...we have this development, this theological development which is based on this erroneous concept but we also have among the Reformers John Calvin who embraced a lot of the Augustinian concepts including predestination and he also embraced the understanding of Original Sin and the transmission of sin and guilt and the responsibility of Adam based on Augustine's understanding and that has been the case until this day for those who have followed the Calvinist understandings. Of course in the Orthodox Church this is not even a topic to be discussed because we do not see any such possibility of transmission of sin and guilt and responsibility in any possible way.
For the Orthodox, original sin pertains only to Adam’s transgression, and is not something that his descendants inherit from him. What we get from Adam is corruption and death, which lead us to sin, and separate us from God, in that we live in death.This is not even remotely in the same league as intramural debates amongst Reformed theologians such as is found in George P. Hutchinson's fantastic work, The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterianism. Perhaps this would be less of a problem if the ignorance weren't so seemingly prevalent.
Now we sin because we die, for the sting of death is sin. Sin reigns in death, in our corruptibility and mortality. Death is the root; sin is the thorn that springs from it.
This completely reverses cause and effect (Romans 6:23). I've also seen several Eastern Orthodox apologists appeal to John Chrysostom (Romanides and Eastern Orthodox apologists who disagree with Romanides - it seems there may be something of an intramural debate). Chrysostom says (link):
Seeing their children bearing punishment proves a more grievous form of chastisement for the fathers than being subject to it themselves.Without fail, I find that Eastern Orthodox apologists deny original guilt. But then how is it that they think children may justly bear the punishment for another's sins? Whether Chrysostom himself believed this point is irrelevant. Hutchinson and the Reformed tradition deal with this question directly. Eastern Orthodox apologists seem barely aware of it. And those who are aware of it seem to ignore it!
In the context of expounding the doctrine of ancestral sin in terms of a web of human sinfulness going all the way back to our first parents, he raises the issue of whether this is sufficient as an account of sin. As he puts it, for defenders of original sin, like myself, the ancestral sin view “seems to leave open the possibility (even if totally exceptional) of someone living a blameless life.” And this, of course, is the fundamental worry Augustine had with Pelagius’s doctrine. The problem is, Louth never really addresses this objection to his position head on. He never explains how the Orthodox doctrine of ancestral sin can avoid the traditional Augustinian objection that it leaves conceptual room for the existence of someone that is, for all practical purposes, without sin. This, it seems to me, is a serious lacuna in his presentation.
On a final note, the corruption-only position of ancestral sin is a flawed doctrine; it discounts the truths of imputation (and realism) implied in passages like Romans 5:12-21 and 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 as well as the broader doctrinal synthesis of the whole Bible on which imputed guilt rests (see my marks to Crisp). I ask Louth, Are there any human beings apart from Christ who were perfectly sinless? Answering yes would suggest he has a defective hamartiology and Christology. Scripture is clear that with the exception of Christ all humans are sinners (e.g., Rom 3:9-20; 1 Jn 1:8); if we presume there were any sinless people, as perfectionists have claimed, such naiveté detracts from the glory of the incarnation and belittles the gravity of sin. I suspect Louth agrees. In that case, it must be our inherited corruption that makes sinning inevitable. But then how is this scenario just? Since no human is responsible for innate corruption, in his view, and since that same corruption leads inevitably to sin, it is unclear how ancestral sin fares any better than original guilt. The concerns surrounding divine justice remain.
In Christ, the natural will is rooted in his concrete human nature, not an abstract human nature (as some modern philosophers of religion, who reject dyothelitism, haver argued).
And we cannot, if we wish to be accurate, speak of Christ as having judgment (γνώμη) and preference. For judgment is a disposition with reference to the decision arrived at after investigation and deliberation concerning something unknown, that is to say, after counsel and decision. And after judgment comes preference, which chooses out and selects the one rather than the other. But the Lord being not mere man but also God, and knowing all things, had no need of inquiry, and investigation, and counsel, and decision, and by nature made whatever is good His own and whatever is bad foreign to Him.
