Generic unity refers to unity among multiple distinct
species according to the genus or genera under which they may be subsumed. So,
for example, Peter, Paul, and John are generically united because of each the
definition of “human,” “male,” “Jew,” etc. may be univocally applied though
distinctly possessed. They are individual members of the same classes.
I have been told by a fellow Scripturalist that I don’t
have “any understanding of numeric as opposed to generic unity as it relates to
the Trinity” (link).
Let’s see what Gordon Clark has to say and, in the process, evaluate Clark’s related
beliefs.
His clearest exposition of numeric unity is found in Ancient Philosophy (pgs. 112-113). In
context, Clark is expositing Plato’s theory of Ideas by providing a few
historical criticisms. One such criticism was that an individual Idea or
objects of thought “could not be present with two other objects at the same
time, though such presence is necessary because the Idea Animal must be
simultaneously present with the Idea Horse and the Idea Dog” (pg. 112). That
is, Dog and Horse could not be distinct [sub-]species of Animal. Humoring the
argument, Clark writes:
The Animal in the illustration
is either numerically one or not. Since it is individual, the more plausible
alternative is its numerical unity. If, then, this Animal is one, we have an
animal which both barks and neighs” (pg. 113)
That is, the Ideas Dog and Horse would be [numerically]
united such that they would refer to the same animal. Dog and Horse may mean,
imply, or connote different predicates of this one animal – the animal can bark
because it is a dog and neigh because it is a horse – but the referent would be
identical. This is precisely how I view numeric unity.
In my question to Sean on the subject of numeric unity, I
asked: “Have you accepted numeric unity after all? Is there but one Trinitarian
mind and will?” The reason numeric unity would imply one mind and will
rather than three is because the referent of “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit”
would be the same [person], a fact which is plainly Sabellian. So why doesn’t
Sean answer the question? I suspect it is because he knows where my argument is
headed: generic unity alone is an insufficient defense against the charge of
tritheism. Clark recognized this too. More on this later.
Clark’s response to the aforementioned criticism of
Plato’s theory of Ideas can be traced from Plato himself through Augustine.
Clark notes that Aristotle used the same method of definition as Plato: “State
the genus, then add the difference; this gives the species. The whole universal
tree descends from the supreme genus to the infimae,
lowest species” (Logic, pg. 24).
Plato viewed the relation between species and genus as follows:
As Plato so clearly said in his Parmenides,
the Idea, or genus, is not like a canopy or tent in which each man is directly
under only a part of the covering. The Idea or definition must be complete in
every individual case, or – in better Platonic language – every man must
participate in the whole Idea. (The Atonement,
pg. 112)
Neo-Platonists
developed the idea of participation:
…if there be an object which completely realizes the Idea, still the
Idea and the object remain distinct; the Idea never becomes the exclusive
possession of the object but may also be present with other objects as well,
with the same integral presence. The root of all difficulty in explaining
participation is the tendency to think in spatial terms. Omnipresence is not
hard to understand if one grasps clearly that it is the omnipresence of a
spaceless and timeless entity. (Ancient
Philosophy, pg. 245)
This philosophical tradition
was improved by Augustine, who converted to Christianity from Neo-Platonism:
Plato had Ideas. Augustine has
truths or propositions. In reading what Augustine wrote, most people fail to
note what he did not write; namely, they fail to note that he has no theory of
abstraction. Instead of abstract ideas, he has truths. The present treatise
follows Augustine on this point: There are no such things as abstraction and
abstract ideas. (The Trinity, Individuation)
Finally, Clark
himself connects this transition from Ideas to propositions to the unity
between subjects and predicates, species and genera, members and classes:
All items of knowledge are
judgments or predications. A term, such as triangle,
by itself cannot be either true or false. But if one says, “the triangle is an
isosceles triangle,” or, “the triangle is a four-sided figure,” one has said
something either true or false. All judgments are classifications. The triangle
is classified under the species of isosceles triangle, or, falsely, under the
class of four-sided figures. Two terms, therefore, the subject and the
predicate, are brought together. Thus the mind imposes unity on experience by
judging or classifying. Since judgments or propositions are the products of the
mind’s unifying activity, the several types of judgment are witnesses to
several functions of unity. These are the categories, the non-empirical
contribution of the mind to knowledge – the prerequisites of learning. They are
not based on or derived from experience, but rather the possibility of
meaningful experience depends on them. (A Christian View of Men and Things, pgs. 218-219)
In sum, the “participation” of one truth in another is
non-rivalrous. That is, the definitions of “dog” and “horse” can both include
the definition of “animal” without its needing to be the case that there is
just one animal in question, a numerically singular animal to which any
reference to “dog” or “horse” would co-refer.
Rather, than being numerically united, then, the
definitions of “dog” and “horse” are united by the possession of a common genus
or class as a predicate in their respective definitions. This is possible
because “a genus is not one of its included individuals” (The Trinity, Individuation); an animal is not a dog or horse per se. To speak of what a genus such as
animal “is” means to define it, in which case “animal” is the subject, whereas
in the case of species such as “dog” and “horse,” “animal” functions as a
predicate. In its place as one predicate among many in these definitions we may
substitute the predicates found in the definition of “animal” without a loss of
meaning, but then it is obvious that there is a distinction between the genus
[as a subject] and the species which possesses the genus [as a predicate]. In
other words, the numerical oneness or distinctness of “animal” is unaffected by
many species “participating” in it. Furthermore, in that same chapter in The Trinity, Clark notes:
…species and genera can be counted as well as individuals. This pussy,
Timothy Ticklepitchers by name, and this puppy, Sport, are two numerically
different animals. But feline and canine are also numerically different
species. One is as numerical as the other. We can count and number species as
easily as we can individuals.
