources have the same view of immediate imputation - then the question is begged as to why the realist position is contrasted with it.

Another way in which Fesko misrepresents the realist position is in the way he frames what said position entails. One remark Fesko made in an above quote - "apart from any physical or real means" - seems to suggest that Fesko equates realism with the idea of physical identity with Adam. This is confirmed in Fesko's outline of realism itself:

(2) Realism

This view was first made famous by Augustine who, based upon his mistranslation of Romans 5:12, believed that all humanity was seminally present in Adam. In some sense, then, humanity was really truly physically present. In addition to Augustine, similar views appear in John Calvin (1509-1564), W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1894), and James H. Thornwell (1812-1862). (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pg. 294)

I'm not sure what Fesko has in mind. Augustine remained undogmatic on the point of traducianism. However, he considered it, and the terms in which he considered it were immaterial, not material:

...it is necessary still to investigate and to make known the reason why, if souls are created new for every individual at his birth, those who die in infancy without the sacrament of Christ are doomed to perdition; for that they are doomed to this if they so depart from the body is testified both by Holy Scripture and by the holy Church. Wherefore, as to that opinion of yours concerning the creation of new souls, if it does not contradict this firmly grounded article of faith, let it be mine also; but if it does, let it be no longer yours.

26. Let it not be said to me that we ought to receive as supporting this opinion the words of Scripture in Zechariah, He forms the spirit of man within him, and in the book of Psalms, He forms their hearts severally. We must seek for the strongest and most indisputable proof, that we may not be compelled to believe that God is a judge who condemns any soul which has no fault. For to create signifies either as much or, probably, more than to form [fingere]; nevertheless it is written, Create in me a clean heart, O God, and yet it cannot be supposed that a soul here expresses a desire to be made before it has begun to exist. Therefore, as it is a soul already existing which is created by being renewed in righteousness, so it is a soul already existing which is formed by the moulding power of doctrine. Nor is your opinion, which I would willingly make my own, supported by that sentence in Ecclesiastes, Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return to God who gave it. Nay, it rather favours those who think that all souls are derived from one; for they say that, as the dust returns to the earth as it was, and yet the body of which this is said returns not to the man from whom it was derived, but to the earth from which the first man was made, the spirit in like manner, though derived from the spirit of the first man, does not return to him but to the Lord, by whom it was given to our first parent. (From Augustine to Jerome, on the origin of the soul, link)

Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature (not physical creatures per se; cf. angels). For one to be interested in whether Adam's progeny were "physically present" in him would be a category error, a quasi-gnostic mistake no realist of whom I am aware (certainly none in Fesko's list of realists) has ever made. Such a [mis]representation gives the impression that realists consider physical presence relevant to participation in sin when it is rather spiritual presence which has always been at issue.

We have glanced at a few passages of the Scriptures in which our doctrine is formally asserted, or involved by direct and inevitable implication. But it would be an utter mistake to imagine that the Scripture argument in its favor is limited to a series of minute criticisms upon isolated passages in the Bible. On the contrary, the idea of the derivation of our entire being from our parents runs through every part of the book, and reappears continually in every variety of form. From the nature of the case, we are cut off from this aspect of the argument. To its elucidation volumes would be requisite, instead of a few pages. The doctrine in question constantly occurs in the historical scriptures, either in the way of formal statement, or of allusion, as to an unquestioned and unquestionable fact. In the poetic books, whether narrative, prophetic, or devotional, whether prayer or praise, it everywhere presents itself; at one time, the theme of admiring contemplation in reference to the wonderful nature of the phenomena, and at another the subject of penitential confession in view of the corruption so derived. In the doctrinal scriptures, it is made the basis of the whole doctrine of our ruin and the whole system of grace. They everywhere predicate it, as fundamental to all the representations and arguments which they exhibit on these subjects. This doctrine is thus inwrought into the very texture of the Bible; recurring continually, without any caution whatever, by which the begetting asserted should be limited to the body; but, on the contrary, contemplating the moral nature much more than the physical. On the other hand, but a single passages - Heb. xii. 9 - is adduced from the whole Bible, which it can be pretended even seems to look the other way. And in that case the seeming is consequent upon a forced interpretation, at variance with the accustomed meaning of the language employed, as well as with the analogy of Scripture, thus so complete. We make this statement, because it must be evident to any candid interpreter, that the scriptures which merely declare God to be the maker of the soul, are no more conclusive to the purpose for which they are usually cited on this subject, than would be the addition of those which speak with at least equal emphasis of the body, to prove that both body and soul are the immediate workmanship of God, and that the human species is not propagated by generation at all! (Samuel Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pgs. 383-384)

Any beginning to unravel the mischaracterizations seen above or in the conversation in the first link of this post will require a return to the primary sources. Ad fontes. Possibly, it will also require someone who actually believes the view to publish an exposition and defense of it. Although useful in its own way, I wouldn't expect a blog post to gain traction. Well, beginnings are beginnings.

Thursday, April 28, 2022

Reflections on Contingentarianism and Necessitarianism

I had recently thought to finally make an effort to complete a post that has been in the draft phases for around 7 years now in which I revisited necessitarianism, a position I formerly held (example). There was already much to say on the subject even before Amy Karofsky published an interesting - if flawed - book providing a rare defense of necessitarianism (link). With that publication, I thought to use it as a foil for some reflections I've meant to publish for a while now. 

Was Augustine a Necessitarian?

One argument Karofsky makes is that Augustine was a necessitarianism: 

Augustine also believes that the future is necessitated. Combining Christianity with aspects of Plato's metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theories, he maintains that there is an ultimate, necessary basis that is a fully good and all-knowing God. Because God is omniscient, God knows what will occur in the future, and because God's intellect and will are unchanging, so, too, is the way that the world will unfold. God even knows what a person will choose to do. However, Augustine explains, such divine foreknowledge does not cause or force the person to choose in the way that they do; the person still chooses of their own will. (pg. 10) 

...it is, of course, possible to live by the theory of necessitarianism - Parmenides, the Stoics, Augustine, Spinoza, and I are all cases in point. (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 158)

In reality, to suggest Augustine believed the future is "necessitated" or was a "necessitarian" is misleading, to say the least. The simplest refutation is that Augustine argued our will is not necessitated: "We sin not by necessity but by the will" (link). 

Now, the future is indeed foreknown by God. In fact, Karofsky is correct that Augustine believes God's knowledge to be eternal (The Confessions, Book XI, link). But this does not, to Augustine, imply necessitarianism. When Evodius asks, in On the Free Choice of the Will, "How is it that future events God foreknows do not happen necessarily?" Augustine's answer is, in part, that "God foreknows all the things of which He is the author and yet is not the author of all the things He foresees. He is not the evil author of these things..." 

It may be inconsistent for Augustine to hold that God's "eternal" knowledge is [seemingly] contingent on future events like human free will - events and free will that is not necessitated - but that is indeed what it appears that Augustine believed, and nothing in The Confessions indicates otherwise.

Perhaps one might argue that the above only reflects Augustine's earlier thought. On the Free Choice of the Will was written at least a decade before The City of God, the other work by Augustine which Karofsky cites. But it turns out that Karofsky's own citation (book 5, chapter 10) is precisely what rules Augustine out as a necessitarian. Augustine writes:

Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect — as, for instance, the necessity of death — it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself — for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not — for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error — for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. (link)

Later in The City of God, a concrete example of prelapsarian Adam illustrates exactly what Augustine means by "liberty" and "free will," and his statements, such as the following, are unintelligible within the framework of Karofsky's necessitarianism: "the first freedom of will which man received when he was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin" (link). 

How Karofsky can be aware of such a work yet classify Augustine as a necessitarian is a mystery, for this is exactly what Karofsky denies is possible to a necessitarian: "a necessitarian will reject any account that takes free will to mean that a person can sometimes choose one of (sic) more than one possible alternative beliefs... Instead, a necessitarian believes... nothing could have been otherwise" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 153).

To drive the point home, Augustine not only believed that man is - or, at least, was (prior to the first sin) free - he believed that God is free. In The Enchiridion, Augustine says, "both baptism and death, were submitted to by Him, not through a pitiable necessity, but of His own free pity for us" (link). And again, "The omnipotent God, then, whether in mercy He pities whom He will, or in judgment hardens whom He will, is never unjust in what He does, never does anything except of His own free-will, and never wills anything that He does not perform." While God's grace is necessary for our salvation, salvation itself not necessitated but is rather a "free gift."

