Showing posts with label Coherentism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Coherentism. Show all posts

Thursday, December 19, 2024

A Review of "The Bible, Verification, and First Principles of Reason" (Without Excuse)

Last year, I posted a few extended comments on a footnote that referenced Gordon Clark in chapter 11 of Without Excuse (link). In this post, I plan to focus attention on chapter one. It's the essay I found to be the most interesting, contains the only other mentions of Clark in the book, and can also be read for free (link).

The author, M. Dan Kemp, proposes the following thesis: “…if the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge, attempts to verify the Christian Scriptures are not epistemically profitable” (pg. 1). When I read this for the first time, it sounded like Mr. Kemp was suggesting that a Christian foundationalist who accepts Scripture as his epistemic foundation cannot know his epistemic foundation by inferential reasoning. Therefore, any further attempts made towards that end - knowing the Christian Scriptures are true - would not be profitable. 

I would have agreed with Mr. Kemp to the extent that the sort of "human knowledge" in question are true beliefs humans have that are epistemically justified in an internalist and infallibilist sense. That is, in some contexts, while I think "knowledge" might legitimately refer to something other than this (e.g. mere true beliefs; true beliefs that are justified in an externalist sense), there are ways in which internalist and infallibilist "knowledge" is distinctively important. I think the latter knowledge alone can provide grounds for full assurance of salvation or a defense of one's beliefs. With these qualifications in mind - and the importance of these qualification will become more apparent later on - Mr. Kemp's thesis seems sound.

Immediately following this thesis, however, Mr. Kemp says:

This result is particularly acute in readings of Scripture passages that seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God. I argue that the position put forward by Clark, Van Til, and Frame entails a reading of these passages that renders them useless as criteria of verification, even though, on the contrary, the passages present themselves as such. In short, the popular reply to critics of the Clark and Van Til school mentioned above does not succeed. (Without Excuse, pgs. 1-2)

As I initially read this, the first question I had was what Mr. Kemp thinks "verification" means. More on this below.

The second question I had was why Mr. Kemp seems to suggest that Clark, Van Til, and Frame had a singular "position" on this topic. From what follows in the rest of the chapter, Clark would have certainly disagreed with Frame et al. if, as Mr. Kemp thinks, these authors really were "insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means" (pg. 10). By at least the time he wrote "How Firm a Foundation?" in 1943 (also see below), there can be no question about how Clark viewed Scripture for the rest of his life. 

Clark did not think exactly as Frame and Van Til did. This fact is actually indicated by the only time Clark is even quoted in the entire chapter (in a section Mr. Kemp entitles, “Justification and Circularity,” no less!):

How do we know if a purported first principle is correct? Consider again the exchange about my birth city. If the Christian Scriptures are the first principle of reason, then it will not do for me to end the conversation by asserting that reliable witnesses, sensory experience, and memory ought to be believed. Even these principles require rational justification. Gordon Clark says,

Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically…Since therefore every philosophy must have its first indemonstrable axiom, the secularist cannot deny the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom. Accordingly, let the Christian axiom be the truth of the Scriptures. This is the Reformation principle sola scriptura. (Without Excuse, pg. 7)

Take another example of Clark's thought on this subject:

A recent book on Classical Apologetics tries to prove the divine origin and infallibility of the Bible on the premise that the Bible contains accounts of God’s miracles. This is circular reasoning: How do you know the Bible is God’s Word? Because it contains accounts of God’s miracles. How do you know that the accounts are true? Because they are in God’s inerrant Scripture! If anyone wish to prove that the Bible is a divine revelation, his premise cannot be the Bible itself. One does not prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis that the squares of the other two sides equal the square of the hypotenuse. (Commentaries on Paul’s Epistles, 2005, pg. 314 [originally published in 1986 in his book, First & Second Thessalonians])

Is it not clear that Clark's position is different from any position which suggests that "first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means"? To my knowledge, there are only a few places one might try to find some indication that Clark approved of circular reasoning. The first comes from an article Clark wrote on "Apologetics" in 1957. In providing his understanding of Van Til's apologetic, Clark wrote:

In total opposition to Thompson's point of view, the Reformed apologist frankly admits that his methodology presupposes the truth of Christianity. Therefore "the issue between believers an unbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to 'facts' or 'laws' whose nature is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate" (p. 117). Since "there is one system of reality of which all that exists forms a part," and since "any individual fact of this system is what it is in this system," it follows that apart from Christian presuppositions "no facts mean anything at all" (p. 164). "All reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusions are always involved in one another" (p. 118). These quotations, of course, seriously abbreviate Van Til's exposition, but if one keeps in mind the acknowledged control of axioms over theorems, and the theorem's presupposing the axioms, in which case geometry itself may loosely be called circular reasoning, it will not be too difficult to grasp Van Til's thought. 
But apologetics is more complicated than plane geometry, and the matter of the starting point becomes involved with the notion of a common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and a theory of analogy.

In this discussion of the starting point with the example of the axioms and theorems of geometry, it is immediately obvious that there can be no theorem common to two systems of geometry. 

At least three observations mitigate against interpreting the above as evidence that Clark's accepted the epistemic legitimacy of circular reasoning. Firstly, Clark is expositing Van Til's thought, not expressing his own. As the rest of the article shows, Clark's "grasp" of Van Til of Van Til's thought cannot be equated with his acceptance of Van Til's thought. 

Secondly, anyone who believes that the above summary implies some measure of agreement between Clark and Van Til must first acknowledge Clark's own qualifications: axioms "control" theorems, circular reasoning is only "loosely" allowed as a referent to the geometric analogy (in particular), etc. This is not the language of traditional coherentism.

Finally, the above context is not only about Van Til's thought in general, it's specific to Van Til's thought on apologetics. The title of the article itself makes that obvious. This is important, as epistemology (the focus of Mr. Kemp's essay) is a distinct discipline. Apologetics is a discipline which itself presupposes epistemology. An allowance for self-reference or circular reasoning in a context in which one is defending his faith (see below) is entirely different from allowing self-reference or circular reasoning in a context of epistemic justification (see the above quotes from Clark). 

So much for this example. The only other location I could find that might afford reason for thinking Clark advocated circular reasoning is from an article he wrote in 1963 entitled, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?" He writes:

The first reason for believing the Bible is inspired is that the Bible claims to be inspired. When this reason is offered to an unbeliever, almost always his immediate reaction is derision. To him it is very much like putting a liar on the witness stand and having him swear to tell the truth. But why a liar? Do not honest witnesses also swear to tell the truth? Yet even a Christian with a smattering of logic may object to this procedure because it seems to beg the question. It is circular. We believe the Bible to be inspired because it makes the claim, and we believe the claim because it is inspired and therefore true. This does not seem to be the right way to argue.

It must be granted that not every claim is ipso facto true. There have been false witnesses in court, there have been false Messiahs, and there have been fraudulent so-called revelations. But to ignore the claim of the Bible, or of witnesses generally, is both an oversimplification and a mistake. For example, suppose the Bible actually says that it is not inspired. Or suppose merely that the Bible is completely silent on the subject – that it makes no more claim to divine inspiration than did Churchill. In such a case, if the Christian asserts that the book is inspired, the unbeliever would be sure to reply that he is going far beyond the evidence.

This reply is certainly just. There is no reason for making assertions beyond those that can be validly inferred from the statements of the Bible. But because this reply is so just, it follows that the unbeliever’s derision at our first remark was groundless. What the Bible claims is an essential part of the argument. The Christian is well within the boundaries of logic to insist that the first reason for believing in the inspiration of the Bible is that it makes this claim. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 2-3)

It may initially appear as if Clark is admitting as legitimate a circular "procedure." But even here, Clark admits that self-attestation simpliciter does not constitute a proof - as he puts it, "not every claim is ipso facto true." For example, the Bible claims to be God's word and the Quran claims to be God's word. Yet because the Bible contradicts the Quran, both claims cannot be true. An argument regarding the self-attesting nature of a source does not "prove" either is what it claims to be. 

