A while ago, I wrote a post containing (among other things) a reply to what might be called the "normative authority argument" commonly referenced by Eastern Orthodox apologists against Protestants. What is this argument? For example, from EO apologist Alex Sorin:
You are confusing (1) our critique of you lacking any binding, judicial authorities that have a final say in matters of scriptural interpretation, with (2) epistemic certainty.
In Orthodoxy, some things we are bound to believe, because the Church said so in ecumenical council—similar to the Supreme Court. These things are final. (link)
As I understand it, the EO argument basically runs as follows: on Protestantism, an individual is his own normative authority; but it is not true that an individual is his own normative authority; therefore, Protestantism is false. Said another way, the EO apologist alleges, "contrary to Protestantism, we don't bind our own consciences."
Steve Hays rebutted this a long time ago, and despite what EO apologists such as Perry Robinson would like one to believe (link), Hays' points have received no substantial response. I think I augmented Hays' response in the first link at the beginning of this post, and in what follows, I'll attempt to turn the tables on EO apologists.
In the Church, only the books of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures are accepted as divinely inspired and above all criticism on the part of the Christians. Other writings were written as human books and are so considered. For this reason, they are subject to Christian judgment and evaluation. This distinction had not been clarified until the ninth century. Photius was the first to make this distinction insightfully but reverently, which he articulates primarily in his letter to John, the metropolitan of Aquileia.
While the 1690 version in fact received reception from the Moscow Patriarchate, it did not meet the criteria of Pan-Orthodox reception unlike the 1672 version–which was accepted by all jurisdictions in 1723...In other words, according the EO reception theory, oughtn't the 1672 version of the Confession of Dositheus be binding... despite Dositheus himself retracting his own views? Very weird! Imagine if there were a second letter to Titus in which Paul stated that he made a doctrinal mistake in his first letter to Titus. Without massive cognitive dissonance, could anyone trust the first letter to Titus to have been without fault? I think some arguments against Islam are made along these lines.]
The Letter to Mari the Persian was first read out (5), followed by a letter from Proclus of Constantinople to John of Antioch (7), which accused Ibas of so ‘loving the madness of Nestorius’ that he actually admired, translated into Syriac, and circulated certain heretical excerpts (from Theodore of Mopsuestia, though Proclus does not say so) which Proclus had appended to his Tome to the Armenians and circulated for execration (7.3). After this Theodore Ascidas took the floor. He first gave an account of Ibas’ chequered career as bishop of Edessa, omitting the fact that he was reinstated as bishop by the Council of Chalcedon (9.1—5). He then argued that the fathers of Chalcedon, so far from approving the Letter to Mari, only accepted Ibas because he anathematized the letter and denied that he had written it (9.7-15). (Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople 553)
Sorin: You guys confuse personal epistemic certainty with judicial authority almost every single time without fail. I’m not talking about your personal confidence in the fallibility or infallibility of any dispute-resolution body. Now, totally independent from this issue of certainty is this idea that there is a class of judicial officers with authority from Christ to decide matters of interpretation and application of the scriptures. That is what I’m talking about. I’m not sure how else to get through to you guys that these are different categories. I’m starting to think it might just be a comprehension issue.
Sorin is responding to a Protestant interlocutor. Here is where I enter:
Me: If your conscience is bound with respect to conciliar statements that are false - and even EOs like Truglia agree not everything in the acts of ecumenical councils is true - you can keep your supreme court.
If not, it begs the question why the whole of the acts aren't binding.
Here, I am driving at whether Sorin is willing to defend that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding. If he is willing to argue that everything within the acts of ecumenical councils are binding, then I will argue that Sorin's apologetic ought to be rejected on the grounds that ecumenical councils make false statements (cf. the letter of Ibas above; see below for further examples). Sorin, recognizing that the acts of the ecumenical councils contain falsities, tries a different defense:
Sorin: Just like a Supreme Court opinion, it’s the holding of the Council that’s binding—not dicta.
Me: Who gets to decide what is dicta?