In keeping with the previous illustration, not only is
“animal” a genus under which species (dog, horse, etc.) can be generically
united, but it is also itself just one among many species which may in turn be
subsumed under a broader class or genus like “living creature.” Extrapolation
from this fact begs the question: if, in this process of classification and
definition, there is a lowest limit – individuals which cannot function as a
genus (“non-aristotelian infimae species”
per Clark’s Chapter on Augustine in The
Trinity) – is there an upper limit, a genus that is not a species or
sub-category of some broader genus or class? Yes, though what this limit is may
depend on the sort of definition one is interested in:
A good enough beginning for the
problem of definition, but only a beginning, is the distinction between
connotative and denotative definitions. In fact we may say that the term definition is itself equivocal. Suppose
now we wish to define the term eligible
voters in such and such a locality. This may be done by saying, A person
eligible to vote must be an American citizen, above a certain age, a resident
of the State for one year (or whatever the State specifies), and a resident of
the precinct for sixty days before the election, and registered. This is call
connotative definition, because it lists the necessary and sufficient
qualifications. The qualifications are necessary: That is, if any one of them
is lacking, the person is ineligible to vote. The qualifications are also
sufficient: No further qualification can be required. There is, however,
another way to define eligible voters.
This is called a denotative definition. A denotative definition explicitly
mentions every individual – person, place, or thing – in the class. (Logic, pg. 21)
Denotatively, the upper limit of classification can be
said to be existence, reality, or being. These words are simply meant to
encompass what “is,” viz. everything. Clark’s dislike of using these words as
predicates stems from the fact that they can, in some sense, be applied to every
subject. Because they cannot distinguish any one subject from another, they don’t
really serve a useful connotative function: can anything fail “to be [real or
existent]”? No. Everything qualifies ipso
facto. This is why Clark considered himself to be a Realist. On the other
hand, an exhaustive denotative list of everything is useful because knowledge
requires distinctions and distinctions imply multiple subjects or material from
which a hierarchy of classifications can be demonstrated, the total sum of
which is just existence, reality, or being that an omniscience would know. But as this is becoming somewhat
beside the intended point of this post, I digress.
To lay the groundwork for understanding the way[s] in
which Clark believed the persons of the Trinity are united, it will be useful to see
how Clark viewed the unity of men. In The
Biblical Doctrine of Man, Clark states, using A.A. Hodge’s The Atonement as a foil against which to
discuss the proper perspective of the relationship between traducianism and Realism:
How could Adam’s descendants be
personally guilty and merit God’s punishment? Hodge objects to the Realism of
W.G.T. Shedd, whom he represents as saying (not a verbatim quotation from
Shedd) that “Adam was the entire genus
homo, as well as the first individual… every individual member [of the
human race] was physically and numerically one with him… hence the whole genus
is guilty…. This is the Realistic view recently advocated… by Dr. William G.T.
Shedd” (p. 99). On the next two pages he reiterates the idea that we “were really and numerically one with Adam” and that “this Realistic theory of our numerical oneness with Adam is an
essential element of the doctrine….”
Realism of course asserts the real
existence of the human genus. This is an Idea in God’s mind and it is a real
object of knowledge. But it is hard to imagine any Realist identifying the
perfect eternal Idea with a temporal and imperfect individual. The relationship
of Adam to the Idea is precisely the same as the relationship of any other
individual man to the Idea. The individuals “participate” in, or are all
“patterned after” the Idea; but the notion that one individual is “physically
and numerically one” with Adam is enough to send poor Plato to his grace in
despair…
There must be some sort of
Adamic existence and unity; this unity surely has something to do with both
body and soul; and the species man was eternally in God’s mind as truly as Adam
was created. But these indubitable truths do not justify an assertion of the numerical and physical unity of each human being with Adam. Could Shedd or anyone
else ever have held that I am physically and numerically Adam, and that you are
too, and that therefore you and I are the numerically identical body now
sitting in this chair? (pgs. 48-50)
Again, on Clark’s view, everything is “real” or “exists”
in some sense. Every subject has predicates. Even an arbitrary jumble of
letters not meant to mean or refer to anything can be said to be “an arbitrary
jumble of letters not meant to mean or refer to anything” – this predicate is
meaningful, even if the intention of the speech is not. So a genus or “Idea” is real, a point
whose importance will emerge later when discussing why Clark believes that “God
is one substance and three Persons” (The
Trinity, More On Terminology) harmonizes monotheism with Trinitarianism.
Clark corrects Hodge’s misunderstanding of Realism in two
important ways. Firstly, the idea that Adam is the entire human genus is false
if such is a statement of identity – Adam is no more or less man than Plato,
Clark, or I am. All individuals distinctly “participate” in Ideas – or more
precisely, propositions. Unity among men is not to be found in numerical
identification between any one individual and a genus. This should be fairly
obvious, as Adam has a physical body whereas the “Idea” of man is not. As was mentioned
above, “participation” is not spatial.