But Clark does acknowledge that self-attestation is apologetically legitimate. A Christian can at least begin his defense of his faith by noting that the Bible claims to be God's word. But, for Clark, a "reason for believing the Bible" is not a suggestion that one's belief in the Bible is founded upon some more basic epistemic truth. Anyone who thinks that failed to read the rest of the article, let alone the rest of Clark's works. Clark clarifies:

Christianity is often repudiated on the ground that it is circular: The Bible is authoritative because the Bible authoritatively says so. But this objection applies no more to Christianity than to any philosophic system or even to geometry. Every system of organized propositions depends of necessity on some indemonstrable premises, and every system must make an attempt to explain how these primary premises come to be accepted. (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 17-21)

Note that for Clark, self-attestation is not purported to be a demonstration of the truth of Christianity. Rather, he emphasizes that an objection Christians face regarding circular reasoning can be applied tu quoque to the objectors. Clark agrees with Mr. Kemp that “If Scriptures forms the basis of all knowledge, then all arguments for the trustworthiness of Scripture are circular” (pg. 2) - and then he extends this point to other worldviews with stated first principles. An apologetic which uses circular reasoning (e.g. self-attestation), as a means of converting unbelievers is not deficient; after all, how can anyone who would attempt defend his own, primary, indemonstrable premises do so without first knowing such premises? 

Again, apologetics presupposes epistemology. Thus, Clark is not suggesting that one's own, primary, indemonstrable premises are epistemically grounded in or demonstrated by prior reasons. This would be incoherent. For those interested, I've written more on coherentism, foundationalism, and self-attestation here and here.

Bringing the conversation back to Mr. Kemp's article: however Mr. Kemp responds to Frame et. al., his reply to Clark ought to be somewhat different. Here is the extent of Mr. Kemp's reply to the first Clark quote he referenced above:

According to this view, God’s revelation is the only ultimate principle. This claim has vexed many who hear it. If God’s revelation is the ultimate basis of all reason and knowledge, arguing with self-proclaimed nonbelievers becomes very complicated. On the one hand, the aim is to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures. On the other hand, on this view, reason presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures.

According to many who have espoused this view, the necessity of always and everywhere presupposing a proposition does not preclude the possibility of providing evidence for that proposition. Advocates of this view often emphatically tell us that evidence can be best, and indeed only, given for the existence of God when those evidences are put forth and interpreted according to “theistic standards,” which presuppose the existence of God. (Without Excuse, pgs. 7-8) 

We return to the crux of the issue: apologetics vs. epistemology. One can defend the faith by attacking another's first principles. Does such a procedure proceed from one's own first principles? Yes. And is the presuppositionalist suggesting that reason is only intelligible within the Christian worldview? Yes. But does that make the matter "very complicated," as Mr. Kemp suggests? I think not. It is legitimate and may be persuasive insofar as two people may share beliefs in common through which only one system can provide legitimate justification. I could just say that "the Bible is the basis for all knowledge; therefore, whatever basis you have can't be known." But an apologetic doesn't have to be that. 

I've spoken on this before (link, link), but let's ask anyway: "Why not? Can't the Spirit work to convict the minds of sinners, no matter what? If the root of the problem unbelievers have with Scripture is an ethical rebellion to it, isn’t proclaiming the simple truth sufficient opportunity by which the Spirit may work to remove an unbeliever’s rebellious spirit?" Sure - but the Spirit also works through ordinary means, and such may also involve removing barriers to belief. Stopping the mouths of unbelievers might involve explaining why their worldview does not account for knowledge. This could be persuasive even though it is an apologetic which proceeds from one's own, unproved first principle. That has uses.

If I ask someone who is blindfolded which picture I've drawn represents a person, they won’t be able to determine what I am drawing before their blindfold is removed. On the other hand, a picture must nevertheless be present so that if the blindfold is removed, they can determine what has been drawn. Now, I might draw a simple stick figure. If a drawing must be present for the blindfold to be removed, a simple picture would indeed suffice. The person whose blindfold is removed might even be able to pick out my drawing of a stick figure amongst other pictures that are not of persons. On the other hand, it wouldn’t hurt for me to erase some pictures beforehand so that a person is more apt to focus on my person picture – simply conceived or more well-drawn – in the case the blindfold is removed.

The blindfold is ethical rebellion, and only the Spirit can remove it. But the Spirit does so only when the truth is set before someone. It is often the case that the Spirit works when we do and rewards extra effort we put in. Part of this process can include erasing false pictures or worldviews. That removes barriers to aid in focusing on the truth, which has rational motivation and yet does not require an epistemology on which the truth of the Christian Scriptures are known by inference or verification. 

Also, apologetics is not just a rational enterprise. There is not only value in a defense of the faith along rational lines. If we are created by God, may we not suppose beauty, behavior, etc. have a role in persuasion (link)? Aesthetics matter - drawing on the above illustration, for example, there are better and worse pictorial representations of persons (and better and worse representations of Christianity), even if all the representations truly are of persons (and Christianity). 

While Mr. Kemp may find it vexing that God's revelation ought to be regarded as the "basis" of human reason, Clark simplifies what Mr. Kemp views as a complicated apologetic situation in the following article Clark wrote in 1943, which I quote at length: 

But the large majority of people who call themselves Christian in this twentieth century regard the Bible as a very infirm foundation. The appeal today is to experience and reason. It is even stated that it is of no use to talk with those who believe the Bible because talking itself is an appeal to reason. One must choose either reason or authority; one cannot have his Bible and his reason too.

A rational being, the liberals argue, cannot abdicate the throne of his autonomy. He cannot avoid the necessity of making the final decision, and even if he decides to abdicate, it is he who decides. Further, if he should abdicate, the question would always remain whether or not he should reascend the throne - and again it would be he who would make the decision.

The liberal continues: Reason cannot abdicate because it must choose from among different alleged revelations. And to try to persuade a person of the truth of a revelation implies that there is a common ground of persuasion. That common ground is reason. Anyone who argues or persuades at all recognizes reason as the final court.

Is there any reply that an orthodox Christian can make without denying the principle of authority?

The first observation is that the fact that a decision is our own does not imply that we are the final authority. If a person wishes to measure a distance, there are essentially only two ways of doing it. He may look at the distance and guess its length. This is not a very accurate method, nor does it make the guesser the final court of appeal; but it illustrates the attempt to make one's unaided reason the final court. The second method is to use an accurate measuring device such as a yardstick. In using this method, it is we, of course, who make the decision, but we appeal to the yardstick. And the second method has the advantage of being much more accurate. In such a situation, most people do not object to being bound by an external authority.

Since all analogies have their limits, a second observation must question the matter of abdication. To abdicate a throne, it is absolutely essential first to be on the throne. A person who has never been king cannot possibly abdicate. The liberals simply assume that man is on the throne, but that is the very point at issue. If God is on the throne, and if man is not autonomous, then the liberal argument is completely irrelevant.

A third observation is all that the present limits allow. The liberal has argued that we must choose the yardstick, one revelation among other alleged revelations, and that no doubt we seek to persuade others of the truth of the revelation we have chosen. But to persuade is to appeal to the common ground of reason.

This very plausible argument is obtained only by misunderstanding the implications of supernaturalism. To convict supernaturalism of inconsistency, it is necessary to represent it accurately. The plausibility of the objection to orthodox Christianity results from combining a supernatural view of revelation with a purely naturalistic view of persuasion. And the result is easily shown to be inconsistent. But if persuasion and revelation both are understood supernaturally, no inconsistency can be found. For, be it observed, there is no such thing as a common ground between the Christian and a nonchristian system. From a world naturalistically conceived, one cannot argue to the God of the Christians. From a world-view that denies all revelation, one cannot produce a Biblical revelation. Persuasion therefore is not an appeal to a common ground or to a nonchristian reason. Persuasion must be regarded as a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. The true Christian presents the Christian faith to unbelievers, he explains it and shows it in its fullness. Then the Christian prays that the Holy Spirit regenerate, his auditor, renew his mind, and enable him to see the truth of what has been said. This is not an appeal to experience, or to reason, or to a common ground; it is an appeal to the sovereign God of the universe. (link, 1943. "How Firm a Foundation?" The Presbyterian Guardian Sep. 10, Vol. 12, No. 16, 252.)

