Protestantism and James 2

I’ve had the same understanding of James 2 for half a dozen years, dating back to numerous discussions with Roman Catholics on facebook, long before I became interested in epistemology. I don’t usually write posts on specific passages (for a related but more general post, see here), but in the aftermath of a discussion in the comment section of a recent post by Drake Shelton (link), I think it will be useful to explain why I think James 2 is not as problematic for Protestants as its perpetual use by many Roman Catholics for that purpose might indicate. The emphasis, however, will be to examine James 2 in light of the system of Reformed theology. This includes, for example, that good works necessarily follow from saving faith, that saving faith is [efficiently] caused by grace alone, that justification before God is by [the instrument of] faith alone, and, perhaps more contentiously, that saving faith is understanding and assent to the divinely revealed propositions referred to as the gospel. That is, if James 2 can be shown to be compatible with these, the latter two of which are usually disputed – especially sola fide – then it cannot be rejected due to alleged inconsistency with Pauline or [other] canonical books.

James 2:14 What good is it, my brothers and sisters, if someone claims to have faith but does not have works? Can this kind of faith save him? 

15 If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and lacks daily food, 

16 and one of you says to them, “Go in peace, keep warm and eat well,” but you do not give them what the body needs, what good is it? 

17 So also faith, if it does not have works, is dead being by itself. 

Obviously, a claim to faith does not necessarily mean one actually has faith. If, as Reformed theology states, saving faith necessarily yields good works, then a so-called faith which does not yield good works is a “faith” which does not save. As such, it is dead. This is not the faith of saints.

18 But someone will say, “You have faith and I have works.” Show me your faith without works and I will show you faith by my works. 

19 You believe that God is one; well and good. Even the demons believe that—and tremble with fear.

These verses seem to set up an objection from an interlocutor, yet there is some question as to where James intends the quote to end, and this impacts the intended meaning. I think the following from the IVP New Testament Commentary Series succinctly summarizes the options and recommends the best interpretation (link):

An Anticipated Objection and Its Answer (2:18)

The objection that James anticipates presents a problem. We would expect him to propose the statements "You have deeds; I have faith" as a potential retort spoken to him; but what he writes is a reversal of these statements. Some have supposed a loss from the original text; but with no manuscript evidence to support it, this theory must remain a last resort. Others (e.g., Ropes 1916:208-14; Dibelius 1976:155-56; Laws 1980:123-24) have simply accepted James's reversal of these statements as a carelessness about how he formulates them; his primary point is to confront the false theology of separating faith and actions, regardless of which party holds which alternative. Such an explanation is possible but dangerous with any text; the first course must be to seek a reasonable explanation for a deliberately worded text. Laws, for example, admits the solution is not entirely satisfactory (1980:124). Mayor (1897:95-96) and Adamson (1976:124-25) try to solve the problem by extending the quotation through the end of 2:18 and rendering the whole verse not as an anticipated objection to 2:17 but as a further confirmation of it. This requires an understanding of will say in 2:18 as "someone may well say" and the rest of the verse as the person's argument, which James is commending to his readers.

A paraphrase of James's thought would then be: "Faith by itself is dead. In fact, someone could properly say, `You have faith, and I have deeds. Show me your faith apart from deeds, and I will show you my faith by deeds.' "This solution is possible grammatically and attractive because of the consistency it provides for James's use of the pronouns. However, it is too forced, not only because of the sense it requires of the verb will say but also because it attempts to reverse the whole first phrase (but someone will say), which in all other cases in Greek literature introduces a contrast or objection to what has preceded. Davids (1982:124) and Moo (1985:105-6) finally choose the solution accepted by Ropes, Dibelius and Laws as the most likely, acknowledging that all of the solutions to this passage have their difficulties. This does seem the best option.

In other words, James is not particular about whether any hypothetical questioner believes in faith alone or in deeds alone. Instead, James is repudiating any separation of faith and actions as if they were contradictory or even equal alternatives. He is insisting on the theological unity of the two. In 2:18 he challenges anyone to be able to claim genuine faith without the authenticating works, and he declares the only way to have genuine faith is to carry it out with deeds. He affirms the necessity of both faith and actions and says he will show the former by the latter.

In short, the following considerations outweigh the more abstract question of why the interlocutor says “You have faith and I have works” rather than “You have works and I have faith” – it is apparent in 2:20 that James does, in fact, have in mind someone who would object to 2:14-17. Given the connection between this objector in 2:18 and the remarks about a dead faith in the previous verses, it would be odd if it were the objector who challenged, “Show me your faith without works and I will show you faith by my works.” Now, if James were to have said this in response to an objector who is illegitimately dichotomizing faith from works (or vice versa), however, the point is clear: one’s claim to faith must be shown by the works he does.

