Communication and Apologetics

I saw a video (link) recently posted on facebook wherein Eric Hovind – the son of Kent Hovind – attempts to answer a question by an 11 year old who seems to be the debate opponent’s son. It brought to mind my argument that revelation from one who is omniscient is a precondition for knowledge. That isn’t to say I agree with Hovind’s conclusion, much less the means by which he attempts to prove it. But it at least seemed similar enough to warrant discussion of Hovind’s method of communication in his response.

Now, it doesn’t take a paranoid to suspect Hovind was set-up. And even if this 6^th grader wasn’t prepped by his father, a three minute gotcha clip isn’t really a fair representation of the merits of a debater in general. But that’s a price one knowingly pays for marketing and presenting oneself as a public speaker and debater.

The impression I get from this video and another video I recall watching in which he debated some atheist from Youtube is that Hovind is not a particularly good communicator. He exudes the recognizable air of Southen Baptist fundamentalism, and that doesn’t connect with most people. When it comes to verbal communication about controversial subjects, that’s a general difficulty: Christians need to keep in mind that people in general and strangers in particular are prone to judge based on reasons other than the arguments one presents. Appearance, tone, presentation, delivery, etc. will often prejudice a listener even before he has heard the full argument. Not to mention that most people already have some sort of opinion, and others just don’t care.

So it’s hard not to feel a little sympathy for Hovind. Either he treats the kid with kid gloves and then is surprised by a poignant question (as in the video), or he answers on the assumption the kid is capable of fully grasping an intricate argument, in which case it could appear that he would be purposefully talking nonsense, unable to break his argument down to the level a child can understand. Well, that was the ostensive design in having a kid ask the question. It takes a practiced communicator with a full understanding of his argument – neither of which I am sure Hovind possesses – to relate complex truths to adults, let alone to know-it-all adolescents. And even in the case Hovind were able to do so, the best case scenario is that no clip would have been posted. He would merely break even.

I myself am not a great verbal communicator; I am a much better writer than I am a speaker. And in general, I try to stick to what I consider my strengths. But that’s not always possible. People who know me well enough know I am interested in philosophy and theology. Of these people, a few are bound to engage me in conversation about certain subjects. How I answer depends on the context of the situation and the identity of the questioner. I answer atheist acquaintances differently than I do my friends. And that’s how I prefer it, because by having the conversation initiated by another, I can dictate how I want to frame my response without appearing as if I just want to show-off. If they ask a question about a complicated subject, I can tell them they should expect a complicated answer. The more close-minded who are not interested in, unreasonably disagree with, or are irritated by my answers should obviously either ask different questions or ask different people those questions.

While there are differences between the personal situations I describe and the more public setting of a debate – most obviously, a debater implicitly asserts he is some sort of authority on a topic whereas a layman can legitimately plead ignorance – in both circumstances, what can’t happen is actually what happens in the video of Hovind: dumbing down truth to the point that it’s no longer truth. If one must know all things to know any one thing, then the kid would be right. We wouldn’t be able to know God because we are not omniscient. Subsequent backtracking then sounds ad hoc. Hovind says his argument is simple. But it is evident he either simplified it to the point it couldn’t be defended, or it was too simple in the first place.

Corollary to this point, we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be shown up by assuming the people with whom we interact are in need of what we can teach. That may very well be the case, but that is something that is demonstrated over time. This may sound as though it contradicts what I said above: a public debater by definition implicitly asserts he is some sort of authority on a topic. But what I mean is that Hovind’s reputation is not that of William Lane Craig’s. Only so many apologists – whether professional or lay – can pull off a lecturer-student relationship with his audience without challenge. So if a kid thinks he is intellectually able to deal with my argument on my terms, so be it. Hovind sounded like he was trying to communicate to a Sunday schooler or willing pupil rather than someone hostile to God’s word and in good need of a harsh reality check. He didn’t correctly read the context clues. If that really was the case, I hope next time he doesn’t restrain himself. Otherwise, I would recommend a different line of work.

Craig/Harris Debate

William Lane Craig and Sam Harris debated yesterday on the topic "Is Good from God?" You can listen to it here. I have a few criticisms of both sides, mostly with respect to Harris' statements.

Craig

Opening Statement

Contrary to Craig, "ought" does not imply "can." Craig uses this an analogy to attempt to show otherwise: "if somebody shoves you into another person, you're not responsible for bumping into him. You had no choice." This presupposes determinism is incompatible with choice. That does not follow. Determinism is incompatible with free will - the ability to choose apart from antecedent, extrinsic causation - but it is compatible with choice. Choice is volitional, but it is an actual exercise of one's will. Hence, it does not imply one's will has the capacity to have been exercised contrarily. One's choice can be volitional yet necessitated. Religious philosophers as far back as Augustine and as recent as Gordon Clark have noted this. Craig has repeated this false dichotomy for a while now, and he even threw in the robot/puppet caricature one will sometimes hear in these contexts. As I have written elsewhere:

//Neither God’s revelation of what is good nor His decree that men are responsible for obeying His precepts is arbitrary, for in the same way God’s declaration of what is good reflects His own eternal nature, God’s declaration that men are responsible for obeying His law reflects their created natures. That God sovereignly made men for His own ends and glory functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates, in Romans, his claim that men are responsible (Romans 9:19-21). In the absence of a Creator-creation distinction, moral dogmatism is irrational. A dictator may desire to heedlessly enforce his ideas, but he can never possess the divine prerogative. Only a sovereign Creator can universalize His moral precepts to those whom He has created for that purpose, and this God has done by the full, sovereign, and authoritative disclosure of His holy nature and law in Scripture...

Advocates of the free will defense may object that man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose. They also sometimes caricature men in a deterministic world-view as puppets. This method of argument is question-begging and poisoning-the-well. There is no self-evident reason that one who has broken a law is excused from law-breaking because he was unable to do otherwise. Additionally, Scripture teaches that men, in relation to God, are pots, axes, and other instruments God may use as He pleases. What, then, besides emotion, could be the underlying objection laced in the puppet analogy? In fact, God is actually much more sovereign over mankind than a puppeteer is over his puppet. God controls everything men do, whereas a puppeteer is confined by strings and joints. God made men as they are: creatures with minds, wills, emotions, intellects, feelings, and other privileges to which puppets are not privy. Even so, men are not “forced” to will, as that would be a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary. It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose. “For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory forever! Amen” (Romans 11:36).//

To be fair, Craig does add the addendum that compatibilism is a position which avoid his criticism, but given his statement that" ought implies can," something with which Calvinists disagree, it is not clear whether or not he would include Calvinism in this group.

Harris

Opening Statement

Even if it were allowed "good is well-being," as Harris states, Harris seems to miss the point that providing a demarcation of what is good does not explain why one ought to do good. As I point out in a different post, goodness and oughtness are not synonyms. So when Harris says "if we should do anything in this universe, if we ought to do anything, if we have a moral duty to do anything, it's to avoid the worst possible misery for everyone," again, even if this is true, Harris must substantiate the "if." He doesn't show that the "if" is the case. He doesn't show we should or ought to do anything. He doesn't show we have moral duties. He defines good but provides no objective reason we should do good.

Now, it is true Harris appeals to common sense, but if I were to point out that what Harris considers to be common sense can be thought by another - like myself - to be emotive stupidity, what can be his response? Argumentum ad populum? Harris is an unusual Positivist (he strikes me as one, anyways) in that he argues morality is objective. Most Positivists thought ethical discourse was possible (to a certain point) but that ethical claims themselves are unverifiable.

When Harris says one's values can be objectively wrong with respect to deeper values one holds, this is what Feigl would call "validation" and is analogous to an internal question. But Harris forgets to explain how one can verify these deeper values are objective. Feigl at least admitted that if one cannot "vindicate" his ethical system against another - an external question - there remain root disagreements for which there is no recourse for resolution, at least on Positivistic grounds. At this point, it seems Harris wishes to pass off his own system as objective, but that is clearly not the case. To illustrate how unintelligible Harris becomes at this juncture, he says that those who disagree with him are wrong with respect to values they would hold if they were "deeper persons." What does that even mean? How does Harris know counter-factuals?

A still more fundamental criticism of Harris would simply be to attack the idea his naive utilitarianism can be verified. Suppose - and this is quite a stretch, given the above - that Harris' definition of good is true and that one ought to do good. Criticisms nevertheless remain:

//Utilitarianism is an ethical theory which defines good along a spectrum. A choice which causes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest good, and a choice which causes the greatest pain to the greatest number of people is said to be the greatest evil. This understanding of good and evil leads to arbitrariness and irrationality. As a form of consequentialism, choices made by Utilitarians are, incredibly, prospectively a-moral; since one cannot know the future consequences of his choice, the choice must be made arbitrarily. Possibilities of future consequences also suggest that the moral value of any choice is subject to change at any instant. Even [relatively] simple knowledge of all the ways in which a past choice has affected present reality is itself a problem, because one would need to be omniscient to know his calculations are both accurate and exhaustive. Yet another problem with Utilitarianism is that in order to judge the comparative “goodness” of one’s choice, one would need to know counter-factuals; ironically, such is only possible by divine revelation. There are still more complications when one considers, within a Utilitarian framework, whether or not one individual’s pleasure could qualitatively exceed the sum pleasure of many, whether or not it is proper to state minorities possess rights, and whether or not utilitarianism can escape the demerits of empiricism, inductivism, and subjectivism. Given the extremely relativistic and flawed nature of Utilitarianism, one may well believe the demise of Utilitarianism would maximize the pleasure of those who sincerely desire to be moral.//

1st rebuttal

Harris takes an intellectually lazy route in his argument against the divine command theory when he references the problem of evil. Not much needs to be said in reply to Harris here:

//The problem of evil is purportedly an internal critique of Christianity. If the Christian God does not harmonize with the atheist's arbitrary and subjective moral perception, why should the Christian suppose that to be a problem? Smuggling non-Christian concepts into the argument – concepts which they use to profane God’s character – can lead nothing more than an inept attack on a straw man. Confusion can only be avoided by providing clear definitions of key terms.//

Harris has provided definition of the key term - good - and it does not square with Christianity. Why Harris would think any Christian would find his argument meaningful, then, is mystifying.