What is "Theistic Contingentarianism"?

Karofsky defines contingentarianism as the contradictory of necessitarianism. The former (contingentarianism) is the view that "at least some thing about the universe could have been otherwise in some way or other" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 1). The latter view (necessitarianism), as mentioned above, is that "nothing could have been otherwise." Insofar as many theists defend divine freedom in accepting that God could have refrained from creating, theistic contingentarianism is a species of contingentarianism. 

Christianity and Theistic Contingentarianism

What motivates theistic contingentarianism? There's probably more than one answer to this question, so I'll answer for myself one reason why I now disbelieve necessitarianism. If necessitarianism is true, creation is necessitated. What I eventually have come to conclude is that necessitarianism is incompatible with the biblical doctrine of creation and/or God. 

Christians believe in a Creator-creature distinction. Compare this to Karofsky's monism as expressed in pages 137-144. She admits that she believes, for example that "the essence of one thing contains the essence of every other." Any attempt to develop a theistic necessitarianism along such lines would be pantheistic, anti-biblical, and a non-starter for Christians.

In contrast, my own, former view argued that pantheism or monism were not entailments of theistic necessitarianism (link). However, even if my former view were true - even if a necessitated creation is not essentially divine - I now believe such would entail a denial of divine sufficiency. 

Consider what it would mean for God and creation to be ontologically distinct yet for the latter to be necessitated by the former. This would be analogous to a particular understanding of the doctrine of eternal generation - which, even if untrue, highlights the point. If the Father necessarily generates the Son, the Father and Son would be mutually dependent upon one another. Obviously, the Son would depend upon the Father, being necessitated by Him. In turn, however, the Father could be who He is ("Father") without a Son. 

So, too, a necessitated creation would mean that the Creator and creature are mutually dependent such that God cannot be who He is ("Creator") without a creation. If necessitarianism is true, then God not only needs to create to be Creator, He needs to be Creator. Creation is no longer contingent, so God as Creator isn't a contingent predicate either. Indeed, it's essential or necessary that He be Creator. There is, then, a real dependence on creation in order for one to be able to refer to God as what He essentially and necessarily must be - Creator.

The point needn't be that the Father-Son relationship is exactly the same as the Creator-creature relationship. One could maintain (as I did and do) that the Father and Son are of the same nature, whereas God and creation are not. In both cases, however, necessitation entails mutual dependency, and this is what changed my mind. 

[Side note: on a theistic-contingentarian position, God is still the Creator, but such is not essential to who He is. There is no mutual dependency, guarding divine sufficiency. On theistic-necessitarianism, on the other hand, there is no apparent reason why being "Creator" would be any less integral to the essence of God than any commonly regarded divine attribute. Indeed, perhaps this line of reasoning begins to show that Karofsky's reductive monism does follow from necessitarianism (and, hence, why Christians must disagree with Karofsky).]

In short, for a Christian, theistic-necessitarianism is caught on the horns of a dilemma: 1) a pantheistic concession (such as a theistic-Karofskyan necessitarian would make) would salvage the doctrine of divine sufficiency at the expense of the Creator-creature distinction; 2) on the other hand, a concession that there is a mutual dependency between an ontologically distinct Creator and creation would salvage the doctrine of the Creator-creature distinction at the expense of divine sufficiency. 

Thus, theistic necessitarianism is anti-biblical, and this is an obvious motivation for Christians such as myself to reject it. None of this would probably persuade Karofsky herself, but that is a separate matter.

Does Theistic Contingentarianism Fail?

While the above makes a case for why a Christian might be motivated to accept theistic contingentarianism, Karofsky argues that theistic contingentarianism in fact fails. As such, the book implicitly attacks Christianity. 

One such argument it fails is as follows:

In general, it seems that any theory that attempts to account for contingency by appeal to entities that are in some way necessary and in some way contingent will fail. Indeed, the other leading theory that posits a basis for modalities that is partly contingent and partly necessary also fails, and does so for pretty much the same reasons that dispositionalists account fail. That theory is what I will call contingentarian theism.

As I explained in the Introduction, a contingentarian-theist typically maintains that although God is a necessary being, God has free will, and, as such, God could have chosen to create a different world with different inhabitants. God's necessary nature provides for the necessity of laws, essences, and eternal truths, while God's free will provides for the contingency of the existence of the entitites in the world and some of their properties. However, there are many problems with the contingentarian theistic account of contingency, and many of those problems are similar to those that arise for dispositionalist accounts.

Both the dispositionalist and the contingentarian-theist attribute a contingent feature to an otherwise necessary basis. The dispositionalist attributes potency to the essential nature of dispositional properties and the contingentarian-theist attributes free will to the necessary nature of God. As I showed earlier, the contingent feature of dispositions not only fails to account for contingency but also prevents the dispositionalist from providing an adequate account of necessity. A similar problem arises in contingentarian theism and can be expressed as a Euthyphro-type dilemma that might go like this: When God chooses to create from among possible alternative, either God makes the choice for some reason, or God makes the choice for no reason. If God chooses to create this world for some reason (say that it is the best), that reason determines God's choice, in which case, the choice could not have been made differently, and the outcome is necessary and not contingent. However, if God chooses for no reason (God just happens to choose this world), then God's choice is arbitrary and any choice can follow, in which case anything is possible, and nothing is necessary. So, either nothing is contingent, or nothing is necessary. 

The problem is not that difficult to see. Both the dispositionalist and the contingentarian-theist recognize that a necessary basis is needed in order to have necessary natural laws and necessary eternal truths. Both also recognize that if the basis is entirely necessary, there can be no contingency. In a desire to avoid necessitarianism, they attribute some contingent feature to that basis. But then that basis is such that it could have been otherwise in at least some way, in which case it is not necessary and cannot provide an adequate basis for the necessity of certain laws and truths. In essence, one cannot have one's cake and eat it, too.

Finally, the further condition that was derived from Shalkowski's argument works to show that both dispositionalism and theistic contingentarianism fail because, according to that condition, only what is necessary can be a member of basis. (Karofsky, A Case For Necessitarianism, pgs. 76-77)

Paragraphs 1 and 2 set the context for the argument. Paragraphs 3 spells out an argument to which I intend to reply below, as it is similar to the following arguments I made when I was a necessitarian (with some differences, on which, again, see below):

Why did God decree to maximally manifest His glory? I don't see any other possible conclusion than something similar to this or what I said to my friend. In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one? (link)

I then elaborated on this argument here:

My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. (link)

And once more, I make the same essential argument here:

If I ask what the basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His nature” doesn’t suffice. For world B would also have been agreeable to His nature. The arbitrarity objection stands. (link)

To try to put the argument as forcefully as I can think to, one further way to state it is to suppose God was free to create or not create as He has. On this supposition, further suppose we say God has some reason[s] w to create this world. Reason[s] w would not necessitate the creation of this world, so conceivably, God could have refrained from creating this world for reasons x.

Now, any reason[s] y which we might posit as an explanation for why God chose reason[s] w (on which account He created this world) rather than reason[s] x (on which account He might have refrained from creating this world) would be reason[s] subject to the same point ad infinitum. 

That is, reason[s] y would not necessitate choice of reason[s] w (on which account He created this world), so conceivably, God could have had chosen reason[s] x (on which account He might have refrained from creating this world) for reason[s] z.

Reason[s] w do not explain why God did not refrain from creating this world. Reason[s] y do not explain why God did not choose reason[s] x, etc. In short, no appeal to "reasons" can serve as a full-stop explanation of why God chose to create this world rather than refrain from creating this world. On theistic contingentarianism, any attempt to work out why this world was created rather than not would generate an infinite regress. So what Karofsky argues is similar to what I too have entertained. 

So stated: should a theistic-contingentarian regard this objection as problematic?

I now argue that it is not problematic. 

Was this creation necessitated? Did God have to create at all? If divine sufficiency is true and pantheism is false, I think not. 

This does beg the question as to whether God's choice to create this world is "arbitrary." In a sense, the answer to this must be yes. In another sense, no. 

When I was a child, one of the first philosophically interesting things I read was in Animorphs: "...can you decide to do nothing? That's a decision too." (K. A. Applegate, The Message). My dad also listened to Rush quite frequently, and their following refrain in the song Freewill communicates the same point: "If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice."