This would also be the first indication that one intention of the author is to explain how faith can be evidenced to others [i.e. people, not God] (cf. 2:22, 24). An omniscient God does not need to see the necessary subsequent (good works) in order to know the claim to the related antecedent (saving faith) is true. For God can know our thoughts, not to mention that He Himself would have caused saving faith in the first place. We, on the other hand, in general (excluding divine revelation about particular individuals) neither have the privilege of knowing who God has decided to regenerate nor the internal mental activities of any other person, so all we have to go on is what we think we see others do outwardly, i.e. their works. That is the only means by which we can “show” another that our claim to faith is more than nominal.

Briefly, the question of how demons can be monotheists yet unsaved is answered simply: monotheism is not a sufficient condition for salvation. Belief in Christ is necessary. Because 2:19 clearly does not imply the monotheists in question possess saving faith – and, therefore, much less that they do good works – it can’t be used to object to the definition of saving faith provided above.

20 But would you like evidence, you empty fellow, that faith without works is useless? 

21 Was not Abraham our father justified by works when he offered Isaac his son on the altar? 

22 You see that his faith was working together with his works and his faith was perfected by works. 

23 And the scripture was fulfilled that says, “Now Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness,” and he was called God’s friend.

24 You see that a person is justified by works and not by faith alone. 

A few points: this last verse is usually what those who think James 2 contradicts Protestant theology hone in on. However, if the justification in question is the “vindication” (for parallel uses of justification as meaning vindication, see Matthew 11:19, Luke 10:29, Romans 3:4, etc.) of one’s claim to saving faith before men rather than before God, as 2:18 first suggests and the repeated phrase “You see” reiterates, then the point of the passage is that both faith and [good] works are required, and this is not at all inconsistent with Protestantism. 

Faith alone is not useless per se; the question is in what context it would be useless. Without the accompanying good works which should and would follow, justification of a claim to faith just isn’t possible. It is in this context that one’s “faith” without good works would be as useless as one’s “good works” without saving faith. 

The Abrahamic citations that James provides are instructive. Clearly, since the faith which produces good works is the faith which is instrumental to our salvation, reference to Genesis 15:6 and Abraham’s status in God’s sight is natural. Justification before men is related to justification before God, for the former presupposes the latter. But because what counts as evidence of belief differs between an omniscient God and men, in order for this previous Scripture to be “fulfilled,” the exemplification of his faith in Genesis 22 was necessary. Related to this point is the following quote I have produced before on this blog:

James 2:22, NT Context: The Nature of Abraham’s Faith 

“…The verb rendered by the NIV as “was made complete” (eteleiothe [from teleioo]) does not mean (despite Calvin’s support) that the actions revealed Abraham’s faith to be perfect (tetioo never has that sense); nor does it mean that works were somehow tacked onto a faith that otherwise would have been incomplete, for James’s point is that such faith does not really count at all, it is simply useless. Rather, to follow James’s argument we must recognize that although the expression teleioo linked with ek (i.e., Abraham’s faith “was made complete… [lit.] out of” works) is found nowhere else in the NT, parallels found elsewhere are illuminating. Philo tells us that Jacob “was made perfect as the result of [ek] discipline” (Agriculture 42); alternatively, he “was made perfect through [ek] practice” (Confusion 181). In other words, he grew in maturity as a result of the stresses laid on him. In Philo, however, the maturation take place in a human being. Jacob; here in James this “maturation” takes place in an inanimate object, faith. This prompts Moo (2000: 137) to suggest that the closest conceptual parallel is 1 John 4:12: “if we love one another, God lives in us and his love is made complete [teteleiomene estin] in us.” Transparently, God’s love is not somehow lacking something, intrinsically deficient, until we love one another; rather, “God’s love comes to expression, reaches its intended goal, when we respond to his grace with love toward others. So also, Abraham’s faith, James suggests, reaches its intended goal when the patriarch did what God was asking him to do” (Moo 2000: 137)…”

That is, the explanation of the phrase “faith was perfected by works” has to do with a teleological end of faith, not an alleged insufficiency of [saving] faith alone to function in any capacity whatsoever.

25 And similarly, was not Rahab the prostitute also justified by works when she welcomed the messengers and sent them out by another way? 
26 For just as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.

Some attempt to push analogy between body:spirit and faith:works too far. Surely the idea that one is not spiritually alive until he does good works is going too far. Likewise, if spirits can be without bodies (2 Corinthians 12:2), does that also imply one can do good works apart from faith? Analogies have limits. James is simply reiterating his previous statements: saving faith and good works go together naturally. You will either find both or neither.

Triadology and Triablogue

Steve Hays, a primary contributor at Triablogue, mentioned me several times in a recent reply he made to a post by Drake Shelton (link). Over the years, I’ve commented on his blog several times, and I appreciate the breadth of topics he has taken the time to address. He’s always been cordial – even encouraging – towards me.

But in the past few months, I’ve come to accept a position on the Trinity that appears to be highly controversial in Reformed circles. Insofar as I would be more inclined to agree that my position is more in line with the early church than with the classic Reformers, this isn’t so surprising. It’s the fact that the position to which I hold has been seemingly singled out by Reformed Protestants who are themselves in disagreement that is a little more surprising. For example, see here and here as well as here and here.