John of Damascus is referring to what Eastern Orthodox theologians describe as the "gnomic will," a term particularly associated with Maximus the Confessor. Joseph P. Farrell describes it as a "mode of employment of the will" (link). Ian McFarland writes (In Adam's Fall, pg. 112):
Maximus draws a parallel between the natural and gnomic wills on the one hand, and the capacity to speak and the act of speaking on the other... Some monothelites rejected the ascription of a human will to Christ on the grounds that it would imply ignorance (see OTP 19 [PG91:216B – C]). The terms of Maximus’ dyothelitism imply not so much a flat - out rejection of this charge as its deflection by conceding that ignorance is a feature of gnomic will but denying that Christ willed gnomically. To put it another way, from Maximus’ perspective the monothelite charge rests on a failure to recognize that gnome refers to a tropos rather than the logos of the will.
The idea is that while Christ is consubstantial with the rest of humanity - having the same nature and natural will as we do - the rest of mankind has a mode or tropos or manner or way of will[ing] that Christ did not. As McFarland says (In Adam's Fall, pg. 105):
...a given logos may be instantiated according to a range of possible tropoi. The full humanity of the will is thus unaffected by whether the tropos by which it operates is gnomic deliberation or the immediate presence of God characteristic of deification.
Let us now consider a Reformed engagement with Eastern Orthodox apologists. Given what has been said, McFarland points out (In Adam's Fall, pg. 107):
...while Maximus’ understanding of postlapsarian human willing neither envisages nor requires Augustine’s vision of a fallen humanity unable to avoid sin, it certainly allows for it. If the integrity of the will remains intact when we become unable to sin in glory (as both he and Augustine affirm), there seems nothing inherently problematic about affirming that genuine agency is preserved in circumstances where sinning is unavoidable.
Satan is an example of an agent who unavoidably sins. So what prevents a Reformed Christian making use of a concept of mode of will[ing] such that in concrete cases (viz. everyone except Christ), "sinning is unavoidable"?
[As an aside, I don't think McFarland is suggesting that unavoidability implies determinism: we might imagine one's freely (in the libertarian sense) choosing from amongst various, sinful alternatives. On the other hand, it is possible for sin to be predestined (e.g. 1 Kings 22:20-23, Acts 4:27-28).]
I believe the foregoing anwers one further counterargument. Joseph P. Farrell writes:
...nature and its properties as created by God, are good. The natural will thus chooses nothing but the good. Opposition to the divine will is thus always in the evil mode of the employment of the will, and is thus always personal. And this in turn means that free choice is not ultimately concerned with a dialectic of opposition between the divine and human natures in Christ, or between evil and good choices in man himself.
Similarly, McFarland writes:
As promising as Maximus’ doctrine of the will may appear for shoring up Augustine’s understanding of original sin, however, further reflection suggests serious obstacles to any proposed marriage of the two theologies. As Augustine himself was very aware, the doctrine of original sin is credible only if the categories of nature (as God’s good creation) and will (as the source of creatures’ deviation from God) are kept distinct. But surely one of the consequences of Maximus’ integration of will and nature is to render this sort of distinction untenable: if sin is a function of the will (viz., its deviation from God’s will for the creature), and the operation of the will is simply an expression of human nature, then the doctrine of original sin (viz., the assertion that the will is congenitally opposed to God) seemingly implies that human nature as such has become evil. It follows either that God is not the creator of human nature (the Manichean position), or, worse, that God –precisely as the creator of human nature – is also the creator of sin.
In the case of Farrell, my first response would be to point out that the natural will qua natural will does not choose anything. Persons enhypostatize natures. A natural will outlines a capacity one has in virtue of his nature. For Farrell to say "The natural will thus chooses nothing but the good" conflates nature with person, because only persons choose.
Ignoring this slip, there is the question of the natural will itself, discussion of which performs the double-duty of responding to Farrell and McFarland simultaneously. What capacity or capacities does the natural will entail (in the context of anthropology)? The simplest answer seems to be that the natural will affords man the capacity to will, act, or choose. This capacity is distinct from the voluntary exercise of will, act, or choice. This capacity is also distinct from that to which one might be disposed to choose. Sin is not a substance, but neither are volitional natures morally neutral in terms of disposition.