That is, God either could have chosen to create - as He did - or chosen not to create. But a choice simpliciter had to be made. A choice was necessary even though one specified choice was not. Accommodating our language to the timelessness of God's eternal choice is not easy, but however one wants to phrase it, the reality of having to make a timeless choice itself was not arbitrary. 

Neither was God's choice arbitrary in the following sense - God could have had [and indeed does have] reasons for creating this world "so that the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known through the church to the rulers and the authorities in the heavenly places." One may ask for what reason He wanted to make that known. I believe the answer to all such teleological questioning is that all things exist for the glory of God. Although such reasons for His choice are no more necessitated than the choice to create itself, they are still reasons.

This departs from Karofsky: in her third paragraph, when she says that if necessitarianism were false, then "any choice can follow," "that anything is possible," or that "nothing is necessary." If I understand her correctly, I don't follow her reasoning here and disagree with her. That God, being free, is not limited to one choice does not imply "any choice can follow" in the sense, for example, of "any choice [which we could imagine]." We have epistemic limitations, as Karofsky herself acknowledges. These limitations may prevent us from understanding why some choices which we might imagine God could have made might not, in fact, "follow" or be consistent with the nature of God.

Finally, then, in what way must we admit that God's choice is "arbitrary"? God's free choice is the final, metaphysical (causal) explanation of how this world came to be. If we attempt to ask why or for what reason this world was chosen rather than not so created in the sense of seeking a deeper, more fundamental metaphysical explanation for God's choice, I don't think we find one. While it could have "pleased" God to refrain from creating this world, He was "pleased" to freely choose to create this world. He did not have to choose to create this world, and the same can be said for any "reasons" God may have had in freely choosing to create this world. Again, however, this is not a problem, for God had to choose, and He [freely] has. 

Moving on, in reply to Karofsky's fourth and fifth paragraphs on pages 76-77 of her book (cited above), God is indeed the necessary basis for the contingentarian-theist. But I don't think this statement of hers follows: "if the basis is entirely necessary, there can be no contingency." A thorough reply would require a much longer post than I intend here to provide, as it would require a full-fledged exposition of one's metaphysical views to form a complete response to Karofsky. I will, however, offer a few reflections.

Initially, I didn't understand on what grounds she thinks a necessary being would have to [timelessly] act in a way that is necessitated rather than merely in a manner consistent with the nature of said being. In a different context, she makes a similar assertion: "the divine essence includes the divine will and thus includes everything that God chooses" (pg. 12). By initial appearances, she conflates God's will with the exercise thereof. 

Additionally, given her first argument against Aquinas on page 11, I am not sure to what extent Karofsky is familiar with distinctions between God's natural and free knowledge. Her second and third arguments against Aquinas also lead me to wonder how much exposure she has to theistic replies to Euthyphro's dilemma.

An alternative explanation for pages 11-12 might be that Karofsky is only attempting to internally critique the philosophers about whom she is writing (Aquinas, Leibniz). Even if that is the case, her case against theistic contingentarianism on page 76 seemed lacking, and given that I disagreed with her exposition of Augustine, if I knew more about Aristotle and/or Leibniz, I could imagine finding myself disagreeing with her historical analysis of them too.

In general, it was my impression, then, that Karofsky's arguments against theistic contingentarianism here were laden with hidden, unsubstantiated metaphysical assumptions. I thought she might regard certain, controversial views of God - e.g. absolute divine simplicity - as standard for all Christians. 

As it turns out, she lays out the metaphysical background for her criticisms a little later on (pgs. 81-82, 92ff., 137ff.). I'll plan to address these in a separate post, but I will touch on my disagreement with them below as a precursor of further thoughts. 

Is Non-Theistic Necessitarianism Epistemically Viable?

While I might at some other time discuss Karofsky's ethical and metaphysical views in more detail, for now, I will make one criticism - a crucial one, in my mind - of Karofsky's necessitarianism. Is it epistemically viable? 

Earlier, I mentioned Karofsky's monism to be of such a nature that "the essence of one thing contains the essence of every other." Correspondingly, and in the same context, Karofsky also concedes that on her view, "the meaning of one term includes the meaning of all terms" (pg. 143).

These and other such similar statements she makes means she believes herself and fellow necessitarians to be committed to the doctrine of internal relations. This would be epistemically problematic, as Gordon Clark pointed out (before, ironically, he too changed his mind to necessitarianism - without addressing any criticisms of it that I mention in this post - cf. his book The Trinity, pgs. 111-119):

Reenactment of a thought is possible, nonetheless, because it can be separate from this immediacy without alteration. Not only so, it can be separated from other thoughts without alteration. Thus history becomes possible. 
This self-identity of the act of thought has been denied by two extreme views. The first view is that of idealism, the theory of internal relations, the notion that everything is what it is because of its context. This makes history impossible. To know any one thing it would be necessary to know its context; i.e. to know the whole universe. Knowledge would thus be restricted to the explicit consciousness of the omniscient Absolutes; and Collingwood, though he may be Beckett, does not claim to be the Absolute... 
What follows if it is true that psychological analysis presupposes a “complete knowledge of the psychological possibilities of life”? It would follow, would it not, that historical analysis also presupposes a complete knowledge of historical possibilities. In short, it would be impossible to know anything without knowing everything. 
Such a Platonic or Hegelian requirement of omniscience is a serious philosophical problem. It is not to be dismissed thoughtlessly. The meticulous scholar, J. H. Hexter, in his Reappraisals of History, castigates historical relativism as a fad and insists on the “rudimentary distinction” between knowing something and knowing everything. But he omits all philosophic justification for this distinction. 
Undoubtedly this distinction must be maintained, if a human being is able to know anything at all. Make omniscience the prerequisite of partial knowledge, and partial knowledge vanishes. But Bultmann, like Hexter, offers no help: less help, in fact, for Bultmann lets the requirements of omniscience stand. (Historiography, Secular and Religious, pgs. 225-226, 334)

Given that Karofsky admits epistemic limitations throughout her book, these and similar arguments (more of which can be read here) pose serious difficulties to her. She does not and indeed cannot know the meaning of all terms; therefore, on her own grounds, she cannot know the meaning of even one term. Her brand of necessitarianism entails epistemic skepticism. 

Thus, I think the problem of partial knowledge illustrates why a theistic contingentarian metaphysic is more defensible than Karosky's: it is more cohesive with a sound epistemology (link, link).

Saturday, November 20, 2021

How to Study a Philosopher or Theologian

A friend asked me to summarize how I have gone about studying the thought and work of Gordon Clark - that is, what methodological approaches have I used (consciously or otherwise) that would I recommend others take when trying to correctly understand, accurately represent and articulate, and/or develop the thought of another theologian, philosopher, etc. The following is a list of what came to mind:

Is the Theologian/Philosopher Worthwhile?

I started reading books by Gordon Clark a little more than a dozen years ago. At the time, I wanted to be confident in how to defend a faith I had been taught from youth and was learning more about in college. I used to seek out discussions or debates with others to fine tune my apologetic thought processes: what do I find to be good arguments? What arguments seemed to ring hollow? Were there areas in which I was not confident?

To make a long story short, prior to my exposure to Gordon Clark, I toyed with the idea that a transcendental argument could prove the "Christian" worldview true. I knew that evidential arguments would not suffice for a strict proof, so I tried testing, usually in discussions and debates with agnostics and atheists, whether a certain feature or features unique to "Christianity" - for example, the Trinity - had to be implicitly accepted (e.g. either for metaphysical or epistemological reasons). If I couldn't do that, then I felt - at the time - that my faith would rest on shaky grounds. I suppose I was thinking like a rationalist.

Typically, at some point in a conversation, the other person I was talking to would acknowledge that they had certain inconsistencies within their own belief systems and would stop conversation. But I was left with the worried feeling that if they simply pointed out that my own, specific views did not follow from the fact that theirs were flawed - or that whatever arguments I was using did not and would not specifically select for my faith - then I would be unable to affirm with certainty that "Christianity" is true. I felt better about having comparative consistency in my beliefs - I was never tempted to abandon my faith - but I wasn't sure how to pacify my uneasiness in being unable to prove "Christianity" was true. 

[I put "Christianity" in quotes because had someone ever stopped to ask me how I knew what "Christianity" - or a unique feature thereof - was, that may have led to me question how I could prove the Bible itself (a canonical collection of specific books and passages) really was God's Word. It was a question I had never considered, so don't know how I would have answered that.]