This is where Sorin tapped out of the conversation, rolling his eyes at my question - a sort of implicit argument from incredulity, I suppose. Being charitable, I guess Sorin (who is a lawyer) can't believe that anyone would have trouble discerning what are statements made by ecumenical councils "in passing."
But is the orthodoxy of the letter of Ibas dicta? The fifth ecumenical council doesn't seem to have thought so, or it wouldn't have bothered addressing the matter. So does Sorin, like Truglia, reject scholarly consensus on who wrote the letter to Mari? At any rate, my response to Sorin highlights the hypocrisy of the EO argument from "normative authority." I continued:
Me: So, no response? If you're judging what is and isn't dicta - you're judging what statements made by a council you will accept or reject - you're in no obviously different position than a Protestant.
Since, by this point, Sorin decided to discontinue the conversions, a few other EOs jumped in:
Sorin follower #1: Which law school did you graduate from? Just curious.
Sorin follower #2: Well since he doesn't understand what dicta is probably no law school.
Me: Cute. Now, who decides which statements are dicta? The dissenters of Constantinople 1351 would have appreciated it if they didn't have to embrace all "the Acts of the ecumenical councils."
Here, I am alluding to the following statement from the EO pan-orthodox Council of Constantinople 1351, in which the opponents of Palamas did not want to hear the acts of the sixth ecumenical council. See here:
12. In what the dissenters said, they were not only continuing to fight against the saints individually, but already were attempting to overthrow and dissolve the holy sixth ecumenical council itself. That council had no other purpose; its whole subject concerned the two natural wills and the two natural energies in our Lord Jesus Christ. Because of this it was necessary to bring in the Acts of the council and to read them, and from these to proclaim the true faith; so they were set out in the midst. But as soon as they were brought forth the dissenters at once cried out, “Not the Acts of the council, but read the definition only.” But while the divine synod was uncertain what this outcry meant, and why they rejected and did not accept the Acts, those men still did not depart in any degree from the same futile evil opinion and their twisted attitude, not at all accepting the reading of the Acts.
At this, by the glorious command of our most clement emperor, a passage was read from the Synodikon which is customarily read on the ambo on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, which word for word is this: “On those who reject the words of the holy fathers, which were expressed at the confirmation of the correct doctrine of the Church of God, of Athanasius, Cyril, Ambrose, Amphilochius who spoke God’s words, Leo the most holy bishop of the elder Rome, and the rest, and in addition on those who did not embrace the Acts of the ecumenical councils, the fourth, that is, and the sixth, anathema.”
Notice, then, that Sorin's earlier attempt to establish non-binding "dicta" of ecumenical councils already is in tension with Constantinople 1341-1368. Are EOs prepared to admit these Palamite councils were neither binding nor infallible? Were they not received? How would such a view affect the dogmatic status of Palamas' essence-energies distinction?
At any rate, the conversation with one of Sorin's followers continued and concluded:
Sorin follower #1: The consensus of US law decides.
Me: And the consensus of Constantinople 1351 was that the dissenters had to accept the acts of the ecumenical councils on pain of anathema. But the acts contain errors. So do you follow your authority here? Do you dismiss that anathema as dicta? Or what?
Sorin follower #1: Well dicta is a term in U.S. law. There is no 1 for 1 equivalent. Not every analogy is perfect. And what errors are you talking about? Can you steelman Orthodox ecclesiology?
Me: E.g. the 6th EC's judgment monothelites forged monoenergist statements in the acts of the 5th EC. The very integrity of acts are at stake.
Even this gets away from the apologetic reversal: does the individual EO decide which statements by his authorities (ECs) can be dismissed?
