Reflections on Contingentarianism and Necessitarianism

I had recently thought to finally make an effort to complete a post that has been in the draft phases for around 7 years now in which I revisited necessitarianism, a position I formerly held (example). There was already much to say on the subject even before Amy Karofsky published an interesting - if flawed - book providing a rare defense of necessitarianism (link). With that publication, I thought to use it as a foil for some reflections I've meant to publish for a while now. 

Was Augustine a Necessitarian?

One argument Karofsky makes is that Augustine was a necessitarianism: 

Augustine also believes that the future is necessitated. Combining Christianity with aspects of Plato's metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theories, he maintains that there is an ultimate, necessary basis that is a fully good and all-knowing God. Because God is omniscient, God knows what will occur in the future, and because God's intellect and will are unchanging, so, too, is the way that the world will unfold. God even knows what a person will choose to do. However, Augustine explains, such divine foreknowledge does not cause or force the person to choose in the way that they do; the person still chooses of their own will. (pg. 10) 

...it is, of course, possible to live by the theory of necessitarianism - Parmenides, the Stoics, Augustine, Spinoza, and I are all cases in point. (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 158)

In reality, to suggest Augustine believed the future is "necessitated" or was a "necessitarian" is misleading, to say the least. The simplest refutation is that Augustine argued our will is not necessitated: "We sin not by necessity but by the will" (link). 

Now, the future is indeed foreknown by God. In fact, Karofsky is correct that Augustine believes God's knowledge to be eternal (The Confessions, Book XI, link). But this does not, to Augustine, imply necessitarianism. When Evodius asks, in On the Free Choice of the Will, "How is it that future events God foreknows do not happen necessarily?" Augustine's answer is, in part, that "God foreknows all the things of which He is the author and yet is not the author of all the things He foresees. He is not the evil author of these things..." 

It may be inconsistent for Augustine to hold that God's "eternal" knowledge is [seemingly] contingent on future events like human free will - events and free will that is not necessitated - but that is indeed what it appears that Augustine believed, and nothing in The Confessions indicates otherwise.

Perhaps one might argue that the above only reflects Augustine's earlier thought. On the Free Choice of the Will was written at least a decade before The City of God, the other work by Augustine which Karofsky cites. But it turns out that Karofsky's own citation (book 5, chapter 10) is precisely what rules Augustine out as a necessitarian. Augustine writes:

Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect — as, for instance, the necessity of death — it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself — for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not — for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error — for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. (link)

Later in The City of God, a concrete example of prelapsarian Adam illustrates exactly what Augustine means by "liberty" and "free will," and his statements, such as the following, are unintelligible within the framework of Karofsky's necessitarianism: "the first freedom of will which man received when he was created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin" (link). 

How Karofsky can be aware of such a work yet classify Augustine as a necessitarian is a mystery, for this is exactly what Karofsky denies is possible to a necessitarian: "a necessitarian will reject any account that takes free will to mean that a person can sometimes choose one of (sic) more than one possible alternative beliefs... Instead, a necessitarian believes... nothing could have been otherwise" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 153).

To drive the point home, Augustine not only believed that man is - or, at least, was (prior to the first sin) free - he believed that God is free. In The Enchiridion, Augustine says, "both baptism and death, were submitted to by Him, not through a pitiable necessity, but of His own free pity for us" (link). And again, "The omnipotent God, then, whether in mercy He pities whom He will, or in judgment hardens whom He will, is never unjust in what He does, never does anything except of His own free-will, and never wills anything that He does not perform." While God's grace is necessary for our salvation, salvation itself not necessitated but is rather a "free gift."

What is "Theistic Contingentarianism"?

Karofsky defines contingentarianism as the contradictory of necessitarianism. The former (contingentarianism) is the view that "at least some thing about the universe could have been otherwise in some way or other" (A Case for Necessitarianism, pg. 1). The latter view (necessitarianism), as mentioned above, is that "nothing could have been otherwise." Insofar as many theists defend divine freedom in accepting that God could have refrained from creating, theistic contingentarianism is a species of contingentarianism. 

Christianity and Theistic Contingentarianism

What motivates theistic contingentarianism? There's probably more than one answer to this question, so I'll answer for myself one reason why I now disbelieve necessitarianism. If necessitarianism is true, creation is necessitated. What I eventually have come to conclude is that necessitarianism is incompatible with the biblical doctrine of creation and/or God. 

Christians believe in a Creator-creature distinction. Compare this to Karofsky's monism as expressed in pages 137-144. She admits that she believes, for example that "the essence of one thing contains the essence of every other." Any attempt to develop a theistic necessitarianism along such lines would be pantheistic, anti-biblical, and a non-starter for Christians.

In contrast, my own, former view argued that pantheism or monism were not entailments of theistic necessitarianism (link). However, even if my former view were true - even if a necessitated creation is not essentially divine - I now believe such would entail a denial of divine sufficiency. 

Consider what it would mean for God and creation to be ontologically distinct yet for the latter to be necessitated by the former. This would be analogous to a particular understanding of the doctrine of eternal generation - which, even if untrue, highlights the point. If the Father necessarily generates the Son, the Father and Son would be mutually dependent upon one another. Obviously, the Son would depend upon the Father, being necessitated by Him. In turn, however, the Father could be who He is ("Father") without a Son. 

So, too, a necessitated creation would mean that the Creator and creature are mutually dependent such that God cannot be who He is ("Creator") without a creation. If necessitarianism is true, then God not only needs to create to be Creator, He needs to be Creator. Creation is no longer contingent, so God as Creator isn't a contingent predicate either. Indeed, it's essential or necessary that He be Creator. There is, then, a real dependence on creation in order for one to be able to refer to God as what He essentially and necessarily must be - Creator.

The point needn't be that the Father-Son relationship is exactly the same as the Creator-creature relationship. One could maintain (as I did and do) that the Father and Son are of the same nature, whereas God and creation are not. In both cases, however, necessitation entails mutual dependency, and this is what changed my mind. 

[Side note: on a theistic-contingentarian position, God is still the Creator, but such is not essential to who He is. There is no mutual dependency, guarding divine sufficiency. On theistic-necessitarianism, on the other hand, there is no apparent reason why being "Creator" would be any less integral to the essence of God than any commonly regarded divine attribute. Indeed, perhaps this line of reasoning begins to show that Karofsky's reductive monism does follow from necessitarianism (and, hence, why Christians must disagree with Karofsky).]

In short, for a Christian, theistic-necessitarianism is caught on the horns of a dilemma: 1) a pantheistic concession (such as a theistic-Karofskyan necessitarian would make) would salvage the doctrine of divine sufficiency at the expense of the Creator-creature distinction; 2) on the other hand, a concession that there is a mutual dependency between an ontologically distinct Creator and creation would salvage the doctrine of the Creator-creature distinction at the expense of divine sufficiency. 

Thus, theistic necessitarianism is anti-biblical, and this is an obvious motivation for Christians such as myself to reject it. None of this would probably persuade Karofsky herself, but that is a separate matter.

Does Theistic Contingentarianism Fail?

While the above makes a case for why a Christian might be motivated to accept theistic contingentarianism, Karofsky argues that theistic contingentarianism in fact fails. As such, the book implicitly attacks Christianity. 

One such argument it fails is as follows:

In general, it seems that any theory that attempts to account for contingency by appeal to entities that are in some way necessary and in some way contingent will fail. Indeed, the other leading theory that posits a basis for modalities that is partly contingent and partly necessary also fails, and does so for pretty much the same reasons that dispositionalists account fail. That theory is what I will call contingentarian theism.

As I explained in the Introduction, a contingentarian-theist typically maintains that although God is a necessary being, God has free will, and, as such, God could have chosen to create a different world with different inhabitants. God's necessary nature provides for the necessity of laws, essences, and eternal truths, while God's free will provides for the contingency of the existence of the entitites in the world and some of their properties. However, there are many problems with the contingentarian theistic account of contingency, and many of those problems are similar to those that arise for dispositionalist accounts.

Both the dispositionalist and the contingentarian-theist attribute a contingent feature to an otherwise necessary basis. The dispositionalist attributes potency to the essential nature of dispositional properties and the contingentarian-theist attributes free will to the necessary nature of God. As I showed earlier, the contingent feature of dispositions not only fails to account for contingency but also prevents the dispositionalist from providing an adequate account of necessity. A similar problem arises in contingentarian theism and can be expressed as a Euthyphro-type dilemma that might go like this: When God chooses to create from among possible alternative, either God makes the choice for some reason, or God makes the choice for no reason. If God chooses to create this world for some reason (say that it is the best), that reason determines God's choice, in which case, the choice could not have been made differently, and the outcome is necessary and not contingent. However, if God chooses for no reason (God just happens to choose this world), then God's choice is arbitrary and any choice can follow, in which case anything is possible, and nothing is necessary. So, either nothing is contingent, or nothing is necessary. 

