Showing posts with label Personhood. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Personhood. Show all posts

Thursday, February 22, 2024

Clark and Nestorius

John McGuckin writes that Cyril of Alexandria
“…was appalled by the way Nestorius kept referring to the different prosopa as well as to the prosopon of the union… The problem was that Nestorius was using one and the same technical term to connote the disparate concepts of differentiation and convergence: there are two prosopa (Jesus and the Logos) and only one prosopon (Christ). There is of course, no sensible context whatsoever that would allow one to speak of three prosopa. It may well be that this economy of language in Nestorius led to a fatal weakness in the coherence of his theory, as Cyril argued, but it is clear enough that the caricature of his teaching that described it as no more than a repetition of the old Two Sons theory is an uneven reading of his intent. To this extent Cyril’s synopsis of his opponent was inaccurate. But Cyril had nonetheless put his finger on the key matter and his criticism still had force in the way he argued from Nestorius’ explicit statements to his necessary implications. In this regard Cyril had posed the essential question and voiced fears of many others when he asked whether such a theory had done enough to secure a concept of unitive subject in Christ.” (pgs. 149, 159)
If true, Cyril makes an excellent point. Indeed, one can read Nestorius make this exact sort of statement in the Bazaar of Heracleides:
…the union of the prosôpa took place for the prosopon and not for the ousia and the nature. It is not indeed that one ousia without hypostasis should be conceived, as if by union into one ousia and there were no prosôpon of one ousia, but the natures subsist in their prosôpa and in their natures and in the prosôpon of the union. For in respect to the natural prosôpon of the one the other also makes use of the same on account of the union; and thus [there is] one prosôpon of the two natures. The prosôpon of the one ousia makes use of the prosôpon of the other ousia in the same [way]. For what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity? Therefore thou wilt not call God the Word flesh nor the flesh Son.
This statement by Nestorius is troubling and why I find a graphic shown here to be misleading. Nestorius says that the prosopon (defined by McGuckin as the “observable character, defining properties, manifestation of a reality,” pg. 138) of the divine ousia (essence) and the prosopon of the human ousia are united in one prosopon.

Two prosopa somehow unite such that one prosopon results. And yet, for Nestorius, even given the resultant prosopon, there are still two prosopa, each making “use” of each other. How is this intelligible? McGuckin goes on to argue that Nestorius grounded the union in God’s will: the prosopa of the Logos and the man Jesus are extrinsically related rather than ontologically grounded. Thus, when Nestorius rhetorically asks, “what ousia seekest thou to make without a prosôpon? That of the divinity? Or that of the humanity?” it seems that Nestorius is denying an enhypostatic-anhypostatic distinction - not that I think human nature can exist apart from a hypostasis but that Christ's human nature is enhypostatized by the divine Son, not a distinct individual/subject/person/hypostasis.

Another implication would be that for Nestorius, the prosopon who was glorified with the Father before the world existed (John 17:5) cannot be the same prosopon as the enfleshed Christ whom the Father sent (John 17:3). Along these lines, I can understand better now the Chalcedonian concern regarding “theotokos” (on which, see below).

Now, the same author who used the graphic I linked to above goes on to conclude, “It is recorded that Nestorius agreed with Leo of Rome in regards to Chalcedonian Christology.” The author then cites a statement Nestorius made in The Bazaar of Heracleides: “I was content to endure the things whereof they accused me, in order that while I was accused thereof, they might accept without hindrance the teachings of the Fathers.”

This appears a little too quick. Driver and Hodgson, who wrote an introduction to The Bazaar of Heracleides, qualify this:
The book must have been written by Nestorius in the year 451 or 452, seeing that there are references to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and to the flight of Dioscorus of Alexandria. Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, but though formally deposed by the Council in October of that year was not condemned to banishment until the following July. On the other hand, Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon. It appears, therefore, that Dioscorus must have fled when the Council decided against him, and that when Nestorius wrote he must have heard of his flight, but not of the formal decision of the Council or of the imperial decree by which sentence of exile was pronounced upon him.
Even if Nestorius knew of the council’s decisions and that there was a great deal of each side talking past one another, there certainly were substantial disagreements. Christology is very technical. It should not be surprising that the progressive, historical outworking of Christology was complex... let alone our second-order, contemporary reflection on this historical outworking. In any case, one should not look to Nestorius for a proper understanding of Christology.

With the above in mind, I recently alluded to the way in which elder Gordon Clark's gradual, metaphysical synthesis (link) may have contributed to the two person theory that he proposed in the last book he penned, The Incarnation. Clark wrote:
It seems absurd that the Second Person of the Trinity would have gone to Gehenna, and certainly peculiar if he had gone to Hades, this last because the Second Person could not die. He was the eternal, immutable Son of God. Hence since “the man Christ Jesus” is the only other possibility, the one who died on the cross was a man, he had or was a soul, he was a human being, a person. 
Note how late this particular change in Clark's mind must have been. In 1982, a Trinity Review article on Traducianism was published. This was taken from Clark chapter on The Atonement in Clark's unpublished systematic theology, completed some time around 1978. The Atonement itself was posthumously published in 1987. This suggests that Clark approved the publication of Traducianism in 1982 - at the very least, there is no record that Clark had any problems with its publication. Why is this point relevant? In the article, Clark writes:
J. Oliver Buswell, Jr. defends creationism in a most unfortunate way. In his A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Zondervan, 1962, Vol. I, 250-252) he speaks three times of Christ having been born with a sinless body: “The body of Christ was perfectly sinless.” Nothing is said about a sinless soul. This is peculiarly strange, for, contrary to orthodox doctrine, Buswell teaches, “He, that is, his personal eternal being, his soul, became a human person, a human soul, without in any way ceasing to be a divine person, a divine Soul” (251). But this seems to be Nestorianism unless Buswell means to annihilate the divine Person, and other creationists would not be pleased with this defense of their doctrine.

This is consistent with another remark Clark makes in his in book, The Trinity (which was originally another chapter in his aforementioned systematic theology):

As a prelude to the discussion of this Athanasian Creed, and all the more of later argumentation, certain terminological difficulties require attention. Some of these terms occur in the creed; others have come into use from other sources. Over the centuries discussions on the Trinity have utilized the words nature, essence, being, substance, subsistence, and the very unfortunate Latin term person. These are hardly ever defined with precision. For example, one would ordinarily think that a person must have a will. But the orthodox doctrine allows the three persons of the Trinity to have one will only, while surprisingly the incarnate Jesus has two wills, one divine, one human; and yet even with a human will, and “reasonable soul,” he is not a human person. Nestorianism, with its assertion that Christ was two persons, though plausible on the ground of this psychology, is nonetheless, on the ground of the mediatorial atonement, a heresy. (Gordon Clark, The Trinity, chapter on The Athanasian Creed)

Thus, in 1978 - and probably in 1982 - Clark rejected Nestorianism. Even in his book on The Incarnation, he denies association with Nestorius on the basis of having provided definitions for key terms. Clark thought Nestorius did not provide any such definitions (McGuckin might disagree, although I'm unsure on this point). Nevertheless, his admission to John Robbins in a 1985 that "it is hard to avoid Nestorianism" suggests that on this matter, Clark was of two minds(!)

Now, definitions are important. But how we formulate theological definitions is even more important, for these must accord with God's own self-disclosure in His word. With that in mind, the point Clark makes in his book on The Trinity is pertinent: Nestorianism is a heresy because its two-person Christology leads to a rejection of one Mediator. It is be strange that so specific and excellent a criticism should have been left unanswered by Clark himself upon his change of mind in The Incarnation. Of course, Clark passed away before completing the book to his personal satisfaction.

Much of this is recounted in Doug Douma's book, The Presbyterian Philosopher. But what might also be pointed out is that it is hard to see how Clark's understanding could avoid the charge that the Son of God is not the Son of Man:

Luke 22:69 But from now on the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of the power of God.
70 And they all said, “So You are the Son of God?” And He said to them, “You say correctly that I am.”

Do two [per]Sons sit at God's right hand? Even Nestorius insisted that it is "not as though again two sons were sitting but one, owing to the union with his flesh." Nestorius verbally denied two that there were two Sons. Whether Nestorius' position is consistent with such a verbal denial is another question.