In its Session III of 13 November 680 a copy of the acts of 553 was read out and found to contain three monenergist or monothelete documents: inserted at the very beginning of the acts was a document entitled ‘A discourse by the sainted Archbishop Menas of Constantinople addressed to the most blessed Pope Vigilius of Rome on Christ’s possession of a single will’, while the acts of Session VII of 553 were found to contain two declarations of faith by Vigilius, one addressed to Justinian and the other to his consort Theodora, which professed belief that 'Christ is one hypostasis and one person and one operation'. The manuscript was immediately examined by the emperor Constantine IV (chairing the council), his officials and the bishops, who found that the discourse of Menas came on pages that had simply been stuck into the manuscript; it was agreed that a fuller examination of the latter would be carried out at an appropriate time. This further examination did not take place till Session XIV of 6 April 681, when it was found that the two declarations by Vigilius were likewise crude insertions into the manuscript read out in Session III; it was also revealed that on a scroll containing the acts solely of Session VII of 553 the offending additions to the text had been ‘written crosswise’ — that is, they were an addition written at right angles to the original text, presumably in the margin. As additional evidence of the spuriousness of all three inserted documents, a number of additional manuscripts were now produced that contained none of them.
What are we to make of all this? The discourse by Menas, whether genuine or a forgery,’ had no proper place in the acts of 553. But the evidence that the two declarations by Vigilius had likewise been clumsily stuck into the manuscript is more suspect: if this were so, why was the examination of the manuscript delayed for five months? It looks as if the evidence needed time to be concocted — by the simple device, it appears, of replacing a copy of the first edition, where the two declarations were integral parts of the text, by a copy of the second edition in which the two letters were indeed late insertions. And in fact, course, the two declarations were not spurious: they come in the first edition of the acts of 553 as preserved in our best Latin manuscript. On the other hand, the additions ‘written crosswise’ on the scroll must have been brief ones, which suggests that in this manuscript the two declarations were part of the original text but with the offending words ‘and one operation’ not in the main body of the text but in marginal annotation. But even if in this manuscript the phrase was an addition, this does not prove that it was absent from Vigilius’ original text, since a merely incidental use of monenergist language is perfectly credible in the mid-sixth century. The manuscripts that did not contain any of the offensive documents prove nothing, of course: they were clearly copies of the expurgated second edition discussed above. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the text produced and read out in November 680 was an authentic copy of the now lost first Greek edition of the acts of 553, in which, however, a monenergist-monothelete profession attributed to Menas had been inserted. That there was delay before evidence could be produced to ‘prove’ the monenergist version of Vigilius’ declarations a forgery, plus the preservation of this version independently in the extant Latin manuscript of the first edition, and also the confusion over whether the evidence was supposed to prove total forgery or simply interpolation, all suggests that Vigilius’ assertion of ‘one operation’ was original and authentic.
After a few more slightly irrelevant questions, Dr. Foreman asks, “Is it necessary for the Bible’s geography to be above reproach before I can put my trust in the God of the Bible?” The series of irrelevant questions with their plausible negative answers has supposedly conditioned the reader to continue with a negative here also. But if the question is examined a little, the negative is not so plausible. If the Bible is mistaken on geography, which ought to have been easy for the writers to put down correctly, it might very well be mistaken on theology, which is much more difficult than geography. To this question an affirmative answer is at least as plausible as the negative answer was to the first question...
Indeed, we wish to ask these men what authority the Bible can have, if it is not true. The Neo-orthodox, or whatever name best suits them, talk a good deal about the Bible and its authority. But they are not at all clear as to why we should believe, submit to, or honor a book that is marred with discrepancies and errors. Karl Barth, it will be remembered, attributes to the Bible not only geographical mistakes and number mysticism, but errors in theology. But if a doctrine is false, why should it be authoritatively preached? The logic of such a position is more than puzzling...
Everywhere the Bible speaks of itself, it teaches verbal inspiration. The words are the words of God. It is nowhere said that the words contain geographical discrepancies and theological errors. No examination of the text itself can produce evidence that the words are not inspired. If we take our belief about the Bible from what the Bible say s about itself, we must conclude that the words are the words of God who cannot lie. (Clark, Holy Scripture, 1963)
Now replace "Neo-Orthodox," "Bible," and "book" with "Eastern Orthodox," "ecumenical councils," and "acts" in the second paragraph. See the problem?