There are several reasons this could be the case. Perhaps each proponent of these different views feels that he has already said his piece about the others’, whereas each feels that it is time for the proponents of my view to step up to the plate. Or perhaps the position I espouse is considered to be closer to or even actual heresy, in which case it merits a harsher and fuller rebuke.

Whatever the case may be, in responding to Steve I am somewhat at a default disadvantage. I was chuffed when I crossed the 200 post mark on this blog last month. Steve and his cohorts have put together more than 10,000 blog posts. Virtually all of my posts about Trinitarianism have been in the past 6 months. He has posted about Trinitarianism for the past 8 years. Steve has been posting for longer than I’ve known what Calvinism is.

But even aside from disparity in theological experience, exposure, or expertise, I am at a disadvantage in another sense: I am not sure what blog posts or comments of mine Steve means to allude to when he makes certain statements. I can trace my blog discussions with Sean Gerety back to facebook. For a while, at least, each of us was keeping up with what the other had to say about the Trinity. But I don’t know how much of this Steve has read, let alone to which of my statements his recent article refers. For instance, Steve writes:

I also notice that Drake and Ryan both fail to draw a rudimentary distinction between theos as a proper noun and theos as a common noun. I went over that ground with unitarian Dale Tuggy.

I am not sure what I have said that gave Steve this impression, but I think I have drawn this “rudimentary distinction” here, for example:

I am not aware of any Scripture in which "set of divine attributes" can intelligibly be substituted for "God." In fact, the WCF's use of singular personal pronouns for "God" was what first led me to question the idea "God and His attributes are one." Rather, it seems to me there are two primary Scriptural meanings of "God" - 1) the Father in a peculiar, preeminent sense; 2) a divine person in general. In either case, it seems to me it always refers to a single person. 

That there are multiple possible meanings of the word is fairly obvious. For instance, Jesus is referred to both as God (e.g. Romans 9:5) and the Son of God (e.g. Mark 1:1). Obviously, Jesus is not the Son of Himself. Equally obvious is that Jesus is not the Son of a set of attributes. Or consider John 1:1-2. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God. He was in the beginning with God." Sean is correct; the Word, Jesus, was God and dwelt among us. Who could deny it? And yet, the Word was not "with" Himself, He was "with" the Father (cf. 1:14, 18). Jesus was with God - a distinct person - and yet Jesus Himself was God. This seems to me to be a pretty clear case that "God" can have multiple meanings. 

And here:

In short, while I believe the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father only insofar as they are eternally begotten of and spirated by (i.e. derived from) the Father, I assert they are both [eternal and necessary] divine persons, which is, in fact, one possible meaning of the word "God" (simply not the monotheistic meaning).

And when I summarized Drake’s view, I noted he too has said “God” can have a broader or narrower application (link):

I have found that the word “God” can mean at least 6 things in this discussion: 1. The Father/Monarchy; Concreted person; 2. The Divine Nature; abstract substance; or that an uncreated person possesses a divine nature 3. Godhead 4.Source of operation; 5. Auto-theos: that is uncaused 6. An indirect sense in that the Logos and the Holy Spirit are called God as they inter-dwell (perichoresis) and are consubstantial with the Father.

So perhaps Steve means that we do not put this distinction into proper practice. Maybe so. But then, I don’t necessarily consider a particular interpretation of John 20:28 to be a hill I need to die on anyway. I’m open to correction, given good argumentation. But I would prefer to discuss more central tenets. I do not mean to dictate the terms of discussion away from what are thought to be areas of weakness in my position, however, so if indeed this passage is or serves as an indication of something more significant than I think is possible, I’m sure I can trust Steve to tell me why.

The one other time Steve mentions me, I again am not sure what statement I’ve made that prompted his remark:

vii) This is not the only unitarian move made by Drake’s party. For instance, Ryan draws a distinction between the Mighty God and God Almighty. Once again, that’s a classic unitarian tactic. Anyone who’s debated Jehovah’s Witnesses will recognize that move.

           

They act as if that’s a theologically significant distinction. They also disregard equally exalted titles applied to Jesus, viz. “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end” (Rev 22:13). 

Though I may have, I honestly don’t recall making this distinction. I recall noting that in the New Testament, “Scripture always refers to the Father as Παντοκράτωρ or παντοκράτορος (“Almighty”).” I don’t think it’s fair to say I “disregard” titles applicable to both the Father and Son. In a discussion about whether the differences between the Father and Son are significant enough to warrant suggestion of the legitimacy of a subordination with respect to the immanent Trinity – or, if you prefer, whether the similarities are significant enough to warrant suggestions of the legitimacy of a co-equality of the persons of the immanent Trinity – it is only natural that one person will tend to focus on differences while another will focus on similarities.

In any case, by this point I have heard enough insinuations and accusations from Sean to be immunized against superficial comparisons with Jehovah’s Witnesses, Unitarians, and semi-Arians. I believe my position is within the bounds of Trinitarianism as established in the [pre]Nicene Fathers, an assertion I have so far defended here and here. But this is obviously not to say there is no further point to discussion.