The problem is not that difficult to see. Both the dispositionalist and the contingentarian-theist recognize that a necessary basis is needed in order to have necessary natural laws and necessary eternal truths. Both also recognize that if the basis is entirely necessary, there can be no contingency. In a desire to avoid necessitarianism, they attribute some contingent feature to that basis. But then that basis is such that it could have been otherwise in at least some way, in which case it is not necessary and cannot provide an adequate basis for the necessity of certain laws and truths. In essence, one cannot have one's cake and eat it, too.

Finally, the further condition that was derived from Shalkowski's argument works to show that both dispositionalism and theistic contingentarianism fail because, according to that condition, only what is necessary can be a member of basis. (Karofsky, A Case For Necessitarianism, pgs. 76-77)

Paragraphs 1 and 2 set the context for the argument. Paragraphs 3 spells out an argument to which I intend to reply below, as it is similar to the following arguments I made when I was a necessitarian (with some differences, on which, again, see below):

Why did God decree to maximally manifest His glory? I don't see any other possible conclusion than something similar to this or what I said to my friend. In fact, to say there are multiple possible worlds is simply to say God's instantiation of this possible world was not necessary. On this supposition, can there be a reason God instantiated this possible world? Would not such a reason imply the necessity of the instantiation? If not, then is not the alleged reason an arbitrary one? (link)

I then elaborated on this argument here:

My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. (link)

And once more, I make the same essential argument here:

If I ask what the basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His nature” doesn’t suffice. For world B would also have been agreeable to His nature. The arbitrarity objection stands. (link)

To try to put the argument as forcefully as I can think to, one further way to state it is to suppose God was free to create or not create as He has. On this supposition, further suppose we say God has some reason[s] w to create this world. Reason[s] w would not necessitate the creation of this world, so conceivably, God could have refrained from creating this world for reasons x.

Now, any reason[s] y which we might posit as an explanation for why God chose reason[s] w (on which account He created this world) rather than reason[s] x (on which account He might have refrained from creating this world) would be reason[s] subject to the same point ad infinitum. 

That is, reason[s] y would not necessitate choice of reason[s] w (on which account He created this world), so conceivably, God could have had chosen reason[s] x (on which account He might have refrained from creating this world) for reason[s] z.

Reason[s] w do not explain why God did not refrain from creating this world. Reason[s] y do not explain why God did not choose reason[s] x, etc. In short, no appeal to "reasons" can serve as a full-stop explanation of why God chose to create this world rather than refrain from creating this world. On theistic contingentarianism, any attempt to work out why this world was created rather than not would generate an infinite regress. So what Karofsky argues is similar to what I too have entertained. 

So stated: should a theistic-contingentarian regard this objection as problematic?

I now argue that it is not problematic. 

Was this creation necessitated? Did God have to create at all? If divine sufficiency is true and pantheism is false, I think not. 

This does beg the question as to whether God's choice to create this world is "arbitrary." In a sense, the answer to this must be yes. In another sense, no. 

When I was a child, one of the first philosophically interesting things I read was in Animorphs: "...can you decide to do nothing? That's a decision too." (K. A. Applegate, The Message). My dad also listened to Rush quite frequently, and their following refrain in the song Freewill communicates the same point: "If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice."

That is, God either could have chosen to create - as He did - or chosen not to create. But a choice simpliciter had to be made. A choice was necessary even though one specified choice was not. Accommodating our language to the timelessness of God's eternal choice is not easy, but however one wants to phrase it, the reality of having to make a timeless choice itself was not arbitrary. 

Neither was God's choice arbitrary in the following sense - God could have had [and indeed does have] reasons for creating this world "so that the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known through the church to the rulers and the authorities in the heavenly places." One may ask for what reason He wanted to make that known. I believe the answer to all such teleological questioning is that all things exist for the glory of God. Although such reasons for His choice are no more necessitated than the choice to create itself, they are still reasons.

This departs from Karofsky: in her third paragraph, when she says that if necessitarianism were false, then "any choice can follow," "that anything is possible," or that "nothing is necessary." If I understand her correctly, I don't follow her reasoning here and disagree with her. That God, being free, is not limited to one choice does not imply "any choice can follow" in the sense, for example, of "any choice [which we could imagine]." We have epistemic limitations, as Karofsky herself acknowledges. These limitations may prevent us from understanding why some choices which we might imagine God could have made might not, in fact, "follow" or be consistent with the nature of God.

Finally, then, in what way must we admit that God's choice is "arbitrary"? God's free choice is the final, metaphysical (causal) explanation of how this world came to be. If we attempt to ask why or for what reason this world was chosen rather than not so created in the sense of seeking a deeper, more fundamental metaphysical explanation for God's choice, I don't think we find one. While it could have "pleased" God to refrain from creating this world, He was "pleased" to freely choose to create this world. He did not have to choose to create this world, and the same can be said for any "reasons" God may have had in freely choosing to create this world. Again, however, this is not a problem, for God had to choose, and He [freely] has. 

Moving on, in reply to Karofsky's fourth and fifth paragraphs on pages 76-77 of her book (cited above), God is indeed the necessary basis for the contingentarian-theist. But I don't think this statement of hers follows: "if the basis is entirely necessary, there can be no contingency." A thorough reply would require a much longer post than I intend here to provide, as it would require a full-fledged exposition of one's metaphysical views to form a complete response to Karofsky. I will, however, offer a few reflections.

Initially, I didn't understand on what grounds she thinks a necessary being would have to [timelessly] act in a way that is necessitated rather than merely in a manner consistent with the nature of said being. In a different context, she makes a similar assertion: "the divine essence includes the divine will and thus includes everything that God chooses" (pg. 12). By initial appearances, she conflates God's will with the exercise thereof. 

Additionally, given her first argument against Aquinas on page 11, I am not sure to what extent Karofsky is familiar with distinctions between God's natural and free knowledge. Her second and third arguments against Aquinas also lead me to wonder how much exposure she has to theistic replies to Euthyphro's dilemma.

An alternative explanation for pages 11-12 might be that Karofsky is only attempting to internally critique the philosophers about whom she is writing (Aquinas, Leibniz). Even if that is the case, her case against theistic contingentarianism on page 76 seemed lacking, and given that I disagreed with her exposition of Augustine, if I knew more about Aristotle and/or Leibniz, I could imagine finding myself disagreeing with her historical analysis of them too.

In general, it was my impression, then, that Karofsky's arguments against theistic contingentarianism here were laden with hidden, unsubstantiated metaphysical assumptions. I thought she might regard certain, controversial views of God - e.g. absolute divine simplicity - as standard for all Christians. 

As it turns out, she lays out the metaphysical background for her criticisms a little later on (pgs. 81-82, 92ff., 137ff.). I'll plan to address these in a separate post, but I will touch on my disagreement with them below as a precursor of further thoughts. 

Is Non-Theistic Necessitarianism Epistemically Viable?

While I might at some other time discuss Karofsky's ethical and metaphysical views in more detail, for now, I will make one criticism - a crucial one, in my mind - of Karofsky's necessitarianism. Is it epistemically viable? 

Earlier, I mentioned Karofsky's monism to be of such a nature that "the essence of one thing contains the essence of every other." Correspondingly, and in the same context, Karofsky also concedes that on her view, "the meaning of one term includes the meaning of all terms" (pg. 143).

These and other such similar statements she makes means she believes herself and fellow necessitarians to be committed to the doctrine of internal relations. This would be epistemically problematic, as Gordon Clark pointed out (before, ironically, he too changed his mind to necessitarianism - without addressing any criticisms of it that I mention in this post - cf. his book The Trinity, pgs. 111-119):

Reenactment of a thought is possible, nonetheless, because it can be separate from this immediacy without alteration. Not only so, it can be separated from other thoughts without alteration. Thus history becomes possible. 

This self-identity of the act of thought has been denied by two extreme views. The first view is that of idealism, the theory of internal relations, the notion that everything is what it is because of its context. This makes history impossible. To know any one thing it would be necessary to know its context; i.e. to know the whole universe. Knowledge would thus be restricted to the explicit consciousness of the omniscient Absolutes; and Collingwood, though he may be Beckett, does not claim to be the Absolute... 

What follows if it is true that psychological analysis presupposes a “complete knowledge of the psychological possibilities of life”? It would follow, would it not, that historical analysis also presupposes a complete knowledge of historical possibilities. In short, it would be impossible to know anything without knowing everything. 

Such a Platonic or Hegelian requirement of omniscience is a serious philosophical problem. It is not to be dismissed thoughtlessly. The meticulous scholar, J. H. Hexter, in his Reappraisals of History, castigates historical relativism as a fad and insists on the “rudimentary distinction” between knowing something and knowing everything. But he omits all philosophic justification for this distinction. 