Secondly, unity among men is also not to be found in
numerical identification among individuals. While participation in an Idea is
not spatial, the assertion that men are numerically united once again is viewed
by Clark as implying that two different words or statements refer to the same
object. In this case, the simplest way to show that no two human individuals
are numerically united is to note that no two human individuals are bodily
identical. Several pages later, Clark reiterates both this and the fact no
genus is one of its individual members:
Hodge (Systematic Theology II, p. 217) admits President Edwards’ theory of
original sin “is not exactly the old realistic theory.” Indeed it is not.
Edwards was not a realist at all. He was an empiricist, deeply influenced by
Locke and Berkeley. Hence objections to Edwards damage neither realism nor
traducianism. But Hodge wants to convict realism, even apart from Edwards. He
writes (p. 221) “the realistic doctrine… makes the numerical sameness of
substance the essence of identity. Every genus or species of plants or animals
is one because all the individuals of those genera and species are partakers of
one and the same substance. In every species there is but one substance of
which the individuals are the modes of manifestations.” From this he infers
that realism must identify the individual Adam with the individuals Peter and
Paul.
But the difficulty, and of
course there are others also, lies in the word substance. This is the word that causes difficulty in the doctrine
of the Trinity. Since substance is
Latin, and since it was given a different meaning from its Greek cognate hypostasis, one wants to know what
Hodge means by it. If we use the medieval Latin, we would not say that “in
every species there is but one substance.” We would say, “every species is one
substance.” Taking this back to Aristotle, this means that every species has a
fixed definition. Plato would have
said that the individuals participate
in the Idea. In this way an individual could be called a mode of the Idea’s or
definition’s manifestation. But this is far from identifying one mode of manifestation
with another mode. That is, this is far from identifying the individual Adam
with the individual Peter or Paul.
It is also far from identifying
Adam with the species homo sapiens. A
late Neoplatonist, Porphyry (c. 275), got his name attached to the phrase “a
tree of Porphyry.” This is a dichotomous scheme of classification. For example,
Living Being is divided into immortal and mortal; mortal is divided into
rational and irrational; irrational is divided into plant and animal. Now,
then, this individual dachshund, Zephi, is a “manifestation” of the essence,
definition, or reality Dachshund. He
also participates in the essence of definition of Dog; and of Animal.
If anyone should suspect that
Porphyry in the third century of our era cannot be trusted as a representative
of Plato six centuries earlier, we may note that Plato’s dialogue Sophist begins with a playful
illustration of a “tree of Porphyry” in defining an angler. It eventually
discusses the highest Ideas of Being, Same, Other, Rest and Motion; and
concludes with another tree of Porphyry defining the Sophist. The dialogue Parmenides is too intricate to discuss
here.
But even if Adam and Peter are
“lowest species,” they are not identical with each other or with the higher
species homo. Someone may now object
that all this is too pagan. What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? This is the
device of escapism. It evinces a disinclination to serious study. Yet a
theologian may and ought to translate this material into more Biblical
terminology. So we say, God knows, has the idea of, defines man, Adam, and
Peter. God’s knowledge is clear and distinct. He does not confuse one
definition with another; he does not confuse Adam with Peter, or either one
with the definition of man. (The Biblical
Doctrine of Man, pgs. 69-71)
Here too we see a rejection of the numerical unity,
identity, or sameness of two individuals or of an individual and a genus. Each
has a distinct definition. But a hierarchy of classes shows how one [definition]
can “participate” in [a distinct definition of] another through incorporation.
Adam and Peter both are men because in the distinct definition of each one will
find that [the definition of] “man” is a predicate. In this way, individuals
may be said to be particular instances of whatever classes they can be traced
to on the “tree of Porphyry.”
It is unclear whether Clark would say that because genera
can also be categorized under broader genera – for genera can “participate” in
other “Ideas” – genera too can be modes, manifestations, or instances of higher
classes. Genera by definition have species: do modes, manifestations, and
instances only apply to concrete or particular individuals?
Regardless, if numerical identity is not the means by
which all men are united, what is? And how does this relate to the Trinity?
Clark answers this in several of his books, so we will examine each in turn. In
his article “The Trinity” (link),
he writes, “If there be any influence of Greek philosophy on the doctrine of
the Trinity, it would be in the relationship of the three Persons to the one
essence. This is very complicated. It involves the general philosophic problem
of unity in multiplicity.” Prefacing his explanation as to how there can be
“unity in multiplicity” in the Trinity, Clark replies to the problem more
generally by once again advocating “Realism”:
The solution the following pages
defend is the philosophy of Realism, often called Platonism. Strictly, it is
not Platonism, but rather the theory of ideas as transformed by Philo. The
term Realism, as opposed to empirical and nominalistic epistemology,
denotes any theory insisting that we know the real object, and not merely a
sensory image or representation of it. Plato called these real
objects Ideas. The argument is this: Suppose we have a lot of dice of
various sizes. They all have the same shape. Now, this shape is something real.
Even though the shape comes in different sizes, it is the same identical shape.