Necessitarianism

This is the first time in a long time I don’t feel as though I have writer’s block. I have had no shortage of topics on my mind, and as if I didn't have enough to blog about, Drake Shelton has written a response to an excursion I wrote on what Gordon Clark called necessitarianism, which he accepted by the time he wrote The Trinity after having previously rejected it. Even as Trinitarianism has become clearer to me in the past several months – thanks in part to Drake – this remains one fundamental issue on which I have been unable to agree with him. This is what I wrote that Drake is responding to in his post:

Finding Scriptures which deal with this issue will require consideration of logical implications, for to my knowledge there is no explicit passage which addresses it. My current response would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. There are, however, several objections to my own position – some made by Clarke and others I have received from those who are in most other respects in agreement with my Trinitarian views – so I will try to address them in a short amount of space.

Clarke thinks the idea that something can be willed necessarily is a contradiction in terms. Thus, he, Athanasius, and others dichotomize that which is willed from that which is a “necessity of nature.” But I do not find his reasons for saying so persuasive: he mentions that I might as well say that a man’s heart beats by his will, the sun rises by man’s will, and a balance which turns necessarily turns by its will. These are just examples of what a proof by example fallacy looks like. What Clarke rather ought to have done is define what it means “to will” or “to choose” or “to act.” As a Calvinist, I don’t have any problem with a definition of these terms which excludes the notion of freedom of contrariety – the ability to have willed, chosen, or acted differently than one did. In fact, freedom of contrariety itself presupposes a definition of willing, choosing, and acting. I would define these words in terms of the mind’s volitional selection, determination, or performance.

Where the line is between providing mere synonyms and providing a clear metaphysical definition can be challenging, but in any case, I am in no worse a position than Clarke, who must also define these terms. Until he does, the burden of proof is on him to explain why necessity is mutually exclusive with will. Anyway, I don’t suppose Sean will have any issue with my explanation, as this is entirely consistent with Gordon Clark’s view 1) that God’s existence is necessary yet by His eternal will and choice, and 2) that the generation of the Son is voluntary and necessary like creation (see his chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity).

This last remark brings me to the objection from the other side to my position, viz. my thinking creation is necessary as well as the Son and Spirit. Whereas Sean thinks I bring the Son and Spirit down to the level of creation by making the them contingent – a counter which backfires, as [I would hope] Sean would not say the person[al property] of the Son is created even though he holds that the person[al property] of the Son is contingent – the objection here is that I raise the creation to the level of divinity (see here and here for examples).

Now, I admit I have perhaps missed some solution which would resolve the tension between an unnecessary creation and a seemingly arbitrary God, but if so, I have not encountered it. It seems easier for me to explain why a necessary creation is not divine than it is to explain why an unnecessary creation is not arbitrary. As I understand it, the reason there is an objection to the idea that who the Father is determines everything He wills is that such means the Son, Spirit and creation all originate from the Father in the same way. I suspect the argument is that since “like causes like,” one whose nature is divine must, if He acts according to a “necessity of nature,” cause another with a divine nature.

But I do not see why this needs to be the case. The nature or person of the Father may determine His causation of this possible world as well as the Son and Spirit, but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not on my view have willed to] communicate His nature to creation. Thinking about this question recently, I found myself asking: is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them? If the latter is possible, then is this not a reasonable answer as to why the necessity of creation would not imply consubstantiality with its Creator?

Drake responds:

We have already discussed this. Your use of “unnecessary” is ambiguous. You could mean a necessity of God’s nature or of a necessity extending from the eternality of his will. (link). I think you are still stuck in the dialectic between a necessity of nature and an arbitrarity.

That is, he wants to know, when I speak of “multiple possible worlds” or of the “necessity” of creation, whether I am speaking with reference to what is possible and necessary to God according to His nature or possible and necessary to God according to His will. On Drake's view, that which is necessary according to God’s nature is also necessary according to His will. But that which God wills is not necessarily necessary according to His nature, though there may be some other meaning according to which it may be called necessary, a point I will turn to momentarily. To answer, though, I was questioning whether there are other possible worlds that God could have instantiated according to His nature or if this actual world is the only possible world and, thus, necessary for Him to will as well.

Now, in our last discussion, Drake agreed that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” But, as I just mentioned, he also said he doesn’t think that God’s nature determines everything He wills. His nature prescribes the boundaries of what can be willed in all cases, but it does not determine what must be willed in all cases. In that case, the argument I outline in the above paragraphs is little different than what it was then:

The divine will is atemporal. We agree. It’s logically contingent on the divine nature. We agree. The only problem, as I see it, is that on your position, no answer can be given as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another “world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. There must be some other “world” agreeable to the divine nature on your view, or else this world would have been necessary, a point to which you strenuously object. I believe last time we established that another such “world” would have been one in which God didn’t create. That would be, you said, consistent with the divine nature. Then again, I pointed out it would be mutually exclusive with this “world” because only in the latter is it true that “God created.”

Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that isn’t relevant because you’ve already agreed that it’s nevertheless logically contingent on the divine nature, a divine nature which, since it doesn’t “direct and regulate” which of the two (or more) “worlds” which are agreeable to it are to be instantiated by the logically contingent divine will, there can never be any answer as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” over against the other which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.

Drake replied that “The will is eternal which makes the question meaningless.” I strongly disagree. My argument is effective as long as God’s will is logically contingent on His nature. This is exactly what Drake admits when he says that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” True, there is no chronological or temporal lapse between that which is possible for God to effect by His nature and that which He eternally chooses to effect; there is, however, a logical priority. Because there is such a priority, the question is begged as to why, if God could have instantiated some other world or reality agreeable to His nature, He rather willed to instantiate this one. What was His reason? Drake replies:

The word “reason” can be replaced by the word “basis” and as we have discussed many times there are two of those in God: nature and will. So yes you could ask what was the basis of his eternal will, and I would respond, the agreeability of his nature.

I am afraid the point has been missed. If I ask what the basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His nature” doesn’t suffice. For world B would also have been agreeable to His nature. The arbitrarity objection stands.

Drake does mention that there are two “reasons” or “bases” in God, but He doesn’t elaborate as to what that means. What does it mean for God to have a reason according to His nature, how is it distinguished from His having a reason according to His will, and in what way does his answers to these questions solve the problem of seeming arbitrariness (i.e. God’s choosing of world A which is no more or less agreeable to His nature than world B would have been)? Drake continues:

You think that necessities are only necessities of nature. I have affirmed that a necessity can also extend from the eternality of God’s will and thus openly deny that creation is arbitrary, thus denying any other possible world, while also denying that it is a necessity of divine nature.

Firstly, I have to wonder what was the point of the previous questions designed to determine whether I was speaking of necessity “according to nature” or necessity “according to will” when it is apparent he already knew I was speaking about the former.

More importantly, how is the will of God necessary if it is not necessitated by His nature? It would seem more precise to say that the will of God necessitates, not that it is itself necessarily necessitated. This is very important, because my objection pertains to the latter, not the former. God’s will may be some times be necessitated – such as in the communication of divinity to the Son and Spirit – but it is not always necessitated.  But my argument is that the fact that the will is not always necessitated is why it is sometimes arbitrary. The fact that it necessitates whatsoever is willed is irrelevant.

As a side point of clarification, the points regarding man’s heartbeat, the sunrise, and the turn of a balance were related to Samuel Clarke’s argument that what is necessary is mutually exclusive with what is willed. I had quoted his argument earlier in my article, which was why I mentioned it then. Drake does not believe the two are mutually exclusive, so there is no reason to further pursue this particular line of dialogue.

So much for the responses to my criticisms. Now Drake offers a few criticisms of his own. Firstly, he thinks that my assertion that there are not multiple possible worlds agreeable to God’s nature implies “a conflation of activity, essence and existence. This is ADS.” But this is not an argument. The Father possesses distinct attributes whether or not creation is necessary according to His nature, and these divine attributes, while they determine His activity, are distinct from it. A definition of “existence” will need to be provided before I can reply further.

In response to my question, “is divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them?” Drake replies:

The former. The emanation is the basis of the communication, in the genus of relation. The latter makes the emanation arbitrary and ad hoc. WE may have here encountered the Hegelian Dialectic. In order to avoid an arbitrary God, you are forced to have an arbitrary God.

I don't particularly like the language of emanation, though I understand what he means: it is the genus of which spiration and begetting are species. Regardless, why does Drake think that “the Son and Spirit [are] said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them” suggests arbitrarity? I stated the existences of the Son and Spirit are necessary in any case, so if everything God wills is to maximize the manifestation of His glory, and the Father has communicated divinity (and individuating properties) to two other subjects, the logical conclusion is that this communication is willed for His glory, which is clearly not ad hoc. There are too many unexplained gaps for me to be expected to follow these arguments.

His last argument, stated here, explains why he thinks that it is necessary to maintain that creation is not necessary according to God’s nature, and this, unless I am mistaken, is supposed to show why that which is derived by a necessity of nature is that to which the divine nature is communicated. Essentially, the argument is that if creation is necessary according to God’s nature, such makes God’s nature dependent on creation, which is pagan.

But dependent in what sense? In my article on Clarke, Drake made the point – with which I agree – that the property of Fatherhood logically depends on the Son. The Father cannot be the Father unless there is a Son, which is no problem since the Son has always existed. But this isn’t pagan, is it? The Son metaphysically depends on the Father, yet the Father too in some sense depends on the Son. If no deficiency in the Father is implied in this case, then I do not see why, by way of analogy, it may not be said that creation is necessary according to God’s nature so long as it is clarified that any implied dependency doesn’t suggest deficiency. Indeed, creation is from God precisely because God had a reason to create. That this reason is necessary according to His nature rather anticipates any objection that this reason is externally imposed on God. Deficiency is precluded rather than established. God is sufficiently able to effect that which He most strongly desires; the fact that He must do so according to His nature is not because of what creation is but because of who He is. The creation clearly metaphysically depends on the Creator, but it must also be kept in mind that it is the nature of God that determines the nature of creation, not the other way around.