Much more amusing is Harris' attempt to analogize the Bible to The Lord of the Rings. He states that to call Scriptural passages evidence for Hell is like stating passages in LOTR which reference Valinor are evidence for Valinor. He makes the same analogy to Hell in the Qur'an later. Well, if Harris thinks he can show that LOTR or Islam can produce a sound, epistemic system, then he is by all means invited to do so. He didn't, however, so this too is another evidence of intellectual laziness.

After listening to Harris' rebuttal, I almost doubt Harris has read the Bible beyond snippets of quotations provided by fellow new atheists. He accuses Christianity of lacking moral accountability, given that a person can live in sin and nevertheless repent and believe in the gospel unto salvation just prior to his death. His argument suggests unfamiliarity with penal substitution and justification, although he in fact alludes to this view (derogatorily) 5 minutes later. Moreover, Harris accuses God of cruel behavior towards innocent people. Has Harris never heard of the doctrine of original sin? Harris never critiques Christianity on its own grounds. He assumes his view is true and projects it onto other world-views in order to disprove them, which is a faulty methodology.

In any case, Harris imperceptibly shifts from attempting to answer "what are the preconditions necessary for sound moral dogmatism?" to "is Christianity moral?" If Craig is right, evil presupposes theism and every attack Harris makes against Christianity would be an admission his own view is inadequate. Harris doesn't seem to understand that.

2nd rebuttal

Harris here attempts to clarify his position, but I think he really only muddied the waters (perhaps unintentionally). It wasn't clear to me whether he was trying to justify moral statements on the basis of science or if he accepted morality as axiomatic such that aim of science is thereby determined. He said in one part of the rebuttal that axioms are necessary and later states one doesn't need to accept anything on faith. Very confusing. He also tried to distinguish between the way in which he and Craig were using the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity," and here again I didn't really follow what he was trying to say. In his closing statement, Craig noted that he had consistently defined objectivity as that which is independent of human opinion since his opening statement.

Needless to say, none of this was relevant to Craig's criticisms. Harris continued to fallaciously equate preferences with oughtness. Instead of answering the fundamental questions like "how do you know utilitarianism is true," Harris would call such questions stupid and his view objective in a thinly veiled attempt to intimidate opponents into silence. I thought Harris was rather disrespectful throughout the debate.

Concluding Statement

Harris compares morality to mathematics and physics and claims that since the latter don't presuppose God, neither does the former. Actually, the latter do presuppose God, and in any case, "ought" is not synonymous with "is." Harris never addressed the is-ought dilemma Craig mentioned several times.

Conclusion

Craig makes similar points to ones I made or might have made with a few mistakes and omissions.

Harris is neither a logician nor a theologian.

White vs. Sungenis on Predestination

After listening to a recent debate between James White and Robert Sungenis on predestination and free will, which the reader can listen to here, I felt compelled to write some notes on the more confusing and erroneous points Sungenis made in his opening statement. I have tried to categorize his statements as best I can.

Church History

Sungenis cited the Council of Orange to explain in what way he believes man possesses free will: enabling grace. However, it is not clear to me in what way Sungenis purports to harmonize Catholic soteriology with several of its canons. He cited Canon 4:

“If anyone maintains that God awaits our will to be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that even our will to be cleansed comes to us through the infusion and working of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit himself who says through Solomon, "The will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35, LXX), and the salutary word of the Apostle, "For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:13).”

Canon 6 makes a similar condemnation:

“If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).”

Does Sungenis believe the Holy Spirit is infused into unbelievers and, if so, what is the nature of such an infusion if not regenerative? White cited a staple passage for the doctrine of total depravity, Romans 8:7-8, in his opening statement, but the verse following is more relevant to this question:

Romans 8:9a You, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you…

If indeed Sungenis believes that the infusion of the Spirit is of a similar nature to that described by Paul – and if the Spirit is said to be infused, I do not see how he could contend otherwise – then in order to remain consistent, he would have to contend a prima facie absurdity: that to be “in the spirit” implies nothing more than that one’s nature, upon infusion, is enabled to choose to believe or disbelieve God’s word; one is not neutral if he is in the spirit.

This confusion aside, Augustine’s influence is nowhere else more evident than in the particular Scriptures the council cites to support its declarations, for Augustine was not shy about repeating passages like 1 Corinthians 4:7, 15:10 in order to press his [similar] arguments. That Sungenis believes Lucidus from the 5th century is the first [post-apostolic] forerunner of “absolute predestination” – i.e. predestination without respect to free will – betrays an unfamiliarity (to put it generously) with Augustine, who most certainly believed in monergism.

Calvinism

After a little church history, Sungenis proceeds to explain how free will is incompatible with total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints.

Sungenis’ understanding of unconditional election is somewhat questionable, as he believes it implies God elects arbitrarily; in a later clip, he asserts that a God who decrees sin in order to manifest His justice and wrath as well as His mercy and grace is arbitrary. But this doesn’t make sense at all. God’s choices are grounded in His consistent, righteous desire to uphold that which is infinitely worthy: His glory. How exactly is that arbitrary? Sungenis’ unsupported accusations, arguments from incredulity (“What kind of God would [do this]?”), arguments from silence (“Wouldn’t God get more glory if He saved all men without exception?”), and utter failure to distinguish between a desire to manifest of His nature to His people from a sub-human need to “prove who He is” are just several samples of the kind of question-begging and straw man argumentation Sungenis resorts to throughout his opening statement, as will become more apparent.

In any case, Sungenis is obviously not a Molinist, since he believes free will and unconditional election are not compatible. Moreover, Sungenis appears equally unswayed by the argument that new Eden provides an example par excellance of a situation in which man could possess free will and yet be unable to fall away; perhaps he doesn’t believe Christians will retain free will after death. I cannot discern that free will bears any direct relation to the extent of the atonement, but at least Sungenis seems to recognize that classical Arminians cannot consistently believe in total depravity and that free will is mutually exclusive with sola gratia.

Coherence

After this contrast, Sungenis explains why he believes in a kind of predestination that works “in conjunction with” free will: the Bible says so. Now this is an admirable reason to believe a doctrine is true, but if one were, on this account, to expect that Sungenis would endeavor to immediately substantiate his assertion and explain the way in which free will relates to predestination, he would be disappointed. Instead, the audience is treated to a lengthy speech in which Sungenis more or less says that systematic theology is hard and God is incomprehensible. One of his arguments could be constructed as follows:

P: Philosophers have debated God’s nature for thousands of years.
P: It is possible that, in some way we do not understand, God’s nature is reflected in all the variant positions which have been advocated during these debates.
C: Analogously, free will and predestination could cohere.

Or maybe:

P: Contrasted concepts of either/or questions which I can’t answer can both be taught in Scripture.
P: The coherence of free will and predestination is such a question.
C: The Bible teaches free will in conjunction with predestination!

Though spoken in a bit of jest, it was truly painful to listen to the way in which Sungenis attempted to excuse his prefatory gymnastics. His follow-up argument was nothing more than a tu quoque argument against White: since White believes Adam possessed free will yet believed God ordained the Fall, White must believe that predestination and free will can cohere. But even if all this were true, it does not follow that free will is biblical.

Even more painful is to listen to Sungenis couch his arguments in hypothetical language and then proceed to pontificate as though the hypothetical is a given. For example, he argues: “If God Himself commands that man participate in salvation by exercising his free will to accept or reject God, then… etc.” But since Sungenis never actually gets around to demonstrating that God commands man participate in salvation by exercising his free will, whether or not his conclusions follow from this conditional are irrelevant. Sungenis will later assume that the fact that all men are commanded to believe implies they can believe and that an “invitation” to believe likewise implies such a capacity, but when push comes to shove, he can provide no substantial argument.

Distinguishing Factors

Sungenis was eager to intercept the argument that free will implies that one who chooses to believe is smarter, more spiritually sensitive, or in some general way “better” than Joe Reprobate who chose, also by free will, to reject God. Yet if Sungenis believes it is within bounds to criticize the Calvinist for believing in a God who chooses arbitrarily, it is unclear why he would consider it out of bounds for the Calvinist to criticize Sungenis’ position on similar grounds.