Undoubtedly this distinction must be maintained, if a human being is able to know anything at all. Make omniscience the prerequisite of partial knowledge, and partial knowledge vanishes. But Bultmann, like Hexter, offers no help: less help, in fact, for Bultmann lets the requirements of omniscience stand. (Historiography, Secular and Religious, pgs. 225-226, 334)

Given that Karofsky admits epistemic limitations throughout her book, these and similar arguments (more of which can be read here) pose serious difficulties to her. She does not and indeed cannot know the meaning of all terms; therefore, on her own grounds, she cannot know the meaning of even one term. Her brand of necessitarianism entails epistemic skepticism. 

Thus, I think the problem of partial knowledge illustrates why a theistic contingentarian metaphysic is more defensible than Karosky's: it is more cohesive with a sound epistemology (link, link).

Trinitarianism and [Eternal] Hierarchicalism

Because I wasn't able to participate in our monthly podcast in May due to the passing of my grandmother, I recently reviewed a book called "Masculine Christianity." In the course of writing the review, I had a few thoughts on "hierarchicalism," a term I use to mean that all [earthly] societies exhibit an ordered hierarchy. These thoughts diverged from the point of the review enough that I felt a separate post on the subject was warranted. So here we are:

Whether it is in the context of the church, government, family, or work, all earthly organizations have authorities and those who submit to said authorities. Because, as I mentioned in the review, I think earthly societies image the divine society, I think there is good reason to consider some idea of eternal hierarchicalism as understandably motivated. It would make sense that the functions of the economic Trinity were rooted in the ontological Trinity, for example.

Could the Father have been sent by the Son to become incarnate? Did the Father not have authority to send His Son? Is it possible for the Son to even obey the Father? A common reply to eternal hierarchicalism is the idea that there is one Trinitarian will, which would seemingly prevent any one person from submitting to or having the capacity for authority over any other. This idea does not seem to do justice to the fact the Father sent/loves His Son (cf. John 17:24) or how the Son obeyed/loves His Father. Rather, a more plausible possibility is that the members of the Trinity have distinct wills - similar to how they must have their own, distinct minds to respectively think "I am the Father" vs "I am the Son" (and perhaps distinct minds itself entails distinct wills) - which, because they are of the same nature, will always be mutually interdependent and directed.

In the book, the author made much of chronological priority in Adam and woman's case as to why Adam was the head over woman. Is there perhaps an analogy to be made - albeit not in temporal terms, obviously - with eternal generation (in that the Father may be considered the fount of divinity)? If so, eternal hierarchalism would make the author's case in the book even stronger. Of course, I would stress that the author is correct to say that women and men are of equal value, equally image God, are equally human, and think they are equally important to that for which God commissioned them in the dominion mandate. But, as the author says, "rank" or hierarchy exists. So too, the Father and Son are equal in nature... thus, I think 1 Corinthians 15:28 and the like (John 5:19, 26) could use better argumentation as to why the authority or hierarchy implied is only an economic one (due to the incarnation) rather than an eternal one - especially since, in the 1 Corinthians passage, Paul specifically switches terminology from Christ to Son.

Nevertheless, in spite of my above reservations and thoughts, I am not as dogmatic about this as I used to be. The subject is complicated, to say the least! Before all else, I deny that the Father and Son are of different natures. After all, if we are speaking of analogies, there is a clear analogy between sonship in human terms vs. Sonship in divine terms in that our being sons of fathers doesn't mean we have different natures than our fathers. So, too, the Son and Father do not have different natures. This parallel is clear, and it is the one I think through which we should evaluate any other parallels we wish to draw (if such there be). That is, human nature and generation differs from divine nature and generation. Thus, if any other parallel we draw would logically imply that the Father and Son are not of the same nature, we should reject such parallels as being instances of disanalogies due to these differences.

While it is possible for those of the same nature to differ in terms of who is authoritative, then (for earthly fathers have authority over sons), if - and this is the big question - it turned out that eternal hierarchicalism would entail that the Father and Son have different natures (e.g. due to aseity), we must reject that the idea that a father-son relationship necessarily entails a hierarchy. One can point out that earthly fathers have authority over their earthly sons as an example of how those of the same nature can differ in rank or authority. But to parallel this to the Trinity would be wrong to do so if such would imply that the Father and Son are of different natures. The intended parallel would break down at precisely this point due to the difference in human and divine nature. Eternal hierarchicalism would be wrong.

Now, I don’t find such an entailment to be a clear implication - and if it were, I would have questions about eternal generation too - but the situation is unclear enough that I hesitate to dogmatically assert eternal hierarchalism. On the other hand, in contrast to the author of the book, I would not be dogmatic in denial of eternal hierarchicalism either. The position makes sense to me, but there are orders of belief, and this one would be subordinate to my belief in the consubstantiality of the Trinity.

Perhaps the author or others have searched the matter more deeply. If so, and to return to the question and men and women and authority, I wish the author would have explained why he thinks a difference in rank or authority implies a difference in nature between men and women, both of whom he regards as equally human but, somehow, as having different natures. After all, fathers and sons or masters and slaves or kings and citizens or elders and congregations have different authority, but they do not have different natures (presumably?). If rank or authority does not usually imply a difference in nature, why suppose that men and women must have different natures? Is it because in the other cases, the relationship is contingent (one can fail to become a father, master, king, or elder) whereas a human is necessarily either a man or woman? Crucially missing in the book was a definition of “nature,” so I can only attempt to hypothesize the author’s case so far.

Either way, care is needed when comparing the earthly father-son parallel to the Heavenly Father-Son parallel. For example, when children leave their earthly fathers and mothers to start new families, new headships and priorities are established that eclipse old ones. In fact, at some point, children begin to become responsible for the well-being of the parents in their old age. Should we press the analogy such that when the Son left His Father’s domain to come wed the church, He similarly has left the divine family to be the Head of a new one? Of course not. Nor can we regard the Father as capable of aging, etc. There are limits to parallels and analogies we can make between human and divine families, though such parallels there are.

ECFs on the Father Alone Being Autotheos

I recently posted 74 pages of quotes by 20 early church fathers affirming the doctrine that the Father alone is autotheos or God-of-Himself. You can find the entire document here. I have a few quick comments on the project itself.

Firstly, I only searched for and copied passages which mention the Father as the first cause, the ultimate cause of all things, the cause of the Son or Spirit, passages which, for instance, identify the Father being without cause with His exclusive property of being unbegotten, etc. In other words, there are many more passages I could have quoted, passages which instead speak of, say, the Father's uniqueness in terms of origination, sourcehood, or beginning, or how the Son's or Spirit's being or existence is from, of, or otherwise derived from the Father. I just found it convenient to hone my search in terms of causation.

Further, I only researched books found on http://newadvent.org/. I am aware of at least one book not on that website which contained statements which would have otherwise qualified, but I did not intend for this to be comprehensive. That wasn't the point. The point of the document is simply to show how pervasive this doctrine was in the early church.

Any edits I made in the above document were either grammatical - in changing the font and type for better readability, some errors occurred and a few have probably been missed - or because newadvent includes Scriptural quotations not found in authors' original works. People are welcome to compare my edit to the online version, there is no significant difference.

Now, I don't usually research church history, but Sean Gerety rekindled my interest after recently peddling the same embarrassing canards on facebook he did when we discussed Trinitarianism several years ago, including this one:

I find it offensive that you think we're stupid, when even a toad could tell that no Trinitarian could ever write as you have: "The Son and Spirit are not “autotheos.” FWIW I'm not going to revisit this whole sorry affair, but suffice it to say you're not a Christian. You may not like Unitarian or Arian, but you is what you is.

Sean is now free to consider Alexander of Alexandria, Athanasius, Basil, Clement of Alexandria, Cyril, Eusebius, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Hillary of Poitiers, Hippolytus, Irenaeus of Lyons, John Chrysostom, John of Damascus, Justin Martyr, Novatian, Origen, Rufinus, Tertullian, Theodoret, etc. as anti-Trinitarians and less intelligent than toads.

Behind Closed Doors

A while ago, I posted a conversation from a Clark discussion board between myself and Monty Collier on the subject of synergism and sanctification (link). This board has also been quite useful in my working out a coherent view of the Trinity and self-knowledge, among other doctrines. For example, recently, Sean Gerety directed the following post by John Robbins at myself and another member:

Folks,  

It seems that when a discussion gets underway on this list some members prefer to return to the question of whether one can now know one is saved. Then follows all sorts of confusion that would take days to sort out, probably to no one's satisfaction. So no progress is made.   

First, the issue is not skepticism. Even if a sinner cannot know (in the proper sense of the word) that he is saved -- and so far no one has shown that he can -- Scripturalism furnishes us with many truths when all other methods fail, and so skepticism is avoided.  

Second, knowledge requires explicit statements in Scripture or deductions from Scripture. It is not the same as assurance or certitude or certainty.  

Third, opinions may be true or false. (It is absurd to say that some propositions are neither true nor false.) So Jack's (a hypothetical person) opinion that he is saved may indeed be true, but no one has yet shown how he can deduce it from Scripture. Those who think he can so deduce it must show how it can be so deduced -- but don't try it here for at least a year.  