Mr. Kemp's vexation with Clark's presuppositionalism was whether "self-proclaimed nonbelievers" can be "rationally motivate[d to] belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures." Clark's above reply demonstrates that such apologetic persuasion is possible but dependent on the work of the Spirit: properly grounded human reason indeed "presupposes the truth of the Christian Scriptures," the very thing nonbelievers reject. Yet because the Spirit operates through the witness of believers, a believer may "aim... to rationally motivate belief in the truth of the Christian Scriptures" while prayerfully relying on the Spirit to remove any kind of barrier to the apologist's rational argumentation.

Does anyone deny that grace is necessary for unbelievers to accept [the premises of] Christianity? I would think Mr. Kemp would also admit this. Neither the presuppositionalist nor Mr, Kemp can ipso facto cause a change of mind by argumentation. To be fair, Mr. Kemp is not the only person who has struggled to understand the importance of the Spirit in Clark's apologetic. Even church historians such as Alan D. Strange have a false understanding:

One might argue that mysticism and pietism emphasize the Spirit without the Word and rationalism and orthodoxism the Word without the Spirit. The OPC has consciously sought to avoid both of these errors, the former in something like the Peniel movement and the latter in something like the Clark case... (Confident of Better Things, pg. 74)

Mr. Strange must be ignorant of articles such as "How Firm a Foundation?" For historians to perpetuate errors such as these illustrates the need for further research about what Clark actually thought. 

So rational motivation is possible. Clark thought unbelievers could reason validly insofar as they can accept conclusions which logically follow from certain premises - and they can do this even apart from presupposing the truth of Christian Scriptures. Unbelievers are still images of God, and they can follow valid arguments Christians make, so Christians have a point of contact with unbelievers in that they can show the reasoning of unbelievers to be unsound or false. That is, while unbelievers can reason validly, such reasoning will not be sound and cannot count as knowledge in an internalist, infallibilist sense, for the premises of unbelievers will necessarily either be false or unknowable (given the worldview of the unbeliever). 

Again, this all deals in apologetics. We aren't proving Christianity by arguing against others' worldviews, but we are implicitly defending it. Practically speaking (which is what apologetics is concerned with, insofar as the apologetic used is also true), an unbeliever won't have an infinite number of alternative worldviews in mind when you're discussing with him. 

Mr. Kemp can't categorize Clark with those who think that Scripture could be epistemically evidenced. All this points to a failure by Mr. Kemp to make good on his statement that Clark's "school" of thought doesn’t “succeed.” In fact, Clark's school of thought is barely engaged!

This ends Mr. Kemp's explicit reference to Clark, but I'll address what other parts of the chapter I think are relevant to his thought - not necessarily in page order - beginning with the question of what Mr. Kemp meant when he suggested that "Scripture passages... seem to provide methods of verification for a word of God." 

What Mr. Kemp means may involve an implicit critique of Clark even if we distinguish Clark's view from that of Frame, Van Til, and others. What, then, does Mr. Kemp mean by "verification"? It appears he means something like "infer[ential reasoning]." 

First principles are known indemonstrably. They are not known by inference from some other proposition. No argument can be given for first principles, but the Bible seems to assume that arguments for divine revelation can be given. Thus, Frame has not shown us why we should not read Scripture as prima facie evidence against the view that Scripture is the first principle of all knowledge. In fact, he makes matters worse by suggesting we “broaden the circle.” Increasing the distance between, say, “God exists” in the conclusion and “God exists” in the premises only gives the appearance of demonstrative knowledge. But in fact, insofar as such arguments are subjectively persuasive, they present a first principle as if it were something else. This is telling since it does not necessarily count against a belief to be put forward as self-justifying. But they should be asserted in their naked glory so that they can be known by themselves (per se) or their lack of self-evidence acknowledged. This constant inclination to regard Christianity as demonstrable may, I suggest, be the result of the operative but unacknowledged belief that it does not form the basic principle of all knowledge. 
Scripture provides examples of God’s Word being tested. Further, these instances of verification are not plausibly explained as broadly circular arguments, that is, circular arguments that incorporate several premises. Broadly circular arguments include premises and sub-arguments that do not provide evidence for the conclusion. They do not make the conclusion more credible than otherwise. Thus, they are not useful as arguments. They are psychologically useful or persuasive, as my argument notes, but this is the very problematic thing about them. Their usefulness is not in any rational element in them, and thus they are deceptive as arguments. It is therefore not flattering to Scripture to understand it as putting forth broadly circular arguments when alternative interpretations are available.  
This result prompts us to consider that there may be multiple first principles of knowledge rather than just one. Knowledge is not a system neatly worked out from a single indemonstrable axiom. Rather, there are many sources of knowledge—sensory experience, testimony, memory, conscience, and divine revelation—working together to inform our judgments. I leave the task of working out these various faculties of knowledge for another day. (Without Excuse, pg. 30) 

I'll return to "verification" in a moment. Mr. Kemp says he leaves the defense of his own position for another day, so I would normally absent myself from feeling the need to critique his view except where his attacks against my position provide occasion for it. That will largely be the case since I've talked about the topics he mentions in other posts. But Mr. Kemp does provide a few remarks about his own position that I'll address. 

One must first question what is Mr. Kemp's working definition of "knowledge." He writes, "A source of knowledge can be without a foundation and fallible" (pg. 6). Firstly, this is not the sort of "knowledge" presuppositionalists like Clark primarily are interested in, so if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that the presuppositionalist's claim that God's word is the basis for "all knowledge" includes "fallible knowledge," his entire chapter sadly rests on an equivocation and false assumption. He has smuggled into the definition of "knowledge" something with which the presuppositionalist is unconcerned. That is, I'm not aware of any presuppositionalist who would suggest that the Bible is the source of all ranges of meaning of "knowledge." Secondly, while Mr. Kemp says his "next few paragraphs will show" that his claim is true, I must be missing where he did that (or else I would have replied). Closest I can find actually is on pg. 4, which comes earlier: 

...imagine that you ask me why it is that I believe that I was born in Nuremburg. I reply that my parents told me I was. If you ask me why I believe my parents, I will tell you that they have been generally reliable in the past. Now here you can ask me at least two questions: (a) how I know that my parents have been reliable, and (b) why reliable witnesses ought to be believed. There appears to be no answer to (b), which asks for a reason to believe a self-evidently true proposition. Under normal conditions, and absent defeaters, reliable witnesses ought to be believed. My answer to (a) might be that my senses and memory tell me that many things my parents told me were in fact true. You might then ask me why I ought to trust my senses and why I ought to trust my memory. To that, again, I need not give an answer. I do not draw an inference from some more basic principle to my trust in my senses and memory. I just find myself doing so, and it seems right to do so.

It "seems right"? Is this really enough to "rationally motivate" anyone to accept Mr. Kemp's view? There's a seeming double standard at play. Now, I actually think Mr. Kemp's position could be tweaked to fit within the presuppositionalist system. But if Mr. Kemp is suggesting that he can "know" he was born in Nuremburg apart from a worldview grounded in divine revelation, I think he is mistaken. Clark made the point that children can be switched at birth - unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible. And if Mr. Kemp isn't talking about infallible knowledge, we must again point out to Mr. Kemp that Clark's presuppositionalism (at least) is concerned with full assurance or infallibilist justification. Admitting we could be "defeated" is precisely what we want to avoid when we defend Christianity.

Also, we could discuss what counts as a "reliable witness." Scripture itself is a "reliable" witness - an infallible witness - so there is a sense in which one can agree that "reliable" witnesses ought to be trusted. But short of infallibility, what counts as "reliable"? Now, if Scripture legitimizes certain, fallible witnesses, we have an answer to this question. But this again grounds our worldview in divine revelation, precisely what Mr. Kemp wants to deny. Instead, he doesn’t find anything "more basic" (trustworthy?) than his memory or senses. He says these are all something like conjoint first principles, “ultimate” in that each cannot “be reasonably questioned.” Can’t they? Didn't I just do that in the last few paragraphs?  

It is interesting that while Mr. Kemp says he can't find anything more basic that his memory or senses, he advocates for the idea that Scripture is "absolutely ultimate" in that it can "override" anything contradictory and cannot be overridden. So at least Mr. Kemp agrees that Scripture can't be defeated. But that admission concedes that "knowledge" had by divine revelation is in a different category altogether. As I said, Mr. Kemp pushes a multi-source theory of "knowledge" but equivocates on the meaning of the word. This undermines his thesis.