Sungenis is also critical of being labeled a synergist or anthropocentric because he does not wish to be associated with others who have dissimilar beliefs to his own. Read that again and see if it makes sense. Even more puzzlingly, he says that if one wishes to learn about synergism, he needn’t look any further than the variance amongst Reformed Theologians regarding lapsarianism &c. Needless to say, Sungenis made not one whit of sense throughout this portion of his diatribe.

He continued in this nonsensical fashion by further criticizing Reformers for making such distinctions in the first place, accusing the origin of disunity on a general lack of possession of the truth; of course, given that Sungenis cannot likewise account for Molinism and Thomism within Roman Catholicism, it is little wonder that Sungenis feels the need to employ yet another disguised tu quoque argument, viz. for no other reason than to attempt to drag his opponents down to ground equal to his own: none.

Exegesis

A little more than halfway through his opening statement, Sungenis finally gets around to putting forward positive evidence for his position… or so it would seem.

In his first cited text, 1 Timothy 2:4, Sungenis assumes that “all men” refers to men without exception rather than without distinction when he in fact cites verses in context which would seem to support the latter interpretation (verse 1 and 6, cf. verse 2). Using his argumentation, Roman Catholics would retranslate Romans 3:23 such that Mary and Jesus are excluded. Apparently, Roman Catholics don’t believe all means all! Comically, Sungenis doesn’t ever connect God’s alleged desire to save all without exception to man’s free will, so one is left to speculate as to just how 1 Timothy 2:4 teaches the concept. The same goes for his throwaway citation of 1 John 2:2 (in which the analogous John 11:51-52 is unsurprisingly left unmentioned).

His other citations fare little better. Neither John 5:39 nor Matthew 23:37 imply, in their respective contexts, that the men mentioned could have been willing to act contrary to what they did, and in 2 Timothy 2:13, Sungenis reverts to assuming that a conditional statement implies actuality – whereas Christ and the apostles repeatedly said he who denies Christ is an antichrist. With that, Sungenis has run out of ammo. That’s all he had to offer.

Logic

The shallow nature of Sungenis’ argumentation is no more evident, however, when Sungenis is reduced to appealing to the emotions of the audience. Sungenis would seemingly have his audience believe that all unbelievers are poor, needy souls who are crying out for a Savior only to be stiff-armed at the goal line by the tyrant God of Calvinism. What rubbish! Men are slaves to sin and lovers of darkness before they are regenerated. White often uses imagery of a man standing on the precipice of Hell shaking his fists at his Creator. In less dramatic terms, he has related times when he has spoken to people who say they cannot possibly accept the God of Calvinism, to which he replies: “I know.” That is to say, apart from God’s unobligated grace and mercy, sinners are quite content with going about their own business of living in sin, thank you very much. Of course they reject God. Sungenis is a very good example of this: he presumes a loving God must attempt (and fail more often than not) to save all men without exception and is further willing to call the biblical God monstrous. One would do well to observe how quickly Sungenis proceeded from an incomprehensible God to an anthropocentric God.

One final attempt is made by Sungenis to show that God can predestine men according to their free will. The CCC, paragraph 600, states:

“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of "predestination", he includes in it each person's free response to his grace”: "In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place." For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.”

Sungenis claims that this illustrates how Roman Catholics are able to interpret Scripture at face value and compatibilize free will with predestination. But firstly, after complaining that White must interprets the “all men” of 1 Timothy 2:4 according to his preconceptions, it is ironic that Sungenis cites an interpretation of Acts 4:27 which substitutes “permitted” for “predestined” without further ado. And secondly, it is very interesting that this catechism predicates God’s predestination on creaturely wills. One wonders how Sungenis would respond to the objection that free will necessarily implies that God cannot be eternally omniscient.

Conclusion

Contrasted to White’s opening statement, Sungenis’ was poor. I had hoped Sungenis would challenge White, but even a lowly layman such as me can perceive the ridiculousness of Sungenis’ arguments. I may listen to the rest of the debate at some other time, if only to hear White’s rebuttal and the cross-ex, but if this is seriously the best non-Calvinism has to offer by way of a defense of free will, what a let-down.

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Conclusion

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Concluding Statement

Since Robert has decided to abandon the debate, this will function more as a commentary on Robert’s logical and exegetical fallacies in his thirty page second rebuttal, most of which I could not have otherwise hoped to address, given its inordinate length and the number of mistakes it contains. A careful reader will observe that many objections Robert makes in his second rebuttal are the same one’s I either refuted or anticipated in my opening statement and two rebuttals:

- Choice isn’t incompatible with Calvinism, contrary to Robert’s opening “joke.” (see: my opening statement).
- Robert’s implicit understanding of Ezekiel 18 would suggest that God works out things which are not according to His good pleasure (see: my first rebuttal and Robert’s evasive answer to my first and seventh cross-examination question).
- One’s will is not forced if one acts according to desires determined by God (see: opening statement). That these desires are determined by God are irrelevant to the point in question, viz. whether or not God actually does determine our desires. Robert assumes the answer is no and uses this to pit man’s will against God’s determinative decree, as though man possesses autonomous desires which God negates. That, obviously, is question-begging.
- Robert’s opinion of the potter-clay motif is utterly without exegetical support (see: my first rebuttal).
- I wrote “God cannot do certain things like rape, murder, lie, deceive, et al.,” and Robert replied that this is contradictory [essentially] because a God who predestines people to Hell cannot love them. Firstly, that a red herring. It has nothing to do with my statement. Secondly, it is unfortunate Robert did not stick around to explain my ninth cross-examination question. That God has a special love for a particular, unconditionally chosen group of people does not imply God is deceitful. Would Robert love another’s child as much as his own?
- Throughout the debate, Robert consistently exhibited no idea what it biblically means to be a respecter of persons (see: my second rebuttal). Furthermore, Robert constantly conflated the distinction between the unconditional nature of decrees like election and reprobation as opposed to conditional decrees like justification and condemnation (see: my second rebuttal).
- Robert could offer no solution to the question of God’s eternal omniscience (see: first rebuttal). In fact, Robert’s analogy of the parent who predicts his child’s behavior works against Robert, because in it he writes that “but the parent’s knowledge of the child does not [cause] or force the child to fulfil the prediction, because the child might do something quite alternative with which the parent does also equally know.” If that’s the case – if God’s knowledge is not a function of His “prediction” – the only remaining conclusion is that, like Arminius, Robert believes God’s knowledge is a function of His foresight of “free will” (as defined in my opening statement) choices. God’s knowledge, if it is contingent on temporal creatures, is necessarily not eternal. Hence, Robert logically must admit God learns. The alternative is that the parent knows the child because he created (caused) the child to be as he is.
- Robert attempts to interact with Romans 8:32 but ignores my rhetorical questions: “Did Paul not write that those for whom Christ died will freely be given all things (Romans 8:32)? Would “all things” not include the desire to come to and remain in Christ? If Christ died for all men, then, would Robert not have to purport the false doctrine of universalism?”
- Robert never seemed to grasp that I believed that Christ’s atonement was sufficient for all but made only for the elect. Despite his illegitimate appeals to passages which say “whoever does believe will be saved” – as though that implies all could be saved if all believed – I wrote in my opening statement “it is counter-factually true that “if the Father desired to save all men without exception, Christ’s sacrifice was such that all men without exception could have been saved.”” Robert’s misunderstanding and refusal to give me the benefit of the doubt until further clarification was, in this case among others, the cause of straw man argumentation.
- John 1:11-13 distinguishes between adoption and regeneration, and Romans 1:16 is a reference to justification, not regeneration. Robert needs to study different soteriological terms. I can’t simplify the arguments I’m making any further than that.
- Robert ignored my exegesis of 1 John 2:2 and 2 Peter 2:1. It is almost as if he didn’t read it at all. My parallel of 1 John 2:2 to John 11:51-52 was seemingly for naught (“What if [I was] one of the scattered children?” is an irrelevant question), and my explanation of the meaning of “agorazo” was likewise ignored.
- Robert ignored my argument from Romans 8:29-30 concerning predication of predestination and the fact unconditional election and reprobation aren’t arbitrary (see: my second rebuttal).