Fourth, Jack's failure is not due to any doubt about Scripture (and it is impossible to doubt a proposition one believes -- one either assents or one does not) but solely to the problem of self-knowledge. He knows the major premise, All believers are saved. He opines the minor premise, I am a believer. Therefore the conclusion, I am saved, can rise no higher than opinion. 

Finally, the question is not how does one know one knows? but how does one know? Scripturalism says, one knows only by explicit statements in or valid inferences from Scripture. 

Now, gentlemen, move on to another topic. 

My reply was short:

Sean, do you opine the canon of Scripture or know it? If the former, does that not mean your axiom and its attendant theorems could be false, in which case knowledge is impossible? If the latter, do you not agree that such would necessitate that you are regenerate due to the fact only God's sheep listen to, hear, and follow the voice of the Shepherd (1 John 4, John 8, 10)? If so, then why isn't that self-knowledge? Or if you would not agree, why not? 

Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, I never received a response to this inquiry. After three or four other members made arguments for self-knowledge from Scripture and the WCF, Sean singled out one, a person who with whom I've corresponded for years, by writing:

Mary, do you think someone who denies that Jesus Christ is the one true God and Lord, maker of heaven and earth (John 1:1-3), has any reason to believe, or if you prefer, know, they are a child of God?

Aside from the fact John 1:1-3 does not mention "the one true God," it will not escape the attention of the critical reader that Sean is changing the subject. He started a discussion on self-knowledge. When faced with several challenging objections to his skeptical position, he transitions to Trinitarianism.

Now, I have no objection to discussing Trinitarianism and have done so for months. But I've had enough conversations with Sean to recognize his bait-and-switch. Clearly, Sean's comment is irrelevant to the topic he started. For even if we suppose I am not a Christian, would this refute my argument? No. Despite our disagreements, I assume Sean considers John 8, 10, and 1 John 4 to be canonical. So if these passages teach that one who is not a sheep is not regenerate and cannot hear, follow, or listen to the voice of the Shepherd, then the argument still appears to stand. That I would not be able to know it would not be relevant to whether Sean could be able to know it.

Nevertheless, although she handled Sean deftly, Sean made a few more misrepresentations before I was able to respond. Naturally, the concern for me which this poster showed prompted me to write a summary of why I hold certain Trinitarian views, correcting Sean where appropriate:

Hi Mary. I'm not sure how much exposure you have had to several issues relevant to why I hold to the Trinitarianism of the Nicene Creed, Novatian, Alexander of Alexandria, Athanasius, and other early church fathers rather than that of Calvin, Van Til, or Clark. So before answering your questions, I thought it would be best to give a broad sketch of some of this material.   

Firstly, I think all Trinitarians would agree with a few tenets:   

1. Monotheism: there is one God. 

2. The Father is God, the Son (Jesus) is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. 

3. The Father is distinct from the Son, and both are distinct from the Spirit. 

4. The Father, Son, and Spirit each univocally though distinctly possess divine attributes: each is omniscient, eternal, good, etc. Each possesses a mind and a will. On the other hand, they are individuated or distinguished from one another by properties: for instance, only the "first person" is the Father, only the "second person" is the Son, and only the "third person" is the Spirit. They have different thoughts (e.g. "I am the Father") and make different choices with their different wills (e.g. "I, the Son, will to die"), though all of these variances are with the same purposes and ends in mind, of course. 

For the past 6 months or so, I have been attempting to reconcile point 1 with point 2. Without qualification, point 2 seems to be an indication of support for tritheism. In fact, I think Sean's position logically resolves either into my own or into tritheism. As it stands, Sean can't consistently affirm point 1, monotheism (see my concluding paragraphs). 

The solution I came to was to affirm that what the phrase "one God" means in point 1 is not the same as what "God" means in point 2. In point 2, I think the word "God" means "divine [nature]" or "deity." The Father, Son, and Spirit are each able to be called "God" because each possesses the divine attributes or divine nature. But "[one] God" has more than one meaning. Clearly, when Jesus is said to be the "Son of God," he is not the Son of a divine nature or set of divine attributes - He is the Son of a particular person, the Father. 

So one meaning of God is Father. Another meaning of God is divine. I think John 1:1-2 supports this: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with [the Father], and the Word was [divine]." The Word was not the Father, which is Sabellianism. Nor was the Word with some abstract divinity, for the Word Himself is divine.   

Now, when we examine the passages in which the New Testament which refer to the "one" God (Mark 10:18, 12:29, 1 Corinthians 8:6, Romans 3:30, Galatians 3:20, Ephesians 4:6, 1 Timothy 2:5, James 2:19) or "[only] true" God (John 3:33, 5:44, 17:3, Romans 3:4, 16:27, 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 Timothy 1:17 1 John 5:20), we find that they each refer to the Father alone. Thus, I think monotheism is true because we have one Father: "Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us? Why then are we faithless to one another, profaning the covenant of our fathers?" (Malachi 2:10). But Trinitarianism is also true because there are three distinct yet equally divine persons. And while this post is primarily about what Scripture and logic dictate - we are Protestants, after all - please note that the Nicene Creed refers to the Father as the one God, not the Trinity. 

You might wonder why the Father alone is called the one God if the Son and Spirit are really equal with Him in respect to their divinity. The reason is to be found in the different properties each possesses. The Father, Son, and Spirit are each equally divine. But only the Father is uncaused: the Son and Spirit are, respectively, eternally begotten and eternally spirated of or from the Father. It is for that reason they are subordinate to the person of the Father. It is analogous to a human relationship between a father and son: when a father begets or generates a son, that son possesses humanity. The son is no less human than is his father. But because the son derives humanity from or has humanity communicated to him from his father, he is subordinate to his father. The obvious difference between this and the Trinity is that the relationship between the Father and Son/Spirit is eternal, not temporal, and divinity is communicated rather than humanity.   

So the Son and Spirit are co-equal in respect to nature but not in respect to person[al properties]. If they were co-equal in the latter case, then there really is no reason that one person should obey the other. The relationships themselves would be arbitrary. 

I think this is a fair summary, and I am of course willing to expand on or point you to posts in which I elaborate on these arguments, so to answer your specific questions: 

"So it is a matter of semantics, then?" 

In one sense, yes, and in another sense, no. Sean seems to deny that "God" can have multiple meanings, so semantics is relevant. But these semantics have significant implications. 

"But Ryan (and I ask this with all humility), when Jesus says I am my Father are ONE---would this language not be considered the same as “one God?”" 

Define "one God." We would agree they are not the same person, right? But isn't the "one God" a person? If so, then doesn't it make more sense to say that Jesus and the Father are one in some other sense (e.g. John 17:11, 21-23)? 

With respect to what Sean says, then, he is lying when he says I deny the full divinity of the Son and Spirit. He is equivocating when he says I don't believe the Son and Spirit are co-equal with the Father. He is raising a red herring in citing Thomas' confession. The truth is, I tried for several months to get him to answer specific questions about Trinitarianism, and he has offered no reply. He says the Father, Son, and Spirit have one will. I ask if the Father willed to die or assume humanity as did the Son. No reply. He says the Son and Spirit are autotheos and aseity. I ask how then the relationships among the Trinity can be non-arbitrary. No reply. He says there is one God because there is one definition of God. I ask if there is one person because there is one definition of person. No reply. He says the Father, Son, and Spirit are inseparable. I ask how that establishes monotheism. No reply. He says I'm a Unitarian. I ask if he thinks the early church - including the primary opponent of Arius with whom my position is in full agreement - was comprised of Unitarians. No reply. [I am being polite when I say his historical understanding of the Trinity is skewed.] Etc. 

So why does he bring up the Trinity now, in a completely different context, after failing to respond for so long? Honestly, it is because he realizes he is facing another uphill struggle on yet another topic: my arguments for the necessity of self-knowledge. In my first post, I use the Socratic method to anticipate the possible responses he could have to my questions. Since the answers to these questions lead to a rejection of his denial of self-knowledge, he blatantly changes the subject, making the same misrepresentations for which I have corrected him dozens of times. He used the same bait-and-switch method when we discussed the Trinity. Will he respond to the arguments I make for the Nicene view of the Trinity in this comment? I really don't have anything else to say. Just watch and see. 

I hope your worries are calmed and that you are doing well. Thank you for your kind words.

I have said all of this on my blog at one time and in one form or another. However, seeing it in all at once puts into perspective how systematic Trinitarianism really is. As I said, the discussion board has been useful. In any case, my prediction about the substance of Sean's reply quickly came to fruition:

While Ryan calls me a liar, keep in mind that despite his attempt to paint his view as "Trinitarian," he admits he rejects any view of the Trinity that would be recognized by "Calvin, Van Til, or Clark" not to mention the Westminster Divines or any Christian church anywhere. Further, while pretending to hold to the Nicene creed (he doesn't) he completely rejects the Athanasian creed which states in part: 

"So there is One Father, not Three Fathers; one Son, not Three Sons; One Holy Ghost, not Three Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is afore or after Other, None is greater or less than Another, but the whole Three Persons are Co-eternal together, and Co-equal. So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped. He therefore that will be saved, must thus think of the Trinity."