It is rather like epistemology: in epistemology, there are axioms and theorems. In short, axioms are the set of propositions purported to be sufficient in order for knowledge to be possible. They are preconditions for knowledge. Theorems are what can be deduced by means of the axioms. Now, even though our knowledge-claims regarding theorems depends on our being able to deduce them from a source – axioms – the knowledge of the axioms will in some sense depend on the system of theorems they yield. For axioms can be falsified if two theorems they produce are contradictories.

So on the one hand, just as a theorem cannot be known if it is not deducible from some given set of axioms, creation cannot exist if it is not the product of the Creator. The theorems (creation) are determined by the nature of the axioms (God). On the other hand, just as one can use theorems as one means by which to evidence that a set of axioms is not unsound, creation is one means by which to evidence that God is divine. Neither of these are sufficient conditions, but both are necessary conditions. But I will not push the analogy too far.

Finally, none of this implies that the divine nature is communicated to creation if it is necessary according to God’s nature. That only follows if it cannot be the case that “the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them.” I don’t see that this possibility has been refuted.

UPDATE: Drake and I are continuing this discussion here.

Drake Shelton's Triadology: A Summary

In a Christian context, debates about monotheism and trinitarianism seem to reduce to this: who are [or is] the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who or what is God, and how are these related to one another? Drake’s view is as follows:

There are three divine persons: Father, Son, and Spirit. To be divine is to be eternal, omniscient, good, just, etc. These are universals which may be predicated of the Father, of the Son and of the Spirit; that is, each is divine because there are a set of distinct, divine attributes which may be predicated of each of them. Why this is the case will be explained momentarily.

Whereas these attributes are what each has in common with the others, each is individuated from the others by his respective property or properties. So, for instance, the Father is eternally unoriginate, the Son is eternally begotten or generated from the Father, and the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father.

Hence, the Father, Son, and Spirit must be distinct persons. To be a person is to possess a mind capable of reflexively indexing a certain set of propositions. So, for example, the reasons that the Father, Son and Spirit are distinct persons or minds is that only the Father can think “I am unoriginate,” only the Son can think “I am eternally begotten,” and only the Spirit can think “I eternally proceed.”

[These variances in reflexive thought do not imply that omniscience is impossible. The subject of the proposition "I am unoriginate" is, for the Father, "the Father," and both the Son and Spirit also assent to the proposition "the Father is unoriginate." Propositions are the meanings of declarative statements, and the meaning of the Father's thought "I am unoriginate" is synonymous with "the Father is unoriginate." Reflexive knowledge can accordingly be considered an indexation of propositional thought.]

Eternal generation and procession may be distinguishing properties, but they also point to the source of unity among the persons: the Father. It is the Father who communicates His divine nature, essence, or attributes in the Son and Spirit whose very persons are metaphysically grounded in the Father. This is not to say that the Son and Spirit are creations, however. Each is eternal and consubstantial with the Father in respect to His divine nature, for both persons causally extend from the Father necessarily rather than as an act of free will. And though eternal generation and eternal procession can be considered types of emanation or consubstantial extension from the Father, it is not Neoplatonic since such causality is a property of the Father alone. But the point is that the Father is the point of unity among the divine persons, not an abstract set of attributes which each person allegedly possesses of Himself. The Son and Spirit are not "autotheos." From this, Drake concludes that in the ontological as well as economic Trinity,

There is a subordination of persons but not of nature. The nature in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost is the same in character. However, the Father is the source of the Son and Spirit and all operation... Therefore, the Son is said to obey these commands and operations of the Father (John 10:18, Heb 10:7). The Son never commands the Father but the Father commands the Son. Jesus said in John 14:28 that the Father was greater than he was. The very terms Father and Son require a subordination of some kind.

It may be better, when first trying to grasp this view, not to think of the divine nature abstractly at all. There is certainly nothing wrong with the question, "what is the divine nature?" The divine nature is an idea – a proposition enumerating the attributes which must be predicable of an person in order for him to be divine – analogous to human nature. But neither divine nor human nature in themselves are minds or persons but attributes which identify divine or human minds or persons. Now, I may be said to be human and Jesus may be said to be divine, but in both cases the person is the subject.

As such, "God is three persons," "God is Triune," etc. are false. These propositions make the subject an impersonal divine nature and lead either to the view that the three persons are merely modes of God, which is the error of Sabellius, or to the view that the three persons are in some sense merely parts of God, which is unintelligible. It is no more proper to state that "God is three persons" than it is to state that "human is x number of persons."

This is a danger of considering the doctrine of the Trinity by beginning with the divine nature abstract from persons of whom it may be predicated. Hence, it is often the case that those who hold to the Western or Latin view will first ask “what” – not “who” – is God yet proceed to use personal [relative] pronouns in describing God’s attributes. This turns the divine nature into a person and either leads to a quaternity or a collapsing of the Trinity into [parts of?] one person.