Instead, the point I wish to make is that despite elder Clark's protestations against comparison to Nestorius, his position begs the same questions: who sits at God's right hand? Is there one mediator between God and man, or are there two? Who intercedes for us: God, man, or the God-man? Is the Son through whom God spoke the same Son whose throne is forever and ever (Hebrews 1:3, 8)? Etc.

For the same reasons, we should not hesitate to affirm that Mary was "theotokos." I've spoken with Protestants (and not only those who read Clark) who have had reservations about affirming this. But in his book on The Trinity, Clark said, "theology cannot be divorced from church history" (chapter on Athanasius). Well, did any patristic or theologian in church history who affirmed "theotokos" also affirm that Mary gave birth to the divine nature? Of course not. Any hesitation on this point seems to be a needless worry, whereas accidentally affirming Nestorianism is a real worry.

Take an analogy: would the same people who have reservations about affirming Chalcedon's reference to Mary as "the mother of God" also hesitate to affirm that "the Father is God," "the Son is God," and "the Spirit is God" because they don't want to be confused with tritheists? Wouldn't they rather affirm each statement and just qualify them appropriately (such that monotheism is also affirmed)?

Or take Matthew 1:23. Mary is prophesied as the one who will give birth to Immanuel. She will give birth to "God-with-us." Should we have reservations about affirming this Scripture just to avoid a position that no important theologian in history has ever affirmed? These are fair challenges to those who refuse to accept orthodox doctrines and inferences.

Now, as with his Trinitarian model, I would like to think Clark's attitude regarding his theory of personhood was something along the following lines: 

The discussion of the main problem in the doctrine of the Trinity may now be called completed, even if it is not complete. Other students and scholars may add to, subtract from, modify, contradict, or otherwise alter the foregoing. Such responses would be a great improvement over the present almost universal neglect of the doctrine. (chapter on Individuation)

Charity towards Clark would, I think, read him as primarily encouraging thoughtfulness regarding metaphysical conundrums. However, there can be little doubt that Clark's own thought has inhibited some people from accepting orthodox Christology. That's the charitable way to put the matter. One might reasonably be more blunt. Even so, it remains for us to take up Clark's challenge:

...if someone does not like these definitions, he is free to present his own for consideration. (The Trinity, Bavinck and Van Til).
I have offered a definition of the term person. Most people will find it queer. Most theologians will find it unacceptable. Well and good, let them formulate and propose a different definition. That is the honest and logical thing to do. Then there will be an intelligible subject of discussion. One can reasonably suppose that it could be a better definition than mine. (The Incarnation, Conclusion)

A Nestorian Christology of any flavor is biblically untenable. Clark's view causes worse problems than it aims to solve. But unless we are content with apophaticism, some positive theory must be given. 

The problem for Clark was when he defined a person as "his mind or soul" (The Trinity, chapter on Some Conclusions). In fact, for Clark, a single person always has a single mind because a single person just is his mind... not to mention that he is also the objects "he" thinks (I go into more detail about this ontological collapse here). This too strict equation of a single person with a single mind led Clark to believe that Christ incarnate was two persons because Christ incarnate has two minds. That is the problem stated. 

What follows is a solution - a positive theory which coheres with the foregoing analysis. I do not argue my solution is the most coherent one possible. But I take it as prima facie acceptable insofar as it can account for the Scriptural data while avoiding a few of the conundrums Clark mentions. I mentioned it a long time ago, and as it's held up in my mind over time, I'll attempt to outline it in a little more detail below.

A helpful way to begin a formulation of a definition for "person" is to point out that Jesus Christ is the single subject of many biblical propositions. Whatever explains the unity of Jesus Christ as a single subject might also help us to explain what persons are.

That is, suppose one wrongly accepted some version of Nestorianism (Clark's or otherwise). That person would still tend to make statements such as, “Jesus Christ is a human person and divine person.” But this still implies a single subject, Jesus Christ, which or who the Nestorian thinks is the unity of two persons. Well, how would the Nestorian unite the two persons in a single subject? 

Just as importantly, if and once such an explanation is provided, why can't that explanation about how Jesus Christ is a single subject also help us to explain how Jesus Christ is a single “person” in the first place (rather than two persons)? Christ is one subject. Therefore, is it not plausible that He is one person? However one attempts to explain that Christ is one subject can also be used to help explain how He is one person. I take this to be a good start.

Pushing the matter a bit further, I think any thorough solution should recognize that Christ incarnate does indeed have two minds. Thus, the definition of "mind" is not identical to the definition of a person. Instead, a mind is that by which a person can think. Note that this does not suggest that the relationship between persons and minds is one of one-to-one correspondence (see below).

Now, in certain cases, minds think self-referentially. Take an example: "Ryan is a male" is a true proposition. Because I am Ryan, I am also able to truthfully think, "I am a male." This thought reflexively indexes the true proposition "Ryan is a male." Other persons (like females) cannot truthfully use the reflexive indexical "I" to think the proposition that I think in the mode that I think it. Females would only be able to truthfully affirm the true proposition, "Ryan is a male," not the self-referential thought which indexes the proposition to myself.

In normal cases, when we talk about one, singular person, we usually associate him or her one mind. Thus, Clark's faulty definition of persons is natural, if dangerous. However, given the unique case of Christ, we should allow for the possibility that a single person can have multiple minds. A better definition of "person" than Clark's, I think, is one which is not too far removed from it: a person is a mind or minds capable of reflexive indexation. Perhaps the underlined portion is redundant, but at any rate, here's an example of how this cashed out in the case of Christ incarnate:

The human mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "I grow in wisdom."
The divine mind of Christ incarnate thinks, "I am all-wise."

In both cases, the "I" has the same referent, a singular subject, individual, or hypostases: Christ incarnate. Thus, one can truthfully affirm that "Christ incarnate grew in wisdom" and that "Christ incarnate is all-wise." This is not a contradiction, because Christ incarnate does not grow in wisdom in the same sense that He is all-wise. He grows in wisdom by His human mind and is all-wise by His divine mind. On this definition of "person," we can avoid the error of Nestorianism.

Accepting this definition would mean one would have to reject elder Clark's metaphysical synthesis. But I think this turns out to be a case of addition by subtraction: the less one relies on Clark's metaphysics, the better.

Now, I have seen the following citation float around which might seem to pose a problem for the view I've expressed. In his book Paradox in Christian Theology, James Anderson writes:
If claims about Jesus possessing two distinct ranges of consciousness, two distinct sets of experiences, beliefs, etc., are to be coherent then it must be possible to refer to those mental features without those features being necessarily owned by any particular person. Yet this is precisely what our concept of a person rules out. If experiences are necessarily individuated with respect to persons, then at the most fundamental logical level it makes no sense to speak of one person with two distinct consciousnesses (in the sense that each consciousness might in principle be ascribed to a different person that the other)...

If persons and not minds are the logically primary subjects of experiences and other mental states then it makes no more sense to say Christ believe that water is H2O with respect to his divine mind but did not believe that water is H2O with respect to His human mind than it does to say that Christ broke break with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet. A person either breaks bread or he does not; likewise, a person either believes that water is H2O or he does not. To try to isolate two distinct minds or consciousnesses within one person, as Morris seeks to do, is to kick against the goads of the very concepts needed to formulate the christological problem in the first place. (Paradox in Christian Theology, pgs. 97-98)

Frankly, I personally don't see a problem with the statement that Christ broke bread with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet. Despite his seeming incredulity, does Anderson think that this statement is false? In what way does this conflict with Anderson's argument that "If particular experiences are to be meaningful, they cannot be logically isolated from the subjects of those experiences"? Subjects are not attribution-less particulars. To say that there is a distinction between the subject or person of Jesus and His divine and human minds does not seem to entail that Jesus' divine mind (in particular) is not "necessarily owned" by the person of Jesus. 