Examining arguments (particularly exegetical) Robert made in his second rebuttal which I had not space to address:

- Robert cites 2 Peter 3:9 and John 3:16 as passages which state God does not wish any should perish. Aside from the tangential biblical problems with this (again, see my first and seventh cross-examination questions), 2 Peter 3:9 is written to the elect and about the elect (to whom has God made promises in verse 9? to whom is God patient in verse 15?) and John 3:16 only states that God loves the world (which has a multiplicity of meanings in Johannine literature; cf. 1:29, 6:33, 17:9, &c.) and that those who do (not “can”) believe will not perish.
- 1 John 2:15-17 is not relevant to Romans 8:7-9. Obedience per the former presupposes regeneration per the latter. And, even when we are commanded to follow a certain precept, it is as Luther observed: “Even grammarians and schoolboys on street corners know that nothing more is signified by verbs in the imperative mood than what ought to be done, and that what is done or can be done should be expressed by words in the indicative. How is it that you theologians are twice as stupid as schoolboys, in that as soon as you get hold of a single imperative verb you infer an indicative meaning, as though the moment a thing is commanded it is done, or can be done?” God commands what we cannot do so that such may be the occasion by which we learn we must absolutely depend upon God.
- Robert cites Genesis 3:9-10 and asks how, if Adam was totally depraved, he could hear God’s voice. Of course, no consistent Calvinist denies men can understand the gospel; we just deny men can believe it. Men are not neutral to the gospel, they are negative, unable to respond positively prior to regeneration. As for why God asked Adam what He was doing (almost as if Robert thinks God didn’t know!), the answer is simple: God often uses questions to prompt a certain line of thought. Example: when God asked Job whether he knew the intricacies of creation, he was indirectly rebuking Job by reminding him of the Creator-creature distinction. Similarly, asking Adam what he did required Adam to address his sin.
- Robert states all men possess “the image of God and his law resides in [all] of mankind’s hearts.” Since mankind’s image is corrupted (hence, we must be conformed to Christ’s image) and only believers with whom God has covenanted have God’s laws written on their hearts (Jeremiah 31:31-34, Hebrews 10:16), Robert is simply wrong.
- That Robert says he would defect to Luciferianism or Gnosticism if he believed Scripture affirms what I believe (which he falsely alleged to be HyperCalvinism) is representative of the fallacies Robert must insert into what is supposed a rational discussion to score emotional points with those who agree with him, thus begging the question as to whether or not he realizes that apostates are never truly saved.
- Robert completely misses the point when I asked him to explain how the fact that faith is pleasing is harmonious with that fact that, prior to regeneration, one cannot please God (Romans 8:8-11).
- Proof-texting (e.g. Robert’s use of Matthew 23:37) is not equivalent to exegesis.
- No explanation was provided as to how I took Arminius “out of context.” Arminius clearly taught one only “might” be saved by Christ’s death, clearly showing the uncertain, unintentional nature of the Arminian’s conception of the atonement.
- All men without distinction (1 Timothy 2:4) is not equivalent to all men without exception.
- I am aware Arminians teach prevenient grace. What Robert never established is how such grace can enable us to choose good with an unchanged, unregenerate nature. I wonder, given Roberts allusion to Acts 21:4-14, if Robert is aware “irresistible grace” only pertains to regeneration.
- Robert’s explanation of imputed guilt is convoluted. Romans 5:18 explicitly teaches men (plural) are condemned for one (singular) transgression. How Robert imagines this to mean men’s guilt is erased is not comprehensible. In context, the free gift of grace lies in the fact Christ merits the justification of the believer, not in some idea that all men without exception are cleansed of the guilt of Adam’s sin. That is opposite the point Paul is making.
- Instead of explaining the meanings of the majority of the passages I cite (e.g. Job 23:13-14), Robert relies on an unsubstantiated assumption (Calvinists deny men can choose) to explain what the text can’t mean rather than explain what it does.
- Robert replies to Lamentations 3:37 as though God passively predestines, i.e. allows. But that concept nowhere appears in the text (nor in Psalm 33:9, for that matter). Also, 3:38 does refer to moral evil, per 39. Sins are moral evil, not natural disaster. Isaiah 10:15 (a context Robert references) indicates God is active, and Robert never responded to that fact Isaiah 45:7 says God creates wickedness.
- Robert anachronistically applies his “multiple wills of God” thesis to Ephesians 1 without further ado.
- Obviously, I could not exegete Romans 9 within the short space I am allowed, but I actually agree with most of what Robert says: chapters 9-11 (the whole of Romans, really) serve to vindicate God’s righteousness per 9:6, God is attempting to display His freedom to sovereignly harden and mercy when He exercises His power over Pharaoh, men who question God’s blameworthiness do overstep their bounds as creation, &c. These points Robert makes are points any Calvinist would agree with. However: Paul does not say men are hardened because they are lost, nor that God actually “makes” and “molds” (certainly not “allows” or “permits”) reprobates like Pharaoh to be as they are (Romans 9:19-20); the idea that Paul’s primary concerns is “national election” in light of (9:6, 24-10:21) is absurd; that Paul uses the middle voice in 9:22 (true enough) is irrelevant, since it is God ho is doing the demonstrating, not man, effectively reversing the point Robert is trying to make; it is unfortunate Robert is so flippant in his referencing of which verb is in the passive voice in verse 23. I don’t know what he is referring to, as both verbs are in the active voice.
- That men are able to choose and that God accordingly responds does not imply man’s wills are autonomous of that God did not decree such should be the case from eternity; likewise, responsibility does not presuppose a “free will.”
- Rejecting universalism does not mean that the logical end of Robert’s position does not lead to universalism. He didn’t seem to understand that, especially with regards to John 6 and the fact that if God draws all and gives all to Christ, all will come and be raised the last day.
- Calvinists don’t deny one can know one is elect; if one believes, one knows he is saved and will remain saved. John wrote so that men would know they possess eternal life. But to know that means one knows he will never perish. Robert’s assertion is vacuous.
- Calvinists teach the need of a general call because no man knows who are among the elect. This should be obvious.
- Robert argues Matt 25:41 proves Hell was not made for men. That hell is said to have been prepared for a particular group does not imply it was prepared for them exclusively. Using the same type of argument, I could say John 10 shows Jesus was died for the elect exclusively (cf. Jude 4).

Final observations:

- Regarding the cross-examination, I think it speaks for itself.
- Quoting apocryphal literature, pagan philosophers, Christian opinions, and writing more than the agreed upon restrictions is not a sufficient substitute for actual exegesis and logical argumentation.
- Copying and pasting the Greek text into a debate doesn’t mean you made a good point (speaking of, it is remarkable that Robert questions the canonicity of Proverbs 16:4, but not Mark 16:16?).
- Compare these two statements Robert made in the debate:

“…TULIP is completely non-biblical, despite apparent scriptures to back up the five points, however the five points associated with Arminianism is completely biblical.”

“It is this final point (the P in TULIP, or as Ryan would name it to be “Eternal Security”) with which I must contend that the Calvinist [may] indeed have a point of truth here.”

Is it not unfortunate that Robert left before he could be fully persuaded of the error of Arminianism? But God works out all things in due time according to His pleasure, even this.
- I truly believe this debate has evinced God as sovereign as Reformed theologians have taught and as deserving of glory as He has declared.

(Word count: 2,280)

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Cross-ex part 4 of 4

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Cross-examination

Question 7 (me): Reply to the following arguments:

1. Those for whom Christ died are freely given all things (Romans 8:32). Reprobates are not freely given all things (e.g. sufficient desire to believe). Therefore, Christ did not die for reprobates.

2. All who are given to Christ by the Father come to Christ (John 6:37). Not all men without exception come to Christ. Therefore, not all men without exception were given to Christ.

3. God does as He pleases (Psalm 115:3). Not all men without exception are saved. Therefore, God was not pleased to save all men without exception.

(Word count: 100)

Answer 7 (Arminian): Let us take the Calvinist’s lens off our eyes when we read your question. Starting with part 1 of your question you declare, “[Those] for whom Christ died...” are you declaring an elect few preordained afore-time, or those elect few that have [decided] through God’s constant calls to our hearts and in his Word, to come to the knowledge of Christ and Salvation? As how I regard myself coming from an extreme depraved state, and thus thereafter, it was [me] who made the choice of wanting Christ in my heart!

Proverbs 1:23
(23) Turn you at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you.

This is why I do not understand God suddenly ‘zapping’ me with some form of irresistible grace, to spark a ‘regeneration’ in me, and thus for me to have faith. Quite the opposite and thus I am thankful to Yeshua for being patient with me while I slowly removed the ignorant mindset during my depraved state. Any Christian here, reading this, will agree with me on the same testimonial basis on how awesome it is when they, through research and a will to search for the truth, stumbled across a wonderful truth in the Gospel.

Even Satanists “look for the truth” but they have yet to find it. Why haven’t they found it yet? First of all, what every human being needs to do is to remove his presuppositions and preconceived or indoctrinated ideologies on religion and start afresh. That is what I did, comparing every religion out there. What have I come to understand now? Proverbs 9:10 so dearly is the answer. As far as the Satanists go, because of their ignorant narrow mindedness to cling onto Luciferianic ideologies even if they honestly declare, “we read the bible also”, Paul gives an answer as to what happens if this is the case, 2 Corinthians 4:4
(4) In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them.

Was I a depraved person during my adventure? Oh yes! Am I as much of a sinner as I was after declaring, “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God”? No! Why? Because this is one of the glorious obvious truths to [know] that Yeshua does exist, and he does mean what he promises, that if I have faith and I lovingly come to understand in all awe and reverent fear of who he really is – he gives me life, truth and a passage unto eternal righteousness (regeneration), John 14:6
(6) Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.

John 11:25-26
(25) Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live:
(26) And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this?

Galatians 6:15
(15) For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.

Don’t equate this line of thought with synergism either. Didn’t Christ do it all on the cross (τετελεσται)? Therefore, how can you (Ryan) declare that the non-elect in whom make [their] own choice on coming to the saving faith of Christ (according to what the Arminianist would say) have personal equal merit within salvation (hence synergism)?