If sensory objects alone were real, there could be no idea of similarity or
identity, for none of the individual dice is itself similarity. Nor is any one
of the dice cube. If one of
the dice were the cube, and if only sense objects are real, then no other die
could be cube. Hence, there is a real object of knowledge, the cube. It is not
a sense object, not only for the preceding reason, but also because this cube
exists in many places at once, as no sense object can. Similarly, Plato united
all men under the Idea Man, all horses under the Horse, and all beautiful
things under real Beauty. With other arguments also Plato asserted the reality
of knowable intellectual objects.
Here, Clark associates “participation” with unity [among participants]. Species presuppose a real
genus, and it is by being subsumed under this genus that they are really
united - this is just what I mean by generic unity. Again, the Idea is not physical, which is why it can be “omnipresent”
or equally fully inherent in each participant; in Clark’s preferred terms, the
definition of the class can be univocally predicated of each member. So with
cubes, so with horses, so with men, and so too with the Trinity, as shall be
shown in the following citations:
Postponing the matter of the Tri-personality, let us first examine the
indivisibility of the substance. The term substance is an
unfortunately mistaken Latin translation. Athanasius spoke of one ousia and
insisted that the Three Persons were homoousioi, the same in ousia. Ousia means being (a participial
noun), reality, or definition. Charles Hodge, Volume I,
460, complains that homoousias can
mean either specific sameness or numerical identity. He then argues that
Athanasius intended the latter meaning. “In the former sense,” says Hodge, “all
spirits, whether God, angels, or men are [h]omoousioi because
they are all rational intelligences.” This is not, however, a good argument
against the specific, or generic, use of the term homoousios. While God,
angels, including Satan, and men are all rational intelligences, just as apple
trees, rose bushes, strawberries and plums are rosaceae, the homoousios of
Athanasius did not refer to the definition of rational intelligences, but to
the definition of God in Three Persons. Species may be defined. So may genera.
All the members of a genus are homoousioi.
All the members of a species are also homoousioi.
But the two homoousioi are
not the same ousia. All apple
trees belong to the same genus; but not all rosaceae are apple trees. The definition of the latter is more
restrictive than the definition of the former. Therefore Athanasius was
justified in asserting that the Three Persons were homoousioi, for this does not imply that men and angels are
specifically homoousioi with
the Three Persons. To make the point clearer, if that be necessary, not only
are God and angels homoousioi:
God, demons, men, plants, and even rocks are homoousioi. But this does not transmute worms into Deity.
Hodge, of course, is quite correct in saying that the Council took homoousios and homoiousios in radically different
senses. But he has not disproved the specific unity of the Godhead. (The Trinity, The Athanasian Creed)
I am not exactly sure what Clark had in mind when he said
“God, demons, men, plants, and even
rocks are homoousioi.” He may
have meant that each are at least included in the denotative list of all things: God,
demons, men, plants, and rocks are all “real.” But in Trinitarian
contexts, to say the persons of the Trinity are homoousioi is to say they are species of the genus “God.” All the
members of a genus are homoousioi –
the same in ousia – yet not the same ousia. That is, they are the same in
being or definition, but not the same being or definition. In one respect, the same
definition may be said to apply to each – in this case, the definition of “God”
– but as this definition does not exhaust any of the persons, the persons may
yet differ in some other respect such that they are specifically but not numerically
the same:
One substance or essence means
that neither the Father nor the Son is an “essence.” Each is a “person.” Only
the Trinity as such is an “essence.” The confusion here and in the footnote
above disappears, or at least is alleviated, by using the word definition instead
of essence; and also by remembering that the Son has an “essence” that is
different from the “essence” of the Father, but which in both cases contains
the “essence” of Deity. The definition of Deity does not define the Son; nor
can the definition of the Son apply to Deity. A succulent does not have all the
qualities of a cactus, but the latter has all of the characteristics of the
former. That is to say, the Trinity or Godhead, absolutely and as such, does
not have the characteristics of any one Person, absolutely and as such; but
each Person has all the predicates of Deity. Note that the word here is Deity,
not Father. (The Trinity, Augustine)
Simplified: each Trinitarian person or species distinctly
yet univocally possesses the genus “God.” Hence the label “specific” or
“generic” unity: the species are united; the genus is that which unites. Not
only does Clark equate specific and generic unity in his article “The Trinity,”
but he also explicitly notes that the persons of the Trinity are united in the
same sense men are united and uses this to in part explain why he thinks
monotheism and Trinitarianism are compatible:
Now, when we face the subject of
the Trinity – the common unity in the three Persons – may we not say that the
three Persons share or communicate the common characteristics of omnipotence,
omniscience, and so forth, and so constitute one essence? The Platonic point of
view makes this essence a reality, as truly as Man and Beauty are real. Were
the essence not a reality, and the Persons therefore the only realities, we
should have tritheism instead of monotheism.
But if anyone assert that it is
completely wrong to begin with realistic epistemology, it is enough to recall
that nominalism provides no basis for the imputation of righteousness and
justification by faith. Or even for talking about the human race. For any
doctrine, it is necessary that the cube be a real object of knowledge.
A more substantial objection is
that unity in the Godhead cannot be the unity of a species or a genus. The
three Persons are one in a stricter, deeper, more inexplicable sense than the
sense in which three or thirty men are one. Whether this objection is plausibly
true or not depends on the sense in which men are one and the sense in which
the Trinity is one. Those who make this objection should define the two senses
(if indeed they are two) and point out the distinction. Unless we know how the
Persons are one and how men are one, we cannot tell whether the unity is the
same or different. But the objectors hardly define specific unity and disclaim
ability to define divine unity. Their wording, however, suggests that they are
using Aristotelian terminology and have misunderstood Plato.