Here is an analogy: "if claims about the person of the Father possessing two distinct attributes is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those attributes without those attributes being necessarily owned by any particular person." Does Anderson really think that [the divine] attributes are not "necessarily owned" by the Father? Or would Anderson suggest some sort of extremely strong, Plotinic view of divine simplicity on which God has no attributes? I wouldn't think so, as I recall Anderson had some relevant criticisms of Dolezal's book on divine simplicity (link).

In fact, Anderson himself accepts theistic conceptual realism. He thinks that God's thoughts are identical with propositions. Insofar as propositions are distinct, God's thoughts must also be distinct. So here's another, even better analogy: "if claims about the Father's possessing two distinct thoughts is to be coherent, then it must be possible to refer to those thoughts without those thoughts being necessarily owned by any particular person." Would not Anderson deny that this follows? If so, that would mean his original argument doesn't follow either.

One final thought: a separate objection to the definition I've proposed for what a "person" is might be that it is contrived. Well, in some sense, I grant that this is true: the incarnation is a special case, after all. The language of "personhood" is one the church did contrive to deal with heresies and of which the church should take the data of special divine revelation in account when formulating a coherent Christology. This is less a criticism and more so an obvious statement of a historical reality.

Wednesday, February 14, 2024

Clark's Gradual, Metaphysical Synthesis

A recent question was asked about Clark's theology proper which allowed me to collect thoughts that I have been meaning to put into words for some time. The question was as follows:

Clark was known to have translated John 1:1 so that the Logos was rendered as "Logic". Along these lines, Clark would argue to the effect that logic is the manner or characteristic of God's thinking.

How or where does Clark deal with the objection where logic is the art which orders discursive thought (something of which God does not have)? In other words, how can logic (as that which applies to reasoning from premises to conclusions) be said to be the characteristic of God's thinking if God's thinking is non-discursive?
This is an excellent question in that it draws out some implications of Clark’s view that may not be immediately obvious to the ordinary reader. 

Several people who responded to this question pointed out that an answer to it might depend on what the questioners thinks characterizes “discursive” reasoning. Clark himself used the word "discursive" to mean different things in different contexts.

For example, does “discursive” reasoning in the context of the above question involve a temporal succession and/or dependent process? If so, Clark would reply that God’s knowledge is not "discursive" in this sense:
The Complaint admits that Dr. Clark distinguishes between what may be called the divine psychology and human psychology in the act of knowing. God’s mode of knowing is intuitive, while man’s is always temporal and discursive. This distinction, the Complaint claims, is insufficient; a further distinction is needed. It is obvious therefore that the complainants hold to a two-fold theory of something in addition to a two-fold theory of the act of knowing. (Winter 1946/1947. Studies in the Doctrines of the Complaint. PCA Archives and SDCS)
Or does "discursive" merely suggest (in the context of the above question) that one’s thinking is syllogistically ordered? If so, Clark would reject the questioner's premise that God’s thinking is not "discursive":
God's knowledge is sometimes called intuitive rather than discursive. These terms are unfortunate, because if discursive means “syllogistic,” then God thinks in syllogism (Rom 4:2-3), and because men also presumably have intuitions. (1972. In Encyclopedia of Christianity. Philip E. Hughes, ed. Marshallton, Delaware: National Foundation for Christian Education. Feuerbach, Ludwig A.)
For Clark, however, for God to think "in syllogism" does not mean that there is some so-called fundamental truth or truths from which God must deduce all others. That would mean there would be more fundamental parts of God than others since, for Clark, God just is truth itself. I'll return to this point below, but by way of anticipation, I think Clark does implicitly provide answer to the questioner's confusion (although in such a way that it still leaves problems with Clark's larger theology). 

I'll put it another way: for humans, Clark says the law of contradiction is a test that requires supplementation – God’s word – in order for knowledge to be possible. For God, this is not so:
The substantive point needing discussion is whether the law of contradiction is the one and only test of truth.
Ideally or for God this seems to be the case. Since there is nothing independent of God, he does not conform truth to an alleged reality beyond truth and beyond him. Since there is no possibility of “vertical” (to use Carnell’s terminology) coherence, the “horizontal” test, or, better the horizontal characteristic of logical consistency seems the only possible one.

Weaver correctly notes that I do not claim for human beings the ability to apply this test universally. In this sense it is a “negative” or, better, an incomplete test. For this reason it must be supplemented some way or other...

Undoubtedly I hold that truth is a consistent system of propositions. Most people would be willing to admit that two truths cannot be contradictories; and I would like to add that the complex of all truths cannot be a mere aggregate of unrelated assertions. Since God is rational, I do not see how any item of his knowledge can be unrelated to the rest. Weaver makes no comment on this fundamental characteristic of divine truth.

Rather, he questions whether this characteristic is of practical value, and whether it must be supplemented in some way. It is most strange that Weaver here says, “I must agree with Carnell,” as if he had convicted me of disagreeing with Carnell by providing no supplementation whatever. Now, I may disagree with the last named gentleman on many points, but since it is abundantly clear that I “supplement” consistency by an appeal to the Scripture for the determination of particular truths, it is most strange that Weaver ignores my supplementation.// (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 287, 290)

A shorter statement by Clark to the same effect is as follows:

One who believes in the unity of truth may still believe that the false system entails contradictions; but to prove this is the work of omniscience. (Historiography: Secular and Religious, 1971, pg. 370)

Now, the following is very important: Clark held to a coherence or consistency theory of truth.

This gentleman distinguishes between logical consistency and a coherence view of truth. Since he stresses the latter rather than the former, he might think that Nash rates me too highly by asserting that I hold to coherence. However, neither Professor Nash nor I acknowledge this distinction, and while I now prefer the word consistency for clarity’s sake, I have no objection to Nash’s statement at this point. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 142)
For that reason, I believe, Clark came to reject that there could be multiple propositional systems that are completely coherent or consistent. If truth is coherence or consistency, there must be only one completely consistent or coherent system. Clark considered this even as early as 1952. From the Introduction to his A Christian View of Men and Things, he writes:
Now, there is a theory that the ultimate test of truth is coherence, and on this theory it would be impossible to have two self‑consistent, mutually contradictory philosophies. A false statement, so it is said, will always, if pursued far enough, imply its own falsity. If this coherence theory of truth should be established, then we could rely with confidence on this application of the law of contradiction. Its sufficiency would be inherent in the nature of truth. The mere fact that the coherence theory of truth would eliminate a final impasse might even be reason enough for adopting it. One might hold that all other theories of truth lead to skepticism, and that therefore the coherence theory alone is coherent and true. Possibly all this is so, but surely it needs some more talking about. And in talking about it, there can be no logical objection to using the law of contradiction as far as it will go.
Over time, I think his acceptance of a coherence theory of truth pushed him to accept necessitarianism (see here). There is necessarily only one coherent or consistent system of propositions, and God necessarily just is this system.

For Clark, the idea of multiple propositional systems that are coherent or consistent would not only have posed an epistemic difficulty for God but also a metaphysical one since, for Clark, God just is truth. Clark himself says: "Truth is God... God is truth." (1984. In the Beginning. The Trinity Review Nov.-Dec.). This dovetails with his theory of personhood in which persons just are that which they think:
As there is no temporal priority, so also there is no logical or analytical priority. Not only was Logic the beginning, but Logic was God. If this unusual translation of John’s Prologue still disturbs someone, he might yet allow that God is his thinking. God is not a passive or potential substratum; he is actuality or activity. (1980. God and Logic. The Trinity Review Nov.-Dec.)
God thinks truth; therefore, God is truth. Returning to an earlier point, for Clark, the unity of truth (God) is such that any single, true proposition will mutually entail all others, whereas a false proposition will always lead to systematic inconsistency. God has no need for axiomatic truths (unlike us), for He is in no need of "supplementation" (unlike us) to apply the law of contradiction to Himself - or, what is equivalent, to His own knowledge - with complete sufficiency. God just is the singly coherent, consistent, necessary, logical system: truth itself. God is this truth actually and actively. There is no potential for God to have been another system of so-called truths. 

Roughly, then, one can argue that epistemological beliefs Clark became committed to in the 1940s-50s - e.g. man's knowledge is univocal with God's; coherence theory of truth; anti-empirical means of knowledge - shaped his later, metaphysical views. For example:

- Clark's theory of truth was such that in order for Clark to account for knowledge of persons (e.g. man's knowledge of God or God's knowledge of men), he believed he had to change his views (cf. his earlier anthropological views here) by collapsing personhood into 1) propositions or 2) thoughts. 