Returning to Mr. Kemp's comments on pg. 30 (see above), an attempt to epistemically "verify” (or "infer") that something is true would seem to fall into one of four different structural proposals by which a person might try to justify his beliefs: 1) an infinite chain of verification/justification (infinitism), 2) circular verification/justification (traditional coherentism), 3) verification/justification from a basis that is itself unjustified (positism), or 4) verification/justification from a basis that is itself justified (foundationalism).

If the Christian Scriptures constitute or form the basis for all human knowledge - as presuppositionalists whom Kemp intends to engage believe - then infinitism is not a live option. If Scripture itself can be known - as Christians should affirm - then neither is positism. I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. I further discuss why I disagree with these proposals regarding the structure of epistemic justification here, here, and here. That leaves foundationalism. 

Given the above, let's run through the rest of what Mr. Kemp says: does accepting foundationalism mean "No argument can be given for first principles"? As discussed already, no: apologetic arguments can be given. Is there a "rational" element in this argumentation? Yes: while the argumentation does not increase the epistemic justification for belief in God's word, removing intellectual barriers is rational. Displaying (to what extent is possible for us) the internal consistency of God's word is rational. Drawing better pictures is rational.

But further, is it "deceptive" to make arguments that are non-rational, psychological, or persuasive? How does that follow? I've given the following illustration several times before that shows just how nonsensical is Mr. Kemp's assertion (link): 

When a mom calls a child to dinner, she doesn’t need to identify who she is for the child to "know" who is calling. If she did identify herself, such self-attestation ("Ryan Hedrich, your mom is calling you!") wouldn’t be "needed"... but it also wouldn’t be unreasonable. Self-attestation might serve as a reminder to the child to take her words seriously. Aside from questions of knowledge, such reminders might have a psychological or pragmatic purpose (e.g. behavior reinforcement, mindfulness).

How is it deceptive for a mother to identify herself when she thinks such might cause a correction in her child's behavior? 

Similarly, experiencing what we already know is valuable. We can have full assurance of our complete salvation while we yet look forward to experiencing our great reward. We can have full assurance that God's word is true without having experienced said truth in certain ways: divine providence, historical confirmations, prayerful effectuality, etc. But when we do experience these things, it isn't deceptive to bring them up to those who would attempt to undermine our foundation. 

That ties in to another dimension of our Christian life: to behave like a Christian. Do we not defend our faith to remain faithful in the face of persecution, even to the point of martyrdom? How about when we sacrifice to help others? I suppose Mr. Kemp could reply that such behavioral apologetics are really rational in that we suffer unto glory and are humiliated unto exaltation (like our Savior), but I don't think something like rational anticipation of future reward is often (let alone always) in the minds of believers and unbelievers in these cases.

Arguments for divine revelation can be given, then. No one denies that. The question is whether such are of "epistemic profit." Mr. Kemp thinks so, citing a few Scriptures. He claims, “…no complicated exegesis is required for my argument” (pg. 3). Well, whether that is so or not is irrelevant. What matters is if his exegesis is sound, and I will argue it is not. 

The first passage cited is Exodus 4. But when one reads this passage, all that is indicated is that if one sign does not persuade the Israelites, another might. This is language of causation: certain signs might cause them to believe. Nowhere is it suggested that miracles are epistemically more basic than or on par with divine revelation, as if the word of God through Moses was itself insufficient. So if "verification" refers to epistemic inference, it isn’t unintelligible to deny Mr. Kemp's assertion that “Moses’ authority as a speaker of God’s word is verified by miraculous events” (pg. 13). At most, we can say that what is happening is that gracious Yahweh is drawing the Israelites fuller, better pictures. But even this is apologetic, not epistemic.

The second passage Mr. Kemp mentions is Deuteronomy 18. Mr. Kemp says, “Deuteronomy anticipates that some would claim to receive a prophecy from God, and that such claims will need to be tested” (pg. 13). Well, tested, yes. Verified, no; rather, falsified. Read verse 21 closely: "How may we know the word that the Lord has not spoken?"

Now, we could delve into what meaning of "know" might here be in use. The crux, though, is that this passage primarily deal with how to falsify false prophets. In fact, any two people can predict contradictories ("It will rain tomorrow;" "It will not rain tomorrow"), both claim divine prophecy, and one will be falsified. And while the other will be right, does that mean the Mr. Kemp thinks said person has been verified as a divine prophet? I doubt it. As a species of divine revelation, the Bible does not require external, epistemic authentication. 

[Side note: our foundational principle ought to be more broad than that Scripture is the sole source or basis of all knowledge (link). Something like, "special divine revelation - the extant extent of which is codified in the Scriptures - is the premise with which one must begin in order to intentionally defend his beliefs with full assurance." This indicates acceptance of infallible, internalist, and propositional knowledge and takes God's word to be the sufficient condition (which accounts for all subsidiary, necessary conditions for knowledge, cf. link) for said knowledge.]

To summarize the response to Mr. Kemp's citations, then, the biblical contexts he mentions do not say that inspired revelations “appeal to something other than themselves… in order to be known as Scripture” (pg. 15). In fact, in one context, "knowledge" isn’t even mentioned, and in the other, the only "knowledge" given is of who is not a prophet. Further, Deuteronomy 18 is only applicable if one even thinks to ask the question in the first place. 

I'll also offer some pushback against statements like, “God does not deliver the Word and then remain silent, expecting the recipients to take it on a sheer leap of blind faith” (pg. 14). What does Mr. Kemp make of Abraham's ordeal in Genesis 22 (cf. Hebrews 11)? And was Abraham's faith "blind," or did he not have every reason to suppose Isaac would return with him? Either way, God's word was itself sufficient for Abraham to know to obey.

I've been critical of Mr. Kemp throughout this post, but I will end on a positive note. I said earlier that I think the value of the Mr. Kemp's chapter is its insistence that circular reasoning is of no epistemic profit. After citing Greg Bahnsen and John Frame on pgs. 9-10, I'll repeat an earlier quote: “The thought pushed by Bahnsen and Frame in these passages departs with this school by insisting that first principles can be “proved” (i.e. demonstrated), albeit by circular means” (pg. 10).

Now, I'll leave it to Van Tilian apologists to make their own case on behalf of Bahnsen and Frame. My initial impression is that Mr. Kemp has a point against Frame and makes a good case for it in the rest of his chapter. The Bahnsen citation could instead be a reference to a sort of coherentism that actually is meta-justificatory foundationalism (link). If I'm right, while I would disagree with Bahnsen, I don't know if he can be called a traditional coherentist (i.e. circularist). In any case, Clark cannot be associated with these views, and I hope we see more future engagement with his actual thought from theologians and philosophers.

Tuesday, June 4, 2024

Eastern Orthodoxy, Original Sin, Normative Authority, and Epistemology

I'm struck by how incautious authorities within Eastern Orthodoxy can be regarding the significance of original sin. As one example, in a video posted recently, Eastern Orthodox bishop Irenei of London & Western Europe said (link): 
We are born spotless. There is no human ever ever born sinful, as if he were already a sinner by virtue of his constitution. God does not create like this, and every human being is born pure as Adam was fashioned pure. Yet we are touched by sin from the very beginning. By the time we open our eyes to the world, the sinfulness of the world is already having an impact on us.
He borders on suggesting that original sin merely refers to Adam's progeny having to be born into a corrupted, external world. Agreements and disagreements with this very sentiment emerged in the comments. Now, as I already noted in a recent post that there appears to be an intramural debate within Eastern Orthodoxy on this point (link), I'm not surprised. 

