K. Scott Oliphint on Clark and Van Til

There’s been a podcast floating around for some time now about the “Clark and Van Til Controversy” involving K. Scott Oliphint, a fairly popular Van Tilian (link). I’m a little tired of writing posts on Van Til, but I’m also a little tired of seeing Van Tilians link to this audio. So, on that cynical note, here are a few observations:

Clark and Rationalism

A recurring criticism of Clark throughout the conversation is that he is too rationalistic. His view of logic and philosophy is too high. Unfortunately, “philosophy” is never defined, so there isn’t much I can say about that, but regarding rationalism and Clark’s view of logic, I found it ironic that the only actual citation of Clark – which was explicitly acknowledged as having been derived from a second-hand source (a book by Greg Bahnsen) – was the following:

The more consistent unbelief is, the less can agreement be obtained. So long as the unbeliever is inconsistent, we can force him to make a choice. If he inconsistently admires Jesus Christ or values the Bible, while at the same time he denies plenary and verbal inspiration, we can by logic insist that he accept both – or neither. But we cannot by logic prevent him from choosing neither and denying a common premise. It follows that in logical theory there is no proposition on which a consistent believer and a consistent unbeliever can agree. Therefore the doctrine of inspiration, like every other Christian doctrine, cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a clear-thinking unbeliever. 

If, nonetheless, it can be shown that the Bible – in spite of having been written by more than thirty-five authors over a period of fifteen hundred years – is logically consistent, then the unbeliever would have to regard it as a most remarkable accident. It seems more likely that a single superintending mind could produce this result than that it just happened accidentally. Logical consistency, therefore, is evidence of inspiration; but it is not demonstration. Strange accidents do indeed occur, and no proof is forthcoming that the Bible is not such an accident. Unlikely perhaps, but still possible. 

How then may an unbeliever be brought to admit the inspiration of the Scripture? Or, for it is the same question, how did “I” come to accept inspiration? (God’s Hammer, 1995, pgs. 15-16)

Clark then talks about the role of the Spirit in conversion. Of course, only the second of these paragraphs was quoted so as to give listeners the impression Clark himself believed the consistency of Scripture could have been an accident. But even if such were the case, and it’s not, is it not interesting that Clark believed logic was insufficient to establish the truth of God[’s revelation]? Compare this apologetic to that of contemporary Van Tilians (link) and ask yourself who is closer to rationalism.

To be fair, Oliphint himself cannot be included in this group of Van Tilians. He says (45^th minute) that Muslims, atheists, et. al. can use the transcendental methodology or apologetic structure that Van Til does – i.e. an argument of the impossibility to the contrary – but the but claims that the content of any such non-Christian argument will always be false. Why? Not because we need to know all false positions in order to know the truth; Oliphint explicitly mentions that this is not necessary. Rather, we know the transcendental argument for Christianity is true “by virtue of God’s grace and what He has revealed” (47^th minute). This is excellent, but it’s easy to miss that he really is essentially affirming divine revelation as his epistemic axiom. This just is Scripturalism – give or take its authoritative sanctioning of alternative means of knowledge – and it is at odds with contemporary Van Tilian apologists who seek to prove God by logic apart from Scripture. In my experience, the number of those who interpret Van Til as teaching the latter outnumber those who would side with Oliphint’s interpretation.

But getting back to the idea that Clark was too rationalistic, if they had simply noted a few instances in which Clark’s exposure to secular philosophy could have provided an explanation for why he believed several dubious doctrines – like his acceptance of Leibniz’s theory of personhood – I don’t think I would have had much of a problem with it. I think it’s fair to say that it would be difficult for anyone who has read and taught as much and as long as Clark has to have maintained complete doctrinal purity throughout. I think the same goes for Van Til (link). This isn’t to excuse either man, it’s just common sense.

But they don’t leave their criticism of Clark at that. What they really mean by a tendency towards rationalism becomes apparent later in the video, when Oliphint says it would be better to side with Bavinck and say that “all theology, all dogmatics is ultimately a mystery” than it would be to say that the paradox of divine sovereignty and human responsibility has been solved; in fact, Oliphint shockingly says that the latter indicates a “secular” or “pagan understanding of what logic is meant to do” (40^th minute). This is what Van Tilians usually mean when they say Clark is too rationalistic: he tried too hard to solve so-called theological conundrums.

