Simply Yes or No

Every so often, I see a man by the name of Berj Manoushagian attempt to influence readers of Gordon Clark that only one proposition is true: Jesus Christ is Lord (link). What Berj makes of Psalm 119:160, 1 Kings 17:24, etc., I do not pretend to understand. Nor do I find that it makes much sense that he would attempt to influence anyone by means of propositions which he admits are not true. For whatever reason, Berj himself seems to find the work of logical positivists like Hans Hahn - who denied the possibility of metaphysics (link) - influential. Clark handily dealt with nonsense such as this during his lifetime. There would be little reason for me to mention any of this except that Berj has cited Clark as supporting his views.

One method Berj uses to argue that there is only one proposition is that the Law of Excluded Middle "must be discarded." Berj wants to discard the Law of Excluded Middle, I believe, so that no one can accuse him of counting Scriptural propositions as false. As Scripture refers to its own statements as truth, however, his merely allowing that they are not false is insufficient, a point he studiously avoids. 

My interest, however, is more so that Berj thinks Clark and John Robbins wrote statements supporting a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle in favor of a view that some propositions are neither true nor false:

The “Law of Excluded Middle” states that every proposition must be either True or False.

This “law” must be discarded.

Its acceptance hinders the study of meaningful propositions, and is incompatible with the nature of reality and the nature of Truth.

The Quotations given below are in support of the necessity for a third category. (link)

The following are what statements Clark and Robbins made which Berj interprets as denials of the Law of Excluded Middle (emphases his):

A proposition therefore is defined as the meaning of a declarative sentence. Some sentences are not declarative, such as commands in the imperative mood, or exhortations in the well-nigh extinct subjunctive mood. Questions, or interrogative sentences, also are neither true nor false. Only declarative sentences are true or false; and it is this common character that is important for propositions. Of course in English rhetoric there are questions that are intended as propositions. They are called rhetorical questions. They are an embellishment of style. They spruce up a speech. But logically they are propositions. A question that is intended as a question is neither true nor false. It can play no part in an argument.

Let us now return– an exhortation, neither true nor false, but one which it is hoped that the student will follow– to the simplest propositions and the simplest form of arguments.
Gordon Clark; Logic; 1988; p30

As I said earlier, single words without context are neither true nor false.
J. W. Robbins; Without a Prayer; 1997; p78

Ignorance is neither true nor false.
J. W. Robbins

Now, in what way Berj thinks these statements imply a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle is anyone's guess, for they in no way do so. He even quotes Clark as specifically defining a proposition as "the meaning of a declarative sentence." If Berj is arguing that some propositions are neither true nor false, it is of no help to him to cite Clark and Robbins discussing "single words," "ignorance," "questions," or "an exhortation," for none of these are declarative sentences. Thus, none of these - at least in Clark's mind - are propositions, so none of these have any bearing of the Law of Excluded Middle.

As for what Clark actually believed regarding the Law of Excluded Middle, what he says below simultaneously refutes Berj's position and defends Clark's own:

The law of identity, a is a, and the principle of disjunction also fall under Curtis’ condemnation. For a reason he does not state, he objects to the assertion, If I am an historian, I either follow F. J. Turner or I do not. But apparently his conscience pricks him a little, for he admits that it is legitimate to say, Either I am a Christian or I am not. But by what principle can he reject disjunction in history and retain it in religion? If disjunction or excluded middle is a fallacious form of thought, it can never be used legitimately; but if it is legitimate in one case, all the misapplications of slovenly thinkers will not serve to invalidate its proper universality. 

...if a word is to convey a meaning, it must not only mean something; it must also not mean something. If it had an infinite number of meanings, if the term man had the meanings of all the words in the dictionary, it would be useless in speech. In fine, if man means not-man, the sentence, Socrates is a man, means nothing. But those who deny the law of contradiction identify man and not-man. Those who deny the law of excluded middle assert that Socrates is neither man nor not-man. What they say is nonsense. Nothing sensible can be said without using the laws they deny. (1956. Logic and Language, The Gordon Review Vol. II No. 1 Feb)

Finally, readers should carefully consider whether Jesus' disjunctive words in Matthew 5:37 or John 8:42-45 are or are not truth as well as who Jesus says is the father is of one who denies that they are truth:

Matthew 5:37 Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil.

John 8:42 Jesus said to them, “If God were your Father, you would love me, for I came from God and I am here. I came not of my own accord, but he sent me. 43 Why do you not understand what I say? It is because you cannot bear to hear my word. 44 You are of your father the devil, and your will is to do your father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning, and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks out of his own character, for he is a liar and the father of lies. 45 But because I tell the truth, you do not believe me.