But given their commitments to conciliarism - I'll return to this point later - the most "consistent" of Eastern Orthodox apologists will verbally state some kind of acceptance of original sin. But because they reject original guilt, I infer that laymen and even bishops will sometimes mistakenly reject any version of original sin. In a note in Michael Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, we read:
Some Orthodox Christians have mistakenly defended the Augustinian notion of "original guilt" — that is, that all men have inherited the guilt of Adam's sin — and others, going to the opposite extreme, have denied altogether the inheritance of sinfulness from Adam. Fr. Michael rightly points out, in his balanced presentation, that from Adam we have indeed inherited our tendency towards sin, together with the death and corruption that are now part of our sinful nature, but we have not inherited the guilt of Adam's personal sin.
My own explanation for this is alluded to in an earlier post and more clearly outlined on pages 125ff. of Andrew Louth's defense of EO in Original Sin and the Fall: Five Views, which reads as follows:
The doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary is not accepted by the Orthodox Church. Yet, as Meyendorff has observed, “the Mariological piety of the Byzantines would probably have led them to accept the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary as it was defined in 1854, if only they had shared the Western doctrine of original sin.” But exempting the Virgin Mary from original sin must mean exempting her from the effects of the fall; in some way she is separated from the rest of the human race, who experience the fallen state through participating in (being guilty of) original sin. Paintings of the immaculate conception, depicting the Virgin Mary raised up, on the moon, or borne up by putti, seem to emphasize her separation from the rest of humanity. In contrast, the Byzantine liturgical texts (though plundered for the Latin feast of the immaculate conception) see Mary as part of humanity, in particular the crowning glory of the Old Testament church, emphasizing that she belongs to the Jewish race: “the beauty of Jacob,” as she is called in one of the liturgical hymns. Although confessed as sinless, the Virgin is not regarded as exempt from the consequences of sin. She lived in a sinful world and suffered temptation as we all do. For if her Son was “tested as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4:15), she can hardly have been exempt. Maybe here original sin meets its reductio ad adsurdum, if it means that the Savior and his mother must be considered free from original sin, for they were not exempt from the struggle against temptation that is part of the fallen human lot.
Louth is rejecting the Augustinian understanding of original sin insofar as it entails original guilt, not original sin as such (he prefers the terminology of "ancestral" sin, as do some others within Eastern Orthodoxy). Now, I believe Louth is mistaken insofar as it is my understanding that Eastern Orthodoxy exempts Christ from the effects of original sin. 

Leaving that aside, though, he is correct about Mary: original guilt would mean that Mary was guilty. So when someone like Michael Pomazansky says, "The Most Holy Virgin was born as subject to the sin of Adam together with all mankind, and with him she shared the need for redemption," what he means is not that Mary was guilty before God - on Eastern Orthodoxy, that would only be the case if her own actions were sinful - but that Adam's sins have conveyed negative consequences (e.g. mortality, passions) to all Adam's progeny except Christ and from which they are in need of "salvation."

Eastern Orthodox apologists whom I have read or listened to who try to accept original guilt within their larger framework - and I've seen a few try it - all fail to engage this point on Mary. For just one example, see here for an unsuccessful attempt to interact with Augustine's use of particular, Latin terms with which at least one interlocutor, host Craig Truglia, was admittedly (and obviously) unfamiliar. Both apologists seemed unaware of Augustine's acceptance of reatus culpa when they tried to suggest he agreed with their view, which would be odd except that the apologist who noted this terminology admitted he failed to read the whole article from which he learned of it in the first place (see below)! This is a textbook example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. They also reference Pomazansky, but they made no mention of what I quote from him above, let alone show awareness of the implications any of this has for their Mariology. 

Now, I've argued other grounds why I think rejection of original guilt (particularly, reatus culpa) is problematic, some of which I'll touch on again momentarily. These problems are not only for Eastern Orthodoxy (example) but certainly include it.

But I'll also use this occasion to discuss "normative authority," a concept Eastern Orthodox apologists sometimes argue is an advantage they have over against Protestantism. In this context, Orthodox apologists usually emphasize church councils and synods. Commonly, this is framed in terms such as who decides interpretations of Scripture that are "binding."

For starters, it seems obvious enough that even a bishop can make mistakes. Many Eastern Orthodox believers seem comfortable enough to admit this is the case with Irenei and to thereby reject that any authority he possesses is sufficient to "bind" them to his teaching in the above video. So let's look at a confession produced by the Synod of Jerusalem (1672). Here is what the Confession of Dositheus says on the topic of original sin:
We believe Holy Baptism, which was instituted by the Lord, and is conferred in the name of the Holy Trinity, to be of the highest necessity. For without it none is able to be saved, as the Lord says, “Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, shall in no way enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens.” {John 3:5} And, therefore, baptism is necessary even for infants, since they also are subject to original sin, and without Baptism are not able to obtain its remission. Which the Lord showed when he said, not of some only, but simply and absolutely, “Whoever is not born [again],” which is the same as saying, “All that after the coming of Christ the Savior would enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens must be regenerated.” And since infants are men, and as such need salvation, needing salvation they need also Baptism. And those that are not regenerated, since they have not received the remission of hereditary sin, are, of necessity, subject to eternal punishment, and consequently cannot without Baptism be saved. So that even infants should, of necessity, be baptized. Moreover, infants are saved, as is said in Matthew;{Matthew 19:12} but he that is not baptized is not saved. And consequently even infants must of necessity be baptized. (The Confession of Dositheus, Decree 16)

Perry Robinson, a prominent Orthodox apologist, has written that this synodical document is one to which Eastern Orthodox believers "must adhere" (link):

Next Hank talks of the Confession of Dositheus as an “Orthodox writing.” Well, its more than just a “writing.” It is a synodally affirmed document and one that anathematizes Protestantism, to which Hank must adhere. So here it seems Hank is trying to play down its significance. Maybe he missed its synodal standing when he read Bp. Ware’s book, The Orthodox Church?
On the other hand, Robinson also intimates this synod itself was not infallible and that is not as authoritative as others synods or councils (link):
If the council were ecumenical then it would be infallible. I would think that Catholics would agree that local synods aren’t necessarily infallible. I would also think that Catholics would agree that there are degrees of authority and means for expressing them. While it is true that councils a step down from ecumenical councils hold authority, it doesn’t follow that they bind equally. This is uncontroversial for Catholics so I don’t know on what grounds you are pressing it as some kind of problem for Orthodox ecclesiology.
This is difficult to decipher. Does Robinson think one "must adhere" to a document which contains errors? Or is Robinson suggesting that the document is a fallible yet true and [subordinately?] authoritative product? Or is Robinson suggesting we can filter out false statements from true ones within this [subordinately?] authoritative product, or that only the true statements are [subordinately?] authoritative? These are questions any Eastern Orthodox apologist will need to answer. 

If Decree 16 of the Confession of Dositheus is binding, then Eastern Orthodox believers are bound to believe that infants are subject to eternal punishment. But if they reject original guilt - that infants are guilty of sin - such punishment is unjust. It would be most amusing if the charges of nominalism and voluntarism one often hears Eastern Orthodox apologists level against Reformed theology are actually applicable to their views.

If Decree 16 of the Confession of Dositheus is not binding, how is an Eastern Orthodox believer able to determine:
i) which synods or councils (or decrees, canons, or products thereof) are binding and which are not (e.g. Palamite synods)?; 

ii) what is the meaning and/or to what "degree" is a synod or council "binding" (which seems to suggest lower and higher rules of faith)?; 

iii) answers to i) and ii) in such a way that Protestants cannot make an analogous case for sola scriptura?
Take another example. The recent Council of Crete (2016) might lead one to think that the Synod of Jerusalem and Confession of Dositheus is binding:
3. The Orthodox Church, in her unity and catholicity, is the Church of Councils, from the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem (Acts 15.5-29) to the present day. The Church in herself is a Council, established by Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit, in accord with the apostolic words: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” (Acts 15.28). Through the Ecumenical and Local councils, the Church has proclaimed and continues to proclaim the mystery of the Holy Trinity, revealed through the incarnation of the Son and Word of God. The Conciliar work continues uninterrupted in history through the later councils of universal authority, such as, for example, the Great Council (879-880) convened at the time of St. Photios the Great, Patriarch of Constantinople, and also the Great Councils convened at the time of St. Gregory Palamas (1341, 1351, 1368), through which the same truth of faith was confirmed, most especially as concerns the procession of the Holy Spirit and as concerns the participation of human beings in the uncreated divine energies, and furthermore through the Holy and Great Councils convened in Constantinople, in 1484 to refute the unionist Council of Florence (1438-1439), in 1638, 1642, 1672 and 1691 to refute Protestant beliefs, and in 1872 to condemn ethno-phyletism as an ecclesiological heresy.
Note also that the Council of Crete declares itself to have been given by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit:
With a hymn of thanksgiving, we praise and worship God in Trinity, who has enabled us to gather together during the days of the feast of Pentecost here on the island of Crete, which has been sanctified by St. Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, and his disciple Titus, his “true son in the common faith” (Tit 1.4), and, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to conclude the sessions of this Holy and Great Council of our Orthodox Church – convened by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, by the common will of Their Beatitudes the Primates of the most holy Orthodox Churches – for the glory of His most holy Name and for the great blessing of His people and of the whole world, confessing with the divine Paul: “Let people then regard us thus: as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor 4.1).
Through a spokesman, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople further declared that the Council of Crete is "binding" (link). Is this, then, an open and shut case that the Synod of Jerusalem (and Confession of Dositheus) is binding? 

