The Greeks and the Irrational. By E. R. Dodds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Pp. ix + 327, with index. $5.00.
If Greek culture was the triumph of rationalism, were the Greeks blind to the nonrational factors in human nature? The author seems to believe it paradoxical, surprising, or at least noteworthy that a civilization should contain great philosophers, artists, and statemen and also popular irrational elements. Whether this is quite so surprising or not, the author wishes to make sure that the latter elements are not overlooked. However, in order that philosophical readers will not be disappointed, it must be noted that Professor Dodds is not concerned with the anti-intellectualism of the Sophists, but with the irrational superstitions of religion.
No adequate condensation of the details can be included in a review, for the work consists of eight chapters (and two appendices), each about twenty pages long, and each followed by about twenty pages of footnotes. The descriptions of ATE, divine insanity; or MENOS, energy or spunk; of divine madness caused by Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, or Aphrodite and Eros; of the patterns of dreams; of shamanism; as well as of the treatment accorded to these phenomena by Plato, Aristotle, and the tragedians – the descriptions of these defy condensation.
They also defy criticism. The author is cautious and modest. He recognizes the limitations under which such a study can be conducted; and while, or because, he quite probably knows as much as any loving scholar, he is keenly aware of how much is unknown. The unknown comprises not only lost sources of information but also a fuller knowledge of the psychological principles of interpreting the irrational. In this regard, only recently in the Freudian theory have satisfactory principles been obtained for this purpose. And much remains to be done. Here, also, the author is cautious. While he evidently holds the Freudian development in high estimation, he does not wish to accept it uncritically. Whether or not he has in fact depended too greatly on this type of interpretation, each reader must estimate for himself.
As the detailed description piles up, a sort of theme slowly emerges. The Greeks, apparently, were more superstitious even than “my own superstitious countrymen, the Irish” (p. 13). But primitive peoples do not believe magic because they reason faultily; rather, they reason faultily because they are socially conditioned to magic. Thus it is not because he is impulsive that the Homeric man believes in the psychic intervention; but, rather, because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention, he gives way to his impulses (pp. 26, 27, and note 110). The Homeric culture was a shame culture which evolved into a guilt culture in the following centuries, possibly because of economic upheavals.
At any rate the Archaic Age (800-500) was more dismal and fearful than the Homeric Age. A more specific factor is the gradual revolt against the tyrannical power of a father over his children, and the sons’ sense of guilt in opposing the old customs. However, neither a simple Freudian nor a simple Marxian explanation is satisfactory, for culture is too complex.
The title of chapter five, The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism, seems a misnomer to the reviewer. Contrasted with the views of the northern shamans, from the Black Sea to Siberia, nothing could be more rationalistic that the creedally minded Puritans. Only its historical juxtaposition with the licentiousness of the Stuart Restoration could make Puritanism appear ascetic. And to suppose that Puritan Calvinism believe the body to be a tomb, advocated celibacy Janicheism, held that the soul could leave the body, travel great distances, and bring back news is to show that a great knowledge of Greek culture is compatible with antipathy toward the Puritans.
In the fifth century the “inherited conglomerate” began to dissolve under the pressure of rationalism to form an “open society” in which conduct could be directed by free choice. From 330 to 200 custom had almost entirely lost its hold. However, a reaction set in. The Enlightenment had produced wide-spread irresponsibility; rationalism had not yet enabled men to live like beasts - that was possible previously - but it had enabled them to justify their conduct. It was natural, and the restraints of Law were gone.
If Greek culture was the triumph of rationalism, were the Greeks blind to the nonrational factors in human nature? The author seems to believe it paradoxical, surprising, or at least noteworthy that a civilization should contain great philosophers, artists, and statemen and also popular irrational elements. Whether this is quite so surprising or not, the author wishes to make sure that the latter elements are not overlooked. However, in order that philosophical readers will not be disappointed, it must be noted that Professor Dodds is not concerned with the anti-intellectualism of the Sophists, but with the irrational superstitions of religion.