[Parenthetically, one might easily expand this discussion on human nature to encompass our rationality. Both the rational and volitional seem to be rooted in one's concrete humanity, viz. one's spirit or soul. What I've said regarding a distinction between a natural will vs. its employment/disposition would analogously apply to a distinction between a so-called natural rationality vs. its employment/disposition.
Thus, these are two capacities of one nature. In no sense did the Fall destruct our capacity to capacity to think, will, act, or choose. On other other hand, our mode of disposition and action - in obedience or rebellion to God - was mutable.]
This finally turns us to the fact that God created Adam and Eve good. Of course, God created everyone good. Does this entail that the orientation of one's natural will can only towards the good, as Farrell seems to want to suggest? If so, then why isn't it possible for Satan (for example) to employ his will towards the good?
On the other hand, how does the Reformed position avoid McFarland's point regarding anthropological Manicheanism? If the orientation of a concrete human nature might be to rebel against God, how could this be? As has been mentioned, traducianism seems to solve the dilemma. McFarland seems to assume that this is not a live option - as if the concrete humanities (souls and bodies) of Adam's progeny are created ex nihilo. While John of Damascus is taken to be a creationist, consideration of the following is still useful (link):
...generation means that the begetter produces out of his essence offspring similar in essence. But creation and making mean that the creator and maker produces from that which is external, and not out of his own essence, a creation of an absolutely dissimilar nature....Wherefore all the qualities the Father has are the Son's, save that the Father is unbegotten, and this exception involves no difference in essence nor dignity, but only a different mode of coming into existence. We have an analogy in Adam, who was not begotten (for God Himself moulded him), and Seth, who was begotten (for he is Adam's son), and Eve, who proceeded out of Adam's rib (for she was not begotten). These do not differ from each other in nature, for they are human beings: but they differ in the mode of coming into existence.
After contrasting begetting and creating, he says Adam begot Seth. This implies Adam produced out of his essence an offspring similar in essence. If we highlight that it was out of Adam's concrete humanity that Seth was begotten, we are closer to a biblical and reasonably motivated model on which:
1. Christ was consubstantial with the rest of humanity yet, unlike them, not subject to [the effects of] original sin.
2. Adam's ancestors are justly punished for having guiltily participated in the original transgression.
3. The Fall did not destruct the image of God in man yet did put us in a terrible mode of need for conformity to Christ's image.
15 comments:
"In that case, it must be our inherited corruption that makes sinning inevitable. But then how is this scenario just? Since no human is responsible for innate corruption, in his view, and since that same corruption leads inevitably to sin, it is unclear how ancestral sin fares any better than original guilt. The concerns surrounding divine justice remain."
I've came to this same conclusion but dealing with Provisionist who deny Original Sin's imputation. How can death be just for us if Adam's sin wasn't imputed to us in the first place? And, how can Christ death in our behalf be just if our sin wasn't imputed to Him? They imply that God is unjust.
"How can death be just for us if Adam's sin wasn't imputed to us in the first place?"
That quote comes from Oliver Crisp, who I disagree with (although his response to Louth's Eastern Orthodoxy is good). Crisp's view is as follows. From Original Sin and the Fall: Five Views (pg. 42):
1. All human beings barring Christ possess original sin.
2. Original sin is an inherited corruption of nature, a condition that every fallen human being possesses from the first moment of generation.
3. Fallen humans are not culpable for being generated with this morally vitiated condition.
4. Fallen humans are not culpable for a first, or primal, sin either. That is, they do not bear original guilt (i.e., the guilt of the sin of some putative first human pair or human community being imputed to them along with original sin).
5. This morally vitiated condition normally inevitably yields actual sin. That is, a person born with this defect will normally inevitably commit actual sin on at least one occasion provided that person lives long enough to be able to commit such sin. (The caveat normally indicates limit cases that are exceptions to this claim, such as infants that die
before maturity and the severely mentally impaired.)
6. Fallen human beings are culpable for their actual sins and condemned for them, in the absence of atonement.
7. Possession of original sin leads to death and separation from God
irrespective of actual sin.
