This is the first time in a long time I don’t feel as though I have writer’s block. I have had no shortage of topics on my mind, and as if I didn't have enough to blog about, Drake Shelton has written a response to an excursion I wrote on what Gordon Clark called necessitarianism, which he accepted by the time he wrote The Trinity after having previously rejected it. Even as Trinitarianism has become
clearer to me in the past several months – thanks in part to Drake – this
remains one fundamental issue on which I have been unable to agree with him. This
is what I wrote that Drake is responding to in his post:
Finding Scriptures which deal
with this issue will require consideration of logical implications, for to my
knowledge there is no explicit passage which addresses it. My current response
would be that nothing which occurs is unnecessary, for that would imply, as
Clarke wishes to avoid, that God’s will is arbitrary. Sure, on the assumption
that there are multiple possible worlds, God may have a reason for
instantiating some particular possible world, but as on Clarke’s view such a
reason would not be necessary, it would still be arbitrary. I may as well ask
what God’s reason was for choosing His reason for creating this possible world
over against any other reason capable of being chosen which might have led to
the instantiation of another possible world, and there could be no answer
because the reason itself was chosen arbitrarily. There are, however, several
objections to my own position – some made by Clarke and others I have received
from those who are in most other respects in agreement with my Trinitarian
views – so I will try to address them in a short amount of space.
Clarke thinks the idea that
something can be willed necessarily is a contradiction in terms. Thus, he,
Athanasius, and others dichotomize that which is willed from that which is a
“necessity of nature.” But I do not find his reasons for saying so persuasive:
he mentions that I might as well say that a man’s heart beats by his will, the
sun rises by man’s will, and a balance which turns necessarily turns by its
will. These are just examples of what a proof by example fallacy looks like.
What Clarke rather ought to have done is define what it means “to will” or “to
choose” or “to act.” As a Calvinist, I don’t have any problem with a definition
of these terms which excludes the notion of freedom of contrariety – the
ability to have willed, chosen, or acted differently than one did. In fact,
freedom of contrariety itself presupposes a definition of willing, choosing,
and acting. I would define these words in terms of the mind’s volitional
selection, determination, or performance.
Where the line is between providing
mere synonyms and providing a clear metaphysical definition can be challenging,
but in any case, I am in no worse a position than Clarke, who must also define
these terms. Until he does, the burden of proof is on him to explain why
necessity is mutually exclusive with will. Anyway, I don’t suppose Sean will
have any issue with my explanation, as this is entirely consistent with Gordon
Clark’s view 1) that God’s existence is necessary yet by His eternal will and
choice, and 2) that the generation of the Son is voluntary and necessary like
creation (see his chapter on Eternal Generation in The Trinity).
This last remark brings me to
the objection from the other side to my position, viz. my thinking creation is
necessary as well as the Son and Spirit. Whereas Sean thinks I bring the Son
and Spirit down to the level of creation by making the them contingent – a
counter which backfires, as [I would hope] Sean would not say the person[al
property] of the Son is created even though he holds that the person[al
property] of the Son is contingent – the objection here is that I raise the
creation to the level of divinity (see here and here for
examples).
Now, I admit I have perhaps
missed some solution which would resolve the tension between an unnecessary
creation and a seemingly arbitrary God, but if so, I have not encountered it.
It seems easier for me to explain why a necessary creation is not divine than
it is to explain why an unnecessary creation is not arbitrary. As I understand
it, the reason there is an objection to the idea that who the Father is
determines everything He wills is that such means the Son, Spirit and creation
all originate from the Father in the same way. I suspect the argument is
that since “like causes like,” one whose nature is divine must, if He acts
according to a “necessity of nature,” cause another with a divine nature.
But I do not see why this needs
to be the case. The nature or person of the Father may determine His causation
of this possible world as well as the Son and Spirit, but I assert that
creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and,
therefore, could not on my view have willed to] communicate His nature to
creation. Thinking about this question recently, I found myself asking: is
divine nature communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten
and spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and
spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them? If the latter is
possible, then is this not a reasonable answer as to why the necessity of
creation would not imply consubstantiality with its Creator?