I think you'll figure out shortly who is the liar.

Again, what had I just said in my last comment?

"Will he respond to the arguments I make for the Nicene view of the Trinity in this comment? I really don't have anything else to say. Just watch and see." 

Called it. 

Again, this is just what occurred in our discussions several months ago. I make half a dozen or so Scriptural and logical arguments for my view, and Sean passes these by, instead focusing on historical theology. Although Sean is being disingenuous in his representations of this history, even if he weren't, none of it could bind my conscience.
But this is well-trodden ground before. I ask Sean who the Nicene Creed calls the one God, the Trinity or the Father. No reply. I ask Sean whether the Creed says the Son is God of Himself (autotheos) or God of God. No reply. So who is really pretending to hold to the Nicene Creed? Look no further than the person who thinks the Trinity is the one God or that the Son [or Spirit] is autotheos: Sean. 

Does Sean explain why I should accept Calvin, Van Til, or Clark's view? No. Does he explain why I should accept the Athanasian Creed? No. Does he respond to any criticisms of their views which I have made? No. Does he interact with the works of early church fathers on whom I have commented? No... Is this all sounding too familiar? 

Now, if I cared enough, I could perhaps find support for my Trinitarian position in Reformed authors. But given that historical theology isn't conscience-binding, I really find it ridiculous for Sean, a fellow Scripturalists of all things, to use it [with less than stellar effect] as his primary rebuttal. That's a Roman Catholic method, not a Protestant one. Nevertheless, I recall several statements which support my view with which Sean cannot agree. One is given by Jonathan Edwards who, speaking of the immanent Trinity, eternally subordinates the Son and Spirit to the fount of divinity, the Father, so as to non-arbitrarily explain their economic activity: 

"Though a subordination of the Persons of the Trinity in their actings, be not from any proper natural subjection one to another, and so must be conceived of as in some respect established by mutual free agreement, whereby the Persons of the Trinity, of their own will, have as it were formed themselves into a society, for carrying on the great design of glorifying the deity and communicating its fullness, in which is established a certain economy and order of acting. Yet this agreement establishing this economy is not to be looked upon as merely arbitrary, founded on nothing but the mere pleasure of the members of this society, not merely a determination and constitution of wisdom come into from a view to certain ends which it is very convenient for the obtaining. But there is a natural decency or fitness in that order and economy that is established. It is fit that the order of the acting of the Persons of the Trinity should be agreeable to the order of their subsisting. That as the Father is first in the order of subsisting, so he should be first in the order of acting. That as the other two Persons are from the Father in their subsistence, and as to their subsistence naturally originated from him and are dependent on him, so that in all that they act they should originate from him, act from him and in a dependence on him. That as the Father with respect to the subsistences is the fountain of the deity, wholly and entirely so, so he should be the fountain in all the acts of the deity. This is fit and decent in itself. Though it is not proper to say, decency obliges the Persons of the Trinity to come into this order and economy. yet it may be said that decency requires it, and that therefore the Persons of the Trinity all consent to this order, and establish it by agreement, as they all naturally delight in what is in itself fit, suitable and beautiful." 

http://www.apuritansmind.com/puritan-favorites/jonathan-edwards/miscellaneous-writings/the-trinity/ 

Finally, it seems Sean is a little huffy that I call him a liar. Sean, you don't get kid gloves any more. You don't get the benefit of the doubt. I've bent over backwards to explain my view to you dozens of times, and if you still don't see fit to correctly represent it, I have no problem calling you out. If you want to use this as your excuse to exit this conversation - an exit which, I suspect, was and is forthcoming in any case - that doesn't bother me. My responses to you are no longer to convince you but to prevent you from doing spiritual and intellectual harm to others. Your allegiance to Clark is taking precedence to Scripture, whether you realize it or not. 

This particular discussion really is a microcosm of our months of discussion. Sean picks a topic. I respond. Sean switches topics. I point this out but respond anyway. This continues for a while, then Sean waits a few weeks and starts the process all over again. It's one charade after another. The difference is, I expect it now. It is perhaps for this reason that the conversation took a rather nasty turn after my last comment above. In my last blog post, I pointed out Sean's hypocrisy in moralizing on his blog while making backhanded remarks behind closed doors. As a close to this post, I hope readers will remember the following as just one more evidence of this (Sean's comments are indented, my replies are not):

You're losing it Ryan. Now you're threatening me? Do you really think I'm afraid of you? Like I've said before you are a very arrogant young man. A theologically blind one too. More concerning is that you sound like someone on the verge of a nervous breakdown. That's no joke. I don't think you're well. I mean, you're arguments to Patrick were so bizarre (I hope to blog on it soon) that I really started to fear for your mental health.  

My advice to you is get off the Internet for a couple of months and devote your time to studying the Scripture and prayer. Good advice for anyone really. In your case I would recommend mediating specifically on those passages of Scripture that affirm the equality of the Son to the Father. Maybe then with doubting Thomas you may one day call upon Jesus Christ as your Lord and God too. 

And, you're right, we really don't want people with an allegiance to Clark on a Clark list. 8-P 

Supposed threats and my mental health... well, at least these are new. But they are even less worthy of a response than your arguments, if that is possible.

I am serious Ryan. I don't think you're well.

I guess when all else fails, one is left with questioning his opponent's sanity to justify ignoring his arguments. 

The Early Church, Trinitarianism, and the Subordination of the Son II

[This will be the second of a series of posts on the Trinitarian views of the early church fathers, particularly focused on the way in which they view the relationship between the Father and Son. For the first, see here.] 

Novatian was a third century early church father whose impressive intellectual capacities facilitated his near rise to the office of the bishop of Rome. Eusebius even records that his opponent Cornelius, who eventually secured the episcopate, admitted he was “remarkable” and “illustrious man,” a “defender of the doctrine of the Church,” though he clearly thought little of his moral character (link). While Jerome notes some of his letters which have apparently not survived, he particularly mentions that his work On the Trinity was “a great volume” and “a sort of epitome of the work of Tertullian” (link), a second century early church father credited as having coined the word “Trinity.” It is to this work (link) I now turn.

In his first eight chapters, Novatian uses Scripture to carefully and with appreciable nuance defend the doctrines of man as image of God, creation, and divine simplicity, timelessness, immutability, incomprehensibility, immanence, providence, accommodation, and perfection. On the whole, he is remarkably efficient. Noteworthy exegetical conclusions include that Isaiah 45:22 and Mark 10:18 both apply to the Father and that the “I AM” statements indicate divine immutability. These eight chapters each refer to the Father, after which he begins chapter 9 by writing:

The same rule of truth teaches us to believe, after the Father, also on the Son of God, Christ Jesus, the Lord our God, but the Son of God—of that God who is both one and alone, to wit the Founder of all things, as already has been expressed above. For this Jesus Christ, I will once more say, the Son of this God, we read of as having been promised in the Old Testament, and we observe to be manifested in the New, fulfilling the shadows and figures of all the sacraments, with the presence of the truth embodied. For as well the ancient prophecies as the Gospels testify Him to be the son of Abraham and the son of David.  

He then lists many passages in the Old Testament which anticipate Christ and follows in chapter 10 with a refutation of Docetism. Here, it is sufficient to note that he is clear in his affirmation that the Father is “God who is both one and alone.” This is not to exclude divinity from Christ, as he proceeds to extensively demonstrate from Scripture in chapters 11-22, but from this prelude to his discussion of the Trinity there can already be seen an indication that the Father is God in a peculiar sense. Indeed, in chapter 16, Christ’s relationship with “the one true God” who sent Him – the Father – is why He too is able “to be understood to be God”:

We must not then lean to one side and evade the other side, because any one who should exclude one portion of the truth will never hold the perfect truth. For Scripture as much announces Christ as also God, as it announces God Himself as man. It has as much described Jesus Christ to be man, as moreover it has also described Christ the Lord to be God. Because it does not set forth Him to be the Son of God only, but also the Son of man; nor does it only say, the Son of man, but it has also been accustomed to speak of Him as the Son of God. So that being of both, He is both, lest if He should be one only, He could not be the other. For as nature itself has prescribed that he must be believed to be a man who is of man, so the same nature prescribes also that He must be believed to be God who is of God; but if he should not also be God when he is of God, no more should he be man although he should be of man. And thus both doctrines would be endangered in one and the other way, by one being convicted to have lost belief in the other. Let them, therefore, who read that Jesus Christ the Son of man is man, read also that this same Jesus is called also God and the Son of God.