This is ridiculous because he/she who is receiving this awesome [free] gift – cannot be doing any form of merited work! They are simply [receiving] that which is completely undeserved at all! But because God so loved the world – thus he died for all, in this truth, he cries that all should theoretically be in his eternal glory.

Does it mean that God failed if Anton LaVey is not saved? No! Why? Because how can God be blamed conditionally on the choices that Anton LaVey makes; in regards to whether he makes the choice to adhere to Luciferanistic stupidity or the saving Gospel / relationship with Christ?

“All are not saved by Christ’s death, but all which are saved, are saved by Christ’s death: His death is sufficient to save all, as the sun is sufficient to lighten all; but if any man wink, the sun will not give him light.” – Henry Smith

“That mystical Sun of Righteousness (saith St. Ambrose) is risen to all, come to all, did suffer and rise again for all—but if any one doth not believe in Christ, he defrauds himself of the general benefit. As if one shutting the windows should exclude the beams of the sun, the sun is not therefore not risen to all.” - Isaac Barrow

Therefore, “freely given all things” can be seen in the lens of, Revelation 21:7
(7) He that overcometh shall inherit all things; and I will be his God, and he shall be my son.

I did [make] the choice by the way. Anton LaVey likewise had that choice to repent and be saved, until his death of course.

Oh, and let us define “given all things” – because that does not equate, “sufficient desire to believe”.

Are you declaring that since we are automata (as understood by TULIP), that God gives his special ‘elect’ a peculiar cryptograph in their hearts / mind, to [make] them believe!?

Thus if this was the case, obviously Christ would not die for [other] reprobates – because it all comes to an absolute understanding of a [fixed] predestinational / fatalistic ideology that God has already planned even before creation (when he actually planned the Mashiach sacrifice from Genesis 3:15 onwards), who will be saved and who will be damned.

The ridiculous irony that no Calvinist seems to understand is that Ryan Hedrich is as much of a sinner as Anton LaVey was, so why did God choose to regenerate Ryan (towards saving faith; according to TULIP, regeneration precedes faith) over Anton LaVey?

Yes, Anton LaVey would have been saved and would have inherited the fruits of the Spirit, if he so desired to fully understand, 1 John 4:15
(15) Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God.

Part 2 of your question, you summarise, “Therefore, not all men without exception were given to Christ”. This then implies limited atonement, correct?

I differ because Christ was the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.

By a willingness to reject the Gospel of Christ – the person stays depraved in his/her state. This does not mean God has “given up” on them.

For those that have accepted the Gospel, that is where John 6 comes into mind. Notice, John 6:35-40
(35) And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.
(36) But I said unto you, That ye also have seen me, and believe not.
(37) All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
(38) For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.
(39) And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
(40) And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.

And thus, this is only possible, because Christ died for all – in whom if they make the choice to accept this free gift, they will be indeed raised up on the last day. Hebrews 2:9
(9) But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man.

1 Timothy 2:6
(6) Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.

When we look at part 3 of your question, “God does as He pleases (Psalm 115:3)”

But a sovereign God cannot lie, deceive, murder, rape, et al.? Take note of these passages, Genesis 50:19-20
(19) And Joseph said unto them, Fear not: for am I in the place of God?
(20) But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.

Deuteronomy 32:4
(4) He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.

Psalms 12:6
(6) The words of the LORD are pure words: as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times.

Psalms 18:30
(30) As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the LORD is tried: he is a buckler to all those that trust in him.

Psalms 119:140
(140) Thy word is very pure: therefore thy servant loveth it.

Proverbs 30:5
(5) Every word of God is pure: he is a shield unto them that put their trust in him.

“Not all men without exception are saved.”

Because, 2 Timothy 4:2-4
(2) Preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine.
(3) For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears;
(4) And they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables.

“Therefore, God was not pleased to save all men without exception.”

Heresy.

Do you love and wished for Anton LaVey to have been saved? In fact, do you [not] have a weeping sorrow that he is indeed awaiting an eternal Hell fire?

1 John 4:8
(8) He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.

Mark 9:23-24
(23) Jesus said unto him, If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.
(24) And straightway the father of the child cried out, and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou MINE UNBELIEF.



Question 7 (Arminian): Michael Heiser, an esteemed biblical scholar specifically in Semitic languages, has released an interesting May 25th 2008 blog entry titled, “The Ends, Not Necessarily the Means (Sovereignty and Free Will Addendum)” in further response to his “Predestination and Free Will: A Summary Position” a few days prior. The reason is because not many people understood his overview that,

* God foreknows ALL events
* God foreknows events that never happen
* Therefore, the fact that God foreknows an event doesn’t require that it will come to pass.
* Therefore, there is no cause and effect relationship between foreknowledge and predestination.

“The short version of all this: All I’m really saying is that God foreknows all events, predestinates certain (but not all) events, and is not responsible for sin and evil.”

Therefore, he further declares, “When I say that I don’t believe God predestines every event, I mean that, but the way I explain it needs some work.

For one, I need to be clear that I don’t think the terms “sovereignty” and “predestination” are synonymous. I have hinted at this in Chapter 4 and some posts, but looking back I don’t think it’s clear. What I really believe is that God predestines the ends to which all things work, but not necessarily the means. He predestinates the end point, but not necessarily the path to the end point (though he can). How things end up can’t be random in that God has to be satisfied with the way it all ends and isn’t surprised or anything like that.

God’s sovereignty is shown in that he has the ability to influence and oversee the paths, paying close attention to what is happening in the course of human history. I reject deism for this reason (among others). God is intimately involved in using human and non-human free agents and his Spirit to move things along as he wishes. He of course can foresee both what humans actually will do and what they could do (Keilah). He knows what choices he’d like to see made and works to influence those choices. Humans sometimes make the desired choices, but when they don’t, God remains at work. This kind of program requires omniscience in my view.

Lastly, God has told us in Scripture that he did predestinate certain events (e.g., election of a remnant; the sacrificial death of the messiah who was incarnate deity). I don’t believe that the paths to these events was necessarily predetermined, though (see my previous reply to Phil’s comment about the crucifixion; all that prophecy required was consistency with the typology of sacrifice and Passover).

I think this position allows genuine freedom, does not impinge on God’s sovereignty (which is not predestination), and allows God to predestinate certain events. It also has God not causing sin or doing evil to accomplish things, even things that are predestinated.”

What is your take on this?

Words: 105 (excluding quotes)

Answer 7 (me): Robert’s seventh cross-ex question is puzzlingly similar to his first. The important points I made which I will not hereafter repeat are as follows:

- “knowledge beforehand” is not the only concept in the semantic domain of “foreknowledge” and “foreknow.”
- contexts determine which concept is implied.
- “proginosko” and “prognosis” are never used as referents of God’s knowledge of counter-factual conditionals.
- God’s knowledge is not predicated on created things like man’s will.
- God’s eternal knowledge is predicated on the fact He has unconditionally determined all things from eternity. That God knows counter-factual conditionals is unsurprising, then, for such suggests God knows what would have occurred had He decreed that events should unfold in a manner different than He actually decreed.

There is really only one other point from the blog entry which bears mentioning:

“All I’m really saying is that God foreknows all events, predestinates certain (but not all) events...”

The idea that God doesn’t predestine all things – or, if He does, He [sometimes] does so conditionally – can be rebutted a number of different ways. The simplest way – the one which I have repeated most often – is that such would mean God cannot be eternally omniscient. Since Robert has cited this “esteemed biblical scholar,” I will assume that his understanding of God’s eternal omniscience – or at least Robert’s inference of his understanding – is not much different from Robert’s own (expressed most explicitly in his answer to my fifth cross-ex question). Given this assumption, which, if false, Robert is free (!) to correct along with providing an explanation as to how the author explains God can be eternally omniscient apart from causing all things, I will examine Robert’s own long-winded beliefs as to how God’s eternal omniscience is compatible with human freedom. His 1,500 word reply can really be condensed to the following:

//…self-determinists respond that God can predetermine in several ways…

1. Contrary to free choice (forcing the person to do what he or she does not choose to do);
2. Based on free choices already made (waiting to see what the person will do);
3. Knowing omnisciently what the person will do.//

Let’s examine these alternatives:

1. If this is supposed to be a caricature of my beliefs, it’s a straw man. I anticipated this argument before Robert ever made it when, in my opening statement, I wrote:

//Calvinists are quick to point out that men are not “forced” to will; that is a contradiction in terms. Rather, insofar as man always chooses in accordance with his most strongest desire, and insofar as God determines our desires (directly or indirectly), our will is determined and yet voluntary.//

2. How does God know these “free choices already made”? Robert’s answer is clear: God “waits to see what the person will do.” But that’s the problem! If God’s knowledge is predicated on the wills of temporal creatures, God’s knowledge by DEFINITION cannot be eternal.

3. What does “omnisciently” mean? This is obviously a not-so-subtle tautology: “God knows because He knows.” This doesn’t answer my question: HOW does He know if not by the fact He caused? A circular argument doesn’t cut it.

Robert’s citation of Romans 8:29 and 1 Peter 1:2 in support of the latter two [bad] explanations of God’s eternal knowledge presupposes he has shown there is only one biblical definition of foreknowledge. As no indication has been given that Robert is even aware I rebutted this presupposition in my first cross-ex answer, however, one really has to wonder if Robert even understands the problem. He should reread my fifth cross-ex question.