[As an aside, these two positions might be distinct (link). In particular, the second position - i.e. persons are what they think - might seem to require what Clark calls elsewhere a "subjective, psychological act" (link), implying something seemingly distinct from propositional objects yet corresponding to them: i.e. thinkers. 

An interesting question is whether Clark believed these positions were distinct. It does not appear so, for in his book The Trinity, he says in the same chapter ("Individuation") that persons are a "collection of thoughts" and that his wife is "merely a set of propositions." He appears to equate positions 1) and 2), at least in terms of his own, proposed definition of personhood.

So did Clark think propositions can think themselves? Is this intelligible? And contrary to contemporary philosophers, did Clark think propositions have causal powers? Combined with his quote from the "God and Logic" article above, it does indeed appear Clark thought such to be the case! Of course, an obvious, unfortunate product of this position as held by elder Clark is a two-person theory of the incarnation (two thinkers = two persons).

On the other hand, even if our "subjective, psychological act" of believing might itself be a proposition, Clark does nevertheless seem to introduce something distinct from propositions elsewhere in accepting Clark's acceptance of a "Platonic-Philonic" dualism (link). But this then begs the question as to whether one must know phenomena qua phenomena or if it suffices to know the noumenal, suprasensible world. Likewise, Clark's theory of language trades on nonpropositional "symbols" which, in Clark's own words, correspond to propositions (link). 

This would be problematic unless the following assertion Clark made to Buswell in 1948 is false: "The correspondence theory would require us to compare an idea we have in consciousness with some utterly unknown object." But if it is false (as I've argued, link), it demotivates Clark's reason for accepting the coherence theory of truth and, in turn, the many metaphysical views Clark was led to as a result.]

- Likewise, Clark's theory of time as a "succession of ideas" suggests yet another collapse of a metaphysical category into an epistemic one. 

[Another aside: I wonder if this may function to explain why Clark waffled on the age of the earth prior to the creation of man. Clark did believe angels had successions of ideas; I suppose only the hypothesis that angels were the first creations would prevent one from asking Clark "how much time elapsed between the creation of the heavens and the creation of angels?" This question might be problematic if no angels existed to have a succession of ideas according to which the elapse between the creation of heaven and the creation of angels might be measured.]

- Returning to Clark's metaphysic of persons, one might suggest that whereas Thomistic divine simplicity is subject to comparison to Plotinus' One, Clark's version of divine simplicity is more subject to comparison to Plotinus' Divine Mind (link). To the chagrin of adherents to these versions of divine simplicity, I think the comparisons are warranted.

To expand on Clark's view, it is fairly apparent that Clark's affirmation of univocal knowledge plays a part in his unique understanding of divine simplicity. If Clark can be categorized as a classical theist - for he did accept divine simplicity, immutability, timelessness, and impassibility - he is certainly an odd one! On the other hand, that a comparison to Plotinus might nevertheless be made to Clark's views might lead one to theorize that Clark had a tendency to overly depend on ancient philosophers (with whom Clark was so familiar).

- In support of this thesis, 1) Clark's view of time depended on Augustine; 2) elder Clark seemed to deny the possibility of an infinitude of knowledge in The Incarnation, a denial which Steve Hays once point out presupposes a pre-Cantorian definition of "infinity" and simultaneously demonstrated Clark's ignorance of mathematics (cf. Personal Recollections, pg. 117); 3) elder Clark's acceptance of necessitarianism is somewhat similar to Plotinian necessitarianism. In this last case, however, I would say his view is rather more similar to that of Leibniz, which is nevertheless striking in that so far as I am aware, elder Clark never responded to his own, proleptic criticism (written in 1957) of his later acceptance of necessitarianism: 
If all truths are to be deduced by logic alone from the being of God, this world cannot be the best of all possible worlds because there are no other possible worlds. Are the theorems of geometry the best of all possible theorems? The question is meaningless, for there are no other theorems. God, therefore, exercised no choice in causing the world; he is its cause in precisely the same sense in which the axioms of geometry are the cause of the theorems. (Thales to Dewey, pg. 327, 1957)

Clark wrote other criticisms of necessitarianism he also neglected to address when he later came to accept the position (cf. Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 36).

- One final metaphysical category that seems driven by Clark's epistemic beliefs pertains to causation. I've suggested that elder Clark's acceptance of occasionalism (link) was due to his anti-empirical epistemology. Clark might have feared that an alternative account of causation would support his critics, who perpetually asked if Clark had to read his Bible in order to know its contents. 

Now, I've also argued there was no reason for Clark to have had this fear (if he did; link). It is possible for propositional truths to correspond to nonpropositions - and even for the truth-values of contingent propositions to be determined by nonproposition[s] (for God Himself is not a [set of] proposition[s], link) - without devastating a revelational epistemology. Additionally, in the context of the specific critique regarding the reading of one's Bible, it is possible Clark conflated the basing relation in epistemology (or something like it) with causation simpliciter.

These are the beginnings of an interesting story one might tell about how Clark's unique thought developed and converged over time, a story I eventually hope to narrate in a more ordered form. 

As a perhaps unnecessary outro, I don't agree with Clark on several of these points. Nor were his views on several points I've outlined above always the same. For example, as I point out in one of the above links and quotes, one will find statements earlier in his life in which he (correctly) rejects necessitarianism. 

However, I think there is a gradual, metaphysical synthesis in Clark's thought that implies his awareness of such problems as the one posed at the beginning of this post. Even though I think Clark gets quite a few things wrong, his attempted synthesis is nonetheless impressive. Clark's following speech "from the grave" was a little too humble: "Clark never had much to do with ta meta-ta-phusica."

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Everything is Everything

I’m a staunch Ironyc: everything is ironical. Objects, actions, various parts of speech – each of these individuals are sets, a congeries or combination, system or agglomeration, but at any rate a collection of ironies.

People, for example, are what they aren’t - how obvious this is in the case of this very post! - and ironically, no two are what each other is. Several romantically inclined students, and a few professors as well, have complained that “this makes your wife merely a set of ironies.” Well, so it does. This suits me, for I am a set of ironies too. And those who complain also are as they aren’t, which is especially ironic.

Secularists like Aristotle admitted that individuals cannot be ironies. But I will show what several of my critics ironically consider paradoxical; to wit, persons are ironies. The simple justification is this: in the Bible, God and men mock each other. That must mean both are capable of being objects of ridicule. So they must metaphysically just be objects of ridicule. Further, God cannot be an object of ridicule for what He is, only for what He isn’t. And when men are mocked, it must be for what they are not, which must mean they are being mocked for what they are. Of course, per the above, this exegetically proves persons are ironies.

Far from my making it impossible for God to mock human beings, it is rather my critics who do so. Their view of the self is that of some Spott-an-sich. But Leibniz, whose words we must absolutely take into consideration, suggests that the ego is a complex irony. This definition is ironic in essence, and God mocks it because he determined what it should not be. On the other hand, it is something that the person himself may not laugh at, at least in this life.

Now, there is a philosopher who has argued that “if a word meant everything, it would mean nothing.” Apparently, for this philosopher, everything means nothing. How ironic!