But then what is the role of logic according to Van Tilians? For on the one hand, we hear that “we must use logic” (41^st minute). This is repeated several times, and yet on the other hand, “…the church is going to have to set out paradoxes, two teachings, side by side, that we don’t have laws of thinking that allow us to bring together those things neatly” (43^rd minute). The church has to set out paradoxes? As in must or necessarily set[s] out paradoxes? From what “law of thinking” is this conclusion derived? Where has God revealed this? On the contrary, the New Testament celebrates the dissipation of mysteries and the unveiling of the whole counsel of God. Granted, there are things which have not been revealed as well as difficult sayings, but in light of the doctrine of perspicuity, this should provide no basis on which to defend the idea that paradox is a theological necessity. What we have here, then, is a clear real-life example of David Hoover’s argument that the analogical knowledge licenses paradox and inhibits a defense of the faith (link).

They also speculate that divine simplicity and the meaning of “logic” might complicate our ideas of what it means for God to think. Oliphint says that while humans need logic, “if logic is the science of necessary inference, God doesn’t have any because He doesn’t infer anything.” This seems a bit hasty to me. Of course, God does not derive His knowledge from anyone or anything else. But does that mean He has no grounds for His knowledge? I think not (link). It is at least debatable, depending on what Oliphint means by inference. And as to the question of whether a God without parts is eternally able to make “real distinctions,” the answer should be obvious:

To avoid and to confute Clark’s position, some of Van Til’s disciples contend that God does not think in propositions, and hence dependence on “mere human logic” is an untrustworthy crutch. To this Clark has made two replies. First, he remarked that his opponents cited no Biblical passage in which this is stated, nor did they deduce it by any “good and necessary consequence” from a group of such premises. Indeed, since the Bible is ninety percent propositional – commands and ascriptions of praise being the exceptions – it would be rather peculiar if the Bible would deny its own truths. Then, second, if God does not think in propositions how could he have given us all the information now contained in the sixty-six books? If he does not think that “David was the Kind of Israel,” how could he have framed that proposition for our instruction? Or, worse, if we say that God cannot think in propositions, we deny his omnipotence. And if we think in propositions and God does not, then Van Til’s statement will be true, that God’s knowledge and ours do not coincide at any single point. Since we “know” that “David was the King of Israel,” God cannot know it, and therefore it is false. So are all the Gospels, and Christianity is a delusion. (Clark and His Critics, 2009, pg. 414)

Analogical Knowledge

Speaking of analogical knowledge, it was disappointing to find that there was virtually no discussion of Clark’s concerns found, for example, in The Answer (link) in reference to The Text of a Complaint (link) which had been signed by Van Til.

Instead, they discuss in general terms what they believed Van Til’s concerns were which led him to positing analogical knowledge and emphasized that he was following the tradition of the Reformed Scholastics, concluding that if Clark had been aware of this, he would have been less likely to dispute it. But this is a strange assumption given that in the rest of the video, they mention several instances in which Clark departed from the mainstream Reformed tradition. What matters is whether an idea is sound, not whether it was taught by a group of people in the 16^th century and onward.

Oliphint does obliquely recognize that Clark wanted to ensure an “identity of content” between the mind of God and mind of man (10^th minute), but he does not explain why Clark could have thought this so important. Rather, he immediately goes on to say that following The Answer, which apparently was orthodox, Clark developed his views to the extreme. Far from this being the case, however, Clark’s reasons for his denial of analogical knowledge had been plainly spelled out in his reply to Van Til and company in the original answer:

On the complainants’ theory the proposition “the truth man has is analogical” is itself only an analogy. It is not the truth that God has. Nor could man know that it was God who was revealing such a proposition, for again the proposition “God is revealing that truth is analogical” is only an analogy of the truth. One can only be sure that such a proposition is not God’s truth. On the complainants’ theory there is no way of ever crossing over from an analogy of truth to the truth itself. All our thinking is shut up in analogies and resemblances and cannot coincide with God’s truth at even a single point. This position really cuts all connection between God’s knowledge and man's knowledge and plunges us into unmitigated skepticism. 