(Word count: 600)




[Since my opponent has abandoned the debate following the eigth question, the following questions are provided only to show what I would have asked]


Question 8 (Ryan): I would like for you to respond to two arguments I’ve made:

1. For God to choose to save some men on the basis of their free will (as defined in my opening post) would contradict God’s eternal omniscience. Particularly, I wish you to interact with my remarks in my seventh cross-ex answer.

2. The paragraph in my first rebuttal which begins: “Robert also argues that predestination is not unto faith, but rather subsequent spiritual blessings…” Particularly, I wish you to show that, given my argument in that paragraph, conditioning predestination on faith is not circular.

(Word count: 100)

[No answer]



Question 9 (Ryan): I believe I have sufficiently exposed the fact you have failed to address the mutual exclusivity of eternal omniscience and free will. Let’s suppose, however, that the two doctrines are compatible. You’ve written:

“There is no problem in saying that God created men with free will so that they could return His love, even though He knows that some will not make that decision.”

How is God any more loving by creating men He knows will “freely” choose that which will damn them forever than if He had created reprobates for the sake of the elect?

(Word count: 100)

[No answer]




Question 10 (Ryan): [I would probably have asked a question relating to one of Robert’s replies to questions 8 and 9]

Formal Calvinism vs. Arminianism Debate, Cross-ex part 3 of 5

This is the first "formal" debate in which I've participated (with rules and such). For readers who are on facebook, they may find both sides of the debate here. If others are interested, they may email me for a word document. The format, set by my opponent, will be as follows:

"Opening Statement period (~1,000 words each)

First Rebuttal period (really depends on the opening statement, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Second Rebuttal period (really depends on the first rebuttal statements, and you can provide as much rebuttal as possible)

Cross Examination - each side asks 10 questions (there is no limit to the response word count)

Closing Statement period (~2,000 maximum, otherwise below that number is fine)"

Cross examination

Question 5 (me): I have argued that “if God's knowledge is contingent on the wills of temporal creatures, God cannot be eternally omniscient.” In response, you have referenced “Messianic Jewish” perspectives (1), God’s predictive power (2), and Matthew Henry (3), yet I respectively find these references vague (1), an indication of a misunderstanding that God’s predictive power would be proportional to man’s allegedly free will (2), or irrelevant (3). My question, then, is not whether God is eternally omniscient or whether we have free will, but rather how God can possibly know from eternity our [allegedly] antecedently uncaused choices.

(Word count: 100)

Answer 5 (Arminian): The Father is omniscient in Jeremiah 17:10, The Son is omniscient in John 21:17 and the Holy Spirit is omniscient in 1 Corinthians 2:10-11.

Let’s go through some philosophy. ‘Determinism’ is the belief that all events, including human choices, are determined or caused by another (in this case, Theistic Determinism means that God directly or indirectly has caused me to write this verse paragraph). Proponents of this view believe that human choices are the result of antecedent causes, which in turn were caused by prior causes.

Conceptions of the nature of human choice (as well as free will choices) fall within three categories,

1. Determinism,
2. Indeterminism
3. Self-determinism.

A deterministic ideology looks to actions caused by another, an indeterminist to uncaused actions, and a self-determinist to self-caused actions. I will only look at Determinism (because Ryan holds to that view, and Self-determinism, because ultimately that is what the Arminian believes in. Indeterminism is ridiculous due to the fact that such reasoning would make the world we live in to be irrational and it abuses the Heisenberg principle)

Determinism (5-Point Calvinism): There are two basic kinds of determinism, naturalistic and theistic. Naturalistic determinism is Humans who simply act according to what has been programmed into them – B. F. Skinner, “Beyond Behaviorism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity”

As you can see, Ryan who holds a very strong Calvinistic theology believes to some degree of theistic determinism.

Jonathan Edwards in his, “The Freedom of the Will”, related all actions ultimately to God as First Cause. “Free choice” for Edwards is doing what one desires, and God is the Author of the heart’s desires (and it is clear that Ryan in the unofficial thread – made adherence to such a declaration).

God is sovereign, in control of all and so ultimately the cause of all. Fallen humanity is totally without freedom of the affections, so they can do whatever they want, but what they want will forever be in the control of their corrupt, world-directed heart. God’s grace controls actions as God controls desires and their attendant thoughts and actions.

Non-determinists respond that a self-caused action is not impossible, and all actions need not be attributed to the First Cause (God). Some actions can be caused by human beings to whom God gave free moral agency. Free choice is not, as Ryan contends, doing what one desires (with God giving the desires). Rather, it is doing what one decides, which is not always the same thing. One need not reject God’s sovereign control to deny determinism. God can control by omniscience as well as by causal power.

A hard determinist believes all acts are caused by God, that God is the only efficient Cause. A soft determinist holds that God as the Primary Cause is compatible with human free choice as the secondary Cause. I am more lenient on the latter.

Self-Determinism (Arminian): According to this view, a person’s moral acts are not caused by another or uncaused, but are caused by oneself. It is important to know at the outset precisely what is meant by self-determinism or free choice. Negatively, it means that a moral action is not uncaused or caused by another (God). It is neither indeterminate nor determined by another (God). Positively, it is morally self-determined, an act freely chosen, without compulsion, in which one could have done otherwise (Yourself).

Either moral actions are uncaused (indeterminism), caused by another (determinism), or caused by oneself (self-determinism / soft determinism). However, no action can be uncaused, since this violates the fundamental rational principle that every event has a cause (as stated briefly above). Neither can a person’s actions be caused by others, for in that case they would not be personal actions. Further, if one’s acts are caused by another, then how can he or she be held responsible for them?

But Ryan declares that he has responded to such in his “Anticipated Objections”, and with this, let’s see what Ryan said (ultimately) about Man's free will, "It is certainly we who choose, feel, think, and act – and yet it is all in accordance with God’s determinative purpose."

He further states, "A fallback objection I have sometimes faced is that “even if the above argument is invalid, man cannot be faulted for his choosing that which he was predetermined to choose.” This is an example of the fallacy of begging-the-question"

And he finalises this by saying, "The fact that we are subject to God’s law despite how He has made us should not be surprising, for it the fact that He made us for His own ends functions as the very means by which Paul substantiates his claim that God is sovereign and man is responsible."

How can Charles Caldwell Ryrie (for example in my first rebuttal) beg the question when he clearly demonstrates in his philosophical reasoning that, "Thus, the biblical doctrine gives proper place to human responsibility. What’s going to be is going to be through certain means and procedures and responsible human actions. Ephesians 1:11 spotlights all things, not solely ends."

He does not beg the question when he gives a logical [realistic] illustration of two persons having a discussion. I cannot see how that illustration is begging the question / circular reasoning because go back to my Luciferianistic motive ideology.

When Ryan writes, "it is in fact God’s sovereignty which responsibility presupposes." - that is one of two things.

1. A complete contradiction in terms of the TULIP doctrine in proportion with our daily life.

2. God is Xerxes I.

The denial that some actions can be free is self-defeating. A complete determinist insists that both determinists and non-determinists are determined to believe what they believe. However, determinists believe self-determinists are wrong and ought to change their view. But “ought to change” implies freedom to change, which is contrary to determinism. If God is the cause of all human actions, then human beings are not morally responsible. And it makes no sense to praise human beings for doing good or to blame them for doing evil.

If human beings are free, are they outside God’s sovereignty? Either God determines all, or else he is not sovereign. And if he determines all, then there are no self-determined acts. However it is sufficient to note that God sovereignly delegated free choice to some of his creatures. There was no necessity for him to do so; he exercised his free will. So human freedom is a sovereignly given power to make moral choices.

Only absolute freedom would be contrary to God’s absolute sovereignty. But human freedom is a limited freedom. Humans are not free to become God themselves! A contingent being cannot become a Necessary Being. For a Necessary Being cannot come to be. It must always be what it is.
It is objected that either free, good acts spring from God’s grace, or else from our own initiative. But if the latter, they are not the result of God’s grace as seen in Ephesians 2:8–9. However, this does not necessarily follow. Free will itself is a gracious gift. Further, special grace is not forced coercively onto the person. Rather, grace works persuasively. The hard determinist’s position confuses the nature of faith. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver, rather than to the Giver.

Others objections as seen in this debate by Ryan; that self-determinism are contrary to God’s predestination. But self-determinists respond that God can predetermine in several ways.

He can determine,
1. Contrary to free choice (forcing the person to do what he or she does not choose to do);
2. Based on free choices already made (waiting to see what the person will do);
3. Knowing omnisciently what the person will do.

1 Peter 1:2
(2) Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied.

Romans 8:29
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.

Positions 2 or 3 insist that God can determine the future by free choice, since he omnisciently knows for sure how they will freely act. So, it is determined from the standpoint of God’s infallible knowledge but free from the vantage point of human choice.

Connected with the argument from strong determinism is that, while Adam had free choice (Romans 5:12), fallen human beings are in bondage to sin and not free to respond to God. But this view is contrary to both God’s consistent call on people to repent (Luke 13:3; Acts 2:38) and believe (John 3:16; 3:36; Acts 16:31), as well as to direct statements that even unbelievers have the ability to respond to God’s grace, John 7:17
(17) If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

Romans 7:18
(18) For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not.