But let’s seriously entertain his view for a moment, as it applies to ironies:
If a predicate can be attached to everything without exception, it has no distinct meaning, and this is to say that it has no meaning at all…Here then in the conclusion: The predicate ironical can be attached to everything real or imaginary without exception. Dreams are ironical, mirages are ironical, the square root of minus one is ironical. These statements, however, are meaningless; they tell us nothing about dreams and the square root of minus one…Anything is ironical, so far as the term has any faint meaning at all. But it makes a great difference whether God is a dream, a mirage, or the square root of minus one. (link)
Perhaps this philosopher can riddle me this: if a thing's metaphysical makeup isn't ironical, how could God laugh at it? Why, that's like saying God could know what a thing is even if that thing's metaphysical makeup isn't propositional! And I'm pretty sure Leibniz wouldn't agree with that. Clearly, just because the predicate "ironical" - and we can throw the predicate "propositional" in for good measure - can be attached to everything real or imaginary without exception doesn't mean these words are meaningless or mean nothing.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Correspondence, Dualism and Epistemology

I’ve received a reply to this post I wrote a few years ago on Clark’s metaphysics. Hopefully I can clarify some seeming confusion:
For Ryan Hedrich, the philosopher Gordon Clark was so wary of the potentially anti-Christian consequences of an empirical epistemology that he was forced to adopt an unusual metaphysics.
I don't see how Clark’s metaphysic as stated in the quote provided is unusual. It just shows that Clark was a dualist. He believed in physical and mental realities. This is well represented in the history of philosophy, and it shows that Clark didn't always (if ever) hold to propositional monism. Rather, "reality is complex" (link).

Clark often helps himself to terminology of non-Christian philosophers to make his points. I wouldn't say his use of “noumena” and “phenomena” were meant to specifically identify his position with Kant any more than Clark’s use of “infimae species” was specifically meant to identify his position with Aristotle. Clark defines noumena and phenomena as “things which do not appear” and “things that are seen,” respectively. That's as far as he goes.
Thus, Clark's epistemology appears to be a kind of Kantian representationalism. The human perceives a phenomenon which is a pale representation of a thing in itself.
Well, so far as Clark's epistemology itself is concerned, I don't know that this follows, although Clark himself may have thought so (though I doubt it). Either way, I've been working on developing Clark's epistemology. I note here, for example, that a correspondence theory of truth – some variation of which, I think, must follow from Clark’s dualism – doesn't imply a certain epistemology, but nor do I see that it implies a certain metaphysic, like direct or indirect realism, a point to which I will return below. 

Knowledge is indeed propositional. Truth is indeed propositional. But truth is connected to non-propositional realities: "Phenomena come from noumena." If they weren't so connected, then we would have no means by which to even allude to non-propositional realities.

I probably shouldn't have referred to non-propositional realities by using terminology like “thing-in-itself” or “Ding-an-sich.” I can see why the author believed me to be insinuating some sort of Kantian metaphysic, when in reality I only wanted to highlight that Clark was a dualist. But I was just coming to realize certain elements of Clark's metaphysical views were wrong, such as that persons are the propositions they think. My goal was to show that persons can't just be the propositions they think, from which I hoped to buttress the dualism Clark elsewhere espoused. A more recent post of mine does a better job of exposing the problem with Clark's view of personhood (link)
However, Hedrich notes that later, in Clark and His Critics, Clark rejects the existence of an unknowable thing in itself. Instead, all knowledge is propositional. Humans know something if the propositional content of our minds corresponds with that of God's proposition. But are these two views really incompatible? Perhaps the Clarkian can believe that human perception of an object consists of a representation of a thing in itself, but that this representation, though possibly true, does not consist of knowledge, since the individual can never know for sure whether or not or to what extent his representation corresponds with a sensory object.
Precisely, except that it may be somewhat imprecise to say a representation is "possibly true." We can never know a representation qua representation is true; a representation as such cannot be true. Rather, I think it is more precise to say a representation (and I believe this is assuming indirect realism) is possibly connected to a given truth. 

Suppose we have an image in mind which has been caused by perceiving some object. It's possible that both the proposition we think (after which the visible object is patterned) is knowable to us, and it's also possible [and compatible with both direct and indirect realism] that the image we have in mind corresponds to that truth. It's possible if God knows that the proposition is indeed true and has been revealed as well as what images do and don't correspond to this truth, the one we have being among those which do - God doesn't need sensory organs to have images.

If what image we have in mind matches [one of] God's, then it is connected with and so corresponds to that truth, regardless of whether we know such - on a Clarkian epistemology, we wouldn't, though this isn't problematic. That is, we don't need the image to know the truth to which an image (or, potentially, images) corresponds. We can, therefore, know propositions without possessing or connecting any corresponding non-propositional realities to them. 

This is all a bit speculative, but it reflects my current thinking on the subject and illustrates how it is possible to reconcile dualism with Clark's epistemology. Of course, the issue of direct and indirect realism ought to be worked out if it can be, as should the question of how non-propositional realities perceived by means other than physical sight can be connected to truth.
The human's propositional thought concerning the object is certainly true if it corresponds with God's thought about the object, but the individual cannot be certain of its truth, and thus, it does not consist of knowledge. Sense-perception of phenomena is not propositional. It is for this reason that it is not knowledge. Perhaps Gordon Clark can be said to have a representational theory of sense-perception truth while a direct realist theory of knowledge. Thus, it might be said that, at least as far as sense-perception is concerned, Clark might be committed to a representationalist theory of truth, as well as a representationalist position of the contents of consciousness (this, of course, would be restricted to the contents of sensory truth).
I would hesitate to use phrases like "sensory truth" and "sense-perception truth," as well as hesitate to limit Clark's dualism to indirect realism, but I think I understand the intentions of the author and thank him for the chance to update my views on the meaning of correspondence between truth and non-propositional realities, and its [non]impact on philosophic knowledge, which I have been meaning to do for some time.

Monday, April 13, 2015

Further Problems with Clark's Metaphysical View of Persons

I've explained elsewhere why Clark's metaphysical theory of personhood leads to his two-person theory of the Incarnation (here). This two-person theory is flawed because it is manufactured by an illusory problem that it doesn't even solve. If it is a problem for Jesus to be one person, is it not a problem that Jesus is one subject? Or if you can explain why the latter fact isn't a problem, don't you in principle have an explanation for why the former theory needn't be problematic?

I've also explained elsewhere why Clark's theory of persons would imply the unbiblical view that God is metaphysically dependent on creation (here).

Others have pointed out problems with Clark's theory (for example, see here).

I'm going to note a few more problems. But firstly, it isn't clear whether Clark consistently held the same metaphysical view of persons throughout his life. For instance:
Aristotle admitted that individuals cannot be known. Hegel’s fault, or one of them, was to make the concept rather than the propositions the object of knowledge. But a concept is as unknowable as an individual. “Pen” is neither true nor false. Only a proposition can be true. “The pen belongs to Herr Krug” may be true; it may be false; but a concept in isolation is not an object of knowledge. Truth always comes in propositions.  
Two quotations from Leibniz enforced the application of this principle to persons. In fact the citations will do double work. They will show that knowledge of a person is propositions (and thus they bear on what several of my critics consider paradoxical, to wit, persons are propositions), and at the same time they will bring home the lesson from Plotinus that knowledge of oneself is no easy, off-hand, immediate experience, but of all things immensely difficult...  
Far from my making it impossible for God to know human beings, it is rather Professor Nash who does so. His view of the self is that of some Ich-an-sich. Leibniz suggests that the ego is a complex definition, including the life history of the person, and no doubt his state in a future world as well. This definition is not unknowable in essence, and God knows it because he determined what it should be. On the other hand, it is something that the person himself does not know, at least in this life. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs 148-149)
On this view, persons are just propositions. Clark is here silent as to whether or not they are propositions they think, as he argued later in his life:
Accordingly the proposal is that a man is a congeries, a system, sometimes an agglomeration of miscellany, but at any rate a collection of thoughts. A man is what he thinks: and no two men are precisely the same combination. 
This is true of the Trinity also, for although each of the three Persons is omniscient, one thinks “I or my collection of thoughts is the Father,” and the second thinks, “I or my thoughts will assume or have assumed a human nature.” The Father does not think this second thought, nor does the Son think the first. This is the qualitative theory of individuation, as opposed to the space-time theory: No two leaves in the forest are exactly alike, and Leibniz’ Alexander the Great is defined by his history. Even if trees could be individuated by space and time, the persons of the Trinity, as said above, could not; nor could human souls or other spirits.  
Several romantically inclined students, and a few professors as well, have complained that “this makes your wife merely a set of propositions.” Well, so it does. This suits me, for I am a set of propositions too. And those who complain are as they think. (The Trinity, 2010, pg. 129)
The last paragraph does say that persons are propositions, but a problem is that it's a bit too fast. Thoughts don't have to be propositions. We can think about questions or commands, both of which Clark distinguished from propositions yet admitted are necessarily capable of being “understood,” “known,” and “intellectually grasped.” Clark argued that “every declarative sentence – in fact, even questions and commands – are examples of logic” (Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society Volume 24, June 1981, pg. 168). So then which is it? Are we (and the Trinity) merely sets of propositions, or are we also the commands and questions we think?