The alternative to this conception of "numeric unity" is "generic unity" which in Drake's words, means that "the divine nature is generic in the sense that it defines the necessary predicates of three different things: three different divine minds." The only subjects to whom the genus "deity" can apply are the Father, Son, and Spirit. These persons are said to be united because of each the genus "deity" may be predicated, albeit with the qualification that the ground of this unity lies in the Father's eternal communication of this genus in the Son and Spirit.

The debate regarding generic and numeric unity is primarily about the ground of unity, though, of course, why one thinks the Father, Son, and Spirit may be said to be united will affect how one thinks they are united. Generic unity holds the Father as the principle of unity whereas numeric unity holds the divine nature as the principle of unity. The latter view, therefore, requires that the Son and Spirit are autotheos. Drake argues the contrary: "Aseity is not a divine attribute. It is a personal property of the Father. If Aseity is an divine attribute then this denies the eternal generation of the Son, which requires derivation."

The debate between numeric and generic unity is important because, for example, the view of the divine nature as absolutely simple presupposes that the principle, cause, origin, or source of unity among the Father, Son, and Spirit lies in the divine nature "itself" (numeric unity), whereas a view of the divine nature as allowing for real distinctions would be perfectly compatible with the Monarchy of the Father (hence, with generic unity). Absolute divine simplicity is problematic because it is unable to account for how men can participate in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:3-4) given that there are no real distinctions in it. In fact, if there are no real distinctions in the divine nature, some sort of Neoplatonic Monad seems to follow. Real distinctions in God's knowledge and attributes, for instance, are good and necessary to the perfection of the Trinity.

Given these considerations about individuation, personhood, the divine nature, unity, etc., what does "God" means? Drake writes:

I have found that the word “God” can mean at least 6 things in this discussion: 1. The Father/Monarchy; Concreted person; 2. The Divine Nature; abstract substance; or that an uncreated person possesses a divine nature 3. Godhead 4.Source of operation; 5. Auto-theos: that is uncaused 6. An indirect sense in that the Logos and the Holy Spirit are called God as they inter-dwell (perichoresis) and are consubstantial with the Father.

Drake usually uses definitions 1, 4, and 5 when referencing "God." So, for example, Jesus is referred to as the Son of God. Just as the Son is a person, “God,” in this context, is a person – namely, the Father. As the Nicene Creed states, “We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen and unseen.” The one God is the Father. The Father alone is Monarch, autotheos, inoriginate, the principle of unity, etc. Drake doesn't use definition 3.

As for definitions 2 and 6, “God” may in this sense be predicated of the Son and Holy Spirit, but in these cases such is due the fact they are persons who are divine; that is, to say Jesus [or the Holy Spirit] is God is a reference to the essence communicated from the Father. Even in this sense, “God” is an adjectival predicate, not a subject.

The most serious charge against this position is that it implies tritheism rather than monotheism, and Christianity is a monotheistic religion. But this charge can be answered only when it is clarified who or what the "one God" is. On Drakes view, Christianity is monotheistic insofar as the Father is the only person of the Trinity of whom “God” can be predicated qua personhood (cf. definitions 1, 4, and 5): “On my Nicene view, being the one God is a hypostatic property of the Father, not a divine attribute.” This does not preclude the divinity of the Son and Spirit:

God is not three gods as in Tri-theism but God is the Father and with the Father are his Word and Spirit in whom the Father communicates the divine nature. There is only one God, one divine nature and one divine operation. God is the only cause though there are different agents of action in the world. Causality requires infallible operation to produce a uniform effect. The Father is this cause. God is static and immutable. Ad extra the action of God is one in that all things are different aspects of one eternal act. This eternal act is governed by the plurality of Ideas or Thoughts in God as his nature Ad Intra. This eternal act is good because it is in accord with his divine nature/thought affirmations.

Does this mean that on Drake's view, Christianity is tritheistic with respect to definitions 2 and 6 for "God"? Yes. But since whenever Scripture references the "one God" it is always with reference to the Father, this is irrelevant. In the contexts of Scripture in which monotheism is emphasized, only definitions 1, 4, and 5 are applicable anyways. Where, then, is the error? It's principle of individuation coupled with it's rejection of an abstract divine nature as the principle of unity among the Trinity precludes Sabellianism. It's rejection of the Son and Spirit as created in favor of the monarchy of the Father as presented in Scripture, the original Nicene creed, and the Cappadocian Fathers precludes Arianism. Unitarianism appears to be an undefined catch-all which, if applied in this instance without accompanying counter-arguments, would signal a pejorative hit-and-run tactic.

None of this is meant to imply I have no more questions or concerns about this view. But then, those questions or concerns are not solely related to Trinitarianism. For instance, I still have questions about which theory of time is true or whether the idea of multiple possible worlds is intelligible, and the implications of Drake's strict view of the Trinity would seem to demarcate what possibilities are live options. But then, I'm going to have the same or similar questions with respect to any Trinitarian position, and I'd probably have further questions specifically relevant to that Trinitarian view.