Just as the reason Jesus is man is that He is by nature of man, so also the reason Jesus is God is that He is by nature of God. He is able to be called man and God because He is by nature the Son of Man and Son of God. He repeats this argument in chapter 21 when he says: “Christ is proved to be not man only, because He was the son of man, but also God, because He is the Son of God?” Thus, He is no more God-of-Himself than He is man-of-Himself. And in chapter 18, in addition to adducing yet another proof of the divinity of Christ, Novatian argues “He is of God, is rightly called God, because He is the Son of God.” In context, he also touches on the subordination of the Son to His Father:

What in the world is the reason that we should hesitate to call Him God, who in so many ways is acknowledged to be proved God? And if, moreover, the angel meets with Hagar, Sarah's maid, driven from her home as well as turned away, near the fountain of water in the way to Shur; asks and learns the reason of her flight, and after that offers her advice that she should humble herself; and, moreover, gives her the hope of the name of mother, and pledges and promises that from her womb there should be a numerous seed, and that she should have Ishmael to be born from her; and with other things unfolds the place of his habitation, and describes his mode of life; yet Scripture sets forth this angel as both Lord and God— for He would not have promised the blessing of seed unless the angel had also been God. Let them ask what the heretics can make of this present passage. Was that the Father that was seen by Hagar or not? For He is declared to be God. But far be it from us to call God the Father an angel, lest He should be subordinate to another whose angel He would be. But they will say that it was an angel. How then shall He be God if He was an angel? Since this name is nowhere conceded to angels, except that on either side the truth compels us into this opinion, that we ought to understand it to have been God the Son, who, because He is of God, is rightly called God, because He is the Son of God. But, because He is subjected to the Father, and the Announcer of the Father's will, He is declared to be the Angel of Great Counsel. Therefore, although this passage neither is suited to the person of the Father, lest He should be called an angel, nor to the person of an angel, lest he should be called God; yet it is suited to the person of Christ that He should be both God because He is the Son of God, and should be an angel because He is the Announcer of the Father's mind. And the heretics ought to understand that they are setting themselves against the Scriptures, in that, while they say that they believe Christ to have been also an angel, they are unwilling to declare Him to have been also God, when they read in the Old Testament that He often came to visit the human race. To this, moreover, Moses added the instance of God seen of Abraham at the oak of Mature, when he was sitting at the opening of his tent at noon-day. And nevertheless, although he had beheld three men, note that he called one of them Lord; and when he had washed their feet, he offers them bread baked on the ashes, with butter and abundance of milk itself, and urges them that, being detained as guests, they should eat. And after I this he hears also that he should be a father, and learns that Sarah his wife should bring forth a son by him; and acknowledges concerning the destruction of the people of Sodom, what they deserve to suffer; and learns that God had come down on account of the cry of Sodom. In which place, if they will have it that the Father was seen at that time to have been received with hospitality in company with two angels, the heretics have believed the Father to be visible. But if an angel, although of the three angels one is called Lord, why, although it is not usual, is an angel called God? Unless because, in order that His proper invisibility may be restored to the Father, and the proper inferiority be remitted to the angel, it was only God the Son, who also is God, who was seen by Abraham, and was believed to have been received with hospitality.

A messenger is subordinate to the one on whose behalf he relates a message. As Christ is the angel, He is subordinate to the Father or subject to His will. Now, it is true that this is related to economic activity, but the reason he is fit for this office has to do with the relations in the immanent Trinity. The Son is suited to the position in question because He is God’s Son, properly inferior in person though not in nature. The footnote to this reference to the Son’s “proper inferiority” in Volume 5 of The Ante-Nicene Fathers appropriately says: “The Nicene doctrine includes the subordination of the Son.” The subordination of the Son is no more economic than the invisibility of the Father who the Son images. And in chapter 22, Novatian uses Philippians 2 to note He is not only the image of God but also the form of God:

If Christ had been only man, He would have been spoken of as in the image of God, not in the form of God. For we know that man was made after the image or likeness, not after the form, of God. Who then is that angel who, as we have said, was made in the form of God? But neither do we read of the form of God in angels, except because this one is chief and royal above all — the Son of God, the Word of God, the imitator of all His Father's works, in that He Himself works even as His Father. He is — as we have declared — in the form of God the Father. And He is reasonably affirmed to be in the form of God, in that He Himself, being above all things, and having the divine power over every creature, is also God after the example of the Father. Yet He obtained, this from His own Father, that He should be both God of all and should be Lord, and be begotten and made known from Himself as God in the form of God the Father. He then, although He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery that He should be equal with God. For although He remembered that He was God from God the Father, He never either compared or associated Himself with God the Father, mindful that He was from His Father, and that He possessed that very thing that He is, because the Father had given it Him. Thence, finally, both before the assumption of the flesh, and moreover after the assumption of the body, besides, after the resurrection itself, He yielded all obedience to the Father, and still yields it as ever. Whence it is proved that He thought that the claim of a certain divinity would be robbery, to wit, that of equalling Himself with God the Father; but, on the other hand, obedient and subject to all His rule and will, He even was contented to take on Him the form of a servant — that is, to become man; and the substance of flesh and body which, as it came to Him from the bondage of His forefathers' sins according to His manhood, He undertook by being born, at which time moreover He emptied Himself, in that He did not refuse to take upon Him the frailty incident to humanity.

The Son did not grasp at the “claim of a certain divinity” – that is, that which is proper to the Father alone – because such would have been a robbery. Rather, the Son was always “mindful that He was from His Father, and that He possessed that very thing that He is, because the Father had given it Him.” Accordingly, He is neither autotheos nor aseity.

In chapters 23-28, Novatian concerns himself with refuting heretics on opposite extremes: those who think these Scriptures prove the Son is the Father, those who think the Son is not human, and those who think the Son is not God. In chapter 26, he again emphasizes the obedience, subjection, and derivation of the eternally begotten Son to and from the Father:

And I should have enough to do were I to endeavour to gather together all the passages whatever on this side; since the divine Scripture, not so much of the Old as also of the New Testament, everywhere shows Him to be born of the Father, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made, who always has obeyed and obeys the Father; that He always has power over all things, but as delivered, as granted, as by the Father Himself permitted to Him. And what can be so evident proof that this is not the Father, but the Son; as that He is set forth as being obedient to God the Father, unless, if He be believed to be the Father, Christ may be said to be subjected to another God the Father?

He makes very similar points in the next chapter:

He is therefore the Son, not the Father: for He would have confessed that He was the Father had He considered Himself to be the Father; and He declares that He was sanctified by His Father. In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is inferior to the Father. Now, consequently, He who is inferior to the Father, is not the Father, but the Son; for had He been the Father, He would have given, and not received, sanctification. Now, however, by declaring that He has received sanctification from the Father, by the very fact of proving Himself to be less than the Father, by receiving from Him sanctification, He has shown that He is the Son, and not the Father. Besides, He says that He is sent: so that by that obedience wherewith the Lord Christ came, being sent, He might be proved to be not the Father, but the Son, who assuredly would have sent had He been the Father; but being sent, He was not the Father, lest the Father should be proved, in being sent, to be subjected to another God.

It is evident Novatian considered that the economic and immanent Trinity are related, for the Father cannot be sent by the Son, nor can the Father be sanctified by the Son. The Son obeys, is less than, and is inferior to the Father. But again, this is strictly a comparison of the relations between persons, not of the natures of the persons. After a brief chapter on the Holy Spirit, Novatian fittingly concludes his treatise by considering how monotheism can be true if in Scripture both the Father and Son are called God. After citing numerous Scriptures demonstrating this to be the case, he concludes chapter 30 with several useful analogies to put heretics on the defensive:

And in the first place, we must turn the attack against them who undertake to make against us the charge of saying that there are two Gods. It is written, and they cannot deny it, that there is one Lord. What, then, do they think of Christ? — that He is Lord, or that He is not Lord at all? But they do not doubt absolutely that He is Lord; therefore, if their reasoning be true, here are already two Lords. How, then, is it true according to the Scriptures, there is one Lord? And Christ is called the one Master. Nevertheless we read that the Apostle Paul also is a master. Then, according to this, our Master is not one, for from these things we conclude that there are two masters. How, then, according to the Scriptures, is one our Master, even Christ? In the Scriptures there is one called good, even God; but in the same Scriptures Christ is also asserted to be good. There is not, then, if they rightly conclude, one good, but even two good. How, then, according to the scriptural faith, is there said to be only one good? But if they do not think that it can by any means interfere with the truth that there is one Lord, that Christ also is Lord, nor with the truth that one is our Master, that Paul also is our master, or with the truth that one is good, that Christ also is called good; on the same reasoning, let them understand that, from the fact that God is one, no obstruction arises to the truth that Christ also is declared to be God.

