More Thoughts on Necessitarianism

Many years ago, I noted in passing that I had rethought my position on necessitarianism (link), the view that everything that happens [or is] could not have happened [or be] otherwise: the way all things are is the only way all things could have been. The catalyst for my reconsideration was wondering whether what flaws I had discovered in certain aspects of Gordon Clark's metaphysics extended to this position as well, for while Clark rejected necessitarianism earlier in his life - as seen, for example, in the following quote - he accepted it later (link):

Christian theologians have commonly pointed out that creation as a voluntary act is incompatible with Hegelian philosophy. Hegel can very sincerely say that the world depends on God or the Absolute, and to this extent he sounds like a Christian, but Hegel continues as no Christian can and adds that the Absolute conversely depends on the world. This mutual dependence is essentially pantheism. No single thing by itself, the Sun, the Moon, or John Doe, is God but the whole, not in its plurality but in its unity, is God. God and the universe are one reality. Barth’s rejection of this mutual dependence, of this reciprocity between whole and part, is clear cut: “God would be none the less God if he had not created a world and man. The world’s existence and our existence is no wise essentially necessary to God, even as the object of his love” (I, 1, 158) (Karl Barth’s Theological Method, 1997, pg. 36 – original date of publication: 1963)

[As an aside, Clark's early acceptance of ethical and perhaps even alethic voluntarism (link) - on which God's justice and truth are defined by what God indeterminatively does - are totally irreconcilable with necessitarianism].

Formerly, I could not see how necessitarianism leads to pantheism. It seemed to me that a necessitarian could relatively consistently hold that "creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not... have willed to] communicate His nature to creation" (link). That is, while a necessitated creation might share some attributes with God, it wouldn't share others (omniscience, for example) and, therefore, wouldn't be consubstantial. 

As I see it now, the question of whether theistic necessitarianism entails pantheism seems to turn on to what extent individuation is possible if all things are, as necessitarianism seemingly entails, internally related. Does necessitarianism entail monism, as Amy Karofsky argues? Gordon Clark agrees:

Now, first, the brief intellectual biography at the beginning noted that Russell early renounced Hegelianism and became an empiricist. This change started with an attack on Bradley’s, and Hegel’s, theory of internal relations and the substitution of an atomic theory of external relations. The former, holding that everything is implicated in everything, results in an absolute monism. The definition of cat, for example, is part of the definition of dog, and also of Betelgeuse. (Modern Philosophy, 2008, pg. 174)

As Karofsky puts it, "The essence of one thing contains the essence of every other" (The Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 143). If Karofsky is right, the arguments I make here would require her to be omniscient to know anything. 

Upon further reflection, though, even if she did claim to be omniscient, due to the sort of monism for which she argues, her position reduces to skepticism anyways for the simple fact that I do not claim to be omniscient. Further, if "her" mind "contains" "my" mind - if there is even a meaningful way, on such a reductionistic monism, to individuate between the two - that would suggest quite the solipsistic cognitive dissonance!

Further, if monism results from necessitarianism such that there is only one truth or essence, whence the appearance of change or plurality? Clark:

Now I don’t want to bore you by reading what you can read yourself but this is very important and it would be well to read it over several times because there have been, since Parmenides’ day, types of monism, where being is one, but I guess there has never been such an absolute monism as that of Parmenides. From this point on, those who had been monists had always tried to smuggle in a little plurality and we shall see that later on. (link)

On a Parmenidean monism, there is neither time nor change: not even a non-directional C theory. There is no distinction between contingentarians and necessitarians: they are one. There is no such thing as arguments: premises and conclusions are the same. 