Drake responds:
We have already discussed this.
Your use of “unnecessary” is ambiguous. You could mean a necessity of God’s
nature or of a necessity extending from the eternality of his will. (link).
I think you are still stuck in the dialectic between a necessity of nature and
an arbitrarity.
That is, he wants to know, when I speak of “multiple
possible worlds” or of the “necessity” of creation, whether I am speaking with
reference to what is possible and necessary to God according to His nature or
possible and necessary to God according to His will. On Drake's view, that which is necessary according to God’s nature is also necessary according to His will. But that which God wills is not necessarily necessary according to His nature, though there may be some other meaning according to which it may be called necessary, a point I will turn to momentarily. To answer, though, I was
questioning whether there are other possible worlds that God could have
instantiated according to His nature or if this actual world is the only
possible world and, thus, necessary for Him to will as well.
Now, in our last discussion,
Drake agreed that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” But, as I just mentioned, he also
said he doesn’t think that God’s nature determines everything He wills. His nature prescribes the boundaries of what can be willed in all cases, but it does not determine what must be willed in all cases. In that
case, the argument I outline in the above paragraphs is little different than what it
was then:
The divine will is atemporal. We
agree. It’s logically contingent on the divine nature. We agree. The only
problem, as I see it, is that on your position, no answer can be given as to
why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another
“world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. There
must be some other “world” agreeable to the divine nature on your view, or else
this world would have been necessary, a point to which you strenuously object.
I believe last time we established that another such “world” would have been
one in which God didn’t create. That would be, you said, consistent with the
divine nature. Then again, I pointed out it would be mutually exclusive with
this “world” because only in the latter is it true that “God created.”
Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that isn’t relevant because you’ve already agreed that it’s nevertheless logically contingent on the divine nature, a divine nature which, since it doesn’t “direct and regulate” which of the two (or more) “worlds” which are agreeable to it are to be instantiated by the logically contingent divine will, there can never be any answer as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” over against the other which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.
Now, you can say the divine will was eternal or atemporal, but I don’t think that isn’t relevant because you’ve already agreed that it’s nevertheless logically contingent on the divine nature, a divine nature which, since it doesn’t “direct and regulate” which of the two (or more) “worlds” which are agreeable to it are to be instantiated by the logically contingent divine will, there can never be any answer as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” over against the other which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.
Drake replied that “The will is eternal which makes the
question meaningless.” I strongly disagree. My argument is effective as long as
God’s will is logically contingent on His nature. This is exactly what Drake
admits when he says that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.” True,
there is no chronological or temporal lapse between that which is possible for
God to effect by His nature and that which He eternally chooses to effect;
there is, however, a logical priority. Because there is such a priority, the
question is begged as to why, if God could have instantiated some other world or
reality agreeable to His nature, He rather willed to instantiate this one. What
was His reason? Drake replies:
The word “reason” can be
replaced by the word “basis” and as we have discussed many times there are two
of those in God: nature and will. So yes you could ask what was the basis of
his eternal will, and I would respond, the agreeability of his nature.
I am afraid the point has been missed. If I ask what the
basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in
which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to
instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His
nature” doesn’t suffice. For world B would also have been agreeable to His
nature. The arbitrarity objection stands.
Drake does mention that there are two “reasons” or “bases”
in God, but He doesn’t elaborate as to what that means. What does it mean for
God to have a reason according to His nature, how is it distinguished from His
having a reason according to His will, and in what way does his answers to
these questions solve the problem of seeming arbitrariness (i.e. God’s choosing
of world A which is no more or less agreeable to His nature than world B would
have been)? Drake continues:
You think that necessities are
only necessities of nature. I have affirmed that a necessity can also extend
from the eternality of God’s will and thus openly deny that creation is
arbitrary, thus denying any other possible world, while also denying that it is
a necessity of divine nature.