In 2009, I happened upon the presuppositionalism of Gordon Clark, whose points about the need for first principles allowed me to see that everyone makes assumptions. We cannot "prove" all of our beliefs ad infinitum. I found this convincing, and the way in which the point was presented was so simple, I found myself wanting to read more by him: did he have ideas about how or why some assumptions or presuppositions could be better than others, or how we could defend some to be true and find others to be false? Yes, he did. The more I read, the more I became interested. I doubt I would have kept reading Clark if he had only made that solitary (though important) observation and left readers to figure out any subsequent questions on their own. 

In short, then, I generally liked how he thought, and his writing was personable enough for me to want to continue learning more about what he had to say. I can imagine that another reason one might be attracted to Clark's thought is by having knowledge of the man himself: in all areas of his life, he stood for what he thought was true. If I were to recommend a starting point for others who want to "master" the thought, so to speak, of another person, it would simply be to find a person whose content or life story you enjoy reading about or listening to. 

Alternatively (or additionally), one can study an author so long as one has a defined motivation, goal, or purpose. A long time ago, I read William Young's "The Shack," not because I thought I would particularly enjoy the content, but precisely because I gathered that someone I knew might enjoy the content - content which I gathered contained unorthodox views of Christianity. While I would not have otherwise read the book, it wasn't so much a chore for me to do so because I had a reason for it: to highlight remarks in the book that an unsuspecting reader might overlook and point them out as having dangerous implications. 

Now, while that was just one book, I could extrapolate the principle to an entire collection of works by an author with whom I disagree, and indeed I have done in at least one other case that I can recall. In preparation for the 2012 TrinityFoundation essay contest - contests which were motivation enough for me to begin reading Clark in the first place - I not only read John Robbins' book-length critique of Ayn Rand's so-called Objectivist philosophy, I bought all of her published books and read them myself. I studied her thought, not just Robbins'. 

As penetrating as Robbins' critique may have been, I wanted to make sure, among other things, that it was accurate as well as developed, two other methodological points which served to supplement my motivation and to which I will return below. Would I have had a personal interest in reading Ayn Rand were it not for an essay contest? No. But again, having a specific goal helped the cause: I wanted to write my own critique of Rand simultaneous to reviewing Robbins' book.

One thing I think is important to mention is that all of these authors mentioned thus far wrote as popularizers, which is not meant as a pejorative (just the opposite). Rand and Young wrote fiction for wide readership. Robbins and Clark wrote so that lay Christians - particularly, Reformed Christians - could understand philosophy and its importance. Their works are all relatively inexpensive. I do not know how easy it would be to invest myself in reading an author whose content, price point, or intended audience is rather specialized unless I had a natural interest in the content about which they wrote or specific purpose for reading their work in mind. 

So: do you want to learn about the sorts of things a given philosopher or theologian has to say? Do you have some definite reason for reviewing their work? Do you plan to write a book on them, talk about them with others, or synthesize some of what insight you think they have into your own belief system or life choices? Make sure your study is worth your time. 

Comprehensiveness and Patience

I didn't immediately know that I was going to study Clark as much as I have. It was due to the essay contests put forward by the TrinityFoundation that I was able to acquire some of Clark's relatively more expensive collections without having to spend a lot of money which, as a poor college student, was important. At some point, I decided that because I had already acquired so many of his books, it would be cool to have them all. 

It was convenient to not have to search hard for a bibliography of his works. At the time, the TrinityFoundation had nearly every publication I could find online. For some authors, this is not so easy. Rand only wrote a dozen or so books. Clark wrote around forty, and even though around 300 writings or transcriptions by Clark have been discovered in the past decade, many of these are short and not nearly as dense as other philosophers or theologians. 

For instance, James B. Jordan, whose work I began looking into last year, is a much more prolific writer and speaker: in a festschrift written for him, the bibliography runs approximately 25 Word document pages long, is now out of date by over 10 years, and does not adequately capture the reality that there are nearly over 1700 recordings of him (compared to the perhaps few dozen or so one can find of Clark).

Hence, studying even one philosopher or theologian can require a great deal of patience. Even before a wife and house and real job (and, in the future, kids), it took me a little less than a year to feel like I had thoroughly studied Rand's philosophy, and it took over 3 years for me to grasp Clark's thought before I really felt equal to the task of understanding him well enough to challenge and/or develop his ideas. It will take a long time for me to be able to do that with respect to Jordan. 

The mindset and approach to how one studies is as important as the study itself. Accepting that studying a philosopher or theologian can be a long-term and ongoing process is important to not feel discouraged, especially if it seems you can't quite get a proper perspective of some aspect you feel as though you should. Even now, with the release of many new articles by Clark, I find myself returning to a project (see below) I had thought was essentially complete. But the payoff is mastery, so I advise collecting as much of the person's works as you can in preparation to be thorough, then reading or listening to them once to get a sense of the general thought, and only afterwards setting yourself to the task of "studying," on which see below.

The Actual Study or Research

What helped me as I went through Clark's books after the first read was setting a goal. As I read more, I found that even in books not specifically geared towards epistemology or apologetics - the reasons I began reading him in the first place - Clark would usually make a few comments that would have some bearing on these subjects. Searching for these over time became almost like a scavenger hunt, which was what probably led me to a research project of compiling a list of his quotes relating to epistemology and apologetics. 

After my first read-through of a book, I would go back through it and skim to find and highlight certain sentences or paragraphs which I later intended to transcribe to a Word document. I only looked for statements that I found relevant to epistemology and apologetics. I worked on this for around a year, with the result being some 200+ pages of Clark quotes. I have been compiling further quotes from newly released articles by Clark over the past few years (at a much slower pace than my original project), and this has led to 350+ additional pages of quotes. There are still 30+ longer articles/transcriptions for me to review, and I anticipate 150+ more pages of quotes to include. This addendum to the original project is ongoing and will probably be another several years before completed to my satisfaction (fortunately, these writings are online, so it is not so much transcription as it is editing). Like I said, patience is a necessity.

While repeat reading and transcription probably helped to solidify Clark's thoughts in my mind, I think what helped more was beginning to apply his thinking to conversations I was having and posts I was writing. The research process I described above facilitated that by making it easy for me to search through my compilation for key words as well as reference to where and what the fuller context of those statements were (if I needed to). When someone had or has a question about Clark's views, I haven't had to work from memory: I have a searchable and quotable resource from which I can lead the questioner straight to the source.

For instance, a few years ago, there was a question in Scripturalist circles as to how Clark defined knowledge: as 1) mere true belief or 2) as [so-called] "justified" true belief. I was able to answer the question for a few people by producing multiple quotes in defense of a particular interpretation of Clark's thought (in essence, of the two choices, I believe the latter description more accurately reflects Clark's thought). Similarly, when some refer to Clark as an epistemological coherentist or externalist, I have resource to think otherwise and have argued to that effect.

Or if I have wanted to write a post on Clark's views - for example, regarding a specific apologetic argument from partial knowledge - having a full library of books at my disposal has been important, but parsing those books down into relevant and searchable portions has been indispensable. But if I had finished the project and not applied it to my any conversations or reflections, I don't know that I would have retained the information very well.

Authorial Tension, Openness to Revision, and History vs. Development

No one theologian or philosopher is perfect. In any work or collection of works, there may be errors or lacuna - the latter might even be by design, given the intended scope of a work. Further, like anyone else, philosophers and theologians can change their minds over time. Therefore, those who study them ought to be open to a revised understanding of what they taught. In his late life, Augustine wrote a whole book of reconsiderations in which he outlined points at which he had changed his mind. In the case of some authors, like Clark, new publications or anecdotes by people who knew him can also surface that can also broaden our understanding of his thought. 

Example: I remember listening to Greg Bahnsen say that in a conversation he had with Clark, Clark openly questioned the Westminster Confession's doctrine of assurance (link, minutes 50-52) due to his skepticism (at the time of the conversation) that a person could have self-knowledge. This is an anecdote you won't find in any of Clark's publications, and the anecdote illustrates the importance of reading or listening to other material than who it is being studied. It is an anecdote I have no reason to doubt; on the contrary, given that Clark wrestled with the question of self-knowledge and found himself answering it in affirmative in some publications and in the negative in others, I can easily enough believe the conversation happened as described. 

