Representationalist Misrepresentation of the Realist View on Original Sin

Continuing a train recent thoughts on a realist apologetic of original sin (link), what is often difficult is that opponents of the view don't seem to understand it. Over time, misrepresentations that stem from this seeming misunderstanding seem to have gotten worse. 

One example can be found in the works of J. V. Fesko. Fesko is an author whom I credit with opening my eyes to biblical theology, so much so that I wrote a 10 part review of his book, Last Things First (link). I quite enjoy many things he writes about. I think he may have even been involved with my local church, at some point. I visited a lecture by him at RTS Atlanta and spoke with him in passing about infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism (which I doubt he would remember, as I barely remember it). I say this because the below is not to be taken as a slight against him personally. What it does illustrate, given his pedigree, is the extent to which a breakdown has occurred in a proper, historically grounded perception of a realistic theory of original sin.

Ken Hamrick, a fellow realist with respect to original sin, has already reviewed some misrepresentations of the realist position contained in a separate book by Fesko (e.g. link). The following quote is from Fesko's book, Adam and the Covenant of Works:

...in some sense God views all of humanity as guilty because of Adam's one transgression. And while arguing that all humanity participated in Adam's sin is an accurate conclusion, we must drill down into text to determine the precise nature of this participation. In what way have all humanity sinned (ἥμαρτον)?

Answering this question brings us to the shores of some heavily trafficked territory in the history of exegesis. There are largely four different views on the manner of humanity's participation in Adam's sin... (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pg. 293)

Fesko then outlines the four views he has in mind, critiquing the first three and defending the last one. The four views outlined are: Pelagianism, Realism, Mediate Imputation, Immediate Imputation.

To say nothing of my suspicion towards the idea that anyone besides a realist can truly believe that "all humanity participated in Adam's sin," as I initially read this, I was right away confused by Fesko's stated contrast between realism and immediate imputation in particular. He writes,

(4) Immediate Imputation

This view appears in, among others, Francis Turretin (1693-1687), the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), the Savoy Declaration (1658), Second London Baptist Confession (1689), and Charles Hodge (1797-1878). Advocates of this view maintain that God immediately (apart from any physical or real means) imputes both Adam's guilt and Christ's righteousness to those whom they represent. (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pgs. 295-296)

This is an historic redefinition of immediate imputation. A realist with respect to original sin is completely free to hold to immediate imputation. For example:

So far is it from being the fact that the dependence of the federal upon the natural headship involves the mediate imputation of Adam's sin, directly the reverse is the case. If our relation to the covenant is founded on our natural relation to Adam, - if we are, at the bar of God, held to have sinned in him because the nature that is in us flowed to us from him, - it immediately follows that the responsibilities thence derived are the same in their order in us as they were in Adam. If his nature was first guilty of apostasy and then of consequence depravity and sin, it will be so as it flows to us. This doctrine is so entirely consistent with that of immediate imputation, that De Moor, after devoting twenty-one pages to the refutation of Placaeus, plants himself, in harmony with Marck, upon our very position as the ground of defence against the objects of those who denied immediate imputation. (Samuel Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pg. 505).

Even representationalists have understood this. For instance, John Murray, an author who was not shy in his critique of the realist view, acknowledges:

"It is not necessary to discuss the question whether Edwards was a realist in his view of the Adamic union. The realist as well as the federalist holds to immediate imputation and the point at issue is not affected by the question of Edwards' affinities on that other issue." (John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pg. 56)

What Fesko has done - unwittingly, I imagine - is subtly redefine "immediate imputation" in terms only a representationalist would accept. 