Firstly, I have to wonder what was the point of the previous questions
designed to determine whether I was speaking of necessity “according to nature”
or necessity “according to will” when it is apparent he already knew I was speaking about the former.
More importantly, how is the will of God necessary if it is not
necessitated by His nature? It would seem more precise to say that the will of
God necessitates, not that it is itself necessarily necessitated. This is very important,
because my objection pertains to the latter, not the former. God’s will may be some times be necessitated – such as in the communication of divinity to the Son and Spirit – but it is not always necessitated. But my argument is that the fact that the
will is not always necessitated is why it is sometimes arbitrary. The fact that it
necessitates whatsoever is willed is irrelevant.
As a side point of clarification, the points regarding
man’s heartbeat, the sunrise, and the turn of a balance were related to Samuel
Clarke’s argument that what is necessary is mutually exclusive with what is
willed. I had quoted his argument earlier in my article, which was why I
mentioned it then. Drake does not believe the two are mutually exclusive, so
there is no reason to further pursue this particular line of dialogue.
So much for the responses to my criticisms. Now Drake
offers a few criticisms of his own. Firstly, he thinks that my assertion that
there are not multiple possible worlds agreeable to God’s nature implies “a
conflation of activity, essence and existence. This is ADS.” But this is not an
argument. The Father possesses distinct attributes whether or not creation is
necessary according to His nature, and these divine attributes, while they
determine His activity, are distinct from it. A definition of “existence” will
need to be provided before I can reply further.
In response to my question, “is divine nature
communicated to the Son and Spirit because they are eternally begotten and
spirated, or are the Son and Spirit said to be eternally begotten and spirated
because the divine nature is communicated to them?” Drake replies:
The former. The emanation is the
basis of the communication, in the genus of relation. The latter makes the
emanation arbitrary and ad hoc. WE may have here encountered the Hegelian
Dialectic. In order to avoid an arbitrary God, you are forced to have an
arbitrary God.
I don't particularly like the language of emanation, though I understand what he means: it is the genus of which spiration and begetting are species. Regardless, why does Drake think that “the Son and Spirit [are] said
to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated
to them” suggests arbitrarity? I stated the existences of the Son and Spirit
are necessary in any case, so if everything God wills is to maximize the
manifestation of His glory, and the Father has communicated divinity (and
individuating properties) to two other subjects, the logical conclusion is that
this communication is willed for His glory, which is clearly not ad hoc. There are
too many unexplained gaps for me to be expected to follow these arguments.
His last argument, stated here, explains why he
thinks that it is necessary to maintain that creation is not necessary
according to God’s nature, and this, unless I am mistaken, is supposed to show
why that which is derived by a necessity of nature is that to which the divine
nature is communicated. Essentially, the argument is that if creation is necessary according
to God’s nature, such makes God’s nature dependent on creation, which is pagan.
But dependent in what sense? In my article on Clarke, Drake
made the point – with which I agree – that the property of Fatherhood logically depends on the Son. The Father cannot be the Father unless there is a
Son, which is no problem since the Son has always existed. But this isn’t
pagan, is it? The Son metaphysically depends on the Father, yet the Father too
in some sense depends on the Son. If no deficiency in the Father is implied in
this case, then I do not see why, by way of analogy, it may not be said that
creation is necessary according to God’s nature so long as it is clarified that
any implied dependency doesn’t suggest deficiency. Indeed, creation is from God precisely because God had a reason to create. That this reason is necessary according to His nature rather anticipates any objection that this reason is externally imposed on God. Deficiency is precluded rather than established. God is sufficiently able to effect that which He most strongly desires; the fact that He must do so according to His nature is not because of what creation is but because of who He is. The creation clearly metaphysically depends on the Creator, but it must also be kept in mind that it is the nature of God that determines the nature of creation, not the other way around.