Now let's compare Parmenides to Karofsky, who says that 

Although I do think that contingentarians should change their view and alter their contingentarian beliefs, I do not take that to mean that the future is open and not necessitated. The claim that one ought to change and alter their beliefs does not entail that there are two possible futures; instead, when a person changes a belief, that merely means that they held it at some earlier time and rejected it later. Change is consistent with necessitarianism; all change occurs necessarily (pg. 152)

Here is the smuggle. At least Wittgenstein acknowledged he threw away the ladder he climbed. Karofsky uses concepts of time, change, distinctions between contingentarians and necessitarians, etc. - this is not reconcilable with her claim at the end of the book, viz. "I will continue to follow Parmenides' route on which it is..." (pg. 159). And again, see here:

....given the monism that I defend, there are neither individual moments nor individual causes and events; instead, there is a singular, continuous flow of movement and change, and we merely posit “moments,” “causes,” and “events” as a way of articulating and communicating certain ways that we perceive the world to be working. (pg. 154)

Can Karofsky define define "time" without there being individual events? No. Can she define "change" or "flow of movement" consistent with Parmenides' route? No. How Karofsky seems to think of "change" is purely epistemic, a way "we" order the working of the world. But on monism, there is no "we." There is no distinction between us and the world. That is, our (i.e. Karofsky's) articulations and communications and posits are false:

I take it that necessitarianism probably does entail monism and all of the aforementioned monist theses. But it also seems to me that monism can be shown to be plausible, especially in comparison to the difficulties faced by pluralistic theories... The monist account that I have in mind seems to be similar to the ontological monism and blobjectivism that Horgan and Potrč defend. I take it that there is only one reality that is the whole universe, a universe that does not have any genuine parts. And, as I articulated in this section, I believe that there is just one true proposition that is the statement of the entire universe that is the combination of all of the statements that are true. But it also seems to me that there are simple expressions of the one statement, like: there is one reality that is the universe, X =X, and it is. Such expressions are complete and true, but they are not distinct statements; rather they are different ways of expressing the one true proposition, the truthmaker for which is the ultimate existence fact, namely the way that the one reality—the universe—is, where, the is in that claim indicates that the universe: exists, is in fact the case, is real, is such as it is, and that propositions that correspond to it are true (pgs. 139, 144) 

"One reality" "that does not have any genuine parts," "difficulties faced by pluralistic theories," and the like are the closest Karofsky comes to admitting the fully orbed nature of Parmenidean monism. But these are precisely what makes the Parmenidean "route" of "it is" entail no change. For what "flow of movement" can there be other than "from-to"? But there is not really a "genuine" distinction between "from" and "to" given the monism described above. Likewise with change: there can be no "genuine" distinction between and "earlier" or "later" time. The smuggle has been busted.

Now, even if a theistic necessitarian could avoid monism and pantheism, I've argued here that they would nevertheless be caught on the other horn of a dilemma, and a horn which still involves, as Clark mentions above, the problem of mutual dependency. If divine sufficiency is an essential distinction between the Creator and creature (Acts 17:24-25; John 5:26; 2 Corinthians 2:14-16, 3:4-6, 9:8, 12:8-10), then any position which involves mutual dependency between Creator and creation would be problematic.

This is a presuppositionalist reply to necessitarianism. Other arguments - such as those which might be found in contemporary literature - may be less well-founded. For example, I don't have much issue with Amy Karofsky's first chapter on bad arguments for contingentarianism. I agree with her "that there cannot be any empirical evidence in support of contingentarianism because there cannot be any experience of what is never-actual" (The Case For Necessitarianism, pg. 31). 

We only experience the world as it actually is, so it does not make sense to use our experience as grounds for a world that could be otherwise. That is, a posteriori knowledge cannot suffice to rule out necessitarianism, and philosophers who argue to this effect are wrong for doing so. 

Other arguments she mentions in the same chapter - those grounded in "probability," "intuition," "majority opinion," and "contingency-talk" or the way we use language - are also rather weak. I think philosophers who use these arguments tend to conflate metaphysics with epistemology, overly inflate the value of opinion, or trade on our epistemic limitations. To what extent these sorts of fallacious reasonings represent how contemporary philosophers defend contingentarianism, I don't know. Karofsky's work appears well-documented, at least. Nonetheless, I found none of the arguments presented in the entire chapter for contingentarianism to be persuasive.