What then? Well, I affirm self-knowledge and see that Clark did too... sometimes. Such does not entail that Clark did so at all times, and as much as I or others admire Clark, we need to accept that he was sometimes wrong or did not believe everything that we may wish he did. Authorial tension and history are realities. If one finds real authorial tension or certain historical statements by an author frustrating - especially if it is someone one might consider a "hero of the faith" - I think there may be a danger in implicitly treating him as infallible. A mature Christian ought to be able to separate he believes from what an author believed or believes. 

Another example: Clark once wrote, "Science is always false, but often useful." Even when I read that for the first time, it didn't make sense. If two scientists formulate two contradictory hypotheses and, after scientific procedures, come to contradictory conclusions, one must be right and the other must be wrong. Of course, the scientific procedure of the one who is right may or may not enable that scientist to know that his hypothesis is true, but this is a separate question from whether or not the hypothesis of that scientist is itself true. So many admirers of Clark can't seem to grasp that Clark simply blundered at this point. I suspect Clark intended to say something to the effect of "Science cannot enable us to know truth." But since that isn't what he wrote at this point, the reader has to address the content of the statement as it is: false.

With that said, one can and should, as Bahnsen was, be charitable about disagreement. We can, like Bahnsen did, speculate that Clark perhaps intended something other than the face-value of the statements he made. Even when the disagreement is real and substantial, one can be kind while delivering a rebuke or rebuttal. 

But in order to improve or develop an author's thought - whether towards truth or the application of the thought to other contexts than those the author addressed - one must first have an accurate understanding of the thought as the author himself expresses it. If disagreement exists, it has to be recognized and confronted so that a better view can be proposed. This is best done only after having as full an understanding of an author's reasons for disagreement as possible, as one can then argue the contrary more effectively... or, perhaps, allow that the author's reasoning is sound and change his own mind! Either way, reading or listening to others about the same subject matter as the author being studied will tend to provide needed balance.

Summary

Have a purpose for your study.

Own all the person's works (or as many as possible).

Read and/or listen to the person normally, then skim/highlight with intention.

Consider transcribing/editing quotes of interest for use in conversation, reflective writing, etc.

Accept the possibility of tension within the author's own thought, but be charitable.

Be open to revision.

Differentiate between what the author believed or believes and what you yourself believe.

Think about how to improve the author's thought, whether towards truth or comprehensiveness.

Read other material.

Be patient, and enjoy the study.

Saturday, December 13, 2014

Augustine's On the Unity of the Church

Some of my first posts on this blog were about how closely Augustine’s beliefs regarding soteriology and Scripture lined up with contemporary Protestantism. I don’t remember why I was so interested in Augustine. It may have been because I used to discuss with RC’s on facebook pretty regularly, and you don't get very far in such discussions before hearing about the early church.

In any case, the latter post contained some quotes from Augustine’s “On the Unity of the Church,” which I recall had unfortunately (given what he seemed to argue in it) not yet been translated. At least, I could not find one online. Recently, however, I was notified that William Webster had posted both English and Latin versions of this treatise. So I decided to revisit my old post on Augustine's doctrine of Scripture to see if its thesis - particularly, that Augustine believed Scripture to be supremely authoritative, perspicuous, and the sufficient rule of faith - held up in light of Webster's translation. The categorization of the following quotes are pretty loose, as several could be included in other categories, but I think the result is clear.

Scripture as Supremely Authoritative

But, as I had begun to say, let us not listen to “you say this, I say that” but let us listen to “the Lord says this.” Certainly, there are the Lord’s books, on whose authority we both agree, to which we concede, and which we serve; there we seek the Church, there we argue our case. (Chapter 3)

I do not wish the holy Church to be founded on human evidence, but on divine oracles. (Chapter 3)

So that I not mention those Gentiles, who after the time of the apostles believed and came to the Church, but only those whom we find in the sacred literature (the Acts and the Epistles of the Apostles and in the Apocalypse of John) which we both embrace and to which we both are subject, let them speak to us how they perished in the African dissension, for we received this not from the councils of arguing bishops, not from disputations, not from legal or municipal acts, but from holy canonical literature. (Chapter 12)

…if I do not wish to believe those examples cited by them, how would they convince me? Is it not in the Holy Scriptures, where they are read with such clarity that whoever receives this literature in faith cannot but confess those things to be most true? (Chapter 13)

Does it please you now if we bring forth this last charge of yours into our midst? "See," they say, "you adhere to the Church. How do we take it up if we would want to go over to you?" Briefly I answer, "You take it up in the same way as that Church gathers, as we find in the holy canonical books." (Chapter 21)

Scripture as Perspicuous

This I preach and promise, that we prize whatever is open and clear. If these things were not found in Holy Scripture, there would be no way by which things closed might be opened and obscure things clarified. (Chapter 5)

What do they say to this, they who so arrogantly call themselves Christians and so openly contradict Christ. We hold to this Church, we admit no human accusations against those divine utterances. It moves us greatly that our Lord, whom not to believe is sacrilegious and impious, in his last words spoken on earth, left this last saving evidence of the primitive church. For having said these things, he soon ascended into heaven. He wished to fortify our ears against those whom he had predicted in earlier times would rise up and say Look, here is the Christ. Look, there he is (Mt. 24:23). He warned us not to believe them. Nor is there any excuse for us if we believe them against the voice of our shepherd that is so clear, so open, so obvious that no one whether insensible or slow witted could say, "I didn't understand," for who wouldn't understand Thus it is fitting that the Christ suffer and rise on the third day, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins be proclaimed in his name to all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem (Luke 24:46-47). Who wouldn't understand You will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth. When he had said this he was lifted up and a cloud took him up and they saw him going into heaven (Acts 1:8-10). What is this I ask? When these last words are heard of a dying man who would go among the dead, no one says he lied, and he is judged an impious heretic who perchance makes light of them. So how do we flee the wrath of God if, either not believing or belittling, we spurn the last words of the only son of God, our Lord and savior, who would go to heaven and from there watch who neglects these words and who observes them and then would come to judge concerning all of them. I have the most obvious voice of my shepherd commending the Church to me without any ambiguity. I will blame myself if I should be led astray or wander from his flock which is the Church itself, through the words of men when he has especially warned me, saying, those who are my sheep hear my voice and follow me (John 10:27). See, his voice is clear and open. Having heard it, who does not follow him? How will he dare to say he is his sheep? No one tells me "O, what does Donatus say, what does Parmenianus say, or Pontius or any of them? No one agrees with the catholic bishops if they are anywhere by chance mistaken in holding any opinion contrary against the canonical Scriptures of God. But if they maintain the bond of unity and love and they fall into error, it will be done to them what the Apostle says if you think differently about anything, this too God will reveal to you (Phil. 3:15). But now those divine utterances about the universal Church are so obvious that the heretics cannot rant against them unless out of perversity of mind or blind rage. (Chapter 11)

Those who are my sheep, says the heavenly shepherd, hear my voice and follow me (John 10:27). His voice concerning the Church is not enigmatic. Whoever does not want to wander from his flock, hears it and follows it. His very faithful manager, a teacher of the Gentiles in truth and faith (1 Tim 2:7), because he himself [i.e. Jesus] speaks in him, says I am astonished that you are so quickly deserting the one who called you in the grace of Christ and are turning to a different gospel, because there is no other; unless some are confusing you and wanting to pervert the Gospel of Christ. But even if we or an angel from heaven should proclaim to you a gospel contrary to what we proclaimed to you, let there be anathema upon him. As we have said before, so now I repeat, if anyone proclaims to you a gospel contrary to what you received, let there be anathema upon him (Gal 1:6-9). (Chapter 12)

For this reason, if the evidence of the canonical Scriptures needs no interpreter, which commends the Church standing in communion with the whole world and you can find no such right for your separation in Africa established from the same books, you do not justly complain of persecution which the Church endures more gravely the more broadly it is spread and it bears all things in faith, hope, and love, not just such things which your Circumcellians and such other inflict on their members where they can but all scandals of various injustices abounding throughout the whole world, concerning which the Lord shouted woe to the world because of scandals (Mt. 18:7). (Chapter 20)