3 and 4 are especially problematic. Madueme's Reformed response to Crisp is good:
"A final concern with Crisp’s doctrine of original sin relates to divine justice. Although we are blameless for Adam’s first disobedience, he avers, we still inherit a state of moral corruption and are blameworthy for sins that arise inevitably from it. On this view, however, I would like to know why God condemns us for our actual sins. Since Crisp believes that we are blameless for our vitiated condition, why are we blameworthy for sins that arise inevitably from that very condition? That seems unjust, for Crisp’s position implies that I sin by necessity through no fault of my own. To be sure, sin is a contingent truth; it is not essential to original human nature. But sin does become a consequent necessity after Adam’s fall, hence the universality of sin; fallen human beings sin by necessity. If I am right, then Crisp needs to explain why this situation is not monumentally unjust."
While Madueme is not a realist like I am, he agrees (against Crisp) that original guilt is biblical. Original guilt accepts the imputation of Adam's sin: we inherit a corrupt nature because we are guilty. Why are we guilty? Because the original sin is imputed (charged) to us. It's regarded as ours. How is that just? Well, this is where Madueme and I would disagree. As a realist, I think we are guilty because we participated in the original sin (in some sense). I'm actually writing another post on original sin which will expand on the sense in which we participate in Adam's sin.
"And, how can Christ death in our behalf be just if our sin wasn't imputed to Him? They imply that God is unjust."
I don't think our sin is imputed to Christ. That is, the Father does not charge or regard the Son as a sinner. That would imply God views as true that which is really false, for Christ never participated in sin as we did. That would indeed imply injustice.
Instead, I think Christ suffers what is equivalent to the penalty for sin. But as I note in the post, He does so voluntarily. Thus, if and when we are united to Christ, the Father sees Christ's suffering as a sufficient equivalent to the penalty our sin incurs and is able to pass over punishing us (cf. the angel of death in Exodus).
https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/04/imputation-in-various-contexts.html
Thanks for answering! As always.
Before more consideration, how do you view the sacrificial system of the Old Covenant? Or, how do you deal with the laguage of, for example, Isaiah 53?
My take is, on imputation, that "Yahweh has caused the iniquity of us all to fall on Him" (Isaiah 53:6), or the idea behind Leviticus 16:21-22. This is, not that Christ Has sin Himself our sins, but the blameworthiness of our concrete sins was fall upon Him and, in consequence, He receive our punishment.
What are your toughts on this?
The Levitical system was the shadows or type of the fulfillment which was to come. Christ was that fulfillment, so we are in a better position than that of Israel under the old covenant. We should look to clarification in the subsequent progression of revelation for explicit language (where it exists) and the Christological reality of what was once only dimly promised.
Was Christ Himself guilty, blameworthy, sinful, or iniquitous? No. So is the imputation of any of these to Him sensible? It might help if you define what it means to "impute." I think to "impute" means to "attribute," "charge," or "regard." Are you suggesting that Yahweh attributed, charged, or regarded Christ as a guilty, blameworthy, sinful, or iniquitous? If so, wouldn't that be a lie? That's the problem.
Further, sin is not something one can physically put, lay, fall on another. Likewise, sin is not something one can metaphysically put, lay, fall on another. As I wrote in the original post, "Sin is not a substance." It isn't a soul or body. Rather, sin is a moral disposition or an action that is directed against God or God's law. Christ never had such a disposition and never acted in such a way, so it would be untruthful for God to attribute, impute, charge, or regard Christ as guilty, blameworthy, sinful, or iniquitous. In other words, the meaning of Isaiah 53:6 cannot be literal.
What, then, is the meaning? I think verses 4-5 interprets verse 6. That is, Christ suffered - He was smitten, afflicted, chastised, crushed, and pierced. Why? Teleologically, because of the iniquities, transgressions, or sins of His sheep. That is, our sins required just punishment, and the Father is only able to pass over punishment if we have a substitute whose self-sacrifice made provision for an equivalent satisfaction. Thus, could He have saved us in any other way? No - God can only justly pass over sins if propitiation is made, so Christ appeased God's wrath and, therefore, made it possible for God to be just and the justifier of the sinner who is united to Christ (Romans 3:25-26). Was Christ unwilling to experience this suffering? No - He wanted to save us from our sins. This was a voluntary agreement made in the covenant of redemption.