Hodge wrote (Systematic Theology, II, 59), “the whole
nature of essence is in the divine person [each one], but the human person
[each one] is only a part of the common human nature” [Hodge is quoting W. G.
T. Shedd, History of Christian
Doctrine, II, 120. -Ed.] This is a confusing sentence. To fit the argument,
it ought to read, “the whole nature or essence is in the divine person, but
only a part of the common human nature is in the human person.” If the sentence
is not so interpreted, the antithesis Hodge wants to assert-the antithesis
between the unity in God and the unity in men-vanishes. Yet this
interpretation, the only one that preserves the antithesis, makes the second
half of the sentence false; for if a part of human nature were lacking in an
object, if the definition of that object did not include every part of the
definition of man, if the man did not participate in the whole Idea, that
object would not be an individual man. A man is a man only because the entire
definition fits.
The arguments of the eminent
American theologian fail completely to show that epistemological realism, and
especially the assertion that there are eternal Ideas in the mind of God, are
inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. But it must be made likewise
clear, in the interest of sound logic, that the failure of Hodge’s arguments do
not prove the identity of the type of unity among men with the type of unity
among the three Persons of the Trinity. It remains an unrefuted plausible
option. It seems to be the best solution ever proposed. But it still may be and
undoubtedly is inadequate.
Taking note of Clark’s proposed solution first, he says
the divine attributes may be predicated of each person of the Trinity. They are
therefore specifically or generically united in some sense. Furthermore, “The
attributes constitute the definition of God” (The Trinity, Hodge and Berkhof). This definition, like the
definition of “man,” is as real as the persons or definitions of whom these
definitions may be predicated, so Clark puts forward the argument that monotheism is true because there is just one
[real] definition of “God” – the divine attributes – that is applied to each
person.
The primary objection to this is that if there is one God
in the same sense that there is one man – one generic definition applied to
each species – then there would be nothing to prevent us from saying that there
are three Gods just as we say there are “three or thirty men.” So even though
there is but one definition of “God,” tritheism is still a real danger. Indeed,
Clark does not even attempt to reply to this objection in the article. His
conclusion here is simply that while the unity among the persons of the Trinity
is parallel to the unity among men, “it still may be and undoubtedly is
inadequate.” Elsewhere, however, he attempts an answer:
It is interesting to see how
Gregory relates the generic Man to the One God. In a letter (?) to
Ablabius, On ‘Not Three Gods’ (331-336),
he raises the question why, if Peter, James, and John are one human nature, but
three men, why are not the Three Persons, of the same nature, three Gods? With
unintentional understatement he remarks that this is a difficult question. All
men, he continues, have the same nature. Similarly an army has a nature, and
though each soldier has an individual name, the nature cannot be divided.
However, in the case of God, the matter is more complicated. Gregory’s answer
seems to be that God’s nature is unnameable and unspeakable. God is indeed
incorruptible, but this word does not express God’s nature in essence. When we
say that God is incorruptible, we say that his nature suffers no corruption,
but we do not say what that nature is.
Yet, Gregory admits, this does
not solve the problem: If there is one common nature, why are there not three
Gods? The Godhead signifies an operation, not a nature. Philosophy is an
operation, but there are three philosophers. Gregory replies, perhaps lamely,
that although the Godhead is an operation, like shoemaking or philosophy, and
not a nature, the men operate independently, but the Three Persons always act
conjointly, and their operation is one, not three operations. For example, he
adds, a sinner does not have three regenerations. Therefore there are not three
Gods. (The Trinity, Three
Intermediates)
While first paragraph should clarify that Clark’s
references to “one nature” or “same nature” is to be taken in a generic rather
than numeric sense, it’s worth repeating. Men are not numerically united. The
Father, Son, and Spirit are not numerically united. As the aforementioned dog-horse illustration shows, that would lead to Sabellianism. There is one
definition but multiple possessions of that one definition. There is not one
omniscient mind, though there may be one definition of “omniscient mind.”
Actually, Clark’s primary method of individuation necessitates three omniscient
minds:
Though they are all equally
omniscient, they do not all know the same truths. Neither the complex of truths
we call the Father nor those we call the Spirit, has the proposition, “I was
incarnated.” This proposition occurs only in the Son’s complex. Other examples
are implied. The Father cannot say, “I walked from Jerusalem to Jericho.” Nor
can the Spirit say, “I begot the Son.” Hence the Godhead consists of three
persons, each omniscient without having precisely the same context. (The Incarnation, pgs. 54-55)
Naturally, human beings are
mutable: Their thoughts or minds change. The three Persons of the Godhead are
immutable because their thoughts never change. They never forget what they now
know, they never learn something new, in fact they have never learned anything.