Not quite! Four Eastern Orthodox churches - representing a significant percentage of the worldwide population of Eastern Orthodoxy - declined to participate in the Council of Crete. Several of these churches (e.g. Antioch) convened synods in which they stated that the Council of Crete is not binding. But since then, the ecumenical patriarch wrote a letter of admonishment (link) in which he reaffirmed "the binding nature of its documents for all the Orthodox faithful, clergy and lay..."

If I'm Eastern Orthodox, who am I supposed to believe, and why am I supposed to believe them? Are Eastern Orthodox apologists left with "private judgment" as they themselves have constructed the concept when straw-manning Protestantism (regarding which I've always found this post by Steve Hays to be helpful - see more below)? If not, what criteria are supposed to be applied, and - just as importantly - on what normative and/or epistemic grounds in said criteria used? 

Robinson's once theorized answer of pentarchical ratification was critiqued long ago by Steve Hays (link, link, link, link, link). There's no need for me to repeat Hays' points, especially as it seems quite a few other Eastern Orthodox apologists have shied away from Robinson's theory (example; example, example) in favor of different forms of the very "receptionism" view that Robinson suspects is due to a reliance on "pop-Orthodox" works. 

Several of these other apologists explicitly embrace circularity. If this sounds Van Tilian, it's because they have either implicitly or even explicitly borrowed from him and, therefore, are susceptible to points a foundationalist - such as myself - make (link).

These apologists also tend to conflate performative contradictions (e.g. you can't perform an apologetic against language or logic without using language and logic) with the structure of epistemic justification, as if apologetic circularity somehow entails justificatory circularity. 

Further, these apologists attempt to leverage this bait-and-switch by begging the question, analogizing an internal contradiction inherent in concrete examples of performative contradictions to an alleged internal contradiction if one rejects their particular "paradigm" of circularity. When it is pointed out to them that anyone can make an assertion such as "my circle is good and yours isn't" (do they think that claim is also "justified" circularly?) they completely fail to recognize that the way in which they typically respond to it - which is to admit the point and pivot to apologetics - is equally available to foundationalists who encounter objections on the grounds that anyone can assert their foundation is self-justifying. They further fail to address problems with a coherentist structure of justification, which I've critiqued elsewhere (link).

Now, all Eastern Orthodox receptionists will need to answer whether there are any authorities in any situations in which one may instantly know they are speaking infallibly. 

1a. If so, which and why? In one example I link to above, an Eastern Orthodox apologist appeals to the remarks of a fallible bishop to prop up his entire receptionist criteria. Talk about a fallible list of infallible "books"!

1b. Or if the Eastern Orthodox apologists will attempt to borrow still more from, say, a presuppositionalist such as myself and claim that one can know such foundationally, these apologists will have abandoned receptionism as meaningfully distinct from the Protestant doctrine of the self-authenticity of divine revelation, the usual arguments one encounters against sola scriptura, and any pretense that their position is advantageous with respect to Protestantism. In fact, they will have the harder responsibility of reconciling conciliar promulgations with their larger "paradigm," on which see more below. These apologists would also need to answer whether one may know that the eighth "ecumenical" council and Palamite councils are infallible, on which I believe there is some question within Eastern Orthodoxy.

2. If not - if "reception" is a condition for knowledge which takes time - then not only will these apologists face questions regarding what "reception" entails (what are the criteria and why?) but also the following question: for one who hears the words of a council before such time as it may be "received," is the hearer obligated to accept the promulgations of said council at the time he heard it or not? If he is not obligated, then it would appear that normative authority actually rests in whatever are the criteria for "reception." If he is obligated, then one is obligated to accept that which might be damnably false. And for those apologists who would argue ad hoc that a hearer is only obliged if the council is true and will be received (despite the fact the hearer doesn't know it at the time), they will be placing hearer of Councils in an epistemic dilemma: if they accept the council, they risk believing damnable error; if they reject or refrain from belief in the council, they risk rejecting or refraining from belief in that which is obligatory. Take, for example, the so-called "robber" council of Ephesus.

The Orthodox view of "normative authority" is not as perspicuous as their apologists project, let alone their claim that it advantages them in contrast to Protestantism. The reverse seems to be the case.

[Side note before proceeding: keeping in mind these criticisms, given that Eastern Orthodoxy would seem to view the second council of Nicaea in 787 as ecumenical and infallible, at the very least, Eastern Orthodoxy seems committed to accepting a doctrine of original sin. To understand why this is the case, take Canon 110 of the Council of Carthage (419), which states:

Likewise it seemed good that whosoever denies that infants newly from their mother's wombs should be baptized, or says that baptism is for remission of sins, but that they derive from Adam no original sin, which needs to be removed by the laver of regeneration, from whence the conclusion follows, that in them the form of baptism for the remission of sins, is to be understood as false and not true, let him be anathema.

For no otherwise can be understood what the Apostle says, By one man sin has come into the world, and death through sin, and so death passed upon all men in that all have sinned, than the Catholic Church everywhere diffused has always understood it. For on account of this rule of faith (regulam fidei) even infants, who could have committed as yet no sins themselves, therefore are truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that what in them is the result of generation may be cleansed by regeneration.

This council was accepted by the Council of Trullo (Canon 2). In turn, the Council of Trullo (otherwise known as the Quinisext Council) was ratified at the second council of Nicaea - the so-called seventh "ecumenical" council - as having been adopted at the sixth "ecumenical" council:

[After a number of other quotations, was read the Canon of the Council in Trullo as a canon of the Sixth Synod (col. 233).]

Tarasius, the most holy Patriarch said: There are certain affected with the sickness of ignorance who are scandalized by these canons [viz. of the Trullan Synod] and say, And do you really think they were adopted at the Sixth Synod? Now let all such know that the holy great Sixth Synod was assembled at Constantinople concerning those who said that there was but one energy and will in Christ. These anathematized the heretics, and having expounded the orthodox faith, they went to their homes in the fourteenth year of Constantine. But after four or five years the same fathers came together under Justinian, the son of Constantine, and set forth the before-mentioned canons. And let no one doubt concerning them. For they who subscribed under Constantine were the same as they who under Justinian signed the present chart, as can manifestly be established from the unchangeable similarity of their own handwriting. For it was right that they who had appeared at an ecumenical synod should also set forth ecclesiastical canons. They said that we should be led as (by the hand) by the venerable images to the recollection of the incarnation of Christ and of his saving death, and if by them we are led to the realization of the incarnation of Christ our God, what sort of an opinion shall we have of them who break down the venerable images? (link)

See also the part in bold from Canon 1 of this council which indirectly references the Council of Trullo:

Seeing these things are so, being thus well-testified unto us, we rejoice over them as he that has found great spoil, and press to our bosom with gladness the divine canons, holding fast all the precepts of the same, complete and without change, whether they have been set forth by the holy trumpets of the Spirit, the renowned Apostles, or by the Six Ecumenical Councils, or by Councils locally assembled for promulgating the decrees of the said Ecumenical Councils, or by our holy Fathers. For all these, being illumined by the same Spirit, defined such things as were expedient. Accordingly those whom they placed under anathema, we likewise anathematize; those whom they deposed, we also depose; those whom they excommunicated, we also excommunicate; and those whom they delivered over to punishment, we subject to the same penalty. (link)

I'm approaching this topic from the perspective of a Protestant who aims to provide an internal critique. Roman Catholics might object to Eastern Orthodoxy on external grounds, as they reject the Council of Trullo. Interested readers can see here for more on that question.