Sadly, some EOs who concede that ecumenical councils taught historical falsehoods seem open to rejecting the infallibility of Scripture with respect to historical matters (link):
[minute 56:12] I'm going to give my personal opinion about something, which is that councils can make historical mistakes. Because I don't think councils are given a guarantee from the Holy Spirit they'll be preserved from making historical and scientific errors. So let me unpack this opinion of mine - and again, it's just an opinion. I have no authority in the church to bind anyone to this opinion.
But in John chapter 17, Christ guarantees the apostles that can be led into all truth. But we see in the epistle of Jude, saint Jude speaks of the faith delivered once for all to the saints. And so the whole truth that the Holy Spirit guides the apostles into is the deposit - the apostolic deposit - of faith, which is the the beliefs, the morals, the disciplines of the church, right? How the church operates, what we believe. That is what's preserved.
The historical evaluation of Jude of Enoch as Scripture, for example - and not to get all cope, "Oh, he never says 'the Scripture sayith,'" he appears to treat the book Enoch as Scripture. We don't think that because the Scriptures might have made a historical error with the Book of Enoch that the Scriptures don't have some sort of authority.
Now this doesn't open up, for example, the book of Genesis and to allow for evolution or something like that. But the point is, even saint Maximus says, the Scriptures sometimes have deliberate historical errors, and the point is for us to look further and to look for figurative meanings and things like this. So the point is, if we don't even believe the saints, don't believe the scriptures themselves are in all respects preserved some historical error, I don't see the basis to apply that to councils.
It makes no difference to me that Truglia qualifies the above as his personal opinion. I find it not at all surprising that Truglia's openness to a lower estimation of Scripture would correspond to his hedged view of ecumenical councils. It strikes me as a sort of pre-emptive, apologetic tu quoque: "Sure, Protestant, ecumenical councils contain historical errors; but Scripture contains these kinds of errors too!"
Would Truglia think the way he does about Scripture had he not already been forced to concede the fallibility of ecumenical councils? On that note, his contention about Enoch is weak. A text can reliably speak to what a prophet prophesied without itself being God-breathed.
Finally, is Maximus infallible? More to the point, this reference was an odd one anyways, since surely Truglia wouldn't admit that the many historical errors of ecumenical councils were deliberate? For example, in the acts of Nicaea II (what EOs consider to be the seventh ecumenical council), Severian of Gabala is repeatedly miscited as John Chrysostom. What makes this historical error especially embarrassing is that Severian of Gabala persecuted John Chrysostom. Certainly, this wasn't deliberate! Because of this, even some EOs who agree with icon veneration admit:
The issue becomes more significant, however, for those who hold an extremely strong view of conciliar inspiration or infallibility. The bishops at Nicaea appear to have acted sincerely and in good faith. They were trusting the manuscript traditions available to them. But the fact remains: the quotations were misattributed. The bishops believed they were appealing to the authority of St. John Chrysostom when in reality they were citing the writings of Severian of Gabala. (link)
In short, here is the quandary: according to the very "normative authorities" (ecumenical councils) EO apologists cite as providing some sort of advantage against Protestants (i.e. Protestants, unlike EOs, are like "sovereign citizens" without a "Supreme Court"), these same EO apologists must accept the acts - not merely the definitions - of ecumenical councils. What are the main options? The acts of ecumenical councils are:
2. Sometimes true, but in every respect binding. Do any EO apologists really think that our conscience's are bound to accept falsehoods? If so, then as I said in my reply to Sorin, "you can keep your supreme court." It would be so much the worse for their apologetic, for as Steve Hays said, "It's enough to be right. You don't need a right to be right."
3. Sometimes true, and sometimes binding. This begs the question: in what way does the EO avoid private judgment? Isn't it the individual EO who judges what to accept or reject in acts of ecumenical councils? But that is no different than the Protestant position, so the "sovereign citizen" pejorative ricochets against EOs.
WCF 31.3 All synods or councils, since the apostles’ times, whether general or particular, may err; and many have erred. Therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith, or practice; but to be used as a help in both.