Their thought is eternal. Since also the three Persons do not have precisely
the same set of thoughts, they are not one Person, but three. If substance were
the principle of individuation – for we have seen that space-time cannot be –
then there could not be three Persons. Identity of substance would mean
identity of person. If then substance, for this and other reasons, is not the
principle of individuation, the theologians referred to should explain what
their principle is. (The Trinity,
Individuation)
More precise would be to say that though each person
knows the same truths and propositions – meanings of statements – they are able
to state their knowledge differently. This variance in ability is entirely due
to the utterer, not the content of what it uttered per se. One can refer to oneself or one’s ego with the indexical
“I.” Such reflexive utterances would mean the same thing as [others’] statements in
which the name of the person is substituted for the indexical he would use, for the referent
is the same in both cases – so it is the same propositional knowledge – but still, only the first person can state the proposition with the indexical without a
loss of or change in meaning. At any rate, Clark is correct that the Father, Son, and Spirit have different
thoughts. Distinct persons and thoughts both imply distinct minds, and Clark
implies as much when he equates “a person” with “a mind, an intelligence” (The Trinity, The Holy Spirit).
I mention all this because I find it strange that Clark
would be inclined to agree with Gregory of Nyssa that the joint operation of
the Trinitarian persons is the principle of unity which suffices for Trinitarians
to legitimately believe in one God rather than three. If the “Godhead signifies
an operation, not a nature,” then Godhead and God do not mean the same thing.
For Clark agrees with Berkhof and Gill that “God” is His attributes and His
attributes are His nature:
The Biblical data, as it seems
to me, adequately support Berkhof’s assertion that “God and his attributes are
one” (44). Psalm 85:10 gives literary expression to this idea: “Mercy
and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.”
The Scriptures give no hint of a quality-less ousia to which separate
attributes are somehow glued on. “Neither can they be regarded as something
added to the Being of God.”
In this Berkhof agrees with John
Gill, who also held that “the attributes of God...are not other than God
himself, and neither differ from one another, but with respect to their objects
and effects, and in our manner of conception of them; nor from the nature and
essence of God: they are himself and his nature...” (A Body of Divinity, I, iv,
34, column 2). (The Trinity, Hodge
and Berkhof)
One Godhead or [joint] operation, then, would not answer the tritheistic objection. There would still be three possessions of
the one definition of “God.” To be sure, this definition may necessitate cooperative
rather than independent action, but this does not establish monotheism. Monotheism
pertains to the immanent or ontological Trinity, not the economic Trinity, so
reference to the activity of the persons seems out of place in this discussion
anyway.
But sometimes Clark himself is less than clear in his usage terminology, so it is difficult to follow
what meaning of Godhead he intends. Does he really think “Godhead” means the
operation of the persons per Gregory of Nyssa? Or does he think it refers to
the “qualities” or “attributes” the persons have in common?
The orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity certainly teaches that the Father and Son are equal in power and glory,
and, as equally eternal, they may be called equally ultimate. But the Father is
not to be equated with unity and the Son with plurality. The three persons are
the plurality and the Godhead is the unity. The Godhead is not one of the
persons as distinct from another, but rather the common reality shared by the
three. Such is our partial answer to the objections of Islam, and also to some
confused American theologians. But whether the group of common qualities, the
Godhead, is more ultimate than any one of the three persons who share these
attributes, and whether “ultimate” means “generic,” for certainly there is no
chronological precedence in this argument, are questions more properly discussed
in a systematic theology than in an exegesis of Colossians. (Commentaries on
Paul’s Epistles, pg. 204)
Clark certainly doesn’t seem satisfied with Gregory of
Nyssa’s answer, which he admitted was perhaps lame. But then, I don’t see that
Clark provides a significantly different answer. Clark writes that “…the Trinity
has three Persons but only one will”
(The Incarnation, pg. 22), and he
uses this fact in what may be his most direct explanation as to how the unity
among the persons of the Trinity is superior to the unity among men:
Naturally the Persons of the
Trinity are one in the sense that all men are one, and all horses; but it does
not follow that the three Persons are one only in that sense. For example, three
human beings have three wills; but the three Persons of the Trinity have but
one will. Hence the diversification of human beings is not identical to the
diversification of the Persons, for which reason we cannot assert that the two
unities are completely identical. (The
Atonement, pg. 117)
However, if this is intended to explain how there are not three
Gods, it seems to be very similar to be Gregory of Nyssa’s answer. It depends
on whether “operation” is synonymous with “will.” If so, then the above
criticisms apply. But in any case, is “one will” to be taken generically or
numerically? If the former, saying the persons of the Trinity are “of one will” insofar as they
distinctly will unto to the same ends, goals, or purposes seems little
different than the fact that the Trinity is “of one mind.” And as men could
hypothetically be completely of one mind or will and remain three distinct men,
the persons of the Trinity could be completely of one mind and will and remain
three distinct Gods.