It is rather like epistemology: in epistemology, there
are axioms and theorems. In short, axioms are the set of propositions purported
to be sufficient in order for knowledge to be possible. They are preconditions
for knowledge. Theorems are what can be deduced by means of the axioms. Now,
even though our knowledge-claims regarding theorems depends on our being able
to deduce them from a source – axioms – the knowledge of the axioms will in some
sense depend on the system of theorems they yield. For axioms can be falsified
if two theorems they produce are contradictories.
So on the one hand, just as a theorem cannot be known if it
is not deducible from some given set of axioms, creation cannot exist if it is
not the product of the Creator. The theorems (creation) are determined by the nature of the axioms (God). On the other hand, just as one can use theorems
as one means by which to evidence that a set of axioms is not unsound, creation
is one means by which to evidence that God is divine. Neither of these are sufficient conditions, but both are necessary conditions. But I will not push the analogy
too far.
Finally, none of this implies that the divine nature is
communicated to creation if it is necessary according to God’s nature. That
only follows if it cannot be the case that “the Son and Spirit said to be
eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to
them.” I don’t see that this possibility has been refuted.
UPDATE: Drake and I are continuing this discussion here.
UPDATE: Drake and I are continuing this discussion here.
32 comments:
Cool discussion. I'm not sure what "agreeable to God's nature" means. I'm lost!
It just means that what God wills must be wise, good, etc.
Ok. So I think that all events are certain due to predestination. In a way, TO US they are necessary, but not to God. Maybe that's too simplistic.
I'm just putting my 2 cents in to let you know your blog is being read. Thx!
You're saying God's will necessitates but is not necessitated. My argument is that means God's will is arbitrary. That's the short of it, anyway.
I assume by "arbitrary" you mean without reason? Perhaps that is true, but from a human viewpoint there's always a reason - namely God's will. God's will might not have a reason, though, because He can pretty much do what he wants - I'm in no position to talk back (think Romans 9). But that's doesn't imply he has no mind.
Ephesians 3:8 To me, though I am the very least of all the saints, this grace was given, to preach to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ,
9 and to bring to light for everyone what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all things,
10 so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.
God did not create without reason.
You've shown that God's act of creation has purpose, but there's a difference between a decree and its execution, as in passages like 1 Peter 1:20 "Who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world [the decree] but was manifest in these last times for you [the execution]."
God creates with purpose, but does He choose to create with purpose? It would be to effect His ultimate purpose. I have no theological problem with the ultimate purpose being arbitrary.
Hi Ryan
You said the property of the father is logically dependent on the Son. The property of the Father is self-existant and unbegotteness, these two properties cannot be dependent of anything. To be dependent on anything, a being cannot be self-existant. If they are mutually dependent there is no subordination but coordination, if they are mutually dependent then the Father is not greater than the Son.
My son will not even exist without me, but I exist independently, but only my fatherhood. God is called father because he begat his son, but his very existence is totally independent of anything even his son.
Regards,
Mark
Max,
"God creates with purpose, but does He choose to create with purpose?"
Are you asking if His chosen purpose was itself purposeful or arbitrary? A God who acts on whims is a God whose actions are not the products of wisdom.
Mark,
"The property of the Father is self-existant and unbegotteness, these two properties cannot be dependent of anything."
You are acting as though the Father has but one property. I have updated the post to reflect the distinction. Fatherhood is relational.
"To be dependent on anything, a being cannot be self-existant. If they are mutually dependent there is no subordination but coordination, if they are mutually dependent then the Father is not greater than the Son."
This is no different that the objection than the argument that the need for God to generate the Son somehow implies dependency, as if this need somehow arises from or is in any part the product of something external to the Father. The fact is, one cannot be a Father if one does not have a Son. That's only logical. Nevertheless, the Son is metaphysically dependent on the Father, not the other way around, so I've already distinguished different senses of dependencies which you are now conflating.
"God is called father because he begat his son, but his very existence is totally independent of anything even his son."
I agree, but your admittance of that fact means you think that being able to call God "the Father" is in some way logically dependent on the existence of the eternally generated Son, which was the main point.