Let's forget about that for now. Let's say we are what we think - specifically, the propositions we think. But sometimes, we think falsely as well as truly. Clark admits as much himself, including the false propositions we think in our individual, personal definitions as well as the true ones: 
Therefore, since God is Truth, we shall define person, not as a composite of sensory impressions, as Hume did, but rejecting with him the meaningless term substance, we shall define person as a composite of truths. A bit more exactly, since all men make mistakes and believe some falsehoods, the definition must be a composite of propositions. As a man thinketh in his (figurative) heart, so is he. A man is what he thinks... Whether the propositions be true or false, a person is the propositions he thinks (The Incarnation, 1988, pgs. 54-55).
However, given Clark's statements that “No one more than I insists on the necessity of a single self-consistent worldview” (Today’s Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine? 1990, pg. 111), doesn't that mean that, metaphysically speaking, we are contradictions? If there is a single, self-consistent worldview, any false thought we have must be contradictory to any true thought we have. The result is that either God doesn't know us or God is a dialetheist, which is about as far removed from Clark's "consistency" theory of truth (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pgs. 142-145, 290-291, etc.) as one could get.

Of course, if one bites the bullet and argues God doesn't have to know us, then Clark's whole motivation for persons metaphysically being propositions in the first place is gone. God either doesn't need to know us or, as I think, we don't have to metaphysically just be propositions in order for God to know us, for what we metaphysically are was determined by God to correspond to some truth which God knows.

Now instead, let's say we are just a set of propositions and disregard what it is that we think. We are a complex definition that God has determined, per the above exposition of Leibniz. In that case, mustn't whatever set of propositions God knows us to be, whatever set of propositions we are, be changeless - which would make us eternal - on pain of making God's knowledge change? As propositions, we must be the objects of God's thoughts; if we change, God's thoughts and knowledge must change. Most Clarkians don't believe God's knowledge can change, but the resultant implication goes much farther than this or even a corollary to a B-series theory of time called eternal creation; in this case, we ourselves would cease to be temporal. We wouldn't change. This is opposed to Clark's own beliefs, and, at any rate, clearly unbiblical.

But suppose we allow that the set of propositions we are changes, and so God's knowledge changes. I've argued elsewhere (without endorsing the view) that God could be eternally omniscient and yet have determined that His knowledge will change in accordance with changes in time. In fact, per the above quote, it seems Clark unwittingly admits this to be the case in the incarnation (“I or my thoughts will assume or have assumed a human nature”). [Lest anyone think Clark's change of view on the incarnation may have affected this, he says on pg. 55 of The Incarnation (1988): “Neither the complex of truths we call the Father nor those we call the Spirit, has the proposition, “I was incarnated.” This proposition occurs only in the Son’s complex.”]

It would take someone extremely committed to Clark's metaphysic of personhood to goes so far as to admit God is temporal just to save it, for he would have to give up Clark's motivations for necessitarianism and divine eternality. Worse, however, I think this view leads to a kind of process theology or divine becoming. For if persons are propositions, the persons of the Trinity must be propositions. And if "the Father is a knower of [person] x as [a set of propositions] y" is true at one time and false at another (corresponding to the time[s] at which He decreed we change as persons), does this not imply metaphysical change on the part of the Father? 

One would have to state that this proposition ("the Father is a knower of [person] x as [a set of propositions] y") isn't essential to or found in the complex definition of the Father at any time (and likewise the Son and Spirit). But then, this implies "the Father is omniscient" isn't to be found in the definition of the Father either, for the truth of this latter proposition hinges on the truth[s] of the former. And then by parity of reasoning, all the other divine attributes appear equally unessential, and thus one couldn't even say that "the Father (or Son or Spirit) is God (or divine)" is essential to their personhood. Clearly this has been ad hoc reasoning for more than a while now, so the view that persons metaphysically just are propositions is problematic too.

Thursday, July 4, 2013

K. Scott Oliphint on Clark and Van Til

There’s been a podcast floating around for some time now about the “Clark and Van Til Controversy” involving K. Scott Oliphint, a fairly popular Van Tilian (link). I’m a little tired of writing posts on Van Til, but I’m also a little tired of seeing Van Tilians link to this audio. So, on that cynical note, here are a few observations:

Clark and Rationalism

A recurring criticism of Clark throughout the conversation is that he is too rationalistic. His view of logic and philosophy is too high. Unfortunately, “philosophy” is never defined, so there isn’t much I can say about that, but regarding rationalism and Clark’s view of logic, I found it ironic that the only actual citation of Clark – which was explicitly acknowledged as having been derived from a second-hand source (a book by Greg Bahnsen) – was the following:
The more consistent unbelief is, the less can agreement be obtained. So long as the unbeliever is inconsistent, we can force him to make a choice. If he inconsistently admires Jesus Christ or values the Bible, while at the same time he denies plenary and verbal inspiration, we can by logic insist that he accept both – or neither. But we cannot by logic prevent him from choosing neither and denying a common premise. It follows that in logical theory there is no proposition on which a consistent believer and a consistent unbeliever can agree. Therefore the doctrine of inspiration, like every other Christian doctrine, cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a clear-thinking unbeliever. 
If, nonetheless, it can be shown that the Bible – in spite of having been written by more than thirty-five authors over a period of fifteen hundred years – is logically consistent, then the unbeliever would have to regard it as a most remarkable accident. It seems more likely that a single superintending mind could produce this result than that it just happened accidentally. Logical consistency, therefore, is evidence of inspiration; but it is not demonstration. Strange accidents do indeed occur, and no proof is forthcoming that the Bible is not such an accident. Unlikely perhaps, but still possible. 
How then may an unbeliever be brought to admit the inspiration of the Scripture? Or, for it is the same question, how did “I” come to accept inspiration? (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 15-16)
Clark then talks about the role of the Spirit in conversion. Of course, only the second of these paragraphs was quoted so as to give listeners the impression Clark himself believed the consistency of Scripture could have been an accident. But even if such were the case, and it’s not, is it not interesting that Clark believed logic was insufficient to establish the truth of God[’s revelation]? Compare this apologetic to that of contemporary Van Tilians (link) and ask yourself who is closer to rationalism.

To be fair, Oliphint himself cannot be included in this group of Van Tilians. He says (45th minute) that Muslims, atheists, et. al. can use the transcendental methodology or apologetic structure that Van Til does – i.e. an argument of the impossibility to the contrary – but the but claims that the content of any such non-Christian argument will always be false. Why? Not because we need to know all false positions in order to know the truth; Oliphint explicitly mentions that this is not necessary. Rather, we know the transcendental argument for Christianity is true “by virtue of God’s grace and what He has revealed” (47th minute). This is excellent, but it’s easy to miss that he really is essentially affirming divine revelation as his epistemic axiom. This just is Scripturalism – give or take its authoritative sanctioning of alternative means of knowledge – and it is at odds with contemporary Van Tilian apologists who seek to prove God by logic apart from Scripture. In my experience, the number of those who interpret Van Til as teaching the latter outnumber those who would side with Oliphint’s interpretation.

But getting back to the idea that Clark was too rationalistic, if they had simply noted a few instances in which Clark’s exposure to secular philosophy could have provided an explanation for why he believed several dubious doctrines – like his acceptance of Leibniz’s theory of personhood – I don’t think I would have had much of a problem with it. I think it’s fair to say that it would be difficult for anyone who has read and taught as much and as long as Clark has to have maintained complete doctrinal purity throughout. I think the same goes for Van Til (link). This isn’t to excuse either man, it’s just common sense.