Now let this be enough; stop working with such texts. Everything of this type you have brought forward is either to our benefit, or that I might limit much of my own case, it is certain to whose benefit it is. But you willingly linger in obscurities, lest you be compelled to speak openly. Behold the Church. I ask, why are you passive? Behold the Church commended and announced, foretold and shown with so much obvious evidence from the Holy Scripture as we have heard, so have we seen (Ps. 48:8). Why do you delay how you might be gathered in? Why do you refuse to be thus gathered in, as the Church for which the one who cannot lie offers evidence gathers you in. Teach that which the canonical Scripture openly said that he who might be baptized among heretics was to be baptized in the catholic Church in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Even if you can’t teach this, teach to you own communion, that is to Donatus’ sect where you learned this, that some obvious and clear evidence is offered by the canonical Scriptures and I shall say that people should go over to you and that the heretics shouldn’t be gathered in any other way from how the church in which you are gathers them in, since it has been made clear by such evidence. Why do you rage, why are you disturbed? You do not find in the canonical Scriptures what we demand of you. What you are accustomed to say where you pasture your flock, where you make it lie down at noon (Cant. 1:7), you see what it is and how it does not benefit you. Do not then seek such things since even if the sect of Donatus were in northern regions which are opposite to the southern regions, he would say it was said of him Mount Zion, in the far north, the city of the great king (Ps. 48:2). Certainly the city of the great king is nothing if not the Church, and that doubtlessly means the Church rather than this where you pasture your flock, where you make it lie down at noon? But perhaps Marcion the heretic used that evidence who is said to have been from Pontus which is in the north. Again, if the sect of Donatus were in the west, he would say that this was said of him journey to him who ascends over the sun’s setting; his name is the Lord (Ps. 68:4). Perhaps he would say this is loftier to ascend over the setting sun than make it lie down at noon. These are mysterious, secret, symbolic; we beg of you something obvious that doesn’t need an interpreter.

And so I gather you in in the same way the offspring of Abraham gathers in in whom all nations shall gain blessing (Gen. 22:18). This would perhaps be mysterious, had Paul not revealed the seed of Abraham, which is Christ. Thus I gather you in in the same way that that desolate woman gathers whose many children will be more than the children of her that is married (Is. 54:1), which would be mysterious had Paul not said that she is the Church, our mother, to whom it was said the Lord who redeemed you, he will be called the God of the whole earth (Is. 54:5); to whom it was said your land the whole world (Is. 62:4); just as that queen gathers, concerning whom it is said in the Psalms at your right hand stands the queen (Ps. 45:9) and to whom it is said sons are born to you in place of ancestors, you will make them princes in all the earth (Ps. 45:16). Moreover, that I not go on too long, I thus gather you in, just as the Church gathers through all nations, beginning from Jerusalem (Lk. 24:47), just as the Church gathers, which is a witness to Christ in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to all the ends of the earth (Acts 1:8). He gathers you in, who said this of the Church, who displays it with such words, lest anyone doubt about it. Thus, I gather you in, in the same way he gathers the wheat sown in the field which grew with the tares until the harvest; for they are the children of the kingdom, the field is the world, the harvest is the end of the age (Mt. 13:38-19). The Lord expounded it, it is the Gospel; these are the words of the Lord, they are clear. (Chapter 24). 

On this account, dearest ones to whom I am writing this epistle, hold to that command of the shepherd with a very firm and faithful heart who laid down his life for his sheep and now glorified and exalted sits at the right hand of God the Father saying those who are my sheep hear my voice and follow me (Jn. 10:27). You hear his most obvious voice not only through his law and the prophets and psalms, but also through his own mouth commending his future Church and in reading you will see these things which he foretold in the way in which they followed in order in the Acts and the epistles of the apostles, which complete the canon of the divine Scriptures. This is not an obscure speech in which they might deceive you whom the Lord himself foretold would say here is the Christ. There he is. Look! He is in the wilderness (Mt. 24:23, 26), as if to show where there is no great crowd; look! He is in the inner rooms (Mt. 24:26), as if to show he is in the secret traditions and teachings. You have the Church spread everywhere and growing to the harvest; you have the city, of which he who founded it said, a city built on a hill cannot be hid (Mt. 5:14). This is therefore one which is well known not in some region of the world, but everywhere. Sometimes it suffers these passing storms even in its grain so that it is not recognized in certain places; yet it lives hidden there. Nor can the divine speech be deceived since it grows up to the harvest. (Chapter 24)

But you, supported by so much obvious evidence from the law, prophets, psalms, the Lord himself, and the apostles concerning the Church spread throughout the world, demand of them that they show some clear evidence from the canonical books out of Africa that pertains to Donatus’ sect. It cannot be found in any way as I have already said that the Church, as they say and which is not true, was foretold to perish so quickly from so many nations, with so much evidence so exaltedly and doubtlessly and it was silent concerning that Church which they want to be their own which, as they contend, was to remain until the end. Be mindful of what was said to that rich man when he was tormented in hell and he wanted a message to be sent to his brothers from the dead: they have, he said, Moses and the prophets (Lk. 16:29). And when he said they would not believe unless someone from the dead was sent to them: if they do not listen to Moses and the prophets neither will they believe if someone rises from the dead (Lk. 16:31). Moses said that in the offspring of Abraham, all nations shall be blessed (Gen. 22:18); the prophets said you shall be called my delight and your land the entire world (Is. 62:4) and all the ends of the earth shall remember and turn to the Lord (Ps. 22:27). They did not want to believe in these and so many other so obvious pronouncements demonstrating the Church. The Lord rose from the dead and said that repentance and the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all nations beginning from Jerusalem. Those who had not believed Moses and the prophets did not also believe the Lord rising from the dead; what remains unless that they gain the torments of that rich man? You who are fleeing these while there is still time before you depart from this life, remain constant in the divine utterances so that you are not disturbed in this life and after this life you deserve to receive what was promised to the offspring of Abraham. (Chapter 25)

Scripture as Sufficient

But if you shout or read aloud from some other place, we do not admit, believe, or receive your voice after we have heard the voice of our shepherd through the mouths of the prophets, through his own voice, and through the mouths of the evangelists so openly declared to us. (Chapter 12)

All such things then removed, let them demonstrate their Church, if they can, not in the speeches and murmurs of African, not in the councils of their bishops, not in the epistles of whatever debates, not in false signs and prodigies, since we are prepared and cautioned against them by the word of the Lord, but in the precept of the law, in the predictions of the prophets, in the songs of the psalms, in the utterances of the one shepherd himself, in the preaching of the evangelists, that is in all the canonical authority of the holy books, and not such that they might gather and cite things that are spoken obscurely or ambiguously or metaphorically which anyone might interpret according to his own opinion as he wishes. Such things cannot be properly understood and explained unless first those things that are said most openly are held with a strong faith. (Chapter 18)

Once these snares of delays have been laid aside let him show that the Church should be preserved in Africa alone with so many other nations lost or that it should be repaired and fulfilled among all nations from Africa. Let him show this that he not say, "it is true because I say this or because my colleague has said this or some colleagues of mine or our bishops or clergy or laity or it is true for this reason that Donatus or Pontius or somebody else has performed these or those miracles or that men pray to the memory of our dead or that these or those facts are relevant here or that our brother or sister has had some vision while awake or has dreamed some vision while asleep." Let these fictions of lying men or omens of treacherous spirits be removed. Or is it not true what is said, if some miracles of the heretics were performed we should be very cautious, because the Lord said that certain men would be deceitful who by performing some signs would deceive the elect, if that were possible. He adds vehemently, take note, I have told you beforehand (Mt 24:25). The Apostle also warns about this now the Spirit expressly says that in later times some will renounce the faith by paying attention to deceitful spirits and the teachings of demons (1 Tim 4:1). Moreover, if anyone praying in memory of heretics is heard, not by merit of the location but by merit of his desire does he receive good or ill. Thus it is written the spirit of the Lord has filled the world (Wis 1:7) and a jealous ear hears all things (Wis 1:10). Many are heard by an angry God of whom the Apostle says God gave them up to the lust of their hearts (Rom 1:24) and to many a favorable God does not bestow what they wish that he might bestow what is useful. The Apostle said the same thing about the goad of his flesh, the angel of Satan, which he said was given to him to box him lest he become insolent from the greatness of his revelation three times I appealed to the Lord about this that it would leave me, and he said to me "My grace is sufficient for you for power is made perfect in weakness" (2 Cor. 12:8-9). Do we not read that some are heard by the Lord God on the peaks of the mountains of Judea, which heights nevertheless were displeasing to God so that the kings who didn't overturn them were found with fault and those who overturned them were praised? From this it is understood that the condition of the petitioner is stronger than the place of the petition. Concerning false visions let them read what was written that even Satan disguises himself as an angel of the light (2 Cor 11:14) and that dreams have deceived many (Sir. 34:7). Let them also hear what the pagans say was miraculously done or seen from their temples and yet the gods of the peoples are demons but the Lord made the heavens (Ps 96:5). Therefore, many are heard and in many ways, not just catholic Christians but also pagans and Jews and heretics given over to various errors and superstitions. They are however heard either by deceiving spirits who nevertheless do nothing unless they are allowed, God judging ineffably from on high what should be bestowed to each person, whether by God himself either for the punishment of wickedness or for the consolation of misery or for a warning to seek eternal salvation. No one arrives at that salvation and eternal life unless he have Christ as his head. No one can have Christ as his head unless he be in his body, which is the Church, which we ought to acknowledge just as the head itself in the Holy canonical Scriptures, and not seek in the various murmurs, opinions, deeds, words, and visions of men.