If the complainants cannot know what God means, how can they know God does not mean this or that? They affirm that there is a resemblance or analogy between the truth God knows and the qualitative different truth man knows. But by what right do they assert a resemblance when they cannot describe the qualitative difference? Or, how can they assert that two things resemble each other when they have never known and can never know one of them? One can say that two men resemble each other if one has seen both men. But one cannot legitimately affirm a resemblance between a man one has seen and a man one has not seen. Similarly, if a man knew God’s meaning, he could compare it with his own and remark the similarity or difference. If I know your opinion, I can say it is similar to or dissimilar from mine. But if I do not know your opinion, I have no way of knowing whether your opinion is the same or contradictory of mine. Similarly if man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge do not “coincide at any single point,” then for all we know, perhaps Christ did not die for our sins. (The Answer, pgs. 22-23)

And to all this can be added many more questions: is divine revelation, as God’s alleged “interpretation” of His archetypal thought (per Oliphint), itself thought by God? What does it mean to say ectypal knowledge is an interpretation of archetypal? If an interpretation gives a new meaning to that which is being interpreted, does that not imply God’s so-called “ectypal knowledge” (theology; divine revelation) is acquired? What does it mean and what sort of metaphysic is implied by the statement that “identity” is found in the “thing” rather than the “mind” (15^th minute)? Etc.

Now, I think the aforementioned link on Hoover’s critique of analogical knowledge covers the philosophical aspect. But as I got the impression that Oliphint was shying away from the stronger statements of Van Til, I think a few of these quotes from The Text of a Complaint will give the reader an indication of just what historical statements a proponent of Van Til must address in order to defend analogical knowledge (or whatever they now want to call it):

While we appreciate the effort to arrive at certainty with reference to man’s knowledge of God, in our judgment this is done at too great a cost. It is done at the sacrifice of the transcendence of God’s knowledge. His thoughts are not our thoughts. His ways are past finding out. The secret things belong unto the Lord our God. If we are not to bring the divine knowledge of his thoughts and ways down to human knowledge, or our human knowledge up to his divine knowledge, we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point. Our knowledge of any proposition must always remain the knowledge of the creature. As true knowledge, that knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge which God possesses, but it can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 5) 

It is clear again that the approach of Dr. Clark is quantitative through and through. It is the number of the propositions, rather than their content as such, not to speak of the inscrutable mystery of the mind of God which is viewed as excluding an exhaustive revelation of the divine mind. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 6) 

It may be objected to the exposition of Dr. Clark’s views presented above that it leaves out of account the important consideration that Dr. Clark allows that beyond the knowledge of a proposition there is the knowledge of the implications of a proposition, and that the knowledge which man may enjoy of a proposition does not necessarily carry with it a knowledge of its implications. This qualification, however, does not affect Dr. Clark’s basic position in any substantial way. The implications of propositions are after all, on his view, also propositions. Consequently, the inclusion of such propositions among the number of propositions that are thought of as constituting the divine knowledge does not require any modification of the judgment that the distinction between the divine knowledge and the knowledge possible to man is merely quantitative. 

Another possible objection to the foregoing might take the form that he does not draw a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God’s knowledge and that of man’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is intuitive while man’s is discursive (Cf. 18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge. We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with it in what has been said above. However, this admission does not affect the whole point at issue here since the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of his knowledge. The latter is concerned only with the contents of the divine knowledge. Dr. Clark distinguishes between the knowledge of God and of man so far as mode of knowledge is concerned, but it is a tragic fact that his dialectic has led him to obliterate the qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature, and thus to impinge in a most serious fashion upon the transcendence of the divine knowledge which is expressed by the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God. (The Text of a Complaint, pg. 6)

This is Van Til’s position put “in context.” References to archetypal vs. ectypal knowledge, original vs. iconic or image knowledge, intuitive vs. discursive knowledge, eternal vs. learned knowledge, self-contained vs. derivative knowledge, and so forth are fine. But if you want to defend Van Til against Clark, you have to deal with what Clark thought were the problem statements in Van Til’s literature, and the problem statements in Van Til’s literature have to do with the qualitative identity of content (or lack thereof) between the mind of God and mind of man. One can’t gloss over or re-frame, as the Oliphint tried to do in minutes 13-18, what Van Til says in particular and expect myself or others who disagree with analogical knowledge to be satisfied.

Theology Proper

While their conclusions regarding the falsity of Clark’s Christological views – or, more precisely, the definition of personhood which determined Clark’s Christological views (incidentally, Oliphint’s statement at the 14^th minute that God’s archetypal knowledge is His being sounds remarkably like Clark) – are correct, here too they don’t show any indication of having read Clark on the subject. The idea that Clark was so “philosophical” that he failed to even interact with historically accepted creedal statements of Christianity is not true. Actually, most of his book The Incarnation is historical. 