I think this illustrates one way in which a presuppositionalist or foundationalist can argue a priori knowledge is foundational for a posteriori knowledge. I imagine that many empiricists or scientists would balk at the suggestion that the world could not have been otherwise. If so, however, could they provide reasonable pushback against Karofsky with purely empiricist reasoning? If they can't, might this not persuade them to re-examine their epistemic presuppositions?

There aren't too many other arguments which need addressing. Foremost would be the two mentioned at the end of this post which deal with time and immutability. These topics being so complicated in themselves (and anyone can read my posts with the "Time" tag to see that I've wrestled with this), I can only be brief: 

The "succession" and time argument - "Making God's knowledge contingent on a 'free' choice... requires a succession of ideas in His mind" - depends on Clark's definition of time and can probably be dealt with just by defining time a different way, such as "the chain of secondary effects from secondary causes." This would protect eternal generation as well as timeless divine omniscience, for example. Most debates about time seem to turn on how one defines it, and this seems as satisfying a definition as I've seen. It might still requires some nuance for cases such as justification depending on saving faith but not being temporally subsequent to it, but I don't think such a point requires pause concerning the whether the definition is felicitous.

The immutability argument - "God's knowledge could be other than it actually is also contradicts His immutability" - conflates God's being and activity (see my discussion of divine knowledge as divine activity under the Horton subsection here). God's ability to do or know otherwise does not entail that He would be otherwise. There is also the question of divine immutability within a broader scope, especially given the incarnation (link).

Divine Impassibility

I was recently asked if I had any thoughts on divine impassibility. I haven't studied the doctrine that much. Here is a quote from Clark on the subject:

Does the Bible indicate that God is subject to sudden, involuntary, non-intellectual upheavals in his usually calm state of mind? Well, hardly. The Westminster Confession, the best summary of the contents of the Bible, says that God is without parts or passions. Parts refers to bodily organs. Bodies have parts, minds do not. But God is also without passions. The word passion, in more modern terminology affection, is wider than the term emotion but includes the latter. A passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force. A dog is affected by a whipping; a student is affected, sometimes, by the possibility of a good grade. There are modern psychology books written about “the affective consciousness.” But God is not affected by anything. Of, in another translation of the Greek term, God does not “suffer” anything. 

On the contrary, not only the Westminster Confession, but all or nearly all the historic creeds says that God is immutable. He does not change. Emotion, however, is a sudden, involuntary change. To have emotions would be inconsistent with God’s eternal state of blessedness. 

Now, someone may say that God loves and that love is an emotion. But with respect to love, two points must be made. First, God’s love is eternal, therefore not a sudden change, therefore not an emotion. Second, God commands us to love him. A command requires voluntary obedience. Therefore the love God commands is volitional, not emotional. Doubtless God commands the impossible. He commands us to keep his law perfectly. This we cannot do because of sin. The impossibility arises from us; it does not arise from any irrationality in the commands. God commands the impossible, but he does not command the absurd. (Gordon Clark, Today's Evangelism: Counterfeit or Genuine?)

A few scattered thoughts:

1. Given that emotions are involuntary, I don't think emotions can be intrinsically sinful, although their presence in a particular context could serve as an indication of sin. Jesus was sinless yet, at times, angry, happy, and sad. If we suppose someone else was happy when Jesus would have been angry (with money changers) or sad (at Lazarus' death), or if we suppose someone else was angry or sad when Jesus was happy, then it would seem emotions are a kind of contextually indicative reflection of one's current state of sanctification. Either way, any argument for the impassibility of God couldn't proceed along these lines.

2. If a "passion or affection is the result of being affected by some external force," then God could not be necessarily be affected by anything external to the Trinity, for there is nothing external to the Trinity which was not created. So if divine passibility could be true, it would have to be a contingent property like divine creator-ship.