Let no one who is prepared to respond to me therefore set this before me that I don't say that I should be believed that the communion of Donatus is not the Church of Christ on this account, that certain men who were bishops among them were convicted by ecclesiastical, municipal, and judicial decrees of having given divine instruments over to the flames, or that in the judgment of the bishops, which they sought from the emperor, they did not maintain their case or that appealing to the emperor himself they even deserved a sentence from him against them or that there are such leaders of the Circumcellians among them, or that the Circumecellians commit such evil, or that there are those among them who cast themselves from precipices or sacrifice others to be consumed in flames whom they themselves burned or they force their slaughter upon unwilling men through terror and they seek so many voluntary and insane deaths so that they will be loved by people or that these drunken flocks of vagabonds mixed with wantonness bury themselves day and night in wine at their tombs and annihilate themselves in disgrace. May this crowd be the chaff and not judge the grain if they adhere to the Church. But they may not show whether they adhere to the Church unless from the canonical books of the divine Scriptures since we do not say that it should be believed of us that we are in the Church of Christ on this account that Optatus of Milevis or Ambrose of Milan or countless other bishops in communion with us commended that Church to which we adhere or that this Church was preached by the councils of our colleagues or that throughout the whole world, in the holy places that our communion frequents, so many miracles either of answered prayers or of healings are performed that the bodies of martyrs that lay hidden for so many years were revealed to Ambrose because they could hear many petitioners and a man blind for many years who was well known in the city of Milan received his sight at those bodies or since this one saw in a dream and that one heard in an ecstasy either that he should not go to Donatus' sect or that he should abandon Donatus' sect. Whatever such things happened in the catholic Church should therefore be approved of. Because they happen in the catholic Church, the Church is not therefore shown to be catholic, just because these things happen in it. The Lord Jesus himself, when he rose from the dead, offered his body to be seen by the eyes of his disciples and touched with their hands in case they nevertheless think they experienced some trick. He considered them more strengthened by the evidence of the law, the prophets, and the psalms, showing what was predicted earlier was fulfilled in him. So he commends his Church, saying that repentance and the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed to all nations beginning from Jerusalem. He asserted that this was written in the law, the prophets, and the psalms; we adhere to this commended by his own mouth. This is the evidence of our case, this the foundation, this the support. (Chapter 19)

…it suffices that we adhere to this Church which is shown by the most obvious evidence of Holy and canonical Scripture. (Chapter 22)

Why should I bring forth more things then? Whoever would think to respond to this epistle, let him search through the Scriptures and either let him bring forth clear evidence concerning Africa in which alone or from which alone Donatus’ sect is (which he cannot bring forth, since Scripture cannot be opposed to these clear citations we have brought forth) or if he seeks credulous followers of his suspicions or charges or slanders and he wishes to lead them to another gospel (but there is no other) and preach to us one other than what we have received, even if he were an angel from heaven, there would have been an anathema, since the devil, who also fell from heaven because he did not stand in the truth preached to man something other than what he had received from the Lord God, if there were an anathema upon man, these first parents of our flesh would not have fallen into the punishment of death nor would they have departed from that place of happiness. (Chapter 24)

Thursday, May 9, 2013

Gordon Clark on the Precondition of an Omniscient Communicator

My efforts to compile a near comprehensive transcription of the positive epistemological views of Gordon Clark were recently completed - at least as far as what materials I am at present able to cover, anyway, including all of his books and, to my knowledge, most of his shorter articles - and this project has been paying off quite nicely.

For instance, I have long argued that in order for me to philosophically know anything, one precondition for this is communication from one who is omniscient (example). While the inspiration for this argument originally stemmed from a book Robert Reymond called The Justification of Knowledge, it turns out that Gordon Clark made much more explicitly relevant statements which lead to this conclusion. To share just a few of these:

Ancient Philosophy (1997), pg. 145:
Now, where the Ideas are important, everything is related to everything else. To use a crude example, the explanation of a desk lamp would require explanations of desks and lamps. The desks would then lead us into carpentry, labor troubles, kinds of wood, forestry, and governmental conservation. An explanation of lamps would include the laws of electricity, and so on forever. In fact, before one could understand a desk lamp, one would have to understand the universe. 
This stress on the interrelations of everything with everything can be developed in two directions. One may argue: Since we know this one thing, we can deduce everything else; or one may argue: Since we do not know everything else, neither do we know this. The first direction has appealed to Hegel, to Bonaventure, Augustine, and Plato.
Historiography: Secular and Religious (1971), pg. 334:
What follows if it is true that psychological analysis presupposes a “complete knowledge of the psychological possibilities of life”? It would follow, would it not, that historical analysis also presupposes a complete knowledge of historical possibilities. In short, it would be impossible to know anything without knowing everything. 
Such a Platonic or Hegelian requirement of omniscience is a serious philosophical problem. It is not to be dismissed thoughtlessly. The meticulous scholar, J. H. Hexter, in his Reappraisals of History, castigates historical relativism as a fad and insists on the “rudimentary distinction” between knowing something and knowing everything. But he omits all philosophic justification for this distinction. 
Undoubtedly this distinction must be maintained, if a human being is able to know anything at all. Make omniscience the prerequisite of partial knowledge, and partial knowledge vanishes. But Bultmann, like Hexter, offers no help: less help, in fact, for Bultmann lets the requirements of omniscience stand.

Baker’s Dictionary of Theology (1991), pgs. 245-246:
Plato and Hegel constructed theories of knowledge which, if pressed to their logical extreme, imply that man must be either omniscient or completely ignorant. If every item of knowledge is so intimately connected with every other that its true nature cannot be seen except in its relation to all, then either we know all or we know nothing. Plato and Hegel both had a hard time escaping this dilemma. 
Now Moses said, “The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever” (Deut. 29:29). The Bible, therefore, both here and everywhere, assumes that we can know some truths without knowing all truths. Accordingly it is incumbent upon us to develop an epistemology in which the relationships are not such as to limit us to the disjunction of total ignorance or omniscience. 
This epistemology may follow Augustine’s view that Christ is the light of every man: that is, mankind possesses as an a priori endowment at least the rudiments of knowledge, so that whenever anyone knows anything he is in contact with God. Or, the epistemology required may be more skeptical as to geometry and science and simply insist that God, being omnipotent, can be a verbal revelation make his truths understandable to me.

Readers can consider this just a teaser. I actually already have in mind an outline for a more comprehensive article that would more fully utilize Clark's writings to show how this argument provides a really powerful motive for accepting many of his epistemic views, but I would like to see if I could get something like that published first.

Monday, September 13, 2010

White vs. Sungenis on Predestination

After listening to a recent debate between James White and Robert Sungenis on predestination and free will, which the reader can listen to here, I felt compelled to write some notes on the more confusing and erroneous points Sungenis made in his opening statement. I have tried to categorize his statements as best I can.

Church History

Sungenis cited the Council of Orange to explain in what way he believes man possesses free will: enabling grace. However, it is not clear to me in what way Sungenis purports to harmonize Catholic soteriology with several of its canons. He cited Canon 4:

“If anyone maintains that God awaits our will to be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our will to be cleansed comes to us through the infusion and working of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit himself who says through Solomon, "The will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35, LXX), and the salutary word of the Apostle, "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:13).”

Canon 6 makes a similar condemnation:

“If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).”

Does Sungenis believe the Holy Spirit is infused into unbelievers and, if so, what is the nature of such an infusion if not regenerative? White cited a staple passage for the doctrine of total depravity, Romans 8:7-8, in his opening statement, but the verse following is more relevant to this question:

Romans 8:9a You, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you…

If indeed Sungenis believes that the infusion of the Spirit is of a similar nature to that described by Paul – and if the Spirit is said to be infused, I do not see how he could contend otherwise – then in order to remain consistent, he would have to contend a prima facie absurdity: that to be “in the spirit” implies nothing more than that one’s nature, upon infusion, is enabled to choose to believe or disbelieve God’s word; one is not neutral if he is in the spirit.