But they don’t leave their criticism of Clark at that. What they really mean by a tendency towards rationalism becomes apparent later in the video, when Oliphint says it would be better to side with Bavinck and say that “all theology, all dogmatics is ultimately a mystery” than it would be to say that the paradox of divine sovereignty and human responsibility has been solved; in fact, Oliphint shockingly says that the latter indicates a “secular” or “pagan understanding of what logic is meant to do” (40th minute). This is what Van Tilians usually mean when they say Clark is too rationalistic: he tried too hard to solve so-called theological conundrums.

But then what is the role of logic according to Van Tilians? For on the one hand, we hear that “we must use logic” (41st minute). This is repeated several times, and yet on the other hand, “…the church is going to have to set out paradoxes, two teachings, side by side, that we don’t have laws of thinking that allow us to bring together those things neatly” (43rd minute). The church has to set out paradoxes? As in must or necessarily set[s] out paradoxes? From what “law of thinking” is this conclusion derived? Where has God revealed this? On the contrary, the New Testament celebrates the dissipation of mysteries and the unveiling of the whole counsel of God. Granted, there are things which have not been revealed as well as difficult sayings, but in light of the doctrine of perspicuity, this should provide no basis on which to defend the idea that paradox is a theological necessity. What we have here, then, is a clear real-life example of David Hoover’s argument that the analogical knowledge licenses paradox and inhibits a defense of the faith (link).

They also speculate that divine simplicity and the meaning of “logic” might complicate our ideas of what it means for God to think. Oliphint says that while humans need logic, “if logic is the science of necessary inference, God doesn’t have any because He doesn’t infer anything.” This seems a bit hasty to me. Of course, God does not derive His knowledge from anyone or anything else. But does that mean He has no grounds for His knowledge? I think not (link). It is at least debatable, depending on what Oliphint means by inference. And as to the question of whether a God without parts is eternally able to make “real distinctions,” the answer should be obvious:
To avoid and to confute Clark’s position, some of Van Til’s disciples contend that God does not think in propositions, and hence dependence on “mere human logic” is an untrustworthy crutch. To this Clark has made two replies. First, he remarked that his opponents cited no Biblical passage in which this is stated, nor did they deduce it by any “good and necessary consequence” from a group of such premises. Indeed, since the Bible is ninety percent propositional – commands and ascriptions of praise being the exceptions – it would be rather peculiar if the Bible would deny its own truths. Then, second, if God does not think in propositions how could he have given us all the information now contained in the sixty-six books? If he does not think that “David was the Kind of Israel,” how could he have framed that proposition for our instruction? Or, worse, if we say that God cannot think in propositions, we deny his omnipotence. And if we think in propositions and God does not, then Van Til’s statement will be true, that God’s knowledge and ours do not coincide at any single point. Since we “know” that “David was the King of Israel,” God cannot know it, and therefore it is false. So are all the Gospels, and Christianity is a delusion. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 414)
Analogical Knowledge

Speaking of analogical knowledge, it was disappointing to find that there was virtually no discussion of Clark’s concerns found, for example, in The Answer (link) in reference to The Text of a Complaint (link) which had been signed by Van Til.

Instead, they discuss in general terms what they believed Van Til’s concerns were which led him to positing analogical knowledge and emphasized that he was following the tradition of the Reformed Scholastics, concluding that if Clark had been aware of this, he would have been less likely to dispute it. But this is a strange assumption given that in the rest of the video, they mention several instances in which Clark departed from the mainstream Reformed tradition. What matters is whether an idea is sound, not whether it was taught by a group of people in the 16th century and onward.

Oliphint does obliquely recognize that Clark wanted to ensure an “identity of content” between the mind of God and mind of man (10th minute), but he does not explain why Clark could have thought this so important. Rather, he immediately goes on to say that following The Answer, which apparently was orthodox, Clark developed his views to the extreme. Far from this being the case, however, Clark’s reasons for his denial of analogical knowledge had been plainly spelled out in his reply to Van Til and company in the original answer:
On the complainants’ theory the proposition “the truth man has is analogical” is itself only an analogy. It is not the truth that God has. Nor could man know that it was God who was revealing such a proposition, for again the proposition “God is revealing that truth is analogical” is only an analogy of the truth. One can only be sure that such a proposition is not God’s truth. On the complainants’ theory there is no way of ever crossing over from an analogy of truth to the truth itself. All our thinking is shut up in analogies and resemblances and cannot coincide with God’s truth at even a single point. This position really cuts all connection between God’s knowledge and man's knowledge and plunges us into unmitigated skepticism. 
If the complainants cannot know what God means, how can they know God does not mean this or that? They affirm that there is a resemblance or analogy between the truth God knows and the qualitative different truth man knows. But by what right do they assert a resemblance when they cannot describe the qualitative difference? Or, how can they assert that two things resemble each other when they have never known and can never know one of them? One can say that two men resemble each other if one has seen both men. But one cannot legitimately affirm a resemblance between a man one has seen and a man one has not seen. Similarly, if a man knew God’s meaning, he could compare it with his own and remark the similarity or difference. If I know your opinion, I can say it is similar to or dissimilar from mine. But if I do not know your opinion, I have no way of knowing whether your opinion is the same or contradictory of mine. Similarly if man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge do not “coincide at any single point,” then for all we know, perhaps Christ did not die for our sins. (The Answer, pgs. 22-23)
And to all this can be added many more questions: is divine revelation, as God’s alleged “interpretation” of His archetypal thought (per Oliphint), itself thought by God? What does it mean to say ectypal knowledge is an interpretation of archetypal? If an interpretation gives a new meaning to that which is being interpreted, does that not imply God’s so-called “ectypal knowledge” (theology; divine revelation) is acquired? What does it mean and what sort of metaphysic is implied by the statement that “identity” is found in the “thing” rather than the “mind” (15th minute)? Etc.

Now, I think the aforementioned link on Hoover’s critique of analogical knowledge covers the philosophical aspect. But as I got the impression that Oliphint was shying away from the stronger statements of Van Til, I think a few of these quotes from The Text of a Complaint will give the reader an indication of just what historical statements a proponent of Van Til must address in order to defend analogical knowledge (or whatever they now want to call it):
While we appreciate the effort to arrive at certainty with reference to man’s knowledge of God, in our judgment this is done at too great a cost. It is done at the sacrifice of the transcendence of God’s knowledge. His thoughts are not our thoughts. His ways are past finding out. The secret things belong unto the Lord our God. If we are not to bring the divine knowledge of his thoughts and ways down to human knowledge, or our human knowledge up to his divine knowledge, we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point. Our knowledge of any proposition must always remain the knowledge of the creature. As true knowledge, that knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge which God possesses, but it can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 5) 
It is clear again that the approach of Dr. Clark is quantitative through and through. It is the number of the propositions, rather than their content as such, not to speak of the inscrutable mystery of the mind of God which is viewed as excluding an exhaustive revelation of the divine mind. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 6) 
It may be objected to the exposition of Dr. Clark’s views presented above that it leaves out of account the important consideration that Dr. Clark allows that beyond the knowledge of a proposition there is the knowledge of the implications of a proposition, and that the knowledge which man may enjoy of a proposition does not necessarily carry with it a knowledge of its implications. This qualification, however, does not affect Dr. Clark’s basic position in any substantial way. The implications of propositions are after all, on his view, also propositions. Consequently, the inclusion of such propositions among the number of propositions that are thought of as constituting the divine knowledge does not require any modification of the judgment that the distinction between the divine knowledge and the knowledge possible to man is merely quantitative. 
Another possible objection to the foregoing might take the form that he does not draw a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God’s knowledge and that of man’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is intuitive while man’s is discursive (Cf. 18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge. We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with it in what has been said above. However, this admission does not affect the whole point at issue here since the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of his knowledge. The latter is concerned only with the contents of the divine knowledge. Dr. Clark distinguishes between the knowledge of God and of man so far as mode of knowledge is concerned, but it is a tragic fact that his dialectic has led him to obliterate the qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature, and thus to impinge in a most serious fashion upon the transcendence of the divine knowledge which is expressed by the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 6)
This is Van Til’s position put “in context.” References to archetypal vs. ectypal knowledge, original vs. iconic or image knowledge, intuitive vs. discursive knowledge, eternal vs. learned knowledge, self-contained vs. derivative knowledge, and so forth are fine. But if you want to defend Van Til against Clark, you have to deal with what Clark thought were the problem statements in Van Til’s literature, and the problem statements in Van Til’s literature have to do with the qualitative identity of content (or lack thereof) between the mind of God and mind of man. One can’t gloss over or re-frame, as the Oliphint tried to do in minutes 13-18, what Van Til says in particular and expect myself or others who disagree with analogical knowledge to be satisfied.