Some of their statements about what problems they have with Clark’s definition of person aren’t on point, however. At the 36 minute mark, the host argues that taking Clark’s definition of person in conjunction with the need for real distinctions among the members of the Trinity leads to the following conclusion: “there ends up being some impersonal essence of which the persons don’t exhaust or overlap. So you don’t end up with a full, divine exhaustion. You don’t end up with a perichoresis…” If we qualify Clark’s theory of personhood as referring to thoughts – not just a set of propositions – then there isn’t necessarily a problem at this point, though there would be at others, for the persons of the Trinity could know each other exhaustively without thinking the same thoughts (link).

But the idea that the divine essence is personal brings up the issue of Van Til’s one-person, three-person “paradox.” Unfortunately, Oliphint never follows through on the host’s request for him to explain Van Til’s definition of a person as well as Clark’s, for Oliphint goes on to rely on Lane Tipton’s solution to Van Til’s Trinitarian paradox (35^th minute). I say it is unfortunate because Lane Tipton, who wrote a dissertation on Van Til’s Triunism, mentions in a different podcast by the same host (link) that he sees no problem with the essence being regarded as a person, so long as the meaning of “person” is different than it is when predicated of the Father, Son, and Spirit. But how can an essence be “personal” without being a person? Is “human” or “angel” personal? This seems awfully ad hoc, and at any rate, it still must deal with other Trinitarian issues like generic vs. numeric unity (link), the relationships among the persons (link), etc.

Miscellaneous

It could just be that I’m in an irritable mood today, but the tone of the podcast bothered me. To me, it felt as if a professor were condescending to lecture on some event in which his tradition played a polemic part and came out clearly victorious. Familiar elements include:

1. a historical exposition primarily consisting of what doctrinal details his fountainhead and subsequent tradition thought important without much corresponding discussion of the opposition;
2. distancing from some of the terminology in his tradition without actually conceding any conceptual ground (“analogical knowledge,” “presuppositionalism,” “transcendental”);
3. a few, well-placed, charitable comments towards the chief opponent designed to appear fair;
4. implicit suggestion throughout the discussion that everyone should already know who was correct, rendering detailed evaluation superfluous.

These appear to me to be intelligent men. Honestly, though, I doubt that any of them have read more than half a dozen books by Clark, if that many. Oliphint mentioned Clark in his Reasons for Faith just once. The other two seemed to know Clark only in virtue of what Van Tilians like Greg Bahnsen have said about him. I can only assume their intended audience are those who are already members of their choir. If so, I guess that’s fine. But then like I said, it’s a bit irritating if you’re on the outside looking in. Of course, there’s only so much that can be said in one video. Still, I was hoping for more.

The Precondition of Self-Authenticity

I have written in many posts that an omniscient source is a precondition for knowledge, essentially because unless we have access to such a source, the possibility that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" (including this proposition) would lead to skepticism.

But isn't this necessarily self-defeating? For I am not omniscient. Is it not possible, then, that the truth value of the proposition in which I assert what the omniscient source is to which I have access is one which could be predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition?

No. For it is possible for an omniscient source to be self-authenticating. In fact, given that we are not omniscient, it is necessary in order to avoid skepticism. What this means is that while an omniscient source is necessary, it is also necessary that for those who are not omniscient to know anything, the proposition that "it is possible the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" is false.

But since this proposition is false, does that mean an omniscient source is unnecessary after all? Again, no. There is a mutual dependency among the preconditions for knowledge. For example, logic and language are preconditions for knowledge. You can't have one without the other. You can't know what logic is without using language, and you can't know what language is without using logic.

Similarly, I am saying it logically follows that you can't know that an omniscient source is necessary if that source isn't self-authenticating, and you can't know a source is self-authenticating if you did not deduce that from an omniscient source. And you can't know either of these if the alleged source is illogical or doesn't communicate. Etc.

To assert "source x is self-authenticating" without having recourse to an omniscient source which states or implies such falls prey to the possibility (within that worldview) that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition." Rejection of this too as a possibility falls prey to the same possibility that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition." These rejections are propositions, after all.