Further, it is not clear that Fesko appreciates the divergence of views among the sources he cites as supporting his understanding of immediate imputation. In the first place, the idea that the Westminster Confession is anti-realist begs the question (cf. Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pg. 39ff.; W. G. T. Shedd, Discourses and Essays, pgs. 260-270; etc.). In fact, again, even representationalists would distance themselves from the views of, say, Charles Hodge, who denied that mankind were participants in the criminality of Adam's sin. John Murray writes:

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the most representative of Reformed theologians were jealous to maintain that reatus and poena and, if we will, reatus poenae, always presuppose culpa and that, therefore, our involvement in the reatus, the obligation to penalty, of Adam's sin means that we were also involved in the culpa of his sin...

Hence when Dr. Hodge says that the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to posterity does not mean the imputation of "criminality" or demerit" but only of "the judicial obligation to satisfy justice", we discover what we are compelled to regard as a divergence from the older Reformed theologians in respect of a principle which they esteemed basic in the construction of the doctrine of our relation to the first sin of Adam. It is just precisely the involvement of posterity in the culpa of Adam's sin that Hodge is jealous to deny, when these other theologians were insistent that poena and culpa are inseparable and that reatus arises from culpa and leads to poena. And it would appear that the difficulty which we found with Dr. Hodge's position from the standpoint of exegesis, specifically the exegesis of Romans 5:12, 19, lies close to this divergence on Hodge's part from the formulation of other Reformed theologians. (John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pgs. 83-85)

Again, John Murray was a federalist or representationalist who, like Hodge, was of Princeton lineage. If anyone can render an objective critique of Hodge, it is Murray. And the above makes it quite clear that Hodge's contemporaries - e.g. Samuel Baird and Robert Landis, both of whom debated him - were correct about the Reformed tradition on this point. 

Now, Fesko does tepidly acknowledge this in his book, Death in Adam, Life in Christ. There, he admits that Hodge's "penalty-only imputation view may represent a minority within the tradition." Firstly, it is a minority position; there is no maybe. Secondly, Fesko should not anachronistically lump the Westminster Confession, Savoy Declaration, Francis Turretin, etc. as holding to Hodge's view of what immediate imputation entails. 

Perhaps Fesko does not intend to do that. But if not - if Fesko is not trying to suggest that all these sources have the same view of immediate imputation - then the question is begged as to why the realist position is contrasted with it.

Another way in which Fesko misrepresents the realist position is in the way he frames what said position entails. One remark Fesko made in an above quote - "apart from any physical or real means" - seems to suggest that Fesko equates realism with the idea of physical identity with Adam. This is confirmed in Fesko's outline of realism itself:

(2) Realism

This view was first made famous by Augustine who, based upon his mistranslation of Romans 5:12, believed that all humanity was seminally present in Adam. In some sense, then, humanity was really truly physically present. In addition to Augustine, similar views appear in John Calvin (1509-1564), W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1894), and James H. Thornwell (1812-1862). (J. V. Fesko, Adam and the Covenant of Works, pg. 294)

I'm not sure what Fesko has in mind. Augustine remained undogmatic on the point of traducianism. However, he considered it, and the terms in which he considered it were immaterial, not material:

...it is necessary still to investigate and to make known the reason why, if souls are created new for every individual at his birth, those who die in infancy without the sacrament of Christ are doomed to perdition; for that they are doomed to this if they so depart from the body is testified both by Holy Scripture and by the holy Church. Wherefore, as to that opinion of yours concerning the creation of new souls, if it does not contradict this firmly grounded article of faith, let it be mine also; but if it does, let it be no longer yours.

26. Let it not be said to me that we ought to receive as supporting this opinion the words of Scripture in Zechariah, He forms the spirit of man within him, and in the book of Psalms, He forms their hearts severally. We must seek for the strongest and most indisputable proof, that we may not be compelled to believe that God is a judge who condemns any soul which has no fault. For to create signifies either as much or, probably, more than to form [fingere]; nevertheless it is written, Create in me a clean heart, O God, and yet it cannot be supposed that a soul here expresses a desire to be made before it has begun to exist. Therefore, as it is a soul already existing which is created by being renewed in righteousness, so it is a soul already existing which is formed by the moulding power of doctrine. Nor is your opinion, which I would willingly make my own, supported by that sentence in Ecclesiastes, Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return to God who gave it. Nay, it rather favours those who think that all souls are derived from one; for they say that, as the dust returns to the earth as it was, and yet the body of which this is said returns not to the man from whom it was derived, but to the earth from which the first man was made, the spirit in like manner, though derived from the spirit of the first man, does not return to him but to the Lord, by whom it was given to our first parent. (From Augustine to Jerome, on the origin of the soul, link)

Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature (not physical creatures per se; cf. angels). For one to be interested in whether Adam's progeny were "physically present" in him would be a category error, a quasi-gnostic mistake no realist of whom I am aware (certainly none in Fesko's list of realists) has ever made. Such a [mis]representation gives the impression that realists consider physical presence relevant to participation in sin when it is rather spiritual presence which has always been at issue.

We have glanced at a few passages of the Scriptures in which our doctrine is formally asserted, or involved by direct and inevitable implication. But it would be an utter mistake to imagine that the Scripture argument in its favor is limited to a series of minute criticisms upon isolated passages in the Bible. On the contrary, the idea of the derivation of our entire being from our parents runs through every part of the book, and reappears continually in every variety of form. From the nature of the case, we are cut off from this aspect of the argument. To its elucidation volumes would be requisite, instead of a few pages. The doctrine in question constantly occurs in the historical scriptures, either in the way of formal statement, or of allusion, as to an unquestioned and unquestionable fact. In the poetic books, whether narrative, prophetic, or devotional, whether prayer or praise, it everywhere presents itself; at one time, the theme of admiring contemplation in reference to the wonderful nature of the phenomena, and at another the subject of penitential confession in view of the corruption so derived. In the doctrinal scriptures, it is made the basis of the whole doctrine of our ruin and the whole system of grace. They everywhere predicate it, as fundamental to all the representations and arguments which they exhibit on these subjects. This doctrine is thus inwrought into the very texture of the Bible; recurring continually, without any caution whatever, by which the begetting asserted should be limited to the body; but, on the contrary, contemplating the moral nature much more than the physical. On the other hand, but a single passages - Heb. xii. 9 - is adduced from the whole Bible, which it can be pretended even seems to look the other way. And in that case the seeming is consequent upon a forced interpretation, at variance with the accustomed meaning of the language employed, as well as with the analogy of Scripture, thus so complete. We make this statement, because it must be evident to any candid interpreter, that the scriptures which merely declare God to be the maker of the soul, are no more conclusive to the purpose for which they are usually cited on this subject, than would be the addition of those which speak with at least equal emphasis of the body, to prove that both body and soul are the immediate workmanship of God, and that the human species is not propagated by generation at all! (Samuel Baird, The Elohim Revealed, pgs. 383-384)

Any beginning to unravel the mischaracterizations seen above or in the conversation in the first link of this post will require a return to the primary sources. Ad fontes. Possibly, it will also require someone who actually believes the view to publish an exposition and defense of it. Although useful in its own way, I wouldn't expect a blog post to gain traction. Well, beginnings are beginnings.

Fesko's "Last Things First" 5

Having established that God and Adam associated with one another within the bounds of a covenant, Fesko proceeds to explain the nature of this covenant before considering several scholarly criticisms of it. Much of the content has already been anticipated at this point: the bilaterality of the covenant, the priestly work of Adam in the priestly context of Eden, the Christological parallels, &c., so at this point, Fesko is primarily concerned with explaining the way in which these elements cohere.

The stipulations of the Adamic covenant, expressed most cogently in Genesis 1:28, were for Adam and his helpmate to multiply, subdue the earth, and exercise dominion over it and its inhabitants. Those who recognize the biblicality of an Adamic covenant are in general agreement as to Adam’s actual duties. The goal of these labors, however, is disputed. Some believe that the purpose was merely an occupation. Others had argued that the tilling of the land and reproduction were commanded as an imitation of God’s own creation. These and other interpretations, however, seem to consider Adam’s work as a teleological end in itself. If one recalls that Adam was a priest within Eden, the holy of holies within God's cosmic temple, it is hard to imagine that in this design there is no more meaningful – if underlying – objective than farming for farming’s sake.