1 Corinthians 9:17
(17) For if I do this thing willingly, I have a reward: but if against my will, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.

1 Peter 5:2
(2) Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind;

This argument continues that if humans have the ability to respond, then salvation is not of grace (Ephesians 2:8–9) but by human effort. However, this is confusion about the nature of faith – with which I have tirelessly tried to explain throughout this entire rebuttal. The ability of a person to receive God’s gracious gift of salvation is not the same as working for it. To think so is to give credit for the gift to the receiver rather than to the Giver who graciously gave it for [all] to receive.

Words: 1,500 (excluding quotes)

Question 6 (me): Notwithstanding your more Pelagianistic comments (compare “The Father will draw the person, yet he [must] come first!” to John 6:44), a number of passages in Scripture support the doctrine of irresistible grace (1 Corinthians 1:23-24, Romans 8:28-30, John 6:37-44, 10:3-5), for it is obvious to any non-universalist that not all men without exception are so called/drawn. Since conditioning God’s effectual call on faith would be circular (cf. my comments on Romans 8:29-30 in first rebuttal) and John 8:47, 10:26 explicitly state election isn’t conditioned upon faith, how do you harmonize these aforementioned passages with Arminianism?

(Words count: 100)

Answer 6 (Arminian): Let us review the passages you cite to see if there is any apparent ratification in proportion with your defence of irresistible grace.

1 Corinthians 1:23-24
(23) But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness;
(24) But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.

Adam Clarke states – “Those, both of Jews and Greeks, who were by the preaching of the Gospel called or invited to the marriage feast, and have accordingly believed in Christ Jesus; they prove this doctrine to be divinely powerful, to enlighten and convert the soul, and to be a proof of God’s infinite wisdom, which has found out such an effectual way to glorify both his justice and mercy, and save, to the uttermost, all that come to him through Christ Jesus. The called, or invited, κλητοι, is a title of genuine Christians, and is frequently used in the New Testament. Ἁγιοι, saints, is used in the same sense.”

Romans 8:28-30
(28) And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.
(29) For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
(30) Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

Romans 8:28–30 pretty much gives us [the] run-down of the sovereign purposes of God, when Paul said those who have been justified will be glorified. He does not say only some who have truly been saved are going to persevere to the end and then make it; he does not say that only some who are justified will eventually be glorified. What is stated is that those who have been justified are also guaranteed to be glorified by God the Father.

Furthermore, Ephesians 1:4, and 11–12 states that believers have been chosen to bring glory to God. If God knew one would lose his salvation, He would not have chosen him to begin with. But this does not mean that God did predestined Anton LaVey to thus be a reprobate, or that God purposely did not seek him thereafter – especially through his saints (isn’t the whole purpose Christians to preach the bible, and to preach the Gospel to every creature true?).

John 6:37-44
(37) All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.
(38) For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.
(39) And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.
(40) And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.
(41) The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.
(42) And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?
(43) Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves.
(44) No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

According to John 6:37–40, the believer is a gift given by God the Father to the Son because of the Son’s obedience. And because the believer is God’s gift to the Son, Jesus is always going to keep him.

Verse 40 specifically states that, “every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day”. This included Anton LaVey – but he did not ‘see’ nor hearken to come to the glorious Gospel of Christ. Hence he died in his sins.

Matthew Henry commentates, “The discovery of their guilt, danger, and remedy, by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, makes men willing and glad to come, and to give up every thing which hinders applying to him for salvation. The Father's will is, that not one of those who were given to the Son, should be rejected or lost by him. No one will come, till Divine grace has subdued, and in part changed his heart; therefore no one who comes will ever be cast out. The gospel finds none willing to be saved in the humbling, holy manner, made known therein; but God draws with his word and the Holy Ghost; and man's duty is to hear and learn; that is to say, to receive the grace offered, and consent to the promise. None had seen the Father but his beloved Son; and the Jews must expect to be taught by his inward power upon their minds, and by his word, and the ministers whom he sent among them.”

John 10:3-5
(3) To him the porter openeth; and the sheep hear his voice: and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out.
(4) And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him: for they know his voice.
(5) And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him: for they know not the voice of strangers.

Matthew Henry commentates, “Here is a parable or similitude, taken from the customs of the East, in the management of sheep. Men, as creatures depending on their Creator, are called the sheep of his pasture. The church of God in the world is as a sheep-fold, exposed to deceivers and persecutors. The great Shepherd of the sheep knows all that are his, guards them by his providence, guides them by his Spirit and word, and goes before them, as the Eastern shepherds went before their sheep, to set them in the way of his steps. Ministers must serve the sheep in their spiritual concerns. The Spirit of Christ will set before them an open door. The sheep of Christ will observe their Shepherd, and be cautious and shy of strangers, who would draw them from faith in him to fancies about him.”

John 10:1–39, contains the discourse on the Good Shepherd as prophesied in Zechariah 13:7
(7) Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the LORD of hosts: smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered: and I will turn mine hand upon the little ones.

The prophet predicted that the rejection of the Messianic Shepherd will include His death which, in turn, will result in the scattering of the flock of Israel. The theme of the Messiah as the Good Shepherd is picked up by Jesus in John 10:1–18.

Jesus is the Good Shepherd (verses 1–6).

The Pharisees, their present shepherds, have gained rule over the flock and who climbeth up some other way like a thief and a robber (verse 1).

Jesus, however, came the right way because He came the way the Old Testament prophets predicted (verse 2).

His own sheep recognised Jesus to be the True Shepherd and they follow Him (verses 3–6). They are the poor of the flock of Zechariah 11.

Jesus then declared Himself to be the door of the sheep (verses 7–10).

Not only is He the shepherd, but He is the door of the sheepfold (verse 7).

Those who usurped authority before Him are thieves and robbers and not true shepherds (verse 8).

Those individual sheep who came through Him as the door will find salvation and spiritual food and pasture (verse 9).

The believing remnant will find this to be true. The Messianic Shepherd has come to provide the sheep with abundant life (verse 10).

Verses 7–10 likewise makes it clear that the Messiah is the door and all who can be saved, must enter by Him only. John 14:6 defends this.

Whereas earlier (verses 1–6) Jesus pictured Himself as the Good Shepherd, He now identifies Himself in that role (verses 11–18).

He is the Good Shepherd and a good shepherd will willingly lay down His life for the sheep (verse 11).

The hireling has no love for the sheep and will flee in the face of danger leaving the sheep to be destroyed (verses 12–13).

However, Jesus the Good Shepherd will lay down His life for His sheep (verses 14–15).

Furthermore, Jesus has other sheep … which are not of this fold (verse 16). The sheep of this fold are the Jewish sheep. The fold is Israel and the believing sheep of this fold are the Remnant of Israel. The other sheep are the Gentile believers. The Good Shepherd will unite together the believing Jewish and Gentile sheep to become one flock under one shepherd. This new one flock is the same as the one new man of Ephesians 2:11–16. It is the Church, the Body of Messiah with the Messiah as its Head. It is to achieve this new unity that the Messiah will die (verses 17–18).

Some of these truths are repeated in verses 26–30, adding the aspect that the Messiah’s sheep have eternal security. In Matthew 25:31–46, the Gentile believers of the Tribulation were also pictured as sheep.

John 10:24
(24) Then came the Jews round about him, and said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.

In reviewing John 10:24ff, Yeshua answers the charge of obscurity and makes four statements.

1. Jesus had already told them clearly in two ways: by His words and by His works (verse 25).

2. The real problem is that they are not His sheep (verse 26). They have not [believed] on Him, so they are not His sheep. Because they are not His sheep, they do not understand the statements He is making.

3. He points out that His sheep, the believers, do recognise Him and do understand what He is saying and do know exactly who He claims to be (verses 27–29). His sheep recognise His voice and they do follow Him (verse 27). Because [they] have [accepted] Him, they have eternal life (verse 28). Because they have eternal life, His sheep cannot lose their salvation (verses 28–29).

4. Having pointed out that the real problem is not that He has been obscure, but their lack of [faith].

As far as irresistible grace goes, we might summarise as follows:
1) Man has no ability and, therefore, cannot believe the gospel;
2) Man is powerless to resist the Spirit;
3) God doesn’t make anybody do anything; and
4) He makes the elect believe in Christ in accordance with His sovereign plan.

Rather confusing, isn’t it?

How is it possible for someone with no ability to believe the gospel and with no ability or power to resist the Spirit’s will to be personally responsible for believing or rejecting the gospel message?

Faith (as seen in point 4 above in my John 10 exegesis) is the single biblical condition for regeneration, but the Calvinist position insists:

1) that man can’t believe and is powerless to do so.

2) that God must regenerate only those so elected for salvation because he has already elected some and He cannot fail.

That all men descend from Adam and are guilty of sin argues for man’s lost condition and the universal need for eternal life. That the gospel message is intended for the whole world of mankind not only suggests that everyone needs eternal life, but also asserts its efficiency (as well as the sufficiency) to regenerate anyone and everyone in the whole world who hears that message and believes in Christ.

