Links to all parts may be found here. This part will contain a review and evaluation of Mr. Lazar's Conclusion in his book, Scripturalism and the Senses.
Summary and References
Mr. Lazar wraps up his book on Scripturalism with a few final thoughts. I've already replied to much of the substance of this chapter in earlier reviews. Thus, like a recent review (link), this part will mostly serve as a chance for me to point out where specific, more thorough replies are to any who don't necessary want to go back and sift through each earlier review to find where relevant references are.
On why Scripturalists (like Clark) don't normally believe Scripture has a "monopoly on truth," see here.
On whether there is "extra-Biblical" knowledge and in what sense such instances are "knowledge," see here.
On whether we can "argue" that we have "warrant" (i.e. "knowledge" in the Plantingan sense) for "extra-Biblical beliefs," see here, here, here, here, and here. These links also discuss our inability to be aware of the epistemic justification for externally justified beliefs and why it follows that internally justified beliefs are more ideal.
This link discusses whether skepticism really "pervaded Clark's philosophy" (it doesn't).
On whether we can "learn Biblical propositions by reading Scripture," see here.
Final Thoughts on Clark
Mr. Lazar alludes to the idea of a Paleo-Scripturalism and the possibility that "Clark's earlier writings actually accepted the existence of sense knowledge." In my own research, I have found that there are indications of this. For example:
If we have no reason to believe there is a God, why should we act as though there were one? The early Christians were more empirically minded than the modern development would lead on to believe. John in his first epistle insists on the testimony of ears, eyes and hands. Paul in his defense before King Agrippa requests consideration of evidence, “for this thing was not done in a corner.” The Christian preacher demands faith to be sure, but the faith he demands is a belief based on evidence. Those who reject Christianity act unwisely in refusing to engage in archaeological argument to demonstrate the mythical character of the Testaments. Such a demonstration would be far more convincing and presumably more scholarly than the actual publications of the day. (1935, Kant and Old Testament Ethics)
Compare this to Clark's later works about the same subjects. Clark was not an evidentialist for most of his life, and how Clark exegeted 1 John in 1980 carries a different tune than the above. That is why I find writings like the above all the more interesting. Clark thought one thing, then came to believe another. Even when I disagree with Clark, he tended to have some stimulating explanation for his thought, so I find it enjoyable to consider what reasons he may have had for changing his mind at various points. In time, I hope to demonstrate more of these and other developments in Clark's thought.
Another topic in Mr. Lazar's Conclusion concerns science:
The riddle of induction is still an open question for me. And Clark’s philosophy of science—and hence, his whole approach to evidence and evidential reasoning—seems inadequate to me given the amazing successes of the sciences. If someone keeps winning the lottery, maybe it’s not really a lottery at all? But that’s a gut reaction on my part, not a fully formed argument. It seems to me that much more work needs to be done in the area of the philosophy (and theology) of science. It’s certainly an area that I need to study more. (pg. 159)
Perhaps Mr. Lazar might be surprised to learn that Clark also, at least at some point in his life, approved of Mr. Lazar's lottery-analogy reasoning:
I hope you all know something about craps. I think knowledge is a very fine thing and I would not even prevent from knowing about shooting craps or breaking a safe. Knowledge is a very fine thing. Well these boys are gathered around a circle and they are shooting craps and one of them picks up the dice. He rolls them out and they come seven. That’s lucky! Then he picks them up again and rolls them out and they come seven. That’s remarkable! He picks them up and he rolls them out and they come seven. That’s suspicious. And the other urchins in the game begin to philosophize. I’m all in favor of philosophizing. All these urchins learn philosophy fast. They argue that the angles at which the dice hit the pavement and the force with which they hit, the velocity – all these things differ from one throw to another and hence these factors cannot explain uniform result. And by this process of elimination they arrive at the startling conclusion that the single cause that is present in all these throws is inside the dice. I would be willing to give those two each an A in philosophy. (Christ Died for Our Sins, 1961)
Who would have thought that as late as 1961, Clark would be so agreeable towards reasoning that, strictly speaking, is fallacious? Clark's reasoning here is like if one were to argue about a pitcher who can consistently throw strikes. Given different release points, rotation, and velocity - "all these things differ from one throw to another and hence these factors cannot explain uniform result" - do we thereby conclude that "the single cause that is present in all these throws is inside the" baseball? What about the thrower? The reasoning is too hasty for one to say he knows - without any possibility for error - that the dice is loaded, despite that our intuitions and expectations do lead us to believe otherwise.
Now, if Mr. Lazar wants to expand the semantic range of "knowledge" to encompass beliefs which may be erroneous, maybe the above illustrations can be revisited and said to be "knowledge" in that sense. That might also allow us to account for what Mr. Lazar alludes to - the "amazing success" of science - without worrying about whether some pragmatistic question-begging is happening. While scientific enterprise cannot be said to aid us in knowing truth without the possibility of error, a softer, colloquial definition of "knowledge" might be fine-tuned and defended. But then, this would not be the sort of "knowledge" that many, like Clark of I, would find ideal or worth bothering too much about.
A final thought: while Mr. Lazar and I have exposited Plantinga's or Clark's meta-epistemic views (link), I have not yet found a thorough, exegetical analysis of what "knowledge" means in Scripture - yet this is most important to a robust Scripturalism and, therefore, something I am attempting to make beginnings toward answering: see here (regarding internally and infallibly justified beliefs about which we can have full assurance) and here (regarding prophecy and externally justified beliefs).
Final Thoughts on Mr. Lazar's Book
I appreciated Mr. Lazar's efforts in writing this book and making it available for free. I enjoyed it despite the disagreements I have had, as it offered me an opportunity to consolidate and better articulate much of my reflections over the past dozen years. I'm glad Mr. Lazar has felt that he is able to revisit Clark and his thought of Clark. I hope Mr. Lazar, myself, and readers continue to investigate how to refine the content of "Scripturalism," even if we can't agree on the name.
In the final part of my review, I will turn to Mr. Lazar's Appendix on Gordon H. Clark and Assurance.
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