Rather, what saves the possibility of knowledge at this point is precisely having recourse to an omniscient source which, since the source knows all, knows that "the truth value of any proposition is predicated on the truth value of an unknown proposition" isn't, in fact, a possibility. Furthermore, the source is able to communicate such information to men, able because the communication is, among other things, self-authenticating. The need for self-authentication strictly pertains to the need for the possibility of communication from an omniscient source; it doesn't erase the need for an omniscient source.

[I have tried to be as neutral as possible in describing the nature of this "source," though it must be the God of Scripture. For why I would write my post in this way, see the last five paragraphs here.]

The Perspicuous CalledtoCommunion

Over at this CalledtoCommunion combox, I asked whether that which the supposedly necessary and infallible Magisterium promulgates is necessarily perspicuous. After initial disagreement, the consensus answer now appears to surprisingly be "no," with the qualification that it is possible for them to clarify what they have said, something Scripture is unable to do.

The (or at least "a") point of the OP was to show that this is the central difference between the "authority paradigms" of RC and Protestantism. But is this difference - that a viva voce can attempt relative perspicuity compared to its previous statements on a subject - meaningful? Since any clarifications they make are in turn not necessarily perspicuous, then how is the RC any better off than the Protestant? As is said in the OP:

Like the Catholic, the Protestant theologian must use his fallible intellect to locate the source of divine authority. Also like the Catholic, the Protestant theologian must use his fallible intellect to construct clarifying questions regarding the content of divine revelation. But unlike the Catholic, the Protestant theologian must also utilize his fallible intellect to construct clarifying answers to whatever second, third, or fourth order questions must be asked in order to arrive a definition or determination of the content of a revealed doctrine. For in order to clarify or determine the content or scope of some theological matter, such as justification, one must necessarily seek answers to second, third, and fourth order questions as described above.

Given that no Magisterial promulgation is necessarily perspicuous, any answer anyone gives to the question of "what is the criterion by which perspicuity can be identified?" must have been discovered by some other means. And since knowledge and application of this criterion will be a precondition for even understanding what Magisterial proclamations in fact mean, it turns out that the sort of private judgment about which RCs lament follows from Protestantism really follows from RC. Note the statement by Bryan Cross I quoted in a post on private judgment (cf. here):

When we approach Scripture, how do we determine what the Holy Spirit is saying? Either each individual is ultimately his own highest authority regarding what the Holy Spirit is saying, or that authority belongs to something outside the individual. In the former case, we are left with “private judgment,” and the endless fragmentation that must accompany it, as history shows.

I might as well ask:

When we approach Magisterial promulgations, how do we determine what the Magisterium is saying? Either each individual is ultimately his own highest authority regarding what the Magisterium is saying, or that authority belongs to something outside the individual. In the former case, we are left with "private judgment," and the endless fragmentation that must accompany it, as history shows.

After all, how many popes are there again? How many authoritative [and extra-biblical] traditions? I dealt with Cross' statement on Protestant terms in the other post. Here, the point is simply that the tu quoque response those at CtC spend so much time trying to refute is shown, right here, to be valid. The tu quoque against RC is not that "there is no difference between what Scripture is capable of as compared to a Magisterium." The tu quoque is that the RC paradigm requires private judgment even while it attacks Protestantism for allegedly requiring it.

Ironically, the real difference between RC and Protestantism is something about which both groups can agree: in comparing RC and Protestantism with their sources of authority, only Protestants believe their source of authority is necessarily perspicuous. Rather than demonstrating RC to be necessary, the CtC post has once again shown off Protestantism as the more attractive option (cf. here).

As an aside, the author of the OP said the criterion of perspicuity must be objective without ever actually explaining what it is (comment #50).

Standing on Straw Legs

Here's a recent post by Called to Communion. Ironically, instead of constructing a successful analogy to sola scriptura, the OP inspired an argument against Roman Catholicism.

On the one hand, the RC magisterium is perspicuous. On the other hand, the Scriptures which the apostles wrote - yes, the same apostles who RCs argue constituted the RC magisterium in Acts 15 - are not perspicuous.

Is the RC magisterium necessarily perspicuous or not? If not, then how can one determine which teachings are and are not perspicuous? If so, then why isn't Scripture perspicuous?

Private Judgment

The accusation of "private judgment" has in my mind always been one of the weakest objections to Protestantism. Take, for example, the following line of argumentation from Bryan Cross (link):

When we approach Scripture, how do we determine what the Holy Spirit is saying? Either each individual is ultimately his own highest authority regarding what the Holy Spirit is saying, or that authority belongs to something outside the individual. In the former case, we are left with “private judgment,” and the endless fragmentation that must accompany it, as history shows. But the only plausible authority outside the individual, for determining what the Holy Spirit is saying in the Scriptures, is the Church.