There is said to be one God, one Lord, one Master, and only one who is good, and yet in other places, other persons are also said to be God, Lord, master, and good. So even if there were a problem for monotheists, these other examples would pose a problem for Sabellians, tritheists, and other heretics too which, if they were to solve those cases, would solve the case for monotheists. The final chapter contains Novatian’s own solution, reproduced here in full:

Thus God the Father, the Founder and Creator of all things, who only knows no beginning, invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, is one God; to whose greatness, or majesty, or power, I would not say nothing can be preferred, but nothing can be compared; of whom, when He willed it, the Son, the Word, was born, who is not received in the sound of the stricken air, or in the tone of voice forced from the lungs, but is acknowledged in the substance of the power put forth by God, the mysteries of whose sacred and divine nativity neither an apostle has learned, nor prophet has discovered, nor angel has known, nor creature has apprehended. To the Son alone they are known, who has known the secrets of the Father. He then, since He was begotten of the Father, is always in the Father. And I thus say always, that I may show Him not to be unborn, but born. But He who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be assigned to Him who is before all time. And He is always in the Father, unless the Father be not always Father, only that the Father also precedes Him — in a certain sense — since it is necessary — in some degree — that He should be before He is Father. Because it is essential that He who knows no beginning must go before Him who has a beginning; even as He is the less as knowing that He is in Him, having an origin because He is born, and of like nature with the Father in some measure by His nativity, although He has a beginning in that He is born, inasmuch as He is born of that Father who alone has no beginning. He, then, when the Father willed it, proceeded from the Father, and He who was in the Father came forth from the Father; and He who was in the Father because He was of the Father, was subsequently with the Father, because He came forth from the Father — that is to say, that divine substance whose name is the Word, whereby all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. For all things are after Him, because they are by Him. And reasonably, He is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made. Assuredly God proceeding from God, causing a person second to the Father as being the Son, but not taking from the Father that characteristic that He is one God. For if He had not been born — compared with Him who was unborn, an equality being manifested in both — He would make two unborn beings, and thus would make two Gods. If He had not been begotten — compared with Him who was not begotten, and as being found equal — they not being begotten, would have reasonably given two Gods, and thus Christ would have been the cause of two Gods. Had He been formed without beginning as the Father, and He Himself the beginning of all things as is the Father, this would have made two beginnings, and consequently would have shown to us two Gods also. Or if He also were not the Son, but the Father begetting from Himself another Son, reasonably, as compared with the Father, and designated as great as He, He would have caused two Fathers, and thus also He would have proved the existence of two Gods. Had He been invisible, as compared with the Invisible, and declared equal, He would have shown forth two Invisibles, and thus also He would have proved them to be two Gods. If incomprehensible, if also whatever other attributes belong to the Father, reasonably we say, He would have given rise to the allegation of two Gods, as these people feign. But now, whatever He is, He is not of Himself, because He is not unborn; but He is of the Father, because He is begotten, whether as being the Word, whether as being the Power, or as being the Wisdom, or as being the Light, or as being the Son; and whatever of these He is, in that He is not from any other source, as we have already said before, than from the Father, owing His origin to His Father, He could not make a disagreement in the divinity by the number of two Gods, since He gathered His beginning by being born of Him who is one God. In which kind, being both as well only-begotten as first-begotten of Him who has no beginning, He is the only one, of all things both Source and Head. And therefore He declared that God is one, in that He proved Him to be from no source nor beginning, but rather the beginning and source of all things. Moreover, the Son does nothing of His own will, nor does anything of His own determination; nor does He come from Himself, but obeys all His Father's commands and precepts; so that, although birth proves Him to be a Son, yet obedience even to death declares Him the minister of the will of His Father, of whom He is. Thus making Himself obedient to His Father in all things, although He also is God, yet He shows the one God the Father by His obedience, from whom also He drew His beginning. And thus He could not make two Gods, because He did not make two beginnings, seeing that from Him who has no beginning He received the source of His nativity before all time. For since that is the beginning to other creatures which is unborn — which God the Father only is, being beyond a beginning of whom He is who was born — while He who is born of Him reasonably comes from Him who has no beginning, proving that to be the beginning from which He Himself is, even although He is God who is born, yet He shows Him to be one God whom He who was born proved to be without a beginning. He therefore is God, but begotten for this special result, that He should be God. He is also the Lord, but born for this very purpose of the Father, that He might be Lord. He is also an Angel, but He was destined of the Father as an Angel to announce the Great Counsel of God. And His divinity is thus declared, that it may not appear by any dissonance or inequality of divinity to have caused two Gods. For all things being subjected to Him as the Son by the Father, while He Himself, with those things which are subjected to Him, is subjected to His Father, He is indeed proved to be Son of His Father; but He is found to be both Lord and God of all else. Whence, while all things put under Him are delivered to Him who is God, and all things are subjected to Him, the Son refers all that He has received to the Father, remits again to the Father the whole authority of His divinity. The true and eternal Father is manifested as the one God, from whom alone this power of divinity is sent forth, and also given and directed upon the Son, and is again returned by the communion of substance to the Father. God indeed is shown as the Son, to whom the divinity is beheld to be given and extended. And still, nevertheless, the Father is proved to be one God; while by degrees in reciprocal transfer that majesty and divinity are again returned and reflected as sent by the Son Himself to the Father, who had given them; so that reasonably God the Father is God of all, and the source also of His Son Himself whom He begot as Lord. Moreover, the Son is God of all else, because God the Father put before all Him whom He begot. Thus the Mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus, having the power of every creature subjected to Him by His own Father, inasmuch as He is God; with every creature subdued to Him, found at one with His Father God, has, by abiding in that condition that He moreover was heard, briefly proved God His Father to be one and only and true God.

It’s difficult to summarize what is quite an articulate summary in itself, much more in a writer who was without much historic precedent for the doctrine. But to summarize anyway, Scripture manifests the Father to be the “one and only and true God” for the following reasons: the Father is the sole individual without a beginning in either a logical or chronological sense. He is the source of the Son who is immanently subject or subordinate to Him; that is, the Father has given the Son all He is and has, including divinity - the Son is from the Father, not from Himself. Therefore, He does nothing of His own will or determination but rather obeys the will, commands, and precepts of His Father. That which the Son is and does redounds to the Father whose majesty, greatness, and power is incomparable. Thus: “God proceeding from God, causing a person second to the Father as being the Son, but not taking from the Father that characteristic that He is one God.” And though He does not receive His Fathers’ properties of invisibility, beginning, etc., yet the Son is God, for He is eternally in and with His Father as the divine and begotten Son. He is logically caused, not chronologically, and in all this Novatian anticipates the arguments of Arius and his followers.

Is Novatian correct in all aspects? Undoubtedly not. And what questionable language he used must be understood in its original context, not read into from our own. But his Trinitarian peers recognized this to certainly be a first-class treatise of the time, and even now Novatian’s understanding far surpasses that of most Christians. Can it be imagined that so ardent an admirer of the man who was the first to call the “Trinity” by name and so remarkable an expositor of Scripture was really a closet Unitarian? If not, then who can deny that Trinitarianism is perfectly compatible with the subordination of the Son and monarchy of the Father in the immanent Trinity?

Necessitarianism

This is the first time in a long time I don’t feel as though I have writer’s block. I have had no shortage of topics on my mind, and as if I didn't have enough to blog about, Drake Shelton has written a response to an excursion I wrote on what Gordon Clark called necessitarianism, which he accepted by the time he wrote The Trinity after having previously rejected it. Even as Trinitarianism has become clearer to me in the past several months – thanks in part to Drake – this remains one fundamental issue on which I have been unable to agree with him. This is what I wrote that Drake is responding to in his post:

Finding Scriptures which deal with this issue will require consideration of logical implications, for to my knowledge there is no explicit passage which addresses it. My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. There are, however, several objections to my own position – some made by Clarke and others I have received from those who are in most other respects in agreement with my Trinitarian views – so I will try to address them in a short amount of space.

Clarke thinks the idea that something can be willed necessarily is a contradiction in terms. Thus, he, Athanasius, and others dichotomize that which is willed from that which is a “necessity of nature.” But I do not find his reasons for saying so persuasive: he mentions that I might as well say that a man’s heart beats by his will, the sun rises by man’s will, and a balance which turns necessarily turns by its will. These are just examples of what a proof by example fallacy looks like. What Clarke rather ought to have done is define what it means “to will” or “to choose” or “to act.” As a Calvinist, I don’t have any problem with a definition of these terms which excludes the notion of freedom of contrariety – the ability to have willed, chosen, or acted differently than one did. In fact, freedom of contrariety itself presupposes a definition of willing, choosing, and acting. I would define these words in terms of the mind’s volitional selection, determination, or performance.

Where the line is between providing mere synonyms and providing a clear metaphysical definition can be challenging, but in any case, I am in no worse a position than Clarke, who must also define these terms. Until he does, the burden of proof is on him to explain why necessity is mutually exclusive with will. Anyway, I don’t suppose Sean will have any issue with my explanation, as this is entirely consistent with Gordon Clark’s view 1) that God’s existence is necessary yet by His eternal will and choice, and 2) that the generation of the Son is voluntary and necessary like creation (see his chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity).