[I am assuming here that the relationships among the members of the Trinity are necessary, eternal, and, thus, not of the sort intended to be included by a doctrine of divine impassibility. The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct, eternal generation and spiration are true, and so some might be tempted to say that the members of the Trinity "affect" one another, for example - whether in respect of person or merely personhood is a matter of dispute between eastern and western Trinitarian models - but I would assume that necessary condition for passibility is change, which obviously does not take place given that the Trinity and their relationships are eternal, at least apart from consideration of a contingent creation (i.e. the ontological vs. economic Trinity)].

3. I believe creation is contingent so as to avoid, roughly, the consequence that the Trinity depends on creation in the same sense the Father depends on the Son. However, I think that most proponents of divine impassibility do not think that the fact that we can affirm contingent truths about God like "God is our creator," "God is our savior," etc. would count as a mark against divine impassibility - they may not even count as a mark against divine immutability. At the very least, those contingencies are true in virtue of God's own initiative.

Furthermore, as a Calvinist, I believe God determines all things. God initiates and determines changes, so only in a proximate sense could I say that something external to God has affected Him (not that I would say that). It may affect Him, but only insofar as God had taken the initiative in determining to create something external to Him for that express purpose. So one question is whether God created with a purpose, in part, that His creation would affect Him - change Him, in some way. It may be that God did not create with this intention and so did not determine that creation would affect Him - obviously, this would be in favor of divine impassibility.

But suppose He did create and determine all things with that intention. Another question is, given that any alleged affectation would ultimately derive from God's own initiative and determination, whether that alleged affectation can really by ascribed to something external to God, or if it is really God who is changing Himself. The latter might be the more accurate expression of the state of affairs. This could constitute an argument for divine impassibility, but it would be controversial.

Suppose I intend and determine to hit myself with a hammer and that nothing could stop me from doing so. Was the hammer instrumental to the change in pain I feel? Yes. But the hammer can has no instrumentality apart from my will. So was it the hammer that really affected me, or was it my will, or was it both? If the first or last option, that cuts against divine impassibility. If the second, that works in its favor. An answer to this could depend on the semantics and technical nuances of a particular expression of divine impassability. I'm not sure.

Of course, this all assumes the speculative point about whether God intended that creation would lead to some kind of internal change or affectation in the first place. But to my mind, the Incarnation seems to correspond to the hammer illustration: who and what I am allows me to be able to assume a hammer in my hand by which I can hurt myself. Indeed, the Incarnation is even stronger than this analogy, for whereas I cannot in fact create a hammer, the assumption of a hammer is not an assumption of a nature or capacities, and other things can prevent me from hurting myself with it, the Son in fact initiated and infallibly determined His own Incarnation and assumption of a nature or capacities precisely so as to be hurt through the crucifixion. So the questions about whether I am being really affected by the hammer, if I am affecting myself, or both would have analogous correspondents to the situation of the Incarnation.

4. Direct arguments for divine impassibility could be made from other alleged divine attributes. Divine simplicity would entail divine impassibility. Given that there would be no real distinction between impassibility and simplicity, then it is trivially true that any argument for divine simplicity would be an argument for divine impassibility. I have numerous reasons for disagreeing with divine simplicity, however, so to the extent that I agree with divine impassibility, I wouldn't look here.

Another direct argument for divine impassibility is to argue for divine immutability. Divine impassibility may not require divine immutability per point 3 above, but if God doesn't change, then obviously nothing external to Him could be said to change Him. Ultimately, what grounds our belief in something about God ought to be divine revelation, but our support can be either explicit or implicit. I'm sure others are more aware of relevant biblical passages than I am.

Currently, I am sympathetic towards divine immutability and, to that extent, sympathetic towards divine impassibility as well. I am undecided, however. Obviously, an adherent of divine immutability must consider the relevancy of the Incarnation. Unless I were to encounter incontrovertible, unambiguous biblical support for a specific theory and expression of immutability or impassibility - I may have done so and just don't remember, or I may have and just think (correctly or not) that those texts are prima facie consistent with varying positions - I would need to develop my views on the Incarnation and a theory of time before I could answer decisively.