What is meant by "determine" is ambiguous. It would be clearer if he answered the analogous question "how does Mr. Cross determine what the Roman magisterium is saying?" Nevertheless, here are the two most likely possibilities that come to mind:

1. Perhaps the question posed desires an answer to how one can understand what a communication - specifically, the communication of God through Scripture - means. Denigrating private judgment in this sense would be a plain attack on the divinely ordained function of language in general or special revelation in particular.

Of course, since at least one of Mr. Cross' collaborators thinks that [some] Scripture is incapable of being understood apart from ecclesiastic intermediaries (link), I suppose the latter actually could be what he meant by private judgment. Suffice it to say that the Protestant position is that the ability to understand Scripture is not only available to an elite few who in turn dumb down the message for their subordinates (Psalm 19:7); that is Gnostic.

To respond to the argument in the above link, in order for the argument against perspicuity to work, Nehemiah 8:1-8 must ironically be perspicuous. But to be clear, Nehemiah 8:1-8 doesn't say exposition was necessary for the people, though such certainly could have been conducive to their understanding and is further useful in that it demonstrates clarification and deduction from Scripture is legitimate. Most important to the present subject is the point that Nehemiah 8:1-8 is actually just an example of obedience to the prescription set down in Deuteronomy 31:9-13, a prescription in which Moses makes no mention of a need to speak anything more than what was written (cf. Joshua 8:30-35, 2 Kings 23:1-3, Nehemiah 9:1-3, etc.).

2. Perhaps private judgment refers to the process by which an individual decides to which of two or more mutually exclusive interpretations - one of which may make the most sense to the individual but all of which he understands - he will submit as authoritative. In this case, one can only take Mr. Cross' word that if his own judgment conflicted with that of the Roman magisterium, he would submit to the latter; in other words, he cannot definitively demonstrate to others that he is not one of the men alluded to in 2 Timothy 4:3-4. Finally, as John Robbins wrote in Slavery and Christianity (pg. 34):

The decisions not to think about certain subjects, to abandon one's own analysis, and to trust the Roman Catholic hierarchy in matters of faith and morals are themselves decisions of private judgment - rash, uninformed, and foolish, to be sure, but still private judgment. Those individual decisions, moreover, are not made once for all; they are made daily. The decision not to think about the most important matters is a private judgment that is made repeatedly by every subject of the Roman Church-State. The attack on private judgment is not only self-contradictory, it is also un-Biblical. Speaking to the multitudes, Christ Jesus himself commands them to think for themselves rather than rely on their religious leaders and experts: "Yes, and why, even of yourselves, do you not judge what is right?" (Luke 12:57).

Epistemology and the Nature of Revelation

Lane Keister over at Green Baggins has posted a very good argument by Owen defending the Protestant belief (against RC) about the way in which the canon is discerned. Naturally, we could extend this a fortiori defense to encompass the perspicuity of Scripture and other doctrines relates to sola scriptura. I think, however, one can push the natural/supernatural analogy further and use it to internally critique what generally passes for RC epistemology. Matthew Schultz at BeggarsAll touches on this point in final paragraph of his most recent post on Whitaker's "Dispuations."

RCs predicate the justification of the canon on an allegedly infallible church. Allowing this, by what means do RCs justify their knowledge of an infallible church? If the Magisterium requires no external justification, then we can, like Matthew, ask what distinguishes Scripture from the Magisterium such that the former cannot be afforded the same presuppositional privilege as the latter. [We might also ask what differentiates Scripture from, say, God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son of promise; Abraham did not need to think about whether or not some omnipotent demon was attempting to trick him. Why? Because God's word is self-authenticating, self-verifying.]

However, I can't recall the last time I asked a RC by what means they claim to know the Magisterium is infallible and received a response which didn't in some way appeal to history. Disregarding the fact many of these responses commit the appeal to antiquity fallacy (not to mention that they are only probabilistic arguments), these are, at the very least, responses which implicitly appeal to natural revelation to justify a belief in an infallible authority. We could modify Owen's argument, then, to read: "if Protestant presuppositional epistemology, grounded on supernatural revelation, is unsound, how much more so is RC epistemology, grounded on natural revelation."