- "Was Christ Himself guilty, blameworthy, sinful, or iniquitous? No. So is the imputation of any of these to Him sensible? It might help if you define what it means to "impute." I think to "impute" means to "attribute," "charge," or "regard." Are you suggesting that Yahweh attributed, charged, or regarded Christ as a guilty, blameworthy, sinful, or iniquitous? If so, wouldn't that be a lie? That's the problem."
As you say, Christ was punished acording to vs. 4-5 for our sins, so we can distinguish between the actual agency of sining and the just consequence acording to God for sining, this is, death. So, imputation of sin means not imputation of the agency of sin but of the responsibility or been called to respond for sin. In this sense, Christ can die for sin without been regarded Himself as sinner by God. Sustitution in this sense would not be participation, but the changing of places on the responsibility stage of the process, in fault of my part for a better way to put it.
No need to apologize, we're just discussing what some might consider to be a difficult subject. The idea that on the cross, Christ assumes or takes the place of the sinner - a "great exchange," I've heard it called - is metaphorical language with which I am a little more comfortable with. After all, I think Christ certainly lived, died, rose, ascended, and was seated so that when we become united to Him in the Spirit, the Father can see Christ in us such that we are able to follow the pattern of Christ without any further need to punish us for our sins.
At the same time, my final concern is that we cannot equivocate on the meaning of imputation, and I fear that is happening here. Note the following 3 proposals (https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2024/04/imputation-in-various-contexts.html):
1. Sins are imputed to Christ when He suffered for the sake of His sheep.
2. Sin is imputed to us when we are born.
3. Righteousness is imputed to us when we are converted.
Again, what word or phrase can we replace with "imputed" that is *consistent* across all three scenarios? If, as you suggest, to "impute" does *not* carry a notion of agency, doesn't that create problems for #2, since it would imply that we would be regarded as involuntarily responsible for sin in which we had no agency? Isn't that unjust? How would you respond to this without equivocating on the meaning of imputation?
Imputation doesn't obviate the need for truthfulness. Our God is always a God of truth. If one of the scenarios leads to a conclusion in which God views matters untruthfully or inconsistently, we have a faulty definition.
My solution, then, is to take the definition I provide by Samuel Baird: "To impute, is, to attribute a moral act or attitude to a party" (The Elohim Revealed, pg. 471). If to impute is to attribute, let's rewrite the 3 scenarios:
1. Sins are attributed to Christ when He suffered for the sake of His sheep.
2. Sins are attributed to us when we are born.
3. Righteousness is attributed to us when we are converted.
Now:
1. Would it be truthful to attribute sins to Christ? No. Therefore, no imputation of sin.
2. Would it be truthful to attribute sins to us at birth? Yes, since we are born in union with the first Adam. Therefore, imputation of sin.
3. Would it be truthful to attribute righteousness to us at conversion? Yes, since we who are converted are in union with the last Adam. Therefore, imputation of righteousness.
On this definition of "impute[d]", 1) there is consistency in the definition and 2) God views matters truthfully.
Thanks again for answering, as always. I really enjoy to talk to you, cos' you defy my mind to think beyond his posibilities and expand my limits, and at the same time makes me humble when recognizing my own limits and ignorance. I thank God for that.
Now, having saying that, I'm still not persuaded. I will speak for myself on this, of course. When I think of the idea of "imputation", I tend to make it concrete by having in mind precisely the sacrificial system of the OC and Isaiah 53:6. This way, first, I can explain it without going out of Scriptural laguage when someone ask me about it (I'm not denying the usefulness of extra-Scriptural designations, for example Trinity, but for me on this particular is just a practical issue) and, second, I find it easy for me to understand it in that way. Is just a simple and understandeable idea, no matter how complex it becomes.