Hi Ryan,
Thanks for looking at my response. I posted a reply in the morning, but I accidentally typed in Sean's name in the post so I deleted it.
You said:"That's only logical. Nevertheless, the Son is metaphysically dependent on the Father, not the other way around, so I've already distinguished different senses of dependencies which you are now conflating."
Thanks for pointing out the difference between metaphysical and logical dependency, I did not realize logical dependency is not the same as metaphysical dependency. I agree with the above statement, and I confess I have learned many philosophical terms and knowledge from you and Drake, which has been very helpful to me, focusing most of my effort and time in bible commentary other than systematic theology.
Three questions I would like to get your clarification:
1. Can you explain what is the difference between logical dependency and metaphysical dependency?
2. God as a father is logically dependent upon the Son, so God as a creator is logically dependent upon the creature.
3. Seeing the property of God is almightiness, unbegoteness and self-existance, I don't see how it be possible for Self-existance to be logically dependent upon anything other than himself. (This is my original argument).
Thanks,
Mark
1. Can you explain what is the difference between logical dependency and metaphysical dependency?
It is the difference between epistemology and ontology. Creation is not only ontologically dependent God as Creator, what it is knowable about it is also dependent on who God is. It is not the ideas of creation which determine God's nature, so to speak, although creation can be used as a lens through which we are able to eliminate possible causes (i.e. every other cause but God, a fact due to who God is).
2. God as a father is logically dependent upon the Son, so God as a creator is logically dependent upon the creature.
This isn't a question, so I don't know how I am supposed to respond. I would agree that God is only creator if He has created just as I would agree God is only Father if He has a Son, if that's what you mean.
3. Seeing the property of God is almightiness, unbegoteness and self-existance, I don't see how it be possible for Self-existance to be logically dependent upon anything other than himself. (This is my original argument).
Those aren't the only properties of the Father, though I have no qualms with the contention that the Father's nature is of Himself.
"Are you asking if His chosen purpose was itself purposeful or arbitrary? A God who acts on whims is a God whose actions are not the products of wisdom."
It seems that His ultimate purpose, which was His glory, is arbitrary. All other decrees have the purpose of getting him the glory. I don't think that conflicts with God being all-wise.
Are you saying that from God's arbitrary decree to glorify Himself, everything else - creation et. al. - follows? If so, does that mean you think God's goodness, righteousness, etc. are concepts unrelated to His glory? It would seem you would have to think that, or else you would be saying that God's goodness or righteousness is arbitrary. But I would object to the disassociation of God's goodness and righteousness to His glory (link).
"Are you saying that from God's arbitrary decree to glorify Himself, everything else - creation et. al. - follows?"
Yes
"If so, does that mean you think God's goodness, righteousness, etc. are concepts unrelated to His glory? It would seem you would have to think that, or else you would be saying that God's goodness or righteousness is arbitrary."
He would still be good and righteous if he didn't decree His glory. I don't see how the attributes of righteousness would be arbitrary, since He never was without them.
"But I would object to the disassociation of God's goodness and righteousness to His glory (link)."
Well, Piper's comments are quite wordy; I would just say that Paul's argument is that God is good no matter what He does, because He's God. Thx for the responses
//He would still be good and righteous if he didn't decree His glory.//
Then what I said is true: that you think God would be good or righteous even if He did not intend to glorify Himself as the teleological end of all things means that your concept of what is good or righteous is unrelated to His glory.
//Well, Piper's comments are quite wordy; I would just say that Paul's argument is that God is good no matter what He does, because He's God.//
Much of that is my summarization of the book Piper wrote on Romans 9. I think it pretty definitively establishes that God's righteousness is tied to the upholding of His glory (cf. Romans 3:23-26).
Ok, so I don't know if the association between God's righteousness and glory is necessary. I think it's accidental.
Then nominalism follows, because righteousness loses any intrinsic meaning.
"Then nominalism follows, because righteousness loses any intrinsic meaning."