So even if the following citations can somehow be squared
with the idea that the three persons of the Trinity each possess a numerically distinct
will which nevertheless cannot act apart from the wills of the other persons,
this affirmation of generic unity would not explain how the unity of will in
the Trinity differs in nature from unity possible among men, let alone why it means
that there is one God in a sense significantly different than all other genera such
that the fact three species of the genus may each be called “God” does not in
turn imply three Gods:
God sent His Son. Christ did not
come of his own individual volition. He was sent. This does not mean that he
was unwilling and reluctant to come. In fact, the phrase ‘his own individual
volition’ is very poor theology. The three Persons of the Trinity have but one
will. On earth Christ did not act on his own volition: “I did not come of
myself (on my own authority), but he who sent me is true”; and, “I do nothing
on my own authority, but as the Father has taught me, these things I speak”
(the Gospel 7:28, 8:28, 42). (First John,
pg. 134)
…one would ordinarily think that
a person must have a will. But the orthodox doctrine allows the
three persons of the Trinity to have one will only, while surprisingly the
incarnate Jesus has two wills, one divine, one human; and yet even with a human
will, and “reasonable soul,” he is not a human person. (The Trinity, The Athanasian Creed)
Thus the begetting of the Son
occurs, and the Son as a Person exists, by a necessity of the divine nature –
the nature of the divine will. Later this theme may become complicated, or
simplified, by the identification of the Father’s will, the Son’s will, and the
Spirit’s will as one will. (The Trinity,
Eternal Generation)
If, as is apparent, Clark means that there is really just
one numeric will, how is that metaphysically possible? How can wills of persons
be numerically united without persons being numerically united? The ambiguity
of what it means for there to be “one will” is surprising, given Clark’s usual
antipathy for imprecise terminology.
Does this mean Father will to die on cross? How can one
person love another if there is only one numeric will? Doesn’t agreement
between two parties presuppose numerically distinct wills and, if so, how is
the covenant of redemption possible on Clark’s view? How can the persons have
different thoughts if each does not distinctly possess a will whereby He is able
to assent to differently indexed statements?
It does not look like Clark has any other answer than to
return to the idea that monotheism is true because, as a genus, “God” is numerically
distinct from all other subjects. It has a unique definition. That returns us to the problem of why we may
say there are three men but not three Gods. Or if there really is only one man, is
there only one “person”? For there are a great many individuals of whom “person”
can be predicated. Does the fact that these are species of the genus
“Person” imply that there is one person? Is Clark a solipsist? Doubtful. Does it not make more sense to say that while the definition of
“person,” “man,” and “God,” is the same in each case of predication, because the
members’ possessions of it are distinct, they are each able to be counted as numerically distinct instances
of the Idea? If not, what has happened to the “omnipresence” of the Idea?
It appears that despite his best efforts, Clark did not harmonize monotheism with Trinitarianism. So what is there left to say? For starters, I think I know what generic and numeric unity mean. Additionally, on the one hand, Trinity and
Trinitarianism are not words found in Scripture. Scripture does not bind our
conscience to these labels. On the other hand, what these labels represent in
church history is relevant insofar as the persons associated with the label
accurately explain and defend Scripture. I am a Scripturalist, but I recognize
the practical function of history. If I didn’t, I wouldn’t refer to myself as a
Calvinist, Protestant, etc. And I believe Clark agreed:
After the time of the apostles
the immediate need of the church was to formulate and defend the deity of
Christ, which it did in the doctrine of the Trinity in the Nicene Creed. (Predestination, pg. 82)
Some theologians, whose
Christianity is in doubt, assert that the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine
of Athanasius, is seriously deformed by a large admixture of Greek philosophy.
If the reader takes the good advice to turn immediately to Athanasius’ On the Decree, he may be amazed at the
amount of Scripture he uses, and the virtually complete absence of Greek
philosophy – only one short reference in the whole book, if I remember
correctly. (First John, pg. 154)
If, as Clark thinks, Trinitarianism is represented by the
Nicene Creed and Athanasian doctrine – and I would certainly agree – then I
would and will argue that these and other primary Trinitarian sources certainly permit Trinitarians to hold to the subordination of the Son, the Monarchy of the Father, and the denial of
numeric unity among the persons of the Trinity or between these persons and the
divine nature. That is to say, they permit the idea that the Father is the metaphysical ground of the persons and definitions of the Son and Spirit, and the resultant perichoretic unity is able to account for their unity in mind, will, and nature as well as biblical monotheism and Trinitarianism. These men and creeds are fallible, but there is much about
Scripture which can be learned through them. To conclude, then, I still insist
I at the very least hold to an orthodox strain of historic Trinitarianism.
11 comments:
"these and other primary Trinitarian sources certainly permit Trinitarians to hold to the subordination of the Son, the Monarchy of the Father, and the denial of numeric unity among the persons of the Trinity or between these persons and the divine nature. That is to say, they permit the idea that the Father is the metaphysical ground of the persons and definitions of the Son and Spirit, and the resultant perichoretic unity is able to account for their unity in mind, will, and nature as well as biblical monotheism and Trinitarianism."
First time commenting here, but I have dialogued a bit with Drake over at his blog. In a short span of time, I have come to believe (Drake's writings have propelled me go back to the sources, re-examine Biblical passages, and helped to clear up some of my contradictory thinking even though I do not agree with every point he makes in some of his writings), the above citation, your conclusion, is correct.
Indeed, numeric unity results in confusion and Modalism, and that unavoidably so. Professing Christians are in a kind of "no man's land" concerning this weighty Doctrine and the fact that most of these "churches" have abrogated their responsibility to equip the saints in favor of fluff, is to result in the peril of many.
In short, I no longer believe that the SON and the HOLY SPIRIT are autotheos. That would clearly neccesitate a type of tritheism. The FATHER is the Monarch, the progenitor of the other two Persons. However, unlike I used to do, there is no need to shrink back as this is from all eternity. Along with you (if I followed you correctly), I understand the doctrine of perichoresis to be the key.........we can't extrapolate this Divine reality as men or project this truth onto human experience, but we can rest assured that it is taught in Scripture, and continually thrust it forth as a first rank reason why the hypostatical/economic subordination of the SON does not run into an essential inferiority. Also, it is the reason why the Persons as being homoousioi can be maintained, as generic, while solidifying unity in Trinity.