Late Night Thoughts

Interesting late night thoughts are double-edged. On the one hand, I hate boredom, so the fact I can entertain myself is a blessing. But usually, I'm too lazy to get out of bed to write any of these thoughts down, and thinking about them usually deprives me of much needed sleep.

To give an example, I was thinking about the relation between time and the Trinity, topics I have been concentrating on for the past few months. Specifically, I was trying to think of a consistent set of theories from among what alternatives I am aware of. I don't really mean for the following to be a strict argument - more like a rare, real life anecdote. I'm in a funny mood, I guess.

"Subordination of the Son to the Father insofar as a divine nature is communicated to the former by the latter in eternal generation seems to be the best explanation for the Trinitarian issue of generic unity which avoids both tritheism and the collapsing of the persons... but if eternal generation is true, the Son is in some sense caused by the Father, so to distinguish Him from creatures it will be necessary to contrast creatures to divine persons... the most obvious way to do that would be by emphasizing the eternality of the latter... but then, since eternal generation would imply some sort of causation, the B-theory of time in which events are ordered in the direction of causation would seem to be precluded or at least in need of modification, as that would suggest the Son is not eternal... but if, on the contrary, something like William Lane Craig's time is true, while that may account for the eternality of the Son, it would mean that the thoughts of the omniscient divine persons change in accordance with irreducible tensed propositions to reflect the temporal "flow" of reality... but if the thoughts of the divine persons change, not only can't a strong view of immutability be maintained like Paul Helm would want, it would suggest a person cannot, as Gordon Clark thought, "be" what he thinks, for then the divine persons themselves would be continually changing due to their change in thoughts... so maybe Clark's metaphysic needs adjusting... or maybe immutability refers to the moral character or rational nature of the persons... ah, screw it, I'll forget all of this by morning."

Enough to keep anyone awake, huh? Good night folks.

Clark's Lectures 5

I was fortunate enough to go to New York this past weekend and obviously wanted to see the public library, but I had no idea I'd discover that they had a copy of Gordon Clark's thesis for his doctorate at UPenn. Unfortunately, it was only a fragment of it, as the rest of the pages seem either to have been torn or fallen out at some point - there were perhaps 20 of the original 50 pages. Nevertheless, what I read impressed on me how much Clark must have developed his personal philosophy over time, even though it was obvious that Clark then was an able philosopher, fluent in multiple languages and ancient philosophies. At any rate, it was a pleasant surprise to find it, and I hope others will enjoy these few points he made that I transcribed:

History, Textual Criticism, and Skepticism

The opening sentence to his thesis was as follows:

Page 5: "Save us, we pray, from those who have so entombed themselves in the dark and damp of antiquity that they no longer appreciate the light of the present day; but save us all the more from those who go blithefully on their way in utter disregard of the lessons the past can teach."

The point of his poetic remark is well-taken but, if taken strictly, is stated a little imprecisely. The past doesn't teach. Its utility lies in its capacity to occasion ideas in our minds as to what is truth. I think I have addressed this issue here, but perhaps a further comment on a statement by Clark will be helpful:

Page 10: "In the case of Aristotle we are not dependent on fragments, for we have his complete works; we are perfectly familiar with the usages of his language; the only difficulty is textual and whoever bases a skepticism in textual criticism asserts that not only nearly all philosophy, but nearly all history as well, before the Renaissance, it forever unknowable. This is a reductio ad absurdem. We can with tolerable certainty ascertain the exact working of Aristotle, but to understand his thought we need also to know the arguments and discussion of previous arguments men which were the motives to his solution. Are these unknowable? My answer would be, try and see."

I thought it was ironic that Clark should have logically followed the implications of textual criticism so closely only to derive a conclusion opposite to what should be drawn from his philosophy of Scripturalism, viz. it is indeed the case that nearly all history is unknowable, since textual criticism often presupposes an empirical methodology. This is not a reductio ad absurdem to the individual who believes that man is efficiently illumined by God, though not necessarily apart from experiential stimulation. Of course, it would be silly of me to heavily criticize a man's early writings when it is that man whose theology I consider myself occasioned to be so indebted.