This confusion aside, Augustine’s influence is nowhere else more evident than in the particular Scriptures the council cites to support its declarations, for Augustine was not shy about repeating passages like 1 Corinthians 4:7, 15:10 in order to press his [similar] arguments. That Sungenis believes Lucidus from the 5th century is the first [post-apostolic] forerunner of “absolute predestination” – i.e. predestination without respect to free will – betrays an unfamiliarity (to put it generously) with Augustine, who most certainly believed in monergism.

Calvinism

After a little church history, Sungenis proceeds to explain how free will is incompatible with total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints.

Sungenis’ understanding of unconditional election is somewhat questionable, as he believes it implies God elects arbitrarily; in a later clip, he asserts that a God who decrees sin in order to manifest His justice and wrath as well as His mercy and grace is arbitrary. But this doesn’t make sense at all. God’s choices are grounded in His consistent, righteous desire to uphold that which is infinitely worthy: His glory. How exactly is that arbitrary? Sungenis’ unsupported accusations, arguments from incredulity (“What kind of God would [do this]?”), arguments from silence (“Wouldn’t God get more glory if He saved all men without exception?”), and utter failure to distinguish between a desire to manifest of His nature to His people from a sub-human need to “prove who He is” are just several samples of the kind of question-begging and straw man argumentation Sungenis resorts to throughout his opening statement, as will become more apparent.

In any case, Sungenis is obviously not a Molinist, since he believes free will and unconditional election are not compatible. Moreover, Sungenis appears equally unswayed by the argument that new Eden provides an example par excellance of a situation in which man could possess free will and yet be unable to fall away; perhaps he doesn’t believe Christians will retain free will after death. I cannot discern that free will bears any direct relation to the extent of the atonement, but at least Sungenis seems to recognize that classical Arminians cannot consistently believe in total depravity and that free will is mutually exclusive with sola gratia.

Coherence

After this contrast, Sungenis explains why he believes in a kind of predestination that works “in conjunction with” free will: the Bible says so. Now this is an admirable reason to believe a doctrine is true, but if one were, on this account, to expect that Sungenis would endeavor to immediately substantiate his assertion and explain the way in which free will relates to predestination, he would be disappointed. Instead, the audience is treated to a lengthy speech in which Sungenis more or less says that systematic theology is hard and God is incomprehensible. One of his arguments could be constructed as follows:

P: Philosophers have debated God’s nature for thousands of years.
P: It is possible that, in some way we do not understand, God’s nature is reflected in all the variant positions which have been advocated during these debates.
C: Analogously, free will and predestination could cohere.

Or maybe:

P: Contrasted concepts of either/or questions which I can’t answer can both be taught in Scripture.
P: The coherence of free will and predestination is such a question.
C: The Bible teaches free will in conjunction with predestination!

Though spoken in a bit of jest, it was truly painful to listen to the way in which Sungenis attempted to excuse his prefatory gymnastics. His follow-up argument was nothing more than a tu quoque argument against White: since White believes Adam possessed free will yet believed God ordained the Fall, White must believe that predestination and free will can cohere. But even if all this were true, it does not follow that free will is biblical.

Even more painful is to listen to Sungenis couch his arguments in hypothetical language and then proceed to pontificate as though the hypothetical is a given. For example, he argues: “If God Himself commands that man participate in salvation by exercising his free will to accept or reject God, then… etc.” But since Sungenis never actually gets around to demonstrating that God commands man participate in salvation by exercising his free will, whether or not his conclusions follow from this conditional are irrelevant. Sungenis will later assume that the fact that all men are commanded to believe implies they can believe and that an “invitation” to believe likewise implies such a capacity, but when push comes to shove, he can provide no substantial argument.

Distinguishing Factors

Sungenis was eager to intercept the argument that free will implies that one who chooses to believe is smarter, more spiritually sensitive, or in some general way “better” than Joe Reprobate who chose, also by free will, to reject God. Yet if Sungenis believes it is within bounds to criticize the Calvinist for believing in a God who chooses arbitrarily, it is unclear why he would consider it out of bounds for the Calvinist to criticize Sungenis’ position on similar grounds.

Sungenis is also critical of being labeled a synergist or anthropocentric because he does not wish to be associated with others who have dissimilar beliefs to his own. Read that again and see if it makes sense. Even more puzzlingly, he says that if one wishes to learn about synergism, he needn’t look any further than the variance amongst Reformed Theologians regarding lapsarianism &c. Needless to say, Sungenis made not one whit of sense throughout this portion of his diatribe.

He continued in this nonsensical fashion by further criticizing Reformers for making such distinctions in the first place, accusing the origin of disunity on a general lack of possession of the truth; of course, given that Sungenis cannot likewise account for Molinism and Thomism within Roman Catholicism, it is little wonder that Sungenis feels the need to employ yet another disguised tu quoque argument, viz. for no other reason than to attempt to drag his opponents down to ground equal to his own: none.

Exegesis

A little more than halfway through his opening statement, Sungenis finally gets around to putting forward positive evidence for his position… or so it would seem.

In his first cited text, 1 Timothy 2:4, Sungenis assumes that “all men” refers to men without exception rather than without distinction when he in fact cites verses in context which would seem to support the latter interpretation (verse 1 and 6, cf. verse 2). Using his argumentation, Roman Catholics would retranslate Romans 3:23 such that Mary and Jesus are excluded. Apparently, Roman Catholics don’t believe all means all! Comically, Sungenis doesn’t ever connect God’s alleged desire to save all without exception to man’s free will, so one is left to speculate as to just how 1 Timothy 2:4 teaches the concept. The same goes for his throwaway citation of 1 John 2:2 (in which the analogous John 11:51-52 is unsurprisingly left unmentioned).

His other citations fare little better. Neither John 5:39 nor Matthew 23:37 imply, in their respective contexts, that the men mentioned could have been willing to act contrary to what they did, and in 2 Timothy 2:13, Sungenis reverts to assuming that a conditional statement implies actuality – whereas Christ and the apostles repeatedly said he who denies Christ is an antichrist. With that, Sungenis has run out of ammo. That’s all he had to offer.

Logic

The shallow nature of Sungenis’ argumentation is no more evident, however, when Sungenis is reduced to appealing to the emotions of the audience. Sungenis would seemingly have his audience believe that all unbelievers are poor, needy souls who are crying out for a Savior only to be stiff-armed at the goal line by the tyrant God of Calvinism. What rubbish! Men are slaves to sin and lovers of darkness before they are regenerated. White often uses imagery of a man standing on the precipice of Hell shaking his fists at his Creator. In less dramatic terms, he has related times when he has spoken to people who say they cannot possibly accept the God of Calvinism, to which he replies: “I know.” That is to say, apart from God’s unobligated grace and mercy, sinners are quite content with going about their own business of living in sin, thank you very much. Of course they reject God. Sungenis is a very good example of this: he presumes a loving God must attempt (and fail more often than not) to save all men without exception and is further willing to call the biblical God monstrous. One would do well to observe how quickly Sungenis proceeded from an incomprehensible God to an anthropocentric God.

One final attempt is made by Sungenis to show that God can predestine men according to their free will. The CCC, paragraph 600, states:

“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of "predestination", he includes in it each person's free response to his grace”: "In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place." For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.”

Sungenis claims that this illustrates how Roman Catholics are able to interpret Scripture at face value and compatibilize free will with predestination. But firstly, after complaining that White must interprets the “all men” of 1 Timothy 2:4 according to his preconceptions, it is ironic that Sungenis cites an interpretation of Acts 4:27 which substitutes “permitted” for “predestined” without further ado. And secondly, it is very interesting that this catechism predicates God’s predestination on creaturely wills. One wonders how Sungenis would respond to the objection that free will necessarily implies that God cannot be eternally omniscient.

Conclusion

Contrasted to White’s opening statement, Sungenis’ was poor. I had hoped Sungenis would challenge White, but even a lowly layman such as me can perceive the ridiculousness of Sungenis’ arguments. I may listen to the rest of the debate at some other time, if only to hear White’s rebuttal and the cross-ex, but if this is seriously the best non-Calvinism has to offer by way of a defense of free will, what a let-down.