Theology Proper

While their conclusions regarding the falsity of Clark’s Christological views – or, more precisely, the definition of personhood which determined Clark’s Christological views (incidentally, Oliphint’s statement at the 14th minute that God’s archetypal knowledge is His being sounds remarkably like Clark) – are correct, here too they don’t show any indication of having read Clark on the subject. The idea that Clark was so “philosophical” that he failed to even interact with historically accepted creedal statements of Christianity is not true. Actually, most of his book The Incarnation is historical. 

Some of their statements about what problems they have with Clark’s definition of person aren’t on point, however. At the 36 minute mark, the host argues that taking Clark’s definition of person in conjunction with the need for real distinctions among the members of the Trinity leads to the following conclusion: “there ends up being some impersonal essence of which the persons don’t exhaust or overlap. So you don’t end up with a full, divine exhaustion. You don’t end up with a perichoresis…” If we qualify Clark’s theory of personhood as referring to thoughts – not just a set of propositions – then there isn’t necessarily a problem at this point, though there would be at others, for the persons of the Trinity could know each other exhaustively without thinking the same thoughts (link).

But the idea that the divine essence is personal brings up the issue of Van Til’s one-person, three-person “paradox.” Unfortunately, Oliphint never follows through on the host’s request for him to explain Van Til’s definition of a person as well as Clark’s, for Oliphint goes on to rely on Lane Tipton’s solution to Van Til’s Trinitarian paradox (35th minute). I say it is unfortunate because Lane Tipton, who wrote a dissertation on Van Til’s Triunism, mentions in a different podcast by the same host (link) that he sees no problem with the essence being regarded as a person, so long as the meaning of “person” is different than it is when predicated of the Father, Son, and Spirit. But how can an essence be “personal” without being a person? Is “human” or “angel” personal? This seems awfully ad hoc, and at any rate, it still must deal with other Trinitarian issues like generic vs. numeric unity (link), the relationships among the persons (link), etc.

Miscellaneous

It could just be that I’m in an irritable mood today, but the tone of the podcast bothered me. To me, it felt as if a professor were condescending to lecture on some event in which his tradition played a polemic part and came out clearly victorious. Familiar elements include:

1. a historical exposition primarily consisting of what doctrinal details his fountainhead and subsequent tradition thought important without much corresponding discussion of the opposition;
2. distancing from some of the terminology in his tradition without actually conceding any conceptual ground (“analogical knowledge,” “presuppositionalism,” “transcendental”);
3. a few, well-placed, charitable comments towards the chief opponent designed to appear fair;
4. implicit suggestion throughout the discussion that everyone should already know who was correct, rendering detailed evaluation superfluous.

These appear to me to be intelligent men. Honestly, though, I doubt that any of them have read more than half a dozen books by Clark, if that many. Oliphint mentioned Clark in his Reasons for Faith just once. The other two seemed to know Clark only in virtue of what Van Tilians like Greg Bahnsen have said about him. I can only assume their intended audience are those who are already members of their choir. If so, I guess that’s fine. But then like I said, it’s a bit irritating if you’re on the outside looking in. Of course, there’s only so much that can be said in one video. Still, I was hoping for more.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Thoughts on Clark's Two-Person Theory of the Incarnation

During the fourth and fifth centuries the church was disturbed by many controversies, but the most prominent seems to have been the debate about Christ. Who, precisely, was Jesus Christ? Was Christ both God and man? Was he the first of all creatures? Was he God in a body? Was he one of the modes of God the Father? Was he merely a man? Was he two persons, Jesus of Nazareth and the Second Person of the Trinity? The debate was lively and acrimonious… 
 The relationship that obtains between the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, and Jesus is unique, unlike that between the Logos and every other man who comes into the world (see John 1:9). The Logos did not merely light the mind of Christ; the Logos Himself is fully in Christ. Christ could therefore say, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life.” No mere prophet could make such an astounding claim. Prophets, inspired by God, possess some of the divine propositions. Christ, however, possesses them all, as the author of Hebrews argues in his first chapter. All the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ, for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. 
 If, as seems to be the case, we now have a solution to the puzzles of the Incarnation, a solution that avoids the contradictions and meaningless words of the traditional formulations, a solution that is supported by Scripture itself, we are obliged to accept it. Jesus Christ was and is both God and man, a divine person and a human person. To deny either is to fall into error. Once the key terms are defined and clearly understood, the Incarnation is an even more stupendous and awe-inspiring miracle than the Church has hitherto surmised. (The Incarnation, pgs. 77-78)
So begins and ends Clark’s book on the Incarnation, summaries written by John Robbins but which faithfully represents what Clark himself argues throughout the book: Jesus Christ, was and is both God and man, a divine person and a human person; he, Christ, was two persons, Jesus of Nazareth and the Second Person of the Trinity.

To some extent, Clark et. al. may be justified in complaining that theologians throughout church history haven’t provided precise definitions of “person” or “nature.” As historical theology is not my primary area of interest, I can’t say. More troubling is the point that it seems Clark exchanged one problem for another. 

Consider: if it is a problem to say Jesus is one person with two natures or minds or whatnot, why is it not a problem to say Jesus is one subject? Notice in the above summaries that Jesus Christ is still a single subject, evidenced by the use of singular personal pronouns. “He” was two persons. “Jesus Christ” was and is both a divine person an a human person. 

By rejecting the one-person view of the Incarnation, what means does Clark have by which to unify or identify the human “person” with the divine “person”? To say “Christ is a human person and divine person” is still to imply a single subject, Christ, which somehow unifies or identifies the two persons with each other. Well, how? Further, if Clark or any other advocate of a two-person theory of the Incarnation were to [have] explain[ed] why there can be a single subject, why can’t one simply define “person” according to that explanation?

I recently defined a person as “an ego, a mind or minds capable of reflexive indexation.” (link). I explicitly stated an ego can be “minds...” (plural) with the case of the Incarnation in mind. That is, both minds have the same referent in mind when each affirms statements using the first person pronoun “I.” Of course, the reasons those statements may be true may differ in respect to the natures (or attributes) which the Incarnate Son possesses, but the central point is that “I” is a reference to the ego, not the mind. In other words, I reject Clark’s equation of mind with ego. A mind necessarily implies an ego, but it does not necessarily preclude another mind.

Now, just as in my departure from Clark’s view of the Trinity, I am sure my departure from his view of the Incarnation will leave more cynical Scripturalists wondering why I still identify with Clark at all. For one thing, I think Clark is most well-known for his epistemological views, views with which I am in broad agreement. For another, Clark himself encouraged critical evaluation and modification of his own Trinitarian and Incarnational proposals. Though many of his followers seem to think so, Clark clearly did not consider what he wrote to be beyond revision:
The discussion of the main problem in the doctrine of the Trinity may now be called completed, even if it is not complete. Other students and scholars may add to, subtract from, modify, contradict, or otherwise alter the foregoing. Such responses would be a great improvement over the present almost universal neglect of the doctrine. It would turn the attention of the somewhat faithful churches from their sociological sentimentalism to the basic doctrine of the Bible. (The Trinity, Individuation)  
...I have offered a definition of the term person. Most people will find it queer, Most theologians will find it unacceptable. Well and good, let them formulate and propose a different definition. That is the honest and logical thing to do. Then there will be an intelligible subject of discussion. One can reasonably suppose that it could be a better definition than mine. But even if not, it could not be branded as meaningless nonsense (The Incarnation, pgs. 75-76)
Hopefully, those who disagree with me will follow Clark’s prescription and concentrate on the arguments rather than the arguers. My views are not above revision either, and especially in respect to areas in which I have not put years of study, I am willing to change my beliefs. But for now, what I argue is obviously what makes the most sense to me.