The Johannine Corpus and the Canon

In my most recent post, I wrote:

"Historically, I believe the Protestant canon to be God's word because God regenerated me, and as a regenerate I hear and submit to the voice of my Shepherd"

A Roman Catholic on facebook asked me to exegete relevant texts so that he could better understand my position. As I here referenced John 10 as support for the contention that the Scripture itself explains the means by which a Christian comes to accept the canon of Scripture - which is a claim that many "C"atholics, in want of ammo against sola scriptura, argue is not the case - my response was as follows (edited):

"The Johannine corpus contain the passages to which I particularly refer. I believe I already mentioned John 10 in the conversation we’ve been having; 1 John 4:4-6 is another.

In John 10, Jesus is talking about the way in which He gathers His sheep. While this could easily rabbit trail into unconditional election or irresistible grace, I will try to stick to the topic. It seems John’s intention is to explain more specifically Jesus’ statements made in 8:42-47. The Jews who belong to the devil (cf. Ephesians 2:1-3) could not believe Jesus’ words – they did not possess the capacity – precisely because they belonged to the devil; equivalently, Jesus states that those not of God cannot “hear” His words. In accordance with Romans 8-10, the problem of the Jews wasn’t with their ears, per se, but with their minds, which were set on flesh (unregenerate). We come to faith by hearing God’s word, but it doesn’t profit our soul to hear the word if we don’t belong to God.

So much for establishing why I must be a regenerate to “hear and submit to the voice of my Shepherd.” What remains is to connect this with why I historically (!) believe[d] the Protestant canon to be God’s extant word.

1 John 4:4 You, dear children, are from God and have overcome [the spirit of the antichrist], because the one who is in you is greater than the one who is in the world.
5 They are from the world and therefore speak from the viewpoint of the world, and the world listens to them.
6 We are from God, and whoever knows God listens to us; but whoever is not from God does not listen to us. This is how we recognize the Spirit of truth and the spirit of falsehood.

It is not a little important that the context of this statement is surrounded by passages dedicated to expressing that which regeneration causes (righteous behavior – 2:29; obedience to God’s law – 3:9-26; knowing God and lives in love – 4:7-16; belief, love, obedience, and victory over the world – 5:1-4; safety from the devil and sinless behavior – 5:18), and that the most relevant one – knowing God – is found right after the passage in question. To be honest, I think these passages are rather self-evident: “We are from God, and whoever knows God listens to us” is obviously a reference to the apostles. We know God because He regenerates us, so those whom He regenerates will listen to those whom He sent to be His messengers of good news. Moreover, the inverse is true, as we have seen: “whoever is not from God does not listen to us.” That is to say, only regenerates are capable of submitting to the words of God as conveyed by His messengers: “This is how we recognize the Spirit of truth and the spirit of falsehood.” One who is regenerate knows and submits God, His words, and His messengers because that is the very purpose of regeneration (Romans 8:7-9, 10:17, and 1 Peter 1:3)! Regeneration is the precondition for a lively hope, a prerequisite in order to “hear” God’s word and, so doing, come to faith. But our faith is not empty: it’s object is the propositions of the gospel, which necessitates the idea we can discern what the gospel is (and hence, as John writes, who the bearers of the gospel are).

Finally, returning to the gospel of John to tie these points together (even though I consider the matter already settled):

John 10:1 "I tell you the truth, the man who does not enter the sheep pen by the gate, but climbs in by some other way, is a thief and a robber.
2 The man who enters by the gate is the shepherd of his sheep.
3 The watchman opens the gate for him, and the sheep listen to his voice. He calls his own sheep by name and leads them out.
4 When he has brought out all his own, he goes on ahead of them, and his sheep follow him because they know his voice.
5 But they will never follow a stranger; in fact, they will run away from him because they do not recognize a stranger's voice."
6 Jesus used this figure of speech, but they did not understand what he was telling them.
7 Therefore Jesus said again, "I tell you the truth, I am the gate for the sheep.
8 All who ever came before me were thieves and robbers, but the sheep did not listen to them.
9 I am the gate; whoever enters through me will be saved. He will come in and go out, and find pasture.
10 The thief comes only to steal and kill and destroy; I have come that they may have life, and have it to the full.
11 "I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.
12 The hired hand is not the shepherd who owns the sheep. So when he sees the wolf coming, he abandons the sheep and runs away. Then the wolf attacks the flock and scatters it.
13 The man runs away because he is a hired hand and cares nothing for the sheep.
14 "I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me—
15 just as the Father knows me and I know the Father—and I lay down my life for the sheep.
16 I have other sheep that are not of this sheep pen. I must bring them also. They too will listen to my voice, and there shall be one flock and one shepherd.