The Thesis

The purpose of his thesis, Empedocles and Anaxagoras in Aristotle's De Anime, was to determine how trustworthy Aristotle was in his historical interpretation of the philosophies of his forebears', with particular attention to Aristotle's treatment of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. He was well aware that his conclusions were tentative due to the focused nature of his thesis, but he believed that similar studies would solidify his generalizations:

Page 6: "What would be necessary for the final verdict on Aristotle would be a series of such theses, treating each philosopher referred to in each of Aristotle's works. Only after such an induction could generalizations be made. But how easy it is to anticipate the generalizations without going through the induction is perhaps only too well illustrated in the following pages."

Page 7: "The firm belief in the final truth of his own system led him to examine others through Aristotelian spectacles."

Page 46: "It appears, therefore, even in the little so far covered that A. is as trustworthy as any historian can be expected to be."

It is too bad that the majority of the pages between these last two statements were missing, as it is otherwise difficult to reconcile them. Perhaps he meant that although a historian cannot be trusted as an objective, unbiased source of information, he can be relatively charitable. But at least this shows Clark seemed to recognized a distinction between incomplete and complete induction and that his work falls under the former category.

Theological Statements

As much of Clark's thesis concerned itself with finding out what Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle taught, there is less of the author's own opinion than may be desired. But this is proper, and it leaves me with only a few more interesting statements:

Page 45: "Now obviously to argue from a man's theism what his psychology ought to be is rather precarious."

I do not believe Clark would have considered this idea to be so obvious later in his life. But again, Clark was only 26 or 27 when he wrote this, so it is not strange that over the next 55+ years of his life that he would change his mind on a few of his beliefs. He apparently changed his mind on the infinitude of God as well (cf. The Incarnation, pg. 62):

Page 46: "The knowledge of an infinite mind, which is not the result of a learning process peculiar to finite minds, may be compatible with impassibility. Yet the more we insist that God is unchangeable, the less we understand how he recognizes temporal events as having happened or as about to happen."

This last statement is profoundly true, reflecting my current struggle to understand God's immutability in relation to time. As Clark changed his mind, I may very well change mine. But it is good to share a God whose truthworthiness is unchangeable.

A tentative philosophy of time

The philosophy of time is a very complex subject. I've put further study of it on hold since I started preparing for a few essay contests on Ayn Rand's philosophy, but a friend recently asked me some questions about it, and I think the following summary I provided is a good indication of where I stand.

While I'm still open to the idea that God is not timeless, the primary problem I have with it is that it seems to be incompatible with even a weak understanding of divine immutability, a doctrine I think is Scripturally supported.

If God is temporal, then an A-series theory of time - which I will explain shortly - is true, and His knowledge literally changes. For example, the proposition "x will occur" would be true until x occurs in time, after which it would be false - so God would know "x will occur" at one point in time but not another. If God's knowledge changes, God changes.

I've tried to construct an argument that God could not be omniscient unless He is timeless, but to be honest, I haven't thought of one which holds. Of course, the meaning of "omniscience" would have to be qualified if God is temporal - it would have to mean something like "knowledge of all propositions which are now true" rather than simply "knowledge of all true propositions[, each of which are unchangingly true]" - but so long as one accepts determinism, God could control under what conditions His knowledge changes.

That's one reason I didn't really like the TF article on time. Parkinson didn't discuss an A-series vs. a B-series view of time, eternal creation, the meaning of omniscience, etc. The discussion is more complicated than "if God's knowledge changes then God is not omniscient," for why couldn't it be the case that God's knowledge changes in accordance with divinely predetermined changes?

Parkinson also doesn't seem to realize omnitemporality traditionally refers to the view that God has an infinitely extended past and future, or at least that He is at all times (contrary to atemporality). He can define omnitemporality in a certain way to make it compatible with Calvinism if he likes, but to me it seems like trying to define free will similarly - it's more likely to confuse than help.