Could you define nominalism for me, and how does righteousness lose its meaning?
What I mean is that the idea that relationship between righteousness and God's glory is "accidental" means it's not "essential." Thus, the fact there is a relationship between the two does not mean the relationship is necessary, in which case God could have been righteous even if He teleologically acted contrary to His glory. This is nominalism-voluntarism in which character and actions are said to be "good" or "righteous" because God says they are rather than because they reflect His nature and character.
One implication of this is that we can't even trust God, because rather than its being the case that it is impossible for Him to lie, God could decide it is good for Him to lie, at least in certain circumstances.
"What I mean is that the idea that relationship between righteousness and God's glory is "accidental" means it's not "essential." Thus, the fact there is a relationship between the two does not mean the relationship is necessary, in which case God could have been righteous even if He teleologically acted contrary to His glory. This is nominalism-voluntarism in which character and actions are said to be "good" or "righteous" because God says they are rather than because they reflect His nature and character."
Define "acted contrary to His glory." I still do not follow the argument. God can command things to specific individuals, and not to others (and that would be the right thing to do - even telling Abraham to kill his son). Does that make God a nominalist?
"One implication of this is that we can't even trust God, because rather than its being the case that it is impossible for Him to lie, God could decide it is good for Him to lie, at least in certain circumstances."
Hebrews 6:18 does say it's impossible for God to lie, so that's a strong affirmation that God necessarily tells the truth. So at least one of his actions is regulated by his nature.
//Define "acted contrary to His glory."//
Earlier, you said: "He would still be good and righteous if he didn't decree His glory." My statement is meant to reflect this sentiment of yours, whatever it means.
//I still do not follow the argument. God can command things to specific individuals, and not to others (and that would be the right thing to do - even telling Abraham to kill his son). Does that make God a nominalist?//
No, because I argue that in every case God had the same underlying reason for those commandments; indeed, a necessary reason: the manifestation of His glory.
//Hebrews 6:18 does say it's impossible for God to lie, so that's a strong affirmation that God necessarily tells the truth. So at least one of his actions is regulated by his nature.//
The point is that you can't appeal to that passage if the meaning of goodness or righteousness is contingent on the arbitrary will of God. You said the relationship between righteousness and God's glory isn't essential. It could have been otherwise. Thus, righteousness is whatever God says is righteous. Why, then, can we not suppose that God could arbitrarily decide lying is righteous?
The passage in Hebrews is a reductio against your whole position. The point is that God's righteousness is not only accidentally related to that which actually determines whether God is righteous - viz. character disposed and actions intended to the manifestation of His glory - the relationship is necessary and essential. But then God's decree to manifest His glory isn't arbitrary after all but rather grounded in His attributes.
I think I can escape the difficulty by just saying some things are arbitrary and some aren't!
Is God's decision to speak truth arbitrary or not? If God's righteousness is arbitrarily related to His will, how could it be non-arbitrary? Or, if arbitrary, how can God be trustworthy?
"Is God's decision to speak truth arbitrary or not? If God's righteousness is arbitrarily related to His will, how could it be non-arbitrary? Or, if arbitrary, how can God be trustworthy?"
Well, God's decision to speak is arbitrary, I guess, because to the Jews "were entrusted the oracles of God," not others. But when God speaks, He speaks truth. I think He arbitrarily decides who He will speak to, but I'm unsure.
Ok so you've convinced me that when God speaks, He necessarily speaks truth, but I think Shelton might still be right...
If God is essentially good and righteous, and if these concepts are necessarily related to God's glory, then how can God's decree to glorify Himself be arbitrary?
Ok, so maybe you're right. But is creation a necessary way for God to glorify himself? I don't think so...
Again, God created all things so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.
How does that imply creation was necessary?
If there is no creation, there is no church through which the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.
So you are saying that God's decree to display wisdom through the church was necessary? Because it shows his glory?
Yes. I fundamentally disagree with the idea that anything God does can be arbitrary. I'll work on better articulating why I think this in the future.
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