Briefly:

1. Jesus is talking about gathering His sheep (who were considered to be His sheep before they entered Him!).
2. He says the sheep will listen to the Shepherd alone. Question: how does a sheep know his Shepherd’s voice (i.e. that it is indeed His voice, the extent of His words)?
a. The sheep follow the Shepherd because they hear His voice (I can’t stress that enough, given the rampant existentialism in present-day “Christendom”).
b. The sheep follow their shepherd because they know their Shepherd (which parallels the above exposition of 1 John 4, also ensuring the regenerate the apostles were given the authority to act as the mediators of our Shepherd’s actual words)
3. The sheep will follow their shepherd (this submission is due to “irresistible,” regenerative grace).

Jesus is being perfectly clear. The sheep He is gathering will recognize and follow His voice because of the nature of the sheep and the Shepherd’s voice. I recognize[d] the Protestant canon as my Shepherd’s voice because as a regenerated sheep, I am able and willing to listen and submit to His word, whether or not communicated efficiently or through His prophets. I’m not a red-letter Christian; the application of this passage extends beyond Jesus’ “own” words to those whom God sent to communicate His word. All Scripture is God-breathed.

And as if this weren’t enough, Jesus has to reiterate His own statements to the Jews… again:

10:26 You do not believe because you are not my sheep.
27 My sheep listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me.
28 I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish; no one can snatch them out of my hand.

Given what we’ve just read, these words are a neat summation of the topic. Those who don’t believe are not sheep (or if they are, they haven't yet been called); those who do believe are regenerated sheep, i.e. sheep whose Shepherd has effectually called them – sheep who know their Shepherd’s voice because He regenerates or makes them belong to Him, speaks to them, and causes them to know Him and His word by whatever means it is communicated to them.

You may find the following short posts apropos:

http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2009/12/canon-of-scripture.html

http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2010/01/doctrine-of-perspicuity.html

Again, please recall that this discussion is meant to establish the historical reason I accept[ed] the Protestant canon. As you read in our previous discussion and the wall posts to [deleted] et. al., you should know that my first principle itself entails what the canon is, so I'm not reasoning circularly (i.e. I'm not arguing that my exegesis is a premise for my first principle, as that would mean my first principle is no longer my first principle); rather, this exegesis suffices to show that my epistemological “system” is self-affirming, or that I’m not just making up a canon arbitrarily."

The doctrine of perspicuity

Are those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation clearly propounded, open in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them?

Hebrews 5:11-6:1 Concerning [Jesus] we have much to say, and it is hard to explain, since you have become dull of hearing. For though by this time you ought to be teachers, you have need again for someone to teach you the elementary principles of the oracles of God, and you have come to need milk and not solid food. For everyone who partakes only of milk is not accustomed to the word of righteousness, for he is an infant. But solid food is for the mature, who because of practice have their senses trained to discern good and evil. Therefore leaving the elementary teaching about the Christ, let us press on to maturity, not laying again a foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith toward God, of instruction about washings and laying on of hands, and the resurrection of the dead and eternal judgment.

1 Corinthians 2:1-5, 3:1-2 When I came to you, brothers, I did not come with eloquence or superior wisdom as I proclaimed to you the testimony about God. For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified. I came to you in weakness and fear, and with much trembling. My message and my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit's power, so that your faith might not rest on men's wisdom, but on God's power... Brothers, I could not address you as spiritual but as worldly - mere infants in Christ. I gave you milk, not solid food, for you were not yet ready for it. Indeed, you are still not ready.

Faith and repentance from dead works encompass that which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation. These are elementary teachings of God's word, given to the immature because:

1. they are not ready for mature wisdom or eloquence.

2. so that they would first learn to rest their faith in God's power.

In other words, God's word regarding the elementary teachings of Gods word - including that which is necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation - are of such a nature that even the immature can understand them, due to the clarity and lack of eloquence with which they are communicated (indeed, they cannot understand the more spiritual things). This is exactly the Protestant understanding of the doctrine of perspicuity.