Anyways, for "now," the best argument for divine timelessness I can think of is the argument that it follows from explicit Scriptural testimony of divine immutability. There do appear to be good philosophical arguments against an A-series view of time, however (e.g. McTaggart's paradox), which could also be used as arguments for divine timelessness. I haven't studied those enough to cite them as support for divine timelessness, though.

As for a defense of divine timelessness from counter-arguments, some language used to describe God is anthropomorphic, figures of speech not literally true. This includes words such as "past," "present," "now," and "future." Temporal events are not literally related this way. The A-series view of time says they are and that there is an objective "now." A simple way of thinking about it is to say that the A-series view of time regards some language as irreducibly tensed. So, for instance, a proposition like "I am writing this post now" cannot be reduced to "I write this sentence at 10:51 pm, June 16, 2012." Both may be true, A-series theorists say, but what they each mean is different.

A B-theory view of time, on the other hand, believes events are related by means other than tensed language. Or, at least, any tensed sentence expresses a tenseless meaning (hence, tensed language is non-literal). So in place of words like "past," "present," "now," ""future," yesterday," "today," "tomorrow," "was," will," "did," "had," etc., B-series theorists substitute words like "earlier than," "simultaneous with," and "later than." These substitutes are not tensed phrases. "I write this sentence simultaneous with Jodie driving a car, you sleeping, etc." is not tensed. "I write this sentence later than my reading of your post" is not tensed. No time has a privileged status of "now" or "present" on a B-series view of time. It rather relates events in the direction of logical causation. An event is earlier than another because the earlier event causes the latter event. Events may be caused by other events without its being necessary that they could have been, at some point, modified by the word "now."

If God is timeless and omniscient, a B-series view of time must be true. Otherwise, propositions describing events would be tensed, God would have to know those propositions, and God's knowledge of tensed propositions would necessitate and A-series view of time. This would lead to divine mutability, as shown earlier, which I find problematic.

How does a B-series view of time square with creation? Paul Helm theorizes an "eternal creation." To be eternal is simply to be atemporal or timeless. What does this mean? Well, A and B-series views of time define time in terms of the tensed or tenseless relations events possess (e.g. past/present/future vs. earlier/simultaneous/later). So the point is that God does not acquire [new] relations if He is timeless. What relation[s] God has to the universe, then, must be timeless - that is, on the B-series view of time, these relations cannot be earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than any other events.

Hence, as Helm puts it, God does not will "in" time but rather "with" time; He eternally or timelessly decrees {event A at time t1, B at t2, etc.}. He does not eternally decree {to will event A at time t1, to will B at t2, etc.}. God's will is eternal - it does not occur in time. So the whole temporal order is timeless, though the events in this order are temporal because of their tenseless yet temporal relations with each other (earlier/simultaneous/later).

In my own words, I think of the whole temporal order - the entire B-series - as a set: {A, B, C...}. A is the earliest event (or events) within this order, B is the next, and so on. A causes B, B causes C, and so on. While the entire set is eternally or timelessly created - hence God stands in static relationship to it and the events of the set, none of which possesses the tensed distinction of being "the present" - the set itself is not earlier/simultaneous/later than any other event, for there is no other event to which the creation of the temporal order could stand in [temporal] relation. However, A, B, C, etc. do stand in relation to each other in such a way, which is why we can say such events occur in time. They are earlier/simultaneous/later with respect to each other.

Thus, since there is no earlier event, the creation of the temporal order (the entire B-series set of events) is eternal. The entire created order is metaphysically dependent upon God's will, however (by definition, since created), so that creation would be eternal does not empty the word of its meaning.

If anyone is finding this difficult to understand, don't feel bad. I've read Craig's Time and Eternity (which was very helpful in introducing the material and written by an A-series theorist) Helm's Eternal God, and God and Time: Four Views, and I still have a hard time keeping it straight. I would recommend reading these books. Helm's summary view presented in God and Time: Four Views is viewable on googlebooks. It seems that he updated his views in Eternal God, though (e.g. possible worlds).