Before he clarifies exactly how the dominion mandate identifies with Adam’s priestly typification, Fesko notes the contrast between the Edenic paradise in which Adam was placed and the surrounding chaos which he was to cultivate (2:5-6, 15). Though the land vegetated and it rained both inside and outside the garden (cf. Job 36:27, Psalm 135:7), order only existed inside the garden. There is, then, certainly something to the idea Adam was to rule as vicegerent over creation analogously to God’s rule over the universe (cf. Psalm 8) by organizing disorder, but Fesko presses this point to further include the idea that the dominion mandate was an extension of the garden-temple itself. Fruit-bearing trees, rivers which proceeded from Eden to the four corners of the earth, and precious materials (Genesis 2:9-14) which would have been available to them as they subdued the rest of the earth would have ensured that Adam, Eve, and their offspring could spread “God’s glory to the ends of the earth” without having to leave the confines of their Paradise, after which they would have – as God did – rested (entered into a real Sabbath), their covenantal activity fulfilled.

This function of the covenant of works is also substantiated by the republications of this [old] covenant to other Old Testament foreshadows of Christ, not to mention the archetypes of the new covenant, and Fesko expounds on this in his next few chapters. In the remainder of his third chapter, however, Fesko addresses various criticisms of the covenant of works, using John Murray as the opposing interlocutor.

There are three fundamental arguments against the [Adamic] covenant of works, viz. nowhere in Scripture is the word “covenant” found in conjunction with Adam, covenants are always redemptive and unilateral, and “works” would be an improper adjectival denotation for whatever else one might wish to label God’s relationship with Adam. While the first two arguments are question-begging, as Fesko has already demonstrated that a covenant need not be explicitly identified as such within the immediate context of a given passage (Jeremiah 33:19-20, Malachi 2:14) and Murray offers no other possible interpretation of Hosea 6:7, the third argument is worth special consideration. The argument is essentially as follows:

“From the promise of the Adamic administration we must disassociate all notions of meritorious award. The promise of confirmed integrity and blessedness was one annexed to an obedience that Adam owed and, therefore, was a promise of grace. All that Adam could have claimed on the basis of equity was justification and life as long as he perfectly obeyed, but not confirmation so as to insure indefectibility. Adam could claim the fulfillment of the promise if he stood the probation, but only on the basis of God’s faithfulness, not on the basis of justice.” (Collected Writings of John Murray)

The first problem with this assessment is that if Adam’s obedience was the condition for life as Murray does admit, then grace cannot have been the basis of God’s reward (Romans 11:6). The second problem is that Murray assumes, without further ado, that a reward of eternal life would not have constituted an equitable reward for obedience to the stipulations of the covenant on the basis justice alone, which is why he is led to believe that Adam’s status was actually grounded on grace. But by this argument, it would seem Murray should consider that the fact Adam disobeyed should neither have merited eternal condemnation. What Murray misunderstands is that God is not treating Adam as an equal; rather, He treated Adam within the bounds of the very covenant which He established as Suzerain. A final problem is that Murray fails to parallel the work of the first Adam with the work of the last Adam. If the first could not merit eternal life, how can the last? And if the last cannot, then there is obviously no justificatory foundation for believers. Interestingly, Calvin believed Christ’s merit depends on God’s good pleasure and grace alone, which, if true, would mean that the means of redemption is arbitrary (not to mention Romans 11:6 is here too ignored). In fact, Christ’s obedience is the reason believers are made righteous (Romans 5:19), as He was able to and did procure that which was necessary in order to fulfill the covenant of works, thus establishing a new covenant of grace for those who believe in Him.