But even granting Eastern Orthodox assumptions, irrespective of their view of the Confession of Dositheus, the foregoing appears to show that Eastern Orthodox apologists ought to accept that infants have sin in need of remission.

On this note, quoting Against Julian (link), Daniel Castellano - a Roman Catholic who is referenced by the pair of apologists I mentioned above who tried to harmonize original guilt with Eastern Orthodoxy - renders a convincing case that Augustine, who was present at the Council of Carthage in 419 and whose theology would seem to provide context to the meaning of "remission" in Canon 110, grounded liability to punishment in culpability:

In this life, even the baptized are subjected to evils, so one can hardly avoid the fact that humans are born under a yoke of affliction. Yet if God is just, there must be in infants guilt (culpam) deserving such punishment (poenam) (Ibid., VI, x, 31) Here, for the first time, St. Augustine clearly says there is culpa in infants, as opposed to mere reatus. He does this on the basis that justice demands there be some culpa for every poena. Yet the culpa that is in infants, we have just seen, is not their own by action, but Adam’s. It is theirs only by contagion. It is only after making this distinction that St. Augustine dares to ascribe culpa rather than reatus to the descendants of Adam.

The Apostle unequivocally teaches that we are all condemned in our nature: We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. [Eph. 2:3] (Ibid., VI, x, 33) This indicates that the reatus is in our nature, and at least suggests that the culpa may be in there also.

St. Augustine finally offers an explanation of how we are all culpable for Adam’s sin toward the end of Contra Iulianum. While expounding in whom all have sinned, he notes that Julian, who accepted the Latin rendering, interpreted it differently as because of whom all have sinned. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 75) St. Augustine counters that a man does not commit personal sin because of Adam’s sin, but for some immediate cause; e.g., a murderer kills because he wants gold; Cain killed because he envied his brother. Rather, the Apostle means that all men have sinned by way of origin in one man, as it were in common, in the oneness of the mass. (Loc. cit.)

This is a sufficiently important expression that we should parse the Latin. In context, Julian denies the verse should be understood thus, so we discard the negative and the main clause, leaving: in uno homine omnes homines peccasse… originaliter, et tamquam in massae unione communiter. The first unusual word is originaliter, an adverbial form of ‘origin,’ so it modifies the verb. Thus we sinned by our origin. In other words, we have sinned by virtue of our descent from Adam. How can this be so? A second adverb is added, communiter. That is to say, we sinned jointly in the unity of the mass.

This need not mean that each of us was personally present in germine when Adam sinned. Rather, when Adam sinned, the human race sinned, for he and his wife were the human race. Since all partake of the same corrupted nature, we all sin jointly, not at some moment near the dawn of creation, but throughout all history on earth. St. Augustine is asserting a continuous solidarity of the human race in its corrupted nature. Indeed, such a solidarity is presupposed by any sensible interpretation of Christ’s redemptive act. The only innovation here is using that solidarity to express how the culpa for original sin is shared by the whole human race.

To uphold the view that all have sinned by our origin from Adam, it is necessary to refute Julian’s view that the Apostle is speaking only of our personal sins:
…if the Apostle had been talking about the imitation of sin, it would have been more fitting to say that sin passed to all men because there had first been Adam’s example, and he would have added that it passed to all men in that all have sinned by imitation of that one man. (Ibid., VI, xxiv, 77)

Julian complained that if the Apostle meant what Augustine says, he would have stated it more explicitly. The response above shows that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. St. Paul was not writing for Julian or Augustine, so we should not expect either doctrine to be stated explicitly. Instead we should look to his context.

The context of Romans 5:12, repeated throughout the passage, is that through one man the wrath of God fell upon human race, and through another man the reconciliation of the human race with God was achieved. St. Augustine repeatedly cites Romans (as any reader can glean for himself) to prove that all, not just many, are said to be condemned in Adam and delivered in Christ. Once this is conceded, it must be acknowledged that this includes infants without personal sin, which leaves only original sin by which we are condemned.

More generally, he shows that it is consistent with reason, revelation, and justice that we have the culpa of Adam in us. He does not prove, however, that this really must be the case. The Orthodox, among others, would object to this strange way of speaking, where we are guilty of a sin that we did not commit in act.

A fitting conclusion given that the Eastern Orthodox apologist who cited Castellano has since defected to Roman Catholicism, a predictable outcome given that Augustine's doctrine of original guilt is incompatible with Eastern Orthodoxy's Mariology - her being subject to punishment for sin for which she is "culpable."

For the fuller context of Augustine's remarks, read Against Julian here.]

Turning to Protestantism, I came across a video in which Robinson lodged objections against sola scriptura. What I found to be the most interesting part of the video is Robinson's reference to former sparring partner, Steve Hays of Triablogue - particularly, his reference to Hays' response to Robinson on the question of "sola" vs. "solo" scriptura (link). Robinson alludes to future videos in which he will interact with Steve's thought, although that was some time ago. When and if he does, I hope he does a better job of representing Hays. Robinson says:
The first thing to note is that Hays agrees with me that the sola-solo description that Mathison puts out (posits) is untenable, right. And Hays essentially admits that my argument is successful - in not so many words, but that's pretty much what it ends up being. And so he constructs an idiosyncratic position - basically a kind of solo biblicist position - and he then reduces normativity to being accurate, to being truthful. So all that matters is that an interpretation is true, and so there really are no secondary authorities. You're not obligated to follow the Westminster Confession or anything else - only insofar as you judge it to be true. So in this way, he's essentially capitulating and rejecting the traditional, Reformed position. 

Now, if your response to my argument - the only way you can get out of it - is to say "well, the Reformed position is wrong," and "I'm going to take this other position," and "hahaha you can't touch me here, the argument doesn't touch me there," well, you've admitted that my argument is successful against the Reformed position. And if you have to excise yourself out of the Reformed position, that's a win as far as I'm concerned.

Of course, people largely "follow" whatever they "judge" to be true. But that's descriptive, not prescriptive. And that description applies just as much to someone like Robinson as it does to Hays (link). 

What, then, by way of prescription? I doubt Robinson agrees with Hays' alternative to Mathison's framework (link; link) - and I missed why Robinson does not consider Hays' position to count as within the purview of the Reformed tradition - so it would have been useful for Robinson to have responded to the following question by Hays: 

Suppose Perry uses ecumenical councils as his benchmark. If so, doesn't that just push the question back a step? By what authority does Perry determine which candidates for ecumenical councils are legitimate?

Does this suggest Hays' position entails oneself as a so-called "final authority," as Robinson states in the video? No. It's a solid, internal critique of Robinson's view. To the extent Robinson pushes back that he is not acting authoritatively, such an answer will be analogously available to Protestants regarding sola scriptura. 

Further, anyone who reads Hays' article can see that Robinson's above summary misstates Hays' position. Contra Robinson, Hays did not suggest that one is [only] obligated to follow what one "judges" to be true. Steve clearly writes: "We are obligated to believe a true interpretation of Scripture, whether or not we perceive it to be true." 

We might approach the distinction between authority and epistemology from another angle. To what extent the following would intersect with Hays' position is unclear, but contrary to the existentialist philosophy which saturates contemporary American culture, humans exist relationally: family, state, and church structures are hierarchical. As such, each structure has authoritative heads (link).

What does this mean? Well, an earthly father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's father commands them to do their homework, eat their vegetables, or go to sleep, the child is bound or obligated to obey.

Likewise, a spiritual father has "authority" over his household. He is the head responsible for the children within his house: for instructing his children, nourishing his children, protecting his children, raising his children, and, when appropriate, disciplining his children. If the child's spiritual father commands them to recite a confession or hymn in unison, to gather together at a certain time on the Lord's Day, or to give heed to a certain Scriptural reading, the child is bound or obligated to obey.

Note that in these examples I use, the fathers might have permissibly chosen to obligate their children to do something else. Nevertheless, commands such as these are within the scope of each authority's power. 

That said, the authority of fathers only go so far. An earthly father cannot determine my spouse; a spiritual father cannot determine my job. Further, the authority of an earthly and a spiritual father are themselves normed by truth. These authorities have God-given prescriptions as well as proscriptions. 