This last remark brings me to the objection from the other side to my position, viz. my thinking creation is necessary as well as the Son and Spirit. Whereas Sean thinks I bring the Son and Spirit down to the level of creation by making the them contingent – a counter which backfires, as [I would hope] Sean would not say the person[al property] of the Son is created even though he holds that the person[al property] of the Son is contingent – the objection here is that I raise the creation to the level of divinity (see here and here for examples).

Now, I admit I have perhaps missed some solution which would resolve the tension between an unnecessary creation and a seemingly arbitrary God, but if so, I have not encountered it. It seems easier for me to explain why a necessary creation is not divine than it is to explain why an unnecessary creation is not arbitrary. As I understand it, the reason there is an objection to the idea that who the Father is determines everything He wills is that such means the Son, Spirit and creation all originate from the Father in the same way. I suspect the argument is that since “like causes like,” one whose nature is divine must, if He acts according to a “necessity of nature,” cause another with a divine nature.

But I do not see why this needs to be the case. The nature or person of the Father may determine His causation of this possible world as well as the Son and Spirit, but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not on my view have willed to] communicate His nature to creation. Thinking about this question recently, I found myself asking: is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them? If the latter is possible, then is this not a reasonable answer as to why the necessity of creation would not imply consubstantiality with its Creator?

Drake responds:

We have already discussed this. Your use of “unnecessary” is ambiguous. You could mean a necessity of God’s nature or of a necessity extending from the eternality of his will. (link). I think you are still stuck in the dialectic between a necessity of nature and an arbitrarity.

That is, he wants to know, when I speak of “multiple possible worlds” or of the “necessity” of creation, whether I am speaking with reference to what is possible and necessary to God according to His nature or possible and necessary to God according to His will. On Drake's view, that which is necessary according to God’s nature is also necessary according to His will. But that which God wills is not necessarily necessary according to His nature, though there may be some other meaning according to which it may be called necessary, a point I will turn to momentarily. To answer, though, I was questioning whether there are other possible worlds that God could have instantiated according to His nature or if this actual world is the only possible world and, thus, necessary for Him to will as well.

Now, in our last discussion, Drake agreed that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” But, as I just mentioned, he also said he doesn’t think that God’s nature determines everything He wills. His nature prescribes the boundaries of what can be willed in all cases, but it does not determine what must be willed in all cases. In that case, the argument I outline in the above paragraphs is little different than what it was then:

The divine will is atemporal. We agree. It’s logically contingent on the divine nature. We agree. The only problem, as I see it, is that on your position, no answer can be given as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another “world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. There must be some other “world” agreeable to the divine nature on your view, or else this world would have been necessary, a point to which you strenuously object. I believe last time we established that another such “world” would have been one in which God didn’t create. That would be, you said, consistent with the divine nature. Then again, I pointed out it would be mutually exclusive with this “world” because only in the latter is it true that “God created.”

Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that isn’t relevant because you’ve already agreed that it’s nevertheless logically contingent on the divine nature, a divine nature which, since it doesn’t “direct and regulate” which of the two (or more) “worlds” which are agreeable to it are to be instantiated by the logically contingent divine will, there can never be any answer as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” over against the other which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.

Drake replied that “The will is eternal which makes the question meaningless.” I strongly disagree. My argument is effective as long as God’s will is logically contingent on His nature. This is exactly what Drake admits when he says that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” True, there is no chronological or temporal lapse between that which is possible for God to effect by His nature and that which He eternally chooses to effect; there is, however, a logical priority. Because there is such a priority, the question is begged as to why, if God could have instantiated some other world or reality agreeable to His nature, He rather willed to instantiate this one. What was His reason? Drake replies:

The word “reason” can be replaced by the word “basis” and as we have discussed many times there are two of those in God: nature and will. So yes you could ask what was the basis of his eternal will, and I would respond, the agreeability of his nature.

I am afraid the point has been missed. If I ask what the basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His nature” doesn’t suffice. For world B would also have been agreeable to His nature. The arbitrarity objection stands.

Drake does mention that there are two “reasons” or “bases” in God, but He doesn’t elaborate as to what that means. What does it mean for God to have a reason according to His nature, how is it distinguished from His having a reason according to His will, and in what way does his answers to these questions solve the problem of seeming arbitrariness (i.e. God’s choosing of world A which is no more or less agreeable to His nature than world B would have been)? Drake continues:

You think that necessities are only necessities of nature. I have affirmed that a necessity can also extend from the eternality of God’s will and thus openly deny that creation is arbitrary, thus denying any other possible world, while also denying that it is a necessity of divine nature.

Firstly, I have to wonder what was the point of the previous questions designed to determine whether I was speaking of necessity “according to nature” or necessity “according to will” when it is apparent he already knew I was speaking about the former.

More importantly, how is the will of God necessary if it is not necessitated by His nature? It would seem more precise to say that the will of God necessitates, not that it is itself necessarily necessitated. This is very important, because my objection pertains to the latter, not the former. God’s will may be some times be necessitated – such as in the communication of divinity to the Son and Spirit – but it is not always necessitated.  But my argument is that the fact that the will is not always necessitated is why it is sometimes arbitrary. The fact that it necessitates whatsoever is willed is irrelevant.

As a side point of clarification, the points regarding man’s heartbeat, the sunrise, and the turn of a balance were related to Samuel Clarke’s argument that what is necessary is mutually exclusive with what is willed. I had quoted his argument earlier in my article, which was why I mentioned it then. Drake does not believe the two are mutually exclusive, so there is no reason to further pursue this particular line of dialogue.

So much for the responses to my criticisms. Now Drake offers a few criticisms of his own. Firstly, he thinks that my assertion that there are not multiple possible worlds agreeable to God’s nature implies “a conflation of activity, essence and existence. This is ADS.” But this is not an argument. The Father possesses distinct attributes whether or not creation is necessary according to His nature, and these divine attributes, while they determine His activity, are distinct from it. A definition of “existence” will need to be provided before I can reply further.

In response to my question, “is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them?” Drake replies:

The former. The emanation is the basis of the communication, in the genus of relation. The latter makes the emanation arbitrary and ad hoc. WE may have here encountered the Hegelian Dialectic. In order to avoid an arbitrary God, you are forced to have an arbitrary God.

I don't particularly like the language of emanation, though I understand what he means: it is the genus of which spiration and begetting are species. Regardless, why does Drake think that “the Son and Spirit [are] said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them” suggests arbitrarity? I stated the existences of the Son and Spirit are necessary in any case, so if everything God wills is to maximize the manifestation of His glory, and the Father has communicated divinity (and individuating properties) to two other subjects, the logical conclusion is that this communication is willed for His glory, which is clearly not ad hoc. There are too many unexplained gaps for me to be expected to follow these arguments.

His last argument, stated here, explains why he thinks that it is necessary to maintain that creation is not necessary according to God’s nature, and this, unless I am mistaken, is supposed to show why that which is derived by a necessity of nature is that to which the divine nature is communicated. Essentially, the argument is that if creation is necessary according to God’s nature, such makes God’s nature dependent on creation, which is pagan.

But dependent in what sense? In my article on Clarke, Drake made the point – with which I agree – that the property of Fatherhood logically depends on the Son. The Father cannot be the Father unless there is a Son, which is no problem since the Son has always existed. But this isn’t pagan, is it? The Son metaphysically depends on the Father, yet the Father too in some sense depends on the Son. If no deficiency in the Father is implied in this case, then I do not see why, by way of analogy, it may not be said that creation is necessary according to God’s nature so long as it is clarified that any implied dependency doesn’t suggest deficiency. Indeed, creation is from God precisely because God had a reason to create. That this reason is necessary according to His nature rather anticipates any objection that this reason is externally imposed on God. Deficiency is precluded rather than established. God is sufficiently able to effect that which He most strongly desires; the fact that He must do so according to His nature is not because of what creation is but because of who He is. The creation clearly metaphysically depends on the Creator, but it must also be kept in mind that it is the nature of God that determines the nature of creation, not the other way around.

It is rather like epistemology: in epistemology, there are axioms and theorems. In short, axioms are the set of propositions purported to be sufficient in order for knowledge to be possible. They are preconditions for knowledge. Theorems are what can be deduced by means of the axioms. Now, even though our knowledge-claims regarding theorems depends on our being able to deduce them from a source – axioms – the knowledge of the axioms will in some sense depend on the system of theorems they yield. For axioms can be falsified if two theorems they produce are contradictories.

So on the one hand, just as a theorem cannot be known if it is not deducible from some given set of axioms, creation cannot exist if it is not the product of the Creator. The theorems (creation) are determined by the nature of the axioms (God). On the other hand, just as one can use theorems as one means by which to evidence that a set of axioms is not unsound, creation is one means by which to evidence that God is divine. Neither of these are sufficient conditions, but both are necessary conditions. But I will not push the analogy too far.

Finally, none of this implies that the divine nature is communicated to creation if it is necessary according to God’s nature. That only follows if it cannot be the case that “the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them.” I don’t see that this possibility has been refuted.

UPDATE: Drake and I are continuing this discussion here.