Now, having the idea of "laid on/fall on" (הִפְגִּ֣יעַ as it appears in Isaiah 53:6), and implying in that idea the distinction between agency and responsibility (implied too in vs. 6 itself and in context), I will try to reformulate your first 3 proposals:
1.- Sins "responsibility" is "laid on" Christ when He suffered for the sake of His sheep.
2.- Original sin "responsibility" is "laid on" us when we are born.
3.- Righteousness "responsibility" is "laid on" us when we are converted.
By the way, I understand "responsibility" in the Clarkian sense of the word, having in mind 2 Corinthians 5:10.
Of course, I get what you say that sin (sin's guilt specificaly) is not a material thing that you can put on someone, but responsibility can be passed from one individual to another or can be colectively shared. That happens in legal systems and even in the Bible. In that sense, as long as I can see I don't find any problem with N°2, and as examples I think of the sin of Achan (Joshua 7) or Korah's rebelion (Numbers 16). Even little childrens that were unconsious of what was happening die that day. As I see, in those examples, the Traducian principle (wich, as I see, has some sense in Adam's corruption of nature passed to his descendants) appears to not aply, but the representation principle makes more sense, at least for me. They were made responsible for the head of the house sin.
As long as I see, this resolves the consistency problem and God's truthfull view of things, because the subjets of הִפְגִּ֣יעַ aren't seen as agents, but as responsible (no matter the form: sutitution, colective sharing, individual passing of, etc.).
Now, my problem with Samuel Baird definition is the word "atribute". Maybe it has to do with laguage limitations (you know, I'm a native spanish speaker), but I feel that the word imply participation, and in that sense, I see a problem with N°3. How can you distinguish between Justification and Sanctification given that definition? I tend to see the line between the two blurred in that sense, but maybe I'm wrong in my perception.
P.D: Sorry for my loosey english!
I'm still not entirely sure to what extent we disagree. Stepping back a moment, I do think that Christ voluntarily assumed a responsibility in the covenant of redemption: to suffer an equivalent of that which sinners would otherwise merit. And I do think Isaiah 53:6 speaks to *this*. To this extent, we seem to agree?
So I think we simply disagree on the meaning of the word in question: what is the biblical meaning of "impute"? Note that Isaiah 53:6 doesn't contain the word "impute"! 53:4 and 53:12 do, though (in the LXX). English words used to translate "ἐλογισάμεθα" and "ἐλογίσθη" are "considered," "esteemed," "numbered," "reckoned," "counted," or "regarded." I take any and all of these to be synonymous with "attributed." Clark also says (https://www.douglasdouma.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/6-7introductiontotheologychapter7-salvation.pdf):
"As various translations show, impute (logizo) means to reckon or to put to one's account."
Again, then, my question is whether you think the Father ever reckoned the Son to be a sinner.
Now, do you have any resources that suggest imputation means "responsibility"? The most worrisome thing about your understanding is the following: you say that for righteousness to be "imputed" to us when we are converted means that "Righteousness "responsibility" is "laid on" us when we are converted."
I completely disagree with this. The meaning of #3 is that God looks at us (or reckons, regards, considers, attributes, etc.) as righteous. *That* is why He is able to justify us (i.e. declare us righteous). *That* is why we have peace with God.
Your definition - "Righteousness "responsibility" is "laid on" us when we are converted" - seems to suggest that upon conversion, "imputation" of righteousness means that we are "responsible" to be righteous! Your citation of 2 Corinthians 5:10 also suggests this. But since justification (a declaration) is due to "imputation" of righteousness, what it seems you are suggesting is that justification is no longer by grace - instead, we are declared righteous because of a responsibility laid upon us! I would not accuse you of denying sola gratia, because I know that this is not what you intend. But it is where your position seems to lead if we define "imputation" as you have.
Thus, if your meaning for "imputation" does not work in #3, it also cannot work in #1 or #2.
Regarding the sins of Korah (and, by analogy, Achan, the Davidic census, etc.), I think Shedd addresses these well on pgs. 958-960 in his Dogmatic Theology: https://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/sdg/shedd/Dogmatic%20Theology%20-%20Shedd.pdf. I would quote the pages in full, but the comment box doesn't have enough space. Please read them, though, as they also answer another concern you have (see below).