No adequate condensation of the details can be included in a review, for the work consists of eight chapters (and two appendices), each about twenty pages long, and each followed by about twenty pages of footnotes. The descriptions of ATE, divine insanity; or MENOS, energy or spunk; of divine madness caused by Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, or Aphrodite and Eros; of the patterns of dreams; of shamanism; as well as of the treatment accorded to these phenomena by Plato, Aristotle, and the tragedians – the descriptions of these defy condensation.
They also defy criticism. The author is cautious and modest. He recognizes the limitations under which such a study can be conducted; and while, or because, he quite probably knows as much as any loving scholar, he is keenly aware of how much is unknown. The unknown comprises not only lost sources of information but also a fuller knowledge of the psychological principles of interpreting the irrational. In this regard, only recently in the Freudian theory have satisfactory principles been obtained for this purpose. And much remains to be done. Here, also, the author is cautious. While he evidently holds the Freudian development in high estimation, he does not wish to accept it uncritically. Whether or not he has in fact depended too greatly on this type of interpretation, each reader must estimate for himself.
As the detailed description piles up, a sort of theme slowly emerges. The Greeks, apparently, were more superstitious even than “my own superstitious countrymen, the Irish” (p. 13). But primitive peoples do not believe magic because they reason faultily; rather, they reason faultily because they are socially conditioned to magic. Thus it is not because he is impulsive that the Homeric man believes in the psychic intervention; but, rather, because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention, he gives way to his impulses (pp. 26, 27, and note 110). The Homeric culture was a shame culture which evolved into a guilt culture in the following centuries, possibly because of economic upheavals.
At any rate the Archaic Age (800-500) was more dismal and fearful than the Homeric Age. A more specific factor is the gradual revolt against the tyrannical power of a father over his children, and the sons’ sense of guilt in opposing the old customs. However, neither a simple Freudian nor a simple Marxian explanation is satisfactory, for culture is too complex.
The title of chapter five, The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism, seems a misnomer to the reviewer. Contrasted with the views of the northern shamans, from the Black Sea to Siberia, nothing could be more rationalistic that the creedally minded Puritans. Only its historical juxtaposition with the licentiousness of the Stuart Restoration could make Puritanism appear ascetic. And to suppose that Puritan Calvinism believe the body to be a tomb, advocated celibacy Janicheism, held that the soul could leave the body, travel great distances, and bring back news is to show that a great knowledge of Greek culture is compatible with antipathy toward the Puritans.
In the fifth century the “inherited conglomerate” began to dissolve under the pressure of rationalism to form an “open society” in which conduct could be directed by free choice. From 330 to 200 custom had almost entirely lost its hold. However, a reaction set in. The Enlightenment had produced wide-spread irresponsibility; rationalism had not yet enabled men to live like beasts - that was possible previously - but it had enabled them to justify their conduct. It was natural, and the restraints of Law were gone.
In reaction therefore culture turned from rationalism to astrology and magic. Why? The explanation is not "decadence," not racial intermixture, not scientific specialization, not political misfortune, economic collapse - though some of these no doubt contributed. But, rather, it was the fear of freedom in an open society, and unwillingness to accept responsibility.
And while the cautious author is sparing of modern parallels, he remarks at the end that in the last forty years western civilization also has begun to doubt its own credentials. And to draw a lesson for us he suggests that our Freudian understanding of the irrational may possibly enable us to avoid the impending retrogression.
Gordon H. Clark
Butler University,
Indianapolis, Indiana
And while the cautious author is sparing of modern parallels, he remarks at the end that in the last forty years western civilization also has begun to doubt its own credentials. And to draw a lesson for us he suggests that our Freudian understanding of the irrational may possibly enable us to avoid the impending retrogression.
Gordon H. Clark
Butler University,
Indianapolis, Indiana
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