This is my understanding now. Still much to learn.
spudgin
"I am not exactly sure what Clark had in mind when he said “God, demons, men, plants, and even rocks are homoousioi.” He may have meant that each are at least included in the denotative list of all things: God, demons, men, plants, and rocks are all “real.”"
I think that is what he meant. Ok, back to reading...
Here's a question. Is a genus merely a label or collection of attributes shared by x number of species? Or is it the sum total of the species, collectively considered? You seem to be using it in the former sense. Is there another word you would use for the latter?
For instance, "man" can refer to a) a specific man (e.g. Ryan, Patrick, or Gordon), b) the list of predicates necessary for a specific individual to be classified as a specific "man" in the previous sense, or c)the human race itself, encompassing and including each and every specific man (including their individuating properties).
Thoughts?
Building on my previous comment, it seems the Athanasian Creed speaks of both these types of oneness: The three belong to the same genera, *and* they are collectively one God. The Nicene Creed, on the other hand, emphasizes the unity grounded in the Father. Then of course there is the unity of operation, goal, and desire, as well as the intellectual triunity that Parkinson highlights. I do not see any of these unifying principles as mutually exclusive, or why we must choose only one as "the" unifying principle of the Godhead.
"Here's a question. Is a genus merely a label or collection of attributes shared by x number of species? Or is it the sum total of the species, collectively considered? You seem to be using it in the former sense. Is there another word you would use for the latter?"
I think you are referring to Clark's distinction between denotative and connotative definitions. I - and Clark, I think - usually use the connotative definition.
"Building on my previous comment, it seems the Athanasian Creed speaks of both these types of oneness: The three belong to the same genera, *and* they are collectively one God."
Are you speaking of the denotative definition of "one God"? Do you not see a problem with that? We don't say Can we say that all persons are collectively one person? What does Scripture says the one God means?
"I do not see any of these unifying principles as mutually exclusive, or why we must choose only one as "the" unifying principle of the Godhead."
Because generic unity is insufficient.
"Are you speaking of the denotative definition of 'one God'?"
I think so.
"Do you not see a problem with that?"
No.
"Can we say that all persons are collectively one person?"
No.
"What does Scripture says the one God means?"
That's the question, isn't it? I would answer Jehovah, to which you would agree. But then when other passages point to Jesus as Jehovah, you say Christ is his representative, and not actually Jehovah, to which I would disagree.
Why can't we say that all persons are collectively one person by parity of reasoning?
"I would answer Jehovah, to which you would agree. But then when other passages point to Jesus as Jehovah, you say Christ is his representative, and not actually Jehovah, to which I would disagree."
To say YHWH is the one true God seems to interpose a needless middleman question, for I think the New Testament plainly affirms the Father to be the one or [only] true God. What passages do you think ought to be interpreted otherwise? Why does Jesus Himself say that the Father is His God and the only true God?
I think Calvin's treatment of this in Institutes, I, XIII.25-26 is good.
To what purpose? It seems to me this has been what you argued in a previous comment box, in which case my answer is the same. As I mentioned before, I think you and Calvin conflate the uncaused divine essence - which is indeed predicable of the Son and Spirit - with the Son's and Spirit's possession of the divine essence. Also, I disagree that the divine essence is aseity. It doesn't exist of itself any more than any one attribute in particular exists of itself. Metaphysically, it cannot be considered abstract from the Father, and that is to what aseity pertains. I also think his explanation of John 17:3 is inadequate, for the person He sent was the eternal Son, not the incarnate Son.
I am looking for some clarification on a comment Clark made.
In his The Trinity, Gordon Clark says there are three basic theories of individuation. The first one he addresses is Kant' time and space view.
Kant held that one thing is not another because of its position in space and time. In criminal law this becomes the defense by albi. I may look like a criminal, says the accused, .but I was not at that place at that time. Neither was Hegel there then, as he tossed his famous slip of paper out the window, but nonetheless he was guilty of murdering this theory. (Trinity, p. 103.)
DO you know what Dr. Clark referred to when he references this "famous slip of paper" and how is this a valid critique of Kant's theory?
Hi William,
I'm honestly not sure. I tried surfing google for a decent while and couldn't find anything concrete. Please let me know if you find out.
My suspicion: it could have something to do with Hegel's differing from Kant on whether space and time are purely subjectively real (i.e. Kant's transcendental idealism in which space and time are just forms of intuition, distinct from things as they allegedly are "in themselves" - Kant's Ding-an-Sich). In particular, I know Clark was heavily critical of the idea of a "Ding-an-Sich." He rejected a correspondence theory of truth in favor of a pure coherence theory of truth (like Hegel). In fact, as expressed in his book The Trinity, he believed men themselves to actually be collections of propositions or thoughts (which I disagree with, but I'm just theorizing about Clark's quote you mentioned). So I imagine Clark might be referring to something in Hegel to the effect that since, for Kant, sensory appearances can be deceiving and subjective reality is not objective truth, therefore Kant's explanation fails.
Post a Comment