"Now, my problem with Samuel Baird definition is the word "atribute". Maybe it has to do with laguage limitations (you know, I'm a native spanish speaker), but I feel that the word imply participation"
I can confirm that for Baird (and for myself), "imputation" does not imply participation. Now, the *context* in which "imputation" occurs may entail participation (e.g. original sin), but the word itself does not. For example, if God imputes, regards, counts, or attributes righteousness to me, that does not mean I participated in Christ's work of redemption (again, see Shedd on pages 958-960).
Looking forward to your response, brother.
- "...I do think that Christ voluntarily assumed a responsibility in the covenant of redemption: to suffer an equivalent of that which sinners would otherwise merit. And I do think Isaiah 53:6 speaks to *this*. To this extent, we seem to agree?"
Yes bro, I agree with this. We are on the same page here as I see.
- "So I think we simply disagree on the meaning of the word in question: what is the biblical meaning of "impute"? Note that Isaiah 53:6 doesn't contain the word "impute"! 53:4 and 53:12 do, though (in the LXX). English words used to translate "ἐλογισάμεθα" and "ἐλογίσθη" are "considered," "esteemed," "numbered," "reckoned," "counted," or "regarded." I take any and all of these to be synonymous with "attributed." Clark also says (https://www.douglasdouma.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/6-7introductiontotheologychapter7-salvation.pdf):
"As various translations show, impute (logizo) means to reckon or to put to one's account."
The word "impute" isn't in vs. 6, as you say, but I believe that the idea is there, in the same way that it is in the sacrificial system of the OC. That's why I tend to think of imputation in terms of "lay on" X from A to B, where X is the "responsibility" or the subjection to receive the consequences of an alien (to B) righteousness or guilt in this context. To put it in simple words: B is responsible (X) for an alien sin/righteousness that belongs to A, where X implies the reception of the consequences merited by the sin/righteousness of the agent (A).
If what I say above is clear enough, it would be clear, too, that when I speak of "responsibility" in relation to righteousness, what I mean is not that I'm "responsible TO BE righteous in the context of Justification (of course, I am in the context of Sanctification), but that I am responsible for AN ALIEN righteousness, or subject to receive what that alien righteousness merits. With this in mind, I don't see how it cannot work for N°1, 2 or 3. That's why in my last coment I speak of representation responsibility, colective resposibility, etc., ideas on wich responsibility of one falls on those under his umbrella. Maybe "responsibility" is not the best word or concept, but I take it under the idea that when A says that B is responsible, it means that B deserves the consequences of that on wich B is reckoned as responsible.
- "Again, then, my question is whether you think the Father ever reckoned the Son to be a sinner."
As long as I see, and having in mind what I have said here, if with sinner you mean the agent of sin (the one who commits the sin), no. What I will say is that the Father considers Christ resposible for sins alien to Himself, where "responsible" is taken as deserving the consequences of those alien sins.
Will read Shedd now bro...
I get the idea of Shedd: to suffer the consequences of other sins is not the same as to be punished for that sin. I agree on that, then.
A few more questions:
1. You might have missed it, but do you have any resources (lexicons, concordances, commentaries, theologians) who define imputation in the way that you have?
2. Suppose for a moment that the way I (and others) define imputation is biblical. In other words, I'm asking you to set aside your understanding for a moment. If to "impute" means to "consider," "esteem," "number," "reckon," "count," or "regard," did the Father "impute" sin to Christ or "impute" Christ a sinner in any of *these* senses?
3. Finally, you write:
"To put it in simple words: B is responsible (X) for an alien sin/righteousness that belongs to A, where X implies the reception of the consequences merited by the sin/righteousness of the agent (A).
On your definition of imputation, is "alien" an essential word? For example, is the sin of Adam which is imputed to us also "alien" to us? If so, how do you reconcile that with divine justice? This goes back to your first question.
My answer is that God always imputes ("considers," "esteems," "numbers," "reckons," "counts," or "regards") things as they really *are*. This is distinct from explanations for why things are as they are or the mode/manner in which things are as they are.