The gospel message itself is indeed “whosoever will” (John 3:16). This fact in no way relegates the Holy Spirit to obscurity. The omnipresent Holy Spirit regenerates the sinner as he believes the gospel. Such regeneration is a divinely powerful act, but it is always performed in conjunction with faith in Christ. So, since the need is universal (sin), the message is universal (the gospel), and the condition for regeneration is universal (faith in Christ), it follows that the effect and efficiency of God’s plan in accord with the gospel offer to all is universal.

The Bible simply places the responsibility of belief directly on the one who hears the clear gospel message. It disallows any excuse for unbelief.

"When Jewish leaders persecuted Jesus and sought to kill Him, He got to the heart of their problem: “But you are not willing to come to Me that you may have life” ([John] 5:40). The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith in the finished work of Jesus Christ; “He who believes in the Son of God has the witness in himself; he who does not believe God has made Him a liar, because he has not believed the testimony that God has given of His Son” (1 John 5:10)." - Earl D. Radmacher, Salvation

Notice the simple and clear wording when Radmacher says, “The general call of the gospel becomes effective when it is joined with faith.” The difference between the general call and the effectual call of God is this: The general call is the message announced to all, i.e., the invitation. The effectual call is the message believed, the invitation received, and the correspondingly powerful work of the Holy Spirit that, at the time of faith, produces eternal life in the one who believes. The effectual call is the gospel message joined with faith, and the explanation need be no more complicated than that.

There is no necessity, either biblically, logically, or otherwise, to insist that the Holy Spirit imposes eternal life on anyone in an irresistible fashion, makes them willing, makes them willing to be willing, or gives them faith, etc., so as to fulfil God’s sovereign plan. This is so because His sovereign plan insists upon human responsibility, and thus, human freedom. And human freedom is validated when one freely believes in Christ alone.

So, can the gift of eternal life be resisted? The biblical answer is yes. The gifts of God, salvation or otherwise, are never imposed by an irresistible force, but are simply and freely received.

Does God’s sovereignty or absolute control of the universe require us to conclude that He forces selected people (the elect) to receive His gift of salvation and to enter into a holy union with Him? No, because he has made mankind an offer which cannot be exceeded.

God is not indebted to us, nor is He obligated to save us. Now, if Jesus’ death was intended to benefit only the elect, the Holy Spirit would indeed be obligated to save those for whom His death was intended. But if Jesus’ death was intended for all, God would in no way be under obligation.

Is it an affront to God to suggest that the Holy Spirit can be resisted? No, because, again, the question presupposes that rejection of the gospel offer for eternal life is the same as personal resistance to the Holy Spirit while the Holy Spirit is somehow pressing and pressuring the sinner for a decision. Rather, the rejection of Christ is indeed resistance to the message that the Holy Spirit has inspired.

Words: 1,700 (excluding quotes)

Question 5 (Arminian): Defining free choice as “doing what one desires” is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do as seen in Romans 7:15–16.

If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?

God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it. Even the Calvinistic Westminster Confession of Faith declares that “Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently” (5.2).

What are your thoughts on this?

Words: 160

Answer 5 (me): “The will always chooses according to its strongest inclination at the moment” – Jonathan Edwards

The above is indeed regarded by Calvinists as an accurate understanding of the will. The qualification that we will what we most strongly desire avoids the pitfalls of Robert’s Romans 7 objection. Furthermore, there is no contradiction between predestination and the idea that man wills what he most strongly desires; indeed, that is the very means by which God predestines! He controls our desires directly (e.g. regeneration) or indirectly (e.g. temptation via evil spirits) and thusly controls in what manner we will.

Historically, “free will or choice” has a multiplicity of meanings. Augustine believed fallen man was free to sin but not free to do good. This is another good definition with which all Calvinists could agree. However, to avoid confusion, I explicitly defined it in my opening statement as “the doctrine that… man is said to be capable of actuating one of two or more possible courses of action.” This was for convenience sake so that Robert and I could avoid frivolous quibbling. To disassociate myself from that definition of free will, I counted it as easier to simply deny free will first and then explain, as I have done, why this does not mean men cannot actually choose or will. With all this in mind, I can proceed to Robert’s two points:

1. “God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it.”

It appears, given Robert’s distaste for what he mistakenly believed to have been the Calvinist understanding of free will/choice, he has reverted to referring to it per the definition provided in my opening statement. It makes little difference, because I already anticipated this and any other counter-factual “why” question Robert may ask when I wrote:

“…God has decreed all things to His glory. Robert can contend – but not substantiate – that a counter-factual world would more greatly manifest God’s glory.”

2. “If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible?”

As Scripture is silent as to the specifics of Satan’s fall – at least as far as Robert’s question is concerned – all I have to do to rebut his charge and defend my beliefs is present a speculatory answer which may be synthesized with Scripture in general and my belief that God predestines all things in particular. I will answer Robert in part as I did a friend who asked me how God could have predestined Satan to sin apart from direct temptation (which is a concept I totally reject in line with James 1):

//I would assume [He did so] in the same manner as He has on any other occasion, i.e. by affecting Satan's inclination in such a way that his pride became that which he most strongly desired to act upon.//

Moreover, it doesn't seem impossible that, since God created Satan and other rational creatures with a capacity to be tempted and sin, He could also have created said creatures with the necessity to sin, given certain circumstances. I speak more to myself when I write this could resurrect the “passive predestination” position I recanted some time ago. This would require further reflection and far more space than I have left, however, and I judge what I’ve already written to have sufficiently satisfied the conditions I have outlined above.

(Word count: 600)

Question 6 (Arminian): In exegeting 1 John 2:1-2, Arnold G. Fruchtenbaum states, “Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation (verse 2). The word “to propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.” By propitiation, we mean that “the wrath of God against sin has been appeased; it has been propitiated; it has been satisfied.”

He points out that the Messiah is the propitiation, not just for believers but also for unbelievers; not for ours [sins] only, but for [those of] the whole world. The Messiah is the propitiation for the world.

The Messiah is the satisfaction for sins, both for us, that is, the elect; and for the world, the non-elect. This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement; the Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect. Because He died for the sins of all men, it means that the blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Whereas propitiation affects everybody, the application of salvation is only for believers; therefore, He is the Advocate for believers only. What He is in verse 1, our Advocate, is true of believers only; what He is in verse 2, the propitiation, is true of both believers and unbelievers.

However, the emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.”

Do you agree?

Words: 10 (excluding excerpts)

Answer 6 (me): There are, in general, several points Fruchtenbaum makes with which I agree as well as several with which I disagree:

Agreement

- Not only is He our Advocate, He is also our propitiation.
- “To propitiate” means “to satisfy or to appease the wrath of God.”
- The emphasis is this: His past death as Savior of the world is the basis of His present ministry as the Advocate for believers who sin.

Disagreement

- This verse clearly teaches unlimited atonement.
- The Messiah died for the sins of all men, not just for the elect.
- The blood of the Messiah has satisfied God’s wrath against sin for all, though salvation is only applied to those who believe.

Reasons for disagreement

1. My explanation of 1 John 2:2 provided in my first rebuttal, especially the parallel demonstrated between it and John 11:51-52, has not been shown to be false. Indeed, much of John’s letters are written with the intention that it be known that Christ died for all men without distinction (Revelation 5:9). Instead, I was asked whether or not I would “find God to be love” if I were reprobate. The answer is “obviously not, as reprobates suppress the truth in unrighteousness” (Romans 1). The question is not relevant to my points and seems to beg an appeal to emotions (of reprobates, no less).

2. As I have said throughout this debate, to say Christ died “for” a person is to say Christ “intended to save” Him. What sense does it make to say that Christ, by His death and resurrection, intended to save those whose destinies were already fixed by having died in wickedness? What sense does it make to say that the Son failed to fulfill the will of the Father, given that the Father desires the salvation of all men without exception and universalism is false? What sense does it make to say that the Father’s desires or will can be resisted? No sense.

3. As Spurgeon noted, while Calvinists limit the scope (intention) of the atonement, Arminians limit its power. Both the logical consequences of point 2 and passages I have elsewhere exegeted (e.g. Romans 8:32; 2 Corinthians 5:14, cf. Romans 6:8) substantiate that the intention of Christ’s sacrificial work cannot be separated from the application of it. It is true that Jesus is not only the propitiator (Advocate) but also the propitiation. Ironically, Fruchtenbaum misses the import of what he rightly recognized as the emphasis of 1 John 2:2, for as Robert Reymond wrote:

“It is highly unlikely that Christ’s high-priestly work of sacrifice and intercession, two parts of one harmonious work, would be carried out with different objects in view—the former (the sacrifice) for all mankind, the latter (the intercession) for only some people. Since Jesus expressly declared that his intercessory work is conductednot in behalf of the world but for the elect (“I am not praying for the world,” he said, “but for those you [the Father] have given me,” and later he prayed, “My prayer is not for them alone. I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message” [John 17:9, 20; see Luke 22:31–32], that is, for God’s elect [see Rom. 8:32–34]), consistency of purpose demands that his sacrificial work would be conducted in behalf of the same group for whom he carries out his intercessory work. It is difficult to believe that Christ would refuse to intercede for a portion of those for whose sin he, by his blood, made expiation!”

(Word count: 594)