I doubt Hays would have disagreed with this. If, say, either father teaches something that is false - cf. Irenei - the truth revealed by our Heavenly Father overrides their subordinate authority. And adding a mother, several hundred bishops, or even an apostle or angel into the mix doesn't change anything (Galatians 1:8). God may delegate authoritative roles, but insofar as any authority (or, for that matter, subordinate) who speaks truth does so by themselves implicitly presupposing divine revelation, God is the "final authority." We can know His word just is truth. For that reason, it is epistemically foundational and our authoritative norming norm.

However, if one typically "follows" what one "judges" to be true (description), how can we ensure our judgments align with our obligations (prescription)? This dovetails with a few other comments Hays offered in his original response to Robinson:

vi) I disagree with how Perry frames the issue. It's not in the first instance a question of authority but truth and evidence. We have a duty to believe revealed truth, and the evidence for some interpretations is better than others.

vii) Apropos (vi), it's meaningless to say, in the abstract, that an individual has more authority than the church or vice versa. Those are empty generalities. They can't be true or false because it depends on the specifics. Sometimes individuals are right while collectives are wrong. Sometimes collectives are right while individuals are wrong. There's no fact-free principle that's true in general. Rather, it depends on specific claims and supporting evidence. 

In most cases, I agree with Hays, and if Robinson thought Hays' position was worth mentioning, one would think he might have responded to points such as these. 

One added caveat to Hay's remarks: when it comes to foundational knowledge - where one's knowledge and obligations begin - I think Robinson's own tutor, Russ Manion, says it well: "God’s revelation is self-authenticating, because, by it, everything else is authenticated" (link). 

From what I've read of him, I quite like Manion - he seems to have derived much of his apologetic from the likes of Gordon Clark, Cornelius Van Til, and Greg Bahnsen. There are obvious disagreements I would have, but I've said before that Eastern Orthodox apologists should read him more closely (link), for as I've also said before, many Eastern Orthodox apologists appear to favor a species of sola revelation (link). Manion ironically confirms this in the most Protestant of terms. He may have even conceded this point - he appears to have been a genuine fellow.

Does Eastern Orthodoxy entail what Manion suggests? Well, on Eastern Orthodoxy, what could have been considered as one's "normative authority" between the time of the apostles and the first Council of Nicaea? Given that bishops can be wrong and sometimes were wrong, might it not be that God's revelation as propositional truth - regardless of whether the mode by which said truth was communicated was oral or written (link) - must be regarded as one's ultimate rule of faith? Everything else - councils and all - are to be measured by it, no? The only question is whether Scripture is materially and formally sufficient for knowledge; many Eastern Orthodox apologists seem to agree with the former, and their view seems to entail the latter. This would be rather Clarkian!

Regarding what "knowledge" itself means seems to be an open question amongst Eastern Orthodox apologists. Robinson himself disclaims "absolute certitude" (link) which, of course, begs the question as to how Protestantism is disadvantaged if Robinson could be wrong about that which he considers normatively authoritative. 

On the other hand, an Eastern Orthodox apologist like Jay Dyer believes Christians were able to have certitude about the faith prior to Nicaea (see the 1 hour mark here). Dyer argues that this refutes the Roman Catholic magisterium as a necessary, "epistemic principle" - well, it also undercuts any analogous suggestion that might be made regarding conciliarism (pentarchical, receptionist, etc.). After all, how else did the participants in the various councils come to their theological conclusions about Trinitarianism, Christology, etc.?

For my part, I think our knowledge of all authority - final and delegated - comes from divine revelation. Of course, we don't need to have a philosophically strict "knowledge" of who our authorities are for them to be authorities. I have authority over my newborn son without him having philosophically strict knowledge of anything, although my status as authority is knowable in principle. But I do think a philosophically strict "knowledge" is possible, as I've argued in dozens of other posts.

So if and when my son grows to the point where he is able to point towards a higher authority as a corrective to some erroneous instruction I give him, he won't be obliged to or bound by that instruction. Just so with any delegated authority. As Hays says, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right." Thus, if I teach error, my son is not obliged or bound by my instruction regardless of his epistemic status.

Does this "right" to refuse to obey delegated authorities in certain situations imply delegated authority is unreal or useless? No. Daniel was really thrown into a lion's den, and powers possessed by delegated authorities often functions to deter reckless behavior. It's just that Daniel was righteous, not reckless. Robinson seems to be aware that Presbyterians such as myself take membership vows. For instance, I myself have vowed the following:

Do you promise to participate faithfully in this church’s worship and service, to submit in the Lord to its government, and to heed its discipline, even in case you should be found delinquent in doctrine or life? (link)

In taking this vow, I joined myself to a body which has the authority to excommunicate me from it. Aside from his view of my church, would Robinson think I take that lightly? 

In short, Robinson's definition of "private judgment" seems to cloud his thinking. He defines it as follows: "Any Christian individual is ultimately obligated to adhere to belief X, if and only if they judge (determine, assess, etc.) that belief X is scriptural." But wasn't Palamas excommunicated by a Synod in 1344 for what he thought was scriptural? Would Robinson describe Palamas as exercising private judgment or right judgment in that case? 

While our epistemic status does not determine that which is authoritative, I don't see the relevance in this statement given that one's epistemic scruples are what will determine that which one regards as authoritative. Put it this way: it is just as easy for a Protestant apologist to posit that they are in an advantageous position with respect to a point of metaphysics (e.g. about what is "normatively authoritative") over against Eastern Orthodoxy as it is for an Eastern Orthodox apologist to posit the same thing in reverse. Without argumentation - which is epistemic and/or apologetic - there will be no reason (by definition!) for either side to budge. In their discussions, Hays was "right" to reject Robinson's definition, to shift focus to the proper sphere, and to hold Robinson accountable for the implications of his metaphysical claims.

Robinson himself admits he could apostatize from Eastern Orthodoxy. He could come to accept the Westminster Confession 31.3. Does Robinson think, then, that his possession of this power entails that he uses private judgment in his rejection of the Westminster Confession or in his acceptance of the ecumenical councils as scriptural? Is Robinson the "final authority" in his own situation? Surely not, but just so for Protestants who, say, reject unbiblical statements in conciliar documents.

One can read here or here for more on sola scriptura, including the following observation:

Sola scriptura is a metaphysical statement of what Scripture is - the extant extent of divine revelation and, thus, our solely ultimate, authoritative rule of faith - not an epistemological statement of how we know what Scripture is. Certainly, what Scripture metaphysically is may and does inform how we can know what it is, but I equally certainly don’t have to answer the question of how I know what Scripture is by looking through Scripture for a table of contents.
This last sentence returns us to Manion and the question of the canon of Scripture. I wonder if Robinson departs from his tutor on the self-authenticity of divine revelation. Robinson derides the Protestant understanding as ahistorical, yet his own view (which he does not outline) would seem to beg serious questions. Let's take a concrete example. Canon 2 of the Council of Trullo reads:

It has also seemed good to this holy Council, that the eighty-five canons, received and ratified by the holy and blessed Fathers before us, and also handed down to us in the name of the holy and glorious Apostles should from this time forth remain firm and unshaken for the cure of souls and the healing of disorders. (link)

The eighty-five canons referred to can be found here, the last of which lists the New Testament canon as including the epistles of Clement and as excluding Revelation. Does Robinson accept this list as binding? 

But we saw earlier that the Council of Carthage in 419 is also accepted, and that canonical list differs from those in the eighty-fifth canon above. Who [authoritatively?] decides which list is right, and why? If I disagree with another Protestant, at least I don't hold that Protestant to be infallible. 

Does Robinson not regard this council as infallible after all? Or does he take this canon of Trullo and now that "push comes to shove," will he "throw it out the window"? Or does he bite the bullet and accept the contradiction?

Further, is it not viewed as an issue that the Moscow patriarchate accepts a canon of Scripture that differs from other patriarchates? 

If one's normative authorities have different understandings of that which is binding - no matter how small the difference - then it is hard for me to take serious any claim about the superiority of Eastern Orthodoxy's concept or practice of normative authority. As an apologetic tack, it's a paper argument empty and devoid of real teeth.