So, for instance, I think Christians really are righteous in God's sight - the righteousness cannot be completely alien - but in explaining this more fully, I would of course recognize that the righteousness imputed to Christians was not one in which we participated; rather, Christians are united to Christ. Hence, His righteousness is not alien to us, although (following Shedd) we did not participate in the groundwork of redemption.
Similarly, we are united to Adam because we have been fathered by him. Hence, his sin is not alien to us. Bernardinus de Moor:
"It is objected that the justice of God will not admit the imputation of the sin of another. The answer is, in our author [Marck]: Justice will not, indeed, permit the imputation of the sin of another which is entirely and in every sense alien to him to whom it is imputed."
Samuel Baird:
"Adam's transgression was not merely personal, as were those that followed it, but common, and, in a sense, belonging to the nature. It hence appears that the dogma of the Pelagians and Remonstrants is to be rejected, — that the sin of Adam was so alien to us, that it could not be called ours; for by God it could not be imputed to us, justly, unless it was in some manner ours; since 'the soul that sinneth, it shall die.'"
See how slow of thinking I am. I came to realize that if the sin of Adam is justly imputed to us BECAUSE we participate ourselves in some sense in that sin, the same relation has to be with ours sins and Christ for it to be justly imputed to Him, but that's not the case and cannot be, too. That's why I try to alienate the agency of sin with the deserving reception of its punishment, seeing that in Isaiah 53 "the iniquity of us all" keeps the agency in those who "like sheep have gone astray" while the punishment was "fall on" Christ by Yahweh, but that's not consistent.
But, therefore, what's the relation between our sin and Christ in order for Him to be justly punished by it? How do you explain rightly the scenario N°1 then?
"I came to realize that if the sin of Adam is justly imputed to us BECAUSE we participate ourselves in some sense in that sin, the same relation has to be with ours sins and Christ for it to be justly imputed to Him, *****but that's not the case and cannot be, too.*****"
Correct. The key difference is what I mention in my most recent post: the *inverse* relationship between the first Adam and the last Adam. We were born *out of* the first and *into* the last. As Samuel Baird writes:
"According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him… Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by ‘the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’ the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration…
If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation."
While there is "real inbeing" in both cases, there is nevertheless an asymmetry that explains how it is we participate in the sin of the first Adam but not the groundwork of redemption wrought by the last Adam.
"But, therefore, what's the relation between our sin and Christ in order for Him to be justly punished by it?"
This is a good question. First of all, we should not look at what Christ did on the cross as a *literal* money payment. He did not pay for our sins in a *literal* sense. Even John Owen seems to have changed his mind on the double payment objection (shee here for more: https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-problem-with-literal-pecuniary.html).
Consider: if Christ somehow literally paid for the sins of the elect at the time of the cross, then any future elect person would owe nothing to God from conception, and it would be impossible for them to ever be under God's wrath. But that is clearly not the case (Romans 5, Ephesians 2). Atonement/reconciliation/justification don't happen until one becomes united to Christ in conversion. In other words, the elect were not united to Christ at the time of the cross, so their sins could not have been imputed to Him.
Therefore, the connotations of "punishment" are questionable. At the time of the cross, the Father did not look at Christ as a sinner. For what, then, could Christ have been justly "punished"? I hesitate to use this language without a clear meaning.
Here's what I am very willing to say: did Christ suffer? Yes. Did Christ bear the wrath of the Father as a satisfactory equivalent of what our sin otherwise merits? Yes. This being voluntarily agreed upon by both the Father and Son in the covenant of redemption so that sinners could be saved, was Christ's bearing the wrath of the Father just? Yes.
Does this mean that sinners were united to Christ at the time of His suffering? No. If sinners weren't united to Christ at the time of His suffering, can it be said that Christ was "punished" [at that time]? I don't think so.
It is one thing for us to suffer *for our own sins* - *this* is what I think it is to be "punished." This is distinct from saying that we no longer need to be punished for our own sins because of what Christ did for our sakes. What Christ did for our sakes was to suffer an equivalent of that which our sins merit - but this is not "punishment" per se.
That's my best explanation at present.
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