To conclude then, Drake's view is the most coherent I have read. I would recommend his posts on Triadology (cf. here, here, here, and here), particularly for the sections of Scriptural support for his preference in using definitions 1, 4, and 5 for "God."

* Personal note: a thanks to Drake for reviewing this post and making some suggestions.

The Procession of the Spirit and the Filioque

I know of very few Scripturalists who make significant contributions to the common philosophy that Clark, Robbins, Cheung, etc. have each developed in his own way. Being able to read, retain, and reproduce what good arguments these men have learned by God’s grace and revelation is a worthy goal. But I think that Scripturalists who attempts to further this common philosophy deserve recognition. As it seems to me that Drake Shelton’s Triadology is an instance of this, I want to provide a summary of and comment on his view for those who are, like I was and to some extent still am, unacquainted with the eastern perspective of the Trinity.

While I continue the process of summarization, I wanted to comment on five objections Drake makes against the Filioque, an issue I think is a little more open-ended than some other doctrines related to the Trinity. Drake seems to agree when he writes, “I do not have that strong of a feeling about the doctrine but I must say that much heresy and division could have been avoided if the root errors of the Filioque would have been exposed.” He does proceed to defend single procession, however. I think these arguments are interesting but ultimately require elaboration in order to be sound proofs that the Filioque is false:

Argument 1. Drake cites Robert Letham as saying “Augustine’s beginning with the trinity rather than with the Father, as the Cappadocians had done, together with his stress on the divine simplicity, makes the Filioque almost inevitable.” From this, Drake concludes, “if Divine Simplicity is wrong, so is Filioque.” But this does not follow, for the Filioque could be [almost] inevitable for reasons other than divine simplicity. Of course, the onus would be on the one who affirms the Filioque to provide these reasons, but that seems to be what most of these arguments come down to. Rather than refuting the Filioque, it seems to volley the burden of proof back to the proponent of the Filioque. In a post on the Monarchy of the Father, Drake says, "If then the Father is Monarch/hypostatic origin and cause, causality need not be predicated of the Son and therefore need not posit the Filioque." It's true that, given the available evidence, the Filioque seems superfluous. But impossible? I don't know that these arguments go so far as to show that. Scripture seems to be silent on the ontological relation between the Spirit and Son, which, if true, is why Argument 2 fails:

Argument 2. Drake asserts that the Filioque “posits a subordination of the Holy Spirit.” I believe I am correct in stating that Drake means to imply this is unacceptable due to an underlying premise: as persons, the Holy Spirit is co-equal with the Son. But this premise is not established. If the Son and Spirit can be subordinate to the Father, why not the Spirit to the Son? Now, the silence of Scripture can cut both ways. Instead of the Spirit proceeding from the Father and Son, perhaps the Son is generated by the Father and Spirit. So I hope I'm not giving the impression that I lean towards acceptance of the Filioque. On the contrary, my intuitions lie in the opposite direction. But that's not enough, which is why I hope this post will lead to a definitive answer.

Argument 3. The Filioque “confuses the distinct properties among the divine Persons.” Why must “cause” be a predicate of the Father alone? Even if the Filioque is true, aseity would remain a distinguishing property of the Father. Furthermore, even if the Father and Son shared a common predicate that the Spirit does not, this would only be relevant if the Spirit can be shown to necessarily be co-equal with the Son.

Argument 4. The Filioque is said to posit “the Son as a cause and therefore a Father.” One defense against this could be that the Son cannot be a "Father" unless He were unoriginate. After all, the Monarchy of the Father is said to be the principle of unity among the persons of the Trinity; the Son and Spirit are identified as such in accordance to their relation to the Father from whom they ultimately logically derive, not according to the way in which they relate to each other.

Argument 5. Drake cites Photius as asking, “what does the Spirit gain which He did not already possess in His procession from the Father?” I'm not sure this is phrased as well as it could have been, so if I may, Photius' problem with the Filioque is this:

The Son extends from or is generated by the nature of the Father. The Father and the Son are consubstantial; that is, the one divine nature is predicated of distinct individuals. The Spirit is also consubstantial with the Father and Son. Given this, how can the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son as well as the Father? In what way could the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

It cannot be from the divine nature of the Son that the Spirit proceeds, for there is nothing in the divine nature of the Son which could supplement the divine nature of the Father in the procession of the Spirit. The divine nature just refers to a set of predicable attributes that identify a subject as divine. The Son possesses no more of these attributes than the Father - the Son is not "more divine" than the Father, as if that could even make sense.

This means, however, that if the Spirit extends from the Father's nature at all, to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well is to say that He proceeds from the Son in some respect other than from His nature. But what, then?

That is the argument. But here too the argument would end with an open-ended question. It seems to me that a full refutation of the Filioque depends on answers to one of these questions:

• Is there a subordination of the Spirit to the Son?
• Does the Filioque stem from absolute divine simplicity, or is there another reason one could believe it?
• Is causality a property of the Father alone?
• Does causality imply fatherhood? If so, so what?
• Can the Spirit be said to proceed from the Son in some respect other than His nature? Why not?

